SPEC PRO SEP 18 DINGLASAN

7. Petition for Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw

FACTS:

Petitioner , Consuelo Cors claimed that she was married to Nicolai Szatraw, a polish citizen and that they
were married in Manila in 1936. They had a son named Alexis Szatraw, who was born on September 8,
1937. That sometime February 1940, her husband, in the pretext that he would call on some friends left
their house carrying their son with him, never came back.

She claimed that she exhausted all her efforts in finding out their whereabouts but all her efforts were in
vain. And since it had been seven years that her husband had been absent, she believed that he was
dead. In her petition she prayed that , her husband be declared dead and her parental authority over
her son, in the event the latter reappears, be preserved.

ISSUE: WON a judicial declaration of presumption of death may attain finality.

HELD:

NO. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead,
because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.

15. Pereira vs CA

Special Proceedings; Administration of Estate; The determination of what properties should be included
in the inventory is within the competence of the probate court, but such determination is merely
provisional, subject to a final decision in a separate action which may be brought by the parties.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as
this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of
the property involved from the estate of the deceased. The resolution of this issue is better left to the
probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best
position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the
decedents estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.
The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
court. However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.

Same; Same; Appointment of Administrator; Judicial administration and appointment of an

administrator are superfluous when a deceased died without debts.It should be noted that recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good
reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations
to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by
the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of
an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Where the claims of the heirs of the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple
partition proceedings, judicial administration of estate is unnecessary.The only conceivable reason why
private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged
properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a
compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To
subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since
the only real property left has been extra-judicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances
of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any
event. We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending
was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate
of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
Pereira vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:]

FACTS:

1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away without a will

a. Survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas
Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.

2. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.

a. REASONS:
 i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased

ii. deceased left no will

iii. there are no creditors of the deceased

iv. deceased left several properties

v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as
such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.

b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.

c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate

3. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate

ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without
leaving any debts?

HELD:

1. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator

a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

2. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .

3. what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased
when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances
of each case.

a. questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs)
may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property
is in the hands of one heir.

b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to
ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
 achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.

c. to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings

23. VDA DE REYES VS CA

Civil Procedure; Appeals; Exception to conclusiveness of trial courts findings.What comes out
prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court. We find none. The
reversal of the trial courts decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual
conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not
bound to agree to such conclusions.

Special Proceedings; Summary settlement of estates; Extrajudicial partition.The Court of Appeals

correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1963, although oral, was valid
and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. In Hernandez
vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are
no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent
for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid.

Same; Same; Same; Co-ownership.Even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed
in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon
the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectares parcel of
land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The estate
of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly
dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is
eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

Same; Same; Same; Rights of successors-in-interest.Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of

Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them
upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in
1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does
not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, it is but a confirmation or
ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the
mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the
deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of
Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non
habet. Vda. de Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

FACTS:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less,
located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of
the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of his property.

In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir.
It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to
Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children
thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.

In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for
the whole property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of
Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this
fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square
meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the
vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed
of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.

In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally
partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael
Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have
been received by his father.

Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as
shown by the torrens title over the land.

Gardiolas defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not
have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.

The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the
Gavinos children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?

Held:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,
although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing
to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from
which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the
reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among
heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for
the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation
or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and
receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly
sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for some
reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in
1921, his heirs automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the
succession. are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent,26 The estate of the decedent
would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his
share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually
allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share
in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually
adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in
the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire
that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot
No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never
became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court
stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus,
since he never had any title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not
improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any
title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give them
what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest,
Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot
to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the owner.
ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by
petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that
they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private
respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf
(13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the
original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for
the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within
four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael
Reyes, Jr.

31. ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS CARREO

JUDGMENTS, REOPENING OF; WlTHDRAWAL OF ONE PARTY DOES NOT PREJUDICE OTHERS.In an
action to reopen previous proceedings, where the movant applied (1) for recognition of her grandson as
natural child, (2) for appointment as guardian ad litem for both the grandson and the three other
legitimate children of her deceased son, and (3) for annulment of an order adjudicating the properties to
the widow and her three minor children,the court may continue the hearing, even after the natural
child had withdrawn.

2.ID. ; ID. ; TIME WITHIN WHICH MINORS MAY ASK REOPENING OF THE CASE.Where the original order
granting the widow onehalf of the property left by her deceased husband was entirely erroneous, and
she failed to protect her children's rights, said children may ask for reopening within one year after
reaching majority.

3.SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES.In a summary settlement of estates, when there is no question

that the realty belonged to the decedent, the Court of First Instance acting as probate court may act on a
petition for annulment of a mortgage and sale of the properties. Estate of Francisco vs. Carreon, et al.,
95 Phil. 237, No. L-5033 June 28, 1954

FACTS:

In September 1947, Rosa Francisco filed a petition incourt for the settelement of the estate of her
deceased husband, Jose Francisco, who died in 1944. She claimed under oath that she was the lawful
wife and that they had 3 minor children. She further stated that her husband left a parcel of land with a
house and that he had no creditors. She asked to be the usufructuary of the undivided share of her
children. She also prayed to be declared as the guardian ad litem of her children. Her prayers were
granted in due course.

After the required publication, petition was heard and approved in November 1947. The court order was
registered with the Register of Deeds which issued thereafter, the new certificate of title in the names of
the heirs in the proportion of one-half undivided share to the widow, and the other half in equal parts,
to the said children.

In August 1948, Rosa mortgaged her pro indiviso share to sister Fausta nad Catalina Carreon for
P13,000. The mortgage was registered as well with the RD. In January 1950, Rosa conveyed a Deed of
absolute Sale for the same, which was likewise inscribed with the Register of Deeds.
In March 1950, the mother of the deceased , Tiburcia Magsalin Vda de Francisco filed a motion in
representation of a seventeen year old minor, Jose Francisco, alleging that the minor was a recognized
natural son of the deceased and who was deprived of his legitimate share in the estate due to the
concealment of Rosa. Tiburcia prayed specifically for the following remedies:

(a) Her appointment as guardian ad item of Jose Francisco y Palumpon; (b) her appointment as
guardian ad item of the three legitimate children Jose, Thelma and Aurelio, in place of Rosa Aldana
Francisco; (c) declaration that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was a recognized natural child of the deceased
with the right to inherit; (d) annulment of the order of November 29, 1947, with the adjudication that
the only heirs of the deceased are the four children already named, the widow being entitled to usufruct
only; (e) annulment of the mortgage and sale executed by Rosa Aldana Francisco in favor of the Carreon
sisters; and (f) appropriate instruction to the Register of Deeds.

Oppositions to the motion were presented by Rosa Aldana Francisco and by the two sisters Fausta and
Catalina Carreon.

The biological mother of jose Francisco asked for the dismissal of the recognition of Jose, but without
prejudice.

Th trail court held that the realty was private property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had
acquired it four years before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it revoked the order of November
29, 1947; it held that the whole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the
deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the widow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed
by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued other appropriate instructions to the
Register of Deeds.

Rosa Aldana acquiesced in the resolution. Not the Carreon sisters, who appealed in due time, asserting
the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for reopening, even after the natural child had
withdrawn from the litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale,
which it could validly consider as a probate court.

ISSUE: WON the mortgage/sale to the Carreon Sisters should be annulled.

HELD: Yes,

Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for readjustment or reopening could
take place only within two years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate
of title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of section 5, Rule
74. As the trial judge correctly observed:

But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the encumbrance annotated; and while it
referred to Rule 74, Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section 4, Rule 74
was therein noted should have been sufficient warning to them that the title was subject to the interest
of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicial notice of the fact that in the adjudication in
summary settlements more often that not, the order merely says that the sale shall be subject to the
provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can not foresee whether the movant
would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the
provisions of Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was subject to the
provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk
of interferring with the rights of minors as provided under section 5, Rule 74.

39. VASQUEZ VS CA

55. BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango
dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia
twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencias
nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as
his own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with
Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of
Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC
of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzos petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the
petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being mangulyan or forgetful making
her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that
Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners
prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she
was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went
up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant
its allowance for probate.
HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the
same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: To
be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act.

63. PECSON VS CORONEL

In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and appellee, vs. AGUSTIN
CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.;

FACTS: On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her
niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following
grounds: First, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate
by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to
extraneous illegal influence.

ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.

HELD: YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose
of ones estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code
in force in the Philippines since 1989.

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives,
nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution
of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
 In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his
property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon
his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is
unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as
injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. X X X (40 Cyc., 1079.)

71. URIARTE V. CFI OF NEGROS

Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE estate
of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special
administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while he was
in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his
recognition as a natural child not yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate
of the will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed, contending that Negros courts already
had exclusive jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special proceeding, and the Manila
court proceeded to probate the will. Petitioner contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a
non-resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the proceedings. But since
probate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if
the venue was improper, petitioner considered to have waived the defect by laches. Lastly, the court
held that if ever recognized as the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the
probate proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.

Facts:

Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros

The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition for settlement of
INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time,
the proceedings for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was still
pending

PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB failed to qualify

OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan):

Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated - submitted before Negros court

ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable

JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced SPECPRO for PROBATE OF
LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts

Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros Courts

Vicente had no legal personality to sue

 OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the same

NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it

VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal of petition
for probate + annulment of proceedings DENIED

Manila court admitted to probate the last will

Issue: W/N NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT?

Ruling: NO.

Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the courts in the
province s where he left property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate

Here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros

Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court special
proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and
turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.

If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy

VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID

He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have filed a MTD in
Manila court earlier: Manila court already

*appointed an administrator

*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier

Court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction

As to interest of Vicente in the case

Two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the
deceased parent:

(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and

(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.