LEGITIME AND COLLATION

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO
ROSALES, respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether
the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu
City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the
dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the
following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox

Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea.
Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow (surviving spouse)
an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow
from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those
who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as
in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for
in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and
if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law
either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code
which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

 The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had
occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim.
A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that
of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales
that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article
981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil
Code, viz

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom
the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the
same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate
or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second
question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his
or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and
LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.

Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.

Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of
partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived
by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-
appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.
Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson,
Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00
(except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00)
among her above-named heirs.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and
testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera
was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters
testamentary were duly issued to her.

After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was
appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal
and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (/7 of the
half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her
six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by
the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80

2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01

The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as
follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and
Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;

(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will,
plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the
other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less
the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number
2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.<re||an1w>

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February
14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half () of
the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of
the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate,
the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are
adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated
the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et
al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of
practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts
set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78

while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-
appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their
respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles
906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the
two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from
which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the
oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791
of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her
own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With
reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of
the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired
legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with
the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and
valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the
following issues: .

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable
to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;

2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of
some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul
of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791
thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59
of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's
decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must
be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds
for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a
partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last
will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is
my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter
following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her
seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator
to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus
provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated
the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the
cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant,
Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more
than their respective legitimes.

2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code
which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision
was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his
estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative
commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a
clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect.
Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition
proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made
by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-
half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by
intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run
counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir
the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro
Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other
compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made
by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was
being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law,
became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors,
subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell
the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the
present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of
devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or
distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the
equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and
that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the
legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or
of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free
portion." 16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties
to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the
disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated
use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert
the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore,
the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs
and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of
the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her
testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any
of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law
enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was
favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a
legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to
collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and
invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this
article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a
distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely
some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.

5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise
necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally
to the executrix-appellee.

Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate
instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will,
by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries,
principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the
commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence,
there cannot be said to be any question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or
that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing
value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly,
the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be
a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There
is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum
of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect
the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the
cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper
adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give
effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors
would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas
they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and
when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died
intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due
time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties
earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute
regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation.
The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her
part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation
and the donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should
be reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the decedent, when
she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not
impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was
imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the deed of
donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated
property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si

BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang
ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa
 kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang
lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng
mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at
sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang
ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the
collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was
prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being
made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The
suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to
collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the
appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of
the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to
decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the
1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for
the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies
and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO,
SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN
ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE
JAUCIAN, respondents.

Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.

Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose
Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought. in
these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a
second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment
thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their
memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides
the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:

The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He
owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death,
his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter,
Magdalena Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose,
Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and
the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his
marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which
she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other
properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union,1 which however was not blessed with children.

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano
inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano
Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir
of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties,
after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to
her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was
probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding
was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for
approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the
deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34
to 42 are conjugal." 7

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the
last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him
custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted
her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and,
more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio,
Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years,
Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties
which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000

Jose R. Locsin

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -

Aurea Locsin

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio

Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)

24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000

in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
Maquiniana

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000

favor of Ireneo Mamia

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750

favor of Zenaida Buiza

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Felisa Morjella

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Casimiro Mondevil

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200

favor of Juan Saballa

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500

of Rogelio Marticio

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she
had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all
the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised
to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except
some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had
already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin
defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who
withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina
Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and
Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
 (2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other
instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not
limited to those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and
void ab-initio;

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title
and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all
such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina,
with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be
effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for
the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from
the filing, of this case

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the
amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

Costs against the defendants.9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed
judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.

The petition has merit and should be granted.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of
Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than
ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa
Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at
the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained
in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all,
treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees
are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the properties she
had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of
the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not
pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise
restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil
Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
 Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced
on petition of any person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6,
1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced
and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties
which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already begun transferring
to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m.
lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before
she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year,
or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin.15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian
and Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from
assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and
Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in
favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975.18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent when she
made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she
was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in
favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death)
one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of
the same lot to Julian Locsin.19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons,
namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro
Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private
respondents.

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea
Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance to
Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property
to Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness
of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had
inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that
"items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the
time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the
marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath,
and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It
was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would
not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since
he stood to inherit from her eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his
wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to
their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa
Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces,
those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena
Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands,
Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property
which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their
desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the
conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been
well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to
make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother,
Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the
titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by
her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November
19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde
Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed
by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is
married to another niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15,
1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions
could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this
action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the
transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years
after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property,28 whether considered an action based
on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign
ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them
and the whole world.29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of
contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of
Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 136773 June 25, 2003

MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO MANONGSONG, Petitioners,

vs.
FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ,
RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ,
JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the Resolution of 21
December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision
dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685,
partitioning the property in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.

Antecedent Facts

Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez;
(2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna
Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda
Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of
respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
("Manongsong").

The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila with an
area of approximately 152 square meters ("Property"). The records do not show that the Property is registered
under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as
bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose
Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias
on 30 September 1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al".4 However, the improvements on the portion of the
Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the name
of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.5

Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992, alleging that Manongsong
and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code, 7 petitioners
prayed for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing
market value, and for damages.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarras death, her children
inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs
of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth
of the Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share in the Property
by right of representation.

There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras children and their offspring,
have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied by each
respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only
descendants not occupying any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo
("Ortiz family"), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and
Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela Cruz family"), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under
the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 ("Agreement"), petitioners and
the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property.
The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and prayed
further that "those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have less and
those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion."9

Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50 square meter portions
of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters
actively opposed petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"),
supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.

The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 91111 for the year 1949 in the sole name of
Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters,
located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I.
Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax
Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as
improvements.

The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA 12 ("Kasulatan") dated 11
October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:

AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS PIAS, ay siyang
nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa
anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:

BOUNDARIES:

NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,

na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.

NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (250.00), SALAPING
PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino,
may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap
ng nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa
nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang
nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang
kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.

Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA
LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the "KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty.
Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx." 13 The certification further
stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for more than thirty
years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners
were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier,
either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead,
petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court
held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:

It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to defendants Jumaquios, it
pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina
Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff
Milagros Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is
however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly
notarized public document (Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn
the documents legality or its validity.

xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a
conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The
name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at
the time the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have
the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is
entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or
the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children
including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The
same Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs
cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for instance
disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the dispositive portion
of the trial courts decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the
remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:

1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately partitioned
giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the
prevailing market value on the date of the decision;

2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of 10,000.00 as compensatory damages for having deprived
the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;

3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum of 10,000.00; and

4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)

When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a supposed
photocopy of the death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana
Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina
Navarro only by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona
Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the
genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.

The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented by petitioners
on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in evidence.

The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that Navarro was the original
owner of the Property, as follows:

Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro and not Juliana
Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-
appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:

"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter
by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.

which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is the admitted history,
facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-
ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx."

The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:

"x x x xxx xxx

With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of the heirs with one
another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned,
however, it must be noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory
heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx xxx xxx"

Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro was their common
ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was conjugal in nature
when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:

However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs to
the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership.

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired by
Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx

The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported by any evidence.

To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation purposes under the
name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one
is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are
concerned.

Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 21
December 1998.19

On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to this Court. The Court
initially denied the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to
the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000.20

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY

ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;

2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;

3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;

4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;

5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;

6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21

The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of
evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to
this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict,
this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. 22 This is
precisely the situation in this case.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of
proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa

Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the
Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege
that the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest
in the Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to
establish their case by preponderance of evidence.

To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the testimonies
of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA
which controverted petitioners claim of co-ownership.

The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 24 Otherwise the
authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity." 26

Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be
authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished
by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.27

Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was conjugal at the time
Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property
was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only
when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage
is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 28

There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. There is
no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary,
Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros
name.29 This tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.

We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous
title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for
valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, 30 that is, the
property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.1wphi1

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the
minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. 31 The presence of these
elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for 250.00.32

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners for the first time on
appeal

We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of
Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their
appellees brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For
reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as
required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.33 To admit these documents now is contrary to due
process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.

Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarros ownership of the
Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not
personally acquainted with her.34 Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro
was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that
Navarro did not own the Property.

Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied
before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that
this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.35

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners case. Absent any
hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to
Guevarra, and then to the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis
for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not
undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on
inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and
convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
the Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for
partition of the Property.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the
complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003]

SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and
NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD
JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and
FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES
TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO
ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and
SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] to annul the Decision[2] dated 26 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[3]dated 18 February 1993 rendered by
Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court) in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed
the case after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the plaintiffs
did not have a cause of action against the defendants.

The Facts

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora,
Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding
certificates of title issued in their names, to wit:
 1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 11
July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration of P6,000.00 (Exh. C),
pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. C-1);
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 7
June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. D),
pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name (Exh. D-1);
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12
May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration
of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh. E), pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. E-1);
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12
May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration
of P[54,3]00.00 (Exh. F), pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. F-1); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed
on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. G),
pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. G-1).
[6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 7
October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. K), pursuant to
which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name (Exh. K-1).]

In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver:

- XX-

The deeds of sale, Annexes C, D, E, F, and G, [and K] are simulated as they are, are NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO because

a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the properties in litis;

b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds,
the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing
therein;

c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and
vendees); and

d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy
designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

- XXI -

Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T-172, S-109772,
155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litisxxx are NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO.

Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them as well as the
requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with
sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of
the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual
and legal basis.[4] (Emphasis in the original)

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses Gavino Joaquin
and Lea Asis.[5] Instead of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion
to Dismiss.[6] In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that compulsory heirs
have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only from the moment of death
of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. [7]
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The trial court stated:

In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will show that the Deeds of
Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of
plaintiffs.

And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against defendants since there
can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In
determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908
of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the
decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.

In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the counterclaim is likewise
DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court ruled:

To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case, which is, whether xxx
they have a cause of action against appellees.

Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers and sisters, are
compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their
parents. However, their right to the properties of their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely
inchoate and vests only upon the latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their
properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do they claim to be
creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to
assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the
true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA
376, thus:

The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily bound thereby;
hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.

Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the dispositions made
by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a
quo, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs
therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-appellants is
inconsequential.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION
HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT THERE
WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT
EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS PART
AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE
CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR
INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD,
SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[10]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale before discussing
the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
 Whether Petitioners have a legal interest
over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the
purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the
rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime. Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale
declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent parents. If their parents die
still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary
succession.[11]
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale,
but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and appellate courts should have dismissed
the action for this reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.[12]

[T]he question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who would be benefitted or injured by the
judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

xxx

In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the
agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even
though they did not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.

These are parties with a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase present substantial interest more concretely is
meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to
recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected
in a payment to or recovery by him.[13]

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate
court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness
to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not
affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate.

Whether the Deeds of Sale are void

for lack of consideration

Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to
their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a contract of
sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the
minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the
breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid
but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price
stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. [14] Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the
price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price
has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the
contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents
the existence of a valid contract.[15]
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To prove simulation,
petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin,
told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase
price.[16] The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners failure to
prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings financial
capacity to buy the questioned lots.[17] On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as
evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the purchase price,
but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have
also fully paid the price to their respondent father.[18]

Whether the Deeds of Sale are void

for gross inadequacy of price

Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate the
Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a
contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in
the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which
would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the
exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value
of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:[19]

Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise
investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute
themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has
been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do
foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they
have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition,
a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are
authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
 Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry greater weight
when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again
unless there has been a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly
erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[20] In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots
were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in
their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a factual finding
that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA
P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia
P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.2

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of
the Makati RTC.3

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that
it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of
determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid
in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation
following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:5

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:

1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of
Angel N. Pascual;

2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;

3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110
Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:

a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and
1/3 share in the rental income thereon;

b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal
Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;

c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by
OCT No. P-2159;

d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following Certificate Numbers:
A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096,
C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239,
S40128, S58308, S69309;

e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following Certificate Numbers:
S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;

f. share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona Arellano;

i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889, Register
of Deeds of Makati City;

j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on
November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties covered by TCT
Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by
OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of their share
have been equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the
value of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P.
 Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to
equalize the shares, then Franciscos and Miguels shares may be satisfied from either in cash
property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that

. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE

ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.

II

. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF

THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

III

. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR.
AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.

xxxx

and

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring supplied)

By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal "partly meritorious." It sustained
the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:

Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division, We hold that
the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be
considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such
immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net
hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said property as
forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner "was able to
submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the
inventory submitted by the administrator."

Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-
5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate
Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are
concerned.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions
herein.9 (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution 11 of
October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court
its ruling

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.

II

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE

1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

III

. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N.

PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.

IV

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and
whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.

On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the
value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.13

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. 14

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and
the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. 15

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was
only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory
heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary
compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only
in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs.
The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory
heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all
his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of
the estate.19There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

On the second issue:

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives,
herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(underscoring supplied)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property
donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court,
which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms
part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

SO ORDERED.

ROLANDO SANTOS, G.R. No. 154942

Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 16, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated March 7, 2002 and Resolution dated July 24, 2002 of the Court of

Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 40728.

A brief narration of the factual antecedents follows:

Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-blood siblings both

asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot located at 1339-B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was

registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of the

Registry of Deeds of Manila. He died intestate on March 10, 1986.

During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner which the latter accepted

on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation (Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari) was annotated on Gregorios title.

On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute Sale.

On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278 in Gregorios name was

cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioners name.

On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia Santos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch

15, a complaint for partition and reconveyance against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father

Gregorio denied having sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation

is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime.

In his answer, petitioner countered that respondents suit is barred by prescription considering that she is

aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold
to him by his father, hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime.
 The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered

in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly

executed by the parties and registered.

The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the donation to petitioner is

inofficious because it impaired respondents legitime.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Deed

of Donation inofficious insofar as it impair the legitime of the plaintiff which is the of the subject
property.

The Registry of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the entry in TCT No. 14278
of the Deed of Donation dated January 16, 1978 and to cancel TCT No. 144706 issued based
on said entry.

The parties are enjoined to institute the proper action for the settlement of the Estate of
Gregorio Santos and for the eventual partition of the estate.[2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision, holding that:
There are in the instant case two documents by which the subject property was
purportedly transferred to the defendant a deed of donation and a deed of sale.

xxx

There can, therefore, be no way by which the appellant may successfully convince
us that Gregorio Santos sold the property in dispute to him and such sale can bind the
appellee so as to remove the case from the realm of the law on donations.

Moreover, as aptly put by the trial court:

In general one who has disposed his property would not and could not
have disposed the same again unless the previous act was rendered invalid or
ineffective.

The validity of the Deed of Donation was never assailed by the

defendant. In fact, it was impliedly recognized as valid by defendant by
registering the same to the Registry of Deeds.

It is the honest belief of this Court, given the circumstances, i.e., the
existence of the vendor and the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
registration of the Deed of Donation despite the supposed previous execution of
 (the) Deed of Absolute Sale, that there was no valid deed of sale executed
and that the true and real agreement between Gregorio Santos and Rolando
Santos was that of a donation.

Furthermore, considering that defendant himself registered the Deed of

Donation, he cannot now close his eyes and deny the existence of the same by
alleging that there had been a deed of sale executed previously. (Appealed
Decision, supra, at pp. 238-239)

xxx

While a person may dispose of his property by donation, there is a limitation to the same.
The law provides that no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give
or receive by will, and any donation which may exceed the foregoing is considered inofficious. x
x x The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation. (Article 752, Civil
Code) The said donation may correspondingly be reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that
may be freely disposed of by will (ART. 761).

xxx

It has been undisputedly shown that the subject property was the only property of the
deceased Gregorio Santos at the time of his death on March 10, 1986 (Exhibit K, Original Record,
p. 163); and that he made no reservation for the legitime of the plaintiff-appellee, his daughter
(See paragraph 2, Complaint and paragraph 2, Answer, Ibid., at pp 1 and 12) and compulsory
heir. Clearly, the rule on officiousness applies. x x x

xxx

Defendant-appellant finally argues that since plaintiff-appellee knew of the donation

since 1978, while the donor Gregorio Santos was still alive, her assailing the said donation only
on January 11, 1991 or thirteen years after, has effectively barred her from instituting the present
action. The foregoing is apparently groundless and without merit.

The inofficiousness of a donation cannot be determined until after the death of the donor
because prior to his death, the value of his estate cannot be determined or computed.
Determination of the value of the deceaseds estate will require the collation of all properties or
rights, donated or conveyed by gratuitous title to the compulsory heirs in order that they may be
included in the computation for the determination of the legitime of each heir and for the account
of partition (Art. 1061, Civil Code).[3]

Hence, the instant petition.

The findings of the courts below that (1) Gregorio donated to petitioner the subject lot; (2) the Deed of

Absolute Sale is void; and (3) Gregorios only property is the said lot are all

factual in nature which are not within the domain of this Court for it is not a trier of facts.[4] Basic is it that findings
of fact by the trial court, especially when affirmed on appeal, as in this case, are conclusive and binding upon this

Court. [5]

The issues which involve questions of law are: (1) whether the donation is inofficious; and (2) whether

the respondents action has prescribed.

I. Whether the donation is inofficious.

It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this

limitation no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by

will. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals,[6] we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor

as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased.

At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell the lot to petitioner. He

donated it. The trial court also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs

respondents legitime; that at the time of Gregorios death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy

he donated to petitioner; and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter

and compulsory heir. These findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly,

by donating the entire lot to petitioner, we agree with both lower courts that Gregorios donation is inofficious as it

deprives respondent of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the

hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit

the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.

II. Whether respondents suit is barred by prescription.

In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals,[7] we held that donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the

allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for

which reason, we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the

obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code,[8] to the extent that they

impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs. Lagua,[9] involving the reduction, for

inofficiousness, of a donation propter nuptias, we held that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon

the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on

which basis, the legitimes may be determined.

Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had until 1996 within which to file the action.

Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 40728 are hereby AFFIRMED,with modification in the sense that the subject deed of donation

being inofficious, one half (1/2) of the lot covered by TCT No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila is awarded

to Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, the same being her legitime. The remaining one-half (1/2) shall be

retained by petitioner, Rolando Santos, as his legitime and by virtue of the donation.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120,
Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and
Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-
Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon,
and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent.Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow,
Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at
Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na
Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property
was issued to Estrellita.[2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria
Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the
proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela
and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings
of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.[4] Accordingly,
Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and
Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael
and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita
and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits,
a car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses
in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement
gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except
Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty
percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were also given to petitioner with
Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate
proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be
appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad
litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private respondent Ramon filed an
opposition[9]dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three
weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition[10] alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela
property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome
murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution
made by deceased Rafael to his children,[11] Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G.
Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children
by Rafael during his lifetime.[12] Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita. [13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and
Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order
did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs. [14] Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of
properties to be included in the estate.[15]Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge and
permission.[16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days x x x within which
to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to
file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita
de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC
noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. [17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a
motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that
the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
be collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which
pertinently reads as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering the
comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.[19]

xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed. [20] On August
12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxxxxxxxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of
having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters
ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family
for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two
daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late
Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business,
canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to
indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a
valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21] (Underscoring added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of
December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals[22] denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly
adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate
of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).[23] Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
 The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent Court of Appeals
sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque
property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of
collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the
inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. [24] Collation is only required of compulsory
heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous
title during the lifetime of the decedent.[25] The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or
predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in
advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the
absence of any expression to the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value
of such property at the time it was donated,[27] the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for
the account of the heir or donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as
respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner,
a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they
exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the
manner and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is
considered a third person or a stranger.[29] As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding,[30] which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which
may or may not be included in the estate proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is
subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the case at bench, however, we note that the
probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of
the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between
the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties,
as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These
issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:

x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings
has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership
or existence of the right or credit.[34]

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records
indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that
the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling
in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article 1035[35] of
the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants
were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which they are
entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless,
made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to
Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired
by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason
thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis. [36] The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate,
however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier
Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is
now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of
collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to
herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property
is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to
his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael,
in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir [38] in
the Paraaque property.
 Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be
brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited
from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. [39] Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has
long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves
no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE

LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO,
VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.

Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN,
DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different
from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of
land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioners deceased father. Marcelo Suarez,
whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en
masse to private respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of
Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles law library

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of
several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of
contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of
about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five
(5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000.
Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1,
1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2
against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for
the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein,
they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held
liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold
on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the
properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for
Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them
and further informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No.
51203), which motion however, was denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents from
transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-
owned by petitioners.

On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for
failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig.

On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for
failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding
petitioners pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the
said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was later denied.

On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista
Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owners duplicate
copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.

Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch
151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.

On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5 dated
September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and
directed the issuance of alias summons.chanrobles law library : red

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated February 25, 1985, 7
May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge
to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985,
May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent
Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private respondents and the
developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the
trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly
selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should
have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion
equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that
of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own
right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28,
1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.chanrobles law library

SO ORDERED.

PRETERITION CASES
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.

Ozamiz & Capistrano for petitioners.

Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner & Laput for respondents.

MORAN, J.:

Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six children named
Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five
children named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage,
died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez,
and was survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda.
In Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his children by
the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already received their
corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found,
contrary to what the testator had declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties
during the existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to the two-
thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be
reviewed in this petition for certiorari.

The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the foregoing facts, the omission of the children of the first
marriage annuls the institution of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the
will may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the testator may dispose of as
legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment, to said children of the second
marriage.

The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code, which read in part as follows:

Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
is not proven, ... shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited;
but the legacies, betterments, and other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no encroach
upon the legitime, shall be valid.

The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the impression that the testator had intended
to disinherit, though ineffectively, the children of the first marriage. There is nothing in the will that supports this
conclusion. True, the testator expressly denied them any share in his estate; but the denial was predicated, not
upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the belief, mistaken though it was, that the children by the first marriage
had already received more than their corresponding shares in his lifetime in the form of advancement. Such
belief conclusively negatives all inference as to any intention to disinherit, unless his statement to that effect is
prove to be deliberately fictitious, a fact not found by the Court of Appeals. The situation contemplated in the
above provision is one in which the purpose to disinherit is clear, but upon a cause not stated or not proved, a
situation which does not obtain in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals quotes Manresa thus:

En el terreno de los principios, la solucion mas justa del problema que hemos hecho notar al comentar
el articulo, seria distinguir el caso en que el heredero omitido viviese al otorgarse el testamento, siendo
conocida su existencia por el testador, de aquel en que, o naciese despues, o se ignorase su
existencia, aplicando en el primer caso la doctrina del articulo 851, y en el segundo la del 814. (6
Manresa, 354-355.)

But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el terreno de los principios) and not
on the express provisions of the law. Manresa himself admits that according to law, "no existe hoy cuestion
alguna en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos, ya se refiera a personas vivas al
hacer el testamento o nacidas despues. Este ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a los descendientes
legitimos, siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima." (6 Manresa, 381.)

Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one of voluntary preterition of four of the children by the
first marriage, and of involuntary preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage,
and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code, which read in part as follows:

The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in
the will, they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is,
therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not
at least manifest.

Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the
Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. (Art. 814, Civil Code;
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908 and February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no such
legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided,
according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express provision therefor is made in the will,
the law would presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 479.) In the will here in
question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any
legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is
accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have
already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred
from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed, without prejudice to the
widow's legal usufruct, with costs against respondents.

G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.

Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.

Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing
the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia
Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late
Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.

The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:

"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this
Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."

It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate,
consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.

When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a
will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his
two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew an nieces The usufruct o the fishpon
situate i barrio Sa Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a
project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto.
Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The
distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title
and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said
estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had
executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs;
and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus,
the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian
of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
same.1

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in
usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond
under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of
the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void
ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'

Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee,
Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto
and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil
Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .

A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be
null and void.

The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was free to
dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee
Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only
true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of
the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not
only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of
partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.

Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present
case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late
Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was
not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants,
but of heirs(without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened
not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease
to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this
reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an
instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage.

Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in
violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the
settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto,
while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no
compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere
forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.

At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for
distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of
the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes,
63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that
judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in
conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it
had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.

It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has
become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of the late Bibiano Barretto
was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who
signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the
filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a judgment by
consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition.
That case is authority for the proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of
mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us, however, the
agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so
much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the
heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.

Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for the
decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since
it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had
been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .

SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after
the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)

That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her father in
1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon
a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:

If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would be
concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the
estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate
is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is
 binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason
why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.

The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court
or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.

It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446
(Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:

... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, and that Maria
Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as
guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the project of
partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court,
does not mean that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship
proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the
appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the
project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition,
apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or
authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and,
consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the project of partition is absolutely
null and void and may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.

So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by publication but
actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the
jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's estate.

Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have ignored that
the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution
was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco
Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria
Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held
liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained
within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.

Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24), she became of age
five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court
decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948
(Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's
Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in
August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano
Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes
had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased
wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions
of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such promise in the decision
under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same can not bind the wards, the
minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being
an act of disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless
duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).

In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its
Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2)
that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of
limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account
for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It
follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given
due course.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and set aside in
so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted
in said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the
records be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond
(Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and
for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate
or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to
her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that
by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1wph1.t

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The
court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors,
in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a
complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of
property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my
name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
 ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of
Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point
Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun

nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se
le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a
uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa;
que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to
have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon
wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d
611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter
absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte?
No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la
institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse
 que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige
con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o

todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total,
cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal
de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la
generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que
"anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers
no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the
statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a
1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun
cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa
en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto
procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la
institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas
obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene
declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa
si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido
y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como
legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a
la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente,
hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only
when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez
Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As
Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre
(que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir.
That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share
in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman
emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other
hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by
a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs
suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment
is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the
institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal
disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but
that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore
cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the
second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely
annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814
and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of
legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have
any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article
817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article
 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments.
And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special
title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in
turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983

ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA, respondents.

Benjamin H. Aquino for petitioner.

Alfredo Kallos for respondents.

MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1

A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment rendered
by the former Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 3956, an action for Recognition.

On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On
February 3, 1970, during the pendency of the suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered
substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated on
March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the same Court. ZONIA entered her
formal appearance as a "substitute defendant" on March 4, 1970 claiming additionally that she was the sole heir
of her father, SOLANO, and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will
with the least interference from the GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of
SOLANO".

On April 6, 1970, the GARCIAS filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance and Supplemental Cause of Action"
impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared
instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT. ZONIA did not file any responsive pleading and
the case proceeded to trial. The GARCIAS further moved for the impleading of the SOLANO estate in addition
to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial Court granted in its Order dated April 15, 1970. 1

In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the legal issues to be treated in the parties' respective
Memoranda as: 1) the question of recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated Will. 2
On July 14, 1970, the Trial Court, presided by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda, rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which decrees: t.hqw

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs Bienvenido S. Garcia and
Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the illegitimate children of the
late Dr. Meliton Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN, with all the rights
granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and universal heir of the said
deceased in the will is hereby declared null and void and the three (3) children shall share
equally the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad
Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the estate. No pronouncement as to costs.

Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the judgment in toto (CA-G.R. No. 49018).

ZONIA seeks a reversal of that affirmance in this petition, which was given due course.

At the outset, we should state that we are bound by the findings of fact of both the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court, particularly, the finding that the GARCIAS and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT.
The oral testimony and the documentary evidence of record inevitably point to that conclusion, as may be
gleaned from the following background facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar Riosa. The
latter died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his second wife in 1928. The
union was short-lived as she left him in 1929. In the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having amorous
relations with Juana Garcia, out of which affair was born Bienvenido Garcia on March 24, 1931 (Exhibits "A" &
"3"); and on November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their birth certificates and
baptismal certificates mention only the mother's name without the father's name. The facts establish, however,
that SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the GARCIAS as his children by acts of support and provisions for
their education.

In 1935, SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were born out of this relation but only
petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, born on July 26, 1941, is living. In her Birth Certificate, her status was listed as
"illegitimate"; her mother as Trinidad Tuagnon; her father as "P.N.C. " (Exhibit "V"), or "padre no conocido".

During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly Gorand on November 29, 1943
(Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December 22, 1943, SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de
Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" (Exhibit "Q"; "7"), acknowledging ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving
her the right to use the name ZONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar on the same date.

On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento" (Exhibit "11"), instituting ZONIA
as his universal heir to all his personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province
of Albay, except for five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad Tuagnon in
usufruct Upon SOLANO's petition (Exhibit "10"), the Will was duly probated on March 10, 1969 in Special
Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in a Decision also rendered by Judge
Ezequiel S. Grageda (Exhibit "12").

As above stated, these facts are not in question.

Petitioner maintains, however, that: t.hqw

I
 The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction in declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana Solano, now petitioner, an illegitimate
child of the late Dr. Meliton Solano in an action where private respondents, as plaintiffs in the
Court below, sought recognition as natural children of Dr. Meliton Solano.

II

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the division of the estate of Dr. Meliton Solano between the petitioner
and private respondents, when said estate is under the jurisdiction and control of the probate
Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.

III

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction in declaring nun and void the institution of heir in the last will and testament of Dr.
Meliton Solano, which was duly probated in special proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, and in concluding that total intestacy resulted there from. 3

Directly challenged is the jurisdiction of the lower Court, in an action for recognition: 1) to declare ZONIA as an
illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2) to order the division of the estate in the same action despite the pendency of
Special Proceedings No. 842; and 3) to declare null and void the institution of heir in the Last Win and
Testament of SOLANO, which was duly probated in the same Special Proceedings No. 842, and concluding
that total intestacy resulted.

It is true that the action below was basically one for recognition. However, upon notice of SOLANO's death, the
Trial Court ordered his substitution by ZONIA, "the only surviving heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her "Appearance
of Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T. Solano ... Sole and Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that she be
6 allowed to assume her duties as executrix and administratrix of the probated will and testament of the late Dr.
Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is already final and executory, with least
interference from the plaintiffs (GARCIAS) who may be classified for the moment as only pretenders to be
illegitimate children". In other words, ZONIA did not only rely upon SOLANO's Answer already of record but
asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and administratrix, "and challenged the
right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was not defending the case as a mere representative of the
deceased but asserted rights and defenses in her own personal capacity. So it was that the GARCIAS filed a
"Reply to Appearance of ZONIA ... and Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously denying that ZONIA was
SOLANO's sole and universal heir; that ZONIA could not legally be considered as SOLANO's acknowledged
natural child because of a legal impediment; that the admission to probate of SOLANO's Will was merely
conclusive as to its due execution; that the supposed recognition under a notarial instrument of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child was fraudulent and a product of misrepresentation; that ZONIA's recognition in the
Will as an acknowledged natural child is subject to nullification and that at most ZONIA is, like them, an
adulterous child of SOLANO with Trinidad Tuagnon.

During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their allegations not only in their main complaint but
also in their "Reply to Appearance and Supplemental Cause of Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the
presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral and documentary evidence and even cross-examined their
witnesses. ZONIA, for her part, presented her own testimonial and documentary evidence, denied the
relationship of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and presented the notarial recognition in her favor as an
acknowledged natural child by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit "Q"). Thus, as raised by the parties in
their own pleadings and pursuant to their respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into a
contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective
rights as such. No error was committed by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, therefore, in resolving
the issue of ZONIA's status.

ZONIA additionally assails the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in declaring null and void the institution of heir in
SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in
SOLANO's estate when said estate was under the jurisdiction and control of the Probate Court in Special
Proceedings No. 842.

Normally, this would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is thrust upon us here. It should be
recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding
was not one to settle the estate of a deceased person that would be deemed terminated only upon the final
distribution of the residue of the hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have
terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings therein.
Secondly, upon motion of the GARCIAS, and over the objection of ZONIA, the Trial Court ordered the
impleading of the estate of SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In effect, therefore, the two cases were
consolidated. The records further disclose that the action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec. Procs.
No. 842 were pending before the same Branch of the Court and before the same presiding Judge. Thirdly, it is
settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution.5 A probate decree is not
concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will. 6

Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the facts, the GARCIAS
and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural
child" in a notarial document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was
erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce
having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the
time of ZONIA's conception, 7 that being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended from
SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir
by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. t.hqw

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. ... 8

As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon
over the five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil
Code, 9and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious. 10

So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and
ZONIA. However, contrary to the conclusions of the Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and
intestacy ensues, the pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as
the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation. 11 It is a plain
that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the law,
he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2)
portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of. 12 Since the legitime of illegitimate children
consists of one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, 13 the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation
therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or
4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties indicated in the Will is valid
and should be respected.

The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., 15 which held that
where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and
intestate succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was
involved with no other provision except the institution of the sole and universal heir; there was no specification
of individual property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. It was upon that factual setting that this
Court declared: t.hqw

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question 'a complete nullity. Article 854 of
the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies 'the institution of heir'. Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the
result is the same. The entire will is null." (at p. 459)

In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra,
applies merely annulling the "institution of heir".

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court was never
questioned before either Court. ZONIA herself had gone, without objection, to trial on the issues raised and as
defined by the Trial Court. Neither had ZONIA assigned lack of jurisdiction of the Trial Court as an error before
the Appellate Court. She should now be held estopped to repudiate that jurisdiction to which she had voluntarily
submitted, after she had received an unfavorable judgment, The leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on
this point, declared: t.hqw

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction. The question
whether the court has jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties is
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication but
for the reason that such practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the hereditary share in the estate of the
decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate,
while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or
(1/6) of the estate. The usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is affirmed in all
other respects. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ
and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No.
05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special
Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the
Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on
February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment
of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the
disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I
earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu
City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands,
houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to
me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and
Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs,
with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda.
de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6,
1986 (Rollo, p. 146).

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents'
Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is
admitted to probate;

(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory
heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory
heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;

(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.

(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and

(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and
ineffectual.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]).
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is
a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct
line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion"
Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without
any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of
heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or
as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967).
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the
testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under
Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation
of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal
institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an
oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v.
Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not
available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are,
however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where
the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule
is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno
v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground
of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity
and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate
court, induced by practical considerations. The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was
grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the
validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on
its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate
outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even
before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that
"the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the
course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra;
Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents.

Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to
resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court
harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly
where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D.
SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999,
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of
preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the
Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia
Seangio."

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that:
1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a
general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for
cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99
93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should
take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng
maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang
paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng
sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at
sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya
nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at
kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at
hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the
Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at
anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3

(signed)

Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)

Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)

ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were
consolidated.4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of
the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir,
devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of
the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the
probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the
estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a
universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that
there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned,
Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would
have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved(underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS,
DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:
 I

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE
OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A
DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF,
THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF
THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY
AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively
mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous
to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs,
legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is
no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were
preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render
nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by
him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as
regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo
was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that
were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his
or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator
to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed.

Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while
it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the
present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP
Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016

IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO
MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA
OLONDRIZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from the May 27, 2011 decision and October 12,
2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.1 The CA denied Morales' petition
for certiorari from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 12, 2007 and October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No.
03-0060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-0069.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Antecedents

Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria
Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa
O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are
collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Pias RTC for the
partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. The case was
raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.

On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a
will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as special
administratrix. Her petition was also raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.

The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and administrator of
my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith, x x x

2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and between
(1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3)
ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother
(6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.3

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.

On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and moved to
suspend the intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-
03-0069. The respondent heirs opposed Morales' motion for suspension and her petition for allowance of the
will.

On November 27, 2003, the RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 with Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-
03-0069.

On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because Francisco was
preterited from the will.

On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of preterition.
Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate the existence of
preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.

After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the evidentiary hearing
was scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her right to present
evidence on the issue of preterition.

On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended the intestate proceedings in Sp.
Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take
precedence over intestate proceedings.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the motion on
September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued to Alfonso
Jr.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of Administration.
They also moved for the inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.

On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition. The case was transferred to Branch
253 presided by Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.

On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs' motion for reconsideration of the revocation of the
Letters of Administration and (2) Morales' motion to be appointed Special Administratrix of the estate. The RTC
noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it
appears that the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir
of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary
hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate
and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.

On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales alleged that
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence of the will. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.

On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate
proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line
annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate succession. 4 Thus, the
continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical because the inheritance will be
adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the present
petition for review on certiorari on December 5, 2011.

The Petition

Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the case to proceed
intestate because: (1) the probate of a decedent's will is mandatory; (2) the RTC Branch 254 already ordered
the case to proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate already attained finality; (3) the
probate court cannot touch on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (4) there was no preterition because
Francisco received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC's jurisdiction to reverse or modify an interlocutory
order setting the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention that she did not appear in any of the
evidentiary hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the RTC and the CA both found that
Francisco was preterited from the will; and (4) that Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs and
opened the case into intestacy. They conclude that the RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave
abuse of discretion when it reinstated Alfonso Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to
proceed intestate.

Our Ruling

We join the ruling of the CA.

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or,
although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the
estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.5 Preterition requires that
the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. 6

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's
inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation, (emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs,
but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will
does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in
total intestacy.7

In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As
the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show
otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during
the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for
reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

We will not entertain the petitioner's factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited because this Court is
not a trier of facts. Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC's conclusion. We see no cogent reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.

The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will
during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to questions on the
extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will's formal validity and due
execution.8 However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. 10 When practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the
probate court should meet the issue.11
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of
the inheritance.12 The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The
conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the
case to proceed intestate.

Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner's argument that the previous order setting the case for probate barred
the RTC from ordering the case to proceed intestate. The disputed order is merely interlocutory and can never
become final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment does. 13 An interlocutory order does not
result in res judicata.14 It remains under the control of the court and can be modified or rescinded at any time
before final judgment.15

Certiorari is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the
officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.16 As discussed, it is well within the jurisdiction of the probate court to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the will if probate proceedings might become an idle ceremony due to the nullity of the
will.

On the other hand, grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law. 17It is present when power
is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion and hostility. Morales failed to show that
the RTC acted in such a capricious and despotic manner that would have warranted the CA's grant of her
petition for certiorari. On the contrary, the RTC acted appropriately in accordance with the law and
jurisprudence.cralaw-red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.