RUBIAS v BATILLER (Status of such contracts Legaspi)

Case Suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lots which
Rubias bought from his father-in-law Francisco Militante
Facts Before the war with Japan, Militante file with CFI and application for the
registration of title of the land, the records of the case were lost so Militante filed
a petition for reconstitution which was dismissed Militante appealed and pending
the appeal, Militante sold the subject land to Rubias. This was recorded in the
Register of Deeds. However, the application for registration was again dismissed.
According to Batiller, Rubias has no cause of action since they are in actual, open
and continuous possession of the lot since time immemorial; Rubias was also the
counsel on record of Militante
Issue w/n the contract of sale was void because it was made when Rubias was
Militantes counsel in the land registration case
Ruling Rubias cannot have any claim on the land which Militante allegedly owned
since the latters application was denied by the CA. Militante had no authority to
dispose the things sold.
Assuming that Militante acquired the property, Rubias claim still fails. The sale
between him and Militante was prohibited by law. Purchase by lawyer of property
in litigation from his client is void and produces no legal effect. Nullity of such
contracts cannot be cured by ratification since the prohibition is grounded in public
policy. Nullity of such contracts is differentiated from that purchased by
guardians, agents and administrators which can be cured by ratification.

RUBIAS v BATILLER
FACTS: Militante claimed ownership over a parcel of land and applied for the
registration of the same with the CFI; his counsel was his son-in-law, Atty. Rubias.
His claim was dismissed by the trial court, thus he appealed. Pending appeal, he
sold the lot to Atty. Rubias for P2,000. Batiller, on the other hand, claimed to have
inherited the same lot from his ancestors who have been in open, public, peaceful,
and actual possession thereof under a claim of title. Atty. Rubias filed an ejectment
suit against Batiller who assailed the validity of the sale to Rubias. Given the
dismissal of Militantes application, he had thus no right over the said land that he
may have validly transferred to Atty. Rubias.
ISSUE: W/N the sale to Atty. Rubias is valid
HELD: NO. Even assuming he had title thereto, the sale of the lot to Atty. Rubias
would be null and void for being expressly prohibited by the Civil Code. Lawyers
cannot acquire by purchase the property or rights under litigation over which they
take part by virtue of their profession. The same rule applies to judges, clerks of
court, and other judicial officers with respect to the same. The purchase in violation
of the above provision is not merely voidable as Atty. Rubias contends; it is VOID
and INEXISTENT from the very beginning. The right to set up the defense of its
illegality cannot be waived and, unlike cases involving agents, guardians, or
administrators with respect to the properties under their charge, it is not
susceptible to compromise or ratification. It is likewise contrary to public policy

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS. IAC (Quantity of Subject Matter not Essential
for Perfection Delgado)
Facts: National Grains Authority (later National Food Authority) is a government
agency which buys palay grains from qualified farmer. Leon Soriano offered to sell
palay grains to the agency. After undergoing the regular application process, he
was given a quota (maximum) of 2,640 cavans of palay. On August 23 and 24, 1979,
Soriano delivered 630 cavans which were not bagged, classified and weighed.
When Soriano demanded payment for the delivered palay, he was informed by the
Provincial Manager William Cabal that his payment was held in abeyance because
there was an investigation concerning him because of allegations that he is not a
bona fide farmer and gets the palay from another person. Soriano filed case for
specific performance. RTC favored him and was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this
petition with National Grains Authority arguing that there was no sale but only an
offer by Soriano because it was not accepted by the agency as evidenced of not
rebagging, classifying and weighing it.
Issue: W/N there was a sale?
Held: The petition is not impressed with merit.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code of the Philippines defines sale as a contract whereby
one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay therefore a price certain in
money or its equivalent. A contract, on the other hand, is a meeting of minds
between two (2) persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The essential requisites of contracts are: (1) consent of the contracting parties, (2)
object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the
obligation which is established (Art. 1318, Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, Soriano initially offered to sell palay grains produced in his
farmland to NFA. When the latter accepted the offer by noting in Soriano's Farmer's
Information Sheet a quota of 2,640 cavans, there was already a meeting of the
minds between the parties. The object of the contract, being the palay grains
produced in Soriano's farmland and the NFA was to pay the same depending upon
its quality. The fact that the exact number of cavans of palay to be delivered has
not been determined does not affect the perfection of the contract. Article 1349 of
the New Civil Code provides: ". . .. The fact that the quantity is not determinate
shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to
determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties." In
this case, there was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a new contract to
determine the exact number of cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano can deliver so
much of his produce as long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans.

MAPALO VS. MAPALO (Price must be real Lopez)

Facts: - Miguel Mapalo and his wife, Candida Quiba, were illiterate farmers. Out of
love and affection, they resolved to donate the eastern half of their land to Miguels
brother, Maximo, who was about to get married. - They were deceived by Maximo
and a notary public into signing an absolute deed of sale over the entire lot by
pretending that the documents the spouses were signing was a deed of donation.
The deed of sale contained a consideration of Php 500, which was never paid. -
Maximo, after proper registration, sells the entire land to the Narcisos. The
Narcisos files a suit in CFI to be declared the owners of the entire lot. - Miguel files
a counterclaim and a separate case to annul the deeds of sale involved in this case.
- CFI rules for Miguel Mapalo annulling the deeds of sale. The CA, on the other
hand, says that the spouses gave their consent to the sale but said consent is
defective for being induced by fraud. Because of this, the CA held that the deeds
of sale are not void but are merely voidable. They further held that the action to
annul the deeds of sale has already prescribed, thus they dismiss the complaint.
Issue: - W/n the deeds of sale are void or voidable. - W/n the action of the spouses
has already prescribed.
Held: - SC acknowledged that the object of the contract of sale is present land.
They also acknowledged that there was consent in this case and that it was merely
defective. The SC, though, took notice of the fact that there was no consideration
in this case. Maximo was alleging that there was merely a fraudulent consideration
(because of the stipulation in the first deed of sale) and that the contract was still
voidable. The SC, though, pointed out that the stipulated consideration was not
actually paid. This brings about a contract of sale where the price is simulated
which is considered void by Art. 1471 (hindi na-mention yung article sa case). - Since
the contract is void ab initio, then the action does not prescribe because the
inexistence thereof is permanent and incurable. Judgment of CFI is reinstated
EQUATORIAL REALTY v MAYFAIR THEATER (Distinguishing Option from Right of First
Refusal Fernandez)
Facts: Carmelo & Bauermann Inc. owned a land with a building. A portion of said
building was leased to Mayfair Theater. A second leased contract covered another
portion of the building. The contracts of lease provide that if Carmelo should
desire to sell the property, Mayfair is given 30-days exclusive option to purchase
the same. Carmelo then informed Mayfair that the property would be sold.
Mayfair wrote to Carmelo and said that it has a 30-day exclusive option by virtue
of the contract. Mayfair sent another letter informing that it is willing to buy the
entire property. 4 years later, Carmelo sold the property to Equatorial Realty.
Mayfair instituted an action for specific performance (based on the lease contract).
The trial court dismissed the complaint, upheld the validity of the sale, and
ordered Mayfair to vacate the property. It reasoned that the option on the contract
is not supported by any consideration, thus not binding on Carmelo. The CA
reversed and said that the paragraph in the lease contract is a right of first refusal
and not an option contract.
Issue: Was the stipulation in the contract an Option or a Right of first refusal?
Held: It was a Right of first refusal. An option clause or an option contract to be
valid needs a determined or certain price. An accepted unilateral promise which
specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid when coupled with a valuable
consideration distinct and separate from the price is what may properly be termed
as a perfected contract of option. An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy
or sell within an agreed time and at a determined price. It is a separate and distinct
contract from that which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the
option. It must be supported by consideration.
A separate consideration is not needed in a right of first refusal. In this case, the
right of first refusal is an integral part of the lease contractthe consideration for
the lease includes the consideration for the right of first refusal. Thus, Mayfairs
consent to the lease and to pay the price agreed upon, is consideration of the
lessors promise that it will give Mayfair the right to match the offered price and to
buy the property at that price, in case it desires to sell the same.
Carmelo acted in bad faith by violating the right of first refusalit did not afford
Mayfair to negotiateand by selling the property to Equatorial. Equatorial was also
in bad faith since it was aware of the lease contract and the existence of Mayfairs
right. Hence the sale is rescissible.

FULE v CA (Perfection Sarenas)

Facts: Fule is the owner of a land in Tanay. Dr. Cruz was the owner of a pair of
emerald-cut diamond earrings. Fule was interested with this jewelry. Fule offered
a barter between the property and the jewelry. Deeds of sale were executed and
ownership of the land and jewelry changed hands. 2 hours after the changing of
hands, Fule goes to the lawyer who assisted in the executing of the deeds and
complains that the jewelry is fake. Fule wants land to be returned. Dr. Cruz refuses.
 TC: the sale was valid, 2 hours is already considered unreasonable delay, Dr. Cruz
and the lawyer are entitled to be paid damages by Fule CA: TC decision affirmed
Issue: W/N there was a valid sale between the parties
Held: The sale is valid. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon
the price. From the facts, there was a meeting of the minds between Dr. Cruz and
Fule. They are bound by the contract unless there are reasons that warrant its
nullification. Fule is alleging that there was fraud amounting to vitiation of
consent. This is untenable. From the facts, it is Fule himself who employed
machinations. He misrepresented how much the property actually costs.

FULE v CA
FACTS: Fule, a banker and a jeweler, acquired a 10hectare property in Rizal (Tanay
Property), which used to be under the name of Fr. Antonio Jacobe, who mortgaged
it to Rural Bank of Alaminos to secure a loan of P10,000. However, the mortgage
was foreclosed. In 1984, Fule asked Dichoso and Mendoza to look for a buyer of
the Tanay property. They found one in the person of Cruz, who owns a pair of
diamond earrings. Fule was interested to buy these earrings, but Cruz refused to
sell them to him for the price he offered. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter
between the earrings and the property ensued. But it turned out that the
redemption period for the property has not yet expired. Thus, Fule executed a deed
of redemption on behalf of Fr. Jacobe in the amount of P16,000, and on even date,
Fr. Jacobe sold the property to Fule for P75,000. The Deed of Sale was notarized
ahead of the Deed of Redemption. Subsequently, a Deed of Sale over the earrings
was executed and when it was delivered, Fule contends that the earrings were fake,
even using a tester to prove such allegation. Thereafter, they decided to Dimayuga,
a jeweler, to have the earrings tested. After a glance, Dimayuga declared them fake.
Fule filed a complaint with the RTC against Cruz and her lawyer, Belarmino, praying
that the contract of sale over the Tanay property be declared null and void on the
ground of fraud and deceit. RTC ruled in favor of Cruz and Belarmino.
ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Sale over the Tanay Property is valid
HELD: YES. It is evident from the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the
minds between petitioner and Dr. Cruz. As such, they are bound by the contract
unless there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its nullification. The
records, however, are bare of any evidence manifesting that private respondents
employed such insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner into entering
the contract of barter. Neither is there any evidence showing that Dr. Cruz induced
petitioner to sell his Tanay property or that she cajoled him to take the earrings in
exchange for said property. On the contrary, Dr. Cruz did not initially accede to
petitioner's proposal to buy the said jewelry. Rather, it appears that it was
petitioner, through his agents, who led Dr. Cruz to believe that the Tanay property
was worth exchanging for her jewelry as he represented that its value was
P400,000.00 or more than double that of the jewelry which was valued only at
P160,000.00. If indeed petitioner's property was truly worth that much, it was
certainly contrary to the nature of a businessmanbanker like him to have parted
with his real estate for half its price. In short, it was in fact petitioner who resorted
to machinations to convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay
property. Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity
required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within which to examine the jewelry as he
in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied with the same. By
taking the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which was more
consistent with his exercise of ownership over it. This gains credence when it is
borne in mind that he himself had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz
by affixing his signature to the contract of sale. That after two hours he later
claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in exchange for his Tanay
property, could not sever the juridical tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The
nature and value of the thing he had taken preclude its return after that
supervening period within which anything could have happened, not excluding the
alteration of the jewelry or its being switched with an inferior kind

CORONEL v CA (Doctrine on Conditional Sales Calinisan)

Facts: Coronel and Alcaraz entered into a contract of sale over a house and lot. At
the time the contract was entered into, the lot was titled in the name of Coronels
father, hence, the sale was subject to the condition that Coronel title the lot in his
name. A P50T down payment was made with the balance of 1.1m to be made upon
delivery of the property. After the condition happened, Coronel, instead of
delivering the property, sold the same to Mabanag for 1.5m. The sale was to
conditioned on the cancellation of sale 1. Mabanag registered the purchase
(adverse claim), but not before Alcaraz had a notice of lis pendens annotated on
the title. Alcaraz then filed for specific performance. Mabanag registered the deed
of absolute sale and obtained TCT.
Issue: W/N Alcaraz or Mabanag had the better right.
Held: Alcaraz has a better right. The court, before applying the provision on double
sales had to determine whether there were indeed two sales. Was the sale to
Alcaraz, despite its being subject to a condition, a contract of sale or a contract to
sell? It was a contract of sale, though subject to a condition that the property be
titled in the sellers name. When the condition happened, its effects retroacted to
the date of the constitution of the obligation. The sale is deemed to have been
absolute on the date the contract was entered into. Seller cannot claim that even
if the condition happened, there was still need for him to make good on his promise
to transfer ownership because the contract was one of sale and not to sell. The
difference between a TO and an OF is that in a TO, ownership is expressly reserved
by the seller until the happening of the condition, upon which, he must make good
on his promise to go on with the sale. In an OF, upon the happening of the
condition, the sale becomes absolute and the seller can be compelled to execute
the relevant documents (or as mentioned in class, the clerk of court can sign for the
reneging seller). In this case, the seller has no more title to sell the thing to another
buyer. In fact, if there had been previous delivery, ownership is deemed
automatically vested in the buyer. Since there were two sales, the provision on
double sales can apply. Though MAbanag registered her purchase, she was not in
good faith (lis pendens) and her registration has no effect.

ADELFA v CA (Contract of Sale vs Contract to Sell Delgado)

Facts: - the subject matter involved here is a land in Las Pias owned by the private
respondents and their brothers Jose and Dominador Jimenez. - the seller (private
respondents) offered to buyer Adelfa the western portion of the lot - exclusive
option to purchase was executed between seller and buyer - before any payment
was made, buyer received summons from the kin of the seller - buyer withheld
payment and as a result, seller sold it to another buyer - buyer writes to seller its
intention to pay the purchase price but seller refuse - RTC and CA for the sellers
Issue: W/N seller was justified in canceling its vinculum juris with buyer.
Held: YES.
1) it is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale a) although provided for
remedies, does not mention that buyer will return the possession of the
property b) deed of absolute sale only to be issued after full payment as
gleaned from the letter request of buyer to allow it to pay the price 2) there
was no valid tender of payment by the buyer, it could have consigned the
payment 3) the seller validly rescinded the contract since buyer didnt still
pay amidst the resolution of the dispute of the kin 4) letter of cancellation is
enough and no need for judicial action since there is a stipulation for
automatic rescission 5) took judicial notice of UP vs. De los Angeles but the
buyer here didnt exercise the privilege given by the doctrine

CORONEL v CA (Is a Contract to Sell a Sale under 1458? Del Socorro)

Facts: - Coronels (seller) executed a document entitled Receipt of Down Payment
in favor of plaintiff Ramona (buyer) - conditions in the sale:appurtenant to the sale
are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of 50T; 2. Coronels will transfer in their
names of the title of the property registered in the name of their deceased father
upon receipt of the 50T downpayment; 3. upon the transfer in their names of the
subject property, the Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of
Ramona and the latter will pay the whole balance of 1.1M. - 50T downpayment was
made by buyer - title to the property originally registered under the name of the
Coronels father was transferred in their names - but the Coronels sold the property
to Mabanag (buyer 2) - Coronels rescinded the contract w/ Ramona by depositing
the downpayment w in the bank in trust for Ramona - Ramona filed for specific
performance against the seller Coronels to compel them to consummate the sale
of land
Issue: W/N the contract between the Coronels and Ramona was a contract of sale
or a contract to sell?
Held: contract of SALE - construing the Receipt of Down payment, there was a
clear intent on the part of the sellers to transfer title to the buyer, but since the
transfer certificate of title was still in the name of sellers father, they could not
fully effect such transfer although the buyer was then willing and able to
immediately pay the purchase price - therefore, sellers undertook upon receipt of
the down payment to be issued of a new certificate of title in their names from that
of their father, after which, they promised to present said title to the buyer and to
execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon, the buyer shall pay the entire
balance of the purchase price - not a contract to sell because the sellers herein
made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land -
furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into an
absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title
was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price - it may be
presumed that, had the certificate of title been in the names sellers at that time,
there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have
been executed and consummated right there and then - moreover, unlike in a
contract to sell, sellers did not merely promise to sell the property to private
respondent upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition - having already
agreed to sell the subject property, they undertook to have the certificate of title
change to their names and immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of
absolute sale - hence, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where
the sellers, after compliance by the buyer with certain terms and conditions,
promised to sell the property to the buyer

CORONEL v CA
FACTS: In 1985, Coronel executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment"
in favor of Alcaraz for P50,000 dp of P1.24M as purchase price for an inherited
house and lot promising to execute a deed of absolute
sale as soon as it has been transferred in their name. The balance of P1.19M is due
upon the execution of the deed. When title to the property was finally transferred
to their names, the Coronels sold the property to Mabanag for P1.58M after she
paid P300K dp. Because of this, they cancelled and rescinded the contract with
Alcaraz by returning the P50,00 dp. Alcaraz filed a complaint for specific
performance against the Coronels and cause the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on the TCT. Mabanag, on the other hand, caused the annotation of a
notice of adverse claim with the RD. However, the Coronels executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor Mabanag. RTC ruled in favor of Alcaraz. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the receipt of downpayment serves a contract to sell or a
conditional contract of sale
HELD: NO. The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers
made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land.
Furthermore, the circumstance, which prevented the parties from entering into an
absolute contract of sale, pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title
was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the
established facts and circumstances of the case, had the certificate of title been in
the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been no reason why
an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated right
there and then. Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners did not merely
promise to sell the property to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition. On the contrary, having already agreed to sell the subject
property, they undertook to have the certificate of title changed to their names and
immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute sale. What is
clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the
said Receipt of Down Payment was prepared and signed by petitioners, the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is
subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of
petitioners father to their names. The suspensive condition was fulfilled on 6
February 1985 and thus, the conditional contract of sale between the parties
became obligatory, the only act required for the consummation thereof being the
delivery of the property by means of the execution of the deed of absolute sale in
a public instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves to do
as evidenced by the Receipt of Down Payment.
DIGNOS v CA (Stipulation on Power to Rescind Rivas)
Facts: Dignos is the owner of a parcel of land sold by installment to Jabil as
evidenced by a deed of sale Several months thereafter, Dignos sold the same
parcel of land to Cabigas evidenced by a registration in the Register if Deeds Jabil
discovered the subsequent sale by Dignos and asked the court to cancel the 2nd
sale RTC: declared that the 2nd sale to Cabigos is null and void CA: affirmed the
decision of the RTC
Issue: W/N the 1st sake between DIgnos and Jabil is a valid contract of sale W/N
there was a valid rescission of 1st sale by the subsequents 2nd sale to Cabigos
Held: It is valid contract of sale and not a contract to sell Nowhere in the contract
did the parties stipulate that the title is reserved in the vendor until full payment
There is also no stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the
contract
No rescission of the 1st contract Dignos never notified Jabil by notarial act that
they were rescinding the contract neither was there a case filed in court to rescind
the contract The contention of Dignos that there was a certain emissiary of Jabil
which informed him Jabil agreed for Dignos to preceed to the 2ns sale is wrong.
It is required that acts and contract which have for their object the extinguishment
of real rights over an immovable must appear in a public document Also, a slight
delay in the perfomance of the obligation of one party is not a sufficient ground for
rescission It is required by equity and justice that Jabil be given addition extention
to pay the P4,000 balance and 1 month delay.
DIGNOS v CA
FACTS: Dignos is the owner of a parcel of land in LapuLapu City, which they sold to
Jabil for P28,000, payable in 2 installments and with an assumption of indebtedness
with First Insular Bank of Cebu for P12,000. However, Dignos also sold the same
land in favor of Cabigas, who were US citizens, for P35,000. A Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed in favor of the Cabigas spouses. Jabil filed a suit against Dignos with
CFI of Cebu. RTC ruled in favor of Jabil and declared the sale to Cabigas null and
void. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC decision with modification.
ISSUE: W/N the contract between Dignos and Jabil is a contract of sale (as opposed
to a contract to sale)
HELD: YES. A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a Deed
of Conditional Sale where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or
stipulation to the effect that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until
full payment of the purchase price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the
right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within
a fixed period. In the present case, there is no stipulation reserving the title of the
property on the vendors nor does it give them the right to unilaterally rescind the
contract upon non-payment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. While
there was no constructive delivery of the land sold in the present case, as subject
Deed of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there was actual
delivery thereof. As found by the trial court, the Dignos spouses delivered the
possession of the land in question to Jabil as early as 27 March 1965 so that the
latter constructed thereon Sallys Beach Resort also known as Jabils Beach Resort
in March, 1965; Mactan White Beach Resort on 15 January 1966 and Bevirlyns
Beach Resort on 1 September 1965. Such facts were admitted by the Dignos
spouses

)DEL PRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR 148225

Facts:
A lot No. 1109 was adjudicated in favor of spouses Caballero thru a
Deed of Sale. They sold to petitioner said lot on the basis of Tax Declaration
covering the said property. In the Deed of Sale, it is stated that the parcel of
land sold to Carmen Del Prado only covers 4,000 square meters while the
total area of the said lot is 14,000 square meters.
Issue:
Whether or Not the sale of the land was for lump sum or not
Held:
 The court reiterated the rulings in Esguerra v. Trinidad; In sales
involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing
agreement:
Unit price contract, where in the purchase price is determined by way of
reference to stated rate per area.
Lump sum, contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable, the
area of which may be declared based on the estimate or where both the area
and boundaries are stated.
In the instant case the sale of the land was for lump sum because the
parties agreed to purchase the land at P 40,000 for pre-determined area of
4,000 square meters, more or less, with boundaries stated therein. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the
contract prevails over any other statement with respect to the area contained
within its boundaries.

SPOUSES TONGSON vs EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, INC.

GR 167874
Facts:
Napala purchased from spouses Tongson their 364 square meter
parcel of land situated in Davao. The respondent prepared an Absolute Deed
of Sale indicating the consideration as P 400,000 and executed another
Memorandum of Agreement in conformity with the Deed of Sale. Upon
signing, Napala paid two hundred thousand pesos in cash to spouses and
issued postdated PNB check to represent the balance. However the check was
dishonored for insufficient funds. Despite demand, Napala failed to pay or
return the purchase land. The petitioners filed for the annulment of the
contract.
The trial court ordered the annulment of the contract. Furthermore,
Napalas action in giving the check constituted fraud that induced the
spouses to enter in the sale.
Issue:
 Whether or Not Napala employed fraud which induces the spouses to
enter in the sale.
Held:
The issuance of PNB check and fraudulently representation made by
Napala could not be considered as determining cause for the sale of the
subject parcel of land.
A valid contract requires occurrence of three elements. In the present,
there is no dispute as regards the presence of two requisites; namely, (a)
determinate subject matter, and (b) price certain in money. As regards the
requisite which is the consent of the parties, it is clearly shown for the record
that the spouses agreed to sell the land to Napala who offered to pay the
price. The fraud was not employed during the negotiation and perfection
stages of the sale, but existed in the consummation when the parties are in
the process of their respective obligations.

SPOUSES MAPALO vs. MAXIMO MAPALO

FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Quiba, simple illiterate farmers,
were registered owners of residential land in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They
donated the eastern part of their land to Miguel Mapalo however they were
deceived into signing a deed of absolute sale over the entire land. Following
the execution of the afore-stated document, the spouses Miguel Mapalo and
Candida Quiba immediately built a fence of permanent structure in the
middle of their land segregating the eastern portion from its western portion.
Said fence still exists. The spouses have always been in continued possession
over the western half of the land up to the present. Maximo Mapala
registered the land to his name and sold it to the Narcisos. They subsequently
registered it to their name.
The Narcisos took possession only of the eastern portion of the land in
1951, after the sale in their favor was made. On February 7, 1952 they filed
suit in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. 1191) to be
declared owners of the entire land, for possession of its western portion; for
damages; and for rentals. It was brought against the Mapalo spouses as well
as against Floro Guieb and Rosalia Mapalo Guieb who had a house on the
western part of the land with the consent of the spouses Mapalo and Quiba.
The Narcisos appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision on May 28,
1963, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of First
Instance, solely on the ground that the consent of the Mapalo spouses to the
deed of sale of 1936 having been obtained by fraud, the same was voidable,
not void ab initio, and, therefore, the action to annul the same, within four
years from notice of the fraud, had long prescribed. It reckoned said notice
of the fraud from the date of registration of the sale on March 15, 1938. The
Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals are therefore unanimous
that the spouses Mapalo and Quiba were definitely the victims of fraud. It
was only on prescription that they lost in the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiffs only assailed the validity of the sale with respect to the
western portion of the land.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an onerous conveyance of ownership, that is, a sale,
by virtue of said deed of October 15, 1936, with respect to said western
portion. Specifically, was there a cause or consideration to support the
existence of a contrary of sale?
HELD:
As a general rule, contracts without a cause or consideration produce
no effect whatsoever. Nonetheless, under the Old Civil Code, the statement
of a false consideration renders the contract voidable, unless it is proven that
it is supported another real and licit consideration. And it is further
provided by the Old Civil Code that the action for annulment of a contract on
the ground of falsity of consideration shall last four years, the term to run
from the date of the consummation of the contract.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs never received a consideration as
purchase price for the western portion of the land. In that case the contract
of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever
where the same is without cause or consideration in that the purchase price
which appears thereon as paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser
to the vendor.
G.R. No. 111238 January 25, 1995
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO JIMENEZ-CASTAEDA and
SALUD JIMENEZ, respondents.
FACTS:

Jose and Dominador were brothers of the private respondent and they
co-owned a registered property. Jose and Dominador sold their share which
is the eastern portion of the land to Adelfa. Thereafter, Adelfa expressed
interest in buying the western portion of the property from private
respondents. Accordingly, an exclusive Option to Purchase was executed
between Adelfa and private respondents and an option money of fifty-
thousand pesos was given to the latter. Before Adelfa could make payments,
it received summons as a civil case was filed against Jose, Dominador and
Adelfa by the nephews and nieces of private respondents. As a consequence,
Adelfa informed the private respondents that it would hold payment of the
full purchase price and suggested that they settle the case with their said
nephews and nieces. Salud did not heed the suggestion; respondent
informed Atty. Bernardo that they are cancelling the transaction. He further
made some offers but they were all rejected.
When the case was dismissed, private respondents executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale in favor of Chua, over the same property so they rejected
the offer of Adelfa to purchase the same. The private respondents sent a letter
informing Adelfa about the sale and they also enclosed a check which
represent the option money paid by Adelfa.
ISSUE:
WON the agreement between ADELFA and Private Respondents was
strictly an option contract.
HELD:
 The agreement between the parties is a contract to sell and not just a
mere option contract or a contract of sale.
In the case at bar, the obligation of petitioner to pay the purchase price
is specific, definite and certain, and consequently binding and enforceable.
Had private respondents chosen to enforce the contract, they could have
specifically compelled petitioner to pay the balance. This is distinctly made
manifest in the contract itself as an integral stipulation, compliance with
which could legally and definitely be demanded from petitioner as a
consequence. The term balance connotes a remainder or something
remaining from the original total sum already agreed upon. The alleged
option money in the case at bar was actually an earnest money which was
intended to form part of the purchase price. The amount was not distinct
from the cause or consideration for the sale of the property, but was itself a
part of the purchase price. It is a statutory rule that whenever earnest money
is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as
a proof of the perfection of the contract.
ADELFA PROPERTIES INC v CA
FACTS: Rosario Jimenez-Castaneda, Salud Jimenez and their brothers, Jose
and Dominador Jimenez, were the registered co-owners of a parcel of land
in Las Pias. In 1988, Jose and Dominador sold their share consisting of 1/2
of said parcel of land, specifically the eastern portion thereof, to Adelfa
Properties. Subsequently, a Confirmatory Extrajudicial Partition
Agreement was executed by the Jimenezes, wherein the eastern portion of
the subject lot, was adjudicated to Jose and Dominador Jimenez, while the
western portion was allocated to Rosario and Salud Jimenez. Thereafter,
Adelfa Properties expressed interest in buying the western portion of the
property from Rosario and Salud. Accordingly, in 1989, an Exclusive Option
to Purchase was executed between the parties, with the condition that the
selling price shall be P2.86M, that the option money of P50,000 shall be
credited as partial payment upon the consummation of sale, that the balance
is to be paid on or before 30 November 1989, and that in case of default by
Adelfa Properties to pay the balance, the option is cancelled and 50% of the
option money shall be forfeited and the other 50% refunded upon the sale of
the property to a third party. Meanwhile, a complaint was filed by the
nephews and nieces of Rosario and Salud against Jose and Dominador for
annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Household Corporation and
recovery of ownership of the property. As a consequence, Adelfa Properties
held payment of the full purchase price and suggested that they settle the
case with their nephews and nieces. In 1990, Adelfa Properties caused to
be annotated on the TCT the exclusive option to purchase. On the same day,
Rosario and Salud executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Emylene
Chua over the same parcel of land for P3M, of which P1.5M was paid to the
former on said date, with the balance to be paid upon the transfer of title to
the specified 1/2 portion. Atty. Bernardo wrote Rosario and Salud informing
the latter that in view of the dismissal of the case against them, Adelfa
Properties was willing to pay the purchase price, and he requested that the
corresponding deed of absolute sale be executed. This was ignored by
Rosario and Salud. Jimenez counsel sent a letter to Adelfa Properties
enclosing therein a check for P25,000.00 representing the refund of 50% of
the option money paid under the exclusive option to purchase. Rosario and
Salud then requested Adelfa Properties to return the owners duplicate copy
of the certificate of title of Salud Jimenez. Adelfa Properties failed to
surrender the certificate of title. Rosario and Salud Jimenez filed a petition
for the annulment of contract, while Emylene Chua, the subsequent
purchaser of the lot, filed a complaint in intervention. RTC ruled in favor of
the Jimenezes and CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the contract between the Jimenezes and Adelfa Properties is an
option contract
HELD: NO. The alleged option contract is a contract to sell, rather than a
contract of sale. The distinction between the two is important for in contract
of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold;
whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the
vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of
sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is
retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment
being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but
an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective. Thus, a deed of sale is considered absolute in nature
where there is neither a stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold
is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor one giving the
vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer
fails to pay within a fixed period. The parties never intended to transfer
ownership to Adelfa Properties to completion of payment of the purchase
price, this is inferred by the fact that the exclusive option to purchase,
although it provided for automatic rescission of the contract and partial
forfeiture of the amount already paid in case of default, does not mention
that Adelfa Properties is obliged to return possession or ownership of the
property as a consequence of non-payment. There is no stipulation anent
reversion or reconveyance of the property in the event that petitioner does
not comply with its obligation. With the absence of such a stipulation, it may
legally be inferred that there was an implied agreement that ownership shall
not pass to the purchaser until he had fully paid the price. Article 1478 of the
Civil Code does not require that such a stipulation be expressly made.
Consequently, an implied stipulation to that effect is considered valid and
binding and enforceable between the parties. A contract which contains this
kind of stipulation is considered a contract to sell. Moreover, that the parties
really intended to execute a contract to sell is bolstered by the fact that the
deed of absolute sale would have been issued only upon the payment of the
balance of the purchase price, as may be gleaned from Adelfa Properties
letter dated 16 April 1990 wherein it informed the vendors that it is now
ready and willing to pay you simultaneously with the execution of the
corresponding deed of absolute sale.

G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu
Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon
thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose
Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and
Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died
in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in
area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan,
which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their
sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita
Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery,
induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and
Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the
sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their
sisters Concepcion and Paz.
Two among of the four parties were minors during the signing of the
Deed of Sale but on the date of sale, these minors presented themselves that
they were of legal age at the time they signed it and they made the same
manifestation before the notary public.

Issue:
WON the Deed of Sale is valid when the minors presented themselves
that they were of legal age.

Held:
The courts lay down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it
was executed by minors who have passed the age of puberty adolescence and
are near the adult age and that the minors pretended that they already
reached their majority. Under Art 38, Minority, insanity or imbecility, the
state of being deaf mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on the capacity to act and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations as when the latter arise from his acts of from
property relations such as easements. Also these minors cannot be permitted
afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation
assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the
provisions of the law on estoppel.
G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO
vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA

Facts:
Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon
Alcantara conveyed to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was
then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of
Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor
and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw
Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose
Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed
of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum
of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores
from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as
regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land covered by certificates
of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her
husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino
Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon
Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of
the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against
Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution,
Issue:
WON the deed of sale should be annulled because one of the parties in
the contract is minor.
Held:
The court ruled that Ramon Alcantara is not allowed to annul such
deed, because he already ratified it. The letter written by Alcantara informing
the buyers about his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the
sale and that the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until
the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded Ramon
from laches and consequent estoppel. Ramon may have executed his acts in
bad faith because he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale
and its ratification, yet the summons the courts to annul the sale because he
executed it while he is a minor.

G.R. No. 106063 November 21, 1996

EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. & CARMELO &
BAUERMANN, INC.
vs.
MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.

Facts:
Petitioners Carmelo Baurmann Inc. leased its parcel of land with two-
story building to respondent Mayfair theater Incorporated. They entered a
contract which provides that if the lessor should desire to sell the property,
the lessee shall be given 30-days exclusive option to purchase the same.
Carmelo informed Mayfair that they have an intention to sell the property to
EQUITORIAL. Mayfair made known its interest to buy the property but only
to the extent of the leased premises. Notwithstanding Mayfairs intention,
Carmelo sold the property to the petitioner company.
Issue:
WON the sale of the property to Equatorial is valid.

Held:
The sale of the property should be rescinded because Mayfair has the
right of first refusal. Both Equatorial and Carmelo are in bad faith because
they knew of the stipulation in the contract regarding the right of first refusal.
 The stipulation is a not an option contract but a right of first refusal
and as such the requirement of a separate consideration for the option, has
no applicability in the instant case. The consideration is built in the
reciprocal obligation of the parties.
In reciprocal contract, the obligation or promise of each party is the
consideration for that of the other. (Promise to lease in return of the right to
first refusal)
With regard to the impossibility of performance, only Carmelo can be
blamed for not including the entire property in the right of first refusal. Court
held that Mayfair may not have the option to buy the property. Not only the
leased area but the entire property.

EQUATORIAL REALTY DEV. INC. v MAYFAIR THEATER INC.

FACTS: For its theaters, Mayfair was leasing a portion of the property in CM
Recto, which Carmelo owns. Under the lease agreement, if Carmelo should
decide to sell the leased premises, Mayfair shall be given 30 days exclusive
option to purchase the same. Carmelo, through Henry Yang, informed the
president of Mayfair that the former is interested in selling the whole CM
Recto propertyand that Araneta offered to purchase the same for $1.2M.
Mayfair twice replied through a letter of its intention to exercise its right to
repurchasebut Carmelo never replied. Thereafter, Carmelo sold the entire
property to Equatorial Realty for some P11M. Thus, Mayfair instituted an
action for specific performance and annulment of the sale.
Carmelo alleges that the right, being an option contract, is void for lack of
consideration.
ISSUE: W/N the right to repurchase is an option contract and void for lack
of consideration
HELD: NO. The clause in the lease agreement was NOT an option contract,
but a RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. It was premised on Carmelos decision to
sell the said property. It also did not contain a stipulation as to the price of
said property. The requirement of separate consideration does not apply to
a right of 1st refusal because consideration is already an integral part of the
lease. Carmelo violated such right by not affording Mayfair a fair chance to
negotiate. It abandoned the negotiations arbitrarily. Equatorial was
likewise in bad faith; it was well aware of the right conferred upon Mayfair
because its lawyers had ample time to review the contract. That being the
case, the contract between Carmelo and Equatorial is rescissible. Mayfair
should be allowed to purchase the entire property for the price offered by
Equatorial. Rights of First Refusal are also governed by the law on contracts,
not the amorphous principles on human relations.

G.R. No. 76031 March 2, 1994

MIGUEL SEMIRA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BUENAVENTURA
.Facts:
Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land situated in Sto. Nio, Taysan,
Batangas which she sold to private respondent Buenaventura for P850.00 by
means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" executed on 4 January
1961. Aside from the estimated area of 822.5 square meters appearing in the
deed of sale, the following boundaries of the lot are also indicated.
Thereafter, private respondent entered the premises observing thereby the
boundaries of the property and not the area given.
Buenaventura also acquired two (2) other parcels of land, Lot 4215
with an area of 8,606-square meters located on the east of Lot 4221 from the
spouses Pascual Hornilla and Gliceria Ilao on 30 June 1964, and another lot
with an area of 11,000-square meters from Santiago Asi. Pascual Hornilla is
the son of Juana Gutierrez.
On 18 October 1972, private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew,
Cipriano Ramirez, and spouse by means of another "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" for P2,500.00, where the lot was described with the same area and
boundaries mentioned in the 4 January 1961 "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
with the exception of the boundary on the east; which was changed from
"Juana Gutierrez" to "Buenaventura An" to reflect the acquisition by private
respondent of the adjoining Lot 4215.
 On 12 March 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the lot to petitioner Miguel
Semira for P20,000.00. However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa" was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the
previous document. As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is actually much
bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was confirmed by the Taysan
Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in 1974 where it is definitely stated that
the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason for the change.
On 17 March 1979, Miguel Semira entered the very same premises previously
occupied by Ramirez and began the construction of a new rice-mill.
However, on 18 April 1979, a complaint for forcible entry was filed against
him by private respondent in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-
Lobo. The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters
only and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by
petitioner formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from the Hornillas in
1964.
Petitioner admits having entered the disputed portion on 17 March 1979, but
denies having illegally done so. In his answer, petitioner claims ownership
over the property by invoking the 1979 deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano
Ramirez.
Issue:
Whether or Not Miguel Semira is liable for forcible entry because lot
4221 has an area of 822.5 square meters only therefore the excess 1,377 is not
covered by the sale.
Held:
The sale is for lump sum. Thus, he is not liable for forcible entry.
The court repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum and
not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated
in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area
thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included
within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater
or smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the
area is described as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less. These
conclusions are drawn from Art. 1542 of the Civil code which states In the
sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum
for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the
price, although there be a greater or less are or number than that stated in
the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold
for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should
be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is
included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer
a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or
number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede
to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.
Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to his
nephew Cipriano Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the
former transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their
document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its boundaries.

REPUBLIC V PHIL RESOURCES DEV (Must be in money or

equivalent Beron)
Facts: Defendant Apostol submitted the highest bid for purchase of 100 tons
of Palawasn Almaciga and logs. Deliveries were made but Apostol failed to
pay . Acomplaint then was filed against Apostol.
Phil REsources seek to intervene in this civil case claiming that it has some
goods deposited in a warehouse which goods were used by Apostol to settle
his personal debts to Bureau of Prisons. Phil Resources demanded the return
of the goods, but bureau refused.
The lower court denied motion for intervention.
Issue: W/n respondent Phil Resources can intervene or has legal interest to
intervene...
Held: YES. It intends to protect its interest and rights over some materials
purportedly belonging to it. The assertion that the subject matter of original
litigation is a sum of money and not the goods, and therefore respondent has
no legal interest to intervene is without merit.
The materials have been assessed and they have been assigned by Apostol as
payment of his debts with the Bureau of Prisons.
Government argues that "price = paid in terms of money and the supposed
payment being in kind, it is no payment at all"
The law provides for money or its 'equivalent'. Equivalent therefore need not
be in money.

REPUBLIC v PHIL. RESOURCES DEV. CORP.

FACTS: The Republic brought an action against Apostol for the collection of
sums owing to it for his purchase of Palawan Almaciga and other logs. His
total debt amounted to some P34,000. PRDC intervened claiming that
Apostol, as President of the company, without prior authority, took goods
(steel sheets, pipes, bars, etc) from PRDC warehouse and appropriated them
to settle his personal debts in favor of the government. The Republic opposed
the intervention of PRDC, arguing that price is always paid in money and
that payment in kind is no payment at all; hence, money and not the goods
of PRDC are under dispute.
ISSUE: W/N payment in kind is equivalent to price paid in money
HELD: YES. Price may be paid in money or ITS EQUIVALENTin this case,
the goods. Payment need not be in the form of money. The prices for the
goods have, in fact, been assessed and determined. PRDC thus has a
substantial interest in the case and must be permitted to interveneits goods
paid out without authority being under dispute in this case.

CARBONELL v CA
FACTS: Poncio, a Batanes native, owned a parcel of land, which he offered to
sell to Carbonell and Infante. The land was mortgaged to Republic Bank.
Poncio and Carbonell agreed to the sale of the land, and the latter assumed
to pay the mortgage in favor of the bank. Poncio and Carbonell executed an
instrument where the latter allowed the former to remain in the premises in
spite of the sale for a period of 1 year. Later on, when the Formal Deed of Sale
was to be executed, Poncio told Carbonell that he could no longer proceed
with the sale as he had already sold the same to Infante for a better price.
Carbonell immediately sought to register adverse claim; 4 days later, Infante
registered the sale with the adverse claim annotated thereto. Infante
thereafter introduced significant improvements on the property. They now
dispute ownership over the said land.
ISSUE: Who has a better title, Carbonell or Infante?
HELD: CARBONELL. In order to claim the benefit of Art. 1544, the buyer of
realty must register the property in good faith. It is a pre-condition to a
superior title. In this case, Infante was not in good faith, thus the prior sale
to Carbonell must prevail. Infante registered her claim 4 days after the
adverse claim was registered, she had notice that Carbonell paid off the
mortgage debt as the mortgage passbook was already in his possession. She
likewise ignored Carbonell and refused to talk to here. These are badges of
bad faith that taint her registration.

RUDOLF LIETZ INC v CA

FACTS: Buriol previously owned a parcel of unregistered land in Palawan. In
1986, he entered into a lease agreement with Flaviano and Tiziana Turatello
and Sani (Italians) involving a hectare of his property. This agreement was
for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. After the paying
P10,000 downpayment, Turatello and Sani took possession of the land.
However, this agreement was only reduced into writing in 1987. After 11
months, Buriol sold the same parcel of land (5 hec) to Rudolf Lietz Inc for
P30,000. Later on, Rudolf Lietz Inc discovered that Buriol owned only 4
hectares with one hectare covered by the lease; thus, only 3 hectares were
delivered to it. Rudolf Lietz Inc instituted a complaint for the annulment of
the lease against Buriol, Sani and the Turatellos before the RTC. RTC and CA
ruled in favor of Buriol, Sani and Turatellos.
ISSUE: Whether the sale between Buriol and Rudolf Lietz Inc is a lump sum
or unit price sale
HELD: LUMP SUM SALE. The Deed of Absolute Sale shows that the parties
agreed on the purchase price on a predetermined area of 5 hectares within
the specified boundaries and not based on a particular rate per area. In
accordance with Art. 1542, there shall be no reduction in the purchase price
even if the area delivered to Rudolf Lietz Inc is less than that states in the
contract. In the instant case, the area within the boundaries as stated in the
contract shall control over the area agreed upon in the contract