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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM:


DEPRIVATION, ISLAMISM AND
GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
a b
Ana Bela Santos Bravo & Carlos Manuel Mendes Dias
a
Academia Militar and CIEF ISEG (Technical University of
Lisbon) ,
b
Academia Militar ,
Published online: 23 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Ana Bela Santos Bravo & Carlos Manuel Mendes Dias (2006) AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM: DEPRIVATION, ISLAMISM AND GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS, Defence and Peace
Economics, 17:4, 329-341

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Defence and Peace Economics, 2006,
Vol. 17(4), August, pp. 329341

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM:


DEPRIVATION, ISLAMISM AND GEOPOLITICAL
FACTORS
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ANA BELA SANTOS BRAVO1 AND CARLOS MANUEL MENDES DIAS2


1 2
Academia Militar and CIEF ISEG (Technical University of Lisbon); Academia
Militar

(Received 10 July 2005; in final form 15 December 2005)


GDPE_A_152633.sgm
Taylor and Francis Ltd

This paper analyses the number of terrorist attacks and their outcomes in the period 19972004. We investigate the
Defence
10.1080/10242690500526509
1024-2694
Original
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00
Ana
2006
000
anasb32@hotmail.com
00 Bela
&and
Article
Francis
SantosBravo
(print)/1476-8267
Peace Economics(online)

hypotheses that deprivation is the underlying cause of terrorism and that geopolitical contexts cannot be ignored. The
results from econometric OLS cross-country testing of these hypotheses with data for two large regions of Eurasia
seem to confirm our hypotheses, given that the determinants of terrorism differ in the two geopolitical areas and the
number of terrorist incidents is negatively associated with the level of development, the literacy level and ethnic frac-
tionalization, being positively related to mineral reserves, non-democratic political regimes and participation in inter-
national organizations.

Keywords: Terrorism; Deprivation; Geopolitics; Econometric estimation

INTRODUCTION

A vast literature on empirical studies has focused on the economic, social and political deter-
minants of terrorism as well as its consequences. Among others, Sandler and Enders (1996)
and Enders and Sandler (2000, 2004) have offered important contributions to the economic
analysis of terrorism, both on the determinants, the evolution and the consequences of its
outcomes. Bruk and Wickstrom (2004) present an introduction to the importance of the
economic evaluation of the consequences of terror and summarize the conclusions of some
recent research on this topic. Recently, various empirical studies have focused on the so-called
deprivation approach, testing the relation of terrorism to low levels of development and weak
institutions. Among others, Weinberg and Eubank (1998), Dumas (2003), Abadie (2004),
Piazza (2004) and Li (2005) have studied the influence of the level of development and the
political regime on terrorism, while Hegre et al. (2001) did the same on civil wars. Krueger
and Maleckova (2002) studied the relation with the level of education and Li and Schaub
(2004) analysed the positive relationship with globalization. Most of the empirical studies do
provide strong conclusive results.

Correspondence Address: Ana Bela Santos Bravo, Academia Militar, Av. C. Castro Guimares, 2720-113 Amadora,
Portugal. Email: anasb32@hotmail.com.

ISSN 1024-2694 print: ISSN 1476-8267 online 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/10242690500526509
330 A. B. S. BRAVO AND C. M. M. DIAS

This paper aims at contributing to this strand of literature by focusing on two features that
are associated with the social, political and economic determinants of terrorism: the relevance
of the particular geopolitical contexts, both globally and of the regions related to the attacks;
and the growing influence of radical Islamic terrorism.
The growth in the Islamic trend of terrorism has already been emphasized as a long-run
tendency by Hoffman (1997). More recently Barros and Proena (2005) study the probability
of a terrorist incident being Islamic-driven in Europe, and Frisch (2005) claims that the latest
developments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict point to an Islamization of the conflict on the
Palestinian side. However, geopolitical and geostrategical considerations have not been
explored in the literature, although Le Billon (2001) has analysed, from a political ecologists
perspective, the relevance of geostrategic natural resources in explaining armed conflicts.
Abadie (2004) found an association between a countrys risk of terrorism and geographic
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features, such as climate, altitude and area, and Cutter et al. (2003) focus on the various
geographical dimensions of terrorism, specifically their implications for national security
policies. However, if we bear in mind that terrorism has always had political objectives, the
influence of geographic characteristics, such as location and regional insertion, are more
relevant when associated with political factors that arise both in the domestic policies and the
international relations of the targeted countries. Regional and global geopolitical configura-
tions changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the other hand, the economic, social,
technological and cultural repercussions of globalization have also influenced the evolution of
terrorism, both in its domestic and transnational trends. Terrorist organizations have also
become global actors, along with other non-state agents, such as multinational firms and non-
governmental organizations. Therefore, we think that the international geopolitical context
cannot be omitted from the study of terrorism.
The aims of this paper are as follows: (1) to discuss the social, political and economic
determinants of terrorism, assuming that the geopolitical contexts of terrorist activities and
the Islamic roots of terrorism are key factors; (2) to perform a statistical analysis of data on
the total number of terrorist attacks and their outcomes.
The paper is organized in the following way: in the second section we discuss some of the
economic, social, religious and political factors that may be regarded as determinants of terror-
ism, presenting a brief review of the literature. In the third section, we argue that the geopolit-
ical contexts are relevant for a comprehensive analysis of terrorism. The fourth section
presents the empirical research, starting with the description of our hypotheses and the meth-
odology used. We analyse the data by regions, comparing the evolution in terrorism from
196897 to the recent period 19972004. Then, we perform an econometric estimation. The
fifth section presents the results and we finish with conclusions.

DEPRIVATION AND ISLAMISM AS DETERMINANTS OF TERRORISM

Despite the efforts of the United Nations Committee for Counter-Terrorism, there is not a
internationally accepted definition of terrorism. However, in order to undertake empirical
research on terrorism, one has to depart from a given definition of terrorist attacks. The view
that underlies the database used in our empirical study defines terrorism as premeditated
politically motivated use, or threat of use, of violence, perpetrated against non-combatant
targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audi-
ence1. The term transnational terrorism applies when the territory, the property, the institu-
tions or the citizens of more than one country are involved.

1
In Title 22 of the US Code, section 2656f (d).
TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 331

It is relatively consensual that the main motives for terrorism across the globe have been
related to domestic problems and directed against the political regime, a particular government
or its social, economic or religious foundations. Ideology has played a relevant role (Drake,
1993); however, during the past two decades the terrorists main motivations have moved
from an ideological reference to an ethnical identity and religious fundamentalism matrix.
Hoffman (1997: 3) showed that the number of religious terrorist groups increased from 2 in
1980 to about half of the active 58 groups in 1995. In 2001, those countries with a Muslim
population over 50% were the home of 66 terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the countries
where Muslims form over 70% of the total population have accounted for about 32% of all the
terrorist attacks.2 At the same time, there has been a confluence of the international and the
domestic terrorist trends, as Hoffman (1997) and Brzezinski (2004) 3 point out. For this
reason, we have analysed total data on terrorist attacks, as it does not seem wise to separate
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domestic and transnational incidents when studying the factors that determine terrorism
worldwide.
In general, the nature of the political regime, as well as the social and economic situation of
the countries where terrorist groups operate, may generate the conditions favourable to the
genesis of radicalism, thus stimulating terrorism. Poverty, weak institutions and corruption
make weak states more vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.4
This view, widely spread by the American administration, can find some support in the
empirical research on the economic and social determinants of terrorism, particularly the
deprivation approach. The main argument is that low levels of education, poor social condi-
tions and lack of political freedom are among the main roots of terrorism in the less developed
regions. Gurr (1970) was one of the pioneers, and more recently Li and Schaub (2004) found
evidence that terrorism is associated with poverty. The implication for politics is that in the
long-term we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice are the best
prophylactics against terrorism.5 According to Frey (2004) it is better to use a carrot by
reducing social exclusion, discrimination and creating better life expectancies, in order to
increase the opportunity costs of potential terrorists rather than a stick (i.e. counter-
terrorism).
However, many empirical studies could not demonstrate the existence and the direction of
a clear association between deprivation and terrorism worldwide. Krueger and Laitin (2003),
and Piazza (2004) found no evidence of a significant association between poverty and the
number of transnational terrorist attacks. Abadie (2004) found the existence of a negative
relationship between the level of development and the risk of terrorism, but it ceased to be
significant when other explanatory variables entered the regression. Krueger and Maleckova
(2002) concluded that the occurrence of hate crimes is largely independent of economic
conditions and education; however, this study is based on opinion polls conducted in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, where incomes above the poverty line and education were shown to be
positively associated with participation in Hezbollah. Testas (2004) concluded that there is a
positive relationship between the education level and transnational terrorism in Muslim coun-
tries, i.e. countries with a higher education level tended to have more terrorism.6

2
Our estimation based on MIPT (2004). There are about 330 known organizations in the whole world and 210 in
Eurasia, but a great part has not been active in recent years. When we take into account all the organizations located
in the Euro-Asiatic continent, Islamic groups represent around 18%.
3
All the talk about terrorism with a global reach cannot erase the national origins of the terrorists, the specific
focus of their hatreds, or their religious roots (Brzezinski, 2004: 32).
4
President G. W. Bush, in www.whitehouse.gov , page 2, 15-02-04.
5
The Committee for Counter Terrorism created at the ONU (www.onu.org/Docs/sc/Committees).
6
This may be explained by the Robin Wood effect highly educated well-off people are more aware of
injustices and are prone to act in favour of the under-privileged.
332 A. B. S. BRAVO AND C. M. M. DIAS

One of the limitations of econometric testing of this relationship lies in the fact that
estimates may be biased, owing to simultaneous causality, as terrorism also affects national
income, as pointed out in the literature.7 Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence that
democratic countries have suffered fewer attacks; some studies showed that there is even a
positive association between the number of attacks and democracy for instance, Eubank and
Weinberg (1994) and Weinberg and Eubank (1998) while some others found a negative
correlation, depending upon the period used, or along the range of political rights as in Abadie
(2004), who concluded that countries with a medium level of political freedom showed a
negative relation between freedom and terrorism but it tended to become positive in either
authoritarian or highly democratic estates. Testas (2004) seems to confirm this non-linear
positive relation with low and high political repression in his study for 37 Muslim countries.
The results from the literature indicate that it is wiser to investigate the determinants of
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terrorism by groups of countries (i.e. by region) in order to reduce heterogeneity and to take
into account the geopolitical contexts, which is the approach followed in this paper.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS FOR TERRORISM

To our knowledge, geostrategic factors have not entered the analysis of the determinants of
terrorism. Traditionally, geopolitics has focused essentially on the struggle for power between
nations concerning territorial influence. However, the growth in transnational terrorism has
shown that non-state agents, or groups, are becoming gate-crashing actors in the theatre of
world geopolitics, to which they have not been invited, with a script that no one else knows,
using non-conventional means but, nevertheless, acting strategically most of the time8 to inter-
fere with the game of the big players.
One of the most well-known interpretations of geopolitical configurations is that of
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, 2001, 2004).9 Following his framework, we have centred our
analysis in Eurasia. This continent is considered the Grand Chessboard, where competition
for global control has taken place throughout history and up to current times. The Eurasian
continent includes four main sectors, which form the corners of the chessboard. In each of
them a state, or a group of states, has been dominant.10
The author also identifies the several actors that can play a competitive role in the Eurasian
system, apart from the USA: the Geostrategic Players11 France, Germany, Russia, China, India
and the Geopolitical Pivots 12 Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran. After
characterizing the main players and their initial positions on the chessboard, Brzezinskis
objective is to discuss some possible moves of the strategic players in a game to increase their

7
For instance, in Sandler and Enders (1996).
8
With a strategy of insurgency, as Merari (1993) points out.
9
Brzezinski (1997) The Grand Chessboard, The Geostrategic Triad (Brzezinski, 2001) and The Choice
(Brzezinski, 2004). Between 1977 and 1981 he was National Security Adviser of US President Jimmy Carter.
10
The West is occupied by the densely populated, economically developed and politically powerful states of
Europe, which are spreading towards the eastern part with the enlargement of the EU. (2) The Eastern corner of the
chessboard is dominated by China, Japan, and North Korea, (3) The Central space is dominated by Russia and partly
by China; (4) The South of Eurasia has been dominated by India and Pakistan, and in the south-western Eurasian
border we find the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
11
Active geoestrategic players are the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influ-
ence beyond their borders in order to alter the existing geopolitical state of affairs to a degree that affects Americas
interests (which explains why the UK is not included in this group). They have the potential and/or the predisposition
to be geopolitically volatile (Brzezinski, 1997: 40).
12
Most often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special
role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player (Brzezinski, 1997:
41).
TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 333

influence over some spaces/regions, in a context where the USA aims at maintaining global
hegemony.
We must point out that this interpretation refers to the late 1990s and it will have to be updated,
to include the USAs invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, the discussion around
the future admission of Turkey to the EU shows the areas relevance as a pivot estate. According
to Brzezinski (2004) it seems that the American dominant strategy for Eurasia has recently been
based on a balanced and coordinated management of the two triangles formed, on the one hand,
by EUA-EU-Russia and, on the other hand by EUA-China-Japan, as well as on some control
over the global Balkans, where conflicts with the Islamic world may be reflected.
Despite the eventual limitations, this setting may provide some insights: (a) Eurasia, the
main stage of international competition, is also the space where the roots of terrorism are
embedded and where most of its activities are concentrated, as our empirical analysis will
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show; (b) the USA needs to hold control, indirectly or directly, of some of its regions (the
Middle East is clearly one of them), in order to maintain global hegemony; (c) in the last two
decades, terrorist activities seem to have been associated (either as a consequence or as a
cause) with alterations in regional power relations.13 Terrorism in the Middle East cannot be
dissociated from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the involvement of the USA and some
European countries. The 11 September 2001 attack in the USA, the consequent invasion of
Afghanistan, then of Iraq, as well as the terrorist bombings in Madrid and in London in the last
two years, indicate that the fundamentalist terrorists main political objective is to stop the
USA and their allies from controlling the Middle East and supporting Israel.

THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Hypothesis and Methodological Approach


Having discussed the relevance of the global geopolitical context for terrorism and its relation-
ship with Islamic fundamentalism, our approach is to associate these issues with deprivation
as the main determinant of terrorism.
Our hypotheses on the determinants of terrorism can be stated as follows.
(1) Terrorist attacks are determined by the social, political and economic conditions of the
targeted countries, which are associated with deprivation;
(2) The geopolitical characteristics of the states/regions and the growth in Islamic fundamen-
talism are also assumed to determine terrorist attacks.
According to (2), the indicators of deprivation and location that are used as determinants
should not be the same for all regions. Hypothesis (2) is based on the assumption that Islamic
groups have attacked either Islamic countries with moderate governments seen as abiding or
collaborating with the West or Western countries where there are Islamic communities
where terrorists can look for recruits and hide among the population. Implicitly, we are assum-
ing the possibility of strategic planning by terrorist leaders, because, as noted by Drake (1993),
terrorist attacks are rarely indiscriminate i.e. the choice of preferred targets and means
depend on their ideology and resources; Islamism has played the role of a powerful ideology.
Hence, we have used the proportion of Muslims in the populations of the targeted countries as
an explanatory variable of terrorism. This is in line with Jordan and Boix (2004), who discuss
the problem that al-Qaeda presents for countries that host Muslim populations of native or
immigrant origins, taking into account that there are about 14 million to 16 million living in
Europe and 4 million to 7 million in the USA.

13
Particularly in the Middle East, but also in Chechnya.
334 A. B. S. BRAVO AND C. M. M. DIAS

The methodology adopted was based on the analysis of the data on total terrorist attacks and
their outcomes for 121 countries and their distribution by regions. The evolution in the number
of attacks, deaths and casualties by region are summed up in Tables A1, A2 and A3 in
Appendix A and we discuss the results in the next subsection.
In a second step, in order to test our assumption that geopolitics matters, we have under-
taken two econometric estimations by using data for the countries situated in the Eurasian
continent. This is justified by the fact that more than two thirds of terrorist attacks were
concentrated there, and it has also been the main theatre of operations in the struggle for polit-
ical influence,14 as discussed earlier. Therefore, we have discarded the American and African
countries from the initial data set (with the exception of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and
Egypt15). As a matter-of-fact, recent studies have used small samples in order to reduce the
heterogeneity of data, such as Sanjeev et al. (2004), who considered only 22 conflict episodes
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in low and middle income countries in a study of the relationship between armed conflicts and
economic performance.16
By estimating simple statistical indicators from total data series and, secondly, by selecting
some of them as independent variables in an econometric estimation, we expect that it will be
possible to test our hypotheses.

Analysis of World Data by Large Areas: the Regional Incidence of Terrorism


Considering the database analysed,17 between 1997 and 2004 there were 9024 terrorist attacks
around the world. We have elaborated Tables A1 and A2 in order to characterize terrorism by
region in this period, comparing the period under analysis with the previous period (1968 to
1996, inclusive) with caution, as the latter refers only to data on international terrorism. We
can observe from Table A2 that, only in the fringes of Eurasia (West and Eastern Europe,
Middle EastPersian Gulf and South Asia), were 6936 terrorist actions concentrated in the last
seven years, representing more than two thirds of the total number (76.9%). As a result, we
can conclude that the Eurasian space is the preferential target. Latin America has reduced its
percentage of the total from 24% to 15% in the last seven years. Africa registered only 2.9%
of terrorist incidents. From the first period to the second it is worth noting that:
a) There was a significant increase in the proportion of terrorist attacks in South Asia and
Eastern Europe from 4% to 17% and from 2% to 9%, respectively (Table A2) and also
in the Middle East from 19% to 26%.
b) There was a remarkable increase in the number of fatalities registered, mainly due to the
inclusion of domestic incidents in the data set thus, the total fatalities in the period
19972004 reached 11,810, which is more than the total number of deaths in the previous
29 years. This represents an average of 1247 deaths per year, when compared with a
yearly average of only 256 deaths in the first period (international incidents only).
When we analyse incidents by Target (Table A3), we see that the number of incidents in
Airlines, Diplomatic and Government buildings/personnel was reduced as a percentage of
the total representing 77% in 1968/96 and 53% in the second period, and generating a signif-
icantly smaller number of deaths (reduced from 45% to 15% in the last seven years), whilst
attacks on Citizens and private property have increased as a proportion, representing around
29% of total incidents and 28% of total casualties.

14
The grand chessboard, as referred to earlier.
15
One can include them in the European-Middle Eastern area of geopolitical influence.
16
Armed conflicts were associated with lower GDP growth and higher inflation and had adverse effects on tax
revenue and investment.
17
MITThe Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the prevention of terrorism; last update in April 2004.
TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 335

North America represented 26% of the total number of deaths during the period 19972004,
corresponding to the 3068 deaths on September 11, 2001.
Therefore, our analysis of the world data shows that terrorists have increasingly targeted
citizens and have caused more carnage since 1997, and even before, as other studies showed,
such as Enders and Sandler (2000) who concluded that events with casualties have risen since
1979. Enders and Sandler (2004: 11) confirmed that for the period after September 11 using
sophisticated statistical tools to look for structural breaks in the year 2001 and afterwards
there was no increase in the growth of total incidents but an alteration in their composition
through greater reliance on deadly bombings and a consequent increase in the number of
casualties.
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Econometric Estimations: The Determinants of Terrorist Attacks in Eurasia


In order to test the hypotheses stated above, we have analysed a large set of indicators, relating
to demographic and cultural features of the population, the degree of development, natural
resources and others, which can be regarded as being included in geopolitical/strategic factors,
as described in the third section, together with other indicators, such as the position-factor18
and the membership of international organizations.19
We ran two regressions, using the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimation on cross-
section data: the first one for 85 countries and the second for a sub-sample of 60 countries. The
purpose was to test our hypotheses on a less heterogeneous group of countries by excluding
the enlarged-EU countries. This is justified by our assumption that it is not correct to use the
same variables as determinants in very heterogeneous countries located in different geopolit-
ical areas; on the other hand, the EU includes powerful states that have imposed their influence
in other parts of Eurasia and elsewhere (when we are not taking into account the USA). There-
fore, many of the terrorist reactions to their dominance occur not only at home (EU) but to their
citizens and property (such as embassies) located in foreign countries.
Taking the number of total terrorist incidents (attacks) which were registered in each coun-
try during the period analysed (19972004) as the dependent variable, the regression function
estimated for the two data-samples was the following:

N.attacks = b0 + b1 Mosl + b2 IHD + b3 Pol + b4 Ener + b5 Min + b6 IO + b7 Embass


b8 Lit + b9 Ethn + b10 Pos + b11Open + b12 MigRate + (1)

All the variables are described in Appendix B. The first variable (Mosl) stands for the propor-
tion of Muslims in the national population to capture the influence of Islamic fundamentalism
and the fact that the associated terrorist cells plan their actions in a decentralized way with the
support of elements of Muslim immigrant communities in the various countries. Pol, Ener,
Min and Pos are dummies taking a value 1 for countries with a pluralist politics regime,
relevant energy and mineral resources and geographic location, taken as 0 otherwise; The
deprivation assumption that low development, illiteracy and lack of freedom are determi-
nants of terrorism is accounted for by the Index of Human Development (IHD), the degree
of openness to trade (Open), the degree of literacy (Lit), and pluralist political regime Pol;
membership of a Union and other international organizations (IO), the number of embassies

18
Commonly used in the literature on international relations to measure the importance of geographical location.
See Cline (1978, 1980), Couto (1988) and Bessa (2001). Variables defined in Appendix 2.
19
In fact, these form part of the political engagement component of the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Globaliza-
tion Index, which ranks 62 countries (making up 68% of world population) according to several indicators, from
finance to trade, information technology, tourism, travel and politics (see www.foreignpolicy).
336 A. B. S. BRAVO AND C. M. M. DIAS

(Embass) and a relevant geographic position (Pos) are assumed to indicate their insertion, in
a regional or the global geopolitical context. The number of ethnic groups (Ethn), high rates
of net migration (MigRate), may indicate demographic, economic and social stress, favouring
terrorism.

RESULTS FROM THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION

Some of the explanatory variables included in equation (1), although correlated with the
number of attacks, were a source of multicollinearity and were not statistically significant in
the estimated relationships, therefore they were abandoned. In the estimation of equation (1)
for total Eurasia, all the estimated coefficients for the variables retained have the expected
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signs, according to some of our assumptions explained earlier - the results are shown in Table
A4 (Appendix C). The estimation for Eurasia is significant (given by the F value and its signif-
icance, shown in the last row) but can only explain around 22% of the variation in the number
of terrorist attacks across the countries (given that R2 = 0.22) as only IO and the Index of
human development (IHD) are statistically significant. The geographic position (Pos), the
pluralist political regime (Pol) and trade openness (Open) have expected signs but low t-ratios,
and hence high p-values, so they are not significant. The proportion of Islamic population
(Mosl) is clearly non-significant, although it is positively correlated to attacks. The nature of
the political regime (Pol), Openess, and the Index of human development (IHD) have the
predicted negative coefficients, which means that the largest number of attacks in the Eurasian
continent in this period have occurred in the less developed countries with non-democratic
regimes, with a smaller degree of trade openness and participation in more international
organizations. This seems to corroborate the assumptions of the deprivation approaches to
terrorism but also the influence of geopolitics. However, income (IHD) tends to become non-
significant when other variables are included in the regression, which was also found by other
authors such as Abadie (2004).
The second regression shows a better fit column 2 in Table A4, a subsample of 60 coun-
tries in Eurasia. We have used the Literacy level instead of the IHD and embassies instead of
international organizations (to avoid multicollinearity and given the non-stability of income).
Observing the results in Table A4, some variables that were not significant in the first
regression are now significant at levels lower than 5% significance, such as the existence of
large reserves of minerals (Min) and literacy (Lit); the political regime is significant in both,
embassies is not significant and ethnic groups (Ethn) is significant at 10%. We find that four
significant explanatory variables (Pol, Min, Lit, Ethn) can explain about 33% of the cross-
country variation in the number of terrorist attacks. We added other variables that were also
correlated to the number of attacks the number of international organizations, migration rate,
food resources, number of TV sets, the degree of openness and also the service debt to the
previous regression, but none of their estimates were significant and they were abandoned.
According to our results, although the Islamic trend has acquired an indisputable relevance
in the analysis of terrorism through the period 1997 to 2004, it did not prove to be statistically
significant when we measure its influence by the proportion of Islamic population across
countries. However, our data show that, although the number of terrorist organization in
Islamic countries20 is only 66 in our sample, if we consider all the countries where Muslims
represent 4% or more of the total population, they are the home ground of 167 terrorist

20
Assumed by us to be the ones with more that 70% Muslim population.
TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 337

organizations, which represents 50.3% of the 332 known terrorist organizations (although
some of those organizations have not been active).

CONCLUSIONS

Our results point to the following conclusions:


(1) By analysing the world data between 1997 and 2004 it becomes clear that there has been
a change in the geographic distribution of the number of terrorist incidents, showing that
there has been a greater concentration in the Eurasian continent relative to the two previ-
ous decades, particularly in the Middle East (from 19 to 26% of the world total) and in
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the South East (from 4 to 17%); at the same time, there has been a tendency for an
increase in the number of casualties, mainly deaths among citizens (Tables A2 and A3 in
Appendix A);
(2) The econometric estimation confirmed the assumption of the deprivation approach to
the determinants of terrorism the largest number of attacks in Eurasia in this period
occurred in less-developed countries, with non-democratic regimes, low literacy levels
and less dependence on international trade;
(3) Based on the data for Eurasia in the period analysed, our hypothesis that geopolitical
factors are relevant as determinants of terrorism may be correct as given by: (a) the vari-
ables found significant as determinants differ in the two geographic areas of Eurasia,
confirming that the results are better for smaller and less heterogeneous samples; (b) the
statistical significance of the political regime, large mineral resources, membership in
international organizations and literacy levels; (c) other geopolitical variables, such as the
number of embassies, the geographic position, energy and food reserves, and net migra-
tion are correlated with terrorist attacks, although they were not statistically significant in
our econometric models. The positive significance of the variable membership in inter-
national organizations and the positive correlation of attacks to the number of embassies
may point to the conclusion that the political component of globalization may be increas-
ing at a faster rate that some of its economic features.21

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this
paper by Professors Todd Sandler, Arye Hillman, Bruno Frey and Antnio Silvestre, and also
two anonymous referees. We thank all and accept full responsibility for the present text and
the opinions expressed in it.

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TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 339

APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 Terrorist Incidents by Region between 1968 and 2004

No attacks Injuries Deaths

Regions 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04

N America 480 91 1289 30 369 3068


Western EU 2177 2291 5768 721 868 149
Eastern EU 175 833 208 2581 47 1196
L America 1738 1324 1405 1726 654 1119
East & C Asia 147 57 5221 107 202 87
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South Asia 304 1506 5659 5023 1289 2489


SE Asia 243 349 419 2176 248 670
Middle East 1398 2308 8199 5226 2761 1372
Africa 535 265 1257 6753 987 1660
Total 7200 9024 29427 24343 7427 11810

Source: elaborated by the authors based on database collected in MIPT (2004)

TABLE A2 Incidents and Casualties by Region between 1968 and 2004 (% of total, based on Table A1)

No. of attacks Injuries Deaths

Regions 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04

N America 6.67 1.01 4.38 0.12 4.97 25.98


Western EU 30.24 25.39 19.6 2.96 11.69 1.26
Eastern EU 2.43 9.23 0.71 10.6 0.63 10.13
L America 24.14 14.67 4.77 7.09 8.81 9.48
East & C Asia 2.04 0.63 17.74 0.44 2.72 0.74
South Asia 4.22 16.69 19.23 20.63 17.36 21.08
SE Asia 3.38 3.87 1.42 8.94 3.34 5.67
Middle East 19.42 25.58 27.86 21.47 37.18 11.62
Africa 7.43 2.94 4.27 27.74 13.29 14.06
Total 99.82 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Estimated by the authors based on Table A1.

TABLE A3 Incidents by target

No Attacks Injuries Deaths

Targets 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04 1968/96 1997/04

Citizens 69 2592 428 6829 127 3409


% 0.96 28.7 1.45 28.1 1.7 28.4
Airlines, diplomat, govt 5586 4742 11982 7958 3327 1789
% 77.6 52.5 40.7 32.7 44.8 15.1
Tourism, transports 334 793 3529 2815 974 1013
% 4.6 8.8 12.0 11.6 13.1 8.6

Source: See Table A1


340 A. B. S. BRAVO AND C. M. M. DIAS

APPENDIX B. DATA DESCRIPTION

N. attacks the number of all terrorist attacks (including threats to act violently, such as
hostage taking) registered in each country in the past 7 years; Source: collected
in MIPT (2004). Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Internet:
http:db.mipt.org, 23June, 14h15min. Several links.
IHD the Index of Human Development a composite index based on a weighted
average of the GDP per capita in terms of the purchase of power parity and a set
of social indicators. Estimated yearly since 1990 by the UN Program for Devel-
opment (PNUD in the French/ Portuguese translations) Source: PNUD (2004),
p.139.
IO the number of international organizations memberships of a country (PNUD
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2004).
Ethn the number of ethnic groups; source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact-
book/ fields/2112.html, 25 June 2004.
Ener the existence of large energy reserves dummy (=1 for top producers and 0
otherwise); source: The State of the World 2003, Atlas Geopolitique, La Decou-
verte, Paris.
Min the existence of large reserves of minerals (top producers) dummy (=1 for top
producers and 0 otherwise); source: The State of the World 2003.
Lit percentage of adult population who have primary education; source: UN-PNUD
(2004).
Mosl the percentage of Muslims in national population; source: http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications /factbook/ fields/2112.html, 25 June 2004.
Open the degree of openness of an economy (defined as the sum of exports and
imports as a percentage of GDP); source: UN-PNUD (2004).
Pol the existence of a pluralist political system dummy (=1 if plural, 0 otherwise);
source: The State of the World 2003, Atlas Geopolitique, La Decouvert, Paris.
Pos the geographic position dummy (=1 if it has relevant geostrategic position);
defined by the authors based on Brzezinski (1997) and Cline (1978).
TERRORISM, DEPRIVATION AND ISLAM 341

APPENDIX C

TABLE A4 Results from OLS regressions

Standardized Estimated Coefficients

Independent variables (1) (2)

Constant 0.09 137.84


(1.12) 0.26 (2.99) 0.004
IHD 0.27*
(1.67) 0.10
POL 0.18 43.92 *
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(1.41) 0.17 (2.21) 0.032


Min 66.38 *
(2.00) 0.050
Lit 1.43 *
(2.44) 0.018
Ethn 8.05 *
(1.65) 0.103
Mosl 0.088
(0.564)
Embass 0.702
(1.51) 0.137
IO 0.278 **
(1.95) 0.05
Pos 0.164
(1.3) 0.17
Open 0.204
(0.44) 0.15
R2 0.22 0.33
St Error 183.83 140.09
F 2.660 5.57
Significance 0.024 0.00
N. Observations 85 60

Dependent variable: the total number of terrorist attacks; * significant at 10% and ** at 5%.
Notes: Column (1) refers to the results for 85 countries in Eurasia and (2) is a subsample of Eurasia (60 countries) which excludes the
EU countries. Values in brackets refer to the t-statistics followed by the corresponding p-values, which indicate the significance error
more directly; for instance, international organizations (IO) has a significance at the 5% level of error (p=0.05).

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