Lubrica v.

LBP
GR No. 170220
November 20, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners rejected the valuation of respondent-bank of their land, which was placed under the land reform program of PD
No. 27 and EO No. 228, being the basis of such value in 1972. The former was deprived of its property since that year but
no just compensation was received by them.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the determination of just compensation should be based on the expropriated property at the time of
payment
(2) Whether or not a transfer of ownership to the government under CARL is allowable even without receipt of the
corresponding payment or deposit of compensation

RULING:
(1) YES. Just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA No. 6657 and not PD No. 27 or EO No. 228,
for it would certainly not be equitable because of the failure to do such in a considerable length of time.
(2) NO. The transfer is conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the
DAR. Until then, title remains and should remain with the landowner.
Santos v. LBP
GR No. 137431
September 7, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a case for the determination of just compensation for the property taken by DAR under PD No. 27. After
the amount was fixed, the court ordered respondent-bank to pay petitioner both in cash and in bonds. The latter then
contended that he be paid in cash or certified checks as stated in Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court regarding how
execution of judgments for money is enforced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be paid in cash for the just compensation

RULING:

NO. Section 18 of RA No. 6657 prescribes the mode of payment of just compensation in these cases, which explicitly
mentions both cash and bonds. The provisions of CARL should be taken in conjuction with the said Rules of Court. The
respondent-bank had already complied with its duty under such Rules by already giving the petitioner the adjudged
amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds.
LBP v. CA
GR No. 118712
October 6, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondents assailed the validity of AO No. 9 and argued that it permitted the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds, which RA No. 6657 stated no such addtional qualification. Petitioner
DAR maintained that AO is a valid exercise of its rule-making power, interpreting deposit as including trust deposit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AO No. 9 is valid

RULING:

NO. DAR exceeded its authority in issuing such AO because it was in effect expanding what the law intended, and
therefore it should be held invalid. There is no ambiguity in Section 16 of RA No. 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term deposit. If it were the intention of the law to include trust deposit, express or qualifying words
ought to have appeared to show such is allowable.
LBP v. Abello
GR No. 168631
April 7, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent owned a parcel of land which was subjected to coverage of PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, in which it was
appraised for just compensation. However, she contested to the amount of valuation of her property for the reason that the
basis of the just compensation should have been RA No. 6657 and not the aforementioned laws, due to it being
inequitable and unjust because of the considerable length of time it took to determine such compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the formula prescribed in fixing just compensation under PD No. 27 and EO No. 228 should be
disregarded

RULING:

YES. It is well-settled that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. This definition does not conform to what
petitioner-bank contended that the basis of value should be the laws of many years ago which, by express provision of the
newer law CARL under Section 75, should only have suppletory effect.
Mago v. Barbin
GR No. 173923
October 12, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents land was placed under the OLT program pursuant to PD No. 27. EPs were issued by DAR to petitioners,
and the TCT relating to the property was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of them, and were eventually
resgistered in the Register of Deeds. The respondent claimed then that said EPs and TCT should be cancelled as the
petitioners failed to pay the amortizations in contravention of the direct payment scheme embodied in their deed of
transfer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the EPs and TCT can no longer be cancelled

RULING:

NO. The mere issuance of an EP does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. EPs issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules
and regulations. There were even grounds for the cancellation of such, one of which is default in paying the
aforementioned amortizations to the respondent by the petitioner.
Padua v. CA
GR No. 153456
March 2, 2007

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Pasco v. Pison-Arceo
GR No. 165501
March 28, 2006

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Estate of the late Encarnacion v. Dizon
GR No. 148777
October 18, 2007

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Soriano v. Bravo
GR No. 152086
December 15, 2010

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Isidro v. CA
GR No. L-105586
December 15, 1993

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Heirs of Santos v. CA
GR No. 109992
March 7, 2000

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Sta. Ana v. Carpo
GR No. 164340
November 28, 2008

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Magno v. Francisco
GR No. 168959
March 25, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an action for collection of lease rentals and ejectment against respondent, which was bound by a written
contract of agricultural leasehold. The latter contended that Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued, subjecting the
subject property to the OLT Program by the PARAD. The valuation of the lot came after the issuance of such EPs, and as
such it was tainted with irregularity, based on the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular on their face can defeat the
landowners rights to agricultural leasehold rentals

RULING:

NO. Such cannot deprive the landowners rights to the leasehold rentals, as this is violative of Section 2 of PD No. 266.
Moreover, the DARAB had no authority to render a decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage because according to
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedures, the Office of the Secretary of DAR has the exclusive
prerogative to do such. The existence of a tenancy relationship, which was not disputed, classifies the complaint as an
agrarian dispute, but there is still a need to ascertain if the lot is under such agrarian reform program.
Laguna Estates v. CA
GR No. 119357
July 5, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners parcel of land was subject of a right of way or easement by the DARAB for the private respondents benefit,
and for them to access the lands which were awarded to them through the CARP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant the private respondents a right of way over petitioners network of
private roads intended for their exclusive use

RULING:

NO. For the DARAB to have such, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties, which was not present in
this case. Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy relations is outside the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction
Alangilan Realty v. Office of the President
GR No. 180471
March 26, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for exclusion/exemption from CARP coverage with the MARO of DAR, averring that its land
was classified as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance (in 1982) even before the effectivity of RA No. 6657.
Also, the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance was approved, thereby
classifying such property into residential in 1994.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is exempt from coverage of CARP

RULING:

NO. The term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. It
simply reflectst the intended land use, and is not considered a land classification catergory. Indubitably, at the time of the
effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential. If, indeed, the
landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no
necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.
Concha v. Rubio
GR No. 162446
March 29, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners-beneficiaries under the CARP named by the MARO argued that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or
authority to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the same is
an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary. Respondent said otherwise, questioning the legality of the institution of the petitioners as beneficiaries over the
subject landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of
qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by the CARP

RULING:

NO. The conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be
recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative function of the Secretary of DAR.
No other agency of government is empowered or authorized by law in the selection and designation of farmer
beneficiaries except the DAR being purely an administrative function. For the DARAB to do so would be an ultra vires
act.
LBP v. Villegas
GR No. 180384
March 26, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner-bank filed cases for determination of just compensation against respondent before the RTC of Dumaguete City,
Branch 32, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court for the Province of Negros Oriental. The said RTC dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction, despite the said designation, because it claimed to have not expanded its territorial jurisdiction to hear
agrarian cases, as the subject property was located outside of such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction over just compensation cases involving
agricultural lands located outside its regular jurisdiction but within the province where it is designated as an agrarian court
under CARL

RULING:

YES. Section 57 of RA No. 6657 mentions the special jurisdiction of an RTC designated by the Supreme Court to act as a
Special Agrarian Court over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under the said Act, so long as they are within the province where they sit. Since the SC had not
designated any other Special Agrarian Courts in the province of Negros Oriental, the RTC of Dumaguete had the proper
jurisdiction of the present case.
LBP v. De Leon
GR No. 143275
September 10, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner initiated in the Court of Appeals an appeal of the decision of the Special Agrarian Court by filing a notice of
appeal, which was subsequently dismissed due to it being erroneous according to the said Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an ordinary appeal is the proper remedy in the circumstances

RULING:

NO. A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the
landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be
adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
construction, but only application
CREBA v. Secretary of DAR
GR No. 183409
June 18, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner avowed that respondent acted without jurisdiction as he had no authority to expand or enlarge the legal
signification of the term agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02, which included lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988."

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent exceeded his authority in issuing AO No. 01-02

RULING:

NO. Respondent merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No.
129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to
define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-
agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for
under Republic Act No. 6657.
Levardo v. Yatco
GR No. 165494
March 20, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent owned a parcel of land which was donated inter vivos to him, and was subsequently sold to a third person.
Petitioner was a tenant in such land, and which a Pinanumpaang Salaysay was executed by him with a disturbanc fee
that waived his tenancy rights. Thereafter, he assailed the validity of both Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale on the basis
that CLTs were issued in favor of them and that they were the rightful owner of such property.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the subject property falls under the coverage of PD No. 27
(2) Whether or not CLTs vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein

RULING:

(1) NO. In conjuction with PD No. 27, the DAR Memorandum is categorical that lands with seven hectares or less
shall not be covered by OLT. The pertinent portion of the Memorandum reads Tenanted rice and/or corn lands
seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered by Operation Land Transfer.
(2) NO. At most, the CLT merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as partly qualified to await
the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided in P.D. No. 27.
Magana v. Estrella
GR No. L-60269
September 13, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioners land was placed under the OLT Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 11 series of 1978
which implemented Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 474, resulting to a Certificate of Land Transfer being awarded to
respondent. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to petitioner but were deposited instead with the
Land Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland. The former then resorted to question the
constitutionality of said measures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MC No. 11, series of 1978 and LOI No. 474 are unconstitutional

RULING:

NO. LOI No. 474 is neither a class legislation nor does it deprive a person of property without due process of law or just
compensation. Morever, it was already well-settled by jurisprudence in cases such as Chavez v. Zobel, Gonzales v.
Estrella and Zurbano v. Estrella. As to the constitutionality of MC No. 11, it is evident that it merely implements LOI No.
474 whose constitutionality has already been established, clarifying for DAR personnel the guidelines set for under said
LOI No. 474. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted
by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to
great respect.
Maylem v. Ellano
GR No. 162721
July 13, 2009

FACTS:

Respondent was awarded by operation of PD No. 27 under Emancipation Patents (EPs) the property which was formerly
owned by petitioner, where both parties were previously under a leasehold agreement. Petitioner then persuaded
respondent to temporarily give to her the possession of the land for one year, and after which the former refused to return
such, then claiming that it was for a monetary consideration and deemed that respondent abandonded subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent abandoned his property in favor of petitioner

RULING:

NO. Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or certificate of land award,
requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a right or property coupled with an
external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. Intention to abandon implies a departure, with the
avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in
any one of these conditions: (a) failure to cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to
agricultural purposes, for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent
transfer of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of cultivating the lot; or (c)
relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same
period.38 None of the instances cited above obtains in this case.
Guevara v. Santos
GR No. L-19716
November 23, 1966

FACTS:

Petitioners were subject of an ejectment case who were ordered to vacate their respective landholdings and surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff. There was ample evidence that they failed to exercise caution that resulted to the
untimely deaths of 34 coconut trees, which was the basis of the ejectment case against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners should be dispossed from their holdings

RULING:

YES. Section 43 of RA No. 1199 which speaks of failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
preserve the improvements existing in their holdings, was violated by the petitioners. This alone was a statutory ground
for dispossession under Section 50 (b) for failure to comply with any provisions of this Act.