1.

SILVERIO VS SILVERIO

Petitioner: Ricardo Silverio, Sr. (Sr.)

Respondents: Ricardo Silverio, Jr. (Jr.), Citrine Holdings, Inc;. (Citrine), Monica Ocampo
(Ocampo), and Zee2 Resources, Inc. (Zee2);
Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court

At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to
annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. x x x It being settled that
property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed
of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.

FACTS:

1. In 7 October 1987, Sr.s wife Beatriz died intestate and was survived by 6 heirs, Sr.,
Edmundo, Edgardo, Jr., Neilia and Ligaya. This led the heirs to file an SP Proc. No. M-2629
under Rule 74;

2. The Intestate Court (IC) first appointed Edgardo as administrator. The latter withdrew thru a
motion in 3 November 1999 which then caused the appointment of Sr. as new administrator;

3. On 3 January 2005, IC replaced Sr. with Jr. as administrator and denied the MR challenging
such order. Thus, IC granted Jr.s motion to take oath as administrator and expunged Sr.s
inventor report;

4. On 12 December 2005, IC recalled the Order granting letters of administration to Jr. upon
Sr.s motion, but the same was reinstated through Jr.s motion for partial consideration for Sr.s
alleged gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court;

5. Sr. filed an MR while Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, leading to the
reinstatement of Sr. as administrator due to the declaration of nullity of certain portions of the
Orders, for which a writ of prelim. injunction was issued and made the said portions permanent;

6. Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) before the SC challenging the CA
Order but the same was denied by SC for failure to show sufficient reversible error. MR for the
same was likewise denied;
7. With Sr.s urgent motion, IC reinstated Sr. as administrator. This order was challenged in
the first of three petitions (Rule 45);

8. The second petition challenges the denial of Jr.s motion for inhibition of Judge Guanlao (of
IC) on the ground of the latters partiality as he appeared once as counsel in the intestate
proceedings;

9. The third challenged order involves the sale made by Jr. in favor of Citrine of a parcel of
land in Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati via a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) executed on 16
October 2007. Another parcel of land in Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati was sold to
Ocampo in 16 September 2010, which the latter sold to Zee2. Individual titles were issued under
the buyers names respectively;

10. Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA with prayer for injunction. A TRO was
issued on 5 February 2007, and later, a Writ of Prelim. Injunction conditioned upon the posting
of a bond of Php 2,000,000.00;

11. Nelia initially paid the said bond but failed to comply with the other requirements of A.M.
No. 04-7-02-SC. CA Ordered Nelia to comply and increased the bond to Php 10,000,000.00
which the latter did;

12. However, with the issuance of the order reinstating Sr. as administrator (see Fact No. 5), Sr.
sought for a TRO/Pre. Prohibitory Injunction v. Jr., Ocampo and Citrine and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles issued in their names.
Likewise, Sr. sought the IC to declare the DOAS executed as null and void. IC granted said
motions;

13. Jr. filed a consolidated petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the reinstatement of
Sr. as administrator, the denial of Jr.s motion for inhibition, and the declaration of nullity of the
DOAS. CA denied the first 2 but granted the latter, thereby reversing ICs declaration of nullity.
Hence the instant Petition (Rule 45).

ISSUES: WON the CA erred in reversing the ICs declaration that the DOAS and the titles
issued to buyers are null and void.

PROVISION: RULING + RATIO: No.The CA was correct in reversing the IC Decision.

In reversing the IC, CA relied on Jr.s arguments that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction pertained only to the portion of Sr.s reinstatement as administrator. It ruled:

x x x In reversing the intestate courts order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA
noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in
effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as
administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was
executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect. x x x

x x x The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the
sale of the three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void. x x x

x x x While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the
August 28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), we agree with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said
decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of
administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as
well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties.
Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied
with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619). x x x
 2. SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS

FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only
a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998

ISSUE: whether or not the venue was properly laid

RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
 3. AGTARAP VS AGTARAP
G.R. No. 177099
June 8, 2011

FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any
known debts or obligations. Joaquin contracted two marriages during his lifetime, with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia) and with Caridad Garcia (Caridad) respectively. Joaquin and Lucia, who died on
April 24, 1924, had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by
three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
1926 and also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.

Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator and was granted by the probate court,issuing him
with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They
alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and
that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father
Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa,
while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his
business partner.

Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No.
(38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad
Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could
issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. The CA settled,
together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes,
Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings
despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of
Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquins
estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first
marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is vested
with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership.

HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
 4. SUNTAY III VS COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G. R. No. 183053, Oct. 10, 2012
Justice Perez

Facts: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Federico and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including respondent
Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and
Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I) who predeceased.

Federico Cristina

Emilio 1 Isabel Cojuangco

Emilio III Nenita Emilio II Margarita Isabel

Illegitimate Legitimate

In 1965, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel Cojuancgo was declared null and void by a
judicial decree. The illegitimate children grew up with Grandparents Federico and Cristina. The
legitimates were raised by their mother, Isabel Cojuangco.

In 1993, after Cristinas death, Fecerico adopted his two illegitimate grandchildren.

In 1995, Isabel filed for an application for letter of administration. Federico opposed in that he is
the nearest of kin and the application did not include the two illegitimates as heirs. Federico
prayed that he be appointed as administrator or Emilio III in his stead.

In November of 2000, Federico died. Emilio III was appointed as administrator in 2001. On
appeal, the appointment was revoked and Isabel was appointed administrator.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Emilio III and Isabel were appointed as co-administrators.
Isabel filed for a Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Who between Isabel and Emilio III is better qualified as administrator.

Ruling: Partially Granted. Letter of Administration is issued solely to Isabel.

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent
is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which
Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment
of administrator for the estate.The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit
of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. Mere demonstration of interest in the estate
to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to coadministration thereof. Neither
does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed as administrator.

In this case, both parties have interest to the estate and are heirs of the decedent. Emilio III was
reared by the decent and was nominated by Federico as the administrator. On the other hand,
Isabel grew apart from the decedent and became only interested with the estate upon her
grandmothers death.

However, Emilio III showed incompetence in administering the properties. He failed to provide
for a complete inventory of the properties as required by the court. He likewise committed fraud
in transferring the properties to different names. With this, the court sees that Isabel Emilio III is
unfit to administer the estate.
 5. LEE VS RTC OF QC
February, 2004
Facts:
- Rafael and Jose Ortaez were appointed by the RTC of QS as the joint special
administrators of their fathers estate. As special administrators they submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, shares of
stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (Philinterlife)
- During its pendency, the decedents wife claiming that she owned some shares of stock
as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares in favor of herein petitioner Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), likewise, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez acting in
his personal capacity also sold the remainining shares of stocks as his inheritance share in
the estate in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
- After being appointed as Special Administratix, private respondent Enderes filed a
motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which
was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
- Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for the approval of the deeds of sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock but it was denied by the intestate court.
- Petitioners Lee and Aggabao (officers of the Philinterlife) subsequently filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging that the intestate court gravely abused
its discretion in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of
stock was null and void and (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity
ISSUE (1): WON the intestate court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or want of jurisdiction in declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of
stock was null and void
HELD (1): NO.
The jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. In a prevailing jurisprudence, an heir can
only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by
the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid
or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only
sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present
case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner
FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the
intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as
what happened in the present case.
ISSUE (2): WON the intestate or probate court can execute an order nullifying the invalid sale?
HELD (2): YES
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. Enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the
intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the
dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
In this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed by the appellate
courts. The finality of the decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of
judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of execution and for the
intestate court to grant it.
 6. HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ VS EDMOND RUIZ

FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all
children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.

Hilario Ruiz died.For unknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his father's holographic will.

Four years after the testator's death, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes filed before the
RTC, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.

One of the properties of the estate the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV,
Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit
and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the
rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.

Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of
the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.

The probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion. Montes prayed for the release
of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the
distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
The probate court ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00.Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of
the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to
certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

HELD 1:On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 3.Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction
of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance
because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and
gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which
excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
"minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the estate.The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

HELD 2:Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:

Sec. 2.Advance distribution in special proceedings. Nothwithstanding a pending controversy

or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died
but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one
of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.Notably, at the time the order
was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

HELD 3:Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of
his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties
of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration,"Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court explicitly provides:

Sec. 3.Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses for administration.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of
the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true
account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety
and justness.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the
private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
 7. UNION BANK VS SANTIBANEZ
452 SCRA 228

FACTS: The deceased,Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement with First Countryside
Credit Corporation (FCCC) for the payment of Agricultural Tractors. Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate.In the meantime, FCCC assigned all its assets
and liabilities to petitioner Union Bank.Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but
the latter refused to pay. Thus, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs
of Efraim Santibaez, before the RTC of Makati City. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of
the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs.

ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before
which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending.

HELD: Yes.Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
 8. GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

FACTS: Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma.
Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Pias City in order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment
as administratrix of her late fathers estate.

Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.

RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975
up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent
was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, LasPias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise
to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of
the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who,
under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
 9. PILAPIL VS HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES
February 5, 2007 G.R. No. 150175

Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones, consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila; Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the other nephews and
nieces of Donata. Respondents are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones, composed of his
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased
siblings of Maximino.

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino
died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate, which appointed
Donata as the administratrix of Maximinos estate.Donata died. Erlinda instituted a petition for
the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were
appointed as administrators of Donatas intestate estate.

Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino, which was initially granted. The trial court also issued an order, allowing
Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a
Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his and his
wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.

The heirs of Maximino filed a complaint against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the
estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging
to the intestate estate of Maximino. Furthermore, the facts show that after Donatas death,
Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the
rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the
heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.

The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not
offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of
them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino
on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in a
special proceeding, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, a
complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of
Maximino.
Issue: Whether or not respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based
on implied trust, is also barred by laches.

Held: Yes. Respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on implied
trust, is also barred by laches.

Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents conduct

before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues,
respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered
reason or justification for such delay.

It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts,
he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
 10. SABIDONG VS SOLAS

FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel
of land, designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at
Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of
Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied by
PriscilaSaplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. On May 31, 1983, a
decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of
Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorneys fees, expenses and costs. At
the time, respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.

Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11

and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondents offer in view of an
application to purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of
the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While
the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a
sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate
Court so that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority
given to them."

The following day, respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234
square meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order issuedby the probate court (RTC of
Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672, respondents Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was
approved upon the courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested
their desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint
and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate
x xx". The probate court issued another Order granting respondents motion for issuance of a
writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued.
Consequently, TCT No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued.

On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court
employee respondent cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good
faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain
court officers of property and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction.

On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Eventually, the case was
assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new EJ of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report
and recommendation. Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation finding
respondent liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty under or the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.
The Court noted Judge Patricios Investigation Report and referred the same to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
respondent liable for serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended the
forfeiture of respondents salary for six months, which shall be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

ISSUE: Whether Clerk of Court Solas violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property
in litigation

HELD: NO.Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of
court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their
courts. Said provision reads:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
x xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. x xxx

The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view
of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
control exercised by these persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more
precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in
Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that
as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering
that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).

A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property
forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is
that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the
time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is
still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the
rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending
before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11. ARANAS VS MERCADO
 12. BUTIONG VS PLAZO

FACTS: In 1989, Pedro Rioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife, who are also the respondents in this case; (Ma. Gracia and Ma. Fe). Pedro also left
several properties including a resort and a family home both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

The respondents alleged that in 1991, their co-heirs - Pedro's second wife Benita, and other
children had sold the subject properties to the petitioner spouses, Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong without their knowledge and consent. The spouses are now deceased and substituted by
their son, Ruel.

They confronted Benita about the sale, and she acknowledged the same, showing a document she
believed to be as a receipt of her share in the sale. However, said document did not refer to any
sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro (decedent) and Benita from a bank. The
document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing
Pedro and Benita's indebtedness therefrom.

Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of
any sale transaction involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the
titles to the same. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of
the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not able to enter as the premises
were padlocked.

Respondents learned that in July 1991, a notice of an extrajudicial settlement of estate of their
late father was published in a tabloid called "Balita". Because of this, respondents caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued to them.

Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge
and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial,
petitioner Francisco contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented
an Extrajudicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale
which provides that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to a certain spouses Bondoc for
P1M as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650K.

In 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners (Butiong;
Villafria) and the spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered
by petitioners; as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. The
Extrajudicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as
such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment
therein was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro Rioza, Husband" on the left side of the
document was not signed. Also, both documents were never presented to the Office of the
Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in the
names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the
subject properties were not even presented as witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing
and execution of the documents of conveyance. On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor
of respondents. The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling which was grounded on the premise that
the complaining heirs are insisting that the settlement of the family home and the resort deed are
void as their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds'
enforceability. And that after the complaining heirs presented proofs in support of their claim
that their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the same, or
conversely, to prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in
this regard.

The Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary public who purportedly notarized the
questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses who appeared in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the
signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing
on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a prerequisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the lower court when it
refused to admit the settlement of the family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are
doubtful.

Aggrieved, Ruel then filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction. He alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate,
determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of legitimate
heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its
ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant
action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate
jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership.
Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that
the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction
while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions.
Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been
rendered in without jurisdiction.

Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of
forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs who assented to the
conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the
findings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took
possession of the subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they
paid the consideration on the sale.

The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the CA committed reversible error in not ruling that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction in entertaining the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Pedro and the
civil action for annulment of title of the heirs and third persons in one proceeding

RULING: NO.

Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading
of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein,
and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument,
or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.

In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 69
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together
with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial
partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent,
properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement
of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or.
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule,
however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who
left no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying
for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they
are immediately entitled.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner's
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit me subject properties of the
estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to
have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to
be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.

Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the
complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean that
there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties as
well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles
to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.