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The Journal of Religion
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Suffering and Soul-Making:
Rethinking John Hicks Theodicy
Mark S. M. Scott / Concordia University, Montreal
313
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The Journal of Religion
5
Hick employs these terms interchangeably. See Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46.
6
For a detailed analysis of Origens theodicy, see Mark S. M. Scott, Cosmic Theodicy:
Origen on the Problem of Evil (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008). The technical term
theodicy was coined by G. W. Leibniz. It signifies the rational attempt to reconcile the reality
of evil with the goodness and justice of God. Despite the Enlightenment origin and valences
of the term, the project of theodicy extends into the ancient world.
7
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 40.
8
Hick presents modern process theology as a third option in his outline of Christian
approaches to theodicy (Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 40, 4855) but does not add it to his
typologies of theodicy because prior to the 1970s the process option was little known outside
of process circles and since then has been subject to substantial criticism (Hick, An Ir-
enaean Theodicy, 68). In his Critique in response to An Irenaean Theodicy, David Ray
Griffin criticizes Hick for ignoring this third option in his constructive discussions of theodicy
(in Davis, Encountering Evil, 5455).
9
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 253, and An Irenaean Theodicy, 39.
314
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Suffering and Soul-Making
10
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 39. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 253.
11
Hicks initial move of polarizing Irenaean and Augustinian theology overlooks the salient
points of intersection between these two pivotal theologians. While it may be instructive to
highlight their different theological emphases and sensibilities, Hick overstates their differ-
ences for his own constructive agenda.
12
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 40.
13
Ibid., 42.
14
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 3848. For an extensive treatment of Augustines views on
evil, see G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
15
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 3940.
315
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The Journal of Religion
perfect environment fall? How do you explain the impulse to sin un-
der these conditions? A flawless creation, Hick contends, would
never go wrong, so the Augustinian etiology of evil lacks plausibility.16
Second, modern evolutionary biology precludes the conception of a
primordial couple who fell from perfection to sin. Third, moral evil
cannot explain natural evil: they are not intrinsically related. Fourth,
the existence of hell would permanently inscribe evil into the fabric of
the universe, thereby undercutting the project of theodicy. Surely a
God of love would find a way to overcome evil and rescue fallen crea-
tion from the scourge it brought upon itself.17 On the force of these
criticisms, Hick opts for the alternative to the Augustinian type of the-
odicy: the Irenaean.
16
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 43.
17
Ibid., 4344.
18
Ibid., 45. Compare Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 11819.
19
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 254.
20
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 44.
21
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 254.
22
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 4041, and Evil and the God of Love, 255. Compare Irenaeus
Adversus Haereses 4.3738.
316
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Suffering and Soul-Making
23
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 41.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 42.
27
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 255.
317
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The Journal of Religion
28
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4445. Compare Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 43.
29
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 256.
30
Ibid., 25657. Compare Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 49.
31
Murray, Theodicy, 36365.
32
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 259.
33
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 46.
34
John Hick, A World without Suffering, in The Mystery of Suffering and Death, ed. Michael
J. Taylor (New York: Alba House, 1973), 2529.
318
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Suffering and Soul-Making
collide, knives would never pierce, and bullets would never kill.35 Under
these conditions, however, the cultivation of character and virtue would
be impossible: Courage and fortitude would have no point in an en-
vironment in which there is, by definition, no danger or difficulty. Gen-
erosity, kindness, the agape aspect of love, prudence, unselfishness, and
other ethical notions that presuppose life in an objective environment
could not even be formed. Consequently, such a world, however well it
might promote pleasure, would be very ill adapted for the development
of the moral qualities of human personality. In relation to this purpose
it might well be the worst of all possible worlds!36
We see, then, that although we instinctively desire a world without
suffering, it would ultimately impede the realization of our full poten-
tial as persons created in the image of God. Moreover, it would pre-
clude our ability to respond to God as free, responsible beings.37 In a
padded-playroom world, we would remain insouciant, irresponsible
children, rather than mature, loving, adults because love and maturity
entail sacrifice: It is difficult to see how it [love] could ever grow to
any extent in a paradise that excluded all suffering. For such love pre-
supposes a life in which there are real difficulties to be faced and over-
come, real tasks to be performed and goals to be achieved, setbacks to
be endured, dangers to be met.38 True love, for both God and others,
must be forged in the fire of adversity.
Some have criticized Hicks theory of the soul-making value of suf-
fering as inconsistent with the soul-destroying reality of evil in the
world. We cannot always trace a direct correspondence between indi-
vidual suffering and soul-making. Hick fails to see, according to John
Roth, that suffering destroys more than it builds: Hick, I think, sees
the world too much as a schoolroom when it is actually more like a
dangerous ally.39 Hick himself raises this problem, noting that obsta-
cles, dangers, and calamities bring out the best in some people and the
worst in others: Lifes pains and agonies, which sometimes help to
create stronger and more compassionate men and women, at other
times overwhelm and crush, leaving only despair, tragedy and disinte-
35
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46, An Irenaean Theodicy, 4647, and A World without
Suffering, 27.
36
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46. Compare Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 119.
37
Hick, A World without Suffering, 26.
38
Ibid., 29; Hick, Critique of David Ray Griffin, Creation out of Nothing, Creation out
of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil, in Davis, Encountering Evil, 130. Compare Hick, A World
without Suffering, 29.
39
John K. Roth, Critique of Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, in Davis, Encountering Evil, 62.
319
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The Journal of Religion
40
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 360. Compare Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 47.
41
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 333.
42
Ibid., 335.
43
Ibid., 33435.
44
Ibid., 335, 353.
45
To employ Marilyn Adamss famous category. See Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous
Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 2631.
320
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Suffering and Soul-Making
46
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 51. D. Z. Phillips, in his Critique, worries that the re-
course to ignorance so fundamental in the appeal to a postmortem continuation of the soul-
making process hides a conceptual bankruptcy (in Davis, Encountering Evil, 58).
47
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 118, and Philosophy of Religion, 47.
48
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 48.
49
If the justification of evil within the creative process lies in the limitless and eternal good
of the end-state to which it leads, then the completeness of the justification must depend
upon the completeness, or universality, of the salvation achieved (Hick, An Irenaean The-
odicy, 52).
50
Hick, Death and Eternal Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 24347.
51
Ibid., 24547.
52
1 Cor. 15:22; Rom. 5:18, 11:32; Eph. 1:10; and 1 Tim. 2:4 (Hick, Death and Eternal Life,
24748). Stephen T. Davis criticizes Hicks universalism as inconsistent with the data of the
Christian tradition, especially the Bible (Davis, Critique of Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy,
in Davis, Encountering Evil, 6062).
321
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The Journal of Religion
regard for the disenfranchised.53 When Paul speaks about universal res-
toration, he speaks in a more detached theological mode.54 While
Jesus speaks truly when he says that a self-enclosed life will eventually
result in damnation, no one, in fact, will finally choose that destiny. As
we will see below, Hicks interpretation of the existential context and
function of Jesus teaching on hell closely parallels Origen.
After resolving the complicated biblical evidence on universalism,
Hick then asks whether universal salvation threatens our freedom.
Does not genuine freedom entail the possibility of finally standing in
defiance against God? If God coerces us into submissioneven out
of loveit erases the reality of freedom. Hick argues that divine om-
nipotence does not need to override the wayward wills of men to
guarantee universal salvation.55 Rather, he posits our innate God-
ward bias that naturally drives us toward God without undermining
our freedom: 56 God has so made us that the inherent gravitation of
our being is toward him.57 We naturally seek God even while God
draws us to salvation and facilitates our growth toward divine likeness.
On the basis of Gods goodness and our innate orientation or open-
ness to the divine Hick argues for universal salvation: And it seems
to me a reasonable expectation that in the infinite resourcefulness of
infinite love working in unlimited time, God will eventually succeed
in drawing us all into the divine Kingdom.58 His theological anthro-
pology, then, negates the need for divine coercion. God draws us like
a divine therapist, not like a divine despot compelling our compli-
ance for our own good. 59 We will take up this image of God as a divine
therapist momentarily, since it coheres well with Origens image of
God as a physician who applies painful remedies for our amelioration
and ultimate salvation.
53
Jesus was neither propounding a theological theory nor defining theological doctrines
(Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 248).
54
Ibid., 249.
55
Ibid., 251.
56
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 52. Ironically, he references Augustine on this point: You
have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in You
(Confessions I.i.1).
57
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 251.
58
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 69. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 344.
59
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 345.
322
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Suffering and Soul-Making
60
Ibid., 40.
61
Irenaeus Adversus Haereses 2.29.
62
Ibid. 1.22.
63
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 41. See St. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Teaching,
trans. John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1997), chaps. 1116.
64
Irenaeus, On the Apostolic Teaching, chaps. 14, 16, 17, quotation from 17.
65
For an exception, see Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 44 n. 7.
66
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 40.
67
In this article I am more interested in establishing the affinity between Origen and Hick
than embarking on a detailed refutation of Hicks appeal to Irenaeus. I have shown the
fundamental incompatibilities between the two for the purpose of presenting Origen as the
new patron saint and showing the constructive potential of Origen for rethinking Hicks
theodicy of soul-making.
323
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The Journal of Religion
ical tradition he would discover the perfect patron saint for his soul-
making theodicy: Origen of Alexandria.
In contrast to Irenaeus, Origen directly confronts the problem of
evil in his theology.68 Origens observations of the suffering of the
world lead him to ask questions about the justice of divine providence.
Why do we find some new-born babes to be born blind, Origen asks,
when they have committed no sin, while others are born with no de-
fect at all?69 In other words, why does God allow the innocent to suf-
fer? The problem of innocent suffering, as we have seen, animates
Hicks theodicy as well. Origen then constructs a narrative about the
fall and ascent of the soul to God that functions as a theodicy: His
theological story is a kind of theodicy and has the function of explain-
ing why evil has arisen.70 Four aspects of this theological story bear
striking similarities to Hicks theodicy. First, Origen denies the literal
interpretation of the creation narrative. Second, Origen conceives of
the world as a schoolroom where God employs suffering for our edu-
cation and healing. Third, he posits the progressive ascent of the soul
in this life and in our postmortem existence. Finally, Origen speculates
about the final restoration of creation when all souls will be saved. We
will explore these four aspects of Origens theodicy in turn and analyze
how they intersect with Hicks soul-making theodicy, which will enable
us to reposition his theodicy as Origenian rather than Irenaean.
Origen, like Hick, does not interpret the story of Adam and Eve
literally. According to the prince of allegory,71 the beginning an-
nounced in Genesis refers to Jesus, not to the cosmos: Scripture is
not speaking here of any temporal beginning, but . . . the Savior.72
68
See Scott, Cosmic Theodicy.
69
Origen De Principiis (hereafter Princ.) 1.8. Compare Princ. 2.9.3. For the critical edition,
see Origene: Traite des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, Tomes 15, Sources
chretiennes nos. 25253, 26869, 312 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 197684). For the English
translation (based on Koetschaus edition), see On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth
(1966; repr., London: Peter Smith, 1973). A new English translation of De Principiis is forth-
coming. See R. J. Rombs, A Note on the Status of Origens De Principiis in English, Vigiliae
Christianae 61 (2007): 2129.
70
Rowan A. Greer, Introduction, in Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, On Prayer, First
Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers,
trans. Rowan A. Greer (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 28.
71
Henri Crouzel, Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian, trans. A. S. Worrall
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 9. Only fragments remain of Origens lost Commentary
on Genesis, which contains his allegorization of Adam, who symbolizes all rational souls, and
his interpretation of the coats of skin in Genesis 3:21 as human bodies (C. P. Bammel,
Adam in Origen, in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Rowan
Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 65).
72
Origen Homilies on Genesis (hereafter HomGen.) 1.1. Compare Origen Commentary on John
(hereafter ComJn.)1.95. For the critical edition, see Origene: Homelies sur Genese, ed. Louis
Doutreleau, Sources chretiennes no. 7 bis (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1976). For the English
324
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Suffering and Soul-Making
325
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The Journal of Religion
hospital for fallen souls and his portrayal of God as Teacher and Phy-
sician: But it is in the same way that a very indulgent father chastens
his son in order to shame him, and as a most caring teacher chastises
the undisciplined student with a look of severity, lest the student
should perish while thinking he is in good standing. . . . Everything
that comes from God that seems to be bitter is advanced for instruction
and healing. God is a physician, God is a Father, he is a Master, and
he is not a harsh but a mild master.81 Origen conceives of suffering
as remedial, never vindictive: And when God afflicts those who de-
serve punishment, how else is it except for their good?82 God allows
us to suffer as part of the educative and remedial process that leads to
our perfection.
Similarly, Hick sees the world as a schoolroom or hospital for the
soul.83 God designs the world, he says, as a person-making environ-
ment that facilitates our moral growth and development.84 More-
over, Hick compares God to a divine Therapist who helps us over-
come all obstacles to attaining divine likeness: The divine therapy is
a matter of healing, of enabling us to fulfill our own selves and to
become more truly what our own natures cries out to be.85 Origens
view of the world as a schoolroom and hospital where God educates
and heals, sometimes through painful processes, closely parallels the
fundamental cosmological and theological presuppositions of Hicks
soul-making theodicy. For Hick, as for Origen, all suffering serves re-
demptive purposes. Just as a physician must employ painful methods
to heal his or her patient, so God uses suffering for our betterment.
As Origen states: But if he in a more bold way proceeds to cut and
cauterize, he will heal by not showing mercy, by appearing not to pity
him who is cauterized and given surgery.86 With almost identical ex-
amples, Hick comments that God may use traumatic experiences for
81
Origen Homilies on Ezekiel 1.2.23. For the critical edition, see Origene: Homelies sur Ezekiel,
trans. Marcel Borret, Sources chretiennes no. 352 (Paris: E ditions du Cerf, 1989). For the
English translation, see Origen: Homilies 114 on Ezekiel, Ancient Christian Writers, no. 62,
trans. Thomas P. Scheck (New York: Newman Press, 2010).
82
Origen Princ. 2.5.3. Compare Origen Philocalia 27.8.
83
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 62.
84
Ibid., 4749.
85
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 253. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 345.
86
Origen Homilies on Jeremiah (hereafter HomJr.) 12.4. For the critical edition, see Origene:
Homelies sur Jeremie, ed. Pierre Nautin and P. Husson, Sources chretiennes nos. 232, 238 (Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 197677). For the English translation, see Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah, Homily
on 1 Kings 28, trans. John Clark Smith, Fathers of the Church 97 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1998).
326
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Suffering and Soul-Making
87
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 258.
88
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Introduction, in Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of
His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2001), 13.
89
Origen Homily on Numbers (hereafter HomNum.) 27.4. For the critical edition, see Origene:
Homelies sur les Nombres, vol. 3, Homelies XXXXVIII, trans. Louis Doutreleau, Sources chre-
tiennes no. 461 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2001). For the English translation, see Origen: Homily
XXVII on Numbers, in Origen, trans. Rowan Greer, 24569. For the most recent translation, see
Origen: Homilies on Numbers, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 16883.
90
On the der innere Aufstieg of the soul in Origens Homilies on Numbers 27, see Walther
Volker, Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes: eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte der Frommigkeit und
zu den Anfangen christlicher Mystik, Beitrage zur historischen Theologie 7 (Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr, 1931), 6275.
91
Origen HomNum. 27.3.
92
Danielou, Origen, 305.
93
The three books of Solomon are related to the traditional divisions of Greek philosophy:
moral, natural, and contemplative. . . . It would be wrong, however, to understand Origen
in a fully systematic fashion. To be sure, he regards the three as arranged in a progressive
order. . . . But the three are mutually involved with one another, and there is a sense in
which the higher stages comprehend the lower ones. It is probably better to speak of the
three as different aspects [rather than stages] of the Christian life arranged in hierarchical
order (Greer, Introduction, 23). Compare Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical
Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5660.
94
Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 57. The origin of some such division
is Stoic, though Origen is actually referring to the sort of division found among Middle
Platonists (ibid.). Origen habitually uses the word to designate spiritual contem-
plation, but here he employs the more esoteric term (Marguerite Harl, Les trois
327
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The Journal of Religion
328
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Suffering and Soul-Making
advance the souls purification for a future existence, all suffering be-
comes meaningful in the larger narrative of the purification of the
soul: The soul, which is immortal, is not shut out by the shortness of
our present life from the divine healing and remedies.103 Gods re-
medial work on the soul extends well beyond this life, allowing the
fallen souls to find a remedy for their wounds and be restored to
what is good or to fall further into sin: This leads us to the opinion
that since, as we have frequently said, the soul is immortal and eternal,
it is possible that in the many and endless periods throughout diverse
and immeasurable ages it may either descend from the highest good
to the lowest evil or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest
good.104 Hick, similarly, acknowledges that most of us do not complete
the soul-making process in this life. We only begin to approximate the
divine life before death, but that does diminish the progress we have
made.105 We continue our journey in future lives, picking up where
we left off on earth.106 The success of the soul-making process, then,
does not depend on its completion on earth: This person-making pro-
cess, leading eventually to perfect human community, is obviously not
completed on this earth. . . . Therefore if we are ever to reach the
full realization of the potentialities of our human nature, this fulfill-
ment can only come in a continuation of our lives in another sphere
of existence after bodily death.107 Once again Hick locates the theory
of postmortem progression within the Irenaean type of theodicy, but
we clearly see that it aligns more closely with Origen, who, like Hick,
speculates on the possibility of a future existence where we continue
to grow toward perfection.
Finally, we come to the controversial question of universalism in Or-
igen (and Hick).108 Frederick Norris surveys the conflicting passages in
Origen on universalism and comes up empty: This is a muddle, he
opines.109 How do we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory
strands in the Origen corpus that create dual pictures of Origen as
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid. 3.1.23.
105
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 68.
106
Ibid., 71.
107
Ibid., 51. Compare Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 253.
108
For a detailed analysis of Origens universalism, particularly vis-a-vis the problem of his
ostensible inconsistency, see Mark S. M. Scott, Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation: The
Pastoral Pedagogy of Origens Universalism, Journal of Early Christian Studies 18, no. 3 (Fall
2010), forthcoming.
109
Frederick W. Norris, Universal Salvation in Origen and Maximus, in Universalism and
the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1991), 56;
cf. 52 n. 40. See also C. C. Richardson, The Condemnation of Origen, Church History 6
(1937): 5355.
329
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Now I myself think that when it is said that God is all in all, it means that he
is also all things in each individual person. And he will be all things in each
person in such a way that everything which the rational mind, when purified
from all the dregs of its vices and utterly cleared from every cloud of wicked-
ness, can feel or understand or think will be all God and the mind will no
longer be conscious of anything besides or other than God, but will think God
and hold God and God will be the mode and measure of its every movement;
and in this way God will be all to it.114
110
Tom Greggs, Exclusivist or Universalist? Origen the Wise Steward of the Word
(CommRom. V.1.7) and the Issue of Genre, International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 3
(July 2007): 315.
111
Like all preachers, Origen was convinced that fear of the pains of hell was a useful spur
to progress along the path toward perfection (Adele Monaci Castagno, Origen the Scholar
and Pastor, trans. Frances Cooper, in Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and
Byzantine Homiletics, ed. Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen [Leiden: Brill, 1998], 84).
112
Origen Princ. 1.2.4. On the affirmation of universal salvation, see also Princ. 2.10.8; 3.5.7;
4.4.9.
113
Origen Princ. 1.6.2. The key to Origens understanding of the concept of deification is
the concept of participation (Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic
Tradition [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 147).
114
Origen Princ. 3.6.3.
115
Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, 195. On the end of evil and the apokatastasis in Origens
theology and cosmology, see the following articles by Ilaria L.E. Ramelli: Christian Soteriology
and Christian Platonism: Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Biblical and Philosophical Basis
of the Doctrine of the Apokatastasis, Vigiliae Christianae 61 (2007): 31356, and Origens
Interpretation of Hebrews 10:13: The Eventual Elimination of Evil and the Apocatastasis,
Augustinianum 47, no. 1 (2007): 8594.
330
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Suffering and Soul-Making
116
Henri Crouzel, A Letter from Origen to Friends in Alexandria, trans. J. D. Gauthier,
in The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honor of George Vasilievich Florovsky, ed. D. Neiman
and M. Schatkin (Rome: Pontificio Istituo Orientale, 1973), 13550, particularly 14344.
Elizabeth Dively Lauro outlines some of the relevant anti-universalist passages in Origen: In
places, he suggests that salvation is not universal (PArch 2.9.8; HomJr 18; ComJn 19.88). For
example, he states that he does not know if hell is final (ComJn 28.6366) and that it may
indeed be final for some (HomJr 12.5; 19.15; HomLev 3.4; 14.4), especially demons and Satan
(HomJos 8.5; ComJn 20.174; ComRm 8.9; HomJr 18 and 19), who have become non-beings by
falling so far from God (ComJn 2.9398) (Elizabeth A. Dively Lauro, Universalism, in The
Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. J. A. McGuckin (London: Westminster/John Knox Press,
2004), 212.
117
Ronald E. Heine, Introduction, in Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John,
Books 1332, trans. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 89 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1993), 65. Compare Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,
Books 110, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Fathers of the Church 1034 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 20012), 168 n. 233.
118
Jerome, Letter 84.9, trans. W. H. Fremantle, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 6, ed.
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (1893; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 180. Compare
Richardson, The Condemnation of Origen, 56. Jerome accuses Origen of teaching univer-
salism in secret while denying it publicly. See David Satran, The Salvation of the Devil: Origen
and Origenism in Jeromes Biblical Commentaries, in Studia Patristica, vol. 23, ed. Elizabeth
A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 17274.
119
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 52.
331
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The Journal of Religion
conclusion
Hick dubs Irenaeus the patron saint of his Irenaean type of theodicy
even though he concedes that it cannot, as such, be attributed to
Irenaeus, and scholars have adopted his attribution without critical
scrutiny.123 If Irenaeus did not develop a theodicy, as Hick admits, why
canonize him as the theological inspiration for his approach to the
problem of evil? Why not consider other Greek-speaking Christian
writers who constructed alternative frameworks to Augustine for
thinking about the problem of evil?124 As we have seen, Origens cosmic
theodicy anticipates the central tenets of Hicks soul-making theodicy.
Moreover, his expansive worldview and speculative theological ap-
proach, in stark contrast to Irenaeus, comports well with Hicks revi-
sionist agenda. Origen would be more willing than Irenaeus to dance
on the edge of orthodoxy with Hick, and sometimes transgress it, for
higher theological purposes.
120
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 340. If there is continued life after death, and if God is
ceaselessly at work for the salvation of his children, it follows that he will continue to be at
work until the work is done (Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 258).
121
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 249.
122
Ibid. Compare Origen HomJr. 19.15.45, 20.3.2.
123
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 40.
124
Ibid.
332
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Suffering and Soul-Making
125
In a personal correspondence (September 9, 2008), John Hick affirms my essential thesis
but explains why he would still uphold Irenaeus as his patron saint: I think you demonstrate
that in many ways Origen is a stronger precursor than Irenaeus of the soul-making theodicy.
Irenaeus understands the fall literally, although he negates it by reducing it to a childish
mistake: he actually, in his Proof of the Apostolic Teaching, describes Adam and Eve as children.
Origen is better here in seeing the metaphorical character of the narrative; but on the other
hand he is eccentric in teaching the pre-existence of souls. Again, he does have a presumably
literal fall, but in the souls pre-existent state. Both Irenaeus and Origen teach the gradual
development of souls towards perfection, but Origen more explicitly. And Origen teaches
eventual universal salvation. So in several ways he is nearer to a modern soul-making theodicy.
But on the other hand, Irenaeus was earlier, and Origen can be seen as developing the basic
idea further and more fully. Again, considered as patron saints, Irenaeus has the advantage
of having been a bishop and now a saint, whereas Origen, although the greater thinker, has
the disadvantage of having declared a heretic. So I am inclined to stick with Irenaeus as
providing the earliest known foundation of a soul-making theodicy and as, from a PR point
of view, a more suitable patron saint. But I nevertheless see your focus on Origen, who is
much more studied today than Irenaeus, as very useful. There is room in any discussion of
theodicy for both of them. Hick, while recognizing the affinities between his approach and
Origens, hesitates to replace Irenaeus with Origen primarily for practical and political reasons.
We have shown, however, that the Irenaean categorization of his theodicy does not withstand
critical scrutiny and that Origen provides a surer foundation for his theodicy.
333
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The Journal of Religion
334
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