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850 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY JUSTICE.

" SEC . 130. The circuit courts of appeals shall have the appellate jurisdictio n
conferred upon them by the act entitled `An act to establish a uniform syste m
of bankruptcy, etc. '
" SEC . 237 . A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, where is drawn in question, etc ., may b e
reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error .
" SEC . 250 . Any final judgment or decree of the Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia may be reexamined and affirmed, reversed, or modified by th e
Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal, in the fol-
lowing cases : * * *
" SEC. 252 . The Supreme Court of the United States is hereby invested with
appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy, etc . "
In the light of what has been said, I think it will be perfectly apparent to you
that the court, in In re Cole, was in no sense discussing its power to give effec t
to its conclusion upon revision . It was discussing only the scope of the matter s
that could be inquired into upon the petition, and found the definition of tha t
scope in the words " revise in matters of law the proceedings of the several in-
ferior courts of bankruptcy ." It becomes, therefore, quite impossible to follo w
the brief we are here reviewing in its assertion that
"The language of that statute (bankruptcy act) is thevery language of thi s
(sec. 1199, R . S.), except that the revision there is expressly limited to matter s
of law . "
There is not even a shadow of . analogy between the words of the Federa l
bankruptcy act investing the circuit courts with specific appellate jurisdictio n
and the words of section 1199, Revised Statutes, relied upon to invest the Judg e
Advocate General with appellate jurisdiction.
But I can not conclude this part of the brief without inviting your attentio n
to the definitions which are quoted from Words and Phrases, volume 7 . It
seems to me that not a single one of the definitions quoted in the brief was ad-
dressed to grants of appellate power to courts, but that all are addressed to
grants of legislative power to revise statutes, or to the scope of the authorit y
granted to special commissions to revise codes, where it goes without sayin g
the power to revise confers no power whatever to give effect to the revision .
There was, however, one definition of the word " revise " on that cited page o f
Words and Phrases that does go to the meaning of a grant of power carried to a
court by the word " revise " ; but I do not find that this definition is in Gen.
Ansell's brief. It is as follows :
" Revision, as used in a statute authorizing the entering of an appeal, after
the expiration of the time limited for such appeal, when the court is satisfie d
that justice required a revision of the decree appealed from, does not mea n
reversal or modification, but simply review, reexamination, or looking at again . "
I may add, in closing this part of my memorandum, that a rather complet e
survey of statutes vesting appellate power in tribunals, administrative as wel l
as judicial, fails to disclose a single case where the power to modify and revers e
is left to he deduced from such an inapt and single word as the word " revise,"
without the addition of appellate power granted in specific and unequivoca l
terms-
2 . HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION .

Gen . Ansell's brief asserts that " the history of the legislation, the early exe-
cution given it, its historical place in the body of the law of which it is a
part, all clearly show that this must be the meaning assigned to the wor d
' revise' in the present instance. "
It is said that Congress established the Bureau of Military Justice in the
light of the necessities of the Civil War, and expressly invested its head, th e
Judge Advocate General of the Army, with this revisory power . Gen . Ansell' s
reference here is to the original statute, the act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stats. ,
598), in which it was provided that :
" The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of th e
Senate, a Judge Advocate General, with rank, pay, and emoluments of a
colonel of Cavalry, to whose office shall be returned, for revision, the records
and proceedings of all courts-martial and military commissions, and where a
record shall lie kept of all proceedings had thereupon . "
The same words were carried forward in the act of June 20, 1864, and n o
further grant of power is found in the later statute . In the act of July 28 ,
1866 (14 Stats ., 324), the granting word is still "revise," the only change bein g
the omission of the words found in the earlier statutes, " a record shall be