Controlling Electrostatic Ignition Hazards during Fuel Delivery at Forecourts

Graham Hearn1, Ulrich von Pidoll2 & Jeremy Smallwood3

1
Wolfson Electrostatics
2
Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)
3
Electrostatics Solutions Ltd.

The use of electrically insulating synthetic materials, such as plastics, for fuel
pipelines and other fuel handling components is now becoming widespread. In the
case of buried pipelines in filling station forecourts the use of these materials offers
superior corrosion resistance and increased longevity. This in turn reduces the risk
of pollution due to fuel leakage. It is well reported that the flow of fuel under certain
conditions in both metal and plastic pipes can produce significant levels of
electrostatic charge on the fuel. Pipe systems in modern filling stations generally
contain both plastic pipe lengths and metal components such as in-line valves and
couplings on which electrostatic charge can accumulate. Non-conductive pipework
properly installed with grounded metal fittings and capped electrofusion coupler
terminals should not create electrostatic ignition hazards.

Over the last year or so a small number of fires have occurred around offset fill pipes
at various petroleum forecourt refuelling sites in Europe. Initially these were blamed
on either static electricity or thermite reaction. A joint investigation by Exxon and
Wolfson Electrostatics [1] has shown the most likely cause to be an electrostatic
discharge between an electrofusion coupler (EFC) and nearby metal flange.
Measurements performed during a repeat of the delivery operation at the site
however produced no significant readings of static electricity.

Work undertaken independently by the three authors of this article has highlighted a
number of factors influencing the levels of electrostatic hazard and these are
discussed in this article. The influence on electrostatic ignition hazards due to the
introduction of new alcohol-based biofuels such as E85 is considered. This article
analyses the conditions necessary for electrostatic ignition and draws important
conclusions with regard to the parameters influencing the degree of hazard present.

Hazard Analysis

There are five general conditions necessary for an electrostatic ignition hazard to be
present:

1. Sensitive flammable atmosphere

2. Generation of electrostatic charge
3. Accumulation of charge
4. Electrostatic discharge (ESD)
5. Sufficient discharge energy for ignition

If all of the above conditions exist, an ignition hazard will be present, if any of the
conditions are removed, the hazard is obviated. As a belt and braces approach
attempts are often made to remove more than one of these conditions, however the
extent to which any mitigating measures can be applied in practice often involve
other considerations which will inevitably include cost and practicality.

Is a flammable atmosphere present?

Petroleum spirit vapour has a flashpoint of around -43C and is flammable within the
range of about 1-6% by volume with air. At most times within a pipe system and
storage tank, there is insufficient oxygen to support combustion ie the atmosphere is
over-rich. During tanker delivery, a flammable atmosphere may be established
around the end of the fill pipe. Similarly flammable petrol vapour concentrations may
exist due to fuel spills and within fill-boxes and chambers. This of course applies
equally to metal and plastic systems.

E85 which is 85% ethanol and 15% petrol has a reported flashpoint of < -20C [3]. It
has a wider flammable range than that of petrol of around 2-26% by volume [3]. Due
to the fact that the gas phase of E85 contains much more petrol vapour than ethanol
vapour, its upper explosion point is strongly dependent on the filling level of the tank
(the so called effect of ullage space). An almost full tank of E85 has a non
flammable gas atmosphere above its liquid phase at temperatures higher than 0C,
this temperature raises to 18C when the tank has become 99% empty [3,4].
Because of this effect E85 may produce flammable atmospheres in a wider set of
circumstances than petrol.

Diesel which has a flashpoint in excess of 60C will not produce a flammable
atmosphere under normal conditions and is not considered at risk from static
electricity at any time during delivery. However mixing diesel with small amounts of
petrol, for example when filling diesel into a road tanker containing residual petrol
from the last filling, may produce an explosive atmosphere even in a diesel tank.

For all fuels the sensitivity to (spark) ignition varies significantly over the flammable
range and is easiest to ignite at a concentration roughly midway between the upper
and lower flammable limits. At or near this concentration, the ignition energy is very
low and vapour ignitions may occur as the result of sparks from charged, ungrounded
metal or electrostatic brush discharges from highly-charged insulating surfaces.

Charge generation due to fuel flow

During fuel delivery it has been estimated that 4500-6000 litres is transferred in 10-
12minutes. This corresponds to fuel flows of between 7 and 9 litres per second and
moderate velocities in the pipe of around 0.3 metres per second.

The electrostatic charge that is generated in fuel being pumped along pipes arises
from the presence in parts per million (or billion) of ions in the fuel. Positive or
negative ions selectively attach themselves to any interfacial surface in contact with
the fuel, such as the inner wall of the pipe, due to selective chemical adsorption (and
possibly ionic injection from the pipe wall) [2]. As a consequence, the inside surface
of the pipe acquires a unipolar charge and ions of the opposite polarity in the fuel are
attracted to it. A charged layer then extends from the wall into the fuel of a thickness
that increases with decreasing fuel conductivity, the net charge in the pipe being zero
when the fuel is at rest.

When the fuel flows, the ions in the boundary layer tend to be carried along, while the
opposite charge on the wall dissipates to earth at a rate depending primarily on the
pipe material's conductivity. This implies that there will be a significant difference
between charging behaviour in metal and plastic pipes. Any filters, valves and elbows
will generally increase the amount of charge, due to greater interfacial charge
separation, higher fuel velocities and increased turbulence. Similarly, the presence
of free water in the fuel can also increase the charge concentration, again due to the
charge separation arising from the large interfacial area of the emulsified mixtures.
Petrol and Diesel are known to produce high levels of charging under certain
conditions.
The conductivity of market-place petrol can vary from 5-500 pS.m-1 [3]. Experiments
have shown that the highest charge generation occurs at a conductivity of 5-50 pS.m-
1
[5]. Being alcohol-based, the conductivity of E85 is several orders of magnitude
higher than traditional fuels and is unlikely to generate hazardous levels of static
electricity due to flow through plastic pipes.

The presence of filters and flame arrestors in the pipe may increase static charge
generation and charging levels are likely to increase if the filter or flame arrestor
becomes partially blocked with particulate materials and impurities. Entrained air and
immiscible impurities could also increase electrostatic charge generation.

According to CLC/TR 50404 [6] typical charge densities of 10 C.m-3 in liquid due to
flow in a pipe can be increased tenfold to around 100 C.m-3 by a blocked strainer.
This level of increase would correspond to a similar tenfold increase in voltages
induced on ungrounded metal parts such as electrofusion couplers.

In addition to the electrostatic charging mechanisms associated with fuel flow, there
is also the possibility of electrostatic charge generation by friction with the external
pipe wall and other components of the system, such as the walls of plastic chambers
and sumps. In such cases, the charge generation mechanism could be frictional
contact with a maintenance workers clothing.

Charge accumulation

With plastic pipe systems, as with metal pipework, the primary source of charge
generation is due to the flow of fuel through the pipe, as discussed above. With
metal systems the charge on the metalwork will normally be conducted safely to
earth. With plastic systems, electrostatic charge can accumulate on the pipe wall
and associated ungrounded metallic components, such as the heating coils in
electro-fusion couplings, metal valves and other metal fittings. This represents the
principal difference between plastic piping systems and earthed metal systems from
an electrostatic point of view.

Totally buried insulating plastic pipes usually do not create dangerous discharges
inside and outside of the pipe. However, in an excavated, unburied or partly buried
system extra care must be taken. In chambers and fill boxes, small sections of the
pipe are not buried. The metal components present in a fill box (e.g. valves and other
fittings) usually have enough capacitance, to produce incendive sparks when
charged by influence of fuel flowing through insulating pipes. For this reason, all
conductive objects in chambers and fill boxes should be sufficiently earthed and the
surface of charged objects should not exceed the limits given in [6]. Furthermore, the
electrical connections of electrofusion couplers should be tightly closed using plastic
caps [6].

The forecourt ground surface of a filling station is normally made of a dissipative

material with a leakage resistance to earth of less than 108 Ohms, e.g. concrete [6].
As tyres are usually sufficiently conductive to provide a leakage path to ground, the
delivery road tanker parked on the forecourt is normally earthed via its tyres. Faults in
the manufacturing process of modern tyres however can occasionally lead to highly
insulating tyres. As a consequence, the leakage path to earth of the road tanker
cannot be guaranteed [7].
Electrostatic discharges

There are essentially two types of electrostatic discharges (ESD) that can occur
during fuel delivery: spark and brush discharges. With regard to ignition hazard the
characteristics of these two discharges are very different.

(a) (b)
Figure 1 (a) Spark discharge between a charged metal object and a grounded metal
electrode (b) brush discharge from a grounded metal electrode to a highly charged
dielectric sheet.

Figure 1 (a) shows a spark between two metal objects at different potential. Figure 1
(b) shows a brush discharge between a highly charged dielectric and an approaching
earthed electrode.

Figure 2 compares the discharge waveforms for the two. The spark discharge current
in (a) looks like a damped sine wave whereas the brush discharge current (b) is a
single broad pulse. It is important when comparing the waveforms in figure 2 to note
that the y-axis for (a) has been compressed and that the spark current is 20 times
greater. Generally sparks produce a higher current density than brush discharges
resulting in higher temperatures and are therefore more likely to cause ignition.

(a) (b)
Figure 2 (a) Waveform of the current and its integral of a spark discharge between a
charged pulse capacitor (93,3 pF at 7 kV) and a grounded metal electrode (b) same
for a brush discharge from a grounded metal electrode to a highly charged dielectric
sheet.

Ignition of fuel vapour

Spark discharges from charged, isolated metal components constitute a strong

ignition hazard if they have sufficient energy. Metal components in a fill-box are
generally earthed. Any unearthed items such as EFC heating coils and clips can only
store small amounts of electrical energy and need a high potential to have sufficient
energy to ignite an optimum fuel-air mix. Even if these conditions are met, a nearby
ground is required to provide the spark gap.

To constitute an ignition source a brush discharge will require not only a highly
charged electrically-insulating surface but a grounded metal electrode to initiate the
discharge. Figure 1 (b) illustrates how the energy of a brush discharge is
concentrated close to the ground electrode and it is this region of the discharge most
capable of providing the source of ignition. A few millimetres away from the ground,
the discharge becomes diffuse and non-incendive. Brush-like discharges inside pipes
have been recorded, especially for fluorinated pipes, but they are normally not
incendive because of the over-rich or too-lean atmosphere inside pipes. These
discharges may be hazardous if an optimised fuel-air concentration were to exist [7].

Flame Measurement
arrester wire

Possible
site of
spark?

Grounded
metal Electrofusion
flange coupler

Figure 3. All the conditions necessary for ignition? Flammable atmosphere due to
residual vapour in the fill box; charge generation due to fuel flow; accumulation on
the heating coil of an electrofusion coupler; spark to nearby grounded metal flange.

Summary of conclusions

1. Static electricity has been blamed for fires that have occurred around offset fill
pipes during tanker delivery. Non-conductive pipework properly installed (grounded
metal fittings and capped electrofusion coupler terminals) should not create
electrostatic ignition hazards.
2. If static electricity is the cause of these fires it is almost certain to be the result of
sparks from ungrounded metal fittings or electrofusion couplers igniting residual fuel
vapour in the box outside the pipes. If air is present in the pipe, brush discharges
may present an ignition hazard. Brush discharges from a buried plastic pipe surface
are unlikely to produce sufficient current density in the discharge to cause ignition.

3. Incidents of fire have also been blamed on thermite reactions between aluminium
fittings and corroded steel but like static electricity this ignition source has not been
ratified.

4. Within a normally-functioning pipe system (plastic or metal) there is insufficient

oxygen present to support or propagate combustion. Furthermore. air does not enter
the inlet pipe of a fill pipe in modern European installations. The installation is under
pressure (35mbar) causing vapour to come out of the fill after disconnection rather
than air going in. This will tend to leave an explosive atmosphere just outside the
pipe rather than inside.

5. The alcohol-based fuels E50 E100 have a much higher electrical conductivity
than petrol and Diesel and will not generate hazardous static potentials in pipe
systems assuming they are in contact with an earth point somewhere in the tank
system.

6. Flame arresters similar to those in place at the site of the incidents in Hungary [1]
(Figure 3) may increase the level of charge generation during fuel flow and may
therefore increase the ignition risk.

Fire prevention

The precise cause of the recent flash fires during fuel delivery cannot be considered
certain on the basis of the available evidence. However some recommendations of
preventative action can be considered. The ignitions were probably caused by an
electrostatic discharge external to the fill pipes. Fuel or vapour may well have been
present due to spillage or vapour release. It was found that some vapour leakage
could occur from the Stage 1 and fill connections on opening, and through a
connection that was not vapour tight.

If the possibility of fuel or vapour in the vicinity of the fill pipes can be excluded then
the risk of fire from this cause may be eliminated. Reliable exclusion of fuel vapour
would be perhaps the best way of removing the risk of ignition outside the pipe.
There appears to be little if any risk of ignition inside the pipe if it is either buried or
air intake is avoided.

It has been suggested that filling the box with sand to above the pipes and sealing
the top layer against fuel ingress. This may be one way of successfully removing the
possibility of a flammable mixture near the pipes. This procedure would have added
benefit in effectively grounding electrofusion couplers in contact with the sand, in all
but the driest conditions. Furthermore, if by some chance vapour did accumulate
and a spark could ignite it, the sand would prevent the propagation of flame.

In any location where a flammable atmosphere can occur, it is important to ground all
conductive objects of significant size. Electrofusion couplers may be significant in
this context. Additionally it is important that a long term reliable earth connection to
these items is achieved.
Another approach is to electrically insulate the heating coil terminals in the coupler by
some means to prevent electrostatic discharge. This is likely to be effective if a
reliable seal is obtained for example by a tight fitting cap or peg. Figure 4 is a
photograph of a properly installed underground fill pipe, with grounded metal
connectors and capped electrofusion couplers. In this situation, steps 3 and 4 of the
five hazard conditions (charge accumulation and ESD) are removed.

Ground
wire

Capped
terminals

Figure 4. Properly installed underground fill pipe with grounded fitting and caps fitted
to electrofusion coupler terminals.

With alcohol based fuels E50-E100 it is postulated that fuel flow will not result in
significant electrostatic potentials. However with existing installations the presence
of a sensitive flammable atmosphere may still exist. Furthermore due to their wider
flammable range and different ignition properties, these fuels may be somewhat
easier to ignite. With this in mind, precautions against electrostatic discharges from
other sources e.g. relating to the grounding of the vehicle and personnel must be in
place.

References

[1] Wolfson Electrostatics report R436/JMS for Exxon Mobil dated 1 February 2006
[2] Feleci, N. J., (1984). J. Electrostatics, 15, 291-7.
[3] Brandes, E., PTB Braunschweig, section 3.41, Safety data of E50, E60, E85 and
E>85, unpublished datasheet dated 25.7.2006.
[4] Vaivads, R. H., Bardon, M. F. Rao, V. K. and Battista, V., Flammability Tests of
Alcohol/Gasoline Vapours, SAE Technical paper 950401, 1995.
[5] von Pidoll, U., Krmer, H. and Bothe, H., Avoidance of electrostatic hazards
during refuelling of motorcars, J. of Electrostatics 40&41 (1997), 523-528.
[6] CENELEC Technical report TR50404, Code of practice for the avoidance of
hazards due to static electricity, 2003.
[7] von Pidoll, U., Electrostatic ignition hazards in motor cars occurrence, detection
and prevention. Proceedings ESA/IEEE Joint Meeting on Electrostatics, 24-
27.6.2003, University of Arkansas, Little Rock, 78-89.