CIV REV CASES: MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY RELATIONS
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
Daddy QUIAO VS momy and children QUIAO
FACTS:
Rita filed for legal separation, granted 2005
Court: children shall remain under the custody of mommy; all
remaining properties divided among them equally subject t the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of unpaid
conjugal liabilities; NET PROFITS ARE FORFEITED IN FAVOR
OF THE common children; daddy to reimburse the attys fees
and litigation expenses.
2006: writ of execution
after partial execution; daddy filed for a motion for clarification of
the term NET PROFITS EARNED
SC DECISION
MPR: since married Jan 6, 1977= system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place
in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry." The husband and wife also
own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
At the time of dissolution of marriage: Family code
the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code
"[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other law."
Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the
conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in
favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the
Family Code?
NO. it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested
right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
Here, he was well aware of the prayer of the respondent; he never
questioned the decision of the RTC of what the NET PROFITS
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Applicable provisions: ART 176 FC
the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering
that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party
in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner
was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's
vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code
since the trial court found him the guilty party.
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is
finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs.
Applicable provisions: ART 129 (7) FC
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
Code.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
products of their labor and industry
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
1. the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties.
2. dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of
the value each one may have originally owned.
3. ART 102- upon dissolution, inventory is made (exclusive
properties of each; debts and obligations paid, if
insufficient-exclusive properties); Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them.
4. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and
the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution
a. the "net profits" requires that we first find the
market value of the properties at the time of the
community's dissolution. From the totality of the
market value of all the properties, we subtract
the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or
net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market
value of the properties at the time of marriage,
which then results to the net profits
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case
for purposes only of defining "net profit."
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage."
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under
the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the
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liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved.
Steps:
1. Inventory
2. Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the
conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in
equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership
and if the community is enriched at the expense of the
separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the
value of such properties to their respective owners shall
be made
3. couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of
each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective
separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.
4. Remains of their separate property shall be returned to
them
PANA VS HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE 2012
FACTS:
Husband and wife was accused of murder: guilty Wife
They filed motion to quash writ for execution claiming that
the levied properties were conjugal assets and not
paraphernal assets of melencia
whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties
of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
SC DECISION:
MPR: CPG since they are married prior to the effectivity of the
family code. They cannot insist that theyre MPR is AC since the
Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements
cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established
by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place
only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their
work or industry in the common fund. This means that they
continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically
change the marriage settlements of couples who got married
under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired
or vested rights to such separate properties. The presumption,
absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married
under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119
of the Civil Code
Provisions of FC on CPG is applicable to marriages with CPG
under the Civil Code (Art 105 of the FC)
whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may
be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the
murder case
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed
upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia
has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The
civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed
on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code
have been covered.
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment
of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the
partnership assets even before these are liquidated. No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair
since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
Ilona HAPITAN VS Sps. LAGRADILLA (2016) (compare with
servacio)
FACTS:
Esmeralda Hapitan issued 31 bounced checks to wife
lagradilla.
Sps sued Sps Hapitan, Ilona and sps Terosa (1995) civil case
for sum of money with a prayer that a writ for preliminary
attachment be issued against the real property of Esmeralda
and Nolan, consisting of a house and lot, as security
Sps hapitan promised to convey their house and lot to Sps
lagradilla; thru Ilona (SPA). Sps lagradilla alleged that the
property was fraudulently sold to Sps Terosa, and that Nolan
and Esmeralda Hapitan were about to depart from the
Philippines with the intent to defraud their creditors; thus, the
prayer for the issuance of preliminary attachment of the house
and lot.
Esmeralda admitted the debts, but alleged that it was due to
the failure of Nolan to send money.
Nolan and Ilona alleged that the debts was incurred solely by
Esmeralda
Entered into amicable settlement, not knowing that there is
already a CA decision
whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement by Husband can
modify the Decision of the CA
SC DECISION
Waiver is INVALID
[I]t is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he
is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally
entitled, whether secured by contract. WIFES WAIVER cannot
cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the
Spouses Terosa since the property is neither a right nor a benefit
she is entitled to.
Amicable settlement is INVALID
With the payment of P425,000.00, Jimmy and Warlily allegedly
released Nolan and Ilona, Esmeralda, and even the Spouses
Terosa from their obligations. While compromise agreements are
generally favored and encouraged by the courts, it must be proved
that they were voluntarily, freely, and intelligently entered into by
the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment.46 The
allegations of Jimmy and Warlily cast doubt on whether they fully
understood the terms of the Amicable Settlement when they
signed it. They further argued that they did not fully comprehend
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the CA Decision in their favor. Thus, it may be reasonably inferred
that Jimmy and Warlily did not give consent to the Amicable
Settlement with Nolan and Ilona.
Nolan cannot waive his and Esmeraldas rights over the
house and lot sold to the Spouses Terosa.
Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 124
of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other
spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void. Further, under Article
89 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares, and
effects of the conjugal partnership of gains during the marriage can
be made except in case of judicial separation of property.
Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving
their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable
Settlement. In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement,
as evidenced by her pleadings filed before the courts. She further
expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to reverse its
decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal
property, is favorable to him.
Sps. AGGABAO VS Dionisio and Elena PARULAN (2010)
bersamin
FACTS:
Property owned by then Sps Parulans.
1991: elena showed SPA by her Husband authorizing her to
sell the property.
Petitioners verified the title with RD; they discovered multiple
annotations, since it is a conjugal property
March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount
of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute
sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said
copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in
Hongkong
TCT was issued to petitioners
Petitioners met wit atty Jeremy parulan who is in possession of
the TCT and SPA from dionisio; he demanded 800k for the
TCT; patitioners refused saying they already paid to Elena
Dionisio sued them, declaration of the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of
the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
RTC: forged SPA, they are not buyers in good faith
CA: affirmed RTC; Art 124 FC applied
1) Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of
the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed without the consent of Dionisio?
ARTICLE 124 FC:
the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is,
therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during
the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of
the Family Code.
-In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma.
Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before
the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the
petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article
124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the
absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
2) Might the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of
their purchase of the property?
Due diligence required in verifying not only vendors title, but also
agents authority to sell the property
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine the
good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and
possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required
before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith
in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not
only into the title of the seller but also into the sellers capacity
to sell.
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely:
(a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the
property; and
(b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting
spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
FLORES VS Edna LINDO (2011)
FACTS:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from
Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable on 1
December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3%
surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[4] (the Deed) covering a
property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico)
Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a
Promissory Note[5] and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All
checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents.
RTC: Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and
authority of Enrico, (deed was Oct 1995, SPA by the husband was
Nov 1995)
SC DECISION:
rticle 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family
Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of
the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected
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the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions:
(1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification,
and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in
this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan
from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without
just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for
declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not
be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy,
as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done,
because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no
jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against
unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the
procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the
assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that
she claimed it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the
validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to
submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to
the amount of her indebtedness.
Josefina NOBLEZA VS Shirley NUEGA (2015)
FACTS:
Shirely 1988 while engaged with Rogelio, She sent the
latter money while working in Israel to purchase a
residential lot . Rogelio was also working then as a
seaman.
1989 upon her arrival, she claimed to have settled the
balance thru SSS financing.
1990 got married. Lived in the property; Rogelio brought
another woman in the family home while Shirley was in
Israel
1992 filed for LS and Liquidation of property,
neighbor intended to buy the prop, Shirley advised of the
existence of the cases, cautioned them in buying the prop
Dec 1992 rogelio sold the prop for 380k
RTC: granted LS and enjoined from selling the prop
(1994)
Filed: recission of sale- RTC: part of Shirley considered
rescinded
CA: affirmed: ordered petitioner to reconvey the prop,
entire sale Null and void
SC DECISION:
Petitioner is not a buyer in Good faith
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right or
interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the
buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of
claims or interest of some other person in the property.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by
merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other
surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the
seller Rogelio himself who was therein also described as "single".
But the circumstances surrounding the sale shouldhave warned
the buyer. (his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale - further creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner
that she is an innocent purchaser for value.) neighbor sila! Hello??!
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not
premised on proof of respondent's financial contribution in
the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is
not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is
community property for the law itself defines what constitutes
community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are:
(1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family
Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of
the Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title
by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if
any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse;
however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the
exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the
absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of
their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage,
and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT
as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and
Rogelio.
HEIRS OF PATRICIO GO VS SERVACIO (2011) Bersamin
FACTS:
1976 Gaviola sold 2 lands to Protacio Go jr. 23 yrs later
(1999), the latter executed an affidavit that it was his
father not he who purchased the land.
1987: Mommy Go died
1999: Protacio Sr. and Rito (son) sold property
(undivided share) to Servacio
2001: petitioners demanded the return of the property,
servacio refused, they sued for annulment of sale
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio,
Sr. and Marta was null and void. [6]
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had
exclusively owned the property because he had
purchased it with his own money.
RTC: conjugal property but affirmed validity of sale (as
long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid.)
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 Appeal on pure question of law
WON the sale is valid
SC DECISION:
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their
property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal
partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in
1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article
175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-
ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Applicable provision: ART 130 FC and ART 105 FC
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256.
Implied co-ownership
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
REMEDY OF CO-OWNERS
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners
in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the
entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares
of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the
co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be
validly sold to her.
Melecio DOMINGO VS Sps MOLINA (2016)
FACTS:
1951:Sps Domingo bought undivided property in tarlac
1978: after wife domingo died, dad domingo sold to
molinas his interest over the land to answer for his debts.
Sale annotated to OCT
1986: dad domingo died
1995: TCT to sps Molina
1999: Melecio (son) learned of the transfer, filed for
annulment of title and recovery of ownership against
Molinas
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property
to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the
money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not
have validly sold the interest over the subject property
without Flora's consent, as Flora was already dead at the
time of the sale.
The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of
the disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio
several times to borrow money. The last loan was even
used to pay for Melecio's wedding.
RTC: dismissed
CA: affirmed RTC decision
(1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina
without Flora's consent is valid and legal;
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married
before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their
property relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal
partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora
died in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code22 (now
Article 126 (1) of the Family Code. )
Art 130 FC: requires mandatory liquidation within 1 year after
death; requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon
death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal
partnership liquidation,
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition
involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the
partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the
provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific
portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless,
Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest in the subject property. And Sps Molina became co-
owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios interest.
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-
heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the
co-heirs after liquidation and partition
PNB VS heirs GARCIA (2014)
FACTS:
JOSE GARCIA Sr acquired property DURING his
marriage with Ligaya (died 1987)
1989: R and C Garcia obtained loan from PNB, Jose Sr.
accommodated then, subj property as addtl collateral to
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 increase their loan, SPA, etc(all of which unknown to the
children)
1994: defaulted on maturity
1996: annulment of Real Estate Mortgage; it was null and
void, since the property is conjugal and upon the death of
their mother co-owners, and that it could not bind the
chidren since their consent was not obtained.
RTC: the conjugal property could only be transferred or
encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s share in the
conjugal partnership, plus his share as an heir in the
other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased
spouse.
CA: affirmed
SC DECISION
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, their property relations were governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does
not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired. The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or
the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the
name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage. It retains its conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property,
the petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. The burden of
proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the
husband rests upon the party asserting it.
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal
partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant
to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code. (now 126 FC). and the
successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777
of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the
entire subject property after the death of Ligaya, but before the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of
the Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even
sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not
dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.s right
in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the
estate which is his deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided
shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because
they did not give their consent to the transaction.
Francisco LIM VS EQUITABLE PCI BANK (2014)
FACTS:
1988: Francisco executed Irre SPA in favor of Franco Lim to
mortgage the property, he did and was able to fully pay the
loan
1996: Franco and their Mother, Loan from EqPCI, secured
by same property, was not paid, foreclosed
1999: TCT to the bank
2001: Franciscio-TRO and cancellation of SPA, mortgage
and civil case against Franco and his mother
Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to
mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his
signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety
Agreement were forged.
RTC: in favor of petitioner
CA: reversed
SC DECISION:
NATURE OF THE PROPERTY MUST BE SPECIALLY ALLEGED
IN THE COMPLAINT
We are not unaware that all property of the marriage is presumed
to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by
the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by
the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband
or the wife alone;and that the consent of both spouses is required
before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.53 However, we find
it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the
nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue
before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact,
petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was
conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut
the said presumption.
ORION VS SUZUKI (2014)
FACTS:
2003: Japanese bought a condominium with parking lot
allegedly owned by Kang
Kang thereafter made several representations with
Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were
then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez,
Orions Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several
verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country,
prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Suzuki learned: still in the name of cityland, but the latter
assured Suzuki that kang paid the full price
Encumbrance in favor of Orion 1999 for Loan, cancelled
2000, but despite cancellation of mortgage, titles
remained in possession of Orion)
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8, 2003,
with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City,
annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No.
18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the
titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to
surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orions
legal counsel as its reason.
2003: he received letter from Orions counsel (Oct 9,
2003) that Kang obtained another loan, Dacion en Pago
(reg:Oct 15, 2003)
2007: Suzuki filed complaint for specific performance and
damages against Kang and Orion
RTC: in favor of Suzuki
CA: upheld Suzukis rights over the properties
ORIONs petition: SUZUKI not a buyer in good faith for
he failed to check the owners duplicate copies of the
CCT and The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of
Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
6
 conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with
the consent of both spouses;
SC DECISION:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property its immobility. This general principle includes all rules
governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable
property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However,
the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
the law of the forum.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely
attached a Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification,
does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated
by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-
identity approach or processual presumption comes into play,
i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to'
Hyun Sook Jung is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang.32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse,
were indeed either conjugal or community properties.34
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.
MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR (2009)
FACTS:
1988: Benjamin married 17y/o joselyn
1989: bought a property in boracay, financed by Benjamin,
and constructed improvements thereon---they separated
1992: Joselyn SPA in favor of Benjamin
same year: Joselyn enter into contract with Taylor (music
garden)
Benjamin: claimed agreement is null and void since done
without his consent
RTC: joselyn in default (Dec of Nullity of Agreement of Lease
with Damages)
CA: In favor of Benjamin
SC DECISION:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the
aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands
of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned
by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to
acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions.
we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin,
being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared
to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we
sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds for such
acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was
illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement
for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made
that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community
property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity
or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have
a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that
the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Sps. BUADO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND Romulo NICOL
(2009)
FACTS:
1984 sps sued erlinda Nicol for slander
1987: RTC: ordered her to pay damages
1992: final and executory
Finding Erlinda Nicol's personal properties insufficient to
satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice
of levy on real property on execution addressed to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite
Public auction was held- Cert of sale issued in favor of
BUados 1993
1994: Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda
Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale
and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and the deputy sheriff; Respondent, as
plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now
petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and
execute his real property without exhausting the personal
properties of Erlinda Nicol.
SC DECISION:
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
7

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty
to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed
by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.
DEWARA VS LAMELA (2011)
FACTS:
Sps dewara married under the Civil code, Separated in
fact
1985 : Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in
the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela
Ronnie filed SPI at MTCC: found guilty
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of
certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in the
name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in
California. (she filed for annulment of sale)
The respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was
the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo.
They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita
during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was
acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time
of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was
registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did
not interpose any objection pending the levy on
execution of the property.
RTC: ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was
personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive
property of his wife.
CA: reversed RTC
whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property
of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo.
SC DECISION
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by
spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also
undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, since they were married before the
enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the
lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal
property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and
convincing evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests
upon the party asserting it.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged
against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same
were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the
wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property
or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and
indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets
only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the
Civil Code have been covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for
the serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered
that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the
name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal
case. Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for
Eduardos liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no
property in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the
RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie
may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita
and Eduardo after the responsibilities enumerated under
Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
FUENTES VS ROCA (2010)
FACTS:
VENTURA VS ABUDA (2013)
BORROMEO V. DESCALLAR (2009)
(ART. 148)
Both have prior marriages when they cohabited.
Socorro prior marriage to crispin (m. 1952) (son:
father of the petitioner)
Socorro m esteban 1980
Estebans wife died in 1960 (daughter: Evangeline)
Esteban died 1997, Socorro died 1999
There were properties that was bought by esteban
1968-1970 (The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11
December 1980, issued to Esteban Abletes, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres.
Evangeline and esteban operated a small business
1997: sold to Evangeline the properties
edilberto rep by his mom, pet for dec of annulment of
deeds, fraudulent signature;
respondents: since marriage with Socorro is void, the
latters heirs cannot claim any right or interest
SC DECISION
MPR: ART. 148
8

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
(BORROMEO)
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan
properties can be considered common property if:
(1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of
Esteban and Socorro; and
(2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired
through the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry.
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone. The phrase married to Socorro Torres is merely
descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that
Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after
the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title
system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
(BORROMEO) Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice
to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right.
The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles
of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in
good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and
the parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by
and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing
payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the
other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing
Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.
OLIVA-DE MESA VS ACERO JR (2012)
RAMOS VS PANGILINAN (2010) (Family home:rules to be
exempt from execution)
KELLEY JR VS PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. (2008) (Effect of
FC on those existing family homes)
In Ramos v. Pangilinan, this Court laid down the rules relative to
exemption of family homes from execution:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must
be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted
and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.Hence, two sets
of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial
constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified
petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order
with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located.Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of
a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry
ofProperty.Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of
constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the
privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need
to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the timeit was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have beenwithconsent of the other, and its
valuemustnotexceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family
home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after
the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted
as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of
August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
Here,
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be
barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable
time thereafter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a
considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its exemption from execution
and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed
the subject property to be levied upon and the public sale to
proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property
was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and,
later, Aracelis Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued
under Claudios name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it
was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the
auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property
is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or
omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives
rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status
of the subject property as a family home.
EULOGIO VS BELL SR (2015)
CABANG VS BASAY (2009)
In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title
and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). Over the 329 sqm
residential lot and cancellation of title
RTC: granted, but liable to pay 1m plus 12% interest
CA: affirmed in toto
9
SC DECISION
Not forum shopping:
Barred by res judicata: The test to determine whether the causes
of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence
will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions.
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the
second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one
case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of action
in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.37chanrobleslaw
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of
Civil Case No. 4581 - including the bid of petitioners to execute the
money judgment awarded to them by the trial court - is founded on
a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the
Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main
proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by
petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the
property from Spouses Bell for P1 million - was utilized to
substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents' family
home was actually PI million.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over
the same property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence
advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over
respondents' family home have already been used to support their
arguments in the main proceedings.
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under
Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family
Code.39chanrobleslaw
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great
controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection
or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A
houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy,
industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No
greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to
be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in
special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to
be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute.
The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the
specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot
exceed the statutory limit.
ART 155: Exempt from execution
ART 160:
ART 157: The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand
pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural
areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution,
forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not
match the present value of the peso because of currency
fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value
that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any
amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of
any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home
by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries
will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the
property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement
does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory
limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the
obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under
Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the
property introduced by the persons constituting the family home,
its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged
- much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented
was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined
with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual
transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners
and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price
stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute.
Cabang vs Basay
from the inception of Civil Case No. 99-20-127, it was already of
judicial notice that the improvements introduced by petitioners on
the litigated property are residential houses not family homes.
Belatedly interposing such an extraneous issue at such a late
stage of the proceeding is tantamount to interfering with and
varying the terms of the final and executory judgment and a
violation of respondents' right to due process because'
As a general rule, points of law, theories and issues not brought to
the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no opportunity to present further evidence
material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware of if at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
The family home must be established on the properties of
(a) the absolute community, or
(b) the conjugal partnership, or
(c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
other.
It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on community
property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the latter.
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no
communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only
on his or her own property. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all
their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is
that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been
long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court's judgment in
10
CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners' continued stay on the
subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
PATRICIO VS DARIO III (2006)
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario
III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a
residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.
One of the son and the mom, extrajudicially settled the estate.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private
respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition
the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an
action for partition before the Regional Trial Court.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and
Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger
the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art.
199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default
is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to
support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson's legal support. On the contrary, herein
petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an
intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more
reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.

RTC: ordered partition

CA: affirmed

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper

where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on
the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home

SC DECISION: NO, not the beneficiary contemplated by law

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the

beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must

concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154
of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.

ART 159 FC: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living
in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the
expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of
age.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not

from his grandmother, but from his father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a

descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article
154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent
on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own
family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of
legal age.

SUPPORT:
Legal support has the following characteristics:
(1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and
the obligee;
(2) It is intransmissible;
(3) It cannot be renounced;
(4) It cannot be compromised;
(5) It is free from attachment or execution;
(6) It is reciprocal;
(7) It is variable in amount.

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