Paul Van Geert (Auth.), Paul Van Geert, Leendert P. Mos (Eds.) - Annals of Theoretical Psychology (1991)

Annals of
Theoretical
Psychology
Volume 7
EDITORIAL BOARD
D. Bakan, York University, Canada
J. S. Bruner, New School for Social Research
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Annals of
Theoretical
Psychology
Volume 7
Edited by
PAUL VAN GEERT
Department of Psychology
University of Groningen
Groningen, The Netherlands
and
LEENDERT P. MOS
Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
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1991 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Contributors
Wm J. Baker, Department of Psychology, Concordia College, Edmon-

ton, Alberta, Canada
John C. Cavanaugh, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State
University, Bowling Green, Ohio
Michael Chapman, Department of Psychology, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Roger A. Dixon, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria,
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
Paul van Geert, Department of Psychology, University of Groningen,
Mark L. Howe, Department of Psychology, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland
David F. Hultsch, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria,
Richard M. Lerner, Department of Human Development and
Family Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
Pennsylvania
J. J. McArdle, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia
Frank B. Murray, College of Education, University of Delaware,
Newark, Delaware
John R. Nesselroade, Department of Human Development and
Family Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
Pennsylvania
Willis F. Overton, Department of Psychology, Temple University,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
F. Michael Rabinowitz, Department of Psychology, Memorial
University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada
v
vi Contributors
Ellin Kofsky Scholnick, Department of Psychology, University of

Maryland, College Park, Maryland
Charles W. Tolman, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria,
Jaan Val siner, Department of Psychology, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Joachim F. Wohlwill, Department of Individual and Family Studies,
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania
Preface
This is the first of a two-volume work in the Annals series devoted

to developmental psychology. The project was originally conceived in
1985 when Paul van Geert, who had just completed his Theory building
in developmental psychology (North Holland, 1986), agreed to col-
laborate on anAnnals volume examining foundational issues pertaining
to the concept of development. The project attracted considerable
interest and, in view of the length of the resulting manuscript, a decision
was made to publish it in two volumes. Fortunately, the contributors
provided coherent perspectives on two relatively distinct developmen-
tal themes which served to facilitate our task of dividing their contribu-
tions into two volumes. The first volume deals with the foundations of
developmental theory and methodology; the second volume - to appear
as Volume 8 of the Annals - with theoretical issues in developmental
psychology.
In this first volume, the contributions by Willis Overton and Joachim
Wohlwill were completed in 1988, those by Roger Dixon, Richard
Lerner, and David Hultsch, and Paul van Geert in 1989. Commentaries
followed quickly and replies to commentaries were completed in 1990.
Paul van Geert provides a general framework within which the founda-
tional issues of development are discussed. He is especially concerned
with the nature of transition models and the structure of time in
developmental theory. The relationship between methods and
framework, or theory, is the topic of Joachim Wohlwill's contribution.
The reader is treated to an historical discussion of the relationship
between theory and methods, focusing on the issues of stages and
continuity-stability in development. He argues that the 'partial-
isomorphism' that characterizes the relationship between theory and
method avoids the sterility of pursuing methodology for its own sake,
as well as the insulation of theory from encounters with rival theories.
Moreover, he deems this construal of a 'partial-isomorphism' between
theory and method as most promising for progress in developmental
psychology.
Willis Overton places the quest for developmental theory within the
framework of philosophical values pertaining to ontology and epis-
temology. He examines the rationalist and empiricist framework, and
vii
viii Preface
compares and contrasts both these to current hermeneutical and nar-

rative modes of knowing. In the final contribution to this volume, Roger
Dixon, Richard Lerner, and David Hultsch examine the strength of
contemporary developmental theory in terms of four dimensions of the
concept of development: universality, reversibility, qualitative versus
quantitative change, and directionality. The dimension of directionality
becomes the focus of an extended discussion of individual and social
change.
The editors are grateful to Professors Richard Lerner and John
Nesselroade for their dedication in honor of the late Professor Joachim
Wohlwill. The latter's contribution was the first to be received and set
the tone for the entire project in both volumes.
Mrs. Valerie Welch entered the text; Mr. Casey Boodt proof-read
the manuscript and ensured the accuracy of citations and references.
Professor Wm Baker prepared the camera-ready copy. The Unversity
of Alberta continues to support my editorial work on the Annals.
Leendert P. Mos
Acknowledgements
The contribution by Willis E Overton and commentaries by Ellin

Kofsky Scholnick and Frank B. Murray are reprinted here with permis-
sion of the authors and publisher from Advances in Child Development
and Behavior (Volume 23). Copyright Academic Press, Inc., 1991.
Contents
Chapter 1. Theoretical problems in developmental psychology 1
Paul van Geert
Developmental psychology: person-centered, not variable-

centered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S5
WmJ.Baker
Development: sequences, structure, and chaos 65
Mark L. Howe & F. Michael Rabinowitz
Reply to commentators 73
Paul van Geert
Chapter 2. Relations between method and theory in developmental

research: a partial-isomorphism view . . . . 91
Joachim F. Wohlwill
Structural models of developmental theory in psychology . 139
J.J. McArdle
Theories and methods in the service of data construction in

developmental psychology ........ .161
J aan Valsiner
Theory and method in the study of behavioral development:

on the legacy of Joachim F. Wohlwill .. 177
Richard M. Lerner & John R. Nesselroade
ix
x Contents
Chapter 3. The structure of developmental theory 191
Willis F. Overton
Questions a satisfying developmental theory would answer:

the scope of a complete explanation of developmental
phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23 7
Frank B. Murray
The development of world views: towards future synthesis? 249
Ellin Kofsky Scholnick
Metaphor, recursive systems, and paradox in science and

developmentaltheory . . . . 261
Willis F. Overton
Chapter 4. The concept of development in individual and social

change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Roger A Dixon, Richard M. Lerner, & David E. Hultsch
On the concept of development: contextualism, relative time,

and the role of dialectics . 325
John C. Cavanaugh
Self-organization as developmental process: beyond the

organismic and mechanistic models? . 335
Michael Chapman
For a more adequate concept of development with help from

Aristotle and Marx ... 349
Charles W. Tolman
Conunu D
Maneuvering among models of developmental psychology 357
Roger A Dixon, Richard M. Lerner, & David E. Hultsch
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 369
Topic Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 377
Contenu of Previous Volumes .. . . 381

1
Theoretical Problems in Developmental
Psychology
Paul van Geert
SUMMARY: The present paper aims at providing a general framework

for the various problems and topics discussed in this volume. After
discussing the purpose oftheoretical reflection in developmental psychol-
ogy in general, several types of theoretical foundations are presented,
namely conceptual, logical and methodological. The paper goes on
discussing two important problems in developmental theory building.
The first concerns the construction of transition models, and provides a
framework for potential transition forms. The second deals with the
structure of time in developmental models, and discusses specific proper-
ties of developmental time.
1. Introduction: The Purpose of Theoretical ReOection in

Developmental Psychology
Theoretical reflection in developmental psychology serves two
major purposes. The first is the clarification of the theoretical founda-
tions of the discipline. However, the search for those foundations is no
singular endeavor. To begin with there are the philosophical and
conceptual foundations of developmental psychology. What are the
deepest properties of the processes we call developmental? Is there
any general definition of development, accepted by all developmen-
talists or, rather, is it a question of a framework covering fundamental
points of disagreement? An example of the latter is the classical
dichotomy between organismic and mechanistic models of development
Paul van Geert Department of Psychology, University of Groningen,

Groningen, The Netherlands.
Annals of Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7

Edited by P. Van Geert and L.P. Mas, Plenum Press, New York, 1991
2 Paul van Geert
(e.g., Overton, 1984). Thus, there is no agreement on what is develop-

ment, but developmental psychologists seem to agree that development
should be captured either in a worldviewwhere the organism is the basic
metaphor, or else in a worldview governed by the metaphor of the
mechanism. So the first question I shall ask is: what is the meaning of
the concept of development as applied to psychology (see Section 2.1,
Overton, this volume)?
The theoretical foundations of developmental psychology may also
be examined in terms of their logical structure. The questions we may
ask concern the logical foundations of developmental theories, and the
problem of whether or not there is something like a logical structure
that may serve as a general standard of developmental theories (see
Section 2.2).
Finally, our theoretical investigations may be directed towards the
methodological foundations of our discipline. Is there anything like a
specific developmental methodology and, if so, to what extent has it
been fully elaborated? It is striking that in the discipline of psychology
the problems of methodology have been - and still are - taken very
seriously, while the problems of the logical foundations of theories have
received little or no attention. Perhaps, the historical reason for this is
that psychology has had to free itself from philosophy, especially the
kind of philosophy that tends to find its truths in an armchair. In any
case, the methodological issues are of two kinds, namely experimental
and psychometrical. However, the common problem is that of concept
validation, that is, the question of whether or not our methods reveal
the empirical facts they purport to reveal (see Section 2.3, Wohlwill, this
volume).
The second and, actually, the main purpose of theoretical reflection
pertains to theory building, namely the construction of descriptively
adequate and explanatory theories of developmental phenomena. The
question of whether such theories already exist is difficult to answer. It
is clear that there are no developmental theories comparable to, for
instance, quantum mechanics in physics. That is, there are no theories
which are strongly mathematically modelled and form the basis for
empirical prediction and technological application. While, it is probably
unwise to take physical theories as a standard for scientific theories in
general, it is the case that what is called 'a theory' in developmental
psychology does not meet even the weakest criterion for distinguishing
a theory from a mere descriptive framework. Although the subject
1 Theoretical Problems in Developmental Psychology 3
matter of developmental psychology is very diversified - it covers the

whole range of psychological phenomena from a developmental point
of view - there are two important problems common to the study of
all developmental topics. The first concerns the concept of develop-
mental transition and addresses the question of why transitions occur
from one developmental state to another. The second concerns the
general problem of time, and the problem of the interplay between
various time scales in particular. It is necessary, for instance, that there
exists a link between the process of individual development and learn-
ing, and the process of cultural reproduction over generations. These
processes run over entirely different time scales (centuries v. decades),
yet they are intricately linked in a way we do not yet understand (Section
3.1.1, & 3.2; Dixon, this volume). Another example concerns the effect
of the distinct paces of interlocking growth processes. The learning of
new concepts is a relatively fast process, while the development of
general representational strategies or the strategies and extension of
working memory occurs rather slowly. Yet there is a definite mutual
effect between the slow and the fast processes.
2. Theoretical Foundations of Developmental Psychology
2.1 Conceptual foundations

The two main problems in this area are: what is (psychological)
development - what does the word mean, what does it refer to - and,
what is the subject matter of developmental psychology - what is it we
study?
2.1.1 What is psychological development? The fact that I pose this
question does not mean that I will try to answer it. I will discuss some
of the perspectives from which this question may be viewed and possibly
answered. In one sense the question is very easy to answer. Psycho-
logical development is that what the term 'psychological development'
refers to, and if one wants to know more, one should investigate the
properties of that referent. The assumption behind this answer is that
'psychological development' is a so-called "natural kind" term 1, and that
it rigidly refers to a specific referent (all instances of 'development' in
1 Schwartz (1977) makes a distinction between "natural kind" and "nominal kind terms".
Natural kind terms refer to objective entities in nature, such as ''water'', while nominal
kind terms refer to whatever satisfies a certain definition, such as "bachelor".
4 Paul van Geert
it rigidly refers to a specific referent (all instances of 'development' in

reality). A discussion of this assumption would lead us into very difficult
philosophical and semantic problems, which we might better leave to
the experts. In order to find out more about what development is, I will
propose a much more pragmatic approach. I will assume that develop-
mental theories and models, different though they may be, are generally
all about development, and not about mere change or learning, for
instance. It is also assumed that the study of certain commonalities and
points of disagreement among developmental theories and models tells
us something about the meaning (reference and sense) of the term
'psychological development'. How shall we find those commonalities
and disagreements? I will discuss some approaches.
It is conceivable that whatever unites the various viewpoints on
development is best exemplified by going back to the basic, etymological
kernel of the term. This kernel is the concept of 'unwrapping' (from
the Old French 'desvoloper', which is literally present in the Dutch or
the German word ['Ontwikkeling' and 'Entwicklung' respectively];
Thomre, 1959; Trautner, 1978). The unwrapping metaphor reveals
some of the classical features of development, such as the fact that the
developmental process is contained as a potential in the form of an
initial state, the fact that the following developmental steps are not
trivially visible in the initial state, the fact that there is a final point in
development, and so forth (van Geert, 1986a for discussion). However,
the metaphor does not fit very well with those theories that emphasize
the interaction between person and environment, or the indeterminacy
of developmental processes.
A second way of finding the common meaning of 'development'
resides in the analysis of the way in which the word is used in several
theories, and probably also in colloquial language (see van Geert, 1986a
for more detailed discussion). There are two of such linguistic
approaches. The first, a syntagmatic analysis, compares all semantic
contexts of the term development. More precisely, it examines the
properties of words that fit in with the slot 'x' in the expression 'the
development of x'. In previous papers (van Geert 1986a, 1987a) I have
argued that this form of analysis reveals two main meanings of
'development'.
The first I call 'retrospective' and amounts to the following semantic
rules:
A process P is called the development of X if

1. X is the name of the final state of P,
2. the states of P are ordered given the properties of X,
3. it is possible to define a non-trivial initial state (or
set of such states) in P given the properties of X.
Most of the classical theories of development fit in with this

retrospective conception in that they try to understand the logically
necessary or possible courses of a developmental process from the
viewpoint of its final state. Various developmental stage models may
be deductively reconstructed if one starts from their definitions of the
end state (for instance Piaget's model, see van Geert, 1987a; Erikson's
model, see van Geert, 1987b; and Galperin's model, see van Geert,
1987c).
The second conception I call 'prospective' and is characterized by
the following aspects:
A process P is called the development of X if:

1. X is a name applicable to all the states of P,
2. the states of P are ordered given the properties of X,
3. it is possible to define non-trivial under- and (event-
ually) upperlimits between which X may vary.
Examples of such theories are 'developmental dimension' theories

(Wohlwill, 1973). If 'formal thinking' is such a dimension, then each
state in its developmental process should be an instance of formal
thinking. There is a minimally developed form of formal thinking at the
initial state, for instance, the earliest expressions of formal thinking
emerging just after the transition from concrete thinking. Eventually,
there is a maximally developed form at the final state. For example,
whereas Piagetian theory would probably claim that formal thinking
may develop ever further qua complexity and range of applicability
within the human life span, Riegel (1973) would claim that formal
thinking reaches a point where it transforms into dialectical thinking.
Syntagmatic analysis finds its complement in paradigmatic analysis.
Here we investigate the way in which a semantic field, namely the set
of meanings related to the concept of change, is divided into subfields
by various te-rms, such as 'development', 'evolution', 'learning', and so
forth. In the expression 'the x of y by/in z', 'x' may stand for
6 Paul van Geert
'development', 'learning', 'change', 'evolution', and so forth; 'y' is a

constant, for instance, 'the alphabet', 'logical thinking' and 'z' is anybody
or anything by or in whom or by which the learning, development, and
so forth is done. By changing the terms and investigating the resulting
changes in meaning, one finds interesting conceptual relations and
boundaries between terms such as 'learning' and 'development', which
may clarify conceptually discussions usually based on empirical argu-
ments. For instance, the problem of whether formal thinking develops
or is learned probably amounts to a distinction between possible mean-
ings of formal thinking and the activities leading to its acquisition (van
Geert, 1986a).
A third way of finding common meanings and points of disagree-
ment between various views on development lies in subsuming the term
under some general framework capable of capturing also the disagree-
ments under a coherent description. Systems theory is a very well
known example of such framework (see for instance von Bertalanffy'
1962; van Geert, 1986a, for discussion). Another framework which has
been influential is that of ,worldviews' introduced by Pepper (1942) and
applied to developmental psychology by several writers, such as Langer
(1969) and Reese and Overton (1970). While the systems approach
tries to build bridges connecting distinct viewpoints, the worldview
approach tends to reduce the differences to incommensurable epis-
temic grounds. Both approaches may have constructive 'therapeutic'
functions in setting out paths for further clarification of theoretical
foundations.
2.1.2 What is the subject matter of developmental psychology?
Like the first question, this question, also, might receive a trivial answer,
namely 'everything (psychological) that develops'. So if we can answer
the first question, the answer to the second becomes obvious. Since we
have no clear answer to the first question, we should try to approach
the present problem from a different perspective. The perspective I
want to take is that of developmental research methodology.
At this point it is interesting to compare the state of affairs in
developmental psychology, with recent developments in linguistics.
The subject of linguistics is clearly psychological. Language is among
the prototypical activities of the human kind. Yet (modern) linguistics
has laid a heavy burden on the analysis of its logical and theoretical
foundations. and much less on the issues of empirical methodology. Its
methods are :~ither very simple - the linguist uses his own imagination
and linguistic intuition - or they are borrowed from psychology. Strict-

ly speaking, there is no fundamental distinction between linguistics and
developmental psychology as far as the accessibility of its subject matter
is concerned. Everybody is familiar with language and with the facts of
development. On the face of it, both language and development seem
rather trivial, maybe because almost every human being has first-hand
knowledge of these subjects. This knowledge takes the form of a tacitly
represented competence, the ability to tell the difference between
grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, or the ability to notice
developmental differences between children and to give proper help.
With regard to the latter, it is striking how remarkably sensitive people
are to differences in developmental levels of other people. Even
relatively young children demonstrate this ability to a significant degree.
It is interesting to note that several of the founding fathers of
developmental psychology (Preyer, Darwin, Piaget) used a simple ob-
servation method with one or a few children to obtain their most
significant data. Some of them who were particularly interested in
language development (Tiedemann's study from 1782, Clara & William
Stern, Preyer, Leopold, van Ginneken, Gregoire, and several others),
used the same observation method. In the study of language develop-
ment, the longitudinal observation of one child is still the dominant
empirical method, while in developmental psychology it has been aban-
donded almost completely. This state of affairs may be defended by
pointing to the fact that the subject matters of language development
and other areas of development are completely different. Only the first
should allow of an observational method. However, one should not
forget that the knowledge we have of language and of other domains
of human activity is the product of historical development in the scien-
tific disciplines which have studied these domains. Thus, if there is a
field in which most of our basic knowldge has been obtained from single
case observational studies, it is likely that the observational method
does not lose its relevance, however more sophisticated the subject
matter of that field might have become. As noted above, language,
unlike psychology, has a history of research into its structural and logical
foundations. The Transformational Generative Grammar revolution in
linguistics, which has taken the problem of the logical foundation of
linguistic theory as one of its primary issues, has also given impetus to
a renewed interest in single-case observational studies of language
development. By comparison, in developmental psychology only
8 Paul van Geert
single-case observational studies remain where these are accompanied

by a strong emphasis on the structural and formal aspects of the
developmental process, namely the studies done by Piaget. It is in a
sense Piaget's fate that his main breakthrough - starting with the
'discovery' of his theory by American psychologists in the early sixties
- amounts to the adoption of the theory by a classical transversal
experimental methodology and, hence, the abandonment of its struc-
tural and logical aspects. If one wants to remain friendly to Piaget's
work, one may state that Piaget was not a developmental psychologist,
but a genetic epistemologist. That, he was not so much interested in
the development of the child as in the development of human
knowledge. This interpretation - which I believe is often implicit in
many textbook accounts of Piaget - is a complete denial of the nature
of developmental psychology. Indeed, if our primary interest lies in the
development of the child or in the (life span) development of the person
for that matter, developmental psychology must either subject itself to
moralism and ideology, or it ceases to be a science of development. Why
is this so? A science of development should be able to distinguish
developmental processes from mere changes and fluctuations of
properties. What distinguishes development from mere fluctuation is
its coherence in a drift toward higher complexity, or to some end or goal
state. A child (or a person) has no intrinsic structural properties
explaining an end or goal state. The latter are prescribed by morals and
ideology. For instance, the idea that a child should grow towards
personal autonomy which, however, should not act against the benefit
of the community within legally established boundaries, is neither an
intrinsic developmental tendency nor an intrinsic goal or end state. It
is rather an ideological conception. Of course, it is possible to ground
a developmental psychology on the latter. But then this ideological
basis should be an explicit structural property of that developmental
psychology. If one abandons the ideological specifications and still aims
at a developmental psychology of the child or the person, then it is no
longer possible to distinguish development from fluctuation, since there
are no intrinsic properties in the child (or person) that could constitute
criteria for such distinction. So what should be the solution (provided,
of course, that one believes there is something to solve)? I think the
solution is quite simple. Developmental psychologists should adopt
formally describable content domains as areas of developmental in-
quiry. In fact, the study of language provides a good example. The
developmental psychology of language is the study of how a formally

described structure - that is, language - develops in a psychological
form, for example in the form of abilities and performances. Develop-
mental linguists have addressed very important and exemplary
problems, such as the learnability question, at a level of theoretical
sophistication which is unequalled in other domains of development.
Piaget's 'one man' explorations in the field of number concept or
geometry provide other examples, although the theoretical under-
pinnings of those studies are much less firm than in the field oflanguage.
The problem, of course, is that the 'cognitive' aspects of development
lend themselves so much more easily to formal and structural descrip-
tion.
2.21.ogical foundations
The problem of logical foundations amounts to the formulation of
a set of formal concepts and relations necessary to describe the structure
of any developmental model, its substantial statements, and its under-
lying theory. This problem has hardly been posed in developmental
psychology, let alone studied and solved. The author has tried to
provide some starting points for the study of those logical foundations
in terms of a framework offormallanguages (van Geert, 1987a, 1988).
In this chapter I will discuss some background problems related to
working within such a framework, primarily to present some idea of the
nature of the questions that are posed.
We start with the following formal concepts:
1. {S}
the set of possible states of any system that is characterized by

psychological development,
a state from {S}

3. ~
next-state-operation, that is, an operation which picks a next state of a

system given the system is in state Si,
10 Paul van Geert
4. <5 : (Si, {S}) = > Sj
dypamics equation (simplest form) stating that Sj from set S succeeds

S12
2 The mathematical notations used in this chapter are taken from set theory, and include
notions such as sets, and functions from one set onto another. Sets, meaning "a
collection of members", will generally be represented by a letter between braces, for
example,
{S}
which reads as "a set whose members are S's", for instance, developmental states. I
shall also use an alternative notation, namely parentheses, for a set when it is necessary
to enumerate its components. For instance,
G(~, {S})
reads "there is a set G, a Grammar for instance, which contains a function ~ and a set
{S}". It is not necessary to let the parentheses be preceded by a set name or
characterization such as G. Thus
( Si' {S} )
reads "the set consisting of a specific element Si and the set {S}". Parentheses are not
necessary if a set consists of only one member, for example, Si is the same as (Si).
Square brackets have the same notational function as parentheses, but are one level
higher, for example,
[(Si' {S}), G, (~, {S}) ]
with the comma separating the constituents. I shall describe functions in terms of
transformations, and denote the transformation by an arrow. For instance, the expres-
sion
~ : (Si' {S}) => Sj
can be read as follows: there is a function "~" which transforms the set (Si, {S}) into
the set Sj. Since this particular transformation does not affect {S}, and since Sj is a
member of {S}, we might also specify ~ alternatively as
~ : (Si' {S}) = > (Sj' {S})
I shall adopt the convention that a function can also be specified by naming only its
domain (that is the set preceding the arrow). For instance, the expression
~: (Si' {S})
states that ~ operates upon (Si, {S}) without specifying its result (i.e., its co-domain).
The domain, that is, the set preceding the arrow, might somewhat loosely be called the
"input" of the function, and the succeeding set its "output". Given the former
characterization of ~ we may say that the set-description of~, that is,
( ~ : (Si' {S}) )
is equal to the description of the codomain or "output of~, that is,
(Sj' {S})
The question we may ask is: what are the properties of {S} and of
c) such that a sequence of applications of c) yields a developmental
sequence of states?
In fact we need two series of the above mentioned concepts and
functions: one yielding real state sequences, the other their descrip-
tions. If we want to study the properties of theories and models, we
clearly need the second series. Our theories and models do not operate
on real states but on their descriptions. For reasons of simplicity I shall
assume that the two series are mirror images of each other. If it is
sufficiently clear from the context I will not specify which type of series
- the real-state or the description series - is being employed.
The simplest answer to our question is that there is actually no
theoretical or conceptual answer to give. The question should be
answered by empirical research. By studying developing organisms we
should try to find universal sequences of states, and those states and
sequences form the developmental model. However, the simple answer
cannot be correct. The concept of 'state of a system' is not defined a
priori. It is possible to specify a sequence by a practically infinite number
of state descriptions. Only a subset of the latter, if any, specifies
developmental states. The assumption that this subset contains all
states that occur in a fIXed order for the population cannot be adequate.
There is no rationale for distinguishing trivial sequences (e.g., univer-
sally occurring sequences which are simply the result of random varia-
tion of state properties over the population) from non-trivial ones.
What 'non-trivial' means is determined by a descriptively adequate
general theory of development. And here we are back to our starting
point, namely, the question, what are the properties of such general
theory?
I will approach this question by engaging in some 'Gedanken-
experiments' on a system with the following properties. The system
contains several subsystems. The first is a 'state generator' G. It is an
automaton that does exactly what the dynamics equation does. It gets
a present state as input, operates on the set of states, and produces a
next state as output. The output goes to two additional subsystems.
The first is a developing person P: the G-output corresponds to a state
change in P (it follows that the previous state of P is the input to G).
The second is an observer O. 0 Bets the G-output in the form of the
corresponding state description S . O's task is to find out whether the
12 Paul van Geert
G
-"" 8. (5)
5Di+i
P
5i ..-5i 0
5Di-i. 5 i. '"
Figure 1. Logical components of a general theory of state changes in

systems.
observed sequence of states in P is developmental and why this is so

(see Figure 1).
The operation <5 may pick any arbitrary S. The resulting sequence
observed by 0 will probably not correspond to a developmental
sequence. But the problem for 0 is to decide how to tell the difference
between a developmental and a non-developmental sequence. O's only
available criterion lies in the semantics of {S}. This latter concept needs
some further explanation because it is crucial to understanding the
nature of developmental sequences.
{S} represents states in P qua states of a system or an automaton.
As such, they are only interpretable to that system or automaton. But
{S} also refers to something outside the field of system or automaton
states. The referent is that which the sequence ofS's is the development
of provided, of course, that the sequence is developmental. For
instance, the sequence may represent the development of, for example,
the number concept, of identity, and of formal thinking. We usually
tend to take this number concept, identity concept, or the concept of
formal thinking to be 'in the mind' of the developing person. However,
what is 'in the mind' of that person is some form of mental realization
of that concept, identity or thinking. The number concept itself, for
instance, is a mathematical object, and as such it can not be part of
someone's mental layout. The mental properties that make somebody
be in a state of 'understanding the number concept' are properties that
refer to the mathematical object 'number concept' in some very specific
sense (how is a question that is beyond the scope of the present paper).
Accordingly, the mental properties that make somebody be in a state of
number concept development are also properties that refer in a specific
way to that mathematical object. The same story can be told for
'identity' or 'formal thinking'. However, there is one difference in that
the semantic properties of a concept like 'identity' for instance are
considerably less well understood than those of the number concept.
The next question then is: what should those semantics do so as to
allow us to distinguish between developmental and non-developmental
sequences? They should offer some way for defining the referent of
{S} (the concepts of number, identity, formal thinking), and a set of
variables over which structural variation of the referent can be
specified. Structural variation may take different forms.
First, the variables take the form of a nominal scale. They specify
either presence or absence of some defining criterion. For instance, in
the Piagetian definition of formal operational thinking the properties
'formal contents', 'operational thought', and 'thought as internal
process' are essential. Their absence (which amounts to the presence
of the opposite) defines forms of thought which are not formal opera-
tional and, necessarily, precede formal operational thought. Thus
precedence is determined by the way in which formal operational
thinking is defined. For instance, if we define a final state by two
properties (A, B), then forms of thinking characterized by (""'A, ....,B),
(""'A, B) and (A, ""'B)3 necessarily precede (A, B). A natural interpreta-
tion of this characterization is that, for instance, formal thought is
preceded by thought which is not formal, if it is preceded by anything.
If the variables are in 'absence-presence' form, the resulting sequence
of conceptual precedences amounts to the retrospective type of
3 I use ..... as a sign meaning 'the opposite or. The properties of the opposite of a property
A, of course, depend on the properties of A
14 Paul van Geert
developmental sequence described in Section 2.1. It is easily

appreciated that the retrospective character of such models is a matter
of semantics and not, of course, of some form of teleology or backward
causation. The second possibility is that the variables take the form of
ordinal scales (including interval or ratio scales). There may be some
lower limit, but this limit never corresponds with absence of the defining
variable. If 'X' is the name of the thing which develops (the concept of
number, identity, or formal thinking) all forms defined by the variables
are instances of X (remember that in the nominal variable case, only
one form is an instance of X, namely the form whose description
contains no opposite sign). Thus the ordinal variable case corresponds
with the 'prospective' type of theory discussed in Section 2.1. In the
nominal and ordinal case alike, it is easy to compute sequentiality among
states.
The third form of the variables is much more complicated. The
variables describing these states take the form of synthetic a priori
properties of those states. I use this concept of synthetic a priori in the
classical sense. Synthetic a priori properties are not empirical and also
not analytical in the sense of trivially known as part of a definition. They
are revealed by computation (or some other form of inferential reason-
ing) and as such they may represent real discoveries. Thus applied to
variables defining properties of potential developmental states we may
start with a minimal number of variables and by the application of some
sort of calculus we may find new variables. The structure of develop-
mental models based on this form ofvariables is much more complicated
than the models based on the two previous forms. Examples of such
models are the so-called differentiation theories, such as Werner's,
Bower's, or Gibson's models. The initial state is defined as some
undifferentiated or minimally differentiated whole. The properties of
the whole, and the properties of the variables defining the initial state
should enable us to compute the variables necessary to specify succeed-
ing states. In practice, such computation is hardly possible since the
formal properties of the basic components, the 'whole' and the initial
variables, are insufficiently defined or known.
From the previous reflection, it follows that the system in Figure 1
should be extended with an additional component, namely a semantics
(named M, from 'meaning'). The semantics contains all there is to know
about the developing entity (the concept of number, identity or formal
thinking). The set of all semantic elements in M is {B}. {B} contains
R
M
(8)
-
G
8, ts~ ~
SD i+i
'-----
P
Si
Si 0
S D i-i, S D i, ...
Figure 2. Logical components of a developmental theory.

-
among others the defining elements and variables just discussed. M has
two important properties. First there must be a referential relation
from G (and also from P, since P is a function of G) to M; and, second,
it must be accessible to 0 (see Figure 2).
The issue of the referential relation from G (and P) to M is anything
but trivial. In general, though, developmentalists do not seem to see it
as a problem. For instance, if a child learns to count and to calculate, it
seems obvious that what it acquires are mathematical concepts, such as
'number' or 'addition'. This is true only in so far as the concepts are not
equated with the mathematical objects or structures to which they refer.
The number concept, present in the mind of even the brightest mathe-
matician is not the mathematical object or structure 'number'. If the
number concept is an adequate representation of the object 'number',
it allows its 'owner' to search for further interesting properties of it
(mathematical investigation), or it allows of correct practical applica-
16 Paul van Geert
tion, such as counting or adding (practical use of mathematical objects).

It is possible, of course, that one of the propositions contained in M
(assume that M consists of propositions) states that the developing
entity is fully represented in G (or P). For instance, it seems likely that
if something like 'identity' exists, it must be something that is fully
instantiated in the form of a real component of P. However, it is
important to note that a developing entity (e.g., the number concept or,
perhaps, even language) does not necessarily refer to something that is
by definition fully instantiated in P, that is fully instantiated inside the
mind of the subject in whom the development occurs.
The present conception extends the problem of the 'aboutness' of
mental states to the domain of development. The following is an
example of the aboutness-problem. If I think about the President of
the U.S.A, it is not necessarily true that my thoughts are about the
President of the U.S.A Maybe I've seen Mr. Gorbachev for the first
time on television and my short-sighted aunt might have told me that
he is the President of the U.S.A So if I think that I'm thinking about
the President of the U.S.A, it is Mr. Gorbachev I'm thinking about.
This kind of problem is known as the problem of the opacity of thought
states, which led Fodor to the postulate of methodological solipsism
(Fodor, 1980). The same kind of problem arises with thought on all
possible developmental levels. For instance, if a 3 year old counts his
matchbox cars, do the number names he utters, or for that matter the
numbers he thinks of, refer to numbers qua mathematical objects?
Maybe the child thinks number words are names for cars in which case
his counting does not refer to numbers (and his thinking does not apply
a number concept). Even if it is true that the child refers to numbers
while counting it remains problematic as to how much the child's
knowledge of numbers is true of numbers. Piaget studied questions like
this one in great depth. For instance, he and his co-workers found that
children, before using a 'quantite' concept, use a 'quotite' concept,
according to which one quantity of 5 for instance may be less or more
than another quantity of 5 (Greco, Grize, Papert, & Piaget, 1960). This
finding illustrates that a child's thinking may developmentally refer to
the object 'number' while the thinking itself instantiates concepts which
are not yet number concepts. So why does the 'quotite' concept repre-
sent a developmental step towards the 'quantite' concept? Not because
it simply precedes the latter: there is so much that precedes the number
concept in time that is not at all developmentally relevant to it. The
answer is that the semantics of numbers allow us to establish a genera-

tive relationship between 'quotite' and 'quantite'. That is, number
theory provides us with a recursive procedure that transforms the object
'quotite' into the object 'quantite'. For the sake of clarity, I must state
that I do not really know whether number theory does indeed provide
us with such procedure. If it does not, then there are no grounds for
claiming that 'quotite' is a developmental precursor of 'quantite' in the
sense that the former is an earlier state of the latter.
This kind of reasoning makes it clear why the semantics of the
developing entity are so important in determining potential develop-
mental sequences. No empirical criterion alone can decide whether or
not a sequence is developmental. For instance, showing that some
sequence of problem solving abilities occurs in a fIxed order in a
population is not suffIcient to determine that the sequence is develop-
mental. First, the empirical procedure cannot decide whether or not
there exist alternative roads to some acquisition since it capitalizes on
singular and universal roads. Second, it cannot tell the difference
between fIXed sequences of states which have no causal or conditional
relationship to each other. For instance, empirically there is a fIXed
sequence of occurrence between the learning of the human face schema
and the acquisition of the passive form in English, but there is no
developmental relation between these two in any interesting sense of
the word 'developmental'. Of course, we cannot preclude that such
developmental relation will be found one day, but that would really be
a discovery. In summary, besides the empirical research on sequences
and occurrences of states in a population, there should be research on
theoretical relationships between the referents of potential develop-
mental states (e.g., the quotite and quantite states). For this theoretical
research the semantics of the developmental entity are an indispensable
domain.
This brings us to the second of the fundamental properties of M,
namely that it should be accessible to O. First, the semantics may be
inaccessible because nothing is known about them. If there is no
theoretical knowledge about the properties of numbers, there can be
no theory of number development although there can be number
development. Second, the semantics may be accessible, but what is
accessible may be irrelevant with regard to the developmental problem.
For instance, mathematicians have known much about numbers for
many centuries, but it seems that we had to wait until Russell and
18 Paul van Geert
Whitehead wrote the Principia Mathematica in order for us to find facts

about numbers that could be used in a program of developmental
research. It is illustrative that Piaget employed many discoveries in
mathematical theory, geometry, logic, and physics as cornerstones for
his developmental theories.
In Figures 1 and 2 we have seen that G's output consists of states
for P and state descriptions for O. Of course, this automatical providing
of descriptions is only a formal metaphor for theoretical and empirical
investigation and reflection. But wherever those descriptions come
from in reality, they must obey two important criteria. First they must
be transparent with regard to states in P (and G). That is, the descrip-
tion of a state Sj must be such that we are able to recognize an Sj state
when we see one in reality. Second, they must be transparent with
regard to developmentally relevant properties in M. For instance, one
could provide a detailed behavioral description of conservation
problems and children's answers which would allow an investigator to
decide whether or not a child has reached the stage of operational
thinking. However, the description clearly does not tell us why behav-
iors so-and-so mark a transition to operational thinking. Providing an
answer to the latter question is a matter of adding good theoretical
interpretations to the empirical description.
We can now summarize the previous discussion as follows:
1. The logical description of a developmental theory needs
at least four components, namely
[M( {B}), G(d, {S}), P(Si), O( ... , SDj, SDj+1, ... ) ]
2. The state generator G is a specific function of the seman-
tic component M
f:M({B}) => G(d, {S}).
The general dynamics equation produces pairs of states
and state descriptions
d : (Sj, {S}) = > (Sj, SDj)
3. If one imagines this general dynamic equation instan-
tiated in the form of some 'machine' (a mental structure,
a brain, ... ) one may see the operation d as a set of
operators which causes a state change in P from Sj to Sj.
This state change should be semantically interpretable
for 0, that is, 0 should be able to infer a correct descrip-
tion SD from it. The inference basis is by definition

something that should be observable to 0, that is, one
form of output or another from P. This inference basis is
picked from a set {o} which consists of everything that P
might show (P's behavior, internal machinery, etc.)
4. In some cases, the state change in P could be determined
entirely by the properties of the preceding state. It is
more likely ,however, that it is caused by the properties
of the preceding state and by inputs from the environ-
ment (picked from the set {i}). So we may write a
specific dynamics equation as follows:
<5' : (Si, {S}, ii, {i}) => (Sj, SDj, 0, pt)
(pt is the probability that a state Sj occurs within time t;
Sj is semantically interpretable for 0, that is it corre-
sponds with a state description SDj, and 0 refers to the

interpretable empirical signals or observations upon
which bases the state description). The present equa-
tion is a standard dynamics equation of a sequential
machine. There is at present no theory of development
which is sufficiently established so as to contain a
dynamics equation of the present form. At best they con-
tain a verbal model of a rather general transition
mechanism (see van Geert 1987b and 1987c for ex-
amples and discussion),
5. There is a grammar f whose i&>ut (i.e., l)
is a mtf, from
{B} and whose output (i.e., f ) is a map from {S }
f: (fI : {B}) = > (fa: {SD} )
6. We may say that this grammar is a component of 0, that
is,
O({SD}, f).

This grammar allows to decide whether or not the se-
quence of states in P is a developmental sequence, and
whether G is a developmental state generator.
Some of those grammars, especially from the models which employ
nominal or simple ordinal variables (see Section 2.1), are quite simple.
Especially those belonging to the retrospective theory type can easily
be written in the form of finite tree structures (see van Geert, 1988).
20 Paul van Geert
Others, namely those associated with models which employ the so-
called synthetic variables, are probably quite complex, and may be of a
form which is not completely accessible to any a (investigator, develop-
mental psychologist, parent, ... ).
2.3 Methodological foundations

Next, I will discuss two central methodological problem domains,
namely the domain of experimental methodology and the domain of the
mathematical methodology. I will not discuss any problems of content,
such as how to set up a developmental experiment, or compute the
sequentiality of acquisitions. The emphasis will be on the theoretical
aspects of methodology and their relationship to the foregoing founda-
tional problems.
2.3.1 Experimental methodology. The central issue in designing
experimental methods is the question of validity. Does an experimental
manipulation - varying from doing a 'real' experiment to presenting a
subject with a test - result in observable signs and behaviors that
referentially relate to the intended concept? Stating the question in
this way relates the validity problem to the problem of reference
discussed in Section 2.2 (Logical foundations). The problem ofrefer-
ence is quite complicated and so is the role of experimentation therein.
In this section, I will discuss various forms of the problem of reference
in experimentation. First I will deal with the form of referential
relationships and its consequences for methodological strategies.
Second, I will address the problem of mental contents of 'exotic' sub-
jects, that is, subjects who differ basically from the investigator such as
pre-verbal children or people from isolated traditional cultures. Third,
I will address the problem of how to determine empirically whether or
not a state is a precursor of another state. Finally, I will deal with the
problem of the stability of a referent over long developmental intervals.
I will start the discussion of the first problem - the problem of
referential relationships - with an example. In the well-known con-
servation experiment children from 4 to 6 are asked whether or not
there is still as much liquid in a (usually transparent) beaker after its
content has been poured in from another beaker (usually of a different
form). Roughly, if the child says 'no' he is classified as a non-conserver,
which means that he is still on the level of pre-operational thinking. If
he says 'yes' he is a conserver, that is, he has reached the level of concrete
operational thinking. The experiment owes its fame primarily to Piaget.
It is interesting, therefore, to see the differences in experimental
methodology between Piaget and the present day users of the experi-
ment. Piaget tended to make it quite difficult for the children, for
instance, by making counter suggestions when the child gave the correct
answer. The modem experimental approach to conservation is consid-
erably different. There is a whole literature showing that the answers
the children give are strongly determined by questioning factors (e.g.,
Rose & Blank, 1974; Bijstra, van Geert, & Jackson, 1989). So the
modem conservation experiment carefully varies those factors, and
takes the connection with children's answering strategies as a central
- if not the central - goal of the experiment. The question then is:
what has changed since Piaget? Have we improved the methodology
of experimentation in the field of conservation thinking in children? In
order to answer this question I shall present a scheme of referential
relations between empirical and theoretical components of an ex-
perimental situation (see Figure 3). Referential relations are relations
with a 'fuzzy' sort of transitivity. If A refers to B, and B refers to C, then
there's probably a relatively great number of cases in which A refers to
C, but there are cases in which there's no reference from A to C, and
cases where the referential relation is quite weak.
Figure 3 shows some classical problems, among others, of validity.
For example, the problem of the relationship between an experimental
manipulation and its perception and understanding by the subject. But
those are not what concerns us here. Our question was whether or not
the change in experimental methodology in conservation experiments
is a methodological improvement compared to Piaget's approach. The
answer is that it is not necessarily an improvement, and the explanation
lies in the nature of the referential relationships. In view of Piaget's
general goals, his primary referential relationship (Rt) went directly
from the experiment to the theoretical objects he wanted to study, for
instance, the transition from pre-operational to operational thought
forms. He was interested in the mental machinery only insofar as it
instantiated his theoretical objects. All aspects in which it didn't had to
be avoided and were not part of the aim of experimentation. Thus the
resulting experimental strategy was one of avoiding false positive errors.
Of course, it remains an open question whether his approach was
successful in establishing referential relations with the theoretical ob-
jects he was interested in. Clearly, modem researchers are much more
interested in the workings of the mental machinery: real time properties
22 Paul van Geert
MENTAl SYSTEM THEORETICAl OBJECTS
experimental
manipulation - input
to system
R2
mental
representation
R3
R4 operational
thinking
-
production ~
observable output
systems
effects from system
Figure 3. Components of an experimental situation.
of processing, answering tendencies, communicative presuppositions,

and so forth (referential relationship R2 in Figure 3). They are inter-
ested in theoretical objects like operational thinking only insofar as the
mental machinery and its processes and behaviors instantiate those
theoretical objects. So the resulting strategy is one of avoiding false
negative errors. That is, what should be avoided is that a mental
operation is overlooked just because the wrong kind of stimulus
material and instructions are employed in the experiment. In com-
parison to Pia get's approach, the referential relation to the theoretical
objects goes the other way around. In the contemporary approach it
goes from the machinery to the theoretical object (R3) and, if the
machinery and its processes do not properly refer to the theoretical
object called 'operational thinking', then so much the worse for that
theoretical object. In the classical Piagetian approach it goes from the
theoretical object to the machinery and its processes (R4), and if the
cognitive performances we usually see happen are not precisely what
'operational thinking' refers to, then so much the worse for those
performances and the machinery which underlies them.
In conclusion, the choice of one's methodology is primarily deter-
mined by the kind of object one wants to study through a particular
experiment. It determines for instance whether one will avoid either
false positive or false negative errors, a choice which will have a consid-
erable effect on the experimental procedure. Because the object of

investigation is potentially not only the mental processes but also their
referents, the choice of one's empirical object is far from trivial and
needs careful theoretical founding.
The second problem I want to discuss is the problem of
methodologies for 'exotic subjects'. Roughly, subjects can be exotic in
two senses. First they may strongly deviate from 'normal' subjects, but
have the same cultural environment as the investigator. In develop-
ment, pre-verbal children are notorious examples of this type of exotic
subject. The problem here might be that researchers fail to see the
referential problem because the subject acts in an environment familiar
to them such that the behaviors of the subject usually fall within
interpretable categories. A simple example is smiling. In our culture
(and probably in all cultures) smiling is an act of establishing a friendly
social contact - one smiles at another person. So infant smiling from
its emergence in the first month of life is, therefore, easily interpreted
as the expression of such an act. There is evidence, however, that early
smiles are non-social expressions of cognitive arousal (e.g. Ambrose,
1963; Papousek & Bernstein, 1969). They look social because most
cognitive arousal in young babies is socially caused, for example, by a
parent showing interesting objects and talking to the child. There is
also the opposite problem, where the infants' behaviors are interpreted
as signing a lack of cognitive understanding, for example, as in the errors
babies make while grasping or trying to retrieve objects. So the
methodological problem is to find experimental procedures that enable
us to go beyond the limits of culturally classified interpretation of
behavior. It is beyond a doubt that infancy research has made
considerable methodological progress as far as the latter problem is
concerned.
The second sense of exotism concerns subjects who are conforming
to normal subjects but who live in a culture that deviates from that of
the investigator. This is the classical problem of cross-cultural research.
The problem of culture-free versus culture-adequate tests and
experimental procedures is widely understood and I will not discuss it
here. However, a problem I want to deal with is that of diachronic
reference and the difficulties it may cause for the validity of developmen-
tal experiments. Diachronic reference concerns the relations over time
between the distinct stages or states of a developmental sequence. In
Section 2.2 we have seen that a theoretical developmental sequence is
24 Paul van Geert
inferred from the semantic properties of the object whose development

is studied. In other words, a particular state refers to the theoretical
object in question if the state belongs to a sequence that refers to that
object (see Figure 4). State properties are commonly determined on
the basis of experimental manipulations and effects. An example is
provided by the aforementioned conservation experiment. The under-
standing of the conservation indicates a state transition in a sequence
which has formal operational thinking as end state. Therefore, the
semantic form of this sequence is determined by the properties of this
end state. Suppose that a particular culture is characterized by an end
state of cognitive development which is different from formal opera-
tional thinking. Then for that culture a model that posits formal think-
ing as an end state is clearly not descriptively adequate. Consequently,
the states preceding that end state suffer from the same lack of descrip-
tive adequacy since their significance is determined by their position in
a sequence which has formal thinking as an end state. However, it is
likely that many of the experimental indicators used to diagnose
developmental states in the first culture will also apply to the second
culture. Thus, for instance, the conservation experiment can be per-
formed easily, provided it is adapted to the objects and communication
style prevalent in the second culture. This does not mean, however,
that the theoretical meaning of the conservation experiment can be
applied to that culture. In this particular example it cannot, since the
potential sequence of development in that culture does not correspond
with the sequence from which the conservation experiment derives its
diagnostic meaning (see van Geert, 1983 for discussion). In conclusion,
the problem of diachronic reference requires that experimental
methods are designed as parts of meaningful sequences of experiments,
that is, meaningful with regard to the total developmental process and
not to just one or a few states in that process.
The problem of diachronic reference is a typical problem of all
developmental models where the main variables are nominally scaled.
All states are defined in terms of either absence or presence of the
nominal variable, such that a state is always unmistakably part of a
specific sequence. In models with so-called synthetic variables, it is
possible that one state yields two different successors, depending on the
nature of the state properties. In principle, these models may bifurcate
at any state in the sequence, and each branch is a definite part of the
whole developmental tree. Models with synthetic variables pose a
~
interpreted

developmenta I
~
g
sequence A
as
--=
behavioral ~
developmental
sequence A
a
fIl
....
=
o
~
o
behavioral "C
developmental
-a
~
sequence B =
S'
--=
~
interpreted
o="
developmental ~
sequence B
Figure 4. Observable behavioral expressions of sequences A and 8 are similar up to the fourth state
and dissimilar thereafter. The theoretical developmental sequences are entirely dissimilm.. Single
lines denote referential relationships; double lines, sequential relationships.
N
Ul
26 Paul van Geert
different methodological problem, namely the precursor problem. By

'precursor' I shall understand "that which precedes and signals the
approach of another; a forerunner" (the entry definition of 'precursor'
in the Longman-Webster English College Dictionary). For instance,
one might claim that in the 1 year old child the use of objects as
inanimate tools is a precursor of the use of gestures as tools, while the
latter is a precursor of the use of words as tools. In this regard, the
concept of 'precursor' should be clearly distinguished from the concept
of 'predecessor', which I will define simply as 'that which precedes', thus
excluding the ordinary meaning of 'ancestor'. The present definition of
'precursor' is only intuitive and too vague a notion to function properly
in a developmental theory. Let us try to find a stricter definition.
The problem begins with answering the question "When is P a
precursor state of a state S?" The strictly empirical answer to this
question might be: if P universally precedes S directly (Figure 5a).
Precedence, even universal precedence, however, does not imply that
P is in some sense necessary for the emergence of S. That is, the
possibility is left open that P is a mere predecessor in the aforemen-
tioned sense. It is also possible that S is a sort of deferred successor of
P, while P still is a precursor to S in the intuitive sense of the term (5b).
So we must strengthen the criterion and say that P necessarily precedes
S. Empirically this is no different from the first definition of universal
precedence. What is different is the theoretical scaffolding of the
precedence in the form of a model that explains in what sense P is
necessary to the emergence of S. The problem here is that there may
be various P's that are necessary predecessors to S, and then they are
not precursosrs in the sense of 'a forerunner' (they are mere building
blocks necessary for the later construction of S; 5c). Finally, one may
define a precursor relation as a necessary and sufficient predecessor.
Intuitively, however, a state may be a precursor, but cause S to emerge
due to the working of a, third, trigger state (5d). If a trigger is necessary,
P is no longer sufficient, but still it may be a precursor to S. It seems
possible that there might be not just one, but rather a number of
alternative precursors to S (but always one at a time; 5e). So these
precursors are not even (logically) 'necessary' for the emergence of S.
So the question becomes by what definition of 'precursor', if any, are
the foregoing more or less intuitive views on the nature of precursors
valid? This definition is the following: a state P is a precursor of S if
there is a transformation function operating on the form properties of
tI t 1+1 t i+2 t 1+3 tiH
Pc S Po ~xxxxx S
Figure Sa. Precursor/predecesssor relation: direct precedence, not

necessarily a precursor relation.
ti
I I
state K ~xxxxx xxxx~
Pc "- state L S
.
~xxx~ pexxxxx state M
I I
Figure 5b. Precursor/predecessor relation: interrupted successor-state

sequence.
28 Paul van Geert
Ply ~X)()()()( XXXXX)(XXXX

~""
p2 y ~,,~
~"" s
~~
Ply .".".)!
I I
Figure 5c. Precursor/predecesssor relation: necessary predecessor to S,

no precursor relation.
t i ti+l tl+2
I I I 1
Pc S
trigger ",.
Figure Sd. Precursor/predecessor relation: state precursor and trigger.

ti ti+1
p'C ~ S s ubject A
precursor relation
;xxxx~

subject B

~ unspecified relation (necessary
~
"x.x precedence, predecessor, ... )
Figure Sc. Precursor/predecesssor relation: alternative precursors to S

in different subjects.
P (written as 1PI) such that 1S 1 = riP I. The identifying of precursor

relations requires a theoretical model which is capable of making the
transformation function explicit. Unfortunately, the existing models,
such as the differentiation model of development, remain rather
obscure on the nature of those transformations. Nevertheless, the
empirical distinguishing of precursors from merely necessary, sufficient,
or universal predecessor states remains a formidable methodological
problem.
Let us proceed to a final problem which is typical of models based
on ordinal variables. Those are the models that study developmental
dimensions. A developmental dimension is an aspect whose identity
and quality remains unchanged throughout the developmental process
but whose magnitude or degree varies. The ohject concept is an
example of such dimension. A number of investigators claim to have
shown that it is present in a very primitive but definite form at or shortly
after birth and develops into conceptions of ever increasing complexity
(e.g. Spelke, 1985). The main methodological problem here is to find
measures that extend along the whole course of the development of a
dimension. Since infancy in particular is a stage of major changes in the
behavioral repertoire, among which the acquisition of language is not
30 Paul van Geert
the least important, it is very difficult to find common measures for

dimensions that are manifestly expressed already in infancy and whose
development extends far beyond that age. Especially the change from
purely behavioral methods to methods that invoke the use of language
may imply a dramatic alteration of the nature of the dimension
measured.
2.3.2 Mathematical methodology. Mathematical methods are
primarily concerned with the problem of noise reduction. It may be real
noise in the form of measurement errors, or apparent noise. If we look
at the raw data from an observation or experiment, we usually perceive
noise since the local variation in the data precludes us from seeing the
structure. Noise reduction is always associated with the presence of
many data points. If only a few data points are available, it is impossible
to reduce the effect of measurement errors. Also in case of few data
points it is very difficult to perceive the noise factor, since for almost
any arbitrary (very) small collection of data it is possible to impose some
kind of structure. Only in extensive sets of data is it possible to see that
many of those locally imposed structures are ad hoc and do not explain
the structure of the entire data set.
Although it may seem too trivial to ask, let us try to find out why
single observations and experiments in general, yield so much and so
diverse data. First, the diversity of data could reflect the manifold facts
and events that together form a developmental history of a person. I
use the term 'history' deliberately here, since a comparable problem
occurs in the study of history. The abundance of facts, events, and
decisions in the lives of numerous people need to be reduced to some
overall trends of historical change. Likewise the life of a single person
counts innumerable small facts and events, and it is necessary to look
beyond them to see the general lines of development in the person.
Second, the diversity of data could derive from the fact that develop-
ment is a property of large populations. Development is repeated in
nearly every human being, although the form in which it occurs is subject
to considerable individual variation.
Traditionally, developmentalists have emphasized the second or
population source of variation. This has led developmental psychology
to view development as a population property and, thus, accentuating
transversal descriptions and stage models. However, there is relatively
little knowledge of the mechanisms and forces that shape the course of
the individual span of development. Obtaining this knowledge would
require that we concentrate on the first or individual type of data, data

on the life history of individual persons. Unfortunately, we hardly have
any good methods for processing such data. There is probably only one
good example of insightful individual research in development, namely
the single-case observational studies in language development. These
studies were inspired by new insights in linguistic theory which enabled
the investigators to test significant hypotheses over single developmen-
tal processes. We have seen that progress in this field was based on
significant theoretical progress in the field of linguistics and not on
developments in the field of data gathering and analysis. It remains to
be seen, however, whether any such progress is currently going on in
the field of developmental psychology.
In summary, developmental psychology should try to unite two types
of mathematical methodology. The first is based on the population
concept and is relatively well developed. The second is based on the
individual strategy and is unfortunately still in its infancy. Combining
those two methodologies should lead to a theory of development able
to explain the logic behind individual life histories in the context of
pouplations.
2.4 Summary: The foundations of developmental psychology

In this section we have dealt with three types of foundations
problems, namely conceptual, logical, and methodological. We came
across a number of interesting problems. One concerned the choice
between a retrospective or prospective approach to development
(Section 2.1.1), another the relation between group and individual
techniques in ascertaining the course and mechanisms of development.
The latter issue turned up in the discussion on the subject matter of
developmental psychology (Section 2.1.2) as well as in the discussion
on mathematical methodology (Section 2.3.1). Several questions were
posed on the aims and forms of experimentation (Section 2.3.1), namely
the question of whether we should concentrate on processes or on the
content matter of mental performance, how to approach 'exotic' sub-
jects such as preverbal babies and people from traditional non-Western
cultures, and how we distinguish precursors from predecessors.
The linchpin of all these problems lies in the Section on the logical
foundations (Section 2.2), in particular the discussion on the semantic
component of developmental models. Developmental psychology
deals with everything the human mind can entertain, but it does so from
32 Paul van Geert
a particular viewpoint, namely that of the growth and emergence of such

entertainment. What is needed, therefore, is a theory of the potential
referents of mental states, that is a semantics of mental state contents
and referents. Unfortunately, the semantics is not some relatively
simple and circumscribed theory, it is rather everything that human
beings presently know and come to know in the future. Put differently,
in our developmental inquiries we should potentially relate to every-
thing we know, that is to scientific knowledge, common sense
knowledge, logic and mathematics, and so forth. It goes without saying
that not everything that we know is relevant to our developmental
questions, but it remains to be determined every time again we plunge
into the wonders of human development what part of our extensive
knowledge is relevant to our present inquiry. That what a baby's, a
child's, or an adult's mind is about is in no way transparently present in
the behaviors, and nor is it always present in the mind of the person
entertaining the mental content. There is no definite algorithm for
determining what of our knowledge of the world is relevant to the
particular developmental question we should eventually be dealing
with. That problem makes developmental psychology particularly in-
teresting, it makes its own scientific development relatively unpre-
dictable, and accounts for the many different schools and approaches
that still continue in spite of the present dominance of one. The
diversity of schools and approaches is not a sign of scientific weakness,
as is sometimes believed, but rather it is a clear expression of the fact
that developmental psychology is about the human mind, and that the
human mind can entertain a multitude of contents that do not fall within
a single ontological domain.
3. Theory Building in Developmental Psychology

One of the major goals of developmental research is to contribute
to the building of descriptively adequate and explanatory theories. The
problem of descriptive adequacy is primarily that of the problem of
theoretical and conceptual foundations discussed in the previous Sec-
tion. Here I will concentrate on the issue of explaining development.
In system theoretical terms, a developing subject can be charac-
terized as a system described by a set of values of variables. Such a set
defines a developmental state of the system. The problem of descriptive
adequacy is concerned with the logical and conceptual justification of
the variables employed to describe the states of the system. The ques-
tion which should first be answered is what is it about the nature of the
variables that defines the system as a psychological and developing
system (see Section 2.). The next question pertains to the problem of
explanation which is directed towards the temporal relations and con-
nections between states. The final, and main, question is: what explains
the transition from a state X to a state Y in a developing system? Of
particular importance in developmental psychology is the nature of the
time structure under which the transitions are subsumed.
3.1 Models for developmental transitions

The aim of the present Section is not to build a theory of develop-
mental transitions. Such cannot be the aim of a reflective paper as the
present one. It merely tries to provide a sketch for a framework within
which empirically based theory building may take place. The
framework will discuss three parameters of developmental transitions,
namely the time level of the transition, the topological level which is
concerned with the 'spatial' structuring of the developmental transac-
tions, and finally a parameter over which different forms of transition
are defined.
3.1.1 Time levels of transition. One of the basic problems of
developmental theory building is the bridging of the gap between
various levels of temporal organization (Riegel, 1972, 1977; Nelson,
1983). These levels correspond with distinct transition forms and
mechanisms.
Sub-personal time. The lowest or micro level is that of sub-personal
(neurophysiological) time. It is the level at which the sub-personal
processes of association, cognitive computation and the like take place.
These levels are traditionally the field of investigation of psychonomics,
and only few developmental models, if any, are explicitly concerned with
that level. There is one notorious exception, namely the information
processing approach to development which tries to disentangle the
information processing strategies at various stages of development.
Experiential time. The second time level is the level of experiential
time. It is the level of consciously entertained experiences and activities
of the subject. This is the level of intentional processes. It is the level
at which we get the most direct access to the developing system, for
instance in the form of teaching or providing the developing mind with
formative experiences. All developmental theories must have a model
34 Paul van Geert
of processing at this level. In Piaget's theory for instance, this is the

level of action initiated and structured by the subject.
It is important to note that developmental models describe the
processes at the experiential time level in two different ways. One is
the aforementioned intentional level, the other the abstract structural
level. These two modes of description are required in order to solve
the question of how the experiential level gets connected with the next
level, namely that of life time. For instance, Piaget uses the term
'cognitive conflict' to theoretically interpret the meaning of intentional
actions by the child. Not all actions are developmentally relevant. Only
those actions are relevant that instantiate a cognitive conflict, for
example, a conflict among different internal schemes, or an internal
scheme and an observed state of affairs in the world. It is not necessary
that the child experiences the action as a conflict, for example, that the
child notices the contradiction between two ways of solving a problem
and is in doubt about which way to choose. The tension between
intentional and abstract descriptions of activities is likely to lead to
conceptual confusions. Take for instance the concepts of 'hypothesis
testing', associated with Chomsky's earlier view on language learning,
or the concept of 'triggering' in Fodor's theory of concept development,
and Chomsky's recent theory on language learning as parameter setting
(Atkinson, 1986). Intentionally speaking, the child may simply imitate
a phrase he or she hears, or simply see that some liquid is water. On the
other hand, the theoretical form of this particular imitating or seeing is
'hypothesis testing' and 'triggering' respectively. Of course, not all
imitating or seeing by the child are instantiations of those concepts. The
error of saying that children are not testing hypotheses but simply
imitating what they hear, is of course easily made. This error refers to
the problem of how to decide that a particular imitation is an instance
of hypothesis testing and that another is an instance of plain imitation.
Such decision depends on our ability to link the event at the experiential
level with events at the next level, namely the level of life time, or stage
time.
Stage and life time. Life time is the favored level of description for
developmental theories. Some deal with the entire life span, either by
viewing life as a continuous process of development as with Erikson's
theory (Erikson, 1963, 1980), or by viewing development as an achieve-
ment of a final state relatively early in life, as with Piaget's theory. Still
others deal with specific aspects of development such as language or
the development of particular skills which cover a relatively limited time

span.
The majority of developmental theories, especially the classical
ones, provide a descriptive framework for the stages of life time. It is
usually this stage's framework which forms the most widely known
contribution of a developmental theory although the theories may in
fact be primarily interested in aspects other than life time. Piaget for
instance was primarily interested in explaining the nature of human
thought by tracing its development and considered the stage theory as
a minor contribution.
The rather exclusive emphasis on the descriptive stage framework
weakens the explanative power of developmental theories. Such
theories should not only describe the possible states and sequences but,
also, explain why actual transitions take place from one state to another.
The emphasis on the descriptive part of a developmental model usually
converges with an emphasis on characteristic observables of stages
(i.e., a pre-operational child is unable to make a correct conservation
judgment, solve a seriation task, etc.). However, what is needed in an
explanative theory is a description of a stage in the form of a structured
dynamic system which takes as its input theoretical interpretations of
events at the level of experiential time, and has as its output specific
shifts in its internal structure at the level of life (or stage) time.
Among the classical models, Piaget's is the most elaborate as far as
its internal transition structure is concerned (Moessinger, 1978; Piaget,
1975). It relates the structural model of a stage to the level of cognitive
conflicts. By introducing the general principle of equilibration, it
explains the self-transcending nature of developmental transitions that
is, the way in which the structural properties of a stage undergo a process
of self-elicited change. The main criticism put forward against Piaget is
that the model remains relatively abstract. More precisely, it is difficult
to establish the link between the abstractly defined processes and the
intentionally defined ones. On the other hand, learning or education
based models, such as Galperin's (Galperin, 1%9a,b), and information
processing models have the great advantage of providing an internal
structure which can be linked with the intentional description level in
a relatively easy way. Put differently, it is relatively easy to use those
models for teaching purposes. The disadvantage of these models is that
they lack the power for explaining self-transcendence in the stage
system, that is, the system's property to change its own basic features.
36 Paul van Geert
As a consequence, those models tend to underestimate or even ignore

qualitative changes throughout life time.
However, these problems are not solely due to the fact that transi-
tion models should be capable of explaining relations over distinct time
levels and they will be addressed again when we examine other
parameters of transition models.
Historical time. Historical time is the time level at which the chain
of life times is located. It is the level of cultural and socio-historical
development. This can be development over long periods as with
anthropogenesis, or relatively short periods of cultural change that
account for cohort differences. There is little doubt that the structure
of culture and society gets reproduced and transformed through its
mapping upon individual subjects (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; van Geert,
1986c). Subjects are not endowed with cultural and social knowledge
and skills at birth. Thus, there is a profound relationship between the
problems of developmental transition in the subject and cultural tran-
sition in society (Featherman & Lerner, 1985). There are three views
on the nature of this relationship.
The first is the methodological view. It expresses the idea that much
of our present knowledge on development through the life span could
have rather limited validity since it is based either on cross-sectional or
on longitudinal methods. In both cases, the effect of historically dif-
ferent conditions of development for different generations is ignored
(Schaie, 1979). This view, which is associated with the names of life-
span develop mentalists such as Baltes and Schaie, separates aspects of
cultural from those of individual developmental transitions. However,
it does not explain the interaction between both time levels.
The second view is the analogy view. It reflects a very old tradition
in developmental studies, namely recapitulationism. Ontogenesis
recapitulates phylogenesis or antropogenesis. In the first case, the
recapitulation is explained by biological mechanisms. In the case of
recapitulation of anthropogenesis, the analogy between society and
individual is explained on the basis of common abstract transition
mechanisms which operate on different time and quantity levels. Such
is, for instance, the position of Piaget. In this view, there is no interac-
tion between the life and historical times, only analogy.
The third view is the conditional view. It has found its clearest
expression in the Cultural-Historical School of Soviet psychology. The
structures and properties of society are the products of historical evolu-
tion in the cooperating and laboring species Homo Sapiens. The

developmental task of a child born in a particular age, society, and social
class, is, therefore, determined by social-historical conditions. The
contents the child should appropriate are deeply determined by their
particular historical development. It is the logical structure of this
historical development - for instance of mathematical concepts - that
will directly determine their appropriation by the child (Galperin,
1969b). This determining is not a matter of analogy, but of causality. It
is interesting to note that in the psychoanalytic tradition, Erikson's
model of the Ages of Man, follows the same direction of thinking,
although it is far less elaborated and less specific (Erikson, 1980).
Biological time. The level of biological time and of phylogenesis is
more than the mere extension of historical time. It is by virtue of the
biological transition mechanisms operative at this level, that the
individual subject gets endowed with the genetic possibilities for
development. Classical theories see the influence of biological time on
transition mechanisms in terms of general conditions at the level of life
time. In Piaget, the dynamic invariants of development, adaptation,
assimilation, and so forth, are of biological origin. In the Cultural-His-
torical tradition in Soviet psychology, the biological factors that allow
individual development to proceed are those that have resulted from
the biological evolution of man and from the particular course of
hominization, including such things as the evolutionary significance of
tool use and collective labor. Recently, several attempts have been
made at combining biological, historical and life time into one compre-
hensive theorical framework, strongly resembling the mathematical
theory of population genetics. One approach emphasizes the biological
influence on cultural transmission and vice versa (Lumsden & Wilson,
1981), another primarily focuses on the formal analogies between the
distribution of genetic properties in a population, and the distribution
of cultural achievements through individual cultural transmission and
learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1985).
Summary. Although developmental theories are primarily
concerned with the scale oflife time, explaining transitions requires the
establishment of relations with other time levels, especially with the
level of experiential time. We have seen that processes over experiential
time are described on different levels, namely the level of intentionality,
and an abstract, theory-specific level. Our understanding of the rela-
tions between life-time transitions, and experiential processes is far
38 Paul van Geert
from complete. Besides, the relations between life time, sub-personal

time, historical and biological time also require much further elabora-
tion in spite of general statements of their fundamental importance
made by almost any developmental theory.
3.1.2 The topology of developmental dynamics. The second
parameter deals with general dynamic and fluctuation properties of the
systems involved in a developmental sequence. The dynamics and
fluctuations are defined over a topology which in the majority of models
is quite simple. Such a simple topology is the classical distinction
between a developing system and its environment. The basic fluctua-
tion is the exchange of information and the consequent change of the
system in the form of a developmental process.
Fluctuation (a)symmetry. Although developmental theories aim to
explain change in the system, some of them endorse the view that the
environment changing the system could be an effect of the system
changing the environment. A theory such as Piaget's tends to emphasize
the asymmetry in the flow of information. Of course the subject is active
in the environment, explores particular things and not others. How-
ever, it is primarily the mental representation of the environment and
not the environment itself that is shaped by the mental structure of the
subject.
Theories of infant development, such as Trevarthen's or
Brazelton's, have more explicitly appreciated the influence of babies
upon their environment. Comparable ideas are those of Chandler and
Sameroff concerning transaction in development (Sameroff, 1975), or
Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel's (1981) conception of individuals as
producers of their own development. The evolution of educational
institutions and practices shows society'S growing tendency to adapt
itself to those who should be educated. Vygotsky's well-known concept
of the Zone of Proximal Development expresses the idea that the
environment actively adapts itself to the developing subject (Vygotsky,
1978). That is, information from the subjects about their current state
of development is the principal factor in changing the subjects' environ-
ment. Thus, although developing subjects in this view do not directly
change their environment, the environment is, nevertheless, definitely
determined by the information available about the subjects' actual state
of development.
Selectivity ofpragmatic information flow. If we treat the developing
subjects and their environment as two subsystems of an overall develop-
ing system, we will see that each subsystem shows a specific degree of
openness to specific information from the other subsystem. Theories
differ as to the amount of developmentally relevant openness they
attribute to the subject. In nativist theories such as Fodor's the subject
is maximally closed. That is to say, the information from the environ-
ment that is able to provoke a developmental change in the subject is
very narrowly defined, and strongly dependent on the current develop-
mental state of the subject.
In traditional behaviorist theories the subject is maximally open,
that is, there is a very wide range of potential fields of learning during
any developmental state. The genuine developmental theories such as
Piaget's, Bruner's, or Vygotsky's, take an intermediary stand. There is
a fairly wide range of information to which the subject is sensitive, but
the nature of that information is determined by the developmental state
of the subject (van Geert, 1986a). The openness holds not only for the
subjects but also for their environment. In fact, the asymmetry dis-
cussed above is a direct consequence of different degrees of openness
between subject and environmerit.
(In)stability. Independent of their position on the open-closed
dimension, developing systems can show various amounts of internal
stability, that is, the tendency towards self-caused or self-conditioned
change under otherwise similar environmental conditions (van Geert,
1986a).
It is clear that models subscribing to a high amount of closed ness of
the developing system have to assume a high level of internal instability
in the subject if they want to arrive somehow at development. The
opposite holds for models with a high amount of openness. The internal
instability may be directed either towards higher order and organization
or towards lower order. Piaget's theory, for instance, assumes a strong
internal dynamic in the developing system - which is a dynamic towards
higher order - whereas, traditional behavioral theories assume a low
level of internal dynamic which is primarily directed towards lower order
(e.g., forgetting, decay of skill).
Topological differentiation. In most theories, the topological dif-
ferentiation is confined to the simple subject-environment dichotomy.
That is, this simple dichotomy suffices to explain developmental transi-
tion. In some theories the topology is fairly complex. A notorious
example is the psychoanalytic model which shows a rather complex
internal topology.
40 Paul van Geert
Another example is Galperin's model and, for that matter, several

other models from the Cultural Historical School. In traditional
models, the subject-environment dichotomy coincides with the mind-
matter dichotomy. The problem then is to explain how mental content,
for instance, a concept, captured in a material form, for instance, an
audible word (matter), gets transmitted to the mind of another person
in whom this mental content has been absent thus far. This is a very
difficult problem indeed. Galperin has tried to solve it by implicitly
distinguishing three dichotomies, the public versus private domain, the
domain of awareness versus the domain of the unconscious, and the
social-objective versus subjective domain. These dichotomies overlap
in such a way that the transmission of a content from 'outside' to 'inside'
is maximally canalized and facilitated. That is, there is not a single high
barrier between matter and mind but three relatively low ones
(Galperin, 1969b; van Geert, 1987c).
Summary. If we combine the four variables we find a relatively
complex space within which developmental models may differ. Much
of the form of the transitions postulated in various theories amounts to
particular positions taken by the theories with regard to these variables,
which in themselves are relatively simple and not restricted to develop-
mental models.
3.1.3 Transition forms. The third parameter concerns the form of
the processes or transformations. In Section 3.1.1 several forms of
transition were distinguished at different time levels. Thus, the various
time levels at which transitions may occur constitute the first variable
of the form parameter.
Descriptors, effectors and effects. The second form variable concerns
the dynamic function of transition forms. Consider, for instance, the
concept of 'differentiation' conceived of as a transition concept. The
concept can have three different meanings in a transition model. First
it could be a 'descriptor'. That is, given a description of a developmental
state it could function as a conceptual operation that the theorist
employs to arrive at a description of a more complex state. For instance,
if an infant is able to distinguish vowels from consonants the theorist
may predict the next developmental state by differentiating the set of
consonants into a set of voiced and a set of voiceless consonants. The
ability to distinguish between voiced and voiceless consonants might
indeed be the next developmental state of the infant, but it does not
necessarily follow that the child has arrived at that state by having
applied a differentiation operation to the domain of consonants

(Jakobson, 1947; van Geert, 1986b, 1987a). Thus, 'differentiation' has
been used as a descriptor, that is as an operation suitable for arriving at
descriptions of developmental states. Instead of being a transition of
the theorist, differentiation may, of course, be a transition of the child.
But then we should be careful not to confuse the effector from the
effect-meaning of the term. If differentiation is a form of activity of the
developing system it is used in the effector sense. The problem is that
differentiation is a form of activity defined at a rather abstract level. It
is not an intentional activity of the developing subject, that is, it is not
specified at the level of intentional processes. Nevertheless it would be
incorrect to say that differentiation is the mere effect of processes at a
lower level of description. More precisely, differentiation is the form
the dynamic processes take at the general systems level, while inten-
tional and structural activity is the form they take at the subject level.
Finally, differentiation may be the effect of dynamic processes that are
not in themselves of a differentiation form. For instance, the effect of
simple addition of elements to an already existing of elements may be
a form of differentiation. However, if differentation is merely an effect
term, it is likely but not necessary that it is also a descriptor.
Conflict versus agreement. Processes and transformations are either
of an agreement type or of a conflict type. If agreement is the major
form of dynamics, either the effects are coherent with the nature of the
information provided, or the coherence between information available
and information provided causes a developmental effect or transition
to occur. The simplest example is the reinforcement principle, that is,
the principle of strengthening associations as a consequence of repeti-
tion (in the case of reinforcement the effect is coherent with the nature
of the stimulus provided, that is, pleasant, thus reinforcing, thus increas-
ing the frequency of the associated behavior, or unpleasant, thus aver-
sive, thus decreasing the frequency of the associated behavior). Much
more complex is the Vygotskian principle of the Zone of Proximal
Development, which holds that an activity fulfilled by a subject with the
help of a more competent subject will become an activity which the first
subject will eventually be capable of fulfilling on his or her own.
Bryant's (1986) recent concept of agreement - children progress when
they realize that two ways of approaching the same problem produce
the same result - is another example of agreement, and exactly the
opposite of Piaget's conflict hypothesis. The conflict hypothesis holds
42 Paul van Geert
that progress will occur as a consequence either of the meeting of two

opposing strategies or of the alternation of opposing tendencies.
Piaget's theory is the best example of such conflict theory. Another is
Doise's social conflict theory where the Piagetian intra-psychic conflict
is replaced by an inter-psychic one (Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont,
1975). Erikson's theory, too, is a conflict theory. During each stage
opposing ego qualities may alternate, and new developmental mile-
stones are reached as a consequence of establishing a specific ratio
between opposing ego qualities (van Geert, 1987b). Conflict theories
differ also as to the consequence of the conflict. The conflict is either
unsolvable as in Freud's theory, and to a lesser degree also in Erikson's,
or it may lead to agreement at a higher level as in Piaget's theory.
Topological criteria. We have seen that transitions are defined over
topologies which in their simplest form consist of an Interior - the
subject - and an exterior - the environment. Also the form of the
transition may be defined with regard to that topology. Some theories
define their transitions in terms of a relationship between the develop-
ing system and itself, for example, at a previous time. Examples are
theories of differentiation, integration, and equilibration. The system
is more integrated now than it was before. Other theories define
transitions in terms of a relationship between the system and some other
part of the developmental topology, for example, the environment. For
instance, the Soviet psychological concept of the mind as mirroring the
structure of reality (Leontiev, 1974), and the corresponding idea of
development as the increase of truth in the mirroring provide a good
example of this type of transition. Some theories employ both types.
For instance, Piaget's concept of equilibration is clearly intra-systemi-
cally defined while his concept of adaptation is extra-systemically
defined.
3.2 The time structure of developmental processes

The often implicit model of the temporal structure of a develop-
mental process is based on a classical conception of physical time. This
classical conception is characterized by three properties which we find
in most current developmental models. First, developmental time is -
implicitly - unidimensional. Thus the human life span is conceived of
as the singular sequence of events starting with birth (or somewhere
before birth) and ending with death, connecting all developmental and
life events as the links of a chain. Second, the temporal dimension is
formally reversible. A particularly clear demonstration of this revers-

ibility lies in the fact that most of the classical theories of development
are retrospective in nature. Third, time is conceived of as a non-local
variable. For instance, a point indicating the present may be located on
any position along the time scale, dividing the latter into a past and a
future. The future is supposed to transform continuously into the past
and vice versa as the present-point moves along the time axis.
The classical concept of time is rooted in a worldview which sees
changing systems primarily as deterministic systems. In principle the
behavior of such systems is fully predictable, irrespective of practical
constraints that may make such predictions impossible to achieve. In
this Section I want to speculate about developmental systems under
continuous transformation and see whether or not they require an
alternative time structure.
3.2.1 The structure of 'life lines'. Suppose we have a collection of
variables necessary to describe any possible state in the life history of a
subject. This set of variables should be extensive and detailed enough
to allow of describing considerable individual variation among subjects.
If all those variables (and values of variables) were to represent nodes
in a graph structure, an individual life history would form a directed
graph in the form of a single chain of nodes. Let us call this single chain
a 'life line'. A life line is a theoretical object. It is a particular description
of the sequence of events that form the history of a subject. Of course,
we may question whether or not a specific variable (or set of variables)
adequately describes an event or set of events. The variables chosen
always amount to some specific interpretation of the meaning of the
occurrent events. It is not the plain events that are developmentally
relevant, but the 'effective' events, that is, the events considered as
effective factors in explaining or determining later events. Whether an
event, such as a former experience, or something one has learned,
becomes effective in this sense, depends on future external events
which are always relatively arbitrary and unpredictable (e.g., the persons
whom one will meet in the future and who will have an influence on
one's development). The consequence of this is that the model of the
person's development at the level of life time should be described in the
form of a fuzzy set of 'potential' life lines. This is so because the
description of each state in terms of developmental relevance is fuzzy.
The extension of the set and the degree of fuzziness depends heavily
on the temporal properties of the model. That is, they depend on the
44 Paul van Geert
relation between the time span covered by the model (the entire life
span, or some particular year of life) and the time level at which the
personal history is described (either detailed or not). It is very difficult
to circumscribe the specific developmental relevance of a specific life
event of relatively short duration. For instance, what is the future
developmental significance of the acquaintance with a particular person
when one is at the age of early adolescence? On the other hand, the
general developmental effects of long term events like schooling or
primary socialization are easy to describe.
The notion of fuzziness of the developmental meaning of life events
plays an important role in developmental theories that emphasize the
re-structuration of experience as a dynamic factor in development
(Tyszkowa, 1986). For instance, almost everybody has learned a great
many different things at school. Only a fraction of what I have learned
has directly influenced my later development, but which fraction has
indeed been so influential differs from individual to individual. This is
because the specific problems and challenges that I presently ex-
perience are more or less arbitrary, to some extent unpredictable, and
unique to myself. Each problem or challenge may call upon very
different kinds of past experiences and knowledge which, in turn, may
either increase or decrease the probability that I will employ those
specific experiences and knowledge in the future.
Thus, my past development, that is my life history in terms of
developmentally relevant events, is continuously reconstructed and
reshaped as a consequence of future events. By the same token, my
future is constrained by my past. The challenges that I am likely to
accept are determined by the directions I tend to take in search for such
challenges.
In the classical conception of a singular lifeline, the past, present
and future are 'isotropic' properties of the time structure. That is, one
may locate a 'now' everywhere on the lifeline, and it will divide the line
in segments of past, present, and future. When viewing a developing
system as a becoming system, past, present, and future are anisotropic
properties. The position of the present does not leave the properties
of the past and future unchanged.
3.2.2 The relation between substructure and overall structure. In
the field of life lines, the distinction between past, present, and future
depends on some point of reference, a 'now'. This point of reference
is not some imaginary Platonic point, it is a point marked by a system
which, with respect to the system of lifelines, is a subsystem. For

instance, if! locate a reference point at the age of sixteen, my reference
point is reified in the form of an adolescent subject and of the experien-
ces of that adolescent. This particular subsystem will restructure the
form of the field of lifelines in two ways.
First, adolescence offers a variety of potential developmentally
relevant challenges and experiences. The actual challenges and events
experienced by a particular adolescent will restructure the adolescent's
past and future in the sense discussed above. In terms of occurring life
events, the developmentally relevant past and future will be
reconstructed. Since the present is to a great extent a function of past
development, this restructuring will be within a relatively confined
range.
Second, the subjects themselves are actively constructing their own
past, present, and future. This construction takes the form of building
up a personal concept of self, an image of the self, but also of an active
self determining future developments. It is clear that this personal
constructive activity depends on the nature of the subsystem intro-
duced. For instance, if the subsystem represents an adolescent person,
there is more active determination of past, present, and future than if
it is a one-year-old infant.
The sub- and supersystem are complementary. Complementarity
implies that one is a function of the other, and vice versa. It is clear that
the description of a subsystem - for example, the age of adolescence,
early infancy, and so forth - is a function of the total developmental
history in which it is embedded. On the other hand, the superstructure
is also a function of the substructure as we have seen previously. Not
only the future, but also the past is a function of the present - as
defined by a particular subsystem - in a definitely objective sense. I
must admit that this viewpoint has some dangerously idealist connota-
tions. If it is true in 1940 that Germany and the Soviet Union signed a
treaty on the 23rd of August 1939, then that same fact cannot be false
in 1960 and, again, true in 1990. However, what objectively changes is
the historically effective meaning of the signing of that treaty: the
meaning differs in 1940, 1960, or 1990 (in 1960, i.e., there was no
political Germany that corresponded with the Germany that signed the
treaty in 1939). The bare facts, of course, do not change. Bare facts,
however, are theoretically trivial. It's their historically or developmen-
tally effective meaning that counts.
46 Paul van Geert
3.2.3 The (ir)reversibility of time structure. Reversibility is a

formal property of a set of transformations. A real process can be
reversible in the sense that it may run either backward or forward as,
for example, in learning a word pair, forgetting it, learning it again. It
is generally accepted that developmental processes are not reversible
in this sense, although some processes might contain regressions, which
are a particular type of reversibility. In the present Section I will discuss
reversibility in a more formal sense. I assume that every real develop-
mental process can be described in the form of a finite set of transfor-
mations, that is, functions rewriting a state description into a description
of a successor state. It may be questioned whether for everyone of those
transformations there is an inverse transformation that exactly reverses
the effect of the first. For instance, for the Piagetian transformation
'equilibration' it seems possible to define an inverse that formally
transforms an equilibrated structure into its un-equilibrated starting
structure. The fact that such a transformation does not occur in reality
does not alter the fact that having an inverse could be a formal property
of an equilibration transformation. It should be noted that reversibility
if employed in the latter sense only holds for the non-contingent, that
is, descriptively essential properties of states. Let us see whether given
the latter restriction, developmental transformations are reversible. It
is clear that if developmental processes are non-deterministic in prin-
ciple, then the operation transforming a present into a future state
cannot have an inverse. Its inverse should have a non-deterministic
component as well. For instance, in throwing dice there is a multitude
of causal factors determining which face will turn up. Assume that some
of these factors are non-deterministic in principle, for example, factors
that depend on quantum mechanical probabilities. If that is the case,
there is no inverse of the throwing operation that will recover the
previous numbers. Both the throwing and the (imaginary) 'inverse
throwing' are non-deterministic processes, and thus connect any
present number to any possible number with a probability of 1/6 (that,
of course, is the ideal non-deterministic case). By the same token there
is no inverse of a developmental transformation if that transformation
contains some non-deterministic component.
There is a second sense in which the developmental transformations
associated with the time structure model discussed in this Section are
not reversible. We have seen that the description of a state in a
sequence depends on the sequence to which it belongs. That is, if we
provide a fOlWard description of a state, part of its developmentally

relevant properties are undecidable, simply because the future of that
state is still unknown. It is like ascertaining the developmentally
relevant properties of a newborn baby. Many of them cannot be
determined without knowledge of how the baby will react in the face of
specific problems and stimulation. Those problems and stimulation
belong to the future. Note that the principle of fOlWard indeterminacy
does not depend on whether or not the developmental process is
non-deterministic in principle. Even in a fully deterministic process the
properties of a state remain partly undecidable as long as the properties
of the state have not been tested. However, testing the state of a system
means to exercise influence on the state properties, and thus to change
the state. In the case of development changing a state means bringing
it into a later developmental state. It seems highly likely that the more
valid and profound the testing of the developmental potentialities of
some present state, the more the testing will affect the properties of the
tested (some relatively shallow form of testing such as taking an intel-
ligence test does not seem to affect the course of one's development
very much, but the specific predictive value of such a test is not very
high either). Thus, determining the future potentialities of a develop-
mental state has the effect of setting the future in a specific direction,
and it is not clear at all that this direction would have been taken if the
testing would not have occurred.
Let us call the fOlWard - or prospective - description of a state
'DF' (that is, the state description made entirely on the basis of the
present and past states, and without any knowledge of its future). It is
clear that a backward definition of a state solves much of the uncertainty
still present in the fOlWard definition. In the backward definition, one
reasons backwards from some later state to define an earlier state in
terms of its actual developmental outcome. This outcome is clearly the
later state from which one looks back. Let us call the backward descrip-
tion'DB,. From this it follows that DF ~ DB. Neither of the descrip-
tions is more true than the other since their truth values are strictly
dependent on the time frame (either backward or fOlWard). Now
suppose that there is a transformation function f transforming a
description of a state into a description of a successor state, such that:
f: Sj ~ Sj+l
Clearly, nobody knows that function, for knowing that function
would amount to having a theory correctly predicting the developmen-
48 Paul van Geert
tal history of any person, within the confinements of the non-deter-

ministic nature of developmental processes. However, what concerns
us here is the question whether this unknown function f has an inverse.
The above-mentioned expression actually describes a relation
between state descriptions, namely a forward description of a state i into
a description of a state i + 1
f:DFi ~ Di+l
Since the inverse function fi is by definition also a time inverse it
changes the description of Si, namely into a backward description of
state i (a description based on knowledge of some later state)
fi,t i : Di+l ~ DBi
Since DBi :#. DFi it follows that fi is not an inverse of f. So the
developmental process is not formally reversible, even in the case it
would be fully deterministic.
3.2.4 Dissimilar rates of processes and the overall structure of
development. In Section 3.1.1 we discussed several time levels in
developmental processes. Within and between those levels, there are
further differences as to the rates of processes. For instance, at the level
of stage or life time some developmental processes may take a few
months, others a few years, and still others a few decades. We have seen
that the different time levels are intricately linked. In the present
Section I shall touch upon a related matter, namely the fact that the
overall form of development results from the different rates at which
developmental processes take place at the same temporal level (stage
and life time in particular).
The effect of different growth rates and different onsets of growth
is well documented in the field of embryology. The fact that several
parameters of embryological growth may be affected relatively inde-
pendently of each other accounts for massive differences in body forms
among animals with roughly similar genetic endowment. In develop-
mental psychology, there are many examples of different developmen-
tal rates, but they have rarely been used to explain the form of human
development itself. An obvious example is the difference between
biological maturation and mental development. Biological maturation
goes on until adolescence, but the groundwork of mental development
has been finished well before that time. Another example is the
different rate of representational development and the growth of work-
ing memory (Case, 1985; Globerson, 1986). Conceptual knowledge
grows at a greater rate than the size of working memory. The effect of
conceptual knowledge at different ages is constrained by the amount of
working memory available. As a final example take the growth of the
lexicon, the growth of syntactic knowledge. Children under six learn
about six to nine words a day (Dromi, 1986). If one reckons that
learning a word is not simply adding it to one's dictionary, but that it
amounts to fitting it into the dense network of meanings and rules of
usage governing thousands of other words, the rate of word learning is
astonishing indeed. The onset of syntactic (more-word grammar)
development is preceded by a sharp rise and concurrent with a sudden
drop in the rate of word learning (Dromi, 1986). It is as if the exponen-
tial growth in the lexicon turns on another mechanism, that of syntax
learning, which immediately affects the rate of lexical growth.
Developmental processes might operate in a strictly hierarchical
way. Particularly in skill and learning theory the processes are ordered
in a conditional way. For instance, processes of association learning
pave the way for the learning of various concepts, which in their turn
are necessary for the learning of rules, and so forth. The overall rate of
development is a simple function of the rates of the subprocesses, and
changing some of the later would result either in no overall change at
all (speeding up some processes at a particular level would not change
the overall rate, since the next step cannot be taken until all learning
tasks at that level are accomplished) or in a simple linear change (the
speed of level crossing is equal to the speed of the slowest component).
It has become quite certain that strict hierarchy among developmen-
tal processes, or for that matter a form of Piagetian 'structure
d'ensemble' is the exception rather than the rule in development.
Distinct developmental processes may affect each other, but they are
in no way fully dependent on each other or on some underlying factors.
Instead of a hierarchy, there is a heterarchy. In such a heterarchical
structure, changing the rate of particular processes may not just simply
change the rate of the overall process but, more importantly, its form.
Here's some wild speculation. Although it is difficult to prove conclus-
ively, it appears that working memory grows until the age of ten.
Suppose first that conceptual development occurs at a rather slow pace.
On the average the solving of common conceptual problems does not
exceed the potentials of working memory. Consequently, the prob-
ability that the problem solver pays sufficient attention to categoriza-
tion concepts and taxonomies is quite low, and under some threshold
50 Paul van Geert
needed to get the development of formal category development started.

Suppose further that due to some particular factor the rate of concept
learning increases, so as to outreach the potentials of working memory.
The pressure upon attending to categorical concepts may grow, and lead
to a strategy of categorical concept employment. The latter may
become the dominant strategy of concept use and in the long run lead
to the adoption of hypothetico-deductive forms of thought. As I said,
the latter speculation is rather adventurous but not entirely fantastic.
Changes in the rate of specific developmental processes are not just
academic possibilities. They occur continuously, as a consequence of
cultural change and as a consequence of the pressure upon individual
variation in development. For instance, the past fifty years have shown
a considerable increase in the rate of concept learning at relatively
young ages, thanks to the distribution of books and other printed
products, television, and so forth. The last ten years or so have made
formal operational problem solving available in the form of playing with
home computers to children who are well below the 'classical' onset of
formal operational thinking. It remains entirely open to investigation
what are the effects of such increasing rates on more slowly paced
processes, such as the development of major representational strategies
(i.e., iconical v. symbolical). It seems that the classical developmental
stages are not simply turned upside down or made obsolete, but they do
not remain unaffected either. The question how much and how
profoundly they are affected remains difficult to answer. It would
require a rather detailed model of transitional relations between several
subprocesses in development to answer such questions. Nonetheless,
it seems a worthwhile endeavor to scrutinize the relations between
dissimilar rates of subprocesses on the overall properties of develop-
ment.
3.3 Summary: theory building in developmental psychology

In short, theory building in developmental psychology requires the
conceptual and empirical study of developmental states and develop-
mental transitions. In the present section we have concentrated on the
aspect of transition. In Section 3.1 a framework has been presented for
systematic investigation of the properties of transition concepts in
theories, distinguishing between time levels, the topology of the
developing system and the forms of the transitions. Developmental
psychology is primarily the science of human mind and behavior in the
framework of life time. The study of the time structure of development,

therefore, is a legitimate task of any developmental research program.
In general, developmental psychologists are not particularly concerned
with the properties of time in development (Nelson, 1983). Neverthe-
less, time in development is a dimension with peculiar qualities. It is
strongly observation-dependent (3.2.1, 3.2.2), formally irreversible in
various senses (3.2.3) and locally dissimilar (3.2.4). It seems likely that
a closer look at time in development, beyond the rather trivial observa-
tions on age/stage relationships and duration of processes, would alter
our view on the structure and mechanisms of development in a more
than superficial way.
The issues discussed in this introductory chapter present a personal
view on the important theoretical problems in developmental psychol-
ogy. Some of those problems will be recognized immediately as they
have been discussed in great length by various authors. For other
problems it might seem a little premature to pose them at all. Future
theoretical work will have to show how many of the issues raised here
were indeed worthy of the paper.
In the present volume several of the issues raised in this chapter will
be discussed and commentated.
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1
Developmental Psychology:
Person-centered, not variable-centered
WmJ.Baker
In his introductory chapter to this volume, Paul van Geert attempts

to layout the conceptual issues that must be confronted by anyone
attempting to provide an adequate theoretical basis for developmental
psychology. He does an admirable job of raising almost all of the
necessary considerations. Neither he nor anyone else can provide us
with the definitive answer to many of his antinomies since their resolu-
tion is achieved only by the deliberate selection of one point of view
rather than another for a given enterprise.
Consider the following list of choices which van Geert, in effect,
suggests that we must make:
1. Are we concerned with observable products, or the proces-
ses which produce those products?
2. Are we concerned with descriptions of behaviors, or do
we want to claim that these are descriptions of states or
conditions within the person?
3. Is the goal simply descriptive adequacy, or do we want
explanations?
4. Are the explanations to be limited to efficient cause state-
ments of relations among variables, or do we require
final cause or agentive accounts to playa role?
5. Do we opt for the nomothetic or the idiographic perspec-
tive?
Wm J. Baker. Department of Psychology, Concordia College, Edmonton,

AB, Canada T5B 4E4
Annals of Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7 55

Edited by P. Van Geert and L.P. Mos, Plenum Press, New York, 1991
56 WmJ.Baker
6. Is the learning that we observe real, or only apparent,

that is, is it deliberate or only incidental learning?
7. Is there a proper choice of a time frame, that is, can we
really specify when a behavior actually begins or ends?
8. Is there a proper, fixed unit of analysis?
9. Should descriptions or explanations be from the
standpoint of an external observer or should they be task-
based from the perspective of the developing person?
10. Do we restrict ourselves to a rigid scientism of explicit
observables, or do we open Pandora's Box to inferences
about internal states?
Van Geert begins his paper with a laudable but, I would suggest,
probably futile attempt to discover the meaning of the term develop-
ment. His problem in this effort is two-fold. First, the majority of users
of the term do so with remarkably little or no reflection on the various
nuances and implications that he properly considers. Secondly, even if
they did consider those implications, definitions cannot take on a
reified, Platonically fixed value. The most that we can ask of the various
authors in any field is that they make explicit just how they use the term.
In the light of that, the informed reader can then at least determine if
the author is subsequently consistent with his own stated position. This
alone would eliminate a great deal of confusion in our literature.
In the same vein, there are no definitive, reifIed answers to the list
of questions I have presented. There are choices to be made and
positions to be adopted. We must be free to follow our own predilec-
tions, but it is incumbent upon each of us to make those predilections
as explicit as possible, that is, we should not leave it as "an exercise for
the reader" to sort out. Effective communication demands conceptual
clarity, and this maxim takes on greater force as the issues become more
abstruse or abstract.
I will not attempt, in this paper, to deal with all of the questions listed
above. That would be a book in its own right. Rather, I wilL attempt to
articulate a particular choice of perspective that I believe is essential if
theoretical gains are to be made for developmental psychology. In
essence I feel that the field has been unnecessarily hampered by an
uncritical adoption of the conventional, positivistically conditioned,
variable-centered approach to accounts of human behavior which has
1 Commentary on van Geert 57
characterized psychology in general. This approach is presented, for

the most part, as if it flowed from a fully detached, almost omniscient
observer whose data gatherings are uncontaminated by his own
philosopical inclinations. The vast majority of available analytical
methods which are geared to this perspective bias our thinking in that
direction. These are aimed at analyzing relations within variables which
are then presumed to hold across all persons. I would contend that the
observed relationships among variables are more a function of intrinsic
relationships within people with respect to those objects than they are
to intrinsic relationships among the objects as such. Clearly, inanimate
objects in particular cannot 'relate' to each other although, obviously,
we can 'see' them as related from our points of view.
A conventional Factor Analysis (as well as almost all other multi-
varate techniques at a basic level in their computations) begins by
computing the correlations or covariances among all pairs of variables
or entities across all subjects. Implicit in this move is the obvious
assumption that any given variable is exactly the same variable for each
and every subject. This notion of sameness is, of course only with
respect to the external or independent existence of the stimulus item as
such. The remainder of the analysis is then carried out in terms of the
relations among the variables. When finished, the newly defined
common variable space may be used to compute, for example, individual
factor scores, but again, only on the assumption that the common space
holds equally for all subjects. Are we looking at the real individual
differences among our subjects in these factor scores, or has the perni-
cious persistence of the 'stimulus error' perverted our thinking yet once
more?
These problems are not obviated by various attempts to develop
three-mode (persons x variables x occasions) factor analysis techniques
(see, e.g., Tucker, 1964) which hinge on computation of a core matrix
which is a simultaneous function of persons, objects, and times, nor is
it approached from the correct direction by so-called "individual dif-
ferences scaling" (Carroll & Chang, 1970) methods which again begin
by computing a common object space and then relating individual
differences to that space, fitting subjects into it.
Granted '~ rose is a rose is a rose ... " but do each of us perceive,
understand, and relate to a rose in the same way? Do each of us
comprehend each and every item on the MMPI in precisely the same
way before providing a 'self report' of our attitude toward that item? If,
58 WmJ.Baker
I would argue, different subsets of subjects perceive the object space or

array, whatever it may be, in systematically different ways, then an
immediate computation of a common object space across all subjects is
obviously pooling over those critical differences. Subsequent consider-
ations of individual differences are then necessarily with respect to their
'deviations' from this rather smeared but putative 'objective reality'. It
is precisely these different 'spaces' that developmental psychology must
be most concerned to discover. If, I would contend, stages of some kind
exist, they would define, in phenomenological terms, different spaces,
different world views that we must discover, describe, and explain.
Let us assume, as I think we must, that psychology is more about
people than it is about variables, that it is about how individual people
perceive, group, understand, and operate on sets of variables or entities
of some kind. Doesn't a stage, in almost anyone's usage, refer to a broad
attitude or approach to a class of objects rather than to individual
variables? And further, for the concept of stage to make any sense at
all, musn't there be groups of individuals in recognizably different
stages, that is, with significantly different views about the same class of
objects?
This would suggest, rather strongly, that we should first be
concerned with examining similarities among persons across variables,
and that the object space, whatever it may be, should be examined only
within relatively well defined or homogeneous sets of persons. Only
then will the object space make coherent sense when attributed back
to the persons providing us with their reactions to it. This is not a new
idea by any means. Early attempts by Stephenson (1953) to develop a
Q-type factor analysis, and subsequent work by many others on the
general problem of 'profile analysis' (see, e.g., Nunnally, 1962) stand as
testimonies to the difficulties to be faced. Unfortunately, developmen-
talists do not seem to have appreciated the value of these perspectives
for their domain and, I would suspect, psychology in general has
neglected it since it is inconsistent with the prevailing views of our field.
These issues are even more blatantly ignored in our highly convention-
alized 'experimental design' methods where, under repeated measures,
the analysis of 'subject-by-treatment' interaction terms almost never
goes beyond their relegation to 'error' terms, that is, the mere 'failure'
of all subjects to behave in the same manner toward the various stimulus
conditions.
I will try to illustrate the procedure for pursuing a person-centered

perspective by citing generally from a study which I conducted some
time ago (Baker & Derwing, 1982). It was motivated by the failure of
an earlier study (Innes, 1974) to reveal any clear-cut evidence for the
existence of stages in the acquisition of the appropriate morphology for
pluralization in English (the proper use of the three possible
allomorphs: lsi, /Z/, or liz! as in calI, dog, and roses, respectively). The
study was well-designed and carefully conducted and the data were
carefully gathered, taped, and checked by several judges. It was an
effective extention of the famous Berko (1958) technique but used a
more extensive inventory (24 items) and a better controlled elicitation
and scoring method. Basically, the child is presented with a drawing of
a strange creature which is paired with a nonsense form name. The child
is told, for example, "This is a WUG." Then, a second drawing of the
same creature would be presented and the experimenter would say,
"Now there are two of them, there are two ... " The child is then invited
to complete the sentence by providing the correct plural form ofWUG.
Despite some short-comings, which have been corrected, the Berko
paradigm has been considered as an excellent method for eliciting
evidence of role governed behavior as distinct from behavior based on
imitation or rote learning. Anecdotally, many researchers, in observing
children, had become quite convinced that they passed through a series
of stages in the acquistion process, that it was not a matter of the gradual
acquisition and addition of individual items through explicit learning for
each of them. However, even with the Berko paradigm, convincing
evidence was difficult to produce.
In examining the Innes data analyses, two major problems seemed
to be present. Firstly, the analysis was initially conducted in terms of a
'right/wrong' concept, that is, responses were scored as correct only if
they conformed to the adult norm for correct pluralization. Secondly,
the data, drawn from 120 children, 20 in each age group from 2 to 7
years of age, were analyzed by these age groups as if age corresponded
to what the author wanted to interpret as stage. This confusion of age
with stage, despite very effective criticism by many writers (see espec-
ially, Wohlwill, 1973), is still quite common; it seems to be driven
primarily by the lack of any alternative approach to developmental data
gathered to discern time-related trends. Whether or not a particular
phenomenon which appears to go through changes over time is, in fact,
time ordered, ought to be an empirical finding, not an a priori imposition
60 WmJ.Baker
on the data. It is, in general, best to totally disassociate age from stage
and simply to argue that stages ought to be sequentially ordered regard-
less of the age at which they occur.
If all that Innes had done was to score her responses as right or
wrong, she would have thrown away the most interesting data she had,
an unfortunate practice in many studies. She would have discarded what
the children actually said. If the children had rules or strategies different
from those of the postulated adult norm, these would have been lost.
Fortunately, she had taped all of the original responses. Secondly, she
recognized that her age-based analyses seemed to offer little clarity, and
an attempt at a factor analysis of her 24 items over her 120 subjects also
lacked the clarity that seemed to be in the data. She then calculated a
total percent correct score, divided her subjects into several somewhat
arbitrary performance groups, and began to see some clearer but still
rather weak trends. Nevertheless, an examination of how children
within these performance groups actually responsed to the set of items
was reasonably informative. Her study was completed in that form, but
my interest in her data continued.
In analyzing items within performance groups, again, several
problems were apparent. A total score of, say, 50% correct, achieved
by two or more children does not indicate that each child responded
correctly to the same subset of items. Quite different subsets of items
could be involved in the same total score. In a technical sense, a strict
Guttman scale (Guttman, 1947) could not be even remotely supported
by the data. Further, it cannot be assumed that a child with a score of
50% correct gets all of the items that would be correctly given by a child
with a score of 30%, plus an additional 20% of other items. This often
naive, and usually only implicit assumption often leads researchers in
the language area in particular to assume that ordering items by their
overall difficulties, that is, percents of persons correctly responding
(counts across people within an item) is indicative of the order in which
each item will be assimilated within each person. Clearly, this does not
necessarily follow. In more general terms, the point is that examining
each item separately gives no indication of patternings, for each
individual, across sets of items even though this would seem to be what
stage analysis ought to focus on. Attention should be directed toward
patterns across items, within each child.
Before dealing with these problems, consideration had to be given
to exactly what meaning I would attach to the concept of stage. Briefly
put, the conclusion was to refer to a strategy as a relatively global

approach for a given subject to the inventory of items being presented.
This strategy could be described by a set of roles which would charac-
terize how subjects treated sets of items within the inventory. Clearly
these would be descriptions of products or responses by the subjects.
Whether or not these provide an adequate basis for inferring from them
explanations or explications of the processes which. produced those
responses is a difficult case to make, and yet it is an essential move for
conceptual advancement in developmental work.
Assuming subjects could be segregated into different strategy
groups, it could then be empirically determined if the groups were more
or less age-ordered. If so, this would be weak evidence for supporting
speculation that the strategies may be sequential within each child, that
is, that they constitute stages. Note that this would be an empirical
finding from the data rather than an a priori imposition on the data. Of
course, strong evidence for the sequential assumption could only come
from a properly conducted longitudinal study. A cross-sectional study
of the type being discussed here can, at best, provide suggestions of
patterns to be considered as candidates for possible stages to look for.
The first step in developing a procedure to resolve these issues
required the invention of a method which would begin with a charac-
terization of how each subject partitioned the inventory of items, that
is, how each child grouped the set of items presented. Each child could
respond in one of four ways to each item. Use could be made of any
one of the three allomorphs (lsI, Iz/, or liz/), or the child could give a null
response, simply repeating the stem without inflection because, pos-
sibly, it already sounded plural to the child, for example, an item such
as tus, which already has a lsI sound at the end often doesn't appear to
need further inflection by many early learners. In effect, this forces each
child to partition the inventory of 24 items by placing each item in one
of four mutually exclusive categories. The results are similar to the
familiar card sorting methodology where each subject is given four
known or a priori categories into which each item of the set must be
placed.
Next it was necessary to capture the patterning among the items as
a consequence of this partioning of the set so as to be able to compare
subjects in terms of degrees of dissimilarity, that is, to generate a
distance function for all possible pairs of subjects. Following, but
extending a notion suggested by Johnson (1968), a technique called
62 WmJ.Baker
Response Coincidence Analysis was devised to accomplish this.

Basically, it generates a matrix of pairwise comparisons of all items in
the inventory and indicates which items were paired in the same
category and which were sorted differently. A comparison of one
subject with another based on counting matched pairings and dividing
this count by the total possible matches yields a distance metric that
ranges between 0 and 1. Zero means a perfect match in two
partitionings, while a score of 1 would mean no similarity at all. Given
a matrix of distances between all subject pairs, the resulting distance
matrix was analyzed through a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (Wishart,
1978) and this yielded the identification of four relatively homogeneous
groups of subjects. These differences among the groups were based
solely on similarities or differences in patterns of responses. This was
then followed by an analysis of distances among all object pairs within
each subject group. These latter analyses provided a basis for charac-
terizing the rules that described the overall strategy for each group as
they responded to the task.
It was found, through subsequent analysis, that the four groups
could be ordered with respect to gradual development toward the adult
norm. There were two rather small, somewhat different strategy groups
and two larger groups who differed in age from the earlier groups and
from each other. The mean age sequence for the four groups was 4.09,
4.14, 4.22, and 4.92, but the best performing group contained a few two
and three year olds, and the worst contained two seven year olds. There
was hardly a strong age related trend. At best, the age evidence could
be used to suggest the possibility of sequential acquisition, but that
would require a longitudinal study to establish with any clarity.
All of the details for this procedure are available in the original
article, but it is only the logic of the procedure which is relevant here.
The study begins by identifying homogeneous sets of subjects as a
function of analyzing a dissimilarity matrix for all pairs of subjects. It
then analyzes distances among pairs of objects within subject groups.
The researcher then writes a set of rules to describe the suggested
relations among the objects. The set of rules describes a strategy for
each group. If the groups are found to be reasonably well ordered in
terms of mean age, this is taken as reasonable grounds to consider the
strategy groups as possibly characterizing stages. This would then be
followed by a longitudinal study which would seek to discover the
existence and sequence of the various postulated strategies.
I would suggest that this type of person-centered approach which

begins by considering how each subject operates on the total task, and
then on how variables or components of the task are related by the
people within differentiated subject groups is much more consistent
with what appears to me to be the major goals of developmental
psychology, the identification of different strategies or stages through
which people pass on their way toward the mastery of some set of target
behaviors. The vast majority of conventional analytical techniques do
not allow for this in any satisfactory manner.
References
Baker, W. J., & Derwing, B. L. (1982). Response coincidence analysis as
evidence for language acquisition strategies. Applied Psycholinguistics, 3,
193-221.
Berko, J. (1958). The child's learning of English morphology. Word, 14,
150-177.
Carroll, J. D., & Chang, J. J. (1970). Analysis of individual differences in
multidimensional scaling via an N-way generalization of Eckart-Young
decomposition. Psychometrika, 35, 283-320.
Guttman, L. (1947). The Cornell technique for scale or intensity analysis.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 7, 247-280.
Innes, S. J. (1974). Developmental aspects of plural formation in English.
Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Alberta, Alberta, Canada.
Johnson, S. C. (1968).A simple cluster statistic. (Thch. Rep.) Murray Hill, NJ:
Bell Thlephone Laboratories.
Nunnally, J. C. (1962). The analysis of profile data. Psychological Bulletin, 59,
311-319.
Stephenson, W. (1953). The study ofbehavior: Q-technique and its methodology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thcker, L. R. (1964). The extension of factor analysis to three-dimensional
matrices. In N. Frederiksen & H. Gulliksen (Eds.), Contributions to
mathematical psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
Wishart, D. (1978). CLUSTAN: user manual (3rd ed.). Program Library Unit,
Edinburgh University.
Wohlwill, J. F. (1973). The study of behavioral development. New York:
Academic Press.
Development:
Sequences, structure, and chaos!
Mark L Howe and E Michael Rabinowitz
In van Geert's article, a number of themes are discussed. To us, the

pivotal theme concerns the construction of (mathematical) models to
understand development. We have a great deal of sympathy with this
position and have argued that progress in developmental theory is
contingent on modeling (Howe & Brainerd, 1989; Howe & Rabinowitz,
1989, 1990; Rabinowitz, Grant, & Dingley, 1987). In this article, we
discuss the merits of stage-based, knowledge-based, sequence-based,
and chaotic conceptions in modeling development.
Stages
Van Geert, like Simon (1962), presents a modeling scheme in which
stage descriptions and transition operators form the core of the theory.
This formalization is consistent with traditional attempts to account for
development in which the question of how best to capture age-
correlated (psychological) change has historically been answered using
some stage-like entity (e.g., Case, 1985; Piaget, 1954). Although stage
theories have taken different forms, they all contain the tenet that there
exists a set of states and that ontogenesis consists of a sequence of
1 Preparation of this article was funded by grants OGP0003334 to MLH and

OGPOOO2017 to FMR from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada.
Mark L. Howe and F. Michael Rabinowitz Department of Psychology,

Memorial University of Newfoundland, S1. John's, NF, Canada AlB 3X9.
11nnals of Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7 65

66 Mark L. Howe and F. Michael Rabinowitz
forward transitions between these states. This overwhelming

popularity of stage conceptualizations may have arisen because
theorists believe that development (a) is discontinuous and that stages
actually exist, or (b) is continuous and that stages are a conceptual
convenience.
In either case, whether stages are real or simply convenient, stage
theories have been scrutinized by a number of critics (e.g., Brainerd,
1978; Flavell, 1971; 1985). Flavell outlines four criteria that age-
correlated changes must meet to support a stage model: structures,
qualitative change, abruptness, and concurrence. By structures Flavell
meant cognitive representations were interrelated in some systematic
manner. He assumed that behavioral representations were organized
in a consistent way that satisfied this criterion. Qualitative change could
refer to either behavior or underlying theoretical mechanisms. Flavell
argued that on a behavioral level qualitative change is apparent (e.g.,
the development of the use of strategies). However, he did not believe
there was evidence for qualitative change in underlying theoretical
mechanisms. Finally, Flavell found the remaining two criteria
problematic for stage theories inasmuch as developmental change tends
to be continuous rather than abrupt and children often develop skills
at different rates.
Sequences
We find Flavell's, and others' (e.g., Brainerd, 1978), evaluation
sufficiently convincing to favor exploration of nonstage conceptualiza-
tions of development. The most plausible alternative involves models
of continuous change. Here, unlike stage models, behavior that is
measured at a particular point in time does not reflect a stage of
development, but rather, reflects the location of an organism in a
developmental sequence at a particular instant in time.
There are obvious sequential patterns in development. Some of
these are culturally invariant (i.e., occur universally), others are
culturally variant (i.e., typify children growing up in a particular culture),
while the remainder represent true individual differences (i.e., are
characteristic of only a proportion of children in a particular culture).
In principle, only culturally invariant sequences are of interest to stage
theorists (see Rabinowitz, 1987, for discussion of universal sequences).
However, from the point of view of a sequential theorist, all of these
sequences should succumb to a common form of analysis. From a
modeling point of view, one should be able to write either equations or

computer programs that will explain/predict individual differences and
commonalities in the development of behavioral sequences.
In order to conceptualize the problem of sequential models of
development, it is necessary to consider classes of relevant variables.
Hebb (1966) offered a classification scheme that is adequate for the
present purposes. Developmental variables are grouped into six
classes: genetic, chemical prenatal, chemical postnatal, sensory
constant, sensory variable, and traumatic. While most of these variables
are self-explanatory, the distinction between sensory-constant and
sensory-variable experiences needs enumeration. Sensory-constant
experience refers to those environmental variables experienced by all
members of a species reared in a species-normal environment
(e.g., force of gravity), whereas sensory-variable experiences may differ
among species members (e.g., schooling).
Models depicting universal (Le., culturally invariant) sequences
would include genetic, chemical (pre- and postnatal), and sensory
constant variables. Models depicting culturally variant sequences
would add sensory-variable experiences that were common to all
members living in a particular culture and that differed across cultures.
All variables are potentially relevant to sequences that differ across
individuals within a culture. Although it is easy to conceive the classes
of variables that must be included in sequential models, the models that
currently exist, while pioneering, are severely limited in their formal
structure and their ability to operationalize developmental change
(e.g., Resnick & Neches, 1984; Sage & Langley, 1983).
In order to make this more concrete, consider the sequential
unfolding of children's rehearsal strategies. In North American culture,
the sequence is as follows: no rehearsal - repeating each individual
concept following its presentation - repeating groups of contiguous
items - rehearsal of clusterable (semantic or subjective organization)
groups of noncontiguous items (e.g., see Bjorklund, 1989). An ideal
sequential model would not only predict the order of acquisition of
these strategies, but also predict the acquisition rate for each individual.
This type of modeling should be distinguished from mere descriptions
of these changes. That is, we seek to write process models that deliver
precise explanations of sequences rather than verbal descriptions that
merely document such changes.
Chaos, Correlated Sequences, and Knowledge Structures

Case (1985) argued that stage models are necessary in order to
explain apparently unrelated aspects of development that occur con-
tiguously. For example, Case presents evidence for such communality
in early childhood based on such disparate skills as figure drawing, block
assembly, role taking, linguistic development, and counting. From a
sequential viewpoint, these contiguities, rather than reflecting stages,
might be a consequence of interrelated developing knowledge struc-
tures, culturally-driven knowledge sequencing, and/or chaotic functions
with temporally common strange attractors.
Although there is a great deal of discussion about the development
of knowledge structures, there has been little systematic work involving
sequential acquisition within this framework. An exception to this
generalization is Carey's (1985) work on children's (from 3 to adult)
knowledge of biological concepts. She presents data from a variety of
content domains (e.g., human body, animals, projection of spleen, and
ontological concepts) and shows that developmental changes across
these domains is the result of corresponding changes in children's
underlying knowledge structures. This work illustrates that a
knowledge base framework can potentially account for stage-like
phenomenon.
Even less research has been directed toward understanding
culturally-driven knowledge sequencing. This is curious because
research of this sort is relatively easy to implement and potentially
significant. As an illustration, consider that children's fine motor
control and production oflanguage appear at about 12 months. There-
fore, it is not surprising that in Western culture children of this age are
presented with materials and/or are formally instructed on a variety of
ostensibly disparate topics related to these skills. For example, around
this age it is appropriate to present children with crayons and paper, to
teach them to count, to play role-taking games requiring verbal instruc-
tion, and to present them with small blocks to play with. The near
contiguous introduction of these materials and instructions may explain
the stage-like phenomenon described by Case (1985). Thus, correlated
sequences of development might be a consequence of culturally-based
correlated tutorial efforts.
Perhaps the most interesting of the three possibilities outlined
above is that development proceeds in a nonlinear fashion consistent
with models described in the mathematical literature as chaotic
(Holden, 1986). Chaotic processes are represented by difference

equations where performance at time t+1 is a nonlinear function of
performance at time t. These equations have a number of interesting
properties which include stable performance for some parameter
values, cyclical performance without repetition at other parameter
values (i.e., they generate outcomes that appear to be random in the
absence of any stochastic features), and strange attractors (i.e., points
in the function space that are always approached by the cyclically
recurring functions). Small changes (i.e., on the order of 1 in 10,(00)
in initial parameter values can create marked divergence in outcome
even though all time-series functions approach the strange attractors.
These models have been used successfully in other sciences (e.g.,
physics, chemistry, biology, and physiology) with specific applications in
meterology (Lorenz, 1984), mathematics (Mandelbrot, 1977), ecologi-
cal and epidemiological systems (Schaffer & Kot, 1985), neural
dynamics (e.g., Chay, 1985), and cardiac dynamics (Winfree, 1983),
among others. A simple description of some of these models can be
found in Gleick (1987).
Currently, chaos models have not been applied to developmental
psychological phenomena. Nowhere is it more appropriate to explore
such models than in developmental psychology. This is because chaotic
models are time-series transition models. Rather than focus on static
descriptors of development suspended in time, therefore, a chaos
theorist would turn their attention to change. Because the single most
important concern to developmental psychology must be the analysis
of transition and change, chaos modeling represents a promising new
approach.
If chaotic models were used to depict development, and they
generated sequences with strange attractors, an observer would
perceive these sequences as stages as long as the attractors occurred
contiguously. Suppose our measure of time begins with conception and
we assume that the values of the starting parameters (e.g., based on
Hebb's nomenclature, genetic, chemical pre- and postnatal, sensory
variable, and traumatic factors) are different for each individual. A
chaotic model would predict a different sequence for each individual,
but at some point in time the developmental curves would tend to merge
(i.e., a strange attractor). Two or more sequences merging over some
short interval of time would give the appearance of a stage. Thus, a
stage might be a mathematical fiction reflecting chaotic contiguity.
Summary and Conclusions

We began this article by evaluating the role of the stage concept in
theories of development. Because the stage concept is deficient on a
number of grounds, we proposed a number of nonstage alternatives.
Knowledge-based and sequential-based approaches were outlined and
found to provide viable alternatives to stage-based models. The acquisi-
tion of integrated knowledge structures, culturally-driven knowledge
sequencing, and chaotic models seem to be particularly promising
theoretical mechanisms. Unlike stages, this triadic approach is process
based.
We believe that in order for developmental theory to progress, we
must do two things. First, we must cast our assumptions in formal
models. By so doing, our assumptions become tractable and potentially
falsifiable. Second, we need to reorient our focus to concentrate on the
core of development, transition. One way to implement both of these
goals is to develop sequential models, including nonlinear chaotic
models. Through the use of sequential modeling we may begin to see
development-as-process rather than development-as-state, of
becoming rather than being.
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Brainerd, C. J. (1978). The stage question in cognitive-developmental theory.
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Case, R. (1985). Intellectual development: Birth to adulthood. New York:
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Chay, T. R. (1985). Chaos in a three-variable model of an excitable cell.
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Flavell, J. H. (1971). Stage-related properties of cognitive development.
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Flavell, J. H. (1985). Cognitive development (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
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Holden, A V. (Ed.) (1986). Chaos. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Howe, M. L., & Brainerd, C. J. (1989). Development of children's long-term

retention. Developmental Review, 9,301-340.
Howe, M. L., & Rabinowitz, F. M. (1989). On the uninterpretability of
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Reply to Commentaries
Paul van Geert
Although my chapter raises several major theoretical problems in

developmental psychology, the commentators have chosen to con-
centrate on two exemplary ones, and to present their own views on how
these problems should be addressed. These problems are the variable-
centered nature of many developmental models and investigations,
discussed by Baker, and the emphasis on stages so often observed in
developmental theory-building, discussed by Howe and Rabinowitz. I
shall discuss these problems separately.
Persons, variables, groups, individuals: A reply to Baker

The meaning of "development." While I shall concentrate on the
problem of variable-centeredness, I would like to start with discussing
Baker's remarks on my "laudable but ... futile attempt to discover the
meaning of the term development." I have the feeling that this does not
very correctly represent my intentions with regard to discussing the
meaning of the term. Baker is right when he says, first, that many
developmentalists use the term with remarkably little reflection, and
second, that there is no reified, fixed value the term could take. I see
these two problems as a major justification for undertaking the attempt
at discussing the meaning of the term "development." Since, if it is true
that it is often used in a rather thoughtless way and, if it is also true that
choices should be made in light of the many faces the term can take, a
systematic reflection on how the meaning of the term "development"
Paul van Geert Department of Psychology, University of Groningen,

Annals o/Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7 73

74 Paul van Geert
could be shaped and specified is helpful. I see the discussion as an

attempt towards specifying different frameworks and different concep-
tual oppositions. They structure different types of discourse in which
the meaning of "development" is the explicit, and often implicit, topic
of discussion. Understanding such discourses and the positions taken
there can be aimed at in different ways. One might trace social networks
and ideological backgrounds of the contributors - as will be illustrated
in the Voneche and Aeschlimann paper on Piaget - but it is also possible
to clarify the issues of the discussions by adopting a more structural
point of view. That is, one might sketch the conceptual building blocks
and major relations that form the rules of the game. That is the stand I
have taken in the present paper. Even if I do have my personal view on
which type of meaning, connotational and denotational, should be given
to "development" I have tried to not let it interfere too explicitly in my
discussion.
Variables, persons, ...? The major part of Baker's paper is
devoted to a critique of the variable-centered nature of so much of
current developmental research. I do not think that my paper can be
conceived of either as a plea for a variable-centered approach, or as a
particularly clear example of such an approach. It is clear, however, that
I have not discussed the issue of variable- versus person-centered
developmental psychology. Since Baker sees the variable-centered ap-
proach as a major problem, stemming from an uncritical adoption of a
conventional positivistically conditioned approach in psychology that
has hampered the field of developmental theory-building, it is under-
standable that he takes the opportunity to present his ideas and to
supplement the chapter that announced itself as an overview of
"Theoretical problems in developmental psychology." Baker contends
that the majority of available analytical tools bias our thinking in the
direction of "objective" variables that constitute universal dimensions,
and therefore "universal" properties of persons (holding across all
persons of a given group). A model of types of relations among a set of
variables becomes a model of each individual subject, irrespective of
whether or not the variables have similar meanings and relevance for
these subjects. A variable-centered approach often reduces a single
person to a token of a type that is revealed by studying responses in
groups.
I agree with Baker when he says that "psychology is more about
people than it is about variables, that it is about how individual people
1 Reply to Commentaries 7S
perceive, group, understand, and operate on sets of variables or entities

of some kind" (page 58). However, I feel that some further conceptual
clarification is needed for me to make clear how I agree with Baker's
point of view.
First, I would not suggest that we should discard the notion of
"variable." It is, after all, a very useful general notion. An observation,
perception or "apperception" of an object, person or event may take'
the form of a wholistic structure, a gestalt or whatever, that very clearly
reveals the nature of the perceived to the individual perceiver. But it is
undoubtedly so that for the sake of communication and reflection it is
useful - in fact necessary - to chop wholistic structures into pieces.
These pieces can be words in contexts, lines on paper, diagrams, vari-
ables or any other sort of representational and communicational en-
veloping device human culture has invented thus far. Variables have
proven to be very useful in science. One may treat them as simple
yes-or-no choices in the case of binary nominal variables, one may even
apply all the tools of mathematical calculus with them provided they can
be expressed in the form of numbers. Baker's argument seems to
amount to paraphrasing Nelson Goodman's dictum that one should not
identify the way the world is with the way the world is described
(Goodman, 1960). That is, if variables are handy instruments of obser-
vation' communication, and theory formation, they are not necessarily
the building blocks of the universe.
On the other hand, I do not doubt that there exist several occasions
where a model of variables does indeed provide one with a convenient
and valid representation of a state-of-affairs. In my discussion of Howe
and Rabinowitz' commentary I shall present a model where variables
are crucial. However, it is true that there exist equally many cases where
uncritically adopting such a model amounts to a "testimonium pauper-
tatis." The example that Baker discusses and which is taken from
language development is a case in point. It does not follow, however,
that developmental psychology should completely refrain from accept-
ing variables models: sometimes these models are adequate, efficient,
valid etc. What is important - at least in my view - is that we cannot give
general prescriptive rules, let alone algorithms, for deciding where and
when such models should apply or not. This is not to say, however, that
the issue is undecidable: it is part and parcel of the art and craft of
scientific research that relevant models of different kinds can be con-
76 Paul van Geert
structed even if there are no - or hardly any - general rules that apply
to all or even a significant majority of the cases.
Does it follow then that where developmental psychology should
not be variable-centered, it should be person-centered? I hesitate to
accept this conclusion. I shall try to explain this hesitation with a few
slightly biographical details. My scientific schooling took place in a
continental-European tradition, in two small countries, Belgium and
the Netherlands. As a student I witnessed a sort of emancipatory
struggle of my professors several of whom were heavily influenced by a
French-German phenomenological tradition which was in the first
place strongly personalistic. For them Popper's falsificationism and the
no-nonsense mentality of logical positivism acted almost as a sort of
"liberation theology." Consequently, for me, the term "person" is
reminiscent of a very specific point of view on the nature of psychology
and the mental. An essential part of this point of view was a specific
view on scientific methodology, on the nature of "objectivity" and truth.
The person cannot be an object of detached inquiry: he or she should
be met in a sphere of basic sympathy and understanding. In an interest-
ing historical study, Dehue (1990) sketches the change in methodologi-
cal thinking in Dutch psychology. She demonstrates clearly that
personalistic and phenomenological psychologists conceived of "objec-
tivity" as that which transcends the superficial appearance and the
transient forms of human conduct. The notion of intersubjectivity as the
Popperian translation of the concept of objectivity was completely alien
to this point of view: the more subjects could agree on some property
of a person's mind, and the easier it was to do so, the less such
agreements could capture what this person's mind objectively charac-
terized. Such intersub jectivity is, almost by definition, superficial, and
cannot be accepted as criterion of psychological truth. What I want to
convey with this little bit of history is the following. The notion of
"person" bears a very specific set of philosophical and methodological
connotations that one should reckon with when introducing the term
in scientific discourse. Of course, one may opt for discarding all histori-
cal connotations while using a term, but it is highly likely that such
connotations will prove stronger than the user's individual intentions.
As I see it, it is not so much a person-centered orientation - given
the connotations of that term that I sketched above - as an individual-
centered approach that Baker seems to defend. I use the term in one
of the senses mentioned in the Longman-Webster's College Dictionary
1 Reply to Commentaries 77
of English (my indispensible guide in the jungle of the Anglo-Saxon

lexicon), namely "a single human being as contrasted with a social group
or institution" (and I do not imply the philosophical meaning of in-
dividual, namely "an indivisible entity"). In my chapter I have em-
phasized the importance of the individual in different paragraphs. For
instance, in paragraph 2.3.2. on the mathematical aspects of methodol-
ogy I stated that developmentalists traditionally emphasize the popula-
tion source of variation. Our view on the individual is clearly determined
by our particular analytical, i.e., statistical tools. These tools are needed
because developmental psychologists - and psychologists in general, for
that matter - are often strongly inclined to investigate properties that
can be observed and measured only with very limited reliability (such as
intelligence, or personality, or whatever is conceived of as a major
psychological property). This limited reliability can be cured only by
adopting a statistical stance, which has been so succesful in many other
scientific disciplines. However, it is here that psychological methodol-
ogy makes a fundamental error in my view (and probably also in Baker's
view if I understand him right). Take for instance thermodynamics. The
behaviour of each individual atom in a gas is unimportant: we can adopt
a statistical methodology to discover the macroscopic properties of the
gas as a huge collection of atoms. Thus physicists escape from the
impossibility of taking into account individual atoms data, while still
achieving a good view on how these individuals operate as a collectivity.
What psychologists often seem to do is just the other way around. They
take a group, covering a set of individual responses, activities, properties
or whatsoever, and use the group properties to compensate for the
unreliability of individual measurements. That is, they statistically
reduce these group properties to an image of an individual. Of course,
no one is so stupid as to say that individual variation is unimportant, but
it remains a given fact that what we say about individuals is a distillate
of a group. Thus many models of psychological phenomena are about
individuals qua representatives of a group (the group upon which the
statistical operations have been carried out) which implies that they are
not about individuals. If they are not about individuals, they are about
groups in the sociological sense (not in the sense of social psychology,
where interactions among individuals in groups are the issue). It seems
to me that Baker's critique on the variable-centered approach mainly
amounts to attacking this "sociological" interpretation.
78 Paul van Geert
All this is not to say that classical statistics should be abandoned,

that measurement errors are inexistent, or that individuals should never
be considered representatives of a group. The implications are theoreti-
cal, and I think that this is what Baker emphasizes also in his paper. In
psychology, the basic theoretically relevant relations are between the
individual with his or hers physical, material and mental tools and
make-up, and the environment, for instance, culture and social groups.
Developmental theory formation should aim at explaining and describ-
ing this basic dialectic relationship in which the individual forms a sort
of magnetic centre. If it is so that individuals may apply quite diverging
methods and tools to encounter and shape their environment and
themselves, it is clear that a view that considers individuals as repre-
sentatives of a group defined by a specific measurement or observation
activity is clearly defective. In a psychological sense, individuals are
representatives of only tht group of individuals who apply basically
similar tools and methods, who are basically similar with regard to
important psychological characteristics, such as linguistic strategies. But
such a "group" cannot be defined by an a-priori criterion such as age
(although age may coincide with a large amount on individual similarity
with regard to a specific psychological property), and neither can it be
defined by an a priori methodological criterion such as "an a-select
sample" from a sociologically defined group (in terms of age, gender,
social level, culture, etc.).
In summary, the group-oriented variables approach that Baker
rightly criticizes is the result of the psychologists' interest in phenomena
that are very difficult to reliably observe or measure in individuals.
Consequently psychologists take group data in order to distill reliable
measurements, which however reduce the subject to a representative
ofagroup.
The variable/group oriented approach in developmental psychol-
ogy is not only the result of measurement and statistics problems. It has
also a theoretical underpinning. Classical and historical theories of
development have strongly emphasized the biological nature of
developmental processes. In doing so, theorists also focused on the
universal aspects of the developmental process. It is undeniably true
that time is a major variable in development, a major carrier of the
developmental process. It follows then that age is a primary distinctive
characteristic of individuals, provided we view them from a develop-
mental perspective. Thus it is natural to conceive of an individual as a
representative of a particular group, namely an age group. Given this

viewpoint it is perfectly natural to use group-based statistics in order to
overcome problems of individual measurement and reliability. There is
more than abundant evidence, however, that age is only a very rough
descriptor, given the very considerable individual differences that are
revealed once these differences are paid attention to (although it
remains definitely clear that there are characteristic age-specific
developmental properties, especially during infancy and childhood, but
developmental psychology would become extremely impoverished if it
would stick to only those aspects). There is some similarity with a
theoretical shift in evolutionary biology, especially the theory of natural
selection and fitness. Modern biologists start from the axiom that it is
the individual organism which is the locus of selection and survival, and
not the species. Species survive because their individual members aim
at surviving. Accordingly, developmental psychologists should more
explicitly view deveopmental processes as individual processes, which
in some cases show considerable intra- and interindividual similarity,
while in other cases divergence and dissimilarity is characteristic. In-
stead of reducing development to simple prototypical, orthogenetic
sequences, we should accept that development amounts to a rich col-
lection of converging and diverging individual life-lines.
Stage, sequence, structure, chaos, . ? A reply to Howe and

Rabinowitz
In my chapter I have tried to sketch the spectrum of theory building
in developmental psychology as completely as possible. I am well aware
of the fact that such an attempt may speak of an attitude which is
probably close to a hopeless form of personal over-estimation, but
anyway, I have tried to do my best. Howe and Rabinowitz state that I
emphasize a classical stage- and-transition governed conception of
development, while there exist several alternative conceptions of
development such as stage-based, knowledge-based, sequence-based
and chaotic conceptions. In my reply, I would first like to discuss an
apparent misunderstanding of the state-transition framework I have
presented. Second, I will further elaborate on the commentators' idea
of a chaos-based conceptualization of development.
State and Stage. I hope that readers of my chapter will appreciate
that the emphasis I have put on some aspects of developmental theory
building is not a representation of what I think developmental psychol-
80 Paul van Geert
ogy ought to be. Rather I have tried to present an analysis of the state
of affairs in theory building, and relied quite heavily upon classical or
standard accounts of development. As such it is not strange that the
concept of stage occurs frequently in the text. As Howe and Rabinowitz
rightly remark, stage-conceptualizations are associated with a view that
emphasizes age as a major distinctive variable in developmental studies.
As will have become clear from the previous paragraph, an age-
centered developmental psychology is not what I would defend.
It seems to me however that either the commentators have
misunderstood my use of the term "state" - not "stage" - or I have been
unsuccessful in emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the
general terms "state" and "transition" from theory specific terms such
as "stage."
In an earlier paper (Van Geert, 1987) I have described a "state" as
"any discernable value occupied on one or more developmental vari-
ables ascribable to a subject." In order not to offend Baker (although I
trust that he will forgive me even if I do not succeed in taking his
suspicion away with the remarks that follow) I should further clarify
what I understand by "variable." A variable is any predicate that we use
in (scientific) discourse and that is intended to discriminate between
individual objects of that discourse (e.g., individuals in a psychological
discussion). Such variables are ascribed to individuals for the sake of a
specific discourse or problem, and are not intended as reified and
exhaustive representations of those individuals. In developmental
psychological discourse, discriminations should be made with regard to
intra-individual variation over time, rather than inter-individual varia-
tions of properties that might be static. In this sense, a "variable" does
not necessarily refer to a static property. For instance, if we would
ascribe a subject as "changing his habits" in opposition to subjects who
are not doing so, we would, of course, not refer to something static. A
"state" is then defined as that which is refered to by any set of distinctive
predicates, provided the predicates refer to properties that change over
time. As I have tried to show in several papers, "stages" characteristicaly
amount to state descriptions based on binary descriptive predicates.
These predicates are thought of as temporary stable characteristics. An
analysis of theories in terms of the state-properties they apply, and of
the semantic rules that underly the ascription of such properties is
interesting for several reasons. One is that such an analysis may lead to
clarifying and making explicit the deductive and retrospective nature of
classical models such as Piaget's, Erikson's, etc. (bibliographical details

can be found in the chapter). For instance, it is possible to describe the
main properties of Piaget's conceptualization of the stage of formal
operational thinking by means of three binary features. These features
can then be employed to infer descriptions of the preceding stages. Such
analysis shows why a particular developmental model confines itself to
distinguishing only four (or five or eight) stages, instead of making this
number an empirically decidable issue.
The notion of transition should be regarded in the same vein. If
"states" are discourse-dependent sets of distinctive predicates ascribed
to an individual at a particular moment, then one should be able to
describe how and when these predicates lose their descriptive adequacy
or truth, and why they should be replaced by other predicates. This part
of the theoretical discourse relates to what I call the transition com-
ponent of a developmental model. Again, one should not make the
error Nelson Goodman has warned against, and identify the way the
world is with the way it is described. Because the word with which a
property is described does not change, it is not necessarily so that the
property to which that word refers does not change either. I must admit
though that Goodman's pitfall has made many victims in that many users
of descriptive predicates reify them into stage-like properties. Another
unwanted reification of such predicates is their turning into "structure-
d'ensemble"-like notions, i.e., the view that if a predicate can be
ascribed to an individual at a given time and place, then everything that
individual is able to do should be subject to that predicate. This point
of view is rightly criticized by Howe and Rabinowitz. They present an
interesting discussion of sequence models. Such models are likely to be
able to deal with synchronic individual variation (i.e., the fact that all
simultaneous developmental properties are not the expression of a
single structure or developmental stage).
Dynamics and chaos. Howe and Rabinowitz express great interest
in what they call chaos models of development. They provide a nice
short explanation of such models. Since a few years such models - which
I prefer to call dynamic systems models instead of chaos models -started
to occupy an increasingly prominent position in my own work. I have
not mentioned these models in my review of theoretical problems
simply because, as Howe and Rabinowitz (partly) rightly remark, such
models have not yet been applied in developmental psychology. I have
added "partly" because several attempts have been made that have
82 Paul van Geert
probably gone unnoticed. Examples of such work are Thelen and

Foge1's work on motor development and the development of mother-
infant interaction respectively (Thelen, 1989; Fogel and Thelen, 1987).
By the time I am writing this reply my own work on dynamic systems
models of language and cognitive development is in press (Van Geert
1991a, b, 1990).
Basically, dynamic systems models of development amount to the
following. A developmental process is described in the form of a trajec-
tory through an n-dimensional space. The space's dimensions are those
variables that one considers essential or sufficient to describe a trajec-
tory. The variables are directly associated with observables. Thus, in-
stead of describing a specific aspect in language development by the
unobservable dimension "lexical knowledge" one employs the
(reasonably) observable variable "number of different words used" or
"number of new words understood per unit time." In principle, any
individual is characterized by its own space of variables, although it will
often occur that many individuals can be described in terms of almost
identical spaces. The basic problem that I have addressed with these
models thus far has been concerned with the aspect of growth, i.e., of
increase or decrease in the number, effectivity, applicability, etc., of a
set of psychological properties. The problem of the construction of new
forms which - as Thelen (1989) correctly remarks is the central ex-
planatory problem in developmental psychology - has remained beyond
my competences. Assuming that a descriptive space consists of three
variables x, y, and z, the state of an individual can be specified by a value
on the corresponding x-, y- and z-axes, that is, by a single point in
three-dimensional space. This space is classically called the "state
space". The transition to another x-y-z-point at a consecutive moment
is determined by the so-called "dynamic rules" assigned to each dimen-
sion. Assume for instance that one dimension specifies the child's use
of a specific syntactic or morphological rule, while another specifies the
level of the parent's help and support with regard to the child's master-
ing the rule. For this two-dimensional state-space, it is possible to specify
a mutually supportive relationship between both dimensions. Given
that growth in each dimension is a process subject to limited resources,
and that both dimensions support each other, it is possible to write a set
of difference equations resulting in a trajectory over time in the two-
dimensional state space. For further details I refer to my forthcoming
papers. It is interesting to note, however, that such "dynamics models"
show a large variety of qualitatively distinct patterns and trajectories in

spite of the mathematical simplicity of the equations employed. In some
cases they reveal developmental processes - or trajectories - that are
very robust and insensitive to random disturbance. Almost irrespective
of the nature of the initial conditions they evolve towards stable end
points. In other cases, the trajectories turn out to be very complicated,
very sensitive to small differences in initial state values, i.e., they are
typically "chaotic" in the technical sense of the word. In still other cases,
the processes are sensitive to threshold values: once such values are
crossed the outcome of the process is qualitatively different. With these
models it is relatively simple to create all sorts of classical developmental
and growth phenomena, such as "sudden" developmental leaps, tran-
sient regressions, stable regressions, stepwise developments etc. Al-
though the mathematical models as such are quite simple, very general
and transparent, they produce trajectories, i.e., models of developmen-
tal and growth processes, that are qualitatively rich and divergent. These
models form a nice counter-illustration of several scientific standard
beliefs, for instance, that complex temporal phenomena are necessarily
associated with complex underlying models, or of the belief that the
effect of interacting variables is basically linear and that prediction can
be based on extrapolation (Van Geert, 1990). It is highly likely that a
renewed interest in a variety of fascinating phenomena will be intro-
duced in developmental psychology with the - hopefully forthcoming-
adoption of dynamic systems models, such as non-linearity, essential
limitations of predictivity, individual variability, quasi-periodicity, tran-
sient regression, robust stability, instability, sensitivity to initial state
conditions, etc.
While studying the theory of fractal phenomena it occurred to me
that even the closed sequences of classical stage models, such as the
Piagetian four-stage model, or Erikson's eight stage model, could be
subsumed under the heading of dynamic systems models. From the
point of view of the transition aspects, these classical models are already
quite close to the concept of dynamic systems, although they have never
been worked out in a more formal sense. From the point of view of the
state or stage component, however, these models consist of small finite
sets of states following a fixed sequence. In a paper on the graph-
theoretical structure of these models (Van Geert, 1988) I have at-
tempted to show that the stage (and, consequently, the sequence)
aspects could be represented in the form of trees. A tree is a graph
84 Paul van Geert
Concrete Formal
Actional. ....... Operational
External. Internal (a)
(b) (c)
001
(d) (e)
011 111
Figure 1
consisting of nodes. Each node has a maximum of one "incoming" and

two "outgoing" branches. Each node level represents a distinctive
feature. For instance, the predicate structure of Piaget's four stages can
be represented in a graph which has four node levels: the top level has
a mere mathematical or "dummy" meaning, the second level specifies
the concrete-formal dichotomy, the third corresponds with the actional-
operational dichotomy, while the bottom level represents the external-
internal dichotomy. It is conventionally understood that if a branch goes
to the right, it ends in a node representing the "inferior" value of a
concept pair (i.e., the values external, actional, and concrete respective-
ly), while a branch bifurcating to the right hits the superior value
(internal, operational, and formal respectively) (see Figure la).
It is possible to represent each of the four states in the model - a
state corresponding with a full brach from top to bottom - by a binary
number. A binary number is a number in the binary number system,
counting only the numbers 0 and 1, such that 1+1=10, 10+1=11,

11 + 1 = 100, etc. Let us now agree upon the meaning of O's and 1's in
the following way: a 0 represents a tum to the left, while a 1 represents
a tum to the right. Each digit in the binary number corresponds with a
predicate level in a graph as depticted in the figure. Thus the first digit
corresponds with either a tum to the right or to the left between the
top node and the second node level, the second digit corresponds with
such a tum between the second and third node level, etc. Thus the
number "000" corresponds with three turns to the left in the graph, i.e.
with the left complete branch, describing the distinctive features char-
acteristic of Piaget's first developmental stage (Figure Ib). Given all
these geometric conventions we may now define the Piagetian stage
logic by the iterative equation:
Xt+ 1 = 2. Xt + 1
Assuming that xo is the number 000, the equation yields the

following result:
Xl =2 . (000) + 1 =001
This number corresponds with the branch represented by thick lines
in Figure lc. Continuing the computation we find:
Xl =2 . (001) + 1 =Oll
X3 = 2 (Oll) + 1 = III
These numbers correspond with the branches in Figures Id and Ie
respectively. It is interesting to note that any continuation of the
computation results in a number specifying the last stage, since:
X4 = 2 . (lll) + 1 = llll
and the number is, by convenience, only three digits long, i.e.:
111 = (1)111 = 111
The Eriksonian model of ego-development amounts to a complete-
ly bifurcated tree (see Figure 2a); further details about the conceptual
interpretation can be found in Van Geert, 1987b)
Its sequence equation is the following:

Xt+l=Xt+l
which, if applied consecutively, yields the following set of numbers

and corresponding branches (see figure 2b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i):
86 Paul van Geert
o ~
o
10
1
1 0
0
10
1
1
(0)
~ 001
(b)
~ 010
(c)
~ 011
(d)
~ 100
(e)
~ 101
(I)
~ 110
(g)
(i)
~ 111
(h)
Figure 2
XO = 000
Xl = 000 + 1 = 001
X2 = 001 + 1 = 010
X3 = 010 + 1 = 011
X4 = 011 + 1 = 100
XS = 100 + 1 = 101
X6 = 101 + 1 = 110
X7 = 110 + 1 = 111
It is interesting to note that if we apply the equation one more time,

the result is a complete regression:
XI = III + 1 = 1000
and since the number counts only three digits, it follows that:
1000 = (1)000 = 000
We may conclude that the Eriksonian model is a cyclical model. This
conclusion, which follows naturally from our calculus, is also supported
by conceptual research into the foundations of the model (Van Geert,
1987b).
In summary, we found that the two basic equations, #1 and #2,
corresponded with classical stage models, namely the linear non- regres-
sional increase model of which Piaget forms a typical example, and the
epicyclical model typically instantiated by Erikson's. We seem to have
no conceptual difficulty in accepting the sequences that these models
describe as basically developmental, even if some, such as Erikson's,
show transient regressions and cyclicity. Does their "developmental"
nature correspond with the simplicity of the equations that describe
their structure? That is, does mathematical simplicity in this case cor-
respond with developmental order? Let us try another simple equation,
namely:
xt+l=xt2+1
which, given a limitation to three digits, yields a sequence ending in a

repetitive cycle (in dynamic systems terms we would say that the process
has a cyclical attractor; see Figure 3). Could such cycles obtain a
developmental interpretation, i.e., are there sets of distinctive features
that we can assign to the digits and the respective trees such that the
resulting sequences represent a developmental process? I do not intend
to answer such questions here. I only want to illustrate that a general
approach - a dynamic systems or "chaos" approach in the terminology
of Howe and Rabinowitz - can also be applied to classical stage models.
That is, these classical models can be conceived of as specific cases of a
more general developmental logic of theory building, and should not be
abandoned as obsolete, because non-chaotic or non- dynamic, attempts
at conceptualizing development. I have the explicit belief, however, that
adopting dynamic systems principles will drastically alter the nature and
methods of developmental theory building. This approach, although
primarily suited to phenomena expressable in terms of observable
variables (Sorry Bill), could also be applied to classical stage models and
leads, among others, to questions on the relationships between mathe-
88 Paul van Geert
Figure 3
matical structures and developmental concepts. The use of logico-

mathematical approaches to developmental theory building is one of
the central tenets in my work. I think this approach is important not
because mathematics per se is important, but because developmen-
talists have thus far paid little or no attention to the logical and mathe-
matical structure of their models and theories (with a very notable
exception, namely Piaget). By "mathematical" I do not mean "statisti-
cal" - and it is clear that there is a lot of statitistical thinking going on
in our discipline - but rather that form of mathematics that tries to
capture the formal structure and properties of development itself - if
any such properties exist - and therefore contributes to making explicit

the theoretical foundations of developmental psychology.
References
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Van Geert, P. (1987a). The structure of developmental theories. A generative
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Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
2
Relations Between Method and Theory in
Developmental Research:
A partial-isomorphism view
Joachim E WohlwiIl 1
SUMMARY: This chapter argues that the linkage in developmental

psychology between methods and theory (conceived of as broadly defined
viewpoints and frameworks) is one of 'partial-isomorphism', that is, of
imperfect correlation. The chapter begins with a general examination
and critique of current views of the issue of the relation between theory
and method, introducing two specific examples, one from an earlier
period of the history of developmental pSYChology, the other from more
current work in the field. The relationship between theory and method
is then analyzed more specifically, with reference to two prototypical
areas of developmental concern: the stage issue, and the con-
tinuity/stability issue. It is argued that a relationship of 'partial
isomorphism' not only does fullest justice to the way in which develop-
mental investigators conduct their research, but also that this construal
of the theory-method relation is most apt to advance scientific progress
in our field. The flexible, loose sort of linkage between theory and
method stressed in this chapter will serve as a counterforce to sterile
pursuit of methodology for its own sake, divorced from and uninformed
by theory, such as would be encouraged if methodology were to be
considered as completely independent of theory. At the same time the
conception likewise avoids the excesses of theorizing without regard to
methodological approach, or of subordinating method entirely to theory,
which is apt to ensure the preservation of the theory in isolation from rival
ones, and thus lead eventually to its dying on the vine. The final section
1 The writer wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments on portions of this paper
offered by Richard M. Lerner and John R. Nesselroade.
Joachim F. Wohlwill Late of the Department of Individual and Family

Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802.

Edited by P. Van Geerl and L.P. Mos, Plenum Press, New York, 1991
92 Joachim F. Wohlwill
of the paper is devoted to some specific methodological issues arising in

developmental research that are implied in a concept of development,
though they are to a considerable extent independent of particular
theoretical positions concerning developmental processes.
Introduction
It has become fashionable to argue that an investigator's theory of
behavior determines, or 'drives', the methods that are applied to test
hypotheses derived from the theory. In developmental psychology this
viewpoint has been repeatedly and effectively articulated. Overton and
Reese (1973) provide one good case in point, in their extension of their
'models of man' dichotomy between mechanism and organism to the
methodological realm. In a similar vein, White (1970) has emphasized
the close bond between learning-theoretical views of child behavior and
the standard procedures chosen by researchers working within this
paradigm. And most recently we find Valsiner and Kindermann (1986)
taking up this refrain by warning us against the dangers of theoretical
or methodological eclecticism, and arguing for an intimate correspon-
dence between theoretical views and methodological approaches, for
example, in regard to the choice of quantitative as opposed to qualita-
tive measures.
The present paper presents a view at variance with this postulation
of a complete linkage between theory and methods. While acknow-
ledging the self-evident fact of a substantial correlation between the
two, both de facto and de jure, it emphasizes the considerable degree of
independence of one from the other that actually obtains, when one
examines the kinds of approaches to research taken by investigators,
and the relationship between these approaches and the theoretical
perspectives represented by the investigators. In this paper I will
consider some of the reasons for such departures from perfect cor-
respondence, and propose that these departures are in fact a healthy
sign, protecting the field from premature ossification. I provide a
framework for assessing the relationship between theory and method,
in terms of the concept of a 'partial isomorphism' of the determinants
of theory on the one hand and method on the other. This framework
provides a useful point of departure for examining the methodological
features of developmental research and their relationship to develop-
mental theory.
2 Method and Theory in Developmental Research 93
The paper starts out with a general examination and critique of

current views on this issue, introducing two specific examples, one from
an earlier period of the history of developmental psychology, the other
from more current work in the field. I will then proceed to analyze the
relationship between theory and method more specifically, with refer-
ence to two prototypical areas of developmental concern: the stage
issue, and the continuity/stability issue. I proceed to argue for a
relationship of 'partial isomorphism' as not only doing fullest justice to
the way in which developmental investigators conduct their research,
but as being most apt to advance scientific progress in our field. The
final section of the paper is devoted to some specific methodological
issues arising in developmental research that are implied in a concept
of development, though they are to a considerable extent independent
of particular theoretical positions concerning developmental processes.
One caveat needs to be noted at the outset: the term 'theory' is used
in this paper to refer primarily to broadly defined theoretical viewpoints
and frameworks (e.g., cognitive, S-R, ecological, etc.), rather than to
specific theories designed to account for a particular phenomenon or
to deal with particular problems (e.g., distinctive-feature theory of
perception; Ainsworth's model of attachment). It is important to bear
this point in mind, since much of what follows would become ques-
tionable if extended to theorizing in this latter sense. We will, in fact,
have occasion to examine one view of the theory-method relationship
(Bentler, 1978) that takes a position seemingly reinforcing the tight-
linkage view referred to in the opening paragraph, but which turns out
to be altogether compatible with the argument to be developed here.
Summary and Critique oCCurrent Views on the Theory-Method

Relationship
It should not be surprising to find that those who espouse the notion
that method is subordinate to theory are themselves primarily
theoreticians, that is, individuals with a strong, and strongly articulated
commitment to theory per se, and to a particular theoretical position.
A prime example is represented by the writings of Reese and Overton
(1970; Overton & Reese, 1973), who argue that developmental psychol-
ogy can be divided up into two opposing 'camps', each representing a
'world view' diametrically opposed to the other, which they identify as
the 'organismic' and the 'mechanistic' positions. These world views are
derived from the set of 'world hypotheses' enunciated by the

philosopher Pepper (1942).
Reese and Overton do not choose sides between these opposing
world views - indeed, from their individual writings (e.g., Overton,
1976; Reese, 1970) it seems clear that they represent opposite sides on
this issue, Overton writes as an organismic, and Reese as a mechanistic,
theorist. This ecumenical stance appears admirable indeed, and consis-
tent with their main intent of articulating the meta theoretical positions
that they find implicit in much, if not all, thinking about developmental
processes. This is not the place to subject their analysis to a searching
critique, valuable though such a critique might prove. Its interest for
the purpose of this paper is rather their attempt in their second paper
(Overton & Reese, 1973) to extend their two-world-view conception to
the methodological realm. [Although in this paper the writers do not
actually confront specific methodological issues extensively, it contains
several points of relevance to the present paper.] Thus the authors refer
approvingly to previous arguments (Fodor, 1968; Kessel, 1969) to the
effect that mechanistic (i.e., S-R, or 'reactive-organism') theorists
choose particular empirical approaches, and look for particular kinds
of data best suited to verify their theories (e.g., discrimination experi-
ments), while organismic (i.e., 'active-organism') theorists choose a
different set of approaches, and look for different kinds of data. They
note further the popularity of analysis of variance models of data
analysis, and rightly emphasize the additivity-of-effects conception built
into these models, and its inconsistency with a dynamic (i.e., as opposed
to statistical) interactionist view which they identify with the organismic
position. On the other side of the ledger, however, one might cite
Zigler's (1963) argument concerning the negative effect that the rejec-
tion of the experimental method has had on the development of ade-
quate theories of development. Whether Zigler in turn recognized fully
the implications of what an experimental approach to development
would entail is an arguable question (see Wohlwill, 1973, for fuller
discusson of this issue).
However apt, Overton and Reese's analysis is one-sided, in their
presumption that investigators necessarily start out from a clearly
articulated theoretical position or world view, and then select a
methodology calculated to buttress their position. Undoubtedly a
certain amount of research follows that strategy. But, as Crutchfield
and Krech (1961) among others perceptively observed, methodological
advances frequently are themselves driving forces in changing our view

of the world, by providing new types of information that require us to
alter our previous conceptions. In the history of science, the invention
of the telescope and the microscope, and the discovery and use of x-rays
have exerted such effects. In the behavioral sciences, similar theoretical
impacts have come not only from certain technical advances (e.g., the
invention of the tachistoscope, the development of the EEG and other
psychophysiological and neurological techniques), but, perhaps even
more importantly, from the elaboration of new methods of data analysis
(multivariate methods; multidimensional scaling) made possible by the
computer revolution.
Crutchfield and Krech suggested rather convincingly that the
relationship between theory and method is a much more complex,
(bidirectional), one than is typically recognized. Their view is most
apposite to the one to be proposed in the present paper, which aims,
however, to transcend the somewhat incidental consideration of these
issues by these writers, and is more specifically focused on issues in the
field of developmental psychology.
At the outset, let us consider some of the factors that are involved
in understanding the linkage between theory and methodology. I
should like to focus on three such factors.
First, theoreticians are not necessarily interested in methodology,
nor vice-versa. Probably the prime example of a theoretician so disdain-
ful of methodological concerns as to consistently fail to obtain the kinds
of data that might provide convincing support for his own theory is Jean
Piaget. In fact, until relatively late in his life Piaget paid little heed to
elementary standards of the scientific method, or of empirical research,
in his work on either sensori-motor or operational intelligence. (His
work on perception provides a notable contrast in that respect.) As is
well known, in virtually all of his books on the development of intel-
ligence the evidential support for his ideas is confined to sample
protocols of observations or verbal responses of individual children. It
remained for others of a methodological bent who were interested in
his theory (e.g., Nassefat, 1963; Moshman, 1977; Wohlwill, Fusaro, &
Devoe, 1969) to undertake the requisite methodological spade-work
that might put Piaget's conceptions on a sounder empirical footing.
Conversely, methodologists are apt to lack theoretical axes to grind,
and are generally willing to apply their pet approaches to whatever
problem happens to strike them as interesting. Thus we find Tucker
(1963) developing a three-dimensional model of factor-analysis to

handle multivariate longitudinal data in a manner fraught with sig-
nificance for developmental psychology (although for pragmatic
reasons this model has proved difficult to apply in empirical research);
at the same time Tucker (1966) has elaborated a very similar factor-
analytic methodology for application in a very different area, that is,
individual differences in learning. In a more general vein, concern for
methodology tends, at least in the U.S.A., to override interest in theory,
and so we find a veritable army of researchers happily operating in a
theoretical limbo, content to pursue the truth wherever their
methodological tools may lead them. Nor is this pattern a recent
development, resulting from the inevitable increase in specialization
and methodological refinement that psychology, like any science, has
undergone; it seems to have been the norm for some time, if we are to
judge by Maslow's (1946) acidulous comments on this subject of some
forty years ago.
The second factor, closely related to the preceding, is that a
researcher's work is apt to undergo change over the course of his or her
career in terms of either theoretical frameworks or methodological
approaches, but these often do not change correlatively. One illustra-
tion of this point comes from a somewhat startling paper in which Estes
(1961) deserted the ship of associationist theory, and of classical S-R
reinforcement continuity learning, in favor of a new 'new chemistry' of
learning conforming to all-or none principles. Yet he based his turn-
about entirely on research conforming to a standard learning paradigm
that he had previously followed as an adherent to association theory.
This example might be thought to represent a special case, in the sense
that here the theoretical shift was brought about by a changed inter-
pretation of the author's own experiments. But it does bring out the
fact that a theoretical shift can occur without a corresponding change
in the realm of methodology. The example further gives lie to the
assertions of some (e.g., Kessel, 1969) that theoretical preconceptions
govern the selection of methodologies destined to bear out these
preconceptions.
An illustration of the opposite phenomenon, that is, of a major
change in research strategy while the theoretical framework remains
intact is shown in the work of Berlyne (1971, 1974). This researcher
moved from a strict experimental approach in his work on psychological
aesthetics, in which the stimulus variables of interest were controlled
and manipulated in laboratory fashion, to one involving ready-made

stimuli (e.g., works of art), analyzed via a combination of multidimen-
sional scaling and factor-analytic approaches to extract the relevant
dimensions from his data. Yet this shift was accomplished with virtually
no change in the theoretical framework inspiring the research.
Third, it must be recognized that methodological approaches do not
map neatly onto theoretical paradigms. In fact, probably the most
important determinant of an investigator'S choice of methodology has
less to do with allegiance to a particular theory or 'world view' than with
his or her identification with one or the other of the two 'disciplines' of
scientific psychology to which Cronbach (1957) called attention as
representing two opposite camps within psychology. In that APA
Presidential address, Cronbach contrasted the experimental and the
differential psychologist as committed to two diametrically opposed
views of research, in regard to the stance taken towards individual
differences, the preference for experimental as opposed to statistical
control, the choice of statistical techniques for data analyses, and the
place accorded to systematic theorizing, of whatever stripe.
The present writer has previously pointed to the ambiguous place
of developmental psychology with regard to this dichotomy (Wohlwill,
1973). In fact, in this field perhaps more than in any other, adherents
of each of these two orientations towards psychological research may
be found side by side. In the developmental realm there is, however, a
closely related division of comparable import, as McCall (1981) has
noted. This is the split between the adherents of the 'classical' approach
to the study of development, concerned with within-individual change
(and in its nomothetic orientation a close cousin to the experimentalist's
view of psychology as described by Cronbach), as opposed to those
working in a differential mode, concerned with inter-individual
differences among children at any given age. This split bids fair to
override in importance major theoretical differentiations, such as that
between the organismic and the mechanismic world view. Thus we find
a proponent of the organismic view such as, for example, Kuhn (1972)
and the more mechanistically (Le., anti-structuralist) oriented Brainerd
(1974) using research strategies for the study of cognitive development
that are fundamentally similar in their resort to an experimental
concept-induction paradigm, in their choice of Piagetian measures, and
in their use of a diagnostic pretest. In all these respects they are surely
more closely akin to each other than they are to the researchers
representative of the differential approach, such as those involved in

the study of attachment, for instance. These in turn may represent
radically divergent theoretical orientations themselves, encompassing
the gamut from organismic to mechanistic - as illustrated in the
contrast between Ainsworth (1973) and Gewirtz (1972).
It is apparent, then, that there are good reasons for skepticism
concerning any supposed determinate relationship between theory and
method. This point may be made more vivid by turning briefly to two
case histories from the field of developmental psychology, one primarily
of historical interest, the other more recent, that reveal clearly the
rather equivocal connection between the two.
Tho Case Histories of the Theory-Method Relationship

The case of Martha Muchow. At a symposium held at the 1983
meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, this writer
(Wohlwill, 1985) called attention to the work of Martha Muchow, a
little-known student and assistant of William Stern and Heinz Werner
at the University of Hamburg during the 19208 and early 19308. Her
most important work, carried out in collaboration with her brother,
Hans, and published by the latter after his sister's tragic death in 1933,
was a study of the "Life-space of the urban child." This study was
devoted to an account of school-age children from a working-class
neighborhood in the city of Hamburg, in regard to both their knowledge
of and their behavior in and use of different sectors of their environment
(Muchow & Muchow, 1935; reprinted 1978).
The writer, as well as his colleagues who served as discussants at this
symposium, commented at length on the interest and significance of
Muchow's work for contemporary developmental and environmental
psychology. But more specifically, as brought out clearly in the publish-
ed version of the symposium a curious tension emanates from the
monograph between its general theoretical framework, clearly derived
from Wernerian organismic theory, and Muchow's concern for the
ecology of children's behavior. That concern transpires from the
account given, in painstaking detail, of the environmental features
characterizing a set of seven different play settings frequented by the
children, and the characteristics of the children's use of those settings.
As Wapner (1985) observes, Muchow's emphasis on the environment
as experienced, that is, on the child's phenomenal environment, and on
the varying 'spheres of reality' experienced by the child, and on the
functionally defined nature of the child's life space, is very much in

keeping with the organismic-developmental perspective that Heinz
Werner had begun to develop during his years at Hamburg. Wapner
further sees Muchow's methods as inspired by that theoretical perspec-
tive, notably in the variety of ways in which Muchow attempted to assess
the child's experience, including the use of verbal reports, the analyses
of graphic records and map-based data similar to those in use today in
the realm of cognitive mapping in children, as well as of overt behavior.
Yet Schoggen (1985), focusing on the third and major portion of the
Muchows' monograph, finds it foreshadowing the entirely different
approach of contemporary ecological psychology, with its emphasis on
the objectively defined behavior setting, and on the constraints upon
behavior placed by the particular features of any given setting. This
leads Schoggen to conclude that "Muchow was continually bombarded
by the coercive forces residing in the ecological environment. Despite
her strong theoretical preferences for a psychological approach to her
study of environments, the realities of the ecological environment could
not be ignored" (Schoggen, 1985, p. 216).
Clearly, this behavioral-ecology flavor of Muchow's research, which
was in such direct conflict with the overall theoretical framework within
which it was conceived, arises from the care that the investigator took
to make detailed observations of the children's behaviors and forms of
use of the environments, and to relate these to specific characteristics
of each setting. It is by no means clear how Martha Muchow came to
embark on such an ecologically oriented enterprise. Undoubtedly close
association with the biologist and student of animal-behavior, Jakob von
Uexkiill, and possibly with Kurt Lewin as well, exerted some effect on
her work and thinking. In addition, her own intimate experience with
the activities of children in diverse settings, deriving from her work as
teacher, pedagogue, and social worker, may well have sharpened her
sensitivity to the characteristics of children's environments and to the
forms of their activities in those environments. What is apparent, in any
event, is that Muchow did not allow her theoretical presuppositions,
derived from Wernerian psychology, to determine or constrict the range
of observational techniques and methodologies for the collection of
information concerning her problem that she incorporated into her
research - much to the enrichment of both developmental theory and
ecological psychology.
Lest this case be dismissed as a negligible product of the early history

of the field of developmental psychology, and of the lesser degree of
theoretical sophistication to be expected from that phase of the
development of a field, let us turn to a second, more recent example.
Unlike the previous case, this one does not involve an attempt to work
within a given theoretical framework, while adopting a methodological
approach fundamentally alien to it. Rather it is an effort to utilize a
single methodological paradigm to document a developmental shift that
appears to represent a change from behavior illustrative of one 'world
view' to that which more nearly fits another. Note that in the process
the research in question casts grave doubt, as others (e.g., Bruner,
Matter, & Papanek, 1955) have done, on the absolute nature of the
differentiation among alternative "world hypotheses."
The case of Tracy Kendler. As soon as experimental child
psychologists attempted to apply S-R discrimination-learning principles
to the behavior of young children, it became apparent (Kuenne, 1946)
that, while that of pre-verbal children might conform to those prin-
ciples, the responses of verbal children could not easily be encompassed
by them. It remained for Tracy Kendler (Kendler & Kendler, 1970;
Kendler, 1979) to turn this sow's ear into a silk purse, by showing - or
at least arguing - that what is reflected here is a fundamental shift in
the nature of the child's cognitive functioning. According to the
Kendlers, whereas the pre-verbal child's behavior conforms to classical
S-R principles, that of verbal children requires the postulation of
mediating processes that fundamentally alter the nature of the learning
process.
The mediation-theoretical framework used to explain the reversal-
shift phenomenon commonly encountered in verbalizing children and
adults is not in itself inconsistent with the behaviorist paradigm from
which the experimental methodology employed by the Kendlers is
derived. It has, of course, a long and honored history in modern S-R
theory applied to the human level, both in this country (Osgood, 1957;
Berlyne, 1965) and abroad (Luria, 1961), and remains fundamentally
associationist. The distinctive character of Kendler's work, and the
clash, such as it is, between theory and method, relates rather to the
emergent-levels conception that Tracy Kendler has introduced to ac-
count for the developmental shift in functioning between the four- or
five-year old (i.e., verbally mediating) child and the seven-year old (i.e.,
non-verbally mediating) one. This "levels-of-functioning" conception,
to use the term Kendler employs in one of her more recent publications
(Kendler, 1979), has in that paper been extended to cover, not only a
change in the mode of learning, from associative to 'cognitive,' that is,
mediational, but in addition a change in encoding processes from
non-selective to selective.
Clearly this formulation of developmental change in terms of
successive, qualitatively different levels of functioning is an 'organismic'
conception, setting Kendler apart as a developmentalist from a tradi-
tionallearning interpretaton of development such as Bijou and Baer's
(1961). It is no less so for Kendler's (1979) insistence that the emer-
gence is gradual and probabilistic, rather than discontinuous and all-or-
none. Others, more closely identified with a Piagetian perspective (e.g.,
Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969), have similarly argued that the process of
development from one level to another in Piagetian stages is best
conceived of as probabilistic rather than taking place in all-or-none
fashion. And even as committed a proponent of the emergent-levels
conception of development as Heinz Werner (1957b) was quite ready
to admit of developmental change occurring in a gradual manner. The
seeming contradiction evaporates once we distinguish, as we need to do
(Wohlwill, 1973) the qualitative-quantitative issue from the question
whether developmental change is continuous as opposed to discrete or
saltatory.
The essential point in regard to Kendler's work, in any event, is that
it displays a developmental slant on changes with age that is at least
closely akin to that of organismic theorists, side-by-side with continued
reliance on an experimental paradigm, that of the discrimination-
learning experiment, derived from S-R association theory. Nor is there
any obvious sense of mismatch or incompatability in this pairing.
Indeed, one might argue that if an associationist research program such
as that of the Kendlers forces the investigators into the adoption of an
emergent levels-of-function account of development, this only
enhances the persuasiveness of the case for such a conception.
Relationships Between Theory and Method in Research on

Specific Issues
The Stage Issue

Let us now turn to an examination of the theory-method relation-
ship within the context of two specific issues. The aim here is not to
draw attention to remarkable instances of theory-method mismatch, but
rather to determine in more neutral fashion the actual form that the
interrelationship between the two has taken in the development of each
problem area.
The first of these issues concerns the concept of stages; the preced-
ing example of the research of Tracy Kendler provides a convenient
bridge leading us into this realm. Here, if anywhere, a close linkage
between theory and method might appear to hold true. It is manifest
in an almost trivial sense in some of the early criticism of the stage
concept, as reflected in the approaches that those holding to a
continuity position commonly utilized in their attempts to discredit the
validity of the stage concept. Typically, such critiques involved present-
ing cross-sectional data on the percentage of subjects falling into
different categories of response at different ages, and pointing to the
overlap of categories across several adjacent age groups. The author
has previously (Wohlwill, 1973) pointed to the utter irrelevance of such
information for determining the adequacy of stage models of develop-
ment. It is pertinent to the present analysis only to the extent that it
documents a tendency for those holding theoretical views inimical to a
particular framework to select methodologies that are inadequate for
dealing with the issues posed by that framework. A somewhat subtler
manifestation of the same principle is reflected in the choice of a
criterion in diagnosing a child's attainment of a given level of cognitive
functioning. Those committed to a Piagetian view (e.g., Smedslund,
1983), are much more likely to rely on verbal justification of the child's
responses, and on the recognition of the necessity of the principle in
question (say, conservation) than are critics of this view (e.g., Brainerd,
1977).
Contemporary work on the stage concept, both pro and con, has
however increased considerably in sophistication and incisiveness, in
part as a result of the extensive theoretical and methodological discus-
sion that it has received (Brainerd, 1978; Flavell, 1972; Flavell &
Wohlwill, 1969; Pinard & Laurendeau, 1969; Wohlwill, 1973). Let us

consider, then, the way in which the theory-method relationship emer-
ges from three different realms of application of the stage concept: that
of sensori-motor development in infancy; that of cognitive development
in childhood; and that of moral development. In all three of these
domains, and most prominently in the last two, the debate has been
between those adhering to a structural model of development and those
who have eschewed such a model, generally (though not inevitably)
adopting a functional one instead. Yet even here we will find the
corresponding methodological paradigms to be variably related to the
theoretical divisions.
Stages of sensori-motor development. To start with sensori-motor
development in infancy, research in this realm has of course been
enormously influenced by Piaget's (1952, 1954) seminal work, based, let
us recall, entirely on observations of a few selected infants (primarily
his own). Indeed, here we find a virtual monopoly for Piaget's system
of stages, at least at a theoretical level, which has furthermore infiltrated
work on aspects of development well beyond those for which Piaget had
intended it, as in Sroufe's (1979) model of early emotional develop-
ment, and Wachs' (1976) analysis of the role of specific home-environ-
mental variables in early development. Critical attacks on the theory
have been few and sporadic, and limited chiefly to restricted questions
of the validity of the sequential emergence of one behavior pattern
relative to another, such as Miller, Cohen, and Hill's (1970) demonstra-
tion that response to invisible displacements need not, in all cases,
follow that to visible ones. No rival theoretical formulations have been
proposed to challenge Piaget's that might permit one even to examine
the theory-method linkage. The major theoretical advances in the area
of infancy, such as attachment theory (Ainsworth, 1973), and theories
of emotional expression in infancy such as Izard's (1978), have been too
divorced from the Piagetian realm to provide pertinent ammunition in
this regard.
What has happened, rather, is that psychologists committed to
Piaget's theory, notably Uzgiris and Hunt (1975), have been active in
devising methodological tools that would allow them to apply the theory
to the assessment of infants and their development. These efforts have
resulted in the construction of ordinal scales of infant development
(Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975), which have already been utilized to good effect
in research. Byway of example, we may point to studies of development
in institutional environments differing in the quality and quantity of

stimulation provided the infant (Paraskevopoulos & Hunt, 1971), and
of the relationship between particular environmental conditions and
variables and infant development (Wachs, 1976).
There is, of course, nothing particularly remarkable about a theory
spawning efforts on a methodological front designed to advance it. Yet,
significantly, this methodological breakthrough, which bids fair to
replace long-standing methods previously in use for assessing infant
development, such as those of Bayley (1933) and Gesell and Amatruda
(1941), has directed attention away from the stage-properties of
Piaget's system, notably in regard to the assumed synchrony in the
development of forms of behavior designated as belonging to a given
stage. In fact, in the process of translating Piaget's theoretical system
of stages of infant development into a series of parallel ordinal scales,
Uzgiris and Hunt found themselves forced to devise a much more
fine-grained set of steps, varying in number for different content
domains, from 8 to 20. The scales emerge thus as more akin to the
classical sequences of motor development proposed by Shirley (1933)
and McGraw (1943), which emphasize sequential invariance, but have
no horizontal component equivalent to the 'structures d'ensemble'
principle embodied in Piaget's stage concept (Wohlwill, 1973). This
feature undoubtedly accounts for the success of these scales in predict-
ing the development of children under contrasting environmental con-
ditions, and in relating it to particular environmental dimensions. What
we are witnessing here, in other words, is a 'methodological drift' where
a methodology designed originally to validate a particular theory has
become subordinated to a rather different purpose, that is, assessment,
in a way that has introduced a degree of inconsistency between the
methodology and the theory from which it was derived. Here we see a
prime example of the primary dependence of methodology on the
adoption of a classical as opposed to a differential focus in developmen-
tal research, rather than on theoretical considerations.
Stages of cognitive development in childhood. This realm has been
less affected by diversion from a theoretical to an assessment focus.
Attempts at deriving scales of cognitive development from Piagetian
conceptions have not been lacking (e.g., Goldschmid & Bentler, 1968),
but the previously developed scales of intelligence, that is, the Stanford-
Binet and the Wechsler, have been too firmly entrenched to allow such
attempts to make significant inroads on their use even among
2 Method and Theory in Developmental Research lOS
researchers, as the Uzgiris and Hunt scale has succeeded in doing in the
area of infant assessment. Even scales conforming more closely to a
psychometric paradigm, but much stronger in construct validity than
standard IQ scales, have met with little success - as shown in the
reception accorded to the Leiter scale (Leiter, 1940).
Conversely, in this area the theoretical debate has been much more
vigorous and prolonged, and alternative models have thrived. The
information-processing models, notably that of Siegler and his
colleagues (see Siegler, 1983), represent a prime example of such a rival
conception, one that competes with, and in certain respects comple-
ments the Piagetian one, though - Siegler's claims notwithstanding -
it can hardly be said to have supplanted it (see Liben, 1987, for a
trenchant discussion of this point). One might thus expect that an
examination of the differences between those models and Piagetian
stage conceptions, and their relationship to divergences between them
at a methodological level, would shed light on our topic.
The problem is considerably complicated, however, by the major
differences among Piagetians regarding the viability and indeed the
meaning of the stage concept, and accordingly of the methodology most
appropriate to studying cognitive development in the terms of Piaget's
theory of cognitive structures. Views on this issue vary all the way from
Pascual-Leone's (1980) spirited defence of the Piagetian model, to
viewpoints that adhere only nominally to a Piagetian position, and are
highly critical of the value of the stage concept (Beilin, 1971). Others
(e.g., Flavell, 1982) fall somewhere between these opposite poles.
Given this disparity, the research being conducted from within a
Piagetian framework is difficult to characterize in methodological
terms. Indeed, were one to look for a common denominator among
these approaches, one would probably settle for a shared concern for
cognitive stlUctures, that is, for mental representations of concepts and
operations that cannot be conceived in terms of discrete individual
responses. Yet that concern is to some extent shared by information-
processing theorists, with their focus on their subjects' response
strategies. Thus methodological differences between the two
approaches are not too sharply defined. The major differences between
them and the Piagetians are rather of a conceptual nature. The infor-
mation processers' primary interest is in task-variables that reflect on
the child's handling of the information presented; they leave
correspondingly little room for developmental changes sui generis,
handling such change rather in terms of specific learning or experience.

In contrast, the Piagetians prefer to analyze the child's mental opera-
tions at the level of 'deep structures', and concern themselves with
developmental changes operating at that level, and correspondingly
with explanation in terms of formal as opposed to conditional causes
(see Liben, 1987, for a more comprehensive comparison of these two
approaches.) But these concerns are still in search of methodologies
appropriate to them, and equal to the task of verifying the unitary
structures that the concept of stages entails, and of revealing the
processes (e.g., equilibration) postulated to underly the changes in
these structures that take place in the course of the child's development.
The differences between the information-processors and the
Piagetians is surely a far cry, then, from the cosmic-sounding schisms
between alternative world hypotheses conjured up by Reese and
Overton (1970). Nor is the absence of such a schism in this case too
surprising: the field of psychology has undergone a veritable revolution
over the past two decades which has pulled along most if not all theorists
over a broad array of behavioral specialties, from perception to think-
ing, from emotion and motivation to personality and social behavior
(see Gardner, 1985). Nowhere has this transformation been more
thoroughgoing than in developmental psychology. By and large, then,
the battle between 'mechanistic' and 'organismic' conceptions has been
fought and lost (i.e., by the former), and the victors have been left to
battle over rather more narrowly defined issues, representing differen-
ces less at the scale of world views than at that of state or country views
at most.
Stages of moral judgment. Perhaps the most fertile use of the
concept of stages in the cognitive area has been that of Lawrence
Kohlberg and his followers, in their work on stages in the development
of moral judgment. In contrast to the continuing debate among
Piagetians concerning the validity and usefulness of the stage concept,
these researchers have consistently followed a stage-theoretical
paradigm, built on a sound theoretical as well as empirical foundation.
The subtitle that Kohlberg chose for the volume in which his major
papers on this topic were reprinted, "The nature and validity of moral
stages" (Kohlberg, 1984), provides convincing testimony on this point,
if any were needed. Because of the centrality of this concept to this
research program, and his efforts to anchor the stage concept securely
in a methodology suited to the theoretical framework, the work of
Kohlberg and his colleagues provides one of the most clear-cut

examples of the kind of direct, strong linkage between theory and
method that is held up as an ideal in some quarters. It should thus repay
a closer look in the present context.
Kohlberg's (1969) paper in the Goslin handbook presents the
clearest and most thoroughly worked-through statement of his stage-
theoretical conception. It shows Kohlberg adhering to a Piagetian
conception of stages with regard to the two most central criteria of those
that Piaget stipulated for this concept: that of an invariant sequential
order in the appearance of the successive levels of reasoning or
functioning, and that of the horizontal linkages among the manifesta-
tions of a given level across different contents, that is, Piaget's criterion
of 'structures d'ensemble' (structured wholes). Thus Kohlberg was
particularly intent, not only on tracing the sequential character of the
progression of stages of moral judgment, preferably through
longitudinal research, along with Guttman scaling of cross-sectional
data, but also on determining the generality of a stage within a given
child, in terms of the correspondence among responses to different
moral dilemmas. In this context, he and his associates (Colby, Kohlberg,
Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981; Turiel, 1966) have
dealt extensively with the problems raised by violations of the two major
criteria for stage progression, that is, sequential invariance, and
horizontal consistency. Manifestations of regression became of par-
ticular concern in regard to the first of these issues, while stage-mixture
was dealt with in regard to the second. It is significant that in his
commentary on the Colby et a1. monograph, Fischer (1983) con-
centrates very explicitly on each of these two aspects, and notes the
advance of the Kohlbergian research program, as regards both of these
issues, demonstrated in the work reported in this monograph, compared
to previous studies.
This advance is directly traceable, in large measure, to two major
methodological refinements adopted by this research team. One, fairly
obvious in its contribution, is the resort to longitudinal methodology.
This feature provided much more convincing evidence concerning
sequential invariance than the previously relied upon Guttman-scaling
methodology. In particular, it allowed the issue of stage regression to
be examined much more effectively than prior research by either this
team or their critics had permitted. The second feature concerns the
shift in the scoring procedure, from 'aspect scoring' to 'issue scoring',
That change entailed essentially a change from a content analysis of the

themes that the respondents to the standard set of moral-conflict
dilemmas referred to in their moral judgments to a set of a priori defined
issues, chosen for their direct relationship to the structural character of
Kohlberg's stage theory of moral judgment. Note that the change did
not involve a wholesale revision of the categories, but rather one that
'purified' them, from their former, ex-post facto based mixture of struc-
ture and content, to a set of elements (e.g., 'egoistic consequences';
'fairness';) and a set of norms (e.g., 'property'; 'contract') that were
chosen for their relevance to a structural analysis of levels of moral
judgment.
Significantly, this structural focus was not abandoned by Kohlberg
and his colleagues as they proceeded to attempt to standardize their
instrument, and to apply it to practical concerns of 'teaching' standards
for moral judgment. It thus provides an admirable - and rare -
example of methodology wedded to theory, each feeding into the other
(e.g., the revision in scoring led at the same time to a redefinition of the
various stages) that may serve as a model for those committed to a
strong-linkage position. At the same time the one-sided theory-
dominated character of the research has proved somewhat limiting, and
been bought at a price. For instance, the substantial effort in time and
resources entailed by the long-term (20-year!) longitudinal study has
yielded rather meager dividends, apart from the restricted interest in
sequential development. The rich mine of information contained in
these data with regard to the more fine-grained aspects of the develop-
mental processes underlying these judgments, and the individual pat-
terning of these responses, which might be revealed by an application
of longitudinal factor analysis (e.g., Nesselroade, 1970) has been left
altogether untapped.
The Stability and Continuity Issues

That the correspondence between theory and method is far from
complete is readily documented in the realm of research on stability and
continuity. Although these two issues need to be distinguished, and
considered each apart from the other, we will find that similar questions
arise with respect to both.
Before we proceed, it is essential to dispose of some terminological
confusion that has beset this problem area, and caused considerable
mischief. As already noted in the previous section, the term 'continuity',
in particular, has been misapplied to discussion of the question of
stage-like forms of developmental progression, where the gradual as
opposed to saltatory nature of developmental change has been at issue.
A very different use of the term has been prevalent in the study of
individual patterns of long-term development, where the term, though
differentiated into various types (e.g., Kagan, 1971; Emmerich, 1964),
has been generally intended to refer to the interrelatedness of behavior
across age levels. But here a confusion has arisen in regard to the use
of the term 'continuity' as opposed to 'stability'.
Perhaps the easiest way of resolving this issue is to reserve 'stability'
to one particular variety of continuity, which Kagan originally called
'complete', that is, where there is a substantial relationship between
measures of the same variable at different ages, and where those
variables themselves preserve their identity over age (e.g., in terms of
correlation with other variables). Continuity can take other forms; for
instance, in the heterotypic variety (Kagan, 1971) a relationship is found
between VariableX at one age and Variable Yat another age. Examples
are the correlations between attention in infancy and cognitive perfor-
mance at age three reported by Kagan (1971) and between exploratory
behavior at the pre-school level and creativity in the later years of
elementary school (i.e., 9 to 12 years) found by Hutt & Bhavnani (1972).
This is similar to Lerner's (1986) concept of 'explanatory', as opposed
to 'descriptive' continuity, although Lerner treats continuity as an
attribute of individual development, rather than of a variable studied at
the level of a group. The term 'continuity' has also been used more
broadly to refer to the irreversibility of the impact of earlier experience
on later behavior, or the predictability of behavior at a later age from
either earlier behavior or earlier experience (e.g., Kagan, 1976, 1980).
In this realm, continuity theorists, ranging from those with a rela-
tively strong hereditarian bias (e.g., Burt, 1958), to those placing a heavy
stress on the determinacy of early experience (e.g., Hunt, 1961, 1979)
might be differentiated from those emphasizing the resilience (Kagan,
1976) or plasticity (Lerner, 1984) of development, although we must
note that Lerner emphasizes that plasticity decreases over the course
of development. The theoretical debate on this issue, however, is not
altogether comparable to that between stage theorists and information-
processing theorists, for instance. In the present case we are dealing
rather with selective reading of the evidence, and strongly defended
assumptions as to the direction in which the evidence points, rather than
opposing theoretical frameworks or explanatory mechanisms. Yet, at a

certain level, it seems appropriate to consider the differences between
Kagan and Lerner on the one hand and Hunt on the other as of
theoretical relevance, even if they are not directly theory-derived.
Indeed, Kagan (1980) considers assumptions about continuity in human
lives to be rooted deeply, not only in the conceptions of psychologists,
but in views of human nature and of the development of human
individuality that pervade the philosophical, literary, and religious
spheres of our society and culture.
How, then, are these various positions differentiated at a
methodological level? A problem in trying to answer that question is
that the major writings on these issues, on both sides, have taken the
form of syntheses of the findings of diverse researchers, rather than
reports of programmatic research by a particular investigator or
research team. Thus we find Kagan (1976) marshalling an impressive
array of evidence, from animal and human research, from experimental,
observational and correlational methodologies, to argue the case for
the reversibility of the negative impacts of early experience. For his
part, Hunt (1979) draws on a similarly broad-gauged array of findings
to support his overall emphasis on the primacy of early experience on
development. And Lerner (1984) likewise adduces data from diverse
levels, physiological, psychological, social, to make his case for the
relative plasticity of the individual organism.
This methodological diversity in the evidence relied on by each of
these writers in support of his argument itself tends to vitiate assump-
tions of a rigid linkage between methodology and theoretical or con-
ceptual frameworks. (Admittedly the theoretical positions assumed by
these various writers on the continuity issue represent something less
than pure manifestations of broadly conceived theoretical systems.) It
is hardly surprising, then, that no agreed-upon methodology has as yet
appeared on the scene as a dominant research paradigm on either side.
Here we find in fact a particularly striking illustration of the point made
earlier in general terms, that such paradigms may have as much, if not
more to do with an investigator's preference for working with individual
differences as they are found, as opposed to treating them as error
variance. As a result, we may find investigators coming down on the
same side of a theoretical issue, though representing contrasting
methodological approaches. Thus we find writers such as Bloom
(1964), relying heavily on the changing magnitude of stability coeffi-
cients for IQ's obtained at successive ages (i.e., a differential
psychologist's approach) arguing for the proposition that the effect of
environmental forces drops off sharply after early childhood. That line
of research has remained completely divorced from the experimental
work that Hunt (1979) drew on in developing the fundamentally similar
case for the primacy of early experience.
In a more general vein, the literature on stability and continuity
reflects not only the conceptual confusion besetting the use of these
terms, but the failure to consider two major issues. A strong case could
be made that it is that failure which has kept the kind of advances on
both a theoretical and a methodological front that are sorely needed in
this area from occurring. What are these two issues?
One is the limiting view of stability (and thus continuity, in the
special sense of the 'complete' variety, to use Kagan's designation) in
terms that abstract developmental change from the data, that is, in terms
of the preservation of individual differences. The fact that the correla-
tion between IQs obtained from a group of children at ages two and six
is lower than that between IQs obtained at ages 10 and 14 tells us little
about either the stability or the continuity of the children's cognitive
development. The result is ambiguous, since, in the absence of a clear
external criterion for the constancy of the dimension itself (as would be
available in the case of a variable such as height), low correlation across
a given age interval may either represent true instability in the course
or rate of development of that attribute among different individuals, or
a change in the meaning of the dimension itself. Leading researchers
today in fact, such as McCall (1979), attribute the low intercorrelations
typically found between infant IQs and IQs obtained in later childhood
as indicative of qualitative changes in the nature of intelligence
occurring over this age interval, from a predominantly sensori-motor
attribute to one based on symbolic and conceptual mechanisms. But
even that interpretation is suspect, since it assumes that the lack of
preservation of individual differences across age necessarily reflects a
qualitative change in process at the level of the individual. The two are
in fact unrelated: lack of stability of a variable is quite consistent with
continuous development within an individual, as in the case of changes
in height during adolescence; conversely, discontinuous development
might occur in the face of substantial stability across individuals (e.g.,
intelligence scores between ages 8 and 16 are substantially intercorre-
lated, notwithstanding the fact that this period covers the transition
from concrete to formal operations, in Piaget's sense).
As long as the question of the continuity of development is reduced
to a mere index of the predictability of behavioral status at one age from
a measure at a previous age, little more than such a fundamentally
inconclusive picture is to be expected. Curiously, that problem has
similarly plagued analyses of continuity such as that of Kagan's (1976)
study of Guatemalan children, which focused on the apparent absence
of deficit in twelve-year old children in a culturally and geographically
isolated setting, in the face of seemingly very unfavorable conditions of
early experience, and an apparent impairment of normal development
in infancy. A variety of problems with this evidence could be and have
been cited, but for our present purposes suffice it to note that the
supposed lack of continuity that Kagan sees in this evidence is again
equated with lack of predictability of later behavior from early condi-
tions or indices of development.
Clearly a more theoretically informed conception of both stability
and continuity is called for, if our understanding of this problem is to
advance beyond its present rather muddled state. From the vantage
point of the present paper, the problem is not so much a mismatch
between theory and method, as an inhibition of theoretical progress in
this area resulting from the adoption of a methodological approach
unsuited to the problem.
That statement might justly be criticized as begging the question of
what theoretical advances in this area might entail. It is time therefore
to proceed to the second of the reasons that were alluded to above as
at least partly responsible for the slow progress that we have seen in our
conceptualization of these questions. This is but a corollary of the first,
arising from the identification of stability or continuity with predict-
ability. To replace this sterile conception, an alternative one, directed
at the study of continuity as an attribute of developmental processes, is
needed. It would focus on the degree of regularity, consistency, and
above all the susceptibility to change of behavior across successive
points in time. Above all, it would consider stability and continuity as
the preservation of individuality in the face of developmental change
- a conception that suggests a refocusing from the group to the
individual in both our conceptions and our measures of stability and
continuity.
This conception is partially identical to Lerner's (1986), since that

writer argues that continuity should be reserved for the consideration
of intra-individual change. There appears no reason in principle,
however, not to adopt a similar stance in regard to the concept of
stability. In a broader sense, Lerner's (1984) analysis of plasticity is
relevant to this point, especially in the way it has been buttressed
through the specification of physiological mechanisms governing
development, thus bringing the account of development that Lerner
provides down to the level of the individual organism.
Similarly pertinent is the analysis by Hood and McHale (1987) of
the conditions making for continuity or discontinuity in development,
considered, not as a statistical abstraction that robs the data of develop-
mental significance, but as an attribute of a developing individual, to be
viewed in the context of the changes taking place in that individual. The
following quote from their chapter puts the matter in a nutshell:
Studies of normative development have shown the typical processes
that transform helpless infants into an orderly succession of creatures
of various types: guileless toddlers, boisterous Children, adventurous
adolescents, accomplished adults, wise elders. This schedule of
physical and behavioral transformations forms the background
against which we assess the extent to which individual uniqueness is
preserved through development[al] transformations. (Hood &
McHale, 1987, p. 19)
Hood and McHale have not addressed the methodological implica-
tions of their reformulation of the stability question, but their analysis,
like Lerner's, has helped to draw attention to the critical issues that
methodologies adequate to this task will need to address. Such
methodologies are, to repeat once more, not tied to specific views
concerning development, but rather to developmental phenomena in a
broader sense. What these issues intrinsic to development are, and
what methodological approaches they call for, will be considered in the
section to follow, once we have had an opportunity to attempt a
reformulation of the linkage between theory and method in general
terms.
A Reformulation of the Theory-Method Relationship

The preceding accounts of research on two central issues in
developmental psychology should show very clearly that those who
would look for a simple and direct correspondence between theory and
method are bound to be disappointed. The various reasons why such a
state of affairs should hold have already been alluded to; it is time to
attempt a more systematic formulation of the matter, and to take a more
specific look at the relationship between. theory and method in develop-
mental psychology specifically.
A 'partial-isomorphism' view. Piaget (1969; Piaget & Morf, 1958)
used the term 'partial isomorphism' to express the relationship between
perception and cognition across development, as he saw it. He viewed
these two processes as developing to a considerable extent along
separate paths, but with a loose kind of intertwining and mutual
influence between them, deriving from underlying structures that are
thought to be partially isomorphic. Examples are the structures of the
perceptual constancies versus those of the operational conservations,
or those represented by reversible figures as opposed to reversible
operations. Perceptual factors might, under certain situations, facilitate
the manifestation of some operational structure, as in the case of
conservation of number, which can be facilitated through a set of rods
connecting corresponding elements of the two sets (Piaget & Morf,
1958). Conversely, the acquisition of operational thought may feed back
on perceptual judgment, as in a size-constancy task (Piaget & Lamber-
cier, 1946), where the introduction of a comparison rod that can be
moved between the standard and the variable will serve to improve the
perceptual size-at-a-distance judgment. Yet, in Piaget's conception, the
two systems were fundamentally separate from one another, so much
so that a developmental trend for a perceptual judgment might on
occasion be diametrically opposite to that found for a superficially quite
similar task involving operational thought (Piaget & Taponier, 1956).
The term seems most appropriate in the present context, to indicate
two sides of the scientific edifice that are in approximate correspon-
dence, but without being rigidly tied to one another. Earlier in this
paper some of the factors that operate to keep the two apart were
considered, and examples were cited from the realm of developmental
research to illustrate the many-faceted character of theory-method
relationships. It is time now to turn to an examination of major
methodological issues that arise in the study of development, by virtue
of the developmental character of the phenomena under study as such,
which frequently cut across major theoretical divisions, and thus
contribute further to the loosening of the theory-method bond.
Methodological Consequences of a Developmental Focus

The concept of development. Over the past three decades we have
seen the appearance of a plethora of books, conferences, symposia, and
other discussions devoted to developmental theory, including two
symposia (Harris, 1957; Collins, 1982) specifically consecrated to the
concept of development. Yet it seems fair to state that agreement on
the meaning of this concept, much less on the methodological
approaches adequate to it, is as yet very far from reality. Lerner (1986,
Chaps. 1, 2), has noted this lack of consensus concerning the concept,
which he identifies as being rooted in philosophical differences attached
to different writers' concepts of development. He considers these as
reflecting alternative world hypotheses in the sense discussed earlier in
this chapter.
Yet Lerner himself argues that there are some features charac-
teristic of development concerning which we find a large measure of
agreement. The essence of these agreed-upon characteristics may
perhaps be formulated as follows: a developmental phenomenon is one
that entails systematic, directional, change in some (at least partially
endogenous) structure or set of structures of an individual organism.
The major ingredients of this definition are three: change, individual
organism, and strncture. Let us consider these in turn.
The focus on change. From a methodological standpoint, surely the
most critical ingredient for research on developmental processes is that
it provide direct information on developmental change within the
individual. This writer has emphasized this point at length in his treatise
on research strategies in developmental psychology (Wohlwill, 1973).
To judge from the remarkable increase in longitudinal research, and the
profusion of recent books devoted to it (Gottfried, 1984; Schulsinger,
Mednick, & Knop, 1981; Schaie, 1984), there is a growing consensus on
the need for a focus on change for developmental-issues oriented
research. This focus cuts across diverse theoretical models in the field,
yet it is curiously either absent, or present only in diluted form, in the
writings of some of the most influential developmental theoreticians.
The explanation for this rather anomalous state of affairs appears
to be tied to the prevalence of structural as opposed to functional
models in our field. Perhaps the most notable example is the theory of
Heinz Werner (1957a; b; see also Langer, 1970). Here we find a
developmental framework applied to comparisons, not only across
different points in ontogenetic as well as microgenetic development,
but across different individuals considered to represent different

developmental levels of functioning, in terms of a purely structural
criterion of development. It is thus not surprising that a direct examin-
ation of within-individual change did not loom very central in the
research inspired by this theory. In fact, to the extent that differences
in behavior related to age have been of interest at all to the Wernerians,
they have relied almost entirely on cross-sectional comparisons.
The case of Piagetian theory is somewhat different, since Piaget and
his followers have concerned themselves much more exclusively with
the course of ontogenetic development. Accordingly, although Piaget
himself only rarely reported changes observed in a given child (apart
from a few observations of his own infants at successive points in time),
a scattering of short-term longitudinal studies have been undertaken
within a Piagetian framework that have addressed within-individual
change more directly (e.g., Hooper, Toniolo, & Sipple, 1978;
Tomlinson-Keasey, Eisert, Kahle, Hardy-Brown, & Keasey, 1979;
Wohlwill, Fusaro, & Devoe, 1969). But even here the theoretical issues
relating to Pia get's structural model of development have not been
primarily concerned with processes of change, such as attempts to
obtain evidence on the processes of the progressive equilibration of
cognitive structures that Pia get postulated. Research on Piagetian
theory has rather been dominated by analyses of structural properties
of cognitive performance at a given stage - for example, the issue of
across-stage relationships, or of ,decalages' (differentials) in the ap-
pearance of an operational structure across different domains.
Paradoxically, adherents of points of view that developmentalists
have been inclined to dismiss as non-developmental, notably those
derived from S-R behavior theory, have at times been more disposed to
study change directly, through intensive study of individual children
(e.g., Bijou & Baer, 1963). However, consistent with the assumption
underlying this approach that developmental change can be accounted
for by recourse to more general principles of behavior change, such
studies have generally been limited to fairly brief periods of the age span
(though see Patterson, Littman, & Bricker, [1967], for a revealing
exception ).
What, then, are the methodological consequences of a focus on
change? The most obvious one has already been mentioned: the adop-
tion of a longitudinal design - though exceptions to this position,
maintaining that essential information about change can be derived
from cross-sectional data, may be cited (e.g., Tabor & Kendler, 1981).
But along with such design considerations, a host of issues arise with
regard to the study of change, ranging from the technical-statistical to
the theoretical-philosophical (see Harris, 1963; Nesselroade & Baltes,
1979). The former, which concern questions of the reliability of change
data, and statistical problems in the analysis of repeated-measurement
data, among others, have been extensively dealt with by methodological
specialists. The latter have received less attention (but see Bereiter,
1963; Cattell, 1963). They concern such questions as to whether there
is a legitimate sense in which change can become an object of study in
its own right, divorced from the referents of the points in time over
which the change is observed, or the starting and ending measures on
which they are presumably based (though not inevitably - see Bereiter,
1963). From an ontogenetic-developmental standpoint, the answer to
this question would seem to be rather clear-cut: the exhortation to study
change directly should not be read as a prescription for conceiving of
change as a disembodied entity (though such a conception might have
some validity with reference, for example, to the study of plasticity or
adaptation). Rather, developmental change needs to be considered
relative to, and indeed anchored in the status of the organism at the end
points over which the change is assessed - and, preferably, at points
within that interval as well. We will return to this point shortly, in the
context of the individual-organism centered focus.
A more positive side of the focus on change relates to the choice of
dependent measures. Even without turning change into a disembodied
entity to be conceptualized independently of initial and terminal status,
one may draw attention to the possibilities for strengthening develop-
mental research by building this focus into the dependent variables that
are brought into the analysis. In the case of quantitative data, this would
include characteristics of the developmental function such as rate of
change, asymptotic level (i.e., the point at which development stops),
and the shape of the developmental function, as had become standard
in the study of physical growth (see Wohlwill, 1973). But even in the
typical case where the more limited degree of refinement of measure-
ment available to the behavioral researcher does not allow for such
fine-grained quantitative analysis, a developmental-function perspec-
tive may yet be meaningful, in regard to questions such as the overall
form of the course of development (e.g., monotonic vs. V-shaped),
which has become a significant issue for diverse aspects of development,
from visual perception to artistic creativity (compare, Strauss, 1982).

And there are additional attributes of change that invite the develop-
mental investigator's attention, which relate to the pattern of behavior,
and to changes in behavioral structures, and which are therefore best
left to the consideration of the structural side of development to follow.
At a minimum, as Vondracek, Lerner, and Schulenberg (1986, Chap. 6)
have noted, the investigators need to use care in the selection of
dependent measures that are sensitive to change.
However important the emphasis on change may be in studying
development, it constitutes only a starting point for an effective
methodological approach to the analysis of developmental processes.
If it is to be endowed with significance for such an analysis, the attention
to change will need to be tied to the two remaining aspects cited above
as intrinsic to developmental issues, that is, an individual-organism
centered approach, and attention to structural features of develop-
ment. Let us turn, then, to the second of these three criteria, the focus
on the individual organism.
The focus on the individual organism. What is intended by this
term is both more than the mere data-analytic reference to a within-
subjects design in which successive measures are obtained from the
same individuals over an interval of time, and less cosmic (and more
theoretically neutral) than the organismic world-hypothesis of Pepper
and his followers (compare, Reese & Overton, 1970). It is, rather, the
concern with the developing individual as the unit of reference, studied
as a live organism, that is, as a being subjected to ongoing developmental
processes that reflect the individual's dynamic relationship to his or her
environment.
Specifically, the intent of the preceding statement is to suggest that
developmental methodology needs to pay adequate attention to the
following issues:
1. The measures that are utilized need to relate, directly or indirect-
ly, to the individual. To illustrate this point, let us contrast two different
statistics that might be obtained on the basis of a longitudinal data set
for a single variable; one, a measure of mean change in the behavioral
variable, the other a measure of the stability of the variable. In both
cases we are dealing with measures characterizing the group. The
difference is that in the first case the mean is a simple function of the
individual scores, and it would be easy to revert to a focus on the
individual (e.g., in order to relate amount of change to some other
information about the individual). One would only need to turn to the
individual difference-scores representing the change along the scale of
the variable measured that occurred over the time interval in question,
from which the mean change statistic was obtained. In contrast, the
stability coefficient (i.e., the correlation between the two sets of
measures) is intrinsically a group datum, and indicates only the tendency
of the variable itself to remain stable over the interval in question, in
the limited sense that individual differences with respect to that variable
tend to be preserved. If stability of an individual's course of develop-
ment were of interest, one would have to take recourse to an entirely
different measure (see Wohlwill, 1973).
2. A more interesting implication of the individual-organism focus
concerns the conception it entails of the developing individual's
relationship to the environment. Without necessarily accepting all the
trappings of the 'organismic' world view in Pepper's sense, and in
particular adopting the individual's own phenomenal perceptions as the
central construct in analyzing development, the proposed focus finds a
simple one-way conception of the effect or impact of the environment
on the organism inadequate. Indeed, this point has been made
repeatedly over the last two decades, by individuals representing a
variety of theoretical positions as developmentalists.
The focus starts with a recognition of the reciprocity in the relation-
ship between the developing child and its caretaker, which has become
increasingly prominent in research and theorizing on the relationship
between child and caretaker, whether considered at a macro- or a
microlevel (Bell & Harper, 1974; Martin, 1981). This writer (Wohlwill,
1983) has previously invoked this reciprocity feature as a primary factor
differentiating the role of the physical environment from that of the
social environment. A related point concerns the role of the individual
child as an initiator of environmental encounters, and as an agent in
self-selecting such encounters, and in modulating their impacts (Lerner
& Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; Scarr & McCartney, 1983).
Recognition of these points has led, first, to a rejection of the simple
one-way conception of environment-behavior effects in development,
though these may to some degree remain appropriate to the concep-
tualization of physical-environmental influences outside of the
organisms' direct control. Subsequently, it found expression in
Sameroff's (1975) view of the transactional character of individual-
environment relations, which in turn inspired some further develop-

ments to be noted presently.
Since the methodological consequences of the adoption of these
conceptions have not been systematically treated thus far, they merit at
least brief consideration here. In order to do full justice to the complex
web of interrelationships between the individual and the social/environ-
mental context implied by this reciprocity or transactional conception,
research inspired by it should ideally conform to at least three
desiderata.
The first, reinforcing a point made just previously, concerns the
importance of a methodology centered on the individual as the unit of
reference. Even with the much more powerful statistical methods
provided by structural-modeling equations, path analysis, etc., it seems
unlikely that a group-level mode of analysis will succeed in unraveling
the intricate interdependent chains of temporally structured processes
that constitute the fabric of a developmental history. That is, if we hope
to trace a developing individual's response to some environmental press
or challenge, we need to find ways of keeping the contingent relation-
ships and interpatterning of the processes of activation, search, and
selection at the individual's command and the environmental forces
impinging on that individual at the focus of the methodology, design,
and data-analysis strategy.
This does not mean that we will necessarily need to revert to an
essentially non-analytic biographical case-history approach, even
though more incisive application of individual biographies could surely
be instructive and rewarding. More analytic approaches have already
been put to use, at least at a microlevel, as illustrated in the study of
mother-infant contingencies (e.g., Martin, 1981). What would need to
occur in order to deal with similar phenomena at a macro-level (in the
dual sense of a broader time frame, and the selection of more broadly
defined behavioral variables) is the development of new techniques for
modeling complex systems undergoing change, of a kind commonly used
in the study of ecological systems, for instance.
This brings us to the second of the desiderata, that is, a systems
framework for analyzing individual developmental trajectories. Such a
framework is clearly implied by the view of child behavior as reciprocally
related to caretaker behavior, or the espousal of a transactional con-
ception. More specifically, we may refer to the notion of "evocative"
genotype-environment relations presented by Scarr & McCartney
(1983), which is also at the heart of Sameroff's proposed transactional

conception of parent-child relations. This concept, which postulates
differential responses from the child's parents and siblings to genotypi-
cally determined characteristics of the child, may usefully be expanded
into a systems conception, akin to that which Lewin provided in his
concept of the 'psychological field' as a system of forces in interaction.
Indeed, a systems perspective could encompass all three of Scarr and
McCartney's forms of the genotype-environment relationship, that is,
the 'passive,' in which the environment acts on the organism without
regard to its genotype, the 'evocative,' considered above, and the
'active', which considers the child as an initiator or instigator of new
forms of environment-behavior relations, through active selection (as
well as adaptation) of environments.
Such a framework, moreover, would permit us to enlarge Scarr and
McCartney's model beyond the exclusive concern for genotypes in
interaction with environments, to deal with environmental responses to
developing attributes, traits, and so forth, of the child, whatever their
origin (e.g., the budding manifestation of some special talent, such as
musical giftedness, or form of behavior, such as tomboyishness). Last,
but surely far from least from a developmental perspective, it would
allow us to model ongoing changes in the web of organism-environment
relations over time, in contrast to the seemingly more static character
of current conceptions of such relations.
The third of our desiderata is related to the point just mentioned.
It concerns the importance of monitoring the state of the organism-
environment system on an ongoing basis. Much of the earlier research
on the effects of early experience on development has proved deficient
in this regard. Perhaps owing to an unwontedly simplistic conception
of such effects, researchers, even when studying them experimentally
at the animal level, have generally allowed the experiential conditions
to exert their effects over the chosen period, without making any effort
to chart the modification of the organism's behavior and development
over the period during which the conditions were operating. As an
illustration of the price paid for the failure to obtain such information,
we may refer to the studies on early sensory restriction carried out in
the McGill laboratories, inspired by Donald Hebb's theory of the role
of sensory experience in development (see Thompson & Grusec, 1970).
In the absence of any assessments made during the course of the
experimental treatment, the investigators in these studies were unable
to isolate the role of the animal's motoric behavior, and of its likely
modification under severe sensory restriction, as a contributing factor
to the impairment of diverse aspects of behavior observed after the
termination of the experimental treatment. Similarly, one suspects that
a more consistent attempt to monitor the course of development of the
monkeys subjected to isolation in infancy in Harry Harlow's laboratories
might well have provided insights into the basis of the severe impair-
ment of normal mating and maternal behavior observed upon these
animals' attainment of sexual maturity.
Given the obvious difficulty of administering intrusive types of
behavioral measures, such as tests of ability or personality, at repeated
intervals, without incurring the risk of severe test-retest effects, it may
well turn out that a resort to less intrusive observational measures may
be better suited for this purpose. While many psychologists have been
averse to the collection of such data, their potential appears consider-
able, as indicated not only by the ambitious research program of the
behavioral ecology group associated with Roger Barker, Paul Gump,
Herbert Wright and their disciples, but even from data in human
behavior genetics, showing that by far the largest values for twin--
concordance have been obtained from records of amount of ambulatory
activity during the course of every-day activities (Plomin & Foch, 1980).
The focus on structural relations in development. A final aspect
of the working definition of development offered previously remains to
be considered. It is probably the most elusive one to confront and
operationalize, for it concerns the role of structure in development -
a morphological term whose relevance for physical and biological
systems is perhaps more readily grasped than it is for behavioral ones.
Simply stated, we need to view an individual organism in the process
of development as constituted of a set of separable subsystems, be-
haviorally as much as biologically.2 A corollary of this view is that
relations among these subsystems, we well as among separable com-
2 Itmust be recognized that systems can be defined at a variety of levels, which, in fact,
constitute a hierarchy of systems. Those of most relevance for the developmental
psychologist relate, first to the level of subsystems confined to one component of the
individual's behavior, for example, emotional behavior (cf. Sroufe, 1979); then to the
level of the organism itself, considered as an organized system of different functions,
and finally of the supra-individual system, in which the individual plays the role of an
element of a system, which may be conceived of in biological terms, as in the case of
ecosystems, or in interpersonal terms, as in considering a child in its family setting.
ponents within those subsystems need to be addressed in our
methodologies. The underlying assumption behind this assertion is that
an organism does not develop piecemeal, each element in isolation from
the rest, but rather in terms of a set of interrelated and hierarchically
structured subsystems and components within subsystems. A major task
for the developmental psychologist, then, becomes that of tracing and
conceptualizing the interpatterning of changes both across and within
these subsystems over the course of development.
The issue of structure has perhaps attracted most attention in
relation to the concept of stages, particularly in relation to Piaget's
postulate of stages as marked by "structures d'ensemble," that is, struc-
tured wholes. Considerable controversy has surrounded this postulate,
with some, for example, Brainerd (1978), denying its validity altogether,
while others (e.g., Flavell, 1972) have argued that structural cohesive-
ness represents a characteristic of cognitive stages primarily at their
end-point, once consolidation has occurred. The present writer,
although inclined to follow Flavell in this regard, would argue that what
is at issue is not the cohesiveness or consistency across different
components (in this case, different concepts forming part of the set of
concrete or formal operations), but rather the form of the interpattern-
ing of their developmental trajectories. That is, the mistake that seems
to be generally made is to assume that there is only one viable alternative
to the clearly untenable assumption of uniformity in level of response
across components implied by the structured-whole concept. There are
in fact diverse ways of conceiving of the interrelationship among inter-
dependent components undergoing development, that are inter-
mediary between the view of a lock-step progression in which all
components develop in unison, as parts of an essentially rigid whole, on
the one hand, and the postulation of complete independence in the
developmental trajectories of components on the other. The middle-
ground is to suppose, as noted earlier, that the interconnections among
components is probabilistic rather than determinate (Flavell &
Wohlwill, 1969) and moreover operate across time-ages, rather than in
strict synchrony. Prototypical examples of such patterns have been
proposed by this writer (Wohlwill, 1973).
The point of this revival of the earlier discussion of Piagetian stages
is to call attention to the criterion of structure as an essential charac-
teristic of developmental change. In the case of the stage concept, as
this writer has argued repeatedly on previous occasions (e.g., Wohlwill,
1973), it is this aspect that lends the concept whatever status as an

explanatory concept it may lay claim to. As we have seen, Kohlberg has
incorporated this principle into his stage-theory of moral judgment; in
a different vein it appears with equal force in Erikson's (1959) system
of stages of personality development.
But the relevance of this point extends into diverse fields outside of
the realm of developmental stages. Subsystems that, because of their
primarily quantitative-change character, may not be assimilable to the
stage model should still be expected to display such structural features,
in terms of an interpatterning of dimensions of change both within and
across subsystems. A good case in point comes once again from the
work of Piaget - this time that in the domain of perception (Piaget,
1969). Piaget's central principle, of a progressive attenuation of the
developmentally 'primitive' errors of centration through the perfection
of mechanisms of perceptual regulation and decentration points to the
expectation that diverse primary illusions that are based on biasing
centration effects will exhibit parallel developmental functions. More
interesting is his analysis of the relationship between the two subsystems
of perception and operational thought. Although he treated these as
separate developmental domains, he postulated important reciprocal
relationships between them over the course of development, with
perceptual processes influencing conceptual ones at earlier points in
development, while subsequently that relationship was reversed.
The need to address such interpatterning processes has been
increasingly recognized by developmental psychologists in diverse
domains. An excellent illustration is afforded by Sroufe's (1979) model
of infant emotional development, which postulates direct linkages
between phases of emotional response and the sensori-motor stages of
development formulated by Piaget. In the areas of mental abilities,
cognitive styles, and personality and social development, we have
similarly seen increasing attention to these issues. This has occurred in
part out of a concern for the continuity of development, and for the
stability and developmental transformations of some trait when studied
at different age levels, and in part in connection with the issue of the
invariance or changes in the factorial structure of measures of ability or
personality over the course of development.
The reference to factorial structure brings us squarely to confront
the methodological implications of the structural focus that, as I am
arguing, is required in developmental research. Its most obvious con-
sequence would seem to be the adoption of multivariate approaches to

data collection and analysis. That is, if development is to be viewed as
involving a set of subsystems and components of such subsystems
undergoing change in at least partially interdependent fashion, this
creates an evident need to obtain sets of measures of these subsystems
and their components, and to find data-analytic strategies that will
reveal such interpatterning. It is interesting to note that, writing from
the somewhat different perspective of a concern for processes of career
development, Vondracek, Lerner, and Schulenberg (1986, Chap. 6)
have recently made the same point regarding the place of multivariate
data in developmental analysis; in fact, much of their argument is closely
congruent with that presented here.
Fortunately the last decade has seen important methodological
breakthroughs precisely on this front, notably through the efforts of
multivariate methodologies (see McArdle, 1988). These methodologies
have allowed us to study changes in factorial structure with age on a
within-individual basis, notably through the application of P-technique
(Nesselroade & Ford, 1985), to trace developmental functions for
individual factors that emerge from longitudinal factor-analysis, via an
integration of factor - and trend-analytic models (Tucker, 1966), and
to generalize longitudinal factor analysis to the study oflatent variables,
so as to permit statements about the interpatterning of changes in
hypothesized dimensions of development (J6reskog, 1979).
In the same context we may refer to a recently developed technique,
that of structural-equation modeling, which may similarly be used to
trace functional interdependencies among interrelated behavioral
measures (McArdle & Epstein, 1987). Along with some of the other
approaches just cited, it has considerably magnified the power of our
data-analytic tools to do justice to the lattice-character of developmen-
tal change. This development in turn should present a challenge to
developmental theorists to provide the alternative theoretical models
for conceptualizing the interpatterning among developmental proces-
ses that, as observed earlier, many of these methods require. Such
modeling efforts should ward off the danger of proliferating mindless
applications of such methodology bereft of any theoretical underpin-
ning, whose results are left uninterpreted, and may well be
uninterpretabie.
In this connection a view of the relationship of structural-equation
modeling methodology to progress on the theoretical front enunciated
by Bentler (1978) deselVes mention. Bentler points to a particular

feature of this methodology that he regards as one of its prime virtues,
namely that it requires the investigator to test a specific, a priori model
concerning causal relations in the data to which the procedures are to
be applied. That model will typically be derived from some theoretical
framework that can provide a basis for postulating the particular cause-
effect relationships, whether unidirectional or reciprocal, that the data
will be used to test. In Bentler's conception, then, this methodology,
far from being divorced from theory, forces the investigator to elaborate
a tightly knit theoretical framework from which causal relations can be
deduced. But it is apparent that the methodology is not tied to any
particular theory. Its only departure from theoretical neutrality is in the
insistence that a theory be employed that will lend itself to specifying
particular causalloops.3
Significantly (and somewhat ironically, given the designation of the
modeling approach as 'structural'), that requirement would seem to rule
out the application of strictly structural developmental theories such as
Werner's, which permit only statements of formal (as opposed to effi-
cient) causation. While the causal loops that are typically associated
with structural-equation modeling procedures transcend the limiting
conception of one-way causal chains that are typically associated with
'efficient' causes, they do presuppose a set of independently definable
interacting elements, thereby excluding a conception of causality at a
formal level, in which characteristics of a system's performance are
explained in terms of structural characteristics of that same system. This
qualification aside, however, causal modeling does appear to be, not
only theoretically neutral but, as Bentler demonstrates, a potential
facilitator of advances in theorizing in a narrower sense (as opposed to
broadly-construed world views).
It is important, at the same time, to stress once more the converse
point, that the above-cited methodologies, and the conception of
3 Nesselroade (personal communication) has pointed out that the more recent develop-
ment of structural-equations modeling has veered away from the conception envisaged
in Bentler's presentation of this technique. Increasingly the investigator is being
afforded an opportunity to ask the program to provide alternative models, or sets of
parameters, that are inserted into the analysis. As a result, the feature of this technique
that Bentler noted, of working from an a priori set of specifications presumably
theoretically derived, has become considerably weakened in the more recent applica-
tions of the model, and those applications have correspondingly become more
atheoretical and pragmatic.
patterned individual change to which they pertain, cut across particular

broadly defined theoretical models of development. They may, admit-
tedly, be more compatible with certain models that leave room for such
conceptions of patterning than with others that eschew that concern,
but this restriction applies in a much broader sense than that of the
structuralist framework represented by the 'organismic' model of
behavior and development.
Two possible dangers inherent in the further development of these
techniques need to be confronted, however. One is that we will find
further advances in methodology outstripping theoretical development,
or at least moving in a direction separate from the latter. There are
already signs of this taking place, almost inevitably, as a result of the
very technical demands of data-analytic models such as structural--
equation modeling, and the designs they require.
A second, related danger is that of the tail wagging the dog - or
better perhaps (since methodology is not to be conceived as an
appendage to research) of the wing flapping the bird. The further
development of these models may well influence the way in which future
researchers will formulate their questions concerning the dynamics of
development, and of transactional relationships between the environ-
ment and the developing individual. Specifically, the variables entering
into the structural equations are apt to be conceived in essentially static
terms, for reasons of simplicity, if no other. This, at least, is a salient
impression that a perusal of the very recently published series of papers,
some expository, some empirical, on the application of structural--
equation modeling in developmental psychology (Connell & Tanaka,
1987) left in this reader.
The major concern in most of these papers - with a few notable
exceptions, for example, Hertzog and Nesselroade (1987) and McArdle
and Epstein (1987) - appeared to be in the isolation of causally
interrelated networks of variables, measured at either a single point in
time, or at two different times, with the longitudinal aspect of the data
being primarily used to determine the directionality of the causal rela-
tions at work. However valuable, this methodology will not succeed in
revealing the reciprocity or interplay between environmental forces in
interaction with developmental processes. The work of McArdle
(1988a), fittingly referred to as dynamic but structural-equation model-
ing, appears to represent a significant advance in this regard, in that it
applies causal modeling techniques, not to data at a given point in time,
but rather to growth functions, through either of two models, one

involving the fitting of growth curves to factors, the other, conversely,
involving the factor analysis of growth curves. This approach appears
to hold considerable promise for the treatment of developmental,
longitudinally obtained data.
Even McArdle's 'dynamic' models fail to address the systemic
character of a developing organism, however. Considerable further
theoretical spadework is required before methodologies suited to this
task can even by imagined. What is needed in that regard is a concep-
tualization of the modes of interaction between ongoing developmental
patterns and ongoing (and changing) experiential factors, as an elabora-
tion and concretization of the transactional view of development for-
mulated by Sameroff (1975), referred to earlier. Scarr and McCartney's
(1983) scheme of genotype - environment relations in terms of pas-
sive, evocative, and active effects, cited in the same context, represents
one contribution relevant to this point, calling attention to both
environmental and organism-based processes mediating interaction
between genotype and environment. A more general formulation of
the kinds of feedback processes at work in such interactions, invoking
some of the same kinds of both environmental and organismic effects,
but without particular reference to genotypes, was offered by the
present writer, in the form of a differentiation between cumulative
versus compensatory effects of experience in modifying incipient dif-
ferences among individuals (Wohlwill, 1980).
But the advances at a methodological level required to handle such
reciprocity relations do not appear in sight as yet. Neither the
microanalytic contingency analysis models devised for the study of
communication processes in parent-child dyads, nor the macro-level
statistical procedures for causal modeling such as path analysis and
LISREL appear adequate to handling this problem. What that would
call for are methodologies that allow one to model the interpatterning
between two sets of processes each of which is undergoing change, in
part as a function of the other. The closest approach to the kind of
modeling that is indicated for this purpose are probably some of the
models from the field of ecology, and similar systems-analytical work.
Whether the need for innovative approaches of this kind will be
recognized soon is quite uncertain, given the well-known tendency for
recently developed methodologies such as structural-modeling equa-
tions to spawn their own constituencies. This is not to minimize the very
real contribution to more sophisticated conceptualizations of experien-

tial effects that these recent breakthroughs at both a micro- and a
macro-level are making, and can be expected to make in the future. But
their value for developmental analysis should receive continued
scrutiny.
Conclusion
The 'partial-isomorphism' conception of the theory-method
relationship in developmental research proposed in this paper should
be viewed, not as representing a deficiency in the state of affairs in either
current theorizing or in our methodological canons, but rather a healthy
situation optimally calculated to further advances in our understanding
of the problems under investigation. For a flexible, loose sort of linkage
between the two will serve as a counterforce to sterile pursuit of
methodology for its own sake, divorced from and uninformed by theory,
such as would be encouraged if methodology were to be considered as
completely independent of theory. At the same time our conception
likewise avoids the excesses of theorizing without regard to
methodological approach, or of subordinating method entirely to
theory, which is apt to ensure the preservation of the theory in isolation
from rival ones, and thus lead eventually to its dying on the vine. The
case of Lewin's field theory represents a good illustration of just such a
development.
Undoubtedly, some theoretical purists will object to this stance.
Those who know that they have a hammerlock on the truth are unlikely
to want to make concessions on the front of methodology, or any other.
But for those who share this writer's belief that theoretical conceptions
are subject to continual refinement, and frequent revision, too rigid a
determination of method by theory is surely to be avoided. Let us note,
on the other hand, that the linkage being proposed, however loose, is
generally quite real and readily detectable. Our review has shown many
examples where theory and method are indeed in good correspondence
with one another; indeed, one would expect that state of affairs to be
the norm. The thesis of this paper is that one should be prepared for
frequent deviations from this norm, and that such deviations deserve
our respect, if not our sympathy.
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2
Structural Models of Developmental
Theory in Psychology
J. J. McArdle1
Introduction
This is a response to the presentation by Wohlwill (this volume). To
begin, I must admit that I have been a follower of Wohlwill's research
for a long time. In particular my own research has benefited from
Wohlwill's classic work on The age variable in psychological research (see
Wohlwill, 1970, 1973). His current paper adds clarity and force to these
issues so here I continue my enthusiastic support of Wohlwill's work.
There are several messages in Wohlwill's present paper worthy of
further discussion. The main theme of a partial isomorphism between
method and theory is provocative. I will return to this theme at several
points. Mainly I will focus on some of the methodological controversies
raised by Wohlwill. To be sure, these methodological statements are
not in dispute; Wohlwill's statements are controversial because they are
widely ignored.
There is one controversy I highlight here. Wohlwill first says:
...we may refer to a recently developed teChnique, that of structural-
equation modeling, which may similarly be used to trace functional
interdependencies among interrelated behavioral measures
(McArdle & Epstein, 1987). Along with some of the other
1 I have enjoyed the benefit of discussions about these ideas with many colleagues. I
thank Jack Wohlwill for his support of my work. This research has been supported by
grants from the National Institute on Aging (AG07137).
J. J. McArdle Department of Psychology, University of Virginia,

Charlottesville, VA 22903.
Annals oJ Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7 139

140 J. J. McArdle
approaches just cited, it has considerably magnified the power of our
data-analytic tools to do justice to the lattice-character of develop-
mental change. This development in turn should present a chal1enge
to developmental theorists to provide the alternative theoretical
models for conceptualizing the interpatterning among developmen-
tal processes that, as observed earlier, many of these methods require
(p.125).
But then he turns around and raises some serious cautions:
Significantly (and somewhat ironically, given the designation of the
modeling approach as 'structural').... While the causal loops that are
typically associated with structural equation modeling procedures
transcend the limiting conception of one-way causal chains ... (p.
126).... this methodology will not succeed in revealing the reciprocity
or interplay between environmental forces in interaction with
developmental processes (p. 126).
I use this general modeling approach to detail some of Wohlwill's
controversal claims about developmental methodology. As may be
obvious from the prior quotes, Wohlwill's ideas require some deviations
away from the usual structural models. I will illustrate some theoretical
aspects of these new models using path analysis based diagrams. These
graphics are isomorphic with the algebra of specification so these
diagrams represent hypotheses about correlations, covariances, or
cross-products, and all of the models diagrammed here can be fitted
with available computer programs (e.g., LISREL, COSAN, etc.). More
details on structural modeling can be found in Joreskog and Sorbom
(1979), Kessler and Greenberg (1981), Blalock (1985), McDonald
(1985), and Loehlin (1987). I simply use these diagrams to clarify the
testable and untestable features of some models, and to illustrate the
kind of flexibility needed for Wohlwill's developmental models.
Stability or Continuity of Development?

At several points Wohlwill discusses ideas about continuity and
stability:
But here a confusion has arisen in regard to the use of the term
continuity as opposed to stability (p. 109). One is the limiting view of
stability ... in terms of the preservation of individual differences....
The result is ambiguous, since, in the absence of a clear external
criterion for the constancy of the dimension itself (such as would be
available in the case of a variable such as height), low correlation
across a given age interval may either represent true instability in the
course or rate of development of that attribute among different
individuals, or a change in the meaning of the dimension itself....
2 Commentary on Wohlwill 141
Lack of stability of a variable is quite consistent with continuous

development within an individual, as is the case of changes in height
during adolescence; conversely, discontinuous development might
occur in the face of substantial stability across individuals (p. 111).
To illustrate some of these issues I use the diagrams of Figure 1.
These are typical structural equation models of the longitudinal factor
analysis model. My path graphics are unusual because I include all
model variables and parameters in the picture. In these diagrams I
represent all model variables as boxes. I draw the manifest (observed)
variables in closed boxes and latent (unobserved) variables in open
boxes. These models include four manifest variables, wtn, xt n, ytn, and
zt n, each measured on T = 2 occasions for n = 1, N individuals. Also,
for each person n at each occasion t, I assume the existence of common
psychometric factor scores ptn. In this model the raw deviation scores
ptn are paired with standardized versions labelled pt*n so correlations
R can be drawn in the diagrams.
In these diagrams I represent all model parameters as lines: Asym-
metric (directed arrows) parameters with one arrowhead and symmetric
(undirected slings) with two arrowheads. I represent the common
factor model with parameters for factor loadings Lt [from ptn to xt n],
factor standard deviations Dt [from pt* n to pt n], and factor correlations
Rp [among pI *n and p2*n]. I have also included unique factor variances,
Uxt, for each variable at each occasion, and other unique factor
parameters can be added.
This structural specification of Figure 1.1 allows the identification
and separation of several formal models of change. First, the factor
loadings Lt reflect the basis of the relationship between the manifest
and latent variables within each occasion. Second, the correlation Rp
reflects the individual differences in the factor scores across occasions.
Various numerical values of the factor loadings Lt and the factor
correlation Rp leads to various interpretations about continuity of
development.
Let me first assume all loadings are the same over both occasions,
that is, Lt = L. This structural feature implies that we have measured
the identical latent construct at both occasions of measurement. This
is the factor invariance basis for the continuity of a construct. Of course,
if factor loadings L remain the same over time then the Rp reflects
individual differences on the same construct. But the correlation over
time could be Rp = 0, Rp = .5, or Rp = 1, and we would still be
measuring the same construct pn. The factor invariance model is inde-
142 J. J. McArdle
11.11: Correiarional Modd
"9- .'"9-
, 1 1,~ R,s 1
TIME I ...Poll:'.... ... ~]~, .... TIME 2
I I I I
: PI I .: P1 I
I I I
'7'\'
I
~-~
LWI LzI L.~'2 L zz
~ ,L. 2
"-~~, "-~~,
'Uxl ' , Uyl' , UzI '
r-- --I
,_x~, ~11
, UXZI I Uy21 zz
r-- --I
, U '
L
U -' L
U -' L U -' L
U -' L
U -' L U -'
11.21: Difference Score Model
Graphic Key
. . = Later,t (Hidden) 'Jarlable
Figure 1. lWo-occasion longitudinal factor models.

pendent of the stability of individual differences in scores across time.
Factor invariance only implies that any differences in the same observed
scores comes from the differences in the same unobserved constructs.
The factor loadings Lt need not be identical at each time of meas-
urement: that is, Lt ;e L. Even when we measure the same people with
the same instruments, we do not automatically measure the same
psychometric construct pn. The factor pattern is a stimulus-response
function and this repeated measures design only allows control over the
response medium. Thus, factor invariance over time is an explicit and
rejectable hypothesis about continuity. In many areas of developmental
research factor loading invariance will be rejected. This will obtain, for
example, when the factors that produce changes within an individual
are different than the factors that produce changes between individuals.
In this model we could have a correlation over time of Rp = 0, or
Rp = .5, or Rp = 1, but, if Lt ;e L, we may be measuring a completely
different construct. The change in the meaning of the latent construct
ptn is independent of changes in the stability of individual differences
in ptn over time.
Some developmental aspects of this model seem counterintuitive:
for example, why should the stability of individual differences be zero
when we are measuring the same thing? These reasonable questions
require a more highly structured model for the correlation Rp. Figure
1.2 is the same as Figure 1.1 except here I include one new parameter,
p1n -+ p2n, and one new label, s*n. The unit valued arrow represents
an equation where the factor score at occasion 2 is partly identical to
the factor score at occasion 1, and partly different: that is, p2n = p1n +
Sn. The latent scores Sn represent the raw first differences between the
two psychometric factor scores for each individual. In this model I allow
a correlation R 1s among the initial scores p 1*n and the difference scores
s *n. Incidentally, the variable Sn is a difference between totally reliable
variables p 1n and p2 n. This latent variable construction puts to rest some
of the well-known fears about the unreliability and spuriousness of
difference scores.
The addition of the one parameter in Figure 1.2 clarifies some
relationships between developmental theory and the mathematical
statistics. Given equal time intervals, td n = t2 n-tl n, the latent Sn are
slopes or rates of change. To the degree the individuals have different
rates of change the size of deviations Ds will be large. In one simple
case, the variance of p2n increases while the covariance of scores p1n
144 J. J. McArdle
and p2n remains the same so the correlation Rp decreases. This means
if people change at different rates then Rp can be low. Actually, the
stability Rp can take on most any value. In this model the correlation
Rp is a function of both deviations Ds and the correlation R1s. This
correlation Rls of levels and slopes describes the statistical features of
the individual rates of change within this time interval. A broad range
of stability correlations Rp can occur while the psychometric dimension
pn remains intact with L or changes with Lt.
There are several other viable models of structured factor change
(e.g., Rozeboom, 1978; Nesselroade, 1983; Horn, McArdle, & Mason,
1983; Rogosa & Willett, 1985). In some of these models we can
formalize the emergence of a second factor qn at one time but not at the
other. In other models we can include the mean parameters Mt to
detect group averages and changes over occasions (see next section).
But my main point here is that what is often meant by the term
developmental continuity is not usually reflected in the stability correla-
tion. The models of Figure 1 are a useful starting point for more
complete modeling of the continuity and discontinuity of development.
Predictability or Measuring Change?

A particularly strong message by Wohlwill is noteworthy:
This is but a corollary of the first, arising from the identification of
stability or continuity with predictability. 10 replace this sterile con-
ception, an alternative one, directed at the study of continuity as an
attribute of developmental processes, is needed. It would focus on
the degree of regularity, consistency, and above all the susceptibility
to Change of behavior across successive points in time (p. 112). In
the case of quantitative data, this would include characteristics ofthe
developmental function such as rate of change, asymptotic level (i.e.,
the point at which development stops), and the shape of the develop-
mental function, as has become standard in the study of physical
growth (see Wohlwill, 1973).... the investigators need to use care in
the selection of dependent measures that are sensitive to change (p.
117).
In Figure 2 I have drawn a few structural models for a single variable
ytn measured over T = 5 occasions. The first model of Figure 2.1 is the
well-known autoregressive or simplex model. As the arrows show, this is
a typical prediction model of scores over time. In this model the means
Mt are removed, the parameter At is the regression coefficient for the
prediction of ytn from yt-1 n, and the error variables etn are independent
of all other variables. We may introduce a more restrictive time series
model where only one parameter At and one error variance en are fit
to the entire series, or we may relax the model by adding second order
lag regressions, Bt. In any case, these models are forward time predic-
tions about the stability and instability of the deviations around some
mean.
Figure 2.2 presents an alternative view of simplex models based on
a different structural idea. In this simplex model there are several
unobserved components dt n. These components are presumably inde-
pendent and effect each observed variable ytn which occurs after its
initial impact; that is, dtn -+ yt +kn for k ~ O. In this model we presume
the observations ytn reflect the buildup or decay of several additive
components dt n. The impact of each component, and the scale of the
developmental process, is given by the variance term, Vdt. This alter-
native model reflects a simple developmental process but does not use
score prediction over time.
These two simplex models look very different from a developmental
point of view. Brilliant treatments of these models have been presented
by Jones (1962) and by J6reskog (1970). In particular, J6reskog distin-
guished the autoregressive simplex as a Markov process and the com-
ponent model as a Weiner process, and said:
The scale for the Markov simplex is just a logarithmic transformation
of the scale for the Weiner simplex. In the Markov simplex, correla-
tions correspond to distances between scale points, whereas in the
Weiner simplex, correlations correspond to square roots of ratios
between scale points. ... In contrast to the Markov simplex, the
Wiener simplex is scale dependent (JOreskog, 1970, p. 128-129).
The need for forward causal prediction and scaling problems have
promoted the use of the Markov simplex. The Weiner simplex is not
often considered. Perhaps it should be.
I present another alternative model in Figure 2.3 - this has been
termed a latent growth model (after Tucker, 1966; Meredith & Tisak,
1984; McArdle & Epstein, 1987). This model is like a Weiner simplex
because it uses latent components to account for changes over time.
We use the term level for the first component In because it remains
constant over the entire series (and is identical to d1n in Figure 2.2
above). But we use the term shape for the second component Sn
because this component is related to the ytn scores by a set of Bt
loadings. We use the term basis for the Bt coefficients because we use
these to define an overall reference shape or change pattern for the
entire group. Levels and shapes scores are allowed to be correlated.
146 J. J. McArdle
[2.1]: Markov Simplex Autoregression
[2.2]: Weiner Simplex Components
[2.3]: Latent Growth Model
[2.4]: Quadratic Latent Growth Model

Figure 2. Alternative path models of a longitudinal time series.
This model also includes location means MI and Ms. (In this kind of
diagram the means or location parameters are always represented by
the asymmetric coefficients to any variable from a unit constant, drawn
as a triangle.) Here the means of the observed variables Myt are
organized as a function of the means MI and Ms of the unobserved
components. This model prescribes joint Bt restrictions on both the
means and the covariances so it is estimated and tested with cross-
products matrices.
This latent growth model makes no particular presumption about
the time based ordering. Here time of measurement is simply used to
organize the individual differences in changes. This organization has a
well-known history in developmental data analysis. For example, if we
take the basis coefficients Bt to be the actual age at testing (with
unequal intervals permitted), then the basis is linear and the shapes are
reinterpreted as slopes. This model is an exact structural equation
representation for linear trend analysis or a repeated measures
MANOVA But this model also allows us to move beyond both
simplexes and MANOVA towards a more developmentally sensitive
view of individual change. In one case we can fit models where Bt is not
forced to be the age at the time of testing but is allowed to be estimated
from the data. In this model the basis Bt gives the reference shape of
the optimal developmental function for the organization of individual
difference in change patterns (see McArdle, 1986, 1988a, 1988b,
McArdle & Epstein, 1987).
The last model of Figure 2.4 shows some consideration of additional
possibilities for change variables. Here I diagram a model with three
latent sources of the change, that is, In, Sn, and Cn. This latent growth
model also allows restrictive functional relations among its parameters:
That is, the loadings for the third component Cn are the square of the
loadings for the second component Sn; that is, Qt = Bt2. Now, when
Bt = At, the average age-at-testing, this model is equivalent to a latent
variable expression for the well-known quadratic polynomial model.
This model allows a linear expression for the first derivatives and the
scoring of a peak within the growth curve, that is, h n = { -Sn / [2 * cn]}.
These mathematical principles apply when Bt is an unknown latent
developmental trajectory and we can obtain latent peaks h n. In some
analyses the rate of changes Sn and the asymptotes hn will be the key
variables in further developmental modeling.
148 J. J. McArdle
The structural representations of growth in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4,
are both substantively and mathematically different from the lagged
autoregressive model Figure 2.1. These alternative views of change
make different untestable assumptions, and they can lead to different
conclusions about developmental processes. The autoregressive model
Figure 2.1 use differences in age or time to define a directional predic-
tion by assuming the error terms are independent instabilities. In
contrast, growth models such as Figure 2.3 use age as a meter or ruler
for the measurement of changes and assumes the changes are related
to the levels. Additional combinations of these change ideas are pos-
sible: that is, we can also fit latent growth models together with a true
first order Markov simplex for the error components. It is interesting
to recall that the first path analysis models used rates or gains as separate
variables and did not allow for autoregression (see Wright, 1921, p. 506;
compare Blalock, 1985). The alternative models of Figure 2 show the
relatively new autoregressive change model is only one of the many
available longitudinal structural equation models.
Structural or Dynamic Systems Analyses?

Wohlwill also discussed some useful methodological alternatives:
This brings us to the second desiderata, that is, a systems framework
for analyzing individual developmental trajectories (p. 120).... this
creates an evident need to obtain sets of measures of these subsys-
tems and their components and to find data analytic strategies that
will reveal such interpatterning (p. 125). The work of McArdle
(1988a), fittingly referred to as "dynamic but structural-equation
modeling, appears to represent a significant advance in this regard,
in that it applies causal modeling techniques, not to the data at a given
point in time, but rather to growth functions, ... This approach
appears to hold considerable promise for the treatment of develop-
mental, longitudinally obtained data (p. 127-128).
But Wohlwill quickly added some cautions:
Even McArdle's 'dynamic' models fail to address the systemic char-
acter of a developing organism, however (p. 128). What we would
call for are methodologies that allow one to model the interpattern-
ing between two sets of processes each of which is undergoing
change, in part as a function of the other. The closest approach to
the kind of modeling that is indicated for this purpose are probably
some of the models from the field of ecology, and similar systems-
analysis work (p. 128).
I am pleased Wohlwill finds something worthwhile in my work, and

I appreciate his thoughtful critique about the need for a systems
approach. Let me now clarify my own view of these issues with the
diagrams presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3.1 is a latent growth model for time series data on two
variables, labelled V and P (from McArdle, 1988b). Here I prescribe a
latent growth curve within each time series but also I examine associa-
tions in the individual differences across the two time series. Invariance
of the basis Bt across the measurement variables vt and pt provides an
external comparison of the growth curves. This extrinsic view formal-
izes the relative sequencing of the growth process. Simultaneously, the
internal individual differences in growth can be seen in the correlations;
that is, Rsvp = 0 or Rsvp = 1. This intrinsic view formalizes the
synchronicity of the two growth processes.
To forward any stronger statement about the controlling features of
growth, we will need to examine other features of the timing of the
process. Suppose we can measure two growth processes V and P over
a relatively large number of occasions T. Given these data we could
estimate a quadratic latent growth model for each variable (as in Figure
2.4). Now suppose the P basis (Bpt) obtains an asymptotic value at some
average time (t =x > 0), while the V basis (Bvt) reaches its highest value
at some later time (t=x+y). That is, the function P peaks earlier than
V within the time frame defined by T. There might even be a distinct
lag in the basis across variables; for example, Bvt = Bpt + x. Given this
offset in timing we might next obtain the regression relationship where
the individual differences in shapes and peaks of P lead to individual
differences in the shapes and peaks of V. This bivariate con-sequence
model may be a useful way to examine system timings in growth in the
absence of a randomized growth experiment.
Multivariate data are essential to any systems analysis and Figure
3.2 proposes one model for these data (from McArdle, 1988a). At the
first order this model presupposes latent growth components for several
variables. These variable-specific models are summarized by curve
scores [CXn, CYn, and cZn] and each have potentially different bases
(Bxt, Byt, and Bzt). The individual differences in the curve components
may have synchronous correlations as above. But at the second order
here we also prescribe a psychometric factor model to account for the
covariance of these curve scores. This model has a strong relation to a
two-mode factor analysis model. In this conception the fCn is the source
150 J. J. McArdle
R,t'P
Variable V Variable P
.- ~,
)CJ)CJjJ,
13.11: Sequenrial and Synchronous Curves Model
OcC&~io" ,.,
Dccatjtm T
IariUll X VaYiMlt Y
[3.21: Factors of Curves (FOCUS> Model

Figure 3. Multivariate growth models for dynamic systems analysis.
of the individual differences in the separate curves. We use the term

factor of cutves, or FOCUS model, to reflect this broad idea.
This FOCUS model is an unusual psychometric organization for at
least two reasons. First, this FOCUS model does not require factor
invariance at the first order because the shapes of different variables
may come in any sequencing. Second, this FOCUS model can provide
direct evidence about patterns of developmental synchronicity. The
assumption of a single factor of curves fCn provides a basis for the study
of broad developmental trajectories. Alternatively, the lack of at least
one factor provides for independent variable-specific development.
These FOCUS concepts can be rejected by empirical data.
Common factor models are relatively crude or passive organizations
for a wide range of developmental patterns (see Horn, 1972). In any
factor model, however, if a loading is high, then a curve component is
similar to the factor of the curves. In theory, if a unique curve variance
is zero then the factor and the curve are the same variable. This FOCUS
model is the same as a path model where one curve is the leader and
others are the laggers. This interpretation could be complicated by the
sequence information in the different bases Bt. Also, this interpreta-
tion could be complicated if a zero uniqueness for the other curves fit
about as well. Perhaps an a priori path analysis structure among the
curves is needed. Nevertheless, even in this passive FOCUS form, some
of the systemic information about subcomponent interplay may become
clear.
Several developmental models in psychology have already used this
kind of systems logic. Perhaps the most general treatment of these ideas
has come from Cattell (1982) in his Investment Theory of Fluid and
Crystallized intelligence and in his Vector Id Analysis Systems model of
personality. Similarly, the Humphreys & Revelle (1984) information
processing model of personality and motivation offer clear structural
predictions.
Other substantive areas use other systems models. For example,
Baltes (1987) recently suggested, "The next belief associated with
life-span work is the notion that any process of development entails
aspects of growth (gain) and decline (loss)" (p. 616). To model this idea
we might hypothesize rising and decreasing basis functions with sub-
stantial shape correlations. Another methodological suggestion comes
from the relationships among biological growth functions in allometric
measurement (e.g., Griffiths & Sandland, 1984). More detailed models
152 J. J. McArdle
of the relationship among biological and psychological growth variables
are on the horizon (e.g., Waber, Mann, Merola, & Moylan, 1985).
The recent flurry of work on dynamical systems analysis is sure to
allow more advanced structural models. Wohlwill points us towards
ecology, and even a brief view of this work (e.g., May, 1981) offers
principles for the measurement of psychological change. These growth
models quickly move from simple differences (e.g., df/dt = B t), to
proportional differences (e.g., df/dt = Q f), to bounded proportional
differences (e.g., df/dt = Q f[1 - f/KD. These concepts have obvious
relevance to the growth, decline, and chaos apparent in most
psychological behaviors.
This work takes on special importance when the mathematics of
deterministic components are augmented with the statistics of stochas-
tic components. Especially valuable psychological models are found in
the seminal work on statistical learning theory (e.g., Neimark & Estes,
1967), especially in the translation to relevant substantive problems
(e.g., Zeaman & House, 1963). A key problem raised here is the
dynamic consistency of individual and aggregate models of change (see
Keats, 1985; but compare Figure 2.4). Other features of dynamical
systems models can be found in aging (e.g., Woodbury & Manton, 1983),
psychometrics (e.g., Ramsey, 1982), sociology (e.g., Featherman &
Peterson, 1986), social psychology (e.g., Newtson, Hairfield,
Bloomingdale, & Cutino, 1987), and many other areas (e.g., Kearsley,
Buss, & Royce, 1977). In this sense, the models of Figure 3 are only
rough outlines for the future organization of individual differences in
change into structural but dynamic systems.
Inter-individual or Intra-individual Analyses?

Wohlwill is particularly clear about the requirements for useful
developmental data collection:
From a methodological standpoint, surely the most critical ingredient
for research on developmental processes is that it provides direct
information on developmental change within the individual (p. 115).
... the methodological consequences of a focus on change ... : the
adoption of a longitudinal design (p. 116).... the importance of a
methodology centered on the individual as the unit of reference.
Even with much more powerful statistical methods provided by
structural-modeling equations, path analysis, etc., it seems unlikely
that a group-level mode of analysis will succeed in unraveling the
intricate interdependent chains of a temporally structured process
2 Commentary on Woblwill 153
that constitute the fabric of a developmental history (p. 120). Its
most obvious consequence would seem to be the adoption of multi-
variate approaches to data collection and analysis (p. 124-125).
These methodologies have allowed us to study changes in factorial
structure with age on a within-individual basis, notable through the
application ofP-technique (Nesselroade & Ford, 1985) (p.125).
The benefit of longitudinal data of any variety is that they allow us
to estimate and test models which would not be testable with cross-
sectional data. The benefit of multivariate data of any variety is that
they allow us to estimate and test models which would not be testable
with univariate data. The combination of longitudinal and multivariate
data is easy to like; I like it, and so does everyone else.
On the other hand it is virtually impossible to collect the longitudinal
multivariate data required to test most developmental theory, and
strategic choices must be made. This is especially true in life-span
development where several forms of mixed forms of longitudinal and
cross-sectional data are routinely indicated. However, it is not usually
clear what to do or who to fault if the analyses of cross-sectional and
longitudinal data do not agree; for example, there could be selection
problems with either (see Nesselroade, 1983; Baltes, Reese, &
Nesselroade, 1988). This means convergence or missing data models are
needed and multiple group longitudinal structural equation models are
likely to be a continued necessity (e.g., McArdle, Anderson & Aber,
1987).
Other inter-individual comparisons are needed for a full intra-
individual analyses. For example, the randomized groups design, where
individuals are placed into treatment conditions based on random
selection, provides the unambiguous benefit of uncorrelated distur-
bance terms. This statistical assumption is always critical to the deter-
mination of univariate or multivariate effects on developmental
trajectories. Another important grouping of individuals is based on
biometric heritage: monozygotic and dizygotic twins, adopted and
biological families, and other variations of biological relatives. These
independent but scalable groups provide needed starting points for the
separation of genetic and nongenetic sources of behavioral growth
variables and broad developmental trajectories (e.g., McArdle, 1986).
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Wohlwill's claims is the
recognition of the developmental significance of individualized single-
subject designs; that is, the use of a P-technique approach. To
demonstrate this idea I use the path diagrams of Figure 4. In the first
154 J. J. McArdle
part of this diagram, Figure 4.1, I draw a typical common factor pattern
defined from the measurement of many variables. The unique feature
here is this particular application was estimated and tested from the data
from a single individual measured over many occasions. In this structural
equation model the density of observations over occasions T replaced
the more typical density of observations over individuals N. This kind
of factor pattern represents the unique organization of multivariate
states for this specific individual (after Cattell, 1966, 1982).
Figure 4.2 adds a second level of structural equations to estimate
aspects of the time-to-time dynamics among the common factor scores.
Here we use both crossed and lagged latent variables to represent daily
state behaviors and then we relate these in the typical multivariate time
series fashion. This aspect of the model has embedded within it many
assumptions of factorial invariance, no mean change, no reciprocity, and
fIXed time intervals. Of course, more advanced structural models can
be used including a differential equations approach (e.g., Arminger,
1986; Geweke & Singleton, 1981; Molenaar, 1985). Likewise, the
modeling of multiple individuals will be needed (as in Nesselroade &
Ford, 1985). Many aspects of these models follows from the procedures
for multiple groups longitudinal structural equation models.
The key feature of this approach is the intensive view of the
individual multivariate data. In theory this approach allows a finer
grained look at the individual questions: What factors are important for
this individual? What timing patterns are important for this individual?
How should this individual be compared to others? The models of
Figure 4, especially in contrast to Figures 1, 2, and 3, indicate how
structural equation modeling is relatively flexible about the appropriate
units of developmental analysis.
Isomorphism or Integration of Theory and Methods?

I finally return to one of Wohlwill's main messages:
For a flexible, loose sort of linkage between the two will serve as a
counterforce to sterile pursuit of methodology for its own sake,
divorced from and uninformed by theory, such as would be
encouraged if methodology were to be considered as completely
independent of theory. At the same time our conception likewise
avoids the excesses of theorizing without regard to methodological
approach, or of subordinating method entirely to theory, which is apt
to insure the preservation of the theory in isolation from rival ones,
and thus leads eventually to its dying on the vine (p. 129).
"~II'".'':"'
'4 i 7. );.
(0Q/ \(04)
~~
, + I
... l... ...l ...
:S.ax: :S~I.I:
'~J Tf
14
1~132'
46
104}
08
i01!
~\~
I f13.'
~r
, (1~l
12 ..
I.'
',03' ( 135'
Figure 4. 1 Structural P-technique factor analysis model: within-person

factor model.
This call for the independent evolution of theory and method is an

interesting idea. I have usually viewed this problem as the integrative
challenge of method and theory (following Cattell, 1966). Obvious
problems arise when available statistical techniques are loosely tied on
as the tailend of a psychological investigation. Similar problems also
arise when psychological investigations are completely defined by, and
hence limited to, the statistical techniques used for data analysis. An
integrative posture is fruitful when it leads us to develop methods which
are immediately useful in ongoing substantive efforts. In turn, these
methodological efforts lead to the development of substantive ques-
tions with a stronger scientific foundation.
I have used Figures 1 to 4 to express the plurality of structural
equation modeling techniques for developmental data analysis. This
approach allowed me to demonstrate partial isomorphisms at several
levels. The models I presented should provoke some controversy
because they conflict with several commonly held beliefs about struc-
tural equations. For example, an arrow in a picture is most often aligned
with a cause which must proceed forward in time, and a common factor
is most often aligned with a reliable measurement of a variable across
many people. This surplus meaning makes it difficult to think about
latent rates of change, common and synchronous curves, or individual-
156 J. J. McArdle
L3.belled lIa.llJes 3.re Milxl1oum-Llkellrreod

EstIlTt3.te=. ('.'.'Itr, St !(Idar,j Erre,,.;,
Panmeters not labelled are Umt-<'a.lLI.ed
r
..............
,CS ,.'_-_4':--+-+-+_...
l t-l~~'
--" CN
"'
. . ._-.5_8_-+----+~ CA
~:
t-l;" "'; t-lr
;
""f._'~.i"" ... t"J

"'[fY"',"
\,"_/~,
. . ~'r"
U
jo '~"
-20 08 -.17
(10) (11) (12)
.l3 - 22 .17 01 ...."', -.21

(11) ----, .---_-..:;:(10:;.)) L:.:(0.:-.1)---, (11) ")
i'. . . "J .~,'. . . . . : !ou........ ,

;CS :..~-----:-:------..: CN ..
:~-------+.; CA :
; toO; -29 ; toO; -39 ; toO;
"",!,r.';;. (09) '''''4T':~ (10) ""'~T7"8
\,- )U4:' -.27
{le)
(,- )(~4) lJ'I"
I.. b!
Figure 4. 2 Structural P-technique factor analysis model: within-person

time-lag model.
ized factors patterns. I am comforted by the fact that these seemingly

odd structural models can be estimated and fit using the current tech-
nology. Of course, it is also true that partially isomorphic graphics are
needed to model most of Wohlwill's developmental concerns.
The need for integration is also clear in some of our research
vocabulary. The words continuity, growth, sequence, stability, status,
synchronicity, and surely the word development, have no prerequisite
mathematical or statistical definition. Other words such as correlation,

derivative, difference, differential, integral, and surely the word
dynamic, have no prerequisite substantive definition. It is not surprising
that in some data analyses the differences in group means have been
termed growth, while in other analyses differences in covariances have
been termed growth, while in still other analyses only differences in the
covariance which are proportional to the means have been termed
growth (e.g., McArdle & Epstein, 1987). Further matching up of these
substantive definitions and these mathematical definitions is needed to
promote scientific precision, objectivity, and communication.
Yet I think Joachim Wohlwill leaves us with a deeper and more
reliable message: All useful scientific definitions are just partial isomor-
phisms and, as such, they are subject to change. Both structural equation
modelers and developmental psychologists need to hear this message.
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2
Theories and Methods in the Service of
Data Construction in Developmental
Psychology
Jaan Valsiner
The canons of the scientific method, as they have been worked out
for field of psychology at large, require modification when applied to
developmental problems (WohlwiU, 1973, p. 17).
Introduction
On July 11, 1987, the menace of our modern busy world - a heart
attack - claimed the life of Joachim Wohlwill. Wohlwill's contribution
to this volume remains his 'scientific testament' - for his colleagues
and disciples to study, understand, and to advance further. Wohlwill's
contribution to the methodology of developmental psychology ranges
over 25 years, from his earlier work on the uses of scaling (Wohlwill,
1963a) and empirical extensions of Piagetian research (Wohlwill,
1963b), to the publication of his major monograph The study of be-
havioral development (Wohlwill, 1973), and beyond - ending with his
contribution to this volume. Wohlwill's concerns about methodology
that would fit the needs of developmental research advanced with great
continuity over these decades. He understood the need for reorganiza-
tion of the scientific method for the purposes of developmental psychol-
ogy. His contribution to the present volume provides multiple lines of
thought for further development of his ideas.
It is essential to bear in mind Wohlwill's focus on the analysis of
theory < = = = > methods relationships. In contemporary psychology,
Jaan Valsiner Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina,

Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

162 Jaan Valsiner
we often discuss 'theory' in ways that leave obscure the level of

generality at which we operate. Wohlwill's disclaimer that he uses the
term 'theory' to refer " ... primarily to broadly defined theoretical view-
points and frameworks (e.g., cognitive, S-R, ecological), rather than to
specific theories designed to account for a particular phenomenon or
to deal with particular problems... " (p. 93) is important to bear in mind.
Faithful to this use of the term 'theory', Wohlwill continues to discuss
theories at the level of conventional classifications of particular
theoretical approaches (e.g., 'organismic' versus 'mechanistic') that
prevail in contemporary discourse about psychology. However, the two
examples that he provides - those of Muchow and Kendler - are
specific 'pictures' of the researchers' activities. Those examples pertain
to the connection of a particular theoretical framework (Werner's in
case of Muchow, S-R 'mediation theory' of the Kendlers), with the
empirical realm. In both examples, the researchers transcended their
particular theoretical backgrounds or empirical findings, rather than
follow each of those in a rigid manner. Muchow, instead of merely
transposing Wernerian ideas onto the rich phenomenology of child-
environment relationships in a Hamburg working-class suburb,
described the observed phenomenology in greater detail than was ever
relevant from the perspective of her theoretical foundations. Kendler,
transcending the behavioristic foundations of her background, arrived
at the general 'theoretical shift' from a 'mechanistic' to the 'organismic'
focus. These examples provide substance to Wohlwill's claim that both
theoretical and methodological facets of research are open to innova-
tion, as they are mutually linked in a bi-directional relationship. I would
like to add wider context to that claim, by arguing that the theories
< ===> methods relationships are guided by the investigators'
axiomatic assumptions on the one hand, and by the phenomena that are
studied, on the other. That context becomes explicit if we view the
scientific process from the standpoint of knowledge construction.
Differently from Wohlwill's wide use of the term 'theory', I limit its use
to a generic particular theory in my commentary. As a result, Wohlwill's
'partial isomorphism' view will become relevant at the level of specific
theory < ===> methods relationships.
Wohlwill's interactionist perspective makes the partial isomorphism
the only feasible view on theory-method relationship. If theory were to
fully determine the relationship, no innovation can enter the theory
from the side of the methods used to derive data from the phenomena.
If that relationship is partially isomorphic, theoretical innovation can
result from both methodological innovations and empirical findings that
lead us to go 'beyond the theory given'. Likewise, however, the position
of partial isomorphism in theory < == => method relationships
implies that methodological innovation is partially guided by the
theoretical system of the scientist.
Data Construction and Theoretical Innovation

Wohlwill's emphasis on method use is crucial for the present exten-
sion of his argument. He did not comment upon the nature of that 'use'
of the method, as the focus of his analysis was on the theory < ===>
methods relationships. I would like to extend his coverage and set it up
in its context - that of the social role of the activities of developmental
psychologists. I start from the premise that the use of any method in a
science is a planful construction of knowledge. We improve our
knowledge by a two-step sequence in the research process - first, we
derive (construct) data on the basis of the phenomena, and sub-
sequently analyze the constructed data to modify our theories in some
of their particular loci. In other terms - empirical data, all by them-
selves, are not capable of verifying (or falsifying) the whole structure of
a basic theory, but only some (more particular) aspects of those. A
theory that is built upon the assumption that the world is organized as
a systemic whole cannot be re-built on alternative (e.g., associationistic)
basis solely because the empirical data call for such shift in the basis of
the theory.
The construction of knowledge proceeds in two steps. At Step 1,
the method is used by the researcher to act upon the phenomena. This
action constrncts the 'data' (or 'derives' the 'data' from the phenomena),
rather than 'collects' them. This terminological distinction is quite
fundamental - the notion of 'data collection' implies that the 'data'
exist in an 'objective form' in the world, and that the investigator merely
'picks them up'. In contrast, the notion of 'data construction' implies
the active participation of the investigator in the making of the 'data'
on the basis of the phenomena from which the former are derived. That
construction may proceed along the lines of more, or less, connection
with the nature of the phenomena under study. As an example, con-
sider the difference in the ways in which 'data' about 'intelligence' are
constructed by two traditions of research - the psychometric, and the
Piagetian ones. For the psychometric tradition, quantification of some
164 Jaan Valsiner
aspects of the phenomena of 'intelligence' is mandatory for the con-

struction of data about 'intelligence'. In contrast, for the Piagetian
tradition, narrative accounts of the child's ongoing efforts to solve an
experimental problem constitute the 'data'. In both cases, the 'data'
reflect only a selected perspective on the phenomena of 'intelligence'
at large. However, the Piagetian tradition of data construction retains
more of the relevant aspects of the 'intelligence' as it is present in the
child's acting and thinking. The psychometric tradition, in contrast, has
constructed highly artificial 'data' about the 'intelligence' that have no
connection with psychological phenomena from which the data are
derived. The long history of trying to define what 'intelligence' means,
in the context of psychometric 'intelligence testing', illustrates that
alienation of the constructed data very well - the most widespread
definition that has been devised defines 'intelligence' through the
method used to study it!
At Step 2, the constructed data are then subjected to a 'data
analysis', which is expected to feed back into our theory - supporting
some of its aspects and leading to the modification of others. Thus, our
data analysis is essentially a meta-level construction of knowledge. It
starts from the constructed data, and is meant to construct (derive)
further general knowledge from those, to feed into the theory. Such
'secondary derivation' nature of data analysis minimizes its role in
theoretical innovation, and leaves it to cover only the particulars of the
theory. The 'data' cannot lead to fundamental changes in the theory
because they are at first constructed on the basis of the theory, and
secondly further analyzed from the same perspective. They, of course,
can prompt the necessary change in some particular aspects of the
theory. Speaking in Wohlwill's terms - a 'mechanistic' theorist will not
become an 'organismic' one solely on the basis of the 'data', but the
particular version of the 'mechanistic' theory is likely to be re-formu-
lated on the basis of the 'data'. This point, of course, diverges from the
accepted norm in psychology that attributes to 'the data' the decisive
role in judging the 'goodness' of theories. Where, then, are the roots of
that norm?
The Vanishing Phenomena, and the 'Cult of the Data'

Contemporary psychology has become careful to hide the original
phenomena that are under study, behind the seeming rigor of the
discourse about 'the data' and their analyses. Interestingly, Wohlwill's
chapter reflects that popular overlook - in the analysis of the relation-

ships between theories and methods, two issues remain outside con-
sideration - what these theories are of, and how the methods are used
to transform the selected aspects of the phenomena into 'the data'. I
claim that Wohlwill's 'partial isomorphism' ideal in theory < ===>
methods relationships is eventually dependent upon the adequacy of
both the theory and the methods, to the phenomena that are being
studied. Contemporary psychology can produce little accurate
knowledge - no matter how the theory < ===> methods relationship
is conceptualized - unless the adequacy of that relationship to the
'target' phenomenology is guaranteed. Without a match between the
phenomena on the one hand, and the theory < ===> methods
relationships on the other, psychology is likely to continue to produce
data that can be characterized as 'Type III error' - that of 'displaced
precision' - a situation where precise 'data' may no longer represent
(often less precise) 'core' of the original object of investigation (Mitroff
& Featheringham, 1974). Contemporary psychology is rich in such data:
empirical findings that are obtained at the level of populations are often
interpreted as pertaining to individuals (see Valsiner, 1986); the most
intricate and humanly relevant qualitative phenomena are transformed
into quantified data that have very little to say about the organization
of the former (see Valsiner, 1987, Chap. V); and clinical methods that
are geared towards structural analysis of the complex phenomena are
'standardized' on the basis of populations (see Luria & Artemieva,
1970). The dangers of generating 'Type III errors' have been largely
overlooked - due to the widespread belief in the accumulation of data
as a way towards solving theoretical problems.
This 'cult of the data' (see Toulmin & Leary, 1985) in psychology
has reached almost religious dimensions over the last few decades. In
the accepted contemporary practice that passes the 'quality control' of
journal reviewing, the majority of psychologists do not specify what they
mean by the term 'data', when they talk or write about them. Qualifiers
like 'good', 'poor', and so forth, are often attached to 'data' in
psychologists' discourse, again without specification of what makes
some 'data' 'good', and others 'poor'. For example, quantitative 'data'
are often labelled 'good', especially if based on not-too-small samples
that evoke the image of the security of the 'law of large numbers' in the
mind of the investigator. Positive connotation of the quantified 'data'
is often paralleled by negative connotation of the qualitative form of
166 Jaan Valsiner
data, with no consideration of the nature of the phenomena. Such

positive or negative connotational labelling of the 'data' has been an
easy way around the major issue - what are the phenomena that the
'data' actually represent? Little emphasis has been given to the core of
scientific research - the process by which a psychologist can advance
understanding of a particular issue. Wohlwill's emphasis on the partial
isomorphism in theory < ===> methods relationships can be inter-
preted in a wider sense as a call for greater understanding by
psychologists of what they are doing while trying to arrive at new
knowledge.
Psychology in the Process of Knowledge Construction

Psychologists have generally overlooked their own psychological
processes that feature prominently in their process of conducting re-
search. It is rare that investigators in any area of science take upon
themselves the difficult task of analyzing the scientists' relationships
with their science (see Devereux, 1967; Mitroff, 1974 for a fewexcep-
tions). That scientists are, first and foremost, human beings (implying
that they are as vulnerable to subjectivity as anybody else), is quite
obvious when we examine their disputes, mistakes, and theoretical
impasses in the history of science. History of psychology, at least since
the advent of behavioristic ideology, gives us ample evidence of the
dominance of culturally determined belief systems in psychological
theorizing. Different fashions in psychology have either overem-
phasized the relevance of the empirical (inductive) or theoretical
(deductive) sides of the research process. Usually these opposite
perspectives have fought battles of criticism with one another, trying to
prove the 'rightness' of their particular points by way of 'popularity'
among the community of psychologists, or by way of gaining support
from extra-scientific institutions (Valsiner, 1988). Consensual valida-
tion of ideas, even if widely used, is a risky step in scientific reasoning,
since it may easily generate consensual (but not actual) truths. Such
'shared illusions' may disseminate widely in a given discipline, leaving
the discipline in an impasse for shorter or longer periods of time.
Reasoning in Science: Inductive Versus Deductive - or Synthetic

Contemporary psychology seems to be infested by the belief that
knowledge results merely from the accumulation of empirical studies,
by way of aggregation of the findings. That perspective has led to the
development and use of so-called 'meta-analytic' techniques (cf. Rosen-
thal, 1984), and has increased the necessity of overviewing existing
literature in publications like Psychological Bulletin, handbooks on
different topics, and review chapters. This, extreme 'inductivist', view is
paralleled by the tendency to declare all empirical research irrelevant
- as a result of deductively obtained knowledge emanating from the
theoretical postulates. It is in conjunction with that - 'deductivist'-
world view that the discussion of the 'mechanistic' and 'organismic'
perspectives has been of relevance for developmental psychology. That
meta-theoretical contrast is useful for organizing the multiplicity of
particular theoretical systems in psychology, and guide the ways in which
empirical data are used in the framework of those theories. In opposi-
tion to the belief in induction as the cornerstone of the enterprise of
science, deductive reasoning is seen as the guide of the researcher's
thinking about particular issues. Our knowledge is based not on mere
accumulation of empirical data in general, but on the psychologist's
reasoning about a phenomenon. Different efforts to gain empirical
knowledge need not 'speak to one another', nor accumulate-because
they are built upon different (mutually disconnected) theoretical bases.
Of course, the distinction of the 'inductivist' and deductivist' 'camps'
of psychologists is a simplified abstraction. Probably no developmental
psychologist would subscribe to an extreme inductivist position in the
matter of accumulation of knowledge. Likewise, the extreme deduc-
tivist position would be unlikely to be endorsed by contemporary
developmental psychologists, since it entails theory's deterministic role
in obtaining data. Wohlwill restores a realistic perspective to the
theory-method relationship, when he cautions us against the hazards of
full determinism of the method by the theory.
Wohlwill's emphasis on the partial isomorphism of theory and
methods leads us to the issue of synthesis of inductive and deductive
aspects of the construction of knowledge in developmental psychology.
An existing theory leads the investigator to construct a method based
on deduction from the theory. The method is used to obtain data that
go beyond the investigator'S expectations. The theory is (if it is - see
Mitroff, 1974 for counter-evidence) then changed in accordance with
the unexpected (inductive) knowledge that emerged in the research
process. The investigator can also 'borrow' methods from others, if
those methods fit his/her goals, and interpret the data derived with the
168 Jaan Valsiner
help of those methods in novel ways. Neither the method nor the theory
determine what the investigator finds. The new knowledge emerges as
a result of the investigator's synthesis of the theoretical thinking (deduc-
tive reasoning) with the derived data (inductive reasoning). Creative
synthesis of that kind is possible only if the theory < = = = > method
relationship is partially isomorphic, rather than strictly determined by
either the theory (primacy of deductive inference) or by the method
(primacy of the inductive inference). The history of 'drifts' of methods
from one theoretical system to another proves the partial isomorphism
point of view that Wohlwill puts forward. However, that 'drift'
phenomenon also reflects the potential dangers of methodological
'freedom' in psychology - the borrowing of methods for the service of
non-theoretical, pragmatic (socially applicable) tasks that psychologists
are often expected to perform.
'Methodological Drifts': Context-Driven Methodology

In psychology we have numerous examples of how a method,
originally devised in conjunction with one theoretical framework, is
borrowed (and transformed) to fit the goals of another. This
'methodological drift' was described by Wohlwill masterfully (p. 104),
using the example of Pia get's stages of infant development (Le., descrip-
tion of the process of development) being turned into means of assess-
ment of the infants' relative (ordinal) status on a presumed
developmental trajectory. In child psychology, the task of assessment
seems to have been a high priority, and hence many methods have
undergone a drift similar to the transition of Pia get's description of
infant development to an assessment device. For example, there have
been attempts to turn the Vygotsky-Sakharov method of the study of
children's concept formation (Sakharov, 1930), into a test of
'intelligence' (Semeonoff & Laird, 1952) or into a more standardized
form (Fosberg, 1948). More recently, another concept introduced by
Vygotsky - that of the 'zone of proximal development' - is made use
of in devising process-oriented diagnostic devices (e.g., Campione,
Brown, Ferrara, & Bryant, 1984). Likewise, the ideas of 'attachment' as
a relationship between the child and an adult (Ainsworth, 1%7; Bowlby,
1969) have been the basis for devising a standardized experimental
situation to assess the child's 'attachment type' (Ainsworth, Blehar,
Waters, & Wall, 1978) -de Jacto a 'characteristic' of the child. And, of
course, we have the classic historical case of the fate of Binet's methods
of the study of children's cognition that were transformed by the

'intelligence testing' movement without borrowing from his rich
theoretical contributions.
Thus, we have ample evidence that the 'methodological drift' in
child psychology has usually proceeded in a specific direction - from
various methods based on specific theoretical backgrounds, towards the
dissociation of the methods and use of them in assessment. Or, alter-
natively, some notions from the theoretical systems have been used to
construct methods, specifically meant for the purposes of assessment.
Why such an obsession with 'assessment', and so little concern with
better understanding of what it is that is being assessed? As Wohlwill
accurately describes the situation in (especially American) psychology
- " ...we find a veritable army of researchers happily operating in a
theoretical limbo, content to pursue the truth wherever their
methodological tools may lead them" (p. 96). The 'truth' here is usually
that of 'prediction' of the future standing of children relative to one
another. Or making sure that a given child 'is O.K' - rather than
knowledge of the underlying psychological mechanisms that organize
children's development. The emphasis on assessment constitutes a
displacement of the research question, under the influence of the
'applied interests' that dominate in the given society. These 'applied
interests' may have nothing in common with the task of reaching a basic
understanding of the processes of development, but may be oriented
towards gaining informa tion for social action (investments) or resources
at the given time, in anticipation of one or another outcome. A social
politician's 'betting' on the majority of children not becoming criminals
or drug addicts by adolescence can be accomplished without any
knowledge of the developmental mechanisms that guide some children
towards (and others - away from) such outcomes, since it is possible
(as statisticians know ever since Quetelet's 'social physics') to find some
predictability in populations (societies). Such populational predict-
ability reveals nothing of the individual psychological processes that
operate in the actual causation of the given outcome. In other terms,
the basic psychological processes operate at the level of individual cases,
whereas the 'applied' interests of the 'social demands' upon
psychologists guide them to study samples of individuals and generalize
the findings to popula tions. The task of psychological assessment is one
particular outcome of the 'social demand' that guides psychologists'
work. it is necessary for social classificaton of persons in a society
170 Jaan Valsiner
('normal' versus: 'abnormal', 'delayed', 'exceptional', etc.). The detec-

tion of non-'normal' cases of children by way of assessment may lead to
different actions by the society - abandonment of efforts to help
further development, or provision of such help (for those who 'lag
behind', and/or for 'the exceptional children' - depending on the
educational philosophy).
As psychologists' obsession with assessment is a result of social
demands, so is the emphasis on the quantified nature ofthat assessment.
The belief in numerical expression of 'the truth' (even, or especially, if
the latter is a result of social convention) as superior to other forms of
presenting information has been present in the occidental cultures long
before psychology became a separate discipline (see Cassedy, 1984).
Psychologists have stubbornly insisted that 'objectivity' in their dis-
cipline can be granted only if their methods produce quantified data,
and any questioning of that belief has usually been dismissed as heresy
(or, its equivalent - 'soft science'). At the same time, very little concern
has been given to the referential aspects of the quantified data, as the
'raw' phenomena are really described or analyzed. The 'methodological
drift' described by Wohlwill is an interesting phenomenon in itself - as
it reflects the social guidance of psychologists' research efforts. The
partial isomorphism between theory and methods here encounters its
context - that of 'social demands' to which psychologists are necessari-
ly and unavoidably vulnerable. The potential for scientific innovation
of psychological theorizing that the partial isomorphism view affords, is
paired with the dangers of innovation in psychologists' research that has
little relevance for theory and is substantially in service of 'social
demands' of their environment. Wohlwill was well aware of that danger
- that the methodological concerns can easily begin to determine the
theoretical issues ('wing flapping the bird' - see p. 127). Neither he,
nor probably anybody else, could suggest a simple tactic for the preven-
tion of the disease that is an inevitable chronic condition of psychology's
existence in any society.
Much of Wohlwill's work was devoted to elaboration of particular
methodologies to fit the developmental focus. His recommendations
in the target chapter are worth more elaborate analysis.
First, Wohlwill was interested in the course of development. He
understood well the barrenness of equating 'predictability' with
'continuity' (or 'stability') of development (p. 112). Continuity can be
observed in developmental processes that generate change and (tem-
porary) stability in the life course of the individual person. Our inability
to predict future development stems from the nature of development
itself - the developmental processes themselves create unpredictable
(novel) outcomes, hence our efforts to predict these outcomes cannot
succeed. The goal of prediction is inconsistent with the propensity of
developing organisms for innovation. The understanding of this basic
discrepancy leads to the need of reconstruction of the scientific method
for the purposes of developmental research.
Secondly, Wohlwill emphasized the contextual interdependence of
developing organism and its environment. According to him, the study
of change can't be taken from the cOntext of where it begins to change,
to where it changes (p. 117). This emphasis leads to the important
imperative for research methodology (that has been forgotten by con-
temporary developmental psychology) - the development of an in-
dividual person needs to be studied in close connection with the
environmental context, with the assistance of which that development
takes place. This imperative, if carried out in a consistent manner, has
the following implications for the research in developmental psychol-
ogy:
1. All research needs to be conducted within individual subjects and
should concentrate on their interdependence with their environments.
2. The longitudinal research design is the default design for any
research in developmental psychology. The use of cross-sectional
designs can be useful only for the provision of approximate, pilot
information about the processes of development.
3. The data that are derived longitudinally must be analyzed within
the systemic framework of the developing individual subject. The
general principles detected in that analysis can be extrapolated to other
subjects, and to the generic case (as opposed to the population).
Instead of the strategy of 'first aggregate, then analyze', the data should
be 'first analyzed, then aggregated' (see Thorngate, 1986).
It is obvious that none of the three methodological implications of
the methodological imperative that emerges from Wohlwill's chapter,
are widely used in contemporary developmental psychology. Wohlwill's
own particular suggestions for research also differ from the course
outlined above. His suggestion for the adoption of multivariate
approaches (p. 125) would lead to the abandonment of person-environ-
ment interdependence as the focus of development. When multiple
'measures' of the person, and other 'measures' of the environment, are
172 Jaan Valsiner
synthesized in the framework of factor analysis (even if the indivial-

oriented 'P-technique' of Cattell is used), or its modem derivates, the
phenomena that constitute the core of development (i.e., the person-
environment interdependence) become replaced by statistical data of
the formal relationships (and their dynamics) between 'person' and
'environment'variables. The latter cannot represent the former - the
dynamics of the person-environment transaction in real time cannot be
restored from the statistical relationship between 'person' and
'environment'variables. Hence it is likely that following Wohlwill's call
for the use of multivariate techniques may lead investigators to an
impasse in theory < = = = > methods relationship, as the core aspects
of the actual phenomena of development are lost in the research
process. It is similarly unlikely that the 'theoretical neutrality' of 'causal
modelling' that Wohlwill proposes (albeit with a shade of doubt - see
p. 127) as potentially valuable tool for the study of development, will
lead the discipline towards greater rigor in adequate understanding of
the processes of development. Again, little (or no) explicit considera-
tion of the 'raw' phenomena, alongside with the data derived from
those, makes it possible for psychologists to experiment in the area of
methodological 'bird-flapping'.
The End is also a Beginning

Complex problems in a science are never solved quickly and with
ease. Joachim Wohlwill moved cautiously towards the solution of some
of the most fundamental problems of developmental psychology. He
left behind a number of contributions that are of great benefit for
developmental psychology. It would be unfortunate if the busy empiri-
cal research activities of contemporary psychologists stop them from
taking time to study Wohlwill's legacy in depth.
The central issue of the target chapter of this commentary - the
partial isomorphism between theories and methods - is but one of
Wohlwill's contributions. He stressed the benefits of the partial isomor-
phism view, while making it clear that this perspective is wrought with
potential dangers of forgetting theoretical limits while using methods
in eclectic manner. In the present commentary, Wohlwill's use of
'theory' (as referring to 'classes of theories') has been narrowed down
to particular theories. Still, the partial isomorphism view remains
applicable to the theory < = = = > method relationships.
2 Commentary on WohlwiII 173
There are, however, limits to the 'partial' nature of the isomorphism
in question. The one suggested in this commentary is perhaps the most
basic - the nature of the phenomena that constitute the resource for
deriving 'data'. It was argued that the 'forgetting' of the nature of these
phenomena in contemporary developmental psychology has resulted in
a situation where discourse about development often proceeds in con-
junction with empirical data from which exactly the developmental
information has been eliminated. Such mismatch between theory and
data is a result of excessive eclecticism in theory < ===> methods
relationship, fortified by the 'social demands' of psychologists' environ-
ments.
Wohlwill's rejection of the extreme opposite of this state of affairs
- the 'full' isomorphism between theories and methods - is under-
standable as a safeguard against a return to some kind of mediaeval
scholasticism that would utilize only deductive reasoning strategies in
the study of development. However, the partial isomorphism view
needs to be fit into the full context of psychologists' research process.
A solution that is suggested here involves the coordination of the
'partial isomorphism' of the theory < ===> methods relationship,
with the nature of the phenomena being studied. Psychologists' a priori
understanding of which methods fit not only their theories, but also
would transform part of phenomena into data in ways that retain the
object of the study - is a necessary (even if intuitive) facet of research.
Like artists, psychologists can trust their (educated) intuition about the
phenomena they try to approach, and then make a careful decision
about which methods to use. It is the careful building of the relationship
from one's theory to the phenomena, and from both of those to the
methods, that may lead us to new knowledge. Science is not a mere
application of the consensually validated 'scientific method' to whatever
phenomena the investigator wants to apply it. Instead, it is a careful,
step-by-step, improvement of the scientists' understanding of the basic
processes that are being studied, wrought by acting upon the
phenomena in ways that retain their relevant aspects (cf. Piaget, 1977).
All through his life, Joachim Wohlwill carried with him this attitude
of careful curiosity. It may have made him less of a 'social celebrity' in
the community of psychologists, but instead he did gain the reputation
of a thorough and careful scientist who was not afraid of addressing
issues that cannot be solved easily, Wohlwill's ideas will continue to
challenge developmental psychologists to seek novel and adequate
174 Jaan Valsiner
solutions to their problems. In this sense, his last authoritative message
is a starting point for others to build upon in the future.
References
Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore, MA: Johns
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Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of
attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss. (Vol. 1).Attachment. New York: Basic
Books.
Campione, J. C., Brown, A L., Ferrara, R A, & Bryant, N. R (1984). The
zone of proximal development: implications for individual differences
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Devereux, G. (1967). From anxiety to method in the behavioral sciences. The
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Thorngate, W. (1986). The production, detection, and explanation of

behavioral patterns. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), The individual subject and
scientific psychology (pp. 71-93). New York: Plenum.
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beyond. In S. Koch & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of psychology as
science (pp. 594-616). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Valsiner, J. (Ed.). (1986). The individual subject and scientific psychology. New
York: Plenum.
Valsiner, J. (1987). Culture and the development of children's action.
Chichester, NY: Wiley.
Valsiner, J. (1988). Developmental psychology in the Soviet Union. Brighton:
Harvester Press.
Wohlwill, J. (1963a). The measurement of scalability for non-cumulative
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Wohlwill, J. (1973). The study ofbehavioral development. New York: Academic
Press.
2
Theory and Method in the Study of
Behavioral Development:
On the legacy of Joachim E Wohlwill1
Richard M. Lerner and John R. Nesselroade
On July 11, 1987, Joachim F. Wohlwill died suddenly and unexpect-

edly. He was felled by a heart that was no match for his indefatigable
spirit or his immutable energy, devotion, and commitment to his family,
his work, and his countless colleagues and friends. The life of a man so
warm, so connected, and so giving always ends with relationships and
works in mid-stream. Jack, had he lived, would be continuing to add
immeasurably to our lives and to our minds. His death has left us with
activities we could only finish adequately with him, activities of both
personal and professional natures.
Such is the case with this paper, a paper which was to be written by
Jack as a response to the commentaries about his chapter in this book.
We find it ironic that Jack was kind enough to provide a footnote (p.
91) acknowledging our comments on an earlier version of his chapter
and, now, it has become our bittersweet task to respond on behalf of
1 Richard M. Lerner's writing of this paper was supported in part by NICHD Grant No.
HD23229. John R. Nesselroade's writing of this paper was supported in part by The
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Successful Aging. The authors thank
Susan McHale and Jacqueline V. Lerner for their comments concerning previous drafts
of this paper.
Richard M. Lerner & John R. Nesselroade Department of Human

Development and Family Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University
Park, PA 16802.

178 Richard M. Lerner and John R. Nesselroade
Jack to others' comments about it. If truth be told, it is we who should

acknowledge Jack Wohlwill, for the personal and collegial support he
gave us throughout our careers and for what he taught us about theory
and method in developmental research. What will remain unfinished
for us, personally, is thanking Jack for his generous colleagues hip and
friendship. On a professional level, what remains for us, at least in
regard to the present paper, is to represent as veridically as we can
suppose the response Jack might have formulated to the thoughtful
comments of Professors McArdle and Valsiner. Our professional task
is made difficult by the fact that the whole of Jack Wohlwill's breadth
and depth of training, experience, interests, and scholarship is greater
than the sum of our respective intellectual parts.
Joachim Wohlwill entered the world at a time and in a place that are
known to many of us only through the gray or brown hues of old news
reels. Jack was born on September 27, 1928 in Hamburg, Germany, the
fourth child of Emma and Friedrich Wohlwill. Friedrich was a physician
and a Jew. After the Nazi gleichschaltung (coordination) of the medical
profession in 1933, Friedrich began to experience the persecution that
would soon envelop all Jews under the dark control ofN ational Socialist
Germany. Friedrich fled with his family to Portugal, and there, for the
next ten years, Jack Wohlwill grew through his childhood, living easily
and fluently with the Portuguese, their language, and their customs.
Yet the specter of the reach of the Nazis seemed to extend ever
further throughout Europe, or so it seemed to Friedrich Wohlwill in
1943. Fearing once again for his family's safety, the father sent the three
children remaining with him to the United States. In this way Jack
Wohlwill found himself in 1943 living in Brighton, Massachusetts, and
being faced - once again - with the task of adjusting to a new cultural
context.
Adolescence is said to be a time of establishing one's identity, and
it may be that this second geographical upheaval, along with what must
have been the wrenching emotions associated with leaving one's
parents in a place where they faced possible capture and murder, were
the experiences giving Jack Wohlwill the quiet resiliency which came to
characterize his adult personality. Indeed Jack adjusted to this second
dislocation in ways even more impressive than those he showed in
Portugal. Within a mere six years of his arrival in the United States, in
1949, Jack Wohlwill graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard (Wapner,
1987).
War once again intruded into Jack's life. With the onset of
American involvement in the Korean conflict, Jack entered the United
States Army and served for two years at Governor's Island. By 1952,
however, Jack was again a civilian and again in search of additional
educational experiences.
He spent part of two years (1952 and 1953) at the University of
Chicago, where he pursued graduate studies in human development.
Jack was not happy with his experiences in this program and elected to
leave it without completion of an advanced degree (Wapner, 1987).
Yet, he left Chicago with something more important and more enduring.
During his time in the Army, Jack had met and fell in love with Fay
Schwartz. They married, in July 1953, and together moved to Berkeley,
California, where Jack pursued and completed a Ph.D. in psychology.
After receiving his degree, Jack spent a post-doctoral year, 1957-
1958, working in Geneva with Jean Piaget. Jack's professional life
flourished in Geneva, as did his family life. Jack's and Fay's first child,
a son, David Emanuel, was born during Jack's year in Geneva.
Jack left Geneva in 1958 to assume a professorial appointment at
Clark University, where he remained for 12 years. Jack's numerous
publications during this period made seminal contributions to the fields
of perceptual and cognitive development. His work was so visible and
deemed so important that, during the 1963-1964 academic year, he was
among the very first scholars invited to be a fellow at the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. Jack's family
life prospered as well during his Clark years. In 1960 Jack's and Fay's
second child, also a son, Arthur Daniel, was born.
In 1970 Jack left Clark University to join the faculty of The
Pennsylvania State University. Jack was one of the first and pioneering
members of the then newly organized program in 'man-environment
relations'. For several years Jack focused his intellectual energies on
formulating, and advancing empirically, a dynamic theoretical concep-
tion of humans' links to their physical ecology. Through articles, chap-
ters, and edited volumes, Jack Wohlwill was a seminal figure in the birth
and development of the field of environmental psychology within the
United States and Europe.
However, developmental issues were really never far from the front
burner. In 1973 one of the most important volumes published in the
history of developmental psychology appeared, Jack Wohlwill's The
Study ofBehavioral Development. By 1979 Jack had renewed his profes-
sorial affiliation with the field of developmental psychology, by joining

Penn State's Department of Individual and Family Studies.
Throughout his years at Penn State Jack's intellectual interests and
accomplishments continued to broaden. Work on aesthetics; on cogni-
tion, affect, and curiosity; and on the use of computers to enhance the
creative and artistic imaginations of young children blossomed along
with his continuing contributions to environmental and to developmen-
tal psychology (Wapner, 1987).
These accomplishments, although diverse, came together in the
work of Jack Wohlwill. With integrations which were ever more intrigu-
ing to his colleagues and students, Jack taught us that the study of the
individual could not be divorced from the study of the environment
within which the person was embedded - and neither could be
separated from the incessant sweep oftime, from change or history. All
were enmeshed in a reciprocal, dynamic manner, a relationship which
required, first, that the scientist be a scholar with a broad vision of the
vast scope of the information pertinent to his or her subject matter. In
addition, the scientist must be a person with an understanding of the
responsibilities incumbent on a privileged, informed citizen. Jack
Wohlwill epitomized the life of a devoted scholar of developing humans'
changing connections to their world. Jack Wohlwill was as well the
epitome of a citizen devoted to enhancing humans' opportunities to
develop in a better world. Jack worked tirelessly, devotedly, and
modestly in organizations such as the Sierra Club and Amnesty Inter-
national in order to enhance people's chances of living in a better
physical and political world. Somehow, he marshalled the same energy
and commitment in helping his colleagues understand what would be
required theoretically and methodologically to study better the dynamic
relations between developing people and their complex, changing
worlds.
It was with this latter effort that Jack was concerned when his life
ended so abruptly. His chapter in this volume represents what are to
be his last words on this issue. Given the role of this chapter in the larger
intellectual mission to which Jack was dedicated, it is not less than an
awesome responsibility to try to represent, for Jack, what he might have
said, in response to the comments of Professors McArdle and Valsiner,
in order to have one last opportunity to extend his message. To fulfill
our task we will attempt to summarize, quite briefly, what we believe is
Jack's position - as reflected in his chapter - in regard to the issues
Professors McArdle and Valsiner have elected to raise. In this context,

we will contrast Jack's views with those of Professors McArdle and
Valsiner. Finally, we shall try to indicate the prescription for the future
healthy development of the study of behavioral development with
which Jack Wohlwill has left us.
Wohlwill on Theory and Method

If there is a meta-message in Jack Wohlwill's chapter, it is that
developmentalists should be wary of easy generalizations, ones that
depict an overly simplistic relationship among variables. Human
development and the laws which govern it are certainly complex, often
individualistic, and always probabilistic. This is especially the case
when, as in Wohlwill's vision, development involves systemic, reciprocal
relationships between individuals and their contexts.
Accordingly, the superordinate theme in Wohlwill's chapter
pertains to the depiction of the link between developmental method
and developmental theory (as he defines it, as broad viewpoints and
frameworks). He argues that it is overdrawn to view the link as a rigidly
deterministic one, wherein the former controls the latter. Upon reflec-
tion, Wohlwill must be correct.
Psychology is pre-paradigmatic in the "Kuhnian" sense (Kuhn,
1970). Certainly, the discipline has not experienced the revolutionary
rejection of the accumulated knowledge of one era by the methods and
findings of a succeeding one. Rather, multiple views of the world
(Pepper, 1942) exist simultaneously in psychology in general
(Cronbach, 1957) and in developmental psychology in particular (e.g.,
see Reese & Overton, 1970). Although the models and methods
typically found within one view may not be the ones favored in another,
it is at least intellectually possible for scholars working within one
framework to understand the research of scholars using another
perspective.
Each approach is 'biased', if you will, toward a particular set of
models and methods; there is a (significantly) higher probability that
Method 'X' will be used by a scientist who adheres to Theory '!\. than
by a scientist who adheres to Theory 'B'. However, in that both share
a commitment to empiricism and to the scientific method (as it is
commonly understood within a given historical period), it is not the case
that a scientist who derives data from the use of one instance of the
scientific method cannot understand and evaluate the data derived from
another, albeit quite disparate instance. Wholwill provides compelling

examples of methodological cross-fertilization, that is, of data derived
from one theory-based study being used to provide support for an
empirical generalization associated with quite another theoretical
perspective.
Wohlwill labels, of course, the bias, or preference, for particular
methods used by adherents of particular theories 'partial-isomorphism'.
It is this partial isomorphism which accounts for the substantial correla-
tion that Wohlwill acknowledges exists between theory and method. In
turn, it is developmentalists' common membership in the community of
scientists adhering to the scientific method which leads them to under-
stand, and at least occasionally draw on, the data from methods not of
their preference; such use necessitates, as a consequence, that the
theory-method correlation always be less than perfect.
Indeed, if the theory-method correlation were not less than perfect,
developmental scientists could not ever hope to provide convergent and
discriminant validation for their ideas through the application of deriva-
tive multitrait-multimethod designs. The partial-isomorphism that
Wohlwill describes provides us, then, with some hope for future advan-
cement of the level of useful understanding of human development.
The concept implies that the discipline will not necessarily be
threatened with a theoretical solipsism, one derived from a situation
wherein only methods which can speak to the theory and no other are
used by adherents of a given perspective. Simply, then, by alerting us
to the existence and assets of the theory-method partial-isomorphism,
Wohlwill is explaining why and how our field can move beyond the
assessment of mere method variance in the study of behavioral develop-
ment.
In turn, Wohlwill's concept alerts us to another issue, that of the
problem of - if you will- theory variance. Partial-isomorphism exists
because there is a correlation, however imperfect, between theory and
method. Both in his chapter in this volume and in his earlier writings
(e.g., Wohlwill, 1973), Wohlwill alerts developmentalists to
... a tendency for those holding theoretical views inimical to a
particular framework to select methodologies that are inadequate for
dealing with the issues posed by the framework. A somewhat subtler
manifestation of the same principle is reflected in the choice of a
criterion in diagnosing a child's cognitive attainment of a given level
of cognitive functioning. Those committed to a Piagetian view ... are
much more likely to rely on a verbal justification of the child's
responses, and on the recognition of the necessity of the principle in
question (say, conservation) than are critics of this view, (Wohlwill,
this volume, p. 102).
Thus, consistent with the meta-message we infer that Jack Wohlwill
was providing, the concept of partial-isomorphism is explained as being
a quite complex one. Developmentalists' community within science
means that methods not high in one's preference hierarchy may never-
theless be used in a positive manner to advance one's theoretical
position. In turn, however, the array of methods thus available to a
scientist may lead to the selection of a particular method precisely
because it is not optimally suited to provide data suitable for the
falsification of one's position. Partial-isomorphism is, then, a double-
edged sword. It holds the promise that the study of behavioral develop-
ment can move beyond method variance; it holds the danger that our
science will be limited by the too frequent introduction of theory-
variance into our knowledge base.
The challenge Wohlwill sets for his colleagues is to remain open to
the array of methods and associated data sets of potential relevance to
any theoretical framework while, at the same time, to decide judiciously
and even-handedly about what linkages of theory and methods are most
useful for a given problem area. Professors McArdle and Valsiner, in
their comments on Wohlwill's chapter, clearly perceive and accept this
challenge. As such, their ideas present helpful emendations and exten-
sions of Wohlwill's presentation. We turn now to a discussion of their
remarks.
The Views of Professors McArdle and Valsiner

The commentaries of Professors J. J. McArdle and Jaan Valsiner
provide important extensions of the ideas of Wohlwill. It is useful to
turn first to the comments of Professor Valsiner.
A key point made by Valsiner is that the theory-method partial-
isomorphism inevitably involves the active role of the investigator
himself or herself; as a consequence, all the historical, contextual, and
ontogenetic variables which act on the people being studied act as well
on the people doing the studying. Thus, the 'data' of a study reflect
variance pertaining to both subjects and investigators. As Valsiner puts
it:
the notion of 'data construction' implies the active participation of
the investigator in the making of the 'data' on the basis of the
phenomena from which the former are derived (Valsiner, this
volume, p. 163).
We believe Wohlwill would concur with this point for at least two
reasons. First, Wohlwill himself sought to explore a similar link -
between the social values and political beliefs of psychologists working
in a specific historical era and the theories, methods, and 'facts' of
psychological functioning they generated; this exploration resulted in
his analysis of the content of German psychological journals under
National Socialism (Wohlwill, 1987). Second, and more to the point of
his chapter in this volume, Valsiner's argument is consonant with
Wohlwill's systemic view of the nature of the processes of human
development. That is, the scientist, as a person, cannot be regarded
appropriately as extricated, or alienated, from the system of person-con-
text relations he or she studies (cf. Riegel, 1975, 1976).
Embedding the scientist - replete with his or her cognitions,
emotions, values, culture, and politics - within the system of person-
context relations he or she is studying, as well as within the method-
theory partial isomorphism, helps both Valsiner and Wohlwill explain
why data alone are never sufficient to prompt a major theoretical 'switch
of allegiance' on the part of a scientist. Such a situation has the asset
of promoting scientific deference to ideas as well as to data. However,
the specter of the double-edged sword of partial-isomorphism is raised
again. Valsiner notes that systemic embedded ness of scientists may lead
(for example, for the political zeitgeist reasons reviewed by Wohlwill,
1987) to consensus among scientists about the 'facts' or 'truth' of human
development when, in actuality, such verity does not exist (see too
Lerner, in preparation).
Thus, there is a great deal of correspondence and useful supplemen-
tation by Valsiner of the ideas of Wohlwill. If one important point of
disagreement exists between the two, however, we believe it is that
Valsiner is skeptical that Wohlwill's promotion of multivariate
longitudinal research will afford the collection of data pertinent to the
systemic model of person-context relations Wohlwill advances. It is on
this point that it is useful to turn to the comments of Professor McArdle.
Throughout his chapter, Wohlwill was supportive of the theoretical
and methodological work associated with the life-span view of human
development (e.g., Baltes, 1987; Featherman, 1983; Lerner, 1984, 1986;
Nesselroade & Baltes, 1979; Nesselroade & Reese, 1983; Nesselroade
& von Eye, 1985). Although he did not see himself as among the group
of scholars associated with this perspective, Wohlwill contributed often

to the works of those who did associate themselves with this orientation
(e.g., Brim & Kagan, 1980; Magnusson & Allen, 1983). Many of these
scholars - ourselves included - were among his colleagues at Penn
State. Jack Wohlwill was too honest and had too much integrity not to
tell us where he believed we were going awry. But he was also too good
of a colleague and friend not to work selflessly to help us better our
work, even when he disagreed with it, and to promote himself those of
our efforts that he believed would benefit the field in general.
Jack Wohlwill thus both shaped and drew from the life-span
perspective and the developmental contextual model (Lerner, 1986;
Lerner & Kauffman, 1985) surrounding it. We believe that as a conse-
quence of these collegial exhanges Wohlwill was integral in the formula-
tion of the links between, on the one hand, a framework for
conceptualizing development as a reciprocal, person-context system
and, on the other, methodologies enabling a focus on change, on the
individual, and on the structure of intra- and inter-individual (including
physical ecological) relations. The complexity of these methodological
prescriptions understandably gives rise to skepticism about their
feasibility and appropriateness. Jack Wohlwill would have shared with
J aan Valsiner a 'wait and see' attitude about the ultimate value of
particular multivariate models for the advancement of theories of sys-
temic person-context relations.
Nevertheless, Jack Wohlwill always, somehow, was an optimist.
And he maintained great hope for and enthusiasm about the creative
methodological innovations of scholars such as McArdle. Indeed,
McArdle and Wohlwill agree about the key uses of dynamic, but
structural models of developmental change. Such tools, when used in
their optimal manner, promote scientists' articulation of a specific
causal model of developmental change. In addition, such procedures,
when coupled with longitudinal data about relations between people
and their contexts, foster an awareness of the need for change sensitive
designs and measures - involving both individuals and environments.
Thus, the models discussed by McArdle help promote the recognition
of the importance of a change-oriented, multivariate conceptualization
of the processes of human development.
However, as Wohlwill and Valsiner point out, and as McArdle
acknowledges, whether the dynamic, structural models McArdle and
others (e.g., Cattell, 1982; Humphreys & Revell, 1984) so creatively
continue to develop actually capture the essence of systemic person-

context relations remains in question. Wohlwill remained concerned
about whether such structural models could adequately represent what
is meant by a focus on the person-context reciprocal relation, as opposed
to the elements in the relation per se (cf. Lerner & Lerner, 1983, 1987;
Riegel, 1975, 1976). McArdle well recognizes the theoretical issue, and
we believe that Wohlwill would have been pleased by McArdle's presen-
tation of how his work on the FOCUS model may begin to address the
problem.
Of course, such work is not a final step, as McArdle is careful to
emphasize. Indeed, he notes that:
... the models ... are only rough outlines for the future organization
of individual differences in change into structural but dynamic
systems (McArdle, this volume, p. 152)
As do we, McArdle finds that Wohlwill's main message - about the
nature of the theory-method linkage - provides developmental
psychology with criteria enabling it to move into the future with an array
of conceptual and empirical tools making progress considerably more
probable. Given such a projection, it is appropriate that we turn to
some final statements about where an understanding of Joachim
Wohlwill and his work may lead us.
The Legacy of Joachim E Wohlwill

Jack Wohlwill's professional life was committed to integrating
theory and method in manners which he believed would optimize the
study of human development. In his personal life, Jack was devoted to
doing all he could to insure that humans' integration with their world
was optimal as well, in regard to the quality of their environment and
to the humaneness of the political institutions affecting their lives.
Moreover, and akin to the systemic person-context reciprocal inter-
action conception he forwarded in the present volume, Jack's life was
a model of the integration of these professional and personal concerns.
As a consequence, it is not surprising to us that Jack Wohlwill's life and
work parallel in many ways key themes in what is his last message to his
colleagues in developmental psychology.
Jack's early life, and that of his family, were caught in the sweep of
historical events too enormous for anyone individual to control. Yet,
to understand his life and, as well, his theoretical model and
methodological prescriptions for the study of human development, one
has to appreciate the links between the developing person and the
physical, social, and historical contexts through which he or she passes
across the life span.
Jack Wohlwilliearned from his personal history that the ideology of
a society and the 'facts of life' within it stand in a complex, changing,
and partially isomorphic relation. So too he cautions his colleagues to
understand that their world - of theory, method, and data - is even
more complex than it seems. He stresses that the links between theory
and method entail assets and liabilities, just as the relations between
people and their context involve, over time, both gains and losses
(Baltes, 1987).
In addition, Jack Wohlwilliearned that in his life he had to accept
and prepare for changes, both anticipated and unpredictable; that
despite the power, prerogatives, or policies of the state, the worth of
the individual, and his or her freedom and dignity, were of paramount
importance; and that to promote people's potential to prosper in the
face of the inevitable changes they would encounter, connections to
their physical and social worlds need to be understood and enhanced.
Similarly, Jack Wohlwill explains to his colleagues that, in order to
devise theories adequate for the understanding of human development,
as it occurs in its ecologically valid context: their methods need to focus
centrally on change, and as such must entail multilevel (i.e., person and
context) and hence multivariate longitudinal designs and change-
sensitive measures; their focus should be on the individual, and on his
or her intra- and inter-individual changes; and the goal of what should
be their explicitly linked theoretical and methodological endeavors
should be the modeling and analysis of the structure of individuals'
systemic, reciprocal relations to the contexts of their world.
Jack Wohlwill was a strong advocate of his ideas, both personal and
professional. He would argue today that adoption of the methodologi-
cal and theoretical prescriptions for which he calls would enrich not only
our discipline'S understanding of the reciprocal relations among
ontogenetic developments and contextual changes but, in so doing,
would further our appreciation of the integration of the scientist and
his or her theory and methods.
Certainly, he would recognize the difficult path he set for his
colleagues. And it is certain too that in a quiet, modest manner he
would, without rebuke to others, model, as both a scientist and as a
citizen, the optimal instances of the integrations of ideas, methods,

person, and context for which he called.
Jack Wohlwill's legacy to his science and to his society is singular
and significant. The elegiac tribute of Jack's longtime friend and Clark
University colleague, Seymour Wapner, is apt to recall here:
With Jack Wohlwill's death we have lost an outstanding human being
whose devotion to people, places, and profession has brought us a
few steps closer to an ideal world. (Wapner, 1987)
Indeed, if the future should witness the adoption of Jack Wohlwill's
theoretical and methodological prescriptions, our discipline and the
people we study will be significantly enriched by having more valid, more
useful knowledge of human development. If any of us should ever have
the opportunity to again know someone like Jack Wohlwill, then it is
our good fortunes and our lives which would be forever immeasurably
enriched.
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3
The Structure of Developmental Theoryl
Willis E Overton
SUMMARY: This paper explores the thesis that any theory is generated
out of a matrix of philosophical values. Evaluations of theories of
development presuppose the acknowledgement that any theory emerges
from an ontological and epistemological realist matrix, or, from an epis-
temological rationalist matrix. Theories are sets of propositions designed
to explain some domain. The realist matrix leads to developmental
theories that are particularistic, bottom up, inductive, and reductionistic.
These theories accept only causal or antecedent factors as ultimately
explanatory. Pattern explanations are viewed as reducible to such
material explanations. The rationalist matrix leads to developmental
theories that are universal, top down, retroductive, and holistic. These
theories offer pattern explanations as primary non-reducible modes of
explanation. Pattern-progressive explanations explain various levels of
organization in the developmental series. Material explanations, within
the rationalistic matrix, are understood as operating within the
framework established by the pattern explanations. The epistemological
rationalist approach to empirical scientific knowledge is compared and
contrasted with the current knowledge building activities called
hermeneutics and narrative knowing.
Introduction
An important question facing anyone interested in development is:
What would a good theory of development look like? A theory is an
1 An earlier abridged versionof this paper was presented for: Universals and Individuals.
Ninth advanced course ofthe Jean Pia get Archives Foundation 21-25 September, 1987,
Geneva University. I would like to thank Jay Efran, Bonnie Howard, and Robert Ricco
for making critical comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Elsa Efran
for her most helpful editorial assistance.
Willis F. Overton Department of Psychology, Temple University,

Philadelphia, PA 19122.

192 Willis F. Overton
interrelated set of propositions that are designed to explain some

domain, but, how would we know that we had a good theory if we were
in some way faced with one? The general aim of this paper is to explore
some answers to this question.
As a preliminary to examining issues concerning the nature of a
good theory, it is important to recognize that theory concerns
knowledge and there are several valid forms of knowledge including,
historical, theological, political, rhetorical, hermeneutic, narrative, and
empirical scientific knowledge. In fact, there are as many forms of
potentially valid knowledge as there are agreed-upon criteria for the
establishment of that knowledge. As a consequence, the knowledge
context within which a 'good' developmental theory will be understood
must be established immediately so as to avoid later confusions. That
is, one might offer a 'good' theological theory of development, or a
'good' historical theory of development, but for each of these the
criteria for 'good' knowledge would be different. For purposes of this
essay then, a good theory of development will be understood in the
context of empirical scientific knowledge. However, as will be discussed
later, a fully adequate understanding of a good empirical scientific
theory of development requires an analysis of the relation of this form
to other forms of knowledge.
The question to be addressed, then, is what would a good empirical
scientific theory of development look like and how would we know that
it is good? At a time not too terribly distant (i.e., the 1950s) this question
would have been easily answered. A good developmental theory, like
any good scientific theory was one that corresponded with the observed
facts; one that was induced from the facts; one that contained no excess
meaning beyond the facts; one that was tested and confirmed or falsified
by the observed facts; and one that allowed the prediction of new
observed facts. The requirement of 'no excess meaning' had a twofold
function. It not only kept theory close to the observed facts but it also
insured that general philosophical ideas would not intrude on the purity
of empirical science.
Over the past 30 plus years, however, there have been radical
changes in the way that science and scientific theory has come to be
understood. These changes, which emerged out of an absolutism of
'hard facts', have seemed at times headed for a relativism and solipsism
unchecked by any bounds. It is not surprising, therefore, that many who
wish to be considered empirical scientists have clung to the old
3 The Structure of Developmental Theory 193
absolutism in sometimes implicit and unreflective fashions while others

have rejected empirical science altogether and have moved to other
modes of knowing such as narrative knowing (e.g., Ricoeur, 1984;
Sarbin, 1986), or hermeneutic knowing (e.g., Habermas, 1971, 1979),
or rhetorical knowing (e.g., Harre, 1986).
Science and Values

In addressing the question of the form or structure of a good
empirical scientific theory of development, I want to claim that both the
old absolutism of facts and the new relativism of unchecked interpreta-
tion are yielding, at least in some areas of science, to more reasoned and
rational approaches. However, and this is a key point, these approaches
recognize that the establishment of scientific norms or rules necessarily
entail philosophical values and these values have a profound impact on
the aims, methodology, theories, and observational techniques of
science.
A major problem with making this claim that philosophical assump-
tions are intricately intertwined in our scientific activity is that
psychologists, and particularly American academic psychologists, have
operated - and generally continue to operate - on the principle that
philosophy is, at best, irrelevant to their discipline. This attitude estab-
lishes a paradox because this anti philosophy 'faith' itself arises out of
the philosophy of absolutism. Given this prevailing sentiment, a num-
ber of other paradoxes emerge in the field. One is that while there has
been a recent proliferation of 'theories' or 'models' in developmental
psychology, and particularly in cognitive developmental psychology,
there is an absence of clear-cut explicit standards by which to evaluate
them. 'Explicit' is used here with reason, because the other pole of this
paradox is that most psychologists implicitly employ some standards of
evaluation. However, without reflective criticism, such standards be-
come folk ways and vary in the most subjective of fashions. Thus, while
adhering to a philosophical value of absolutism, there is a tendency to
act in a most relativistic fashion.
A further paradox is that although virtually all developmental
psychologists assert that their discipline is an 'empirical science', few
articulate any very clear statements about exactly what this means today.
The result is a consistency of shared value and a relativism of the
meaning of that value.
Despite the problems involved in communicating such a message, I

will attempt to articulate the thesis that any rational empirical scientific
theory of development entails as much choice of philosophical values
as it does empirical support of observation. To be explicit, this claim is
that an understanding of the normative features of science, as they
include both metaphysical and epistemological commitments, is a
necessary prerequisite for the construction of any developmental
theory. Further, these normative features are central to an under-
standing of the relation between developmental theory and observa-
tional/experimental techniques or methods. I would further suggest
that many of the conceptual issues that are prevalent in developmental
psychology would be resolved or at least ameliorated if the general claim
were taken seriously.
Within the context of this general claim, I will discuss several value
issues as they apply to the construction and assessment of theory.
However, before systematically examining these issues, a concrete
example of just how philosophical values influence theory assessment
(i.e., our judgment of what a good theory looks like) will serve as a
preview to the general discussion. Following this example, a more
detailed schema will be elaborated in an effort to describe the role of
philosophical values in contemporary empirical scientific theory.
An example of the relation of value and theory assessment derives
from a criticism that is frequently heard today concerning Jean Piaget's
developmental theory. In essence, this criticism asserts that the theory
is critically flawed because it proposes universal explanations in the face
of the empirical observation that individual performance is highly vari-
able across tasks, situations, and occasions. Siegler articulates this form
of criticism in his assertion that:
... cognitive and developmental psychologists often have phrased
their models in terms that suggested that all people, or at least all
people of a given age, performed a given task in a given way. These
models defy the every day observation that people often perform a
given task in different ways on different occasions (Siegler & Shipley,
1987, p. 73).
This criticism, involves a conflict between the universals contained
in Piaget's theory, as well as in a number of other developmental
theories, and the particulars emphasized by critics. Although the
criticism appears to be a simple statement of objective fact, at a deeper
level it reflects a basic difference between philosophical values
associated with conflicting approaches to theory construction.
In other words, the stated contlict between universals offered as

explanations in Piaget's theory and particulars found in observation is
a conceptual contlict, not a perceptual one. To put the matter quite
directly, the contlict here is a surrogate for the ancient philosophical
contlict over universalism versus nominalism. This is the question of
whether abstract universals are to be taken as 'the real', and particulars
taken as 'appearance', or vice versa.
If it were accepted that contemporary science begins from an initial
value assumption of maintaining that abstract universals are 'the real'
(i.e., that which is not dependent on something else) then universals are
to be offered as theoretical explanations of the particulars. In this case
Piaget, Heinz Werner, and others (e.g., proponents of contemporary
psychoanalytic theory in both its object relations and ego psychology
versions) who frame explanations as universals offer a viable scientific
approach, and the original criticism is absurd. If, on the other hand, it
were accepted that contemporary science begins from an initial value
assumption of maintaining that particulars are 'the real', then theoreti-
cal explanation must ultimately remain at the level of the particular. In
this scenario, universals could be considered, at best, nothing more than
complex particulars that are completely reducible to simple particulars.
As a consequence, if the 'particulars as real' assumption were accepted,
bottom up models such as the one described by Siegler would be viewed
as offering a more viable scientific approach. In either case it is clear
that it is philosophical value assumptions and not empirical observations
that frame and determine the debate.
In considering this discussion on the relation between universals and
particulars in contemporary developmental theory, recognize that I do
not necessarily identify 'the real' with material existence as is frequently
done today when people speak of metaphysical 'realism'. That is,
'particulars' in the foregoing argument refer to items that are present
to consciousness at some time and/or place. No philosopher that I know
of, whether universalist or nominalist, denies material existence. How-
ever,material existence mayor may not be 'the real', depending upon
the philosophical system in which it is considered. Thus, as discussed
by Stace (1924), depending upon initial value assumptions, it is quite
reasonable to have the case in which material existence is not 'the real',
and 'the real' does not have material existence. This does not deny
existence of tables, chairs, persons, or even thoughts, and emotions. It
simply claims that these particulars are explained by universals, and this
indeed is the position of both Piaget's theory and a number of other

contemporary developmental theories. On the other hand, it is also
reasonable, given a different set of initial value assumptions, to have
the case in which only material existence is considered 'the real', and
this appears to be the basic, if often implicit, position of several contem-
porary information processing approaches.
The whole issue just discussed in terms of universalism versus
nominalism could as easily be reframed as a debate between idealism
and materialism. Here again the question is what is to be taken as 'the
real'? Contrary to popular opinion, idealists do not argue that only
ideas exist. On the contrary, idealists argue that matter exists but
universal forms constitute 'the real'. Materialists argue that matter
constitutes 'the real'. If space allowed, I would elaborate on the
influence of the value assumptions of universalism versus nominalism
and idealism versus materialism in other areas of contemporary theory
construction. For example, these values also frame the issue of why
some psychologists argue against general (universal) theories and in
favor of limited (nominal) theories; and why some argue against theory
entirely and maintain that description is the legitimate goal of the
science; and why some argue against general principles that explain
development such as the 'equilibration process' or the 'orthogenetic
principle' (universalism) and maintain that such principles must them-
selves be explained by individual causal agents (see, e.g., Flavell, 1985,
p. 290). However, a more productive approach to considering
philosophical assumptions as they impact on developmental theory and
method is to turn more directly to the general question of what a good
theory of development should look like and how we would know it.
These questions will be examined by developing a scheme concerning
the nature, aims, and methods of empirical science.
In discussing aims and methods, it is again important to point out
that my comments will be limited primarily to empirical science, rather
than to other knowledge forms or even other types of scientific
knowledge forms such as historical-hermeneutic or critical hermeutic
science (Gadamer, 1977; Habermas, 1971, 1979). This is not meant to
deny the important contemporary impact that hermeneutic philosophy
is having on the social sciences, nor is it to deny that insights from
hermeneutic (i.e., interpretation of meaning) reflections will influence
our understanding of development. However, most investigators who
have produced or conducted research in the context of contemporary
3 The Stmcture of Developmental Theory 197
theories of development also subscribe to the view that they are empiri-
cal scientists. A discussion of the standards of this form of knowledge
therefore represents at least a 'practical', if not an 'emancipatory'
interest in communicating with this group. Finally, I should note that I
will make no major distinctions between the physical sciences, the
biological sciences, and the social sciences. Although such distinctions
are often made (e.g., Habermas, 1971; Mayr, 1982) I suspect that they
originate primarily from an historical rather than a contemporary reflec-
tion on the norms of science and the changes that have occurred in these
norms are specifically one of the issues of this essay.
Philosophy and Science

The philosophy of science is that arena of inquiry devoted to the
discovery of norms or general rules of science. These are rules that
propose to distinguish science from other human activities and that
offer guidance for choosing between competing theories. The
philosopher of science begins from the assumption that science is a
rational activity (i.e., that scientists do follow reasons or rules even if
they are implicit and not consciously articulated). If this initial assump-
tion of the philosophy of science is rejected then science becomes a
random or irrational activity in which 'anything goes' and anything can
occur under the rubric 'science'. Such a state of affairs would obviously
not only undercut the philosophy of science, it would make vacuous the
very idea of science. It is for this reason that various forms of apparent
scientific relativism such as those proposed by Kuhn and Feyerabend
have been subjected to intense criticism (Putnam, 1983).
Aims of Science
Among philosophers of science and empirical scientists alike one
finds virtual agreement that science is a human activity directed toward
the general aim of establishing a systematic body of knowledge control-
led by observational evidence. That is, science aims at organized
knowledge that represents patterns of relationships among phenomena
and processes of the observed world. These patterns constitute
explanations of the phenomena and processes under consideration.
Further, to be properly scientific, the explanations must have implica-
tions that are at least indirectly accessible to observational/experimental
test.
This statement about empirical test does not mean or imply that the
explanations are directly confirmable or falsifiable. Indeed, it is
generally agreed today that theoretical propositions cannot be
confirmed or falsified. This position - known as the Duheim-Quine
thesis - runs counter to the more traditional falsification position
proposed earlier by Popper, and it represents a rather strong consensus
among contemporary philosophers of science (see Overton, 1984). The
position does not assert that theories cannot be evaluated empirically
and it does not assert that specific experimental hypotheses cannot be
falsified. Indeed, they can be (O'Brien, Costa & Overton, 1986). It
asserts that theories themselves cannot be falsified and hence theory
falsification cannot be used as a method of appraising whether a theory
is good or bad. Thus, to suggest that a theory or some portion of a theory
(e.g., psychoanalytic theory, or Piaget's equilibration principle, or
Werner's orthogenetic principle) is irrefutable or non falsifiable is
tautological and not, in itself, relevant to the issue of the value of the
theory.
To state the general aim of science in a broader context: It is to bring
order and organization into the chaos of everyday experience. There are
also more specific aims of science but, as we will see, these bring in
controversial features and must be discussed following a consideration
of the origin of scientific knowledge.
The Origin of Scientific Activity

Where does this systematic knowledge that constitutes science
begin? Again, there is uniform agreement across a wide spectrum of
philosophical systems that this knowledge begins in the chaos and flux
of what we call 'common-sense' (see Nagel, 1967, 1979; Pepper, 1942;
Wartofsky, 1968). As Nagel states, '~l scientific inquiry takes its
departure from common-sense beliefs and distinctions, and eventually
supports its findings by falling back on common-sense" (1967, p. 6).
Pepper (1942) has articulated the nature of the common-sense that
forms the starting point. Common-sense occurs with respect to some
domain of interest or domain of inquiry. Thus, for example, the domain
that leads to the scientific discipline called psychology begins from
common-sense beliefs and distinctions concerning behaviors, emotions,
and mental processes. The discipline called developmental psychology
begins from common-sense beliefs and distinctions concerning changes
in the behaviors, emotions, and mental processes. Given these general
domains of interest or inquiry, common-sense knowledge includes the
following examples: adults have a language and young children do not;
young children reason differently than adults; children imitate their
parents; children avoid imitating their parents; the adolescent is more
responsible than the child; the adolescent is less responsible than the
child; children learn through rote training; children learn through their
active discovery; children become the kinds of adults they do because
of the way parents train them; children become the kinds of adults they
do as a product of their genetic makeup.
The three primary characteristics of such common-sense, as sug-
gested by Pepper are (a) common-sense is not cognizable, (b) common-
sense is secure, and (c) common-sense is cognitively irritable. By not
being cognizable, Pepper means that any attempts to describe or clearly
specify common-sense takes us away from it. Thus, for example,
behavior is common-sense, but neither B. E Skinner's nor Jean Piaget's
representations of behavior are common-sense. By being secure,
Pepper means that it is never lacking. When one gives up actively
attempting to know, it is then that one knows in a common-sense
fashion. In fact, it seems to be this security that people equate with 'the
real world' or 'reality'. That 'the real world' is a significant feature of
common-sense whereas philosophical 'realism' is an arguable abstract
doctrine generates a great deal of confusion. That is, it is extremely
difficult for people to recognize that one can reject the doctrine of
'realism' while at the same time accepting the common sense security
of 'a real world'. This is an important point to keep in mind when the
doctrine of 'realism' is discussed in a later section. The final charac-
teristic of common-sense is that it is cognitively irritable. That is, if one
tries to focus attention on it, it becomes vague, contradictory, and
muddled. Or to say the same thing in a slightly different way, common-
sense is the flux or the chaos.
From Common-sense to Scientific Knowledge

The path of empirical science then is relatively straightforward and,
again, noncontroversial. There is uniform agreement that science
begins in common-sense observations (the empirical feature of empiri-
cal science) and moves to systematized knowledge that brings order and
organization into this flux. This systematized knowledge is composed
of patterns of relationships constituting explanation. The next question
is, how, or by what route does scientific activity move from common-
sense to scientific knowledge. It is here, however, that specific

philosophical value assumptions and conflict begin to assert themselves
in a much more critical fashion.
Although the story is actually more complex, it may without serious
injustice, be said that two general routes have been proposed for the
journey from common-sense to scientific knowledge. These routes are
presented graphically in Figure 1. The first route implicates values of
metaphysical realism, empiricism, materialism, induction, nominalism,
physicalism, positivism, reductionism. The second implicates values of
pragmatism, rationalism, idealism, universalism, abduction and
retroduction. These routes will be called (a) The route of ontological
and epistemological realism, and (b) the route of epistemological
rationalism. Each of these routes will now be considered in turn.
Route of Realism
The route of ontological and epistemological realism begins with
the assertion of the philosophical value assumption that there lurks
beneath the flux of common-sense an ultimate fIXed, stable, invariant
base that is independent of any observer. Armed with this assumption
the path to scientific knowledge becomes quite clear. The job of the
scientist is to cut through or peel away the chaos or flux until arriving
at the stable, fIXed, objective base. At this point, the 'the real' order will
appear and neutral propositions describing particular causal, or antece-
dent-consequent, or functional relations will constitute explanation.
The assumption of an ultimate fIXed base is the assumption called
'metaphysical realism' or 'objectivism'. As an ontological position this
assumption generally involves the claims that (a) matter or substance is
the ultimate existent (i.e., materialism); (b) the nature of matter is
ultimately fIXed, stable, and invariant, and (c) 'the real' and this matter
are identical. The ontological position has also been referred to as the
philosophy of 'being' (Heisenberg, 1958; Overton, 1984; Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984). Ontological realism constitutes the underlying basic
assumption of this route to scientific knowledge. Indeed, this route
makes ontology logically prior to epistemology. That is, the ontology
determines the kind of statements that have epistemic warrant. How-
ever, because science concerns knowledge, it is the epistemological
aspect of realism that often becomes the focus of philosophical atten-
tion.
A. Route of Realism
Common Sense Observation (Observation)

t
Fixed Unchanging Reality (Data-Test)
Antecedent-Consequent: Antecendent-Consequent (Theory)
B. Route of Rationalism
Guiding Metaphor
f---~Constructed Universal Principles

(Theory)
Constructed Theoretical Principles
ObservationallTheoretical Hypotheses (Data-Test)
Common Sense Observation
Figure 1. Establishing order and organization from chaos of

common sense experience.
Epistemological realism is the position that what we know and

perceive exists independently of our cognitive and perceptual activity.
When it is added that this knowledge comes through observation (and
only through observation) the epistemological position is referred to as
'empiricism'. Thus, on this assumption, because knowledge is concep-
tual, the propositions, terms, and sentences that constitute explanations
must match or correspond with the ultimate ontological fIxed substance.
Truth is defIned with respect to this correspondence. This has tradition-
ally been referred to as the cOITespondence theory of troth.
Whether to employ the assumptions of metaphysical and epis-
temological realism has been and continues to be a hotly contested issue
in both philosophy and science (see, e.g., Harre, 1986; Lepin, 1984). In
support of asserting this value the philosopher Suppe, for example,
argues that
Underlying most contemporary work on the growth of scientific

knowledge ... is the basic assumption that science can and does yield
knowledge descriptive of how the world really is .... Thus a strong
commitment to both a metaphysical realism and an epistemological
realism is characteristic of the new philosophy of science today
(Suppe, 1977, p. 652).
The particular version of realism supported by Suppe (see also,

Shapere, 1977) is entirely consistent with the position that has been
sketched here but it is referred to as 'historical realism'. This version
maintains that the constraints exerted by the underlying fixed substance
on explanatory propositions increase across history. Thus, according to
this position, historically earlier explanatory efforts were rough
approximations to the truth and these approximations become more
and more accurate as science progresses. This version shows some
contrasts to earlier versions which as a group were referred to as logical
empiricism or logical positivism. Logical empiricism attempted to tie
terms and sentences to the fixed base in an unambiguous fashion and
failed. Historical realism offers more subtle arguments concerning a
theory of reference. These arguments maintain that, as Johnson (1987)
points out, "Since science does progress, we must be getting closer to
telling the truth about the way the world is; so there must be some
mapping relation connecting our language to 'the world' (p. 201)."
In contrast to Suppe's positive assessment of the contemporary role
of realism, Fine maintains:
Realism is dead ... Its death was hastened by the debates over the
interpretation of quantum theory, where Bohr's nonrealist
philosophy was seen to win out over Einstein's passionate realism.
Its death was certified, finally, as the last two generations of physical
scientists turned their backs on realism and have managed, neverthe-
less, to do science successfully without it (Fine, 1984, p. 83).
In the scientific arena, Monod (1974) was a recent champion of the

realistic, objectivist assumption in biology; P. M. Churchland, (1979,
1981) and P. S. Churchland (1986) have used the realist assumption to
argue for an eliminative materialism designed to reduce all psychologi-
cal explanation to the physical explanation of neuroscience; and Beilin
(1984) - in his endorsement of the position of Suppe and Shapere-
has suggested that the assumption of realism is basic to the new
functionalism appearing in cognitive and developmental psychology.
Of those philosophers opposing the assumptions of ontological and
epistemological realism, Rorty (1979; 1982), Fine (1984), Laudan
(1984), and Johnson (1987) have, in different ways, developed major
critiques of realist claims. Also, Hilary Putnam (1981, 1983, 1987), once
a strong advocate of metaphysical realism, now rejects this perspective
which he calls the 'God's Eye' view. Putnam (1981) states that, "On this
perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind--
independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete descrip-
tion of 'the way the world is'" (p. 49). However, with respect to this
view, Putnam (1983) asserts "I concluded that metaphysical realism ...
is incoherent" (p. 85). And, "There is no God's Eye point of view that
we can know or usefully imagine ... " (Putnam, 1981, p. 50).
In science, arguments against realist assumptions are made by
Eddington (1958), Heisenberg (1958), and Davies (1980; 1983) in
physics; Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) in thermodynamics;
Stolzenberg (1984) in mathematics; Bertalanffy (1968), and Maturana
and Varela (1980, 1987) in biology; and von Foerster (1984) in
neurophysiology. In social psychology Gergen and Gergen (1986) have
critiqued realist assumptions, as has Barratt (1984) with respect to
contemporary psychoanalytic theory. And in cognitive and develop-
mental psychology Overton (1984, 1985) has suggested alternative
approaches to the realistic functionalism described by Beilin. However,
perhaps the most extensive recent critique of realist assumptions is
presented by linguist George Lakoff (1987) in his analysis of the nature
of categorical thought and reasoning.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
AND
METAPHYSICAL
VALUES
THEORIES & .~_ _ _m_ust harmonize .. AIMS OF

TECHNIQUES ----.,. SCIENCE
METHODS
OF
THEORY
APPRAISAL
Figure 2
Realism and aims, methods, and theories of science. It was sug-

gested earlier that the adoption of specific philosophical assumptions
influences the specific aims of science, the nature of scientific theories,
and the methods of theory appraisal. Laudan (1984) has articulated a
general schema - called the "reticulated model of scientific rationality"
- that identifies the interdependency among aims, theories, and
methods. Figure 2 represents an elaboration of that schema to include
3 The Structure of Developmental Theory 20S
ONTOLOGICAL & EPISTEMOLOGICAL

REALISM
EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS
DRAWN FROM FACTS BY TRUTH
OBSERVATIONAL & -44~ (Corres-
EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES pondence)
INDUCTION
REDUCTIONISM
CAUSAL ANALYSIS
Figure 3
the influence of epistemological and metaphysical factors on the

scientific.
Figure 3 illustrates the influence of realist assumptions on the
formulation of specific aims of science, specific methods of theory
appraisal, and the nature of scientific theory. With respect to aims,
realist assumptions operate to inject new meaning into, and hence
transform, the relatively neutral scientific aim described earlier (i.e.,
systematized body of knowledge controlled by observational

experience). Through this transformational effect, the aim of science
becomes that of attempting to achieve ever truer theories about the
world (Popper, 1959). This aim, in turn, establishes the defining context
for a set of aim appropriate methodology rules for theory appraisal.
That is, in addition to broad criteria - not included in Figure 3 -
concerning scope, depth, empirical support, and, fruitfulness that are
rather directly implied by the original relatively neutral definition,
realistic criteria include: (a) the meaning of explanations must be
limited to specific reference (i.e., excess or surplus meaning or inter-
pretation is avoided), and (b) explanations must involve particularistic
material causal terms or direct inductive generalizations from these. It
is then, no accident that the type of theories generated within this
overall schema will be understood to entail only empirical generaliza-
tions drawn from the facts via direct observation and experimental
manipulations.
It is also not accidental that exactly these realist criteria for theory
appraisal of material reductionism and strict induction formed the rules
designed to demarcate science from non-science during the era of
positivism and conventionalism (see, Lakatos, 1978; Laudan, 1977,
1984; Overton, 1984, 1985). Finally, the realistic assumptions and the
realist-generated rules for theory appraisal that have led to various
forms of 'functionalism' (Beilin, 1984) and many 'information process-
ing approaches'.
Realism and developmental theory. If this path from common-
sense to scientific knowledge is taken, what then does our good
developmental theory begin to look like? Most significantly, given the
realist generated pressures for analysis, reduction, and particulars, over
synthesis, integration, and universals, the theory will quite clearly be one
that is generated from ever closer observations of what 'children
actually do'. In other words it will increasingly be based on further and
further micro-analyses of specific behaviors in specific circumstances.
Whether these analyses are labeled 'contextualist', 'functionalist', or
'interactionist' will have little impact on the nature of the theory thus
generated. In the most extreme case, theory will, in fact, be denigrated
completely and attempts will be made to enlist support for greater
descriptive efforts (Sugarman, 1987a). Here, the realist belief that if
we just look closely enough (i.e., describe), we will eventually see the
order of cause-effect relations finds its ultimate, if scientifically
anachronistic, expression.
Task analysis and rule assessment techniques as employed by

information-processing approaches (e.g., Kail & Bisanz, 1982) are
prototypical of the types microanalytic techniques that are favored in
generating theory from assumptions of realism. It is also the case that
realism influences investigators to employ newly developed correla-
tional techniques such as causal modeling for purposes of data snooping
rather than hypothesis testing. That is, because realism directs the
investigator away from interpretation and toward observational analysis
and reduction, both these newer correlational techniques as well as
traditional experimental techniques tend to be treated as methods of
observation rather than as methods of testing interpretations. Here,
the methodological situation is not unlike the case described by
Eddington (1958) of the sculptor who claims that there is a horse hidden
inside his block of marble. Then taking his tools (methods) he chips
away and chips away until he finally 'finds' the horse.
It is fair to say then that developmental theory generated via realism
as mediated by correlational and experimental techniques will not be a
general theory. Because of the necessity of remaining close to obser-
vations-descriptions and because observations-descriptions vary across
situations, developmental theory virtually must, from this perspective,
consist of a multiplicity of mini generalizations about mini-domains.
The hope here, of course, is that these minis will ultimately generalize
and provide the broad or universal scope of explanation that is neces-
sarily implied in an understanding of science as 'systematic' or
'organized' knowledge. In an examination of contemporary theories of
cognitive development Kessen captures the spirit of both the hope and
the skepticism demonstrated here:
Psychologists often make obeisance toward the notion of a summary

integration, a grand synthesis .... But the historical fact is that analysis
begets further analysis .... The zest for analysis and for particulars
may lie close to the center of American psychology's unspoken creed
(Kessen, 1984, p. 11).
Indeed, this often unspoken creed is the faith called ontological and
epistemological realism.
The failure to arrive at generalizations, a summary integration, or a
grand synthesis, is seldom understood as a failure of this creed of realism
and hence a potentially flawed faith that the totality of science is an
analytic, reductionistic, inductive enterprise. Instead the failure has
tended to spur realist inspired investigators to further creed consistent

action. Like treasure hunters who are convinced that pearls are to be
found by mining deep in the ground, one group relentlessly continues
digging in the same hole or domain while proclaiming that with the
assistance of newly developed digging tools they will soon reach the
treasure. A second group also uses the new digging tools but tries a new
hole. Thus, as frustrations increase and the hope for the treasure fades,
this group switches from the cognitive hole to the social hole, from the
thinking hole to the emotional hole, to the action hole. A third group
abandons all searches for the pearls of empirical scientific knowledge
and declares that other goals are worthier. For this group, the ultimate
goal remains a precious commodity called systematic knowledge, but it
is no longer the pearls of empirical knowledge.
Another way of expressing this view of the nature of developmental
theory as framed within the context of realistic assumptions is to say that
explanations of development will be quite compatible with the old ideals
of positivism and conventionalism (Overton, 1984). They will consist
of sets of propositions that (a) correspond with particular observed
facts, (b) present at least the promise that excess meaning beyond the
facts will ultimately be reduced to the trivial, (c) are induced from the
facts, (d) are directly tested and confirmed or falsified by the observed
facts, and (e) allow the prediction of new observed facts.
Meanings of realism. Before concluding this discussion of the path
from common-sense to scientific knowledge byway of realist metaphysi-
cal and epistemological assumptions, a point of clarification needs to be
made concerning the multiple meanings of the term 'real' in philosophy.
The quest to establish 'the real' (i.e., that which is not dependent upon
or reducible to anything other than itself [Stace, 1924, p. 30]), as
distinguished from 'appearance' has a history as long as written
philosophy. As mentioned earlier, across the course of this history there
have been systems in which 'the real' has been identified with material
existence, as in the cases just discussed. There have also been systems
that have identified 'the real' with forms (universals) that purport to
explain existence (particulars). Kant's "critical realism" for example,
asserts an ontological identity between 'the real' and existence (the
thing-in-itself) but this was considered unknowable and hence of little
value to science. Kant's epistemology, on the other hand, asserts an
identity between 'the real' and forms of knowing. As a consequence
this epistemology is not a 'realism' as discussed earlier, but a form of
rationalism (i.e, knowledge as the product of both the activity of mind

and the context of material existence).
The reason it is important to understand that 'the real' and hence
'realism' can have these divergent meanings is that influential contem-
porary authors such as Putnam, Johnson, and Lakoff retain the label
'realism' while moving their position to Kant's epistemology. Putnam
(1983, p. 85) in fact, is quite explicit in acknowledging his move to a
Kantian position but he calls his newly developed position "internal
realism" and states:
I shall refer to it as the internalist perspective, because it is charac
teristic of this view to hold that what objects does the world consist
of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or
description .... '1tuth', in an internalist view, is some sort of (ideal.
ized) rational acceptability - some sort of ideal coherence of our
beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences
are themselves represented in our beliefsystem - and not correspon
dence with mind-independent 'states of affairs' (Putnam, 1981, pp.
49-50).
Lakoff (1987) takes an almost identical position and calls it
"experiential realism". The important point to remember is that, these
latter usages of the term, 'realism' stand in direct opposition to the
meaning of 'realism' that identifies 'the real' with material existence.
On the other hand, both Putnam's and Lakoff's meanings are highly
compatible with the route to scientific knowledge to be discussed next.
I suspect that retaining the term 'realism' for an antithetical position
represents a desire to demonstrate that the new forms of empirical
science are not turning away from the 'real world' (i.e., the secure world
of common-sense) or from a similar 'reality'. Johnson provides support
for this suspicion when he states:
Putnam is not an idealist, or an anti-realist, for whom there is nothing
'outside us'. 10 deny that there are things existing independent of us
(of perceivers) is a ridiculous view. Putnam ... grants, of course, that
we live, move, and have our being within an environment populated
with physical things (Johnson, 1987, p. 202).
The problem with retaining the label while changing the value is
that it increases the difficulty in making clear cut and important distinc-
tions. No one, neither confirmed idealist nor anti-realist, denies a real
world (the world of common-sense) although each may deny that this
is the 'real' in the philosophical sense. It is also the case that this real
world of common-sense needs to be explained. 'Realism' is an arguable
doctrine that maintains how this world is to be explained. The next
section offers a different doctrine with implications that diverge sig-

nificantly from this one. To call both positions 'realism' might offer a
sense of security but it is cognitively disruptive.
Route of Rationalism
Interpretation. Let us then turn to the second route - the route
of epistemological rationalism - in the movement from common-sense
understanding to scientific knowledge (see Figure 1). This route, of
course, involves a rejection of metaphysical and epistemological
realism. As a consequence, this route does not lead to attempts to
discover the order and organization within finer and finer observation-
al-descriptive analyses. Instead, this route begins with the acceptance
of the philosophical value that it is through human activity, and specifi-
cally the human activity of constructing interpretations that order and
organization will be established in the flux and chaos of every day reality
or every day common-sense experience. Interpretation provides the
order, and interpretation constitutes the explanation, which will itself
be assessed in an observational context.
Accepting interpretation as a basic irreducible value in this route to
scientific knowledge, has several consequences. First, it demonstrates
a clear and definitive epistemological conflict with the realist route. In
the realist route, an essential component of methodology was to
ultimately drive out any interpretation in order to arrive at a bedrock
of hard, unchanging, 'descriptive' facts. In the present route interpret-
ation is a necessary feature of methodology. The epistemological
assumption that establishes the necessity of interpretation is
rationalism. This, following Kant rather than Descartes, asserts that all
forms of human knowing originate in human activity, and scientific
knowing is as much a product of the activity of mind as a product of the
activity of observation.
Although the rationalist assumption has a long history, its impact on
the norms of science has been most influential since the early 1960's
(see Overton, 1984). It was at that time that Hanson (1958) began a
process that ultimately led to a reformulation of the norms of science
by arguing that all data, including the data of observation are 'theory
laden' (i.e., necessarily interpretative) and hence erasing the realist
clear demarcation between descriptive facts and interpretations.
Following this, Kuhn (1962, 1977) presented his now famous - or
infamous, depending upon one's interpretation - thesis that science is
dominated by interpretative paradigms and these influence both obser-

vational data and the methodology of theory choice. This argument has,
in turn, been critically analyzed and further developed in works by Imre
Lakatos (1978), Larry Laudan (1977, 1984), and Hilary Putnam (1981,
1983, 1987).
The contlict between the realist methodology of driving out inter-
pretation to arrive at an absolutistic objective fIXed base of descriptive
facts, and the rationalist methodology of insisting on the necessity of
interpretation, is reflected in debates on subjectivity and relativism in
science. Clearly, if any interpretation were acceptable than the
rationalist assumption would lead to an ultimate solipsism. This issue
of relativism and subjectivity has been the realist point of attack against
the rationalist assumption, and it has been the rationalist point of
departure for further elaborations. The realist Suppe (1977), and
Beilin (1984), for example, have argued that historically the interpreta-
tive paradigms approach to science - also called 'Weltanschauung' or
'world view' approach - represents a critically flawed attempt to
remedy problems with earlier realist approaches - called the 'received
view' - which is identical with logical empiricism, positivism, and
conventionalism. From their realist position, these authors then argue
that the rationalist world view approach has been recognized for its
subjectivist and relativistic inadequacies and has come to be replaced by
the more adequate historical realism described earlier. On the other
hand, the more rationalistically inclined Laudan (1977, 1984), for
example, while recognizing the potential relativistic dangers of a world
view approach, rejects realism and argues for the modified
'Weltanschauung' described earlier and presented in modified form in
Figure 2. This modified position greatly reduces the potential relativism
while recognizing that it can never be eliminated.
Relationship of epistemology to ontology. A second consequence
of accepting interpretation as an irreducible value in the route from
common-sense to scientific knowledge is that epistemology explicitly
comes to take logical precedence over ontology. That is, if interpret-
ation is basic then science must indeed be, first and foremost, an
epistemic activity. As an epistemic activity, science cannot be reduced
to some particular ontological substance. In fact, from this position, the
ontological entities that are presumed to populate the world must be
the products of epistemic activity rather than the other way around.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
RATIONALISM
INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES
via IMAGINATIVE SPECULATION PROBLEM
ASSESSED BY OBSERVATIONAL & SOLVING
EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES
COHERENCE
INTELLIGIBILITY
MAXIMUM PROBLEM REDUCTION
Figure 4
This logical priority of epistemology over ontology is extremely

important for an understanding of any science, and perhaps an example
will clarify the point. Physics has, at various times and various places,
understood the ultimate nature of substance to be either fIxed,
permanent, and unchanging, or to be active, impermanent, and chang-
ing. From a realist perspective, one of these is the ultimate discoverable
'really real'. However, from a rationalist perspective, both are epistemic
constructions. Thus, an ontological fIxed substance (i.e., the philosophy
of being) or an ontological flux of impermanent activity (i.e., a
philosophy of becoming) are each, according to the rationalist assump-
tion, products of particular interpretative frameworks. Physicists
decide (an epistemic activity) that one or the other ontology (or perhaps
both, as in issues of complementarity) is the most adequate with respect
to various unsolved problems. They do not perceive that one or the
other presents 'the real'.
This logical priority of epistemology over ontology also invalidates
any proposed scientifIc approach that suggests ontological reduction as
a methodological goal. Thus, as Putnam (1983) points out, from this
perspective, both positivism and historicism were "heroic attempts to
do the impossible, to reduce epistemic notions to non-epistemic no-
tions" (p. 290). A major implication here that should be strongly
underscored is that scientifIc explanation, in general, is an epistemic
activity and consequently is not susceptible to ontological reduction.
Acceptance of this point forces recognition that scientifIc explanation
need not be limited to material causal factors such as genes, brain states,
environmental forces, or social-political contexts. ScientifIc explana-
tion may quite legitimately employ pattern type explanations in the
sense of general noncausal principles. This important issue will be
elaborated later.
Rationalism and aims, methods, and theories of science. Figure 4
illustrates the influence of the assumption of epistemological
rationalism on the formulation of specific aims of science, specifIc
methods of theory appraisal, and the nature of scientifIc theory. If
interpretation constitutes an irreducible starting point in the rationalist
route, and if, as a consequence, epistemic notions take logical
precedence over ontology, then the notion of truth as a correspondence
between theoretical propositions and an underlying fixed reality loses
meaning. With this loss of meaning, the correspondence defInition of
truth fades as a formative influence on the defIning characteristics of
the aims of science, methods of theory appraisal, and nature of scientifIc
theory. Rather than science having the specified aim of developing ever
truer theories, within the rationalist route the aim of science takes a
more pragmatic turn. Science aims at empirical and conceptual
problem solutions (Laudan, 1977).
Here again, as was the case with realism, the specific scientific aim
that derives from epistemological and metaphysical commitments in
tum influences the nature of methodological rules employed in judging
theory. Here, in addition to broad criteria - not included in Figure 4
- concerning scope, depth, empirical support, and fruitfulness, prag-
matic criteria include that explanations be coherent (coherence criteria
of truth), logically consistent, intelligible, and that they reduce the
proportion of unsolved to solved conceptual and/or empirical problems
in a domain (Laud an, 1977).
Rationalism and developmental theory. We now return to the
question of what our good scientific theory of development begins to
look like when it is formulated within this rationalist scientific path (see
Figures 1 and 4). Here, as in the realist route, we begin from everyday
common-sense observation or 'the real world'. But here, rather than
greater and greater micro-analyses of tasks and situations, or greater
and greater description, we are encouraged to generate interpretations,
principles, or rules that bring coherence and intelligibility to our obser-
vations and reduce their problem content. Consider, for example the
following possible common-sense observation: The reasoning of the
young child tends to be fragmentary, concrete, and easily influenced by
perceptual events while the reasoning of adults tends to be logically
coherent, is less easily swayed by perceptual events, and often involves
matters of principle. As we reflect on this common-sense observation
- that is as we move away from it as a common-sense observation -
we can readily understand that it is contradictory and confusing. It
appears that the adult is somehow different from the child, but yet the
same as the child. Further, this observation may also clash with the
common-sense of others. This state of affairs clearly constitutes a
general problem that demands a scientific solution.
What kind of interpretation, explanation, or theory might be offered
here? Rather than giving a specific interpretation at this point we will
explore some of its general characteristics as framed by the rationalist
scientific perspective. First, the interpretation would not be an empiri-
cal generalization arrived at by inductive inference, nor would it be the
product of hypothetical-deductive inference. The primacy of these
modes of inference is a story told by realists in their efforts to reduce
interpretation to an objectivist, fixed, external reality, or to make inter-
pretation extrascientific. The primary mode of inference employed in
the rationalist path has been called, following C. S. Pierce, and N. R.
Hanson, 'retroduction' (also called the 'logic of abduction' by Pierce),

and a modified version of this is called 'inference to the best
explanation'. In this mode the scientist observes phenomena and
actively constructs interpretations that, in the light of all the available
background information, would most plausibly explain the phenomena.
The assertion that retroduction is the primary mode of inference
employed in the rationalist path for the formulation of explanations is
not meant to deny the validity of inductive or deductive inferential
processes in other areas of empirical science. For example, given that
theories are constructed in a retroductive manner, it is quite reasonable
that in some circumstances deductions might be drawn from these
principles and these deductions assessed according to obervational
methodology. In a similar fashion, there is no attempt to deny that one
type of observational methodology, the experiment, is predicated upon
the eliminative inductive principles framed by Mill's Canons. The
inductive and deductive inference, according to the rationalist formula-
tion are tools for the assessment of interpretations already formed, they
are not the vehicle of hypothesis generation.
A second characteristic of an explanation offered from a rationalist
perspective, is that such explanations involve breadth or scope as an
immediate concern. While the realist takes an atomistic stance and
assumes that broad or universal explanations will ultimately result from
a bottom-up methodology, the rationalist maintains a holistic posture
and claims that explanatory breadth is itself a necessary prerequisite for
a systematic knowledge of individual components. Individual features
can, it is maintained here, only be understood in the context of general
explanatory principles.
A third characteristic of an explanation offered from a rationalist
perspective relates to the fact that it need not be directly tied to any
causal statements or to statements expressing contingent antecedent-
consequent relations. The rationalist perspective would strongly
disagree with the statement that "investigation of the possible causes
of development ought to be a primary goal of developmental research"
(Sugarman, 1987b). It is often maintained that science attempts to
discern patterns in the domain of investigation and that these patterns
constitute explanation. This statement is essentially correct. However,
the realist perspective interprets 'discern' to mean 'directly observe' and
'pattern' to mean 'sequence of causal events' or 'antecedent-albconse-
quent relations' (see Figure 1). From the rationalist perspective,
'discern' implies both mental construction and active perception,

whereas 'pattern' refers as much to the form, organization, or structure
of the domain of interest as it does to causal relations or contingent
antecedent-consequence relations.
The creation of interpretations which constitute explanation and
that are designed to reduce the problem content of an area does not,
of course, mark the end of scientific inquiry. It marks the beginning,
but a crucial beginning that frames the continuing process. From here
assessments must be made of the consistency and reasonableness of any
given interpretation in relation to sets of other interpretations. Further,
implications must be drawn from these interpretative or explanatory
sets, and these implications, which take the form of empirical
hypotheses, require assessment via correlational and experimental
methods of hypothesis testing. This assessment, of course, takes place
in the arena of the world of common-sense and not in a world of
ultimate, fIXed, stable, invariant entities that are independent of any
observer. Confirmation of hypotheses so drawn increases the
plausibility of the general explanations or theory. Falsification may
decrease plausibility. It is, however, plausibility - not the 'probability'
of correspondence truth oriented realist approaches - that provides
the criterial frame for the assessment.
It was described earlier how the rationalist assumption of the neces-
sity of interpretation in scientific knowledge set the debate between
realists and rationalists concerning subjectivity and relativism in science.
In a similar fashion, the issue of the relation between interpretation and
the empirical world of common sense forms the context for a different
debate. This is the debate between rationalists who claim that theory
is a form of empirical scientific knowledge and hermeneutically inspired
authors who claim that interpretation, while necessary to knowledge,
necessarily leads to alternative forms of knowing. Before dealing with
this issue, which entails a discussion of empirical scientific knowledge
in relation to various forms of hermeneutic and narrative knowledge, it
may be helpful to consider more specifically the nature of explanation,
along with some concrete examples of our good scientific theory in the
light of the foregoing reflections.
Developmental Theories
Theories are sets of propositions designed to explain some domain.
There are two general categories of explanation that have historically
had cyclical levels of scientific support since the time of Aristotle (see
Overton, 1985). One category of explanation - which we will refer to
as material explanation - contains all those explanations that specify
material cause-and-effect relations or contingent antecedent--
consequent relations. Traditionally, this category has been subdivided
into specifLC material explanations, in which the cause or antecedent
term is understood as some inherent material factor such as (in theories
explaining human behavior and development) hereditary, genetics,
physiology, neurology; and effLCient explanations, in which the cause or
antecedent term is understood as some environmental, cultural, or
situational event.
The second general category of explanation - which we will refer
to as pattern explanation - contain all those explanations that are
neither causal nor contingent and that attempt to formulate the pattern,
organization, or form of the phenomenon under study. Traditionally,
this category has been subdivided into pattern -conservative explanations
which represent a momentary organization or structure of the
phenomenon; and pattern-progressive explanations which represent a
progressive or directional organization or progressive structure of the
phenomenon.
Material Explanation and Realism

Given the earlier developed schema concerning the role of
philosophical values in empirical scientific theory, it should be evident
that realist-directed theories will ultimately include only material
explanation and theorists who follow the realist creed will accept only
material explanation as having ultimate scientific legitimacy. That is, it
is only this type of explanation that presents the possibility of direct
observation-description and, as described earlier, the realist path of
science consists of cutting through the flux of behavioral variability to
fine the 'real' in an order of observed antecedent-consequent relations.
In fact, this type of explanation finds its roots in the realism of what has
traditionally been known as Newtonian mechanical explanation. This
defines explanation in three steps consisting of (a) the analysis or
reduction of the phenomenon of interest down to its particularistic,
material essence (i.e., the invariable directly observable-describable
behavior); (b) the observation of forces, causes, or contingent antece-
dent events as they relate to this material essence; and (c) the inductive
generalization of this relationship into a law (Overton, 1982).
Although only the category of material explanation is ultimately

acceptable, realist-inspired individual theorists will differ over whether
they emphasize specific material factors, efficient factors, or some
combination of the two. Skinner, for example, proposes to reduce all
psychological explanation to the relation between emitted behaviors
and stimuli that come to control the behavior. Development, within
this approach is a matter of the way in which the environment shapes
behavior. As he states, "The experimental analysis of behavior goes
directly to the antecedent causes in the environment" (Skinner, 1974,
p. 30). Thus, not only does Skinner operate within a realist context, but
his realism favors the ultimate 'reality' of the stimulus. On the other
hand, a number of neurophysiological theories such as Churchland's
(1986) operate within the realist assumptions but favor a complete
reduction to specific material explanations.
Eleanor Gibson's (1983) developmental theory as well as James
Gibson's (1979) perceptual theory represent realist generated views
that strongly favor efficient determination by the environment but also
permit some specific material determination such as a general capacity
for exploring and detecting invariance in the environment. (See Harre,
1986 for an extended discussion of the realist character of J. Gibson's
theory.) Given that realist inspired theories as a group admit only
efficient and specific material explanations, it should be clear that the
nature-nurture or nativism-empiricism issue concerning 'determinants'
of development must always be a kind of either/or issue when addressed
within this creed (Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973). Alternative solutions
require a movement beyond the nominalism and materialism of this
position.
Finally, it should be noted that most 'functional' explanations of
development (see Beilin, 1983, 1984; Overton, 1982, 1984) as well as
some 'contextual' explanations (see, e.g., Perlmutter, 1986) are them-
selves defined by the realist program. For example, although
'contextualism' can have several meanings (see Lerner & Kauffman,
1985; Overton, 1984; Overton & Reese, 1981) it is more and more
frequently used today in a limited realist fashion to denote potential or
actual environmental, cultural, social, and situational determinants.
Thus 'context' here is identical to 'efficient explanation'.
While ultimately accepting only material explanation as scientifically
legitimate, the realist theorist will admit the introduction of pattern
explanation under the condition that this will eventually be reduced to,
and thus explained by, material explanation. This strategy of introduc-

ing pattern as a kind of second-class citizen (Bowers, 1973) is sometimes
accomplished explicitly and sometimes implicitly. On a fairly explicit
level, Mischel (1973), while proposing the pattern explanation of "self
regulating systems and plans", (i.e., structures) went on to assert that
such explanations "cannot be adequately understood without linking
them to cognitive social learning conditions through which they are
developed and maintained" (p. 278).
Arguments that pattern explanation, such as Piaget's equilibration
process, must itself be explained by causal factors (Flavell, 1985, p. 290),
or arguments that this pattern explanation is itself explained by specific
existential cognitive conflict (Rosen, 1986), represent cases in which the
realist strategy is introduced in a more implicit fashion. This implicit
realist opposition to pattern explanations also operates in cases in which
contemporary theorists accept pattern explanations but insist upon
their constriction to increasingly narrow domains of application and
generality. (See Liben, 1987 for an extended discussion of this strategy
in contemporary information-processing approaches.) If a pattern
explanation is thus constricted, at some point it becomes a description
of the specific behavior under investigation and at this point indeed, it,
in itself, needs an explanation. This both takes the pattern out of
pattern explanations, and transforms them from universals to
particulars.
A final method of implicitly reducingpattern explanation to material
explanation is accomplished by changing the meaning of the specific
explanatory concept. For example, a good deal of the emphasis today
on 'knowledge structures', in fact, makes reference not to patterns or
forms of knowledge but to specific knowledge content that is joined
with other knowledge content in an associative fashion. A typical
example ofthis approach is presented by Mandler (1983) who redefines
the Piagetian pattern explanation of 'schema' into a combined efficient
and specific material causal explanatory concept that 'consists of a set
of units connected by various spatial and/or temporal relationships,
which have been learned by experiencing co-occurrences of things in
time and space" (p. 1(0). Here, as Mandler goes on to discuss, the
associationistic efficient causes of contiguity, similarity, and proximity
are offered as the primary explanation, while secondarily specific
material cause explanation is offered for the "tendency of organisms to
segment the world in certain ways and to respond to some kinds of
information in the environment rather than others" (p. 1(0). Thus,

what was originally in Piaget's system a pattern explanation becomes
reduced to material explanation in Mandler's system. (See also
Scholnick, 1983 for an analysis of the different understandings of
schema in different theoretical systems.)
Pattern Explanation and Rationalism

The primary explanatory category for rationalist-directed theories
is pattern explanation. That is, given the understanding that order and
organization are not found in direct observation or descriptions thereof,
but in the construction of principles of order and organization,
rationalist-directed theorists begin the explanatory process, using
retroductive inference, to generate such principles. This rationalist-
directed theorists, therefore, constructs structural explanatory
principles within which functioning operates.
The structure of the atom, the structure of DNA, the structure of
the solar system, and the structure of the universe are all familiar
examples of pattern-conservative explanations, drawn from the natural
sciences. Kinship structures, mental structures, mental organization,
structures of language, ego and superego, dynamisms, schemes,
operations, and cognitive structures are familiar examples of pattern-
conservative explanations drawn from the human sciences. The
commonality among all these examples is that, given an underlying
activity (functioning), there is an attempt to formulate the pattern of
this activity, and this pattern is treated as explanation (Overton, 1975).
It is explanation in that it introduces order and organization into the
domain under investigation. Structure (or pattern, form, system, or
organization - all used interchangeably here) is not directly observable
and cannot, in principle, be reduced to observables. Pattern is inferred
from observables; but as already stated, the method of inference is not
induction but retroduction. And as a retroductive inference, pattern
depends as much upon the creative internal sources of the scientist as
upon the external source of observation. Stephen J. Gould (1987)
articulates this point in his discussion of the discovery of 'deep time' in
geology: "The interplay of internal and external sources - of theory
informed by metaphor and observation constrained by theory - marks
any major movement in science. We can grasp the discovery of deep
time when we recognize the metaphors underlying several centuries of
debate" (p. 8). And "deep time ... imposed a vision of reality rooted
in ancient traditions of Western thought, as much as it reflected a new

understanding of rocks, fossils, and strata" (p. 10).
These pattern explanations - as well as the pattern-progressive
explanations to be discussed next - are, indeed, abstract universals, and
they do not directly entail causes. In fact, from this perspective causes
(i.e., material explanations) acquire their meaning only in the context
of pattern explanation. Numerous illustrative examples could be drawn
from Werner's or Piaget's developmental theories; from Chomsky's
linguistic theory; or from the many varieties of contemporary
psychoanalytic theory - including both Object Relations and Ego
Theory varieties (e.g., Erikson, Sullivan, Bowlby, Fairbairn, Winnicott,
Mahler, Kernberg, Kohut) (see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). How-
ever, Bowlby's (1987) concepts of 'attachment' and 'behavior system'
are chosen because they provide explicit affirmation of pattern explana-
tion that is of relevance to a wide range of behavioral developments.
For Bowlby (1987) "explanations draw on such interrelated concepts as
organization, pattern, and information" (p. 64). And Hinde (1982), in
elaborating on the explanatory value of the 'behavior system', points
out that, "while the scheme is based on behavioral observations, it is
used in an explanatory sense to refer to systems postulated as control-
ling the behavior. However, there is no necessary implication that there
are mechanisms in the brain isomorphous with the systems postulated:
The explanation is a 'software' one" (p. 64). In a similar vein, both
Ainsworth and her colleagues (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978), and Sroufe & Waters (1977) stress the position that attachment
is to be understood as an organizational (i.e., pattern) explanatory
concept.
An important point about rationalist-defined pattern explanation
concerns the frequently raised criticism that pattern explanations such
as structure, organization, form, and the like are static in nature and
therefore inadequate for describing the activity and change that are
characteristics of humans and human development. This is a totally
misplaced criticism that confounds the relation between that which is
to be explained and that which does the explaining. Pattern explanation
does the explaining and patterns of activity and patterns of change are
what are explained. Constancy is introduced through the inference of
pattern, but it is the constancy of explanation and not a constancy of
'that-which-is-to-be-explained'. If, as virtually everyone agrees, empiri-
cal science is about 'systematic' or 'organized' empirical knowledge, or
about 'patterns' of relationships, than invariance must be established in

some realm. For the realist, constancy will be ultimately observed in the
existential arrangement of antecedent-consequent material. For the
rationalist, constancy is established through the construction of pattern
explanation and not observed in the phenomena to be explained.
Although pattern-conservative explanations establish order, con-
stancy, and coherence of activity at any point in a series, it is pattern-
progressive explanations that establish order, constancy, and coherence
across the series. Put simply, pattern-progressive explanations are
explanations of development itself while pattern-conservative explana-
tions are explanations of what develops. Pattern-progressive explana-
tion represents organization of the series just as pattern-conservative
explanation represents the organization of any point in the series.
Because a theory always consists of explanations of something, (i.e.,
some topic or domain), a developmental theory must articulate what it
is that is developing. Recently, realist guided investigators have
criticized the positing of endpoints of development and have argued
that more adequate description is needed (e.g., Sugarman, 1987a). The
question is: what would one possibly describe if one did not understand
development as tending toward some end or other? If one wishes to
explain the course of acquiring language, then adult language is, of
necessity, the endpoint. In fact, no 'description' of the language of the
child would be possible without this ideal endpoint. In a similar fashion,
if one wishes to explain the development of reasoning, or thought, or
problem solving, or personality, or anything, the endpoint must serve as
the ideal.
There is no mysterious force operating in the articulation of
endpoints; it is simply the case that development is not comprehensible
unless a direction is articulated, and a direction cannot be articulated
without an ideal endpoint. Such endpoints may be as general as those
involved in concepts such as 'adaptation', 'maturity', and 'integration',
or they may be more specific. In fact, in general theories such as Piaget's
and Werner's, the specific will be nested within the general. Further, it
is important to note that there can be as many ideal endpoints as there
are domains to be explained. The concept of an ideal endpoint does
not limit the multiplicity of human development; rather, it establishes
order in the domain under investigation. Thus, for example, arguments
that Piaget limited development to logical thought are quite misplaced.
Piaget's theory is an attempt to explain how individuals come to acquire
a certain form of logical thought, just as Freud's theory was an attempt

to explain how individuals come to acquire a certain form of
psychosexual maturity, and Erikson's theory is an attempt to explain
how individuals come to acquire a certain form of psychosocial identity.
One may criticize that the end is poorly or inadequately defined, or that
the path is different than that proposed, but an explanatory develop-
mental psychology requires a concept of direction, and hence it requires
ideal endpoints.
Given that a theory articulates endpoints and hence a direction,
pattern-progressive explanation consists of principles that establish the
path according to which the development occurs. Here again, as in
pattern-conservative explanation, the principles thus constructed intro-
duce order and organization into the ongoing active processes.
In developmental psychology, Piaget and Werner present the
clearest examples of pattern-progressive explanation. (See also, how-
ever, Erikson's epigenetic principle). Werner's 'orthogenetic principle'
is the more general of the two and Piaget's 'equilibration process' might
be thought of as nested within Werner's and providing greater
specificity. Werner's (1957) explanation asserts that any developmental
series proceeds from initial states of globality and lack of differentiation
to states of increased differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic in-
tegration. Piaget's (1967) principle is completely compatible with
Werner's, but it focuses its field of application on logical thought and
asserts that this series constitutes "a progressive equilibration from a
lesser to a higher state of equilibrium" (p. 3). For Piaget, specificity is
achieved by defining 'equilibrium' as a relationship between the active
processes of assimilation and accommodation; 'state' as the structures
(pattern-conservative explanation) of equilibrium; and 'lesser to higher'
in terms of the mobility of the structures and the cognitive territory they
cover (present action, representation, logical representation). Further,
both Werner and Piaget introduce dialectic polarities into theirexplana-
tions, with one pole of the dialectic being conservative (e.g., scheme,
operation, assimilation) and the other being progressive (e.g., equilibra-
tion, accommodation, adaptation).
Two issues that arise with respect to such pattern explanations are
(a) the extent to which they are explanatory rather than descriptive, and
(b) the question of what role is left for traditional material causal
explanation in such schemas. Both of these questions can be best
addressed by briefly considering another developmental pattern
explanation. This principle comes from the field of heat dynamics, and
it is the second law of thermodynamics.
Stated in its most intuitive form, the second law asserts that isolated
systems tend toward diffuse or random states - that is, such systems
demonstrate increasing entropy where entropy is itself a measure of
probability. In other words, the universe, the earth, animals, plants, and
inanimate objects are all moving in a direction from order to disorder.
Several characteristics of this explanation are worth noting. First, it is
an explanation in that it brings order to a number of common-sense
experiences as well as bringing order to some very technical experiences
constructed upon common-sense. Cities, buildings, humans, lower
animals and inanimate objects do seem to tend toward decay or ran-
domness; some chemicals dissipate when containers are opened; if one
puts dye into water and the two will mix through the random movement
of molecules, but the process will never reverse itself. On the other
hand, the second law cannot be an inductive generalization derived
directly from observation. That is, it cannot be descriptive. Inductive
generalizations fail in the case of a single counter-example and there
are many such examples in which, on common-sense grounds, order
emerges out of disorder rather than the reverse, (i.e., cities and buildings
are constructed; animate birth and the build-up of structure occurs).
Despite these counter-examples, it has not been proposed that the law
has been falsified. Instead, recent proposals (e.g., Gleick, 1987;
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) have attempted to build out from this
principle to other principles that show a similar irreversible develop-
mental direction, but one that also accounts for the common-sense
observation of order arising out of disorder. As Gleick (1987) says
concerning these new proposals, "Somehow, after all, as the universe
ebbs toward its final equilibrium in the featureless heat bath of maxi-
mum entropy, it manages to create interesting structures" (p. 308).
The second law, then, is an explanation arrived at through retroduc-
tive inference. Specifically it is a pattern-progressive explanation that
articulates an ideal endpoint and hence a direction to development (i.e.,
randomness) and presents a principle concerning the path according to
which the development occurs. The second law is thus directly
analogous to Werner's orthogenetic principle and Piaget's equilibration
process. All are developmental explanations, and they differ primarily
in that Werner and Piaget focus on the progression of irreversible order
rather than the progression of irreversible disorder.
The second law, and Werner's and Piaget's pattern-progressive

explanations are also directly analogous in the way they deal with the
relation between pattern and material explanation. The second law
postulates a direction, and this direction is not to be found in or
explained by material causes. So also, Werner's and Piaget's pattern-
progressive explanations postulates a direction that are not found in or
explained by material causes. In each case, the pattern-progressive
explanation deals with the system as a whole, and the emergent proper-
ties (i.e., direction) of the system cannot be reduced to or completely
explained by other determinants.
Bunge (1963) describes the situation concerning the second law in
terms of theoretical category levels. The second law concerns systems
as a whole, and at this level categories of material causation and chance
are not employed. This level is partially explained by two or more
molecular levels. At the most molecular level (i.e., particle dynamics)
there is a strong material causal component. Here, single molecules
bumping into other molecules serve to account for dispersion. At the
next level (i.e., statistical mechanics) random motion is introduced. This
noncausal notion deals with the overall behavior of large collections by
statistical means. However, and this is the main point, these two
molecular levels are, in principle, not adequate to yield the unidirection-
al character of the second law. That is, the molecular levels never yield
the irreversible character of the second law. When dye is placed in a
container of water, the random motion of molecules may account for
the dispersion of the dye throughout the water, but the same random
motion would also as readily predict an eventual return to nondisper-
sion. The second law, on the contrary, asserts that such a return will, in
principle, never occur and this assertion is not accounted for by any
material determination.
The analogue to Werner's and Piaget's pattern-progressive explana-
tions is that in these cases, too, the pattern explanations deal with the
system as a whole, and the emergent direction cannot be reduced to, or
completely explained, by material causes. To take the equilibration
process again as an example, although it is possible to partially under-
stand this progression in terms of biological determinants, and in terms
of experiential determinants such as cognitive conflict, none of these
singly or additively can account for the unidirectional character of the
equilibration process. In essence, the material causes can be under-
stood only as operating within the systematic framework given by the

pattern explanation.
Understanding this relation of pattern to material causes clarifies
Piaget's rationalist position that a complete explanation of mental
development must involve the necessary organic, practice (or exercise)
and social factors, all of which constitute material explanation, but that
these are not sufficient. Complete explanation of mental development
involves the consideration of these factors as they operate in the context
of the pattern explanations of equilibration and structure. Just as
Aristotle asserted that an object must always involve both content and
form, so too function (material explanations) and form (pattern
explanations) are necessary components of any developmental theory
that begins from the contemporary rationalist position.
Henneneutic, Narrative, and Scientific Empirical Knowing

The claim has been developed that the route of epistemological
rationalism in the movement from common-sense knowledge to scien-
tific knowledge requires interpretation as a necessary and irreducible
feature of explanation. A problem arises, however, when it is recog-
nized that from the perspective of epistemological rationalism, all
knowing and hence all knowledge forms must necessarily involve inter-
pretation. Thus, the necessity of interpretative activity in constituting
the objects of knowing does not, in itself, distinguish scientific from
other knowledge forms such as hermeneutic knowing and narrative
knowing. A practical distinction between these forms entails an under-
standing that empirical scientific knowledge requires both the tools of
interpretation (e.g., retroduction, metaphor) and the tools of empirical
assessment (i.e., observational and experimental research methods). It
needs these tools not in the way in which they were introduced by
conventionalism (Overton, 1984) wherein interpretation was cast as an
adjunct and ultimately disposable 'context of discovery' related to the
generation of hypotheses while research methods were cast as the 'real'
activity of science. Rather, empirical scientific knowing needs a deep
level commitment to the principle that every feature of the process is
infused with interpretation and that the research methods themselves,
while also necessary, do not occupy a privileged domain.
Traditional and contemporary research methods play an essential
role in assessing the plausibility of our explanatory concepts in the world
of common-sense observation, but this common-sense observation is
itself a way of knowing. Thus, the research methods are, in the final
analysis, means for assessing the coherence of the relation between
reflective critical interpretations called theoretical explanations and
less formal interpretations that reach all the way down to common-
sense interpretations. Within epistemological rationalism, coherence
is accepted as a primary criterion of theory appraisal. The coherence
introduced by the outcome of the application of research methods
expands the scope of the explanatory model. It does this by demonstrat-
ing coherence, not just among the set of reflective or theoretical
interpretations, but also between this set and the less reflective levels
of interpretations ranging down to common-sense observations.
Hermeneutic knowing is that area of knowing directly concerned
with interpretation and the meaning of what is interpreted. One of the
domains that the hermeneutic approach interprets is science itself.
Through critiques by philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger, the
hermeneutic approach (or at least some subset of the various her-
meneutic approaches) concludes that the 'true' meaning of science has
become distorted by a failure to recognize the historical and social
dimensions of science. The route of ontological and epistemological
realism described in this essay, in fact, becomes the focus of the her-
meneutic critiques, and the failure of realism to include the historical
and social context evokes the pejorative label 'scientism'. However,
rather than moving to the epistemological rationalist path to empirical
scientific knowledge, recent hermeneutic approaches have tended to
redefine the aims of science in ways that eliminate any necessity of
empirical research methods. Thus, for example, Habermas (1979)
asserts a practical and emancipatory aim (i.e., an analysis of contem-
porary capitalism which will permit the acknowledgment of suppressed
possibilities and desires for emancipation). Although it is difficult to
argue against such an approach on any assumptive grounds except for
those of realism itself, it should be noted that this emancipatory aim
clearly distinguishes this form of knowledge from that of empirical
scientific knowledge.
There are a number of substantive areas of agreement between the
rationalist-derived understanding of empirical science and the various
hermeneutic critiques. Both epistemological rationalism and her-
meneutics agree that knowledge is activity; both critique the realist
understanding of science offered by the empiricism of positivism and
conventionalism; both argue that science begins in common-sense or
Heidegger's 'ready-to-hand' mode of engagement and that science

moves to critical reflective interpretations or Heidegger's 'unready-to-
hand' and 'present-at-hand' modes of engagement.
However, despite the areas of agreement between science in the
context of epistemological rationalism and the hermeneutic
approaches, the latter - following Heidegger and Gadamer - tend to
ultimately ground their interpretations in a privileged, ontological
materialism. Thus again, as was the case with realism, ontology
subsumes epistemology. And it is here that epistemological rationalism
parts with hermeneutics.
To understand this last point, consider how we determine whether
an interpretation (explanation) is good or bad. That is, again consider
the problem of methods of theory assessment. From the perspective of
empirical scientific knowledge framed by epistemological rationalism,
plausibility is established by assessing the target explanation in relation
to other extant theory level interpretations (coherence) and by assess-
ing the target explanation in relation to common-sense interpretations
(observations) via empirical research methods (coherence). From the
perspective of hermeneutics, a good interpretation is one that is in
conformance with historical and social determinants. Here, however,
we have the situation described earlier by Putnam (see 1983, p. 34) as
the attempt of both historicism (i.e., the perspective that all thought is
determined by and cannot transcend its historical antecedents) and
culturists (i.e., the perspective that all thought is determined by and
cannot transcend its social context) alike, to reduce epistemic notions
to non-epistemic notions.
The hermeneutic approaches, then, are ultimately attempts to in-
troduce a new realism. This is often the realism of Marxist dialectic
materialism, which frequently hovers in the background as a spoken or
unspoken assumption. But regardless of the variety of ontological
realism that is evoked, the hermeneutic approaches do close the 'her-
meneutic circle' by first objecting to the ontological realism of the
positivists and conventionalists and then reasserting an ontological
realism that eliminates any necessary reliance on research methods.
Recent developments in the general area of hermeneutics which go
under the rubric 'deconstructionism' as originally articulated by Derrida
(Silverman & Ihde, 1985) continue this trend toward explanation in
terms of cultural and historical material determinants. The strategy
here, however, is to deny that there is such a thing as a 'good' or
'plausible' interpretation. Interpretations according to this view simply

'are', and the question becomes: What cultural and/or historical deter-
minants explain interpretations. Given the way these approaches have
circled back to complete material explanation, it is no wonder that some
contemporary realists in cognitive and developmental psychology
applaud their introduction (see Keating, 1990).
Narrative knowing, like hermeneutic knowing, focuses on inter-
pretation. In fact, to the extent that varieties of narrative knowing
establish their origin and justification in the ultimate realism of her-
meneutics and deconstructionism (see Gergen & Gergen, 1986;
Spence, 1982) little needs to be added here. However, to the extent
that narrative knowing disclaims such a realism and the attendant
reduction of all explanation to material explanation, it offers some
interesting insights into the relationship of rationalistically framed
empirical scientific knowing and other forms of knowing.
Narrative knowing, like hermeneutics and epistemological
rationalism, begins with critiques of the idea of an absolutistic, knower-
independent reality as presented by empiricism. In narrative knowing,
the domain of inquiry is initially - as in epistemological rationalism -
roughly explained or interpreted according to some guiding metaphor
that frames the construction of a story or narrative that presents the
more specific domain-relevant explanations. Thus, for example,
Piaget's equilibration theory can be understood as a progressive narra-
tive formulated within an organismic root metaphor (Gergen &
Gergen, 1986). Having established the narrative, interpretation, or
theory in this manner, the issue then becomes the criteria according to
which theory assessment will proceed. Here, as with hermeneutics,
empirical research methods (i.e., traditional criterion of empirical
support) are essentially written out of the theory assessment process.
This is accomplished both through the widely accepted recognition that
theories are underdetermined by empirical observations and through
the claim that research methods represent tools for the discovery of the
objective real. With the elimination of the objective mind-independent
real, the argument goes, the tools no longer serve any necessary
function in the scientific process. From the perspective of narrative
knowing, then, the criteria for theory assessment become encapsulated
in the set of and in the relations among, the explanations themselves.
The primary and overarching criterion is the narrative form itself (i.e.,
coherence). Following from this, more specific criteria such as logical
consistency, agreement with other accepted theories, parsimony, are

admitted as they contribute to the narrative coherence.
Within epistemological rationalism, then, narrative knowing can be
seen as a truncated form of empirical knowing. Both agree that
coherence of explanation and subsidiary criteria that contribute to this
coherence (and hence to plausibility) is a primary criterion of theory
acceptance. This means that both agree that ultimately "scientific
theory is governed in substantial degree by what are essentially aesthetic
forms" (Gergen & Gergen, 1986). However, empirical scientific know-
ing insists that coherence extend to the idea of empirical support, not
as a mere ornamental device but as a necessary feature of the knowing
process. There is some possible room for further agreement on this: It
should be noted that some recent narrative proposals (Gergen &
Gergen, 1986; Spence, 1982) have suggested that mature narrative
explanations will include causal components. When it is recognized
that research methods provide the means for increasing the plausibility
of causal - or, more generally, associative - components, the two
forms of knowing become integrated. This integration provides power-
ful support to the structure of an empirical scientific developmental
theory that entails both universal and particular, pattern and material,
and eternal and historical explanation but does not offer these in the
context of an absolute, fIXed, unchanging, mind-independent, objective
reality. The integration also offers such a developmental theory as one
that adheres to the general aim of empirical science, that is the estab-
lishment of a systematic body of knowledge controlled by observational
evidence.
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3
Questions A Satisfying Developmental
Theory Would Answer:
The scope of a complete explanation of
development phenomena
Frank B. Murray
No philosophy will permanently be deemed rational by all men which

(in addition to meeting logical demands) does not ... make a direct
appeal to all those powers of our nature which we hold in highest
esteem. William James (The Sentiment of Rationality).
Overton raises the question of how we can distinguish a good
scientific theory of development from the merely adequate or the
plainly inadequate theory of development. The question is not unlike
the issue raised in 1879 by the American philosopher-psychologist,
William James. In his Sentiment ofRationality he examined the features
of philosophical theories that would lead to some being believed and
taken as true because they generated a sentiment of rationality and the
others being rejected as irrational because they did not generate such
a sentiment. They would fail in this respect solely because there was
some critical aspect of the theory that blocked the unimpeded flow of
thought that gives rise, in the first place, to the feeling of rationality
(James, 1960). He concluded that no theory could or would ever win
universal acceptance because there are intractable and pervasive
differences in the ways human beings know things, and these differences
inevitably favor some theories over others. Consequently no single
theory can be seen as rational by all persons, even all competent
investigators and thinkers, because the criteria for what is rational and
Frank B. Murray. College of Education, University of Delaware, Newark,

DE 19716.

238 Frank B. Murray
reasonable, like the criteria for what is beautiful or fearful, are rooted
in sentiment and preference. Large numbers of people - the tough-
minded, action-oriented, practical as James saw them - will always
'feel' that some propositions are irrationally held by others - the
tender-minded, idealist, humanistic in James' account - who see these
same propositions as self-evident necessities. The tough-minded and
tender-minded will quarrel because the judgment that an argument or
assertion is rational is essentially an emotional response, or an aesthetic
response, rooted in each group's strong preferences to see the world in
different ways. In Overton's terms both the rationalist and realist
researchers think the other has missed the point of science and conse-
quently their subsequently derived experiments and theories are seen
by the others as contaminated and flawed by their respective views of
what is real, true, and important. It is not so much that each sees the
other's theory as wrong as it is that each sees the other's theory as
irrelevant.
Overton comes to a conclusion similar to James' about the criteria
for a good scientific theory of development. The choice between rival
theories of development inevitably entails a choice between philosophi-
cal values. These values, in Overton's account, are rooted in the realist
and rationalist traditions, each of which has the consequences Overton
clearly spells out for developmental theory insofar as each takes a
differing and distinct view of what is the 'real' - either as what is
discovered or what is invented - and the 'true' - either as what
conforms to nature or what is consistent with other propositions.
Nevertheless, how does science go beyond the apparent incom-
patibility of the realist and rationalist assumptions and traditions, as
Overton has portrayed them, to the establishment of a good develop-
mental theory, one that captures and makes sense of what is known and
firmly established in each research tradition? How can the admitted
limitations of each tradition be overcome to produce a good develop-
mental theory, namely, a satisfying, complete, and plausible account of
developmental phenomena that will generate the sentiment of
rationality? Phenomena, no matter how precisely measured,
envisioned, Of determined, still beg for explanation and a way for
scientists to think about them that will yield the feeling that the
phenomenon is understood fully. Can there not be a set of interrelated
propositions whose truth could rest as much in their correspondence
with empirical events as in their coherence and consistency with other
3 Commentary on Overton 239
propositions and systems of thought? Moreover and more to the point,

if the sculpture in Eddington's illustration (cited in Overton, p. 207) is
beautiful, does it matter whether the sculptor (scientist) acted as though
he were merely 'finding' the horse within the marble block by chipping
away until it was discovered, or whether the sculptor felt instead that the
horse was, by the very same acts, constructed and invented by the
sculptor? In other words if a difference doesn't make a difference in
something, perhaps it doesn't make any difference!
An academic discipline advances and develops when long-standing
polarities and dichotomies within the discipline - like qualitative
versus quantitative change or correspondence versus coherence -
come to be seen as having a common dimension that ties them together
with respect to something that allows our thinking to move beyond the
putative contradictions that otherwise block our thinking and problem
solution. For example, the 'realistic' notion of objectively received
common sense facts gives way easily in the end, as Overton documents,
in the face of evidence from several sources that all objective 'facts' are
theory-laden and subjective. Even the notion of 'common sense' is itself
a theoretical abstraction of the data from all the senses. It was originally
an invention, a construct, for that which each sense held in common
with the other senses, but which was not experienced directly by any
sense modality. The bedrock objective facts of psychology, the scientific
building blocks of 'stimulus' and 'response', for example, can only be
determined in reference to some other set of propositions that tell us
such basic things as how many stimuli and responses there are in a
situation. Consider, for example, the prototypical case of Piagetian
conservation, namely, that after an experimenter spreads five marbles
over a wider area, the child observes and asserts, "There as many
marbles as before." Is the child's response one response, two responses
(one for the subject and one for the predicate of the statement), six
responses (one for each word), five responses (one for each marble),
or some other number? Apart from the number of responses, what kind
of response is it? Is it primarily a perceptual response, a linguistic
response, a logical response, a cognitive developmental response, a
learned response, and so forth? Similarly, how would we know how
many stimuli were responded to by the child in this instance without
recourse to some other view of what the child was thinking about when
confronted with this problem? Thus, the question we are really dealing
with is the degree of surplus, or non-operationalized, meaning that
240 Frank B. Murray
inevitably attaches itself to every empirical observation, not whether

there is any non-operationalized or surplus meaning.
At the outset of our scientific inquiry, regardless of our theoretical
orientation, we take an interpretation of both the identity and quantity
of the stimulus and response as the basic datum of the science. The
issue is not whether science begins with interpretive, as opposed to
objectively given, data but the degree and clarity of the interpretation.
The question of what makes a good developmental theory in this
instance comes down to an issue of the magnitude of interpretation and
the degree of surplus meaning that, under the rules of parsimony, must
be accommodated within the theory to give a satisfying and problem-
free account of the phenomena the theory is constructed to explain and
make intelligible.
What must we have from a good developmental theory? What
questions must it answer about the phenomena it attempts to explain?
What problems must it resolve or eliminate? All developmental
phenomena have more or less the same basic form - there is some
change in behavior that takes place over a relatively long period of time
(weeks, months, years as opposed to seconds, minutes, hours, and days).
What must a good theory tell us about this change? Contemporary
scholarship points to ten categories of information that a good theory
must address.
The form or pattern. We need to have a way to identify, name or
define the phenomenon, a way to distinguish it from other phenomena.
This inevitably means that we must have a way to measure it and perhaps
produce it. The act of naming or defining carries the risk that more may
be thought to be known and understood than really is, but it is an
essential part of any theory, particularly at the beginning, to delineate
and name the phenomenon in this way. Thus, we call the child's
response to the shifting marbles, 'conservation', and thereby mark it off
from other phenomena and begin the act of knowing and making sense
of it.
More than the name, we ask the good theory to tell us the underlying
structure, pattern, organization of the various combinations of stimuli
and responses that make up the phenomenon and can legitimately claim
the label, 'conservation'. Furthermore, we ask that more inclusive and
powerful structures and patterns be made clear because these would
show how 'conservation' might be connected with other developmental
phenomena, like seriation, class inclusion, transitivity, decentration,
horizontality, and so forth. Piaget's theory, for example, provided such

a structure, the construct, operativity, to hold together these apparently
separate collections of responses to stimuli. These very different
responses to stimuli are claimed to be the same response insofar as each
is a manifestation of the same underlying structure or pattern of
organization.
Efficient cause. We ask the good theory to tell us the causes of the
phenomenon, the necessary and sufficient conditions for it - the
eliciting conditions. This is not to say that the specifications of the
necessary and sufficient conditions constitute the whole account or
explanation, but only that they are a part of the story, so to speak, and
without their specification, a theory would not be satisfying. Thus, we
want to know under what conditions the child will assert that there are
as many marbles as there were before, and under what conditions the
child will claim there are more or fewer marbles as a result of the
experimenter's actions.
Mechanisms. The good theory will tell us what mental mechanisms
produce the phenomenon. How do these mechanisms (or mechanism)
function and how, over the time-span during which the change takes
place, do they actually produce the change? In the conservation of
number example, what role do the mechanisms of learning, social
interaction, imitation, cognitive dissonance, mediation, maturation,
perception, and so forth play in the child's exhibition of the
phenomenon of conservation? How do they lead the nonconserving
child to give conservation responses?
Moreover, are there mechanisms that are uniquely developmental?
Are there mechanisms that simply must be invented (or discovered) to
account for the phenomenon; or will more parsimonious mechanisms,
mechanisms that are at work in non-developmental phenomena, suffice
to account for the events researchers document?
The developmental end-point. We assume that the changes we
label as developmental are uni-directional, that they lead to a final stage,
that there is a developmental goal, and we ask the good theory have a
way to specify what the developmental end state is. The earlier steps
or stages in a developmental sequence of behaviors are made more
intelligible by our knowledge of the end-point toward which they are
progressing, even though the later periods cannot in any way be the
efficient cause of the earlier events because of the uni-directional
character of time. Later events cannot cause earlier events, but they
242 Frank B. Murray
can help us make sense of the earlier events by showing what the earlier
events lead to. The child's nonconservation responses, for example,
that the number of marbles changed as they were spread out, would
make more sense if we had a way to see what role these nonrandom and
systematic 'errors' played in the child's subsequent error-free and
mature evaluation of the same problem. The very placing of a
phenomenon in a developmental sequence and process confers a high
degree of intelligibility on it by virtue of securing a place for it in a high
level pattern. Conservation, for example, makes more sense when we
can see it as an instance of the child's newly acquired notion of logical
necessity and not merely as a peculiarity of the young child's thought.
The illumination of the end-point of the developmental chain often
demonstrates the inadequacy of the 'non-developmental' mechanisms
to account fully for the phenomenon because usually none has a way to
capture the direction of the changes. While the mechanisms mentioned
above are adequate in most instances to account for the nonconserving
child's eventual acquisition of conservation, they are in a sense too
primitive and powerful because they also require that often as not the
conserving child would acquire nonconservation. They account for all
changes symmetrically, without regard to a particular direction. Like
Overton's lovely example of the dispersed dye never reconfiguring itself
into the initial concentrated drop of dye - despite the fact that
Brownian motion would permit it - the conserving child simply does
not become a nonconserving one even though the conserver's
'acquisition' of nonconservation is permitted by all the known non-
developmental mechanisms. Thus, some higher order mechanism or
principle must account for the large scale movement of cognitive struc-
ture in a single direction - preoperativity to operativity in the case of
Piagetian theory, for example. We expect a good theory of development
to illuminate the nature of this higher-order guiding mechanism. In
fact, the good theory is largely about this higher-order principle that
makes sense of the directional movement of development because the
nature of this principle or higher-order mechanism is an area of research
and theorizing that has stubbornly remained in doubt and contested in
contemporary work in the field.
It must be conceded that the specification of the end-point of an
open ended system is nonbinding with respect to any particular outcome
in the same way that while the principles of biological evolution are
adequate to account for a chain of species development, they are not
of sufficient power to predict the final outcome of species development.

Similarly, we would not expect the good theory of cognitive develop-
ment, for example, to specify the content of thought, but only its general
form and power.
The specification of the end-point of development entails, by
implication, the specification of the other end of the developmental
scale, namely, the point of departure. It is helpful to know why the
earlier periods fail to hold the developing mind at that point or stage
for a longer time even without knowing the character of the next stage
or period. Because of the open-ended character of development and
the potential for inherently unpredictable outcomes of mental function-
ing and accomplishment, it may be inevitable that theorists will always
understand more of where the mind has been, so to speak, than where
it is going.
Moreover, the good theory may provide a way to think about better
developmental outcomes. Given that many developmental outcomes
are possible and that just as many evolutionary solutions are possible
for species development, the good theory could be asked to account for,
identify, explain, and clarify the better of the available outcomes, out-
comes that maximize what it means to be human. We ask that the good
theory critically examine the developmental outcomes that appear to
be necessary and unalterable to determine whether they are really just
one of a range of possible developmental outcomes.
The meaning of the phenomenon. Unlike other natural
phenomena, behavioral phenomena have the attribute of intentionality
insofar as it makes sense to raise the question of what the child, for
example, meant or intended by an action. We expect the good theory
to address the questions of what the actor intended or meant and what
the behavioral phenomenon signifies or means because its uniqueness
as a phenomenon resides in its meaning. Apart from what the child may
have meant or intended in his claim that the number of marbles was the
same, for example, the question of the meaning or significance of the
phenomenon is a micro version of the question of the end-point of
development when it is seen as an inquiry into the purpose and sig-
nificance some aspect of development. In this sense the meaning of the
behavioral change may be quite different from what the child meant by
what she said or what she intended just as the meaning of a work of art
may be, in the end, quite different from what the artist intended.
244 Frank B. Murray
Just as there is no single interpretation of a text that is simply or

literally given in the text apart from a framework of interpretation, one
would not expect that there could be a single meaning of a behavioral
phenomenon that was unrelated to a theory or an interpretative
framework that could give meaning to the event. To raise the question
of what passages in the Bible or Constitution mean is to raise precisely
the same question as what a particular developmental change means.
Transliteration is not translation of text and is unsatisfying because
meaning is lost - even though transliteration, like positivism, assumes
a unique, objective and straightforward connection between the texts
in question (or between theory and fact, or one reality and another).
While many different theories, interpretations, translations, and so
forth may be compatible with the same 'facts' or texts, progress is made
because it can be shown that some theories and interpretations are
incompatible with them. They must be discarded because they simply
will not work as interpretations and translations because they lead to
inconsistencies and incoherence in the relationships between the facts
or text and the interpretation, and also within the components of the
interpretation itself.
Reductionist mechanisms. Owing only to the universal commit-
ment to the principle of the unity of science, we would expect that the
mental mechanisms that heretofore had a place within the good
developmental theory would become tied to physical events and proces-
ses within the body in much the same way as the constructs 'gene' and
'vitamin', initially proposed as wholly hypothetical constructs, eventual-
ly came to be seen as physical entities. This is not to say that the truth
of a good developmental theory lies in its physical verification because
the findings of developmental research, and all behavioral research for
that matter, are true on their own terms because they simply happen
that way. It is only to say that the good theory must have the potential
for coherence with the other sciences, particularly the biological scien-
ces. The link between the onset of conservation, for example, and a
marked increase in brain lateralization, brain surface, the completion
of myelination, increases in EEG alpha activity, and increases in work-
ing memory, is undoubtedly part of the complete scientific account of
the conservation phenomenon.
Deductive formalism. Virtually every scientific researcher knows
that the way the science is actually conducted is not adequately captured
by school accounts of the scientific method. While the logic of discovery
and the logic of justification are different, we do expect that the good
theory will, at some point, have a form such that items to be explained
are explained by virtue of their being implications of general principles
of the theory. The fact that the Pythagorean relation was known and
established independently of the formal system in which it finally came
to have a place as a theorem does not take away from the point that a
greater degree of understanding is conferred by virtue of the fact that
it can be deduced from 47 prior propositions in Euclid's system. The
appeal for a deductive formalism in the good developmental theory
does not mean that theory building needs to proceed by that route, but
only that there be a version of the theory that can be expressed in the
fashion of the hypothetical-deductive sciences - again in conformity
with the unity of science principle.
Cohort specification. The lifespan research community has docu-
mented that generational effects compromise the generality of many
developmental findings, for example, the shape of the growth of
intelligence function. Thus, the good developmental theory would not
consider cohort membership to be merely a noisy source of experi-
mental error to be methodologically corrected, but rather it would be
seen as an integral part of the phenomenon under consideration. Of
course, one would expect that cohort, or time of the subject's birth, is
merely a proxy variable for some yet to be discovered factors that
operated during a particular historical period, and that these factors
would alter significantly the scientific findings that are reported in
research paradigms that were not sensitive to generational factors. The
good theory would have addressed these. For example, to continue with
the nonconservation!conservation literature, it remains to be explained
why the very same experimental procedures that failed to train noncon-
servers to conserve in the 1960s succeeded to a much greater degree in
the 1980s.
Cultural and social determinants. The identification of factors and
mechanisms that operate uniquely in particular historical periods, and
not in other periods, has led researchers to consider a much wider range
of contextual and interactive factors, factors that in earlier research
paradigms would have simply been controlled experimentally or
statistically because they were viewed either as uninteresting noise,
however potent, or as factors whose investigation had to be postponed
until more powerful research techniques became available. However,
the pervasive character of these context specific factors, demonstrated
246 Frank B. Murray
in virtually every area of developmental psychology, has meant that

consideration of these troublesome factors can no longer be postponed
or ignored. At the moment, we are hard-pressed to understand why the
conservation problems, for example, are more difficult when they are
about length rather than number, continuous rather than discontinuous
materials, or why the weight of a clay ball would be seen by the young
child to change in different amounts when the ball was made colder
rather than warmer, rougher rather than smoother, longer rather than
wider, in familiar rather than unfamiliar shapes and so on. We are
equally hard-pressed to see how and why some groups of children, for
example, American Indians in the Southwest, are not 'fooled' as much
by these problems about the clay ball's weight as other children appear
to be, or why Bedouin children are not 'fooled' as much as others about
conservation of liquid amount. In virtaully every domain of develop-
mental psychology, substantial effects can be attributed to factors that
appear to be features of a particular context, social or cultural group,
geographic location, historical time period, and so forth. Obviously the
successful theory will find a way to make sense of this - at the moment
- bewildering array of context-specific influential factors.
The theorist. The interdependence of fact and theory or text and
interpretation leads to an examination of the theorist as a person and
thinker because the interpretive framework that allows events to be
'facts' in a science is shaped presumbaly by personal features of the
theorist that heretofore were considered irrelevant when science was
viewed exclusively as objective and self-correcting. At the moment we
can only speculate how Piaget's account of moral development would
differ had it been formulated outside Protestant Geneva, or how
Skinner's account of learning would differ had it not been formulated
by an American, and so forth. However, as theories are invariably
written and otherwise promulgated, their meaning is also subject to all
the hermeneutic issues implicated in the attempt to specify the meaning
and significance of a developmental change in mental functioning in the
first place.
In summary, the good theory of human development is a complete
theory, a theory that addresses the ten points cited above. While the
good theory cannot be about a set of a priori and objective facts, it is,
nevertheless, about a set of facts that control the degree to which theory
and interpretation correspond to them and are also consistent with
other propositions in the theory and with other theories. Correspon-
dence and consistency are compatible attributes of the good theory and
are achieved through a dialectical exchange between a community of
investigators that demands, in the end, that some theories and accounts
be discarded because they fail to conform to the facts, as they were
established in the theory, or because they lead to a reductio absurdum
with regard to other established propositions. They fail, in other words,
because they fail to sustain a sentiment of rationality.
References
James, W. (1960). The sentiment of rationality. In A Castell (Ed.), Essays in
pragmatism (pp. 3-36). New York: Hafner Publishing Company.
3
The Development of World Views:
Towards future synthesis?
Ellin Kofsky Scholnick
Developmental psychologists have a definitional problem.

Although they study the course of change, they have competitors who
also study change, labeling it as learning, personality reorganization,
history, or even measurement unreliability. Since psychology often
divides itself into content areas like personality or perception, those
subdivisions may subsume or ignore another framework that examines
changes from a unified temporal perspective. So developmental
psychologists often find themselves members of a threatened species in
danger of being identified solely as students of other processes of
change like learning, or as members of other disciplines studying
perception, cognition, or social processes in exotic organisms such as
the infant. The self-reflective developmentalist, therefore, confronts
the problems of defining what is unique and valuable about the
discipline and of understanding why that discipline is always on the
verge of extinction.
Willis Overton's chapter is an explicit and elegant analysis of the
developmentalist's quandary. In it, he argues persuasively that the
controversy over the definition of developmental psychology is not just
a fight over turf, but a battle over appropriate ways to see the world and
to validate claims about it. He also asserts that one particular world
view is most conducive to the preservation of developmental psychol-
ogy. The very question, "What should a good scientific theory of
development look like?", sets up the argument because it reflects a
Ellin Kofsky Scholnick. Department of Psychology, University of Maryland,

College Park, MD 20742.

Edited by P. Van Geert and LP. Mos, Plenum Press, New York, 1991
250 Ellin Kofsky Scholnick
world view. Overton's characterization of science as a "search for

systematic patterns of knowledge", and the title for his chapter, "The
stlUcture of developmental theory," are most meaningful from a
perspective that values system, pattern, and knowledge, and that seeks
to explore the criteria defining a good system. As he points out,
realist-empiricists minimize the role of theory, and thus find the ques-
tion irrelevant. Overton's chapter shifts the focus of scientific inquiry
from the correspondence of data with generalizations to evaluations of
scientific theory as a body of axioms to be judged by consistency,
coherence, parsimony, etc. If theories are judged to be good because
they are coherent and well organized, and they account for a world
which is badly in need of organization, then a developmental theory
must account for the origin and course of organization. In contrast, if
the organism is seen as a set of modules, not a system, and change is
seen as externally imposed rather than internal, there is no discipline of
developmental psychology. It would be better to study the operation
of external variables and the patterns they produce in different domains
and in different organisms. Developmental psychology would simply be
a synonym for experimental child psychology or learning.
Several chapters have been written challenging Overton's perspec-
tive (see the Overton-Beilin-Gholson-Palermo debate in Reese, 1984).
The debates lend credence to Reese and Overton's (1970) claim that
metaphysics, definitions of science, and approaches to development are
intertwined. The attacks on an analysis of world views often arise from
perspectives that are not subjectivist in their conceptions of psychology,
science, or philosophy. To concede that there are world views would
require a psychological theory accounting for subjectivity. Hence the
debate is external to the framework of Overton's analysis.
There are provocative internal questions. Are there rationalist
theories that are not organismic, or that are based on a theory of the
organism different from the one Overton describes? In terms of its own
criteria of evaluation, how good an analysis of development is it?
Because Overton's analysis is metatheoretical, he does not explicitly
claim one organismic theory has developmental priority and he does not
contrast competing organismic approaches in great detail. The reader
is referred to Lakoff (1987) and McCauley (1987) for such analyses. I
wish to focus primarily on evaluating the developmental analysis on its
own terms, although it may be difficult to do so without being accused
of changing perspectives out of that framework. In that framework, a
good theory is coherent, intelligible, and capable of reducing the ratio

of problems solved to problems left unresolved. I begin by describing
the development of Overton's analysis of developmental theory and
illustrate how it has broadened in scope and led to a deeper under-
standing of developmental theory and method. This framework has also
produced problems for Overton. I explore how he has handled the
challenges and discuss alternative means of resolving them.
Developmental Changes in Overton's Theory Defining World

Views
In the early 1970's (Reese and Overton, 1970; Overton & Reese,
1973) began to apply contemporary analyses of the philosophy of
science to bringing order to developmental theory. They noted that two
opposing, mutually exclusive, metaphysical views dictated different
approaches to developmental psychology. One uses the machine as a
metaphor, and the other, the growing organism. Overton and Reese
spelled out the implications of these metaphors or world views for the
content of development that was to be explained and the kind of
explanations chosen. The mechanistic metaphor carries with it a focus
on static parts that are assembled and then launched into motion by
external forces. In the mechanistic program, developmentalists define
the forces that both initiate the process and also guide its direction.
Development is never self-propelling, and its direction is not deter-
mined in advance, but is responsive to the nature of forces operating at
any given time. Because machines are not living or self starting, once a
machine is built it can merely increase or decrease its efficiency and
speed of operation. A machine cannot reorganize itself. Development
is quantitative and the best (most developed) machine operates most
efficiently in the situations in which users employ them. Maybe the
most mature person is most knowledgeable about which machines to
employ. The organic metaphor is based on animacy, and that metaphor
carries with it self-propelled or intrinsically governed growth that is
determined by some overall, initial ground plan built into the organism.
Because organic systems are inherently organized, dynamic, and at some
level purposive, the task of an organismic developmentalist is to capture
the pattern of the individual at anyone time and the pattern of change
over time. The organic metaphor, which applies to the emergence of
flowers and fruit from seeds and toads from tadpoles, also implies that
the patterns that emerge will be novel - not predictable from past
components - and yet regulated - predictably better than their

predecessors.
The two views lend themselves to different scientific methodologies.
The mechanistic view leads to simulation of development by training
experiments, use of stimulus complexity to index developmental chal-
lenge, causal modeling, and analysis of variance. Correlational analyses
and multidimensional scaling may be favored tools of the organismic
researcher although psychology seems sadly lacking in powerful
methods of detecting how patterns change over time (see Porges, 1979).
Elaborating their Implications

As Overton developed these metaphors for developmental
theories, the analysis became more consistent, coherent and
generalizable. He elaborated the implications for categorizing families
of developmental theories (Overton, 1985) and for predicting the
location of theoretical controversies (see Bandura, 1986 as a prototype
of a mechanistic attack on Piaget).
Recently, Overton (1982, 1984, 1985) emphasized how these
metaphors are tied to different levels of explanation and different
characterizations of science. The machine metaphor implies reduc-
tionism and particularism. Each part is composed of other parts, which
in turn is composed of other parts, down to some primitives. Similarly,
variables or forces are in turn the composite of other variables, acting
in particular ways in particular situations. The emphasis on analysis
favors objectivism and inductive science. The scientist uses lenses to
peer ever more closely into nature to find elements not apparent to the
naked eye and measures the forces that govern how those elements are
set into motion. Science is a matter of simply focusing the lens down to
the appropriate level. A theory is a lens that gives the finest grained
picture with the minimum of distortion. It should correspond as closely
as possible to the data under the assumption that the theory maker
could directly and accurately apprehend the data. Disconfirming data
lead to abandonment of a theory unless it can be demonstrated that the
instrumentation and conditions of the experiment are at fault.
In contrast Overton suggested that the organismic view, which
describes progressive changes in systems, requires synthesis. Organis-
mic theories become more powerful as they gain universality. In
Overton's perspective, the environment is not inherently organized,
and never changes predictably in that direction. Organisms do become

organized. In order to deal with the environment, the observer must
impose organization. That organization is inherently constrained by the
observer's own capacities for producing a synthesis or divining the
pattern. Just as ontogenetic development is characterized by the
construction of better theories of the environment, scientific theories
develop and become more useful as they exhibit better organization,
that is, become more coherent, more consistent and broader in scope.
Since theories do not grow from nature but from the interpreter of
nature, an organismic theory ultimately must incorporate not merely a
theory of a domain but a theory of theorizers and the theory construc-
tion. So Overton increasingly focused on the implications of the
'rationalist view' for descriptions of theory production and change.
Scientists construct a set of core assumptions, ways to translate those
core assumptions into testable experiments and a research program
defining interesting places to test those assumptions. As long as those
assumptions yield fruitful problems and a reasonable number of confir-
mations, the theory remains intact. The core assumptions are never
refutable by data, although the data may affect the way the hard core is
translated into theories and research. If the particular theory instan-
tiating the hard core fails to solve problems or generate new problem
areas, that theory might have to be reformulated. Whether theory
change and cognitive development are similar is an interesting issue.
Overton and Reese began with a categorization of world views and
worked out its implications for developmental psychology. They
claimed that a metaphysical view worked downward to influence defini-
tions of science, of psychology, of developmental psychology and choice
of methods used to study each. Each of Overton's successive chapters
made more explicit these ramifications adding new distinctions, for
example, that organismic approaches are linked to explanations focus-
ing on the universals while the mechanistic approach emphasizes the
particulars of individual differences and contexts. Overton incor-
porated contemporary views of philosophy of science consistent with
the organismic view. He also broadened the definitional problem for
developmental psychology. From the mechanistic perspective,
developmental concerns are assimilated to the search for continuity,
particularity, and realistic representational models. From an organis-
mic view, renamed epistemological rationalism, scientific developmen-
254 Ellin Kofsky Scbolnick
tal psychology can be confused with hermeneutic and narrative ways of

knowing.
Dealing with Inherent Thnsions

However, there are muted tensions within the analysis, arising from
proposal of dichotomies and the incompatibilities the dichotomies
produce. How does one reconcile opposites? The basic tension is not
between organism and mechanism, but between descriptions of the
knower and the known. Theories of the mind postulate a relationship
between people and the environment they seek to understand.
Knowledge is the product of the data and the cognizer. Mechanistic
approaches usually downplay the role of the cognizer while exaggerat-
ing the impact of the environment, reducing cognition to perception
and deduction to induction. Thus Overton has attached the label
ontological realism to these approaches. Rationalist-epistemologists
may exaggerate the role of the cognizer at the expense of environmental
determinants. The realist-rationalist controversy could be understood
as a tug of war between the cognizer and the cognized.
The two polar views are only incompatible under the assumption
that discontinuity is pervasive and the environment and the knower are
fundamentally different in kind 1 (even when we are trying to under-
stand one another). This is Overton's perspective. He adopts the view
that science usually aims at imposing order and organization into the
chaos of everyday experience. We can apprehend our experience
directly through common sense, but the chaotic flux is not directly
cognizable. Data are particular, unstable and disorganized; the mind
generates universal, stable systems of organization. Hence the knower
and the known are qualitatively different, and perhaps the course of
development can be described by transformations of the environment
into forms compatible with the mind. Without a fundamental incom-
patibility between mind and matter, there would be no problem in the
choosing between or reconciling world views. Overton and Reese also
noted how the two world views generate incompatible language about
science and incompatible ways of evaluating evidence. Hence there are
scientific paradigms proliferating incompatible evidence and solving
1A deeper, correlated issue underlies these debates. Is definitional categorization, which

creates mutual exclusion and incompatibility, a good characterization of theories and
concepts? (see Lakoff, 1987).
3 Commentary on Overton 2SS
problems that seem important from one perspective, but trivial to the
other. Another incompatibility is evident in the data. Organismic
theories are not faring well of late. It is very easy to find a situational,
task, or individual variation that affects performance. Universal
patterns of performance are harder to find in data. They remain as
ideals. Like developmental psychology, the quest for universals seems
endangered.
Both the mechanistic and the organismic program eventually
produce more problems than they can solve unless they are in some
ways constrained by one another. A mechanistic, antecedent--
consequent approach tends to generate lists of variables and tasks in
minidomains. The fractionation leads to theories as diverse as the
domains they model. There is the danger that an organismic theory can
become so abstract that it explains everything and nothing. The realist-
reductionist theories are flying away from one another. The variables
in the reductionist tradition need themselves to be patterned, and the
patterns in the rationalist tradition need to be systematically tied to
particulars.
When two programs of research have entirely different agenda,
different problem definitions, irrefutable core assumptions, and no
common language, it is hard to evaluate either of them on neutral
grounds. Each may capture a particular part of reality so the temptation
to incorporate one set of findings into another is irresistible.
Dichotomies present incoherence and inconsistency for theorizers who
value just the opposite. Overton states:
Any general theory of behavior must ultimately offer explanations
for change and stability, variation and constancy .... Explanations of
the nature of variation and constancy - and the relationship between
them - form the bedrock on which all other - more local -
explanations stand. (Overton, in press)
Organismic imperialism. The absence of means to resolve
theoretical incompatibilities limits Overton's analysis to a description
of the current state of developmental theory. Overton clearly has
broader aims. He wishes to advocate a program of research. His latest
papers propose one way of resolving the incompatibility, an imperialist
approach. That solution contrasts with two others, resolution by mag-
nification, and synthesis through emergence.
The current chapter reveals one attempt to reconcile opposing
world views. Opposing world views can give rise to relativism without
providing unbiased means of choice. The aim of the current chapter is
to describe a good scientific theory of development so that we can make

a choice. Scientific theories always have an empirical component.
Although theory is qualitatively different from data and not reducible
to data, Overton states that scientific theory is constrained by the data
gathered by observational methods. Hence a scientific theory must
incorporate data and hypotheses. Yet the data have second-class
citizenship. Cognizers invent the theory. Data exemplify the theory
but they cannot falsify it.
The initial Overton-Reese analysis has also been extended and
elaborated in discussions of competence as it is moderated, activated
and utilized in performance (e.g., Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman,
1982). Even in the original Overton-Reese analysis, the mechanistic
and organismic views were not mutually exclusive. They included over-
lapping explanatory principles. Reese and Overton claimed that static
mechanism requires an initiating force that instigates change (efficient
cause) and a medium that embodies the force and that is the target of
that force (material cause). In contrast the organismic position, which
accounts for directed patterns, bases explanations on detection of
organization (formal cause) or endpoint (final cause). However, it
would be ironic if an organismic view existed without organs, and if
growth, a process of transforming external nutrients into an inner
system, existed without external influence. Hence, the organismic posi-
tion is privileged because it really allows for all four forms of causation.
Mechanists and organismic theorists also differ in their approach to
structure (the organization that gives meaning to events and a perspec-
tive to the behaver) and function (the actions of a behaver). Presumably
a pure mechanist view eschews structure and only focuses on function
in a particular environment, whereas a pure organismic position focuses
on structure. By a slight change of meaning from use, to purpose for
which something is used, the organismic view can incorporate function
and structure, as well as particularism and universalism, external and
internal forces into its perspective. Then the organismic view contains
everything the mechanistic view does and more. But Overton limits the
scope of mechanistic influences to slowing down, blocking, or moderat-
ing the activation and use of patterns. The environment can never
create the patterns themselves. Being quantitative variables, external
influences affect the rate of development. They lack the privileged
status of organismic factors, to be partners in reciprocal causality or
creation. In the next two sections, I present two other views trying to
reconcile organism and mechanism through reciprocal causality and

creation. When we adopt the moderator-activation/albutilization view,
there is overlap between mechanism and organism and a neutral
language for describing data and experiments.
Magnification. A mechanistic perspective can also incorporate an
organismic approach. Overton describes world views metaphorically as
lenses, each with different colors or distortions. The part-whole, predic-
tive-teleological opposition might be reconciled through a different
lens metaphor, based on levels of magnification. This quantitative
metaphor has been used by Hofstadter and Dennett (1982; Hofstadter,
1980) to explore the feasibility of and implications of simulating human
intelligence by computers. Like Overton, Hofstadter posits two world
views, the mechanism of hard scientists that values reductionism and
antecedent-consequent relations versus the soulism of soft science that
incorporates holism and teleology. However, among the many
metaphors he uses to describe the relation between world views,
Hofstadter cites reversible figures in which perspectives continually
change. He also presents diagrams of words in which one half the letters
spell 'holism', and these letters are in turn composed of parts spelling
'reductionism', which in turn are made up of elements composed of
'holism', etc. The other half of each word has levels in the opposite
patterns, with reductionism the highest order element. The diagram
illustrates reciprocal determination. Hofstadter argues that "a shift in
frames of reference can induce a shift of perceptions and concepts -
a shift in ways of perceiving causes and effects" (Hofstadter, 1980,
p. 196).
The brain needs this multileveled structure because its mechanisms
must be extraordinarily flexible in order to cope with an unpre-
dictable, dynamic world .... An intelligent system must be able to
reconfigure itself-to sit back, assess the situation and regroup - in
rather deep ways; such flexibility requires only the most abstract kind
of mechanisms to remain unchanged. A many-layered system can
have programs tailored to very specific needs...at its most superficial
level, and progressively more abstract programs at deeper layers,
thus getting the best of both worlds. Examples of this deeper type of
program would be ones for recognizing patterns; for evaluating
pieces of evidence; for deciding which, among rival systems clamoring
for attention, should get higher priority ... (Hofstadter & Dennett,
1982, p. 201).
Shifts in perspective need not reflect changes in level of analysis,
but simply changes in the purposes of the individual (see Lakoff, 1987).
Then we need a theory providing an organized framework linking

purposes and perspectives.
Emergence. When Hofstadter noted that a change of level brings
with it a shift in perspective, he did not characterize that shift. The word
composed of 'holism' and 'reductionism' was 'MU'. It refers to a Zen
tactic of un asking a question by seeking a larger context into which, in
this case, both holism and reductionism fit. But he did not specify that
context. He implied that the context might be an emergent since 'MU'
is neither reductionism nor holism. Emergence is, of course, intrinsic to
Piaget's organismic theory. In one of his books, on equilibration,
"Experiments in contradiction", Piaget (1980) cited numerous
examples of children who had two local laws they reconciled through
an emergent structure. Piaget posits a mind that abhors inconsistency
and so creates new structures to reconcile them. 2 According to Overton
and Reese (1973), the organismic view incorporates reciprocal causality
and emergence. Is it possible to have a theory with truly reciprocal
influences and with constraints that are not located wholly in the
organism or the world but are emergent from their interaction? Within
that viewpoint the challenge would be to reconcile epistemology and
ontology. The challenge to cognitive psychology would be to figure out
the emergent processes or new meanings by which the mind adapts what
it knows to the contingencies of particular events. The puzzle for a
developmental psychologist would be to ascertain how children
construct a working model enabling them to transform what they have
learned into what they think must necessarily be true and reciprocally
fit their necessary principles to what they have learned. The hallmark
of a good developmental analysis, such as Overton's, is that it enables
us to see inherent contradictions that need to be resolved by an emer-
gent structure, and to see some directions that resolution might take.
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2 But is organismic theory the emergent or the world view that needs to be reconciled
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mental psychology (pp. 115-145). New York: Academic Press.
3
Metaphor, Recursive Systems, and Paradox
in Science and Developmental Theory
Willis E Overton1
In my chapter, "The structure of developmental theory," I argued

that the way we decide the value of any theory depends to a significant
degree on abstract philosophical assumptions that we bring to the
evaluation. Specifically, I claimed that the assumptions of ontological
and epistemological realism set one context for theory evaluation; the
assumptions of epistemological rationalism or interpretationism set a
different context. My general point was simply that the rules define the
game, and decisions about whether a game is being played well or
poorly necessarily require understanding of the rules. A North
American who watches Europeans play "football" can be excused for
thinking that Europeans play poorly - indeed insanely - if he is not
aware that the rules of North American and European football differ
significantly. A Realist who watches a Rationalist play "science" must
have similar unkind thoughts.
I situated my exploration at this particular abstract level of
metatheoretical assumptions primarily for three reasons. First, I
wanted to show that it is only at this level that it is clear how the rules
1 I want to express my appreciation to the members of the Epistemology, Development,
and Psychotherapy Seminar at The Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital where several of
the ideas in this paper were first expressed and worked through. Also my special thanks
to Harvey Horowitz for our ongoing discussions about epistemological issues, and to
Carol Groves, Richard Lerner, Lynn S. Liben, Nora Newcombe, Mary Winn for critical
comments on an earlier draft. 10 Ellin Scholnick, my thanks for keeping the discussion
going.
Willis F. Overton Department of Psychology, Temple University,

Philadelphia, PA 19122

of the game called science and the rules of the game called develop-
mental psychology are necessarily interrelated. For example, it is not
accidental that a realist understanding of science and a realist under-
standing of development combine to support the position that theory
is secondary to, and inconsequential in the face of, empirical observa-
tions. Similarly, a rationalist understanding of both science and
development supports the position that empirical observations, while
important and necessary, have no such privileged status.
A concern about what developmental psychology will accept or not
accept as legitimate scientific explanation was my second reason for
basing my exploration at this level. It is impossible to overemphasize
the point that realism demands that ultimately all explanations in science
must be phrased in the language of material causes (e.g., "hardware"
explanations, "semantic" explanations, "heredity", "efficient" cause,
"proximal and distal" causes, "social and cultural determinants,"
"stimuli"). Rationalism or interpretationism, on the other hand, asserts
that there are levels of explanation that require pattern explanation
(e.g., "structure," "design," "formal," "syntactic" explanation) as an
irreducible and necessary feature of the game of science.
My final reason for situating the discussion at the level of the
metatheoretical assumptions of realism and rationalism is that I wanted
to try to fill in, and expand upon, some of my earlier writings on related
topics. These earlier writings, as Ellin Scholnick rightfully points out in
her excellent commentary, examined the role of metaphor and world
views as they influence conceptual, theoretical, and methodological
approaches to developmental psychology. In working on the
"Structure" chapter I believed that by moving to the higher (i.e., more
abstract) ground of philosophical realism and rationalism I might, to
repeat a theme that runs through that chapter, introduce greater
coherence, generality, and plausibility into my earlier stories.
Both Frank Murray and Ellin Scholnick have presented very
thoughtful commentaries. Most of Murray's commentary details
several specific elements that he argues would be required for a
"satisfying" theory of development. In general, I find nothing to quarrel
with in the list of ten "categories of information" that he suggests are
important for maintaining a "sentiment of rationality" about a theory
of development. My own list might drop some of these categories
(e.g., "The Theorist") and it might alter the meaning of some others
(e.g., "Reductionist Mechanisms"). However, I would certainly agree
that any theory that is going to find wide acceptance must ultimately
present the reader with much of the information contained in these
categories.
If I were able to enter directly into a dialogue with Murray about
his commentary, I would focus attention on the argument that ulti-
mately, decisions about what is rational are determined by emotional
responses and hence, the need to generate a "sentiment of rationality"
concerning any theory. I suspect that Murray would not want to press
any narrow interpretation of this position because it leads directly to
the worst of subjectivism and solipsism. If theory x is a good or bad
theory because of my emotional response to it, and theory y is good or
bad because of Murray's emotional response to it, and theory z is good
or bad because of your emotional response to it, we have no basis for
making comparative evaluations among the theories. Further, you or I
can dismiss Murray's ten categories out of hand because they are based
on his "feel" and not your feel, or my feel. It is exactly this problem of
extreme relativism and subjectivism that, as I described in my chapter,
led to the attacks upon Kuhn's proposals about the nature of science.
An interpretationist position avoids this problem by developing an
interlocking set of criteria, including empirical observation, that
increase the coherence and hence the stability of the overall system.
It is possible of course, that Murray would reply that we will one day
find out exactly what determines or causes an emotional response. This
discovery would then provide a common standard from which to make
evaluations about the quality of judgments a person makes, and hence,
about the quality of a theory that is based on the person's judgments.
Although this argument avoids solipsism, it also lands us directly back
into the context of metaphysical and epistemological realism. That is,
the argument maintains that in the future theories will, in fact, be
reduced to specific material causes (i.e., emotional responses). How-
ever, it is only realism that demands that ultimately all explanations in
science be phrased in the language of material causes.
It is also possible that Murray would argue that he did not intend
such a narrow interpretation of rationality. In fact, at one point he
suggests that the emotional response itself may derive from preference.
Here, however, we have the case where the choice of a theory is based
on the sentiment of rationality that, in turn, is based on an emotional
response that, in turn, is based on a preference. And how are we to
understand the nature of this preference? Is preference itself to be
explained by some particular material cause(s), or is preference based

on some set of interlocking reasons? These questions return us again,
at a new level of analysis, to the conflict between realism and
rationalism, because whichever answer is given, that answer is consis-
tent with one position and not the other.
My general point here goes beyond a dialogue with Murray about
his specific comments. The point is that there seems to be no way of
reducing rationalism to realism, or vice versa, unless this reduction is
done from a rationalist, or from a realist, perspective. An important
implication of this general point is the idea that a movement beyond
contradiction - which both Scholnick and Murray would like to see -
is not possible. No matter what level of abstraction one uses to develop
an analysis of the problem, the "other" position asserts itself as a
potentially viable, but contradictory frame.
Compromise, in the sense of eliminating contradiction, is possible,
if and only if, the core integrity of the "other" position is destroyed in
the process (see Overton, 1984). But this is exactly the process of
attempting to use one position to reduce the other to its tenets. Within
this process, I certainly can offer and have offered (Overton, 1984)-
from an interpretationist position - a compromise. This compromise
permits, in fact demands, the integrated features suggested by Scholnick
including synthesis and analysis, whole and part, universal and par-
ticular, change and stability, and, emergence and continuity. While the
compromise eliminates contradiction at the level of analysis offered, the
realist, when he moves to the next higher level of abstraction, notes that
this compromise stands in contradiction to his own basic principles.
Specifically, the compromise that I suggested involves acceptance
of the idea that both material and pattern explanation form an irre-
ducible matrix of explanation. The concept of material reductionism or
eliminative materialism is totally abandoned in this compromise. When
the concept of reductionism is absolutely abandoned, a theory like
Werner's, or Piaget's, or Bowlby's provides universal pattern explana-
tions involving the development of competence. Various social learning
theories, or Gibson's theory, or Skinner's theory, or neurophysiological
theory, on the other hand, provides particularistic (part-analytic)
material explanations that operate in the context of the universal
(whole-synthetic) patterns. The problem with this compromise - and
the point I am trying to make - is that once the realist moves up one
level of abstraction it will be recognized that the absolute abandonment
of reductionism has destroyed the integrity of the realist position. In

effect, what seemed like a compromise at one level turns out to be a
capitulation to rationalism at the next higher level.
Another implication of this inherent and irreducible rivalry between
rationalism and realism is the notion that the whole knowing enterprise
entails iterations of recursive conceptual rule systems. Recursive rule
systems are like stories inside stories, or movies inside movies, or boxes
inside boxes, inside boxes etc. (Hofstadter, 1979). Consider the several
levels of abstraction of recursive rule systems shown in
Figure 1. Here the aim of the knowing activity is to offer scientific
explanations of persons. The ellipses at each level suggest recursive
systems, and the bidirectional arrows through the levels indicate that
the levels themselves form a recursive system. At the 0 level there is
the person to be explained. This is the person of our commonsense
understanding.
At the 1st order abstract level of scientific knowing - that of specific
psychological theories - some theories offer concepts that describe
organisms as operating realists (e.g., information processing devices).
Other theories describe organisms as interpretationists (e.g., assimila-
tion processes, where meaning is a creation that emerges from the
activity of the organism, and not a fixed unit extracted from another
source).
At the next iteration, or 2nd level of recursion, meta theoretical
assumptions frame the context for the theories themselves. Here, for
example, it is possible to point to the realist metatheoretical assump-
tions of Gibson's theory, and the interpretationist metatheoretical
assumptions of Pia get's theory (e.g., Constructivism). At the 3rd level
of recursion resides the demarcationist strategies that present the rules
of the game of science, within which meta theories and theories are
formulated. Here, the strategies of positivism, conventionalism, and
contemporary neo-positivism all reflect the image of realism as it is
worked out at this level. The strategies of paradigm guided research,
research programs, and research traditions (Overton, 1984) similarly
reflect the working out of the images of interpretationism.
Perhaps the 4th level of recursion is the specific realist philosophies
of knowing, or world views, such as those of Locke and Hume, and the
interpretationist philosophies of knowing or world views, such as those
of Kant and Hegel. Then the 5th level of recursion is the level of
KNOWING PERSONS: SCIENTIFIC LEVELS
RATlONAUSM AND REAUSM
3c!IP
DEMARCATIONIST STRATEGIES
METATHEORETIC ASSUMPTIONS
PERSON
o
~
Figure 1. Levels of abstraction (1-5) of recursive systems of
scientific knowing.
epistemology and metaphysics, and these are defined by the concepts

of realism and rationalism as discussed in the "Structure" chapter.
It was, in fact, at this level that I left my analysis in the chapter itself.
That is, I presented this 5th level of recursion; described the contradic-
tions between realism and rationalism; and suggested ways that the 5th
level was reflected - boxes within boxes - at the other levels. In a
sense I felt that I had provided a basic conceptual foundation for earlier
papers where I had developed ideas about the impact of world views,
and strategies of science, on developmental theories and on scientific
research methodologies. However, in her commentary, Scholnick
makes an important point. That is, she suggests that my analysis was, in
fact, conducted from a 6th level of recursion, and at that level I was
operating wholly from a rationalist or interpretationist position. As
Scholnick describes it, even my title - The stmcture of developmental
theory - and my basic question - What should a good scientific theory
of development look like? - betrays my implicit 6th level inter-
pretationist position.
I certainly don't disagree with Scholnick about this. However, I
would like to note that this is exactly the "synthesis through emergence"
solution to the problem of resolving incompatibilities that she suggests
in her commentary. Of course, while the movement to the next higher
level of analysis reconciles the lower level, it leaves in place the con-
tradictions at this higher level.
If compromise - in the sense of eliminating contradictions - is
impossible, another strategy of reconciliation might be considered.
This strategy would accept contradiction - or paradox - as an inherent
feature of complex systems, and use this paradoxical feature to further
understanding. This is somewhat similar to Scholnick's suggestion that
a kind of reconciliation could be achieved through understanding con-
tradictory positions on the analogy of reversible figures in which
perspectives continually change.
An exploration of this strategy first requires mention of the relation-
ships between metaphors, organismic and mechanistic world views, and
rationalist and realist epistemologies. Scholnick suggests that
rationalist and realist epistemologies reflect the renaming of the or-
ganismic and mechanistic world views that I have discussed in several
earlier publications. In an important, if incomplete, sense she is entirely
correct about this. That is, I believe that the metaphor that emerges
out of the image of organic system and the metaphor that emerges out
of the image of the machine, impact on the formation of those perspec-

tives that are called the "organismic world view" and the "mechanistic
world view". Further, I believe that these metaphors and world views
impact on the formation of the conceptual systems called "rationalist
epistemology" and "realist epistemology", respectively. However, it is
also the case that at each level of knowing novel systemic features
emerge that cannot be captured if the process is thought of as merely
that of renaming.
My reasons for using rationalist and realist epistemological
terminology were twofold. First, this terminology makes contact with
a significantly larger body of both historical and contemporary
philosophical and psychological literature than does the terminology of
organismic and mechanistic world views. Therefore, the arguments
tend to be clearer and more familiar in this context. Second, and more
importantly, as suggested earlier, by framing the discussion in the
context of epistemology I thought that a high ground might be estab-
lished from which to examine the role of metaphor and world views as
they impact on our understanding of science, psychology, and develop-
ment. In essence, I felt that for both of these reasons, the scope and
precision of the general argument would be increased by framing the
discussion within the context of rationalism and realism. Scholnick's
point is that, to accomplish these aims, I used the organic metaphor and
organismic world view at yet a higher level (6th recursive level, see
Figure 1).
To avoid moving to a 7th or 8th level, I will return to a more middle
position and consider what this process has been all about. The nucleus
of the proposal that I have been making throughout this and earlier
papers is that, no matter what the level, metaphor is necessary and
central to the knowing process and to all forms of knowing. Given the
context of the "Structure" chapter then, metaphor is particularly neces-
sary in that form of knowing called scientific knowledge. Metaphor
here is not viewed as simply a heuristic device, nor simply a matter of
taking a concept or image that is used in one domain and applying it in
another. Metaphor is a process of knowing. Specifically, it is the
process of knowing that proceeds from the known to the unknown, and
gives meaning to the unknown. Metaphor is the recursive process that
Piaget called assimilation/accommodation, and Heinz Werner called
integration/differentiation. It is the act of construction; the act of giving
meaning to the world.
If the metaphorical process is central to knowing, then the organi-
zation and content of the specific metaphorical entities used in
illuminating the unknown are central to understanding the resulting
knowledge. From this perspective, the image of the organic system with
inherent activity-organization-change, and the image of the machine
with inherent reactivity-uniformity-fIXity, have each been fertile sources
and resources for the elaboration of general systems of thought about
the nature of the world, called world views. Obviously, rationalism and
realism are a part of the warp and woof of this fabric of metaphor and
world views. Rationalism begins from organismic activity in the basic
assertion that all knowledge ultimately originates from and is the
product of the activity of the organism. Realism begins with the
assertion of ultimate fixity, invariance, and stability of knowledge, and
of its basic independence from the knower.
With this discussion of the relationships between metaphor, world
views, and epistemologies as context, it is now possible to describe the
strategy of reconciliation between contradictory positions at any given
level of analysis. An earlier paper (Overton, 1984), explored the way
the several scientific demarcationist strategies (i.e., systems of rules
offered as ways to demarcate science from other knowing activities) had
been formulated in the context of either a Mechanistic-Realism
(positivism, conventionalism strategies) or an Organismic-Rationalism
(i.e., paradigms, research programs, research traditions strategies). The
paper further examined the reasons that each strategy either does not
admit metaphor and world views as a central and necessary component
of the scientific process (i.e., the Mechanistic-Realist strategies), or
does admit them (i.e., the Organismic-Rationalist strategies). A
schematic illustrating the results of this paper appears in Figure 2.
This figure again illustrates the view that abstract levels of knowing
(i.e., Machine-Organic, Realism-Rationalism) influence the formation
of less abstract levels (i.e., the demarcationist strategies). For the
present argument, however, the most important feature of this figure is
the contradiction between the bottom up analysis required by the realist
strategies, and top down analysis required by the rationalist strategies.
Consider what happens to the contradiction between the strategies,
however, when a simple transformation is introduced that converts the
lines of knowing of Figure 2 into the recursive cycle of knowing of
Figure 3. Here the top down, bottom up, contradiction appears as two
related components of the same general process not unlike the earlier
LINES OF KNOWING
Machine Organic
Realism Rationalism
Positivism Conventionalism Paradigms

Research Programs
Research Traditions
Context of Discovery
Metaphor Metaphor
World View !
World View
Context 01 Justification
Concepts Concepts
!
Concepts
Theory Theory
t
Theory
f
Observation Observation
J,
Observation
Experiment Experiment Experiment
Figure 2. Lines of Knowing: distinctions among several demarcationist

strategies in science.
CYCLE OF KNOWING
~MElAPHOR~
OBSERVATION WORLD VIEW
~CONCEm/ Theory
Figure 3. Recursh'e cycle of knowing.
mentioned recursive assimilation/accommodation and integration/dif-

ferentiation processes. Similar effects occur for other contradictions.
Observations do lead to concepts if one looks only at the part, but only
as they are processed through metaphor and world views when one
recognizes the whole. Metaphor does lead to observation in a part view,
but the observation then influences the metaphor in a whole view.
This transformation also has an interesting effect on the analysis of
the demarcationist strategies themselves. Although positivism, with its
complete rejection of any scientific value of metaphor and world views,
is still an historical aberration from this perspective, conventionalism
becomes at least compatible with contemporary research program
approaches. That is, conventionalism does not completely reject
metaphor and world views but it gives them an epiphenomenal status
by admitting them only to an extra-scientific "context of discovery".
Once the recursive cycle idea is accepted, conventionalism becomes a
true historical antecedent to a strategy that maintains the necessity and
centrality of metaphor and world view. Conventionalism's "error" then
becomes that of not recognizing that each component of the cycle is
necessary.
The reconciliation of contradiction then, consists primarily of
understanding the contradictory units not as isolated antagonists, but
as features of the same whole or recursive cycle. This can be done at
any level of analysis. For example, Winnicott (1971) explored the
theoretical question (1st level of abstraction, see Figure 1) of whether
the child constructs the mother, or the mother constructs the child. His
solution was that "the baby creates the object, but the object was there
Figure 4. 'Drawing Hands' by M. C. Escher: A recursive cycle.

1990 M. C. Escher Heirs / Cordon Art - Baarn - Holland
waiting to be created ... " (p.89). Winnicott was a strong proponent of
using related contradictions or paradox as a positive and creative
feature of knowing. He urged that paradox be accepted and respected,
and that attempts not be made to resolve or eliminate it.
This reconciliation of contradiction into productive paradox is illus-
trated in the famous lithograph by M. C. Escher titled Drawing Hands
(see Figure 4). Here, a left hand is drawing a right hand, while at the
same time, a right hand is drawing the left hand. Which hand is doing
the drawing, and which hand is being drawn? Both. Are the hands
identical then? Yes. Is there any difference between them then? Yes,
the left hand is the left hand, and the right hand is the right hand. A
theory of the left hand, like a theory of the child who constructs the
mother, is an important component of knowing. A theory of the right
hand, like a theory of the mother who constructs the child, is also an
important component of knowing. Bringing the two into a recursive
cycle permits a recognition that the one cannot be reduced to the other
anymore than rationalism and realism can be reduced to one or the
other. The paradox stands, and through the paradox the contradiction
is reconciled.
The movement of contradictory elements into recursive cycles is the
primary method of reconciling contradictions and transforming them
into productive paradoxes. However, no less important to this process
is the acceptance of something like recursive cycles as legitimate to all
forms of knowing, including scientific knowing. Hegel (see Stace, 1924)
identified two modes of knowing, or stages of mind, that he called the
Understanding (Verstand), and Reason (Vernunft). When knowing
operates only in accordance with Verstand, contradictions must be
eliminated, and recursive cycles constitute illegitimate and non--
scientific forms of knowledge. When knowing proceeds according to
Vernunft, contradiction or paradox is maintained as the source of both
differences and identities, and recursive cycles find an indispensable
role articulating the knowing process.
Verstand operates in terms of exclusive either... or categories. Every
question put to Verstand is answered in terms of "either. ..or." Either
the phenomena involved are different and thus they are not identical,
or they are identical, in which case they are not different. In this mode
categories are static and fixed. In Verstand opposites are mutually
exclusive and absolutely cut off from each other. The Aristotelian law
of identity holds absolutely: A = A and it is never the case that A = not
A Both identities and differences are considered, but each is taken

separately. As a consequence, concepts are either identical (A = A), or
they are different (not(A = B)).
This mode of knowing implicates linear thinking where contradic-
tions are resolved by showing that the one or the other oppositions is
mere appearance. Hegel accepts Verstand as a valuable mode of
knowing. It is the mode of knowing which searches for precision and
clear distinctions. It is the mode of thinking that has characterized
methods of justification in science. Subject-object, chance-necessity,
object-concept, appearance-reality are all important distinctions that
need to be made if thinking is not to become fuzzy and lost in vagueness.
However, analytic philosophy and positivist forms of science have been
trapped in the exclusivity of this mode of knowing, and as a direct
consequence they have insisted that this, and only this, mode constitutes
scientific knowing.
In Verstand, opposites or contradictions absolutely exclude each
other. Vernunft or Reason, on the other hand, is the mode of knowing
that asserts the principle of the identify of opposites (A = notA). Here
categories break up and flow into each other. Both modes consider
identity and difference, but Vernunft rejects the exclusive non relational
"either... or," and considers identity and difference simultaneously.
Thus, Reason requires that opposites be placed into a relational matrix
like the recursive cycles described earlier.
In Vernunft what is identical is also different, and what is different
is also identical. Categories in Vernunft are both identical and distinct.
In Drawing Hands (see Figure 4) there is identity; both hands are
drawing and both being drawn. But in identity there is the difference
that the left hand is the left hand, while the right hand is the right hand.
For infant and mother there is identity in that each constructs the other,
each provides for the other. But in this identity there is also difference;
the infant is not the mother, and the mother is not the infant.
Hegel pointed out that there is no necessary opposition between
the Understanding and Reason. Reason is only opposed to the
exclusivity of the Understanding. Because it involves both identities
and differences, Reason includes principles of the Understanding.
Reason is the mode of knowing that characterizes discovery in scientific
discourse, and provides the meaning context for justification. Thus, it
is the mode of knowing that establishes the legitimacy of recursive cycles
as a necessary component of scientific knowledge.
CYCLES OF KNOWING
Metaphor
Theory
Concepts
Figure 5. Levels or iterations of recursive cycles of knowing.

To summarize my comments in this paper: The contradictions found

at any level of abstraction among concepts such as subject-object,
whole-part, synthesis-analysis, metaphor-observation, organicism-
mechanism, interpretationism-realism, cannot be eliminated or
resolved at that level. They can, however, be reconciled into productive
paradoxes by recognizing them as components of recursive systems.
The resolution of the paradox occurs only at the next higher level of
abstraction where a synthesis can be established. This synthesis at the
next higher level, however, entails its own contradictions. These can
again be reconciled into productive paradoxes through the recognition
of broader recursive systems. This progressive solution continues at
each iteration, or level of recursion, and it is illustrated in Figure 5.
In Figure 5, the innermost cycle represents the knowing organism,
knowing in the paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-concepts-
observations. This knowing organism is explained and hence under-
stood, and the paradoxes reconciled, only by moving to the next level
of recursive cycle. At this next level, the first level of abstraction,
psychological theories operate to explain the phenomenological know-
ing organism of the first cycle. In fact, it is only by moving to this level
that we transcend the paradox of man knowing and explaining himself.
And only by moving to this level do we avoid the vicious circularity that
could befall the use of recursive systems. However, the theories them-
selves involve a new paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-
concepts-observation. Thus, explanation of this level requires
movement to the next level of abstraction or next outer cycle. Here,
metatheoretical assumptions provide the transcendence and the oppor-
tunity to reconcile the paradoxes of psychological theory. But this level
too operates in a cycle of paradoxes and consequently the process
continues as it does for any dialectical process.
In closing I should, in fairness, note that I have outlined only one
type of solution to contradictions that are found among approaches to
the game called science and the game called developmental psychology.
It is a solution that draws heavily on the categories of dialectical method,
and it is just this method that is both the reason for, and consequence
of, the organismic metaphor. Thus, my solution generates its own
contradiction for I have again, as Scholnick argues, based my solution
at some level of organicism; a point that will not escape the discerning
realist, nor the discerning rationalist for that matter.
References
Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Godel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New
York: Basic Books, Inc
and research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In H. W. Reese (Ed.) ,Advances in
child development and behavior (Vol 18, pp. 191-226). New York:
Academic Press.
Stace, W. T. (1924). The philosophy of Hegel. New York: Dover Publications.
Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and reality. New York: Routledge.
4
The Concept of Development in the Study
of Individual and Social Change
Roger A. Dixon, Richard M. Lerner and David E Hultsch
SUMMARY: In this chapter we suggest that the major models of

developmental psychology may be distinguished in terms of patterns of
positions on four dimensions along which the concept of development
may be defined. These dimensions include universality, reversibility,
qualitative versus quantitative change, and directionality. The pattern of
positions taken on these dimensions is indicative of the relative 'strength'
or 'weakness' of the concept of development associated with a given
model. In exploring the implications of strong versus weak concepts of
development to the study of individual and social change, we focus on the
dimension of directionality (and teleology). Two implications are
discussed in some detail: (a) the extent to which an interaction between
the individual and social levels of change is emphasized, and (b) the
position taken regarding the explanatory primacy of the individual or
social level of change.
In his important treatment of historiography, Carr (1961) con-

structed with quotations a polarity upon which a comprehensive study
of individual development and social change is often scuttled. The
polarity is between the descriptive and explanatory primacy of the
individual versus the society. He quoted first Donne's famous
apothegm affirming the social nature of individuals: no man is an island,
entire of itself ... every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the
main. For the individual side of the polarity Carr quoted (not surpris-
Roger A. Dixon & David F. Hultsch - Department of Psychology, University

of Victoria, Victoria, Be, Canada V8W 2Y2. Richard M. Lerner - Depart-
ment of Human Development and Family Studies, The Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA 16802.

280 Roger A. Dixon, Richard M. Lerner and David F. Hultsch
ingly) J. S. Mill: men are not, when brought together, converted into
another kind of substance. Carr himself argued:
The question which comes first - society or the individual- is like
the question about the hen and the egg. Whether you treat it as a
logical or as a historical question, you can make no statement about
it, one way or the other, which does not have to be corrected, by an
opposite, and equally one-sided, statement. Society and the
individual are inseparable; they are necessary and complementary to
each other, not opposites. (Carr, 1961, p. 36)
And, writing as a historiographer, he quickly turned his attention to
the question of development: "The development of society and the
development of the individual go hand in hand, and condition each
other" (p. 38). Although such a statement, as a conclusion to the above
vignette, does little to resolve the polarity, and even less to guide
empirical research, it does illustrate that the problem of individual
development and social change: (a) is one that is of keen interest to
social scientists, philosophers, and historians, and (b) has been of
interest to such scholars for several centuries.
Developmental psychology is among those enterprises whose busi-
ness it is to advance our understanding of the interplay and mutual
conditioning of individual and social development. In recent years,
numerous developmental psychologists have recognized that the boun-
daries of their phenomena may extend beyond what is traditionally
psychological. Numerous conferences, chapters, journal articles, and
textbooks testify to the broadening horizon of the study of psychological
development. The extent to which this may result in fruitful interdis-
ciplinary research efforts is not yet clear, although some efforts have
begun (e.g., Dannefer & Perlmutter, in press; Featherman & Lerner,
1985). In addition, in recent years, developmental psychologists have
turned considerable attention to the development (history) of develop-
mental psychology. This effort is, at least in part, premised by the notion
that an understanding of the current situation in developmental
psychology is enhanced by knowledge of what developmental psychol-
ogy was and how it got to be what it is. In both cases - the effort of
some contemporary developmental psychologists to move their field
beyond the boundaries of the 'purely' psychological, and the effort of
other developmental psychologists to place their discipline in historical
context - developmental psychology comes face-to-face with such
neighboring disciplines as anthropology, biology, history, and sociology.
Numerous scientists participating in these enterprises - both historical
4 Concept of Development 281
and contemporary - have attempted to address questions that bear

more than a casual resemblance to those of some developmental
psychologists.
Developmental psychology is one of the developmental sciences;
others include fields of geology, archaeology, history, biology, and
sociology. In this chapter we focus on some issues that are common to
all the developmental sciences in the context of some that are unique
to developmental psychology. Our goal is to identify some issues -
contentious and confounding as they may be - that pertain to the study
of individual development and social change. Our method is both
historical and contemporary. The issues we identify are not unique to
contemporary psychology, or other contemporary social sciences for
that matter; rather, they are issues that historical developmental
psychologies, as well as other historical social sciences, have considered
in ways that are, we argue, fruitful to consult. We begin by charac-
terizing the commonalities of all developmental sciences and by using
these commonalities to distinguish among the models of developmental
psychology.
The Concept of Development

Numerous historical and conceptual treatments of the developmen-
tal sciences have emphasized the importance that the discovery of time
- of the on-goingness of time, the virtually boundless history of the
planets and the species - played in their emergence. In retrospect this
may seem axiomatic: just how could many of the developmental sciences
operate effectively in a world with historical time as limited as it seemed
(given extant scientific and cosmological thinking) just two centuries
ago? Just what methods and theories would such developmental
sciences employ in order to study just what phenomena? Just what
metatheories (or 'conceptual frameworks') would predicate and
organize the research questions and interpretations? It is evident from
the discussion of Toulmin and Goodfield (1965) that the concept of
development prior to the discovery of time (their term) in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was restricted both theoretically
and temporally. It was restricted theoretically in that it was informed
and guided primarily by providentialist and progressivist perspectives,
often derived from Judeo-Christian theology. It was restricted tem-
porally in that the dominant perspectives allowed but a few thousand
years for the evolution of (say) geological formations and the species of
plant and animal life living on and around them. We will return to the
theoretical restrictions on the concept of development later in this
section, for they continue to inform some contemporary views of
development. For the moment, it should be noted that this discovery
of time occurred together with numerous advances in philosophy (e.g.,
G. W E Hegel, Karl Marx) as well as in such developmental natural
sciences as geology (e.g., Charles Lyell) and biology (e.g., Jean Baptiste
de Lamarck, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer). We have argued
elsewhere (Dixon & Lerner, 1985, 1988) that, although there had been
occasional developmental psychologies produced prior to the
nineteenth century, for developmental psychology to have emerged as
an intellectual tradition, the discovery of history and temporality, as well
as the merging of history and science, were of immeasurable importance
(see Richards, 1987).
Mandelbaum (1971) argued that indeed the category of develop-
ment came to infuse virtually all fields of intellectual inquiry in the
nineteenth century. The category of development implied that an
adequate understanding of any phenomenon (e.g., biological, cultural,
philosophical) required that it be considered in terms of its position in
the present situation and its role in a continuing developmental or
historical process. Events per se are of interest, but primarily in terms
of the role they play in processes of change. Given the departmentaliza-
tion of the sciences, sociohistorical events became primarily the
province of history and sociology and individual events became primari-
ly the province of life course sociology and developmental psychology.
What Mandelbaum identified as the category of development is now
more commonly referred to as the developmental orientation or
developmental perspective. In short, the developmental perspective is
as follows: to understand the present moment (behavior, performance,
phenomena, event) one must learn something of the conditions that
presently support it, as well as the conditions and processes that led to
it. Numerous textbooks on the theories and methods of developmental
psychology testify to the centrality of this perspective (e.g., Baltes,
Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977; Harris, 1957b; Lerner, 1986; Wohlwill,
1973).
This, the central perspective of developmental sciences, does little
to distinguish among the theories and models of any given science. For
example, in the nineteenth century both Lamarck and Darwin in evolu-
tionary biology and both the catastrophists and the uniformitarians in
geology agreed on this perspective while disagreeing on fundamental

features of how to observe and interpret change processes of interest.
So central is this perspective in developmental psychology that all major
models - however varied their meta theoretical inheritance -embrace
it. As is the case for other developmental sciences, the models differ
not in their adoption of the developmental orientation, but rather in
the definition of development and change. That is, they differ in the
extent to, and criteria by, which developmental processes are distin-
guished from other change processes. In short, the fundamental dif-
ferences among models lie not in the developmental perspective, but in
the concept of development (Lerner, 1986). This concept is used to
populate that perspective with theoretical and methodological
guidelines. In the remainder of this section we review briefly three
major models of developmental psychology, emphasizing that at all
levels of science they are all relatively adequate, but they differ in their
concepts of development. We refer to these models by their most
common names: contextualism, mechanism, and organicism. We will
also refer frequently to a fourth model, dialecticism. We continue by
specifying criteria by which their concepts of development may be
differentiated. In the subsequent section, then, the implications of
various concepts of development for the study of individual develop-
ment and social change are discussed.
Models of developmental psychology. Adherents to the three major
models of developmental psychology embrace the developmental
perspective. Together these models form what may be called a family
of developmental (psychological) sciences. Each of the models has a
relatively unique family tree, but they share numerous intellectual
ancestors, historical origins, concepts, and methods (e.g., Cairns, 1983;
Dixon & Lerner, 1988). Each has been derived from theories and
philosophies pertaining to individual, evolutionary, social-historical,
and intellectual change. They are each comprehensive and relatively
adequate; that is, they differ at the level of assumptions about the
fundamental issues or 'facts' of human life and development. Although,
as models or meta theories, they are incommensurable (Pepper, 1942)
they can explain observables in their own terms. Empirical tests of the
models - critical experiments - are not possible, in part because the
models are founded on nonfalsifiable assumptions. Individual theories
within each of the models, may, of course, be subject to empirical tests
in a variety of ways, although constrained somewhat by the models.
284 Roger A. Dixon, Richard M. Lerner and David F. HuItsch
This working view of the relationship among models of develop-

mental psychology is portrayed in Figure 1. It is evident that the models
of developmental psychology are premised on assumptions about
science, knowledge, and the nature of the species (Pepper, 1942; Reese
& Overton, 1970). Hierarchically contained in these models are
families of theories. They are termed families of theories because they
bear a family resemblance in terms of definitions, variables, constructs,
and hypotheses. There is also a family of methods that is available for
investigating the target behavior, the analysis of data, and the evaluation
of facts. In practice, of course, empirical methods are frequently shared
across models, a characteristic even of the historical succession of
paradigms in the natural sciences (e.g., astronomy), and one that may
be used as an argument for the continuity of such historical trends. The
interpretations resulting from the empirical evaluations of given
theories is constrained, however, by the assumptions of the models.
They rarely have ramifications at the level of the models, but do have
an impact on the details of the theories.
We are suggesting that the notion of family resemblance (which we
have borrowed from Wittgenstein) operates at two levels in develop-
mental psychology. First, there is the family resemblance of all models
of developmental psychology. They resemble each other in their intel-
lectual ancestries and in their adoption of the developmental perspec-
tive. To some extent, these family resemblances set the developmental
psychologies apart from nondevelopmental psychologies. Second, the
notion of family resemblance also operates within each model, for each
model is a relatively autonomous, adequate and comprehensive
perspective on the nature and development of human lives. Thus, the
concepts and theories (but not always the methods) of one model will
resemble each other more than even seemingly similar concepts and
theories of other models. As a simple example, Kohlbergian moral
development theories bear a family resemblance to Piagetian cognitive
development theories as a function of their belonging to the same model
(or family tree), namely, organicism. Although the domain of develop-
ment is somewhat different, there are profound similarities at a more
fundamental level. Contrast this organismic family of theories to a
mechanistic (or behavioral) family of theories addressed to an under-
standing of a parallel domain of psychological development: it is not
difficult to differentiate the families in this simple case. We have left
unanswered, however, the question of just what it is that accounts for
I Model X
I
f Family of Theories
I
Theory of Theory of Theory of
Cognitive Social Moral
Development Development Development
I Family of Methods
I
Method Method Method
A B C
I Family of Interpretations
I
Figure 1. Hierarchical representation of family resemblances among
theories and methods within a given model
the differences and similarities in the models of developmental psychol-

ogy. We turn now to a consideration of this question.
In the last two decades numerous accounts of the meta theoretical
situation in developmental psychology have been published. These
accounts were based largely on readings of Pepper (1942), who
emphasized the 'root metaphor' approach for distinguishing among
four major world hypotheses. Beginning with Reese and Overton
(1970) three of these four world hypotheses have been explored for
their applicability to developmental psychology. For the most part, the
subsequent discussions of the principal features of these models -
contextualism, mechanism, and organicism - are derived from a few
early treatments (e.g., Overton & Reese, 1973; Pepper, 1942; Reese &
Overton, 1970). Other models, such as the psychodynamic tradition
and, especially, in a paroxysm of literature in the 1970s, dialecticism
(e.g., Riegel, 1975, 1979), have been discussed. Because of family
resemblances these alternative models have been associated with one
or more of the three major models. For example, because of similar
assumptions the psychodynamic model is often allied with organicism
(Erikson's approach may be an illustration of this alliance). Dialec-
ticism, which presently receives comparatively little specific attention,
has been associated with both organicism and contextualism, and
occasionally even mechanism (see Datan & Reese, 1977; Lerner, 1986;
Reese, 1986). Certainly, it resembles each of these in some respects.
Indeed, the temptation to assemble the perceived strengths of given
models while overlooking wha t may be fundamental differences is grea t.
It is, however, important to remember the warnings of Pepper (1942)
and others of the inadvisability - if not intellectual danger - of
eclecticism, at least at the level of model building. In our discussion of
individual development and social change we shall see how important
the ramifications of fundamental assumptive differences may be, even
when other assumptions are shared.
We assume some general familiarity with the models of develop-
mental psychology. Lists of the typical characteristics of the models,
salient differences (and similarities) among them, and their historical
origins are available in numerous publications. For example, it is well
known that mechanism adopts a machine metaphor and patterns itself
after its view of the physical and chemical sciences; that it is reductionis-
tic and focuses on the relative activity of the environment and reactivity
of the organism. It is similarly well known that organicism is patterned
after a view of biological growth and distinguishes human phenomena

from other natural phenomena; it is not reductionistic and focuses on
the relative activity of the organism and passivity of the environment.
Contextualism operates on the basis of the metaphor of the changing
event, focusing on the roles of evolution and embeddedness of the
person in the ecology of human development; it assumes relative
activity for both the environment and the organism. Most observers
agree that these features characterize these models, although there is
not, of course, unanimity on all the details or their implications. Each
model has, as well, undergone some evolution in the last two decades;
histories of the descriptions and conceptual treatments of each model
would probably indicate that each has undergone transmutations pur-
portedly eliminating or de-emphasizing this or that intellectually unat-
tractive feature, and perhaps emphasizing more attractive ones. Such
histories of organismic developmental psychology - so closely depend-
ent on Piaget - and mechanistic developmental psychology - which
is heavily influenced by Skinner - would probably reveal the vast
potential of each author's oeuvre to support varying, and sometimes
contradictory, positions. Similarly, contextualism is, by it's nature, dif-
ficult to specify absolutely (see the useful collection of essays edited by
Rosnow & Georgoudi, 1986). In the following subsection we identify
four dimensions along which these models may be compared. Taken
together, these dimensions constitute a portrayal of the models' con-
cepts of development.
Criteria for the concept of development. As we saw above, it is the
concept of development, more than the developmental perspective,
that differentiates the models of developmental psychology. It is imme-
diately apparent, then, that the concept of development is what may be
called (with no perjorative intent) an ill-defined, fuzzy, or blurred
concept. As Wittgenstein (1958, paragraph 71.) argued (against
Frege) a concept with vague or blurred boundaries is no less a concept
than one with specific, well-defined boundaries. The degree of
precision required in specifying a concept depends on the context of
communication. Blurred concepts, especially those critical to particular
sciences, may be natural subjects of disputes among alternative camps.
In developmental psychology this is certainly evident. The concept of
development is an essentially contested one, one for which profound
differences among models may exist and for which there can be no final
or absolute resolution. It is an essentially contested concept because it
is based on a series of contestable assumptions concerning a range of

fundamental issues pertaining to the nature of humans, human
knowledge, and change. In other words, it is based on a series of
model-level assumptions. In this subsection we review four of these
assumptions, the four that are often considered to be the most useful
in defining (in however blurred a fashion) the concept of development.
We shall see that the models differ in their positions (or assumptions)
about each issue. We shall also see, however, that there are some
similarities among the models on some issues. We emphasize, there-
fore, not any single position on any single issue, but rather the pattern
of positions across all four issues. For a blurred concept - an essentially
contested concept - it is, we argue, more useful to define it in terms
of patterns of positions on critical issues than in terms of a particular
position on a particular issue. This may be especially relevant when the
objective is to compare positions taken by models on such concepts.
The concept of development concerns the question of just what
kinds of changes should be counted as developmentaL Alternatively, is
there a difference between change and development? Is development
a category of change and, if so, what constitutes the boundaries? Such
questions have concerned scholars addressing the concept of develop-
ment in developmental psychology, as well as other developmental
sciences, for many years (e.g., Gould, 1977; Harris, 1957a; Lerner, 1986;
Mandelbaum, 1971; Nagel, 1957; Nisbet, 1980; Schneirla, 1957;
Toulmin & Goodfield, 1965; Werner, 1957; Wertheimer, 1984; White,
1983). It is possible simply to answer such questions by arguing that the
question is misbegotten: there is no difference between development
and change. At any given level of analysis and for any given process,
any kind of transformation, alteration, or modification is in fact develop-
mentaL There are no criteria (or very few non-stringent criteria) by
which to distinguish development from change. It is also possible to
answer such questions by arguing that developmental changes should
be distinguished from nondevelopmental changes in accordance with
one or more criteria. For example, adopting a model of biological
maturation, it might be argued that developmental changes are only
those changes that are progressive and growth-like; although other
changes may be of interest to some observers, from this viewpoint they
are simply non-developmental changes. What is at stake in distinguish-
ing development from change?
The following specific sample cases may be useful in answering this

last question. Two operative questions for the following eight cases are:
(a) is this change developmental? and, if so, (b) is this developmental
change paradigmatic?
1. In a typical seminar, participants, for various reasons, un-
dergo numerous shifts in attentiveness, ranging from mul-
tiple gradations of alertness through multiple gradations
of drowsiness. There may be sudden movements (e.g.,
from drowsiness to alertness when particularly interest-
ing information is proffered) along with the gradual chan-
ges that typically occur in this process. Is this process -
or any part of this process - developmental?
2. A newborn human is 'short'. The normal child grows
slowly but surely to a maximum height. This 'final state'
(actually, not-quite-final state) is reached within the first
two decades of life and is a function of certain genetic
and nutritional constraints. The final state is not actually
known in advance, but it is in a sense at least partly
'programmed'. Is this change developmental?
3. On the average, fluid intelligence increases relatively
rapidly through the early 20s and then usually starts to
decline gradually (although not entirely irreversibly)
after that. Is this change process - or any portion of
this change process, for example, the age-related in-
cremental portion - developmental?
4. Someone who goes on a diet program loses 10 kilograms.
Is this change in the amount of their weight a develop-
mental change? Is a hypothetical change in the distribu-
tion of their weight developmental?
5. Normal mood changes may be associated with events in
one's daily life. One may undergo shifts from feeling
satisfied to apprehension to some anxiety to substantial
relief to relatively carefree happiness. Are these chan-
ges - or any portion of these changes - developmen-
tal?
6. Pia get theorized that the typical child goes through four
stages of development, culminating in formal operations,
which is popularly considered the 'final stage' of intellec-
tual maturity. A popular version of Piaget's theory sug-

gested that all children went through these stages in a
specified order. Is this change developmental?
7. If a normal middle-aged adult is stricken by Alzheimer's
disease, gradual (but inevitable) changes occur in various
aspects of personality and cognition. The changes are
decremental in nature and seem to move in a particular
direction, viz., toward total loss of functioning. Are
those changes developmental?
8. In 1917 the Bolshevik revolution resulted in the emer-
gence of the Soviet Union as a replacement for Czarist
Russia. Was this change developmental?
Therefore, what is at stake in distinguishing developmental change
from nondevelopmental change is the very definition and concept of
development. There are several ways by which one may begin to answer
the question of what changes constitute developmental changes. That
is, there are several criteria that may apply. For the purposes of the
present discussion, we have selected four criteria, all of which are
familiar to developmental psychologists. These criteria, however, are
actually continua. From a pluralistic perspective - from a perspective
tolerant of, if not encouraging, a multiplicity of mutually exclusive
models of developmental psychology - it is possible to be a develop-
mental psychologist and fall at any point on any of the continua. As can
be seen in Figure 2, the poles of the continua are in fact occupied by
one or more of the models of developmental psychology. Again, two
qualifications are in order: (a) the placement of models in particular
positions on these continua is done on the basis of a 'received view' of
the model and not all interpreters of the models will agree with every
placement; and (b) the important aspect of this figure is not any
particular position for any particular model, but the pattern of positions
for a given model as compared to the other models.
The four well-known issues are presented in no particular order.
The first issue to be considered in defining the blurred concept of
development is that of universality. Relevant considerations include:
(a) Does the change happen to every normal person or is it (relatively
or highly) context dependent? (b) Does it happen only under given
circumstances? and (c) Are there substantial individual differences in
(for example) the timing of the changes, whether the changes occur,
and how the change occurs? The continuum ranges from universality
Concept of Development
Is the change:
1. Universal Non-universal
2. Irreversible Reversible
3. Qualitative Quantitative
Not
4. Goal-directed Goal-directed
o = Tendency of Oraganicism
o = Tendency of Mechanism
= Tendency of Contextualism
Figure 2. Four dimensions of the concept of development and common pat-

terns of positions for each of three models.
(the developmental change normally happens to just about everybody)

to nonuniversality and perhaps singularity (the developmental change
happens only to some individuals, but depends on the particular
combination of contextual conditions).
The second issue to be considered is that of reversibility. Relevant
considerations include: (a) Once a developmental change occurs in a
given process can that process revert or regress to the original state?
(b) Once a developmental change occurs in a given process, can that
process revert to any previous state? and (c) Are there any restrictions
in the degree of reversibility in a developmental process? The
continuum ranges from irreversibility (developmental changes are
those for which reversibility is not possible) to reversibility (develop-
mental changes include those processes in which regression is expected,
frequent, or possible).
The third issue to be considered in defining the concept of develop-
ment is the nature of change. In particular, this issue pertains to the
question of whether developmental change is qualitative (stage-like) or
quantitative (gradual, incremental) in nature. Relevant considerations
include: (a) Are the changes that constitute development abrupt or
gradual? (b) Are gradual changes as developmental as qualitative leaps
or shifts? (c) How is it possible to tell whether the behaviors observed
at one occasion differ qualitatively from what existed before, or whether
they are just quantitatively different? (d) At what point is the search for
quantitative changes that may underlie qualitative shifts halted? and (e)
When may it be the case that a quantitative change becomes a qualita-
tive change?
The fourth issue to be considered is that of progressiveness or
goal-directed ness of developmental change processes. Relevant con-
siderations include: (a) How strongly does one want to argue that
developmental change is inherently goal-directed, such as an acting out
of a pre-existing program? (b) Is there an endstate to developmental
processes? and (c) Is teleology an important defining characteristic of
the concept of development? The continuum ranges from goal-
directedness (which, in its extreme, implies that in order for change to
be developmental it must be 'inherently' progressive) to non-goal-
directedness (which emphasizes the random and chance nature of
change processes and the absence of 'inherent' directions to change
processes ).
As can be seen in Figure 2, the three major models vary in terms of

how many and to what extent they adopt these criteria for what they
consider as developmental change. Our placement of the models in
particular locations is done tentatively and in the spirit of the notion of
family resemblance described above. That is, we recognize that some
theories, theorists, and interpretations of major theorists (e.g., James,
Piaget, Skinner) within a given model may prefer to be placed elsewhere
on a given continuum. Nevertheless, it is the pattern of placements that
interests us more than individual locations, for (we argue) it is a pattern
such as the one we have constructed that best defines a blurred,
contestable concept. The boundaries of a blurred concept are best
defined by a series of continua. In this way, the shape of the concept
becomes less blurred. In this way, as well, the family resemblance
among the models - and their differences on the critical concept of
development - may be more precisely portrayed. This is the back-
ground for the occasional (published and otherwise) discussions of
strong versus weak concepts of development. In this superordinate
continuum, a stronger concept of development is one that accepts the
most stringent requirements for change processes to be counted as
developmental. In the Figure, it would be a model that occupies a
pattern of positions at the left side of the continua. On the other hand,
a weak concept of development would be one that has virtually no
requirements for which change processes are counted as developmen-
tal. In the Figure, it would be a model that occupies a pattern of
positions at the right side of the continua. Of course, as always, the
terms strong and weak concept of development are not prejudicial or
value-laden; they refer only to how many and how stringent are the
criteria for development. In the following section we explore the
implications of a model's concept of development for research on
individual development and social change.
Implications for the Study of Individual Development and Social

Change
We see from the above that a fuzzy concept of development may be
defined in terms of a pattern of positions on a series of defining continua
or criteria for distinguishing development from change. The four we
selected to highlight were: (a) universality, (b) reversibility, (c) qualita-
tive versus quantitative change, and (d) goal-directedness or teleology.
The pattern of positions taken by the major models of developmental
psychology serve to define their concept of development. These con-

cepts of development may be then categorized into stronger or weaker
concepts, depending on the extent to which criteria for developmental
change are stringently required. Presumably, such a characterization of
the concept of development may be applied at any level of analysis, that
is, in any of the developmental sciences. Thus, in evolutionary biology,
the Darwinian's relatively weak concept of development may be con-
trasted with the Lamarckian's relatively strong concept of development.
And in developmental psychology the mechanist's relatively weak con-
cept of development may be contrasted with the organicist's relatively
strong concept. In addition, the contextualist's relatively weak concept
of development may be contrasted with the (organismically oriented)
dialecticist's relatively strong concept. What are the implications of a
stronger or weaker concept of development for the study of individual
development and social change? For ease of discussion, in the following
pages we discuss this question as though the two levels are separable
levels of analysis, when in fact they may not be. A second concession
to communicability is that we focus on these two levels only and ignore
other relevant levels of analysis.
The implications of a stronger (and more precise) or weaker (and
more blurred) concept of development for the study of change proces-
ses within anyone level of analysis (e.g., individual change, social
change) is relatively clear. One can observe these implications at work
in everyday developmental psychology (cast within a contextual,
mechanistic, or organismic tradition) and in everyday life course sociol-
ogy or macrosociology (cast within similar or parallel meta theoretical
traditions; see Featherman & Lerner, 1985). Within developmental
psychology, does a stronger or weaker concept of development have
implications for the nature and range of possibilities in the study of
individual development and social change? In this chapter we propose
that there may indeed be important implications. In particular, a
stronger concept of development may be associated with a weaker
possible interaction between the levels of analysis (i.e., the individual
and the social). In contrast, a weaker concept of development may be
associated with a stronger possible interaction between the two levels
of analysis. A strong concept of development, as constrained by the
definitional criteria described above, may imply a relatively weak inter-
action between levels of change. For example, when, for a given
psychological developmental process, a strong, universal, irreversible,
goal-directed process of change is involved, there may be fewer oppor-

tunities for levels of change to interact effectively. That is, there may
be theoretically fewer opportunities for the social level to affect sig-
nificantly the (in the extreme case, self-contained and self-developing)
individual developmental level. Of course, the reverse is also true for
strong concepts of development applied primarily at the social level
(e.g., some versions of Marxist theory): there may be theoretically fewer
opportunities for individuals to affect significantly the ongoing social
developmental processes.
Weaker concepts of development, which allow for developmental
change to include changes affected significantly by context, may offer
theoretically more opportunities for strong interactions among the
levels of change. Thus, in developmental psychology not only is the
social level of change allowed to affect the individual level, but this fact
of interaction may be virtually built into the weak concept of develop-
ment. Similarly, for weaker concepts of development applied primarily
at the social change level there may be theoretically more opportunities
for individuals to playa significant role in ongoing social developmental
processes. Whatever level of analysis is of primary interest (e.g., social
change, individual change) the contexts of that level are other levels.
Change may occur constantly in either level, but, as we have seen, not
all change processes may be studied (or accepted) by given models as
developmental change. If developmental change is proceeding willy-
nilly in a given direction (teleology) and for all 'units' (universality) then
'units' from the other levels will probably not have a significant impact.
In the following sections we focus on one of the criteria of the
concept of development and the impact that adopting a stronger or
weaker position on this issue has for the study of individual and social
change. Because it is one of the more salient criteria - and because it
continues to attract commentary and controversy in the developmental
sciences - we have chosen to focus on the issue of the goal-directed-
ness of change. As above, largely theoretical positions are examined;
that is, the emphasis is not on identifying or criticizing particular models
but on describing the implications of particular (or even hypothetical)
extreme positions. In a subsequent section we attend to an issue we
raised in passing above, specifically, the role of the individual in affect-
ing the social level of change.
The Problem of Directionality and Thleology

In this section we discuss an abiding problem in the developmental
sciences, one that continues to attract attention in developmental
psychology (e.g., Chapman, 1988; O'Connor, 1987; Rychlak, 1984). It
is a problem of particular interest in the study of individual and social
development, one for which developmental psychologists proffering
weaker or stronger concepts of development often display vastly
different opinions. Put simply, the issue is teleology, which may be
characterized as the implementation of final cause, goal-directedness,
progressiveness, or purpose in nature, as well as more specifically in
individual and social change. The issue of teleology is a complicated
one, for it operates simultaneously in conjunction with several distinct
but related conceptions (such as function, purpose, intention, progress,
progressiveness, entelechy, and teleonomy). Furthermore, it has been
applied by observers of virtually all levels of organization that undergo
change (e.g. embryologists, botanists, natural historians, social
historians, evolutionary biologists, sociologists, and developmental
psychologists). We do not discuss all possible combinations of concep-
tion and level of organization. Rather, we focus on the problem of
teleology as it pertains to the study of individual and social development.
We have seen that developmental psychologies with weak concepts
of development (DP-WC) and developmental psychologies with strong
concepts of development (DP-SC) share the developmental perspec-
tive. Both emphasize the continuing nature of change and, consequent-
ly, the primacy of historical events and processes in the analysis of that
change and in the understanding of present events. They agree that the
fact of change necessitates the methods of developmental research. In
addition, both DP-SC and, especially, DP-WC, may allow for some
conception of multi-level change. When multi-level change is allowed
- and especially when it is emphasized - a concern with the interac-
tional nature of the levels is not far behind (e.g., James, 1890; Lerner,
1978, Overton, 1973; Riegel & Meacham, 1976; Vygotsky, 1978). It
should be noted, as well, that the epistemological issue - as repre-
sented in the polarities of relatively active/passive organism versus
relatively active/passive environment - does not necessarily distinguish
the DP-WC from the DP-SC. Taken at face value, recent discussions of
such issues indicate that virtually all models emphasize a relatively
active organism and relatively active environment. Is teleology an issue
upon which the DP-SC and DP-WC may be distinguished?
Some meanings ofteleology. Since Aristotle, the question of teleol-

ogy - basically, whether a changing system is end- or goal-directed -
has been discussed in terms of such interrelated issues as its meaning,
the legitimacy of using teleological language, the level of organization
to which it might be applied reasonably, and the propriety of its spon-
sorship of causal or explanatory statements (e.g., Baker, 1984; Beckner,
1967; Braithwaite, 1953; Lenoir, 1982; Mayr, 1982; Nagel, 1961;
Robinson, 1984; Rychlak, 1984; Weimer, 1984). Prior to the 19th
century many changing systems (including human history) were
portrayed (in a generally unchallenged manner) in teleological terms.
The teleological, goal-directed visions of Herder (in human history),
Hegel (ideological development), St. Augustine (Christian theology),
and Lamarck (evolutionary biology) were prominant and influential
(Nisbet, 1980; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1965). The salient questions
included whether a given unit of change was (a) progressive (or merely
showed progression), (b) uni-processual (or recognized multiple, com-
plex interactions of processes), and (c) directional (whether uni- or
multi-directional) (Nisbet, 1980; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1965). We
suggested above that DP-SCwere located closer to the goal-directed or
teleological end of the continuum than were the DP-WC. Such a
difference results in distinct nuances in the interpretation of individual
,nd social development.
Teleology is a doctrine that is invoked when notable differences exist
in a given phenomenon across time, where 'notable' implies that the
differences call for explanation, and where the differences seemingly
involve transformation or change on the order of process or progress.
In particular, since Aristotle's explication of final cause, teleology has
been the explicit haven for such concepts as 'design' and 'purpose',
especially as they are seen to function in natural phenomena (Owens,
1968). The telos, or ultimate object or aim of such a process, is often
portrayed (too simplistically, as numerous scholars have pointed out)
as drawing the events marking that process ineluctably in its direction.
In this way, the telos, the consequent, is seen to have a certain causal
priority over the antecedent. Thus, historically, teleology has often
been associated with such eminently disputable concepts as backwards
causation, vitalism, and entelechies.
It is important to note that the nature of the relationship between
the antecedent and consequent, even among teleologists, is the subject
of considerable debate. Nagel (1961, 1979) suggested that teleology
298 Roger A. Dixon, Richard M. Lerner and David F. HuUsch
must bear an orthogonality requirement, which is designed to distin-

guish between goal-directed and non-goal-directed processes. Thus,
Nagel (1979) argued, variables pertinent to goal-directed processes
must be connected by laws holding only for specialized structures and
not by laws of nature. Clearly, the primary reason for identifying
something as a purpose or end of a process is that it is employed in the
explanation of that process (Wimsatt, 1972). Such uses of teleological
explanations may be seen not only in biology (Brandon, 1981; Grene,
1974; Wimsatt, 1972) and other life sciences (Lenoir, 1982; Wuketits,
1980), but also in behavioral and other learning theories (Mace, 1949;
Perry, 1921; Rychlak, 1981, 1984; Tolman, 1932), and even physical
theories (see, e.g., Gooding, 1982, who enumerates the teleological
character of Faraday's theory of matter). It may also be relevant to the
explanation of intentional human action (Chapman, 1984, 1988;
Churchland, 1970; Davidson, 1963). It should be evident that such
explanations are usually held in contrast to mechanical (e.g., efficient
cause) explanations, although some (e.g., Mead, 1936) have argued that
even for biological processes there is no necessary conflict between the
two accounts. (Nevertheless, Mead's, 1936, view - that a pluralistic
science can tolerate "setting up" the process in teleological terms and
explaining it in mechanical terms - has not prevailed.)
Mayr (1982, pp. 19-20) described four continuing criticisms of
teleological language: (a) it implicitly endorses theological or
metaphysical doctrines, (b) such explanations preclude natural scien-
tific explanations, (c) the end-related causality is in conflict with
'accepted' concepts of causality, and (d) such language is anthropo-
morphic in that it generalizes the phenomenological human experience
of intention and purpose to other domains, structures, and forms of
living and non-living things, as well as to the life course of individuals
and societies. According to Mayr, theories in which a process or trend
is viewed as committed to a future goal - that is, theories which are
'goal-centric' - probably use teleological language or conceptions.
Such theories - unidirectional evolutionism, progressionism, and
orthogenesis are examples - are subject to the critical comments of
Mayr (see also Nisbet, 1980; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1965; Williams,
1982).
In general, ascribing a purpose - as opposed to a function (see,
e.g., Beckner, 1967, or Ghiselin, 1969) - to an entity goes beyond an
immediate description of that entity (Nagel, 1%1). Typically, presup-
positions and pre-existing theory inform the inference or identification

of purpose (Wimsatt, 1972). Although, since the nineteenth century,
there have been alternative elementaristic or mechanistic accounts,
where it is appropriate to speak of part-whole relations, teleological
language is often implied (Grene, 1974; Lenoir, 1982). In psychology,
where the level of analysis is the individual agent, this language may
include such vital forces as rationality, free will, and consciousness. In
biology, the description of goal-directed activities has ranged from the
vitalistic to the teleomechanical (Lenoir, 1982; Wuketits, 1980).
Occasionally, the purportedly more neutral term, teleonomy, has been
used to indicate self-regulating or goal-directed mechanisms at any level
of analysis (Mayr, 1982; Monod, 1971; Pittendrigh, 1958). Teleonomic
language is invoked to address the same explanatory questions - not
so much answers to the questions, 'What?' and 'How?', but to 'Why?'
- but without a commitment to final causality (Mayr, 1982; Pittendrigh,
1958). That is, it is etymologically, 'teleological in name only'. Never-
theless, it, like teleology, has been defined and used in numerous
(sometimes contradictory) ways and settings. Still, whether these
teleological (or even teleonomic) explanations should be treated as
primarily of heuristic value or genuinely theoretical is the subject of
some debate, even among those who are sympathetic to the teleological
enterprise (Braithwaite, 1953; Nagel, 1979; Wimsatt, 1972).
Teleology and the study of human behavior and development. The
concept of teleology can be traced at least as far as classical Greek
thought. Aristotle was perhaps the first to deal with what is known in
modern thought as 'final cause'. Although the status of final cause as a
cause is a controversial issue (Nisbet, 1969), the notion of final cause is
meant to explain the problem of ordered growth and development, the
sort of development that is taken as paradigmatic by DP-SC. Aristotle
suggested that the whole is in some way prior to the part; the final state
of any being which is subject to growth is somehow contained in the
origin and process of growth (Nisbet, 1969). The final cause of a
full-grown plant is somehow contained in the process by which the seed
grows into it, contained in it so as to direct it. Aristotle applied this
purposiveness to both the living and non-living world (Ayala, 1970).
And, according to Collingwood (1945), Aristotle went even further: the
final cause not only directs the growth of the seed, but it excites and
awakens the energy of growth which it controls. Although Collingwood
may have overstated the case, to him Aristotle's final cause implied that:
... the seed only grows at all because it is working at becoming a plant;
hence, the form of a plant is the cause not only of its growing in that
way but of its growing at all, and is therefore the efficient as well as
the final cause of its growth. The seed only grows because it wants
to become a plant. It desires to embody in itself, in material shape,
the form of a plant which otherwise has a merely ideal or immaterial
existence. (Collingwood, 1945, pp. 84-85)
Thus, although Collingwood's rendering may be controversial, he
argued that teleological development implies an "immaterial efficient
cause" as a part of the governing final cause.
Two examples of how teleology may apply to the study of human
behavior and development follow. First, a teleological viewpoint may
apply to at least one version of the dialectical (Marxist) view of social
change, especially to the Marxist account of the relationship between
forces of production and the economic structure, as in Marx's (1970)
famous Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy. Insofar as a
functional relationship obtains between the forces of production and
the relations of production, as well as the relations of production and
superstructures, and insofar as the functional explanation of this
relationship is informed by purposive theory, then such an account of
economic progress has a teleological character (Cohen, 1978, 1982).
That is, an explanation in which consequences are used to explain their
causes is tantamount to teleological explanation (Cohen, 1982).
According to Cohen (1982), this kind of explanation is characteristic of
(at least one interpretation ot) traditional Marxism, as well as historical
and dialectical materialism. Others have argued that this portrayal is
correct, revealing a severe deficiency in Marxism, and have offered
interpretative alternatives such as Game Theory (Elster, 1979). Still
others have suggested that, although Marx may indeed have held the
view that forces of production explain relations of production, and that
the latter explain superstructures, it may be that the teleological under-
standing of these relationships was not intended by Marx (Honderich,
1982).
A second example is that purposive explanations may be employed
subtly within evolutionary biological thinking by inter-relating them
with ideas such as Darwinian chance variation and natural selection
explanations (Cohen, 1982; Honderich, 1982; Novikoff, 1945; Wimsatt,
1972). Indeed, adaptation arguments are often advanced when the
evolutionary history of a form may not have completely involved adap-
tation. The concept of pre-adaptation - which is an inherently
teleological one - is a case in point (Gould & Vrba, 1982). An

illustration derives from the unfused skull sutures found in human
neonates. Such structures serve an important survival function among
modern humans, for they are requisite for undamaged passage through
the birth canal. Gould and Lewontin (1979) observed that many
biologists argue, in accordance with an "adaptationist programme," that
these unfused sutures were designed by natural selection for this
purpose. However, Darwin (1859) himself recognized that this argu-
ment was implausible, because both reptiles and birds, who are born by
breaking out of an egg shell, also have such structures. It is such
structures that are often labelled as pre-adaptations, with the suggestion
being that protohominids evolved unfused sutures in 'anticipation' of
changes in female bone structure (induced by upright posture and
walking) (Johanson & Edey, 1981) which would narrow the birth canal
(see Gould & Vrba, 1982). The teleological and non-empirical features
of such an argument are apparent: a future event is held to shape the
prior (by several million years) evolution of a given structure of a species
that would later evolve into hominids.
As we saw above, a teleological character is often associated with
developmental psychologies with relatively strong concepts of develop-
ment. Of the major models of developmental psychology, those most
likely to promote strong concepts of development, and thus most likely
to have some conception of directionality or teleology, are organicism
and dialecticism (e.g., Baumrind, 1978; Buscaglia, 1984; Buss, 1977;
Overton, 1984; Pepper, 1942; Riegel, 1976; see also Chapman, 1988).
(It should be noted again that, because of blurred and evolving concepts
and assumptions, as well as selective, mistaken, or revised interpreta-
tions of major contributors, it is only natural that there are differences
among the members of these families of theories in the extent to which
they embrace goal-directedness. Evaluating the weight of the evidence,
however, it is possible to assert that these two models, more than
mechanism and contextualism, are likely to involve some conception of
directionality.) To the extent that teleology is associated with the
organismic model, it was derived at least in part from such realms of
biology as morphology (in the form of part-whole relations), physiology
(in the form of means-end relations), and embryology (in the form of
goal-directed relations) (Grene, 1974; see also von Bertalanffy, 1976).
Pepper (1942), who was a source for much metatheoretical self-under-
standing by organicists, described the teleological features of or-
ganicism by noting that in this model there is, among the "fragments"
of an organic whole, an "inevitability of connections ... an implication
of wholeness contained in them" (p. 292), "an internal drive toward the
integrations which complete them" (p. 291), and where, although the
particular path to a goal is not predetermined, it is nevertheless the case
that "the goal was predetermined in the structure of the facts" (p. 295).
Overton (1984) derived his application of organicism to human
psychological development at least in part from Pepper. This is vivified
in his argument that progressiveness - wherein "events proceed from
fragments through a dialectic process toward an ultimate organic
whole" (p. 218), that is, toward, but never reaching, the "ideal absolute
state" (p. 218) - is a fundamental category of organicism. It is notable
that Pepper presaged some of our own comments (see below) about the
distinctions between the teleological representation of change found in
DP-Se, such as organicism, and the non-goal-directed character of
change found in DP-We, such as contextualism, by noting some of the
critical assumptive differences between these two world views, one of
which is the insistence on integration in organicism.
In contrast to the teleology that may characterize organicism, that
of the dialectical model was derived from Marx (or from one of the
variety of interpretations thereof). Again, it should be noted that, since
the mid-1950s, some Marxists have explicitly rejected teleological
renderings of historical change (see Urry, 1981), and some psychologists
have attempted to divorce teleology from dialectical materialism (e.g.,
Reese, 1982). In part, these efforts may be understood as repre-
sentative of dissatisfaction with some implications of goal-directedness
and teleology. Other observers, however, are openly skeptical about
these attempts. For example, Nisbet argued that:
There are few if any intellectual oddities in our time more
pronounced than that among Western Marxist scholars who seek to
disengage Marx from the evolutionary-progressivist tradition in the
nineteenth century. It is impossible to think of any major figure of
that century in which the perspective of inexorable, irreversible, stage
by stage progress toward a golden age on earth is more vividly evident
than in Marx's key works. (Nisbet, 1980, p. 258)
It appears that Marx held the evolutionary views of Darwin in high
esteem. Engels' (1968, p. 435) notes at the graveside of Marx, which
were delivered in 1883, exemplified the perceived intellectual connec-
tion between Marx and Darwin: "Just as Darwin discovered the law of
development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of develop-
ment of human history." Nevertheless, it is not DalWin's evolutionism
that Marx's views on the development of society most resemble.
Rather, it is the earlier progressivist view (with which Darwin disagreed)
of such writers as Herder that Marx resurrected in evolutionary apparel.
That history was viewed as a necessary, unilinear process moving ineluc-
tably toward 'inevitable results' is evident in Marx's (1968) preface to
the first German edition of Capital. This progressivist view of human
history is also apparent in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (Marx
& Engels, 1968) and, especially with respect to the ideal outcome, in
The German Ideology (Marx & Engels, 1947). Still, Nisbet (1980) may
have expected controversy when he included Marxism in the category
of utopian philosophies of history.
Whether organicism and dialecticism are necessarily teleological in
nature may be a debateable point. We do not claim that this is the case.
We claim, instead, that, as DP-Se, some versions of these models involve
goal-directedness (especially if compared to other models) and some
original, authoritative sources for these models contain some indication
of a teleological tendency. Let us turn to some implications of this view.
From the viewpoint of those models that embrace goal-directedness or
teleology, individual and social change are seen as entailing a logical
directionality - often, a unidirectionality - that is drawn fOIWard
(although probably not literally) by the final, inevitable goal. Thus, a
final cause, and perhaps even an immaterial efficient cause
(Collingwood, 1945), such as some forms of entelechy, is posited. In
contrast, a DP-We (such as contextualism) draws upon an alternative
theoretical firmament, such as DalWinism. Such developmental
psychologies with weak concepts of development find such teleological
portrayals of development empirically troubling and possibly even
theoretically atavistic. The DP-We takes this stance because, empiri-
cally, final causes are notoriously unyielding to traditional scientific
methods (Toulmin, 1972). Such renderings of development shift atten-
tion from the ongoing individual-ecology interactions to an (only
retrospectively, see below) evident immanent trajectory. In so doing
they may de-emphasize the place and role of, on the one hand,
individuals in social-historical development and, on the other hand, the
social-historical in individual development. Theoretically, such render-
ings are reminiscent of some pre-Darwinian views of society (and
phyla), as well as pre-DalWinian views of ontogeny (e.g., those of
Spencer). In brief, a privileged position is ascribed to the outcome of
a series of events, and all previous events are retrospectively

schematized in the light of this outcome (Mandelbaum, 1971), as
though they were under its causal control.
Some criticisms of teleology. Is it possible to maintain a strong
theory of goal-directedness at any given level of analysis and operate as
an empirical science? As a sample case, let us consider dialecticism and,
in particular, the Marxist view of social development. Marx and, espe-
cially, Engels perceived their work as scientific (Hudelson, 1982; but
see also Farr, 1983). Several observers have pointedly criticized the
empirical nature of their work (e.g., Eastman, 1940; Kolakowski, 1978;
Popper, 1957; Russell, 1959), as well as the empirical potential for its
derivative dialectical model of developmental psychology (Baltes &
Cornelius, 1977). In fact, a strong empiricist interpretation of Marx may
lead to a rejection of teleological necessity (Hudelson, 1982). It is
possible to find evidence in the massive writings of Marx for both a
strong empirical tendency and for a strong teleological tendency.
(Again, this is not a criticism of Marx or, necessarily, of his many
interpreters, for it is a common phenomen among productive, origina-
tive thinkers.) Certainly, Marx and Engels held views of science that
were very similar (Joravsky, 1961), but precisely what their view of
natural science was is also subject to mixed interpretations (e.g.,
Hudelson, 1982; O'Neill, 1981). The confusion surrounding Marx's
views of Darwinism is one illustration. Some followers seemed to
believe that their work was at once scientific and teleological (e.g.,
Lenin, see Kumanev, 1981).
The progressivist (teleological) position maintained that the (scien-
tific) laws of development (at whatever level of analysis) are dis-
coverable and the direction specifiable. In addition, the universal
process of development is characterized by the appearance of progres-
sively more advanced stages. In dialecticism this position stressed the
rationality of a given process where the immanent cause is the inherent
dialectic. Toulmin (1972) argued that in contrast to a Darwinian view,
which regarded the rationality of historical change in ecological (i.e.,
adaptive) terms, the Marxist dialecticians interpreted the dialectic in a
strong, teleological manner, which was derived in part from Herder,
Hegel, and Lamarck. From a (traditional) empirical perspective this
interpretation may have resulted in an unfortunate twist, for it implied
that the rationality of (in this case) sociopolitical change resided not in
the human response to the problematic context in which they occur but
in a somewhat mysterious, immanent, logical direction to the whole
history of society. Furthermore, each sociopolitical change could be
made to fit into such a general, cosmic ideology. The direction of history
is implicit in the teleological rendering and even apparent setbacks or
egregious social evils may be rationalized by the dialectical nature of
the historical march of humanity (e.g., as one unfortunate pole on the
way to something grandiose; see Engels, 1940).
Continuing with the dialectical illustration, one of the most distin-
guished Marxists since Marx, Lukacs (1972; see also Lowy, 1976; Miller,
1978), described the four theses of Marx's view of human social develop-
ment (history). First, the progression of society is determined exclusive-
ly by forces within that society. Second, there is a clearly determinable
(but not necessarily explicable) direction to this progression. Third, the
direction of the progression is 'specifically related to human objectives.
Fourth, the motive forces of social progression are independent of every
individual human consciousness, will, or objectives, but of course cannot
exist entirely apart from them. It would appear, therefore, that even in
recent dialectical (Marxist) scholarship there is a view that represents
social change as a unitary, unilinear (albeit spiral), unidirectional
unfolding of events, an unfolding that is seemingly held together by a
teleological coherence (Miller, 1978). Such a view of social change
defends humanity from the terror of chaotic, unreasonable, and
unmeaningful history, terms by which alternative views of change (e.g.,
those with weaker concepts of development) are often criticized (in
developmental psychology see, e.g., Overton, 1984). The teleological,
goal-directed rendering of change processes solves some intellectual
problems; for example the random, opportunistic element of change
present in Darwinism - the chaotic, multiplicative view of change
processes - is simplified. This rendering of change processes, how-
ever, may also entail some philosophical and methodological problems.
Is it possible that a defense against the 'terror' of history may also be
grounded in a scientifically testable theories derived from a model of
change that embodies a weak concept of development?
Prior to attempting to answer this question, let us turn our attention
to the most fundamental criticism of a strong position on goal-directed-
ness and teleology. The teleological notion that one must relate the
terminus ad quem of a given development to the stages of that develop-
ment in order to understand the process may rest on what Mandelbaum
(1971) has designated the "retrospective fallacy." In its extreme, it
consists of looking at a series of events in terms of the (hypothetical,

theoretical, probable) outcome and interpreting each event with ex-
clusive reference to that outcome. It is a fallacy, Mandelbaum argued:
... because it rests on the fact that, when we have learned the actual
outcome of a series of events, we tend to forget that other conclusions
might have been possible: we ascribe a privileged position to that
outcome and we view all earlier events as if they had been controlled
by it. (Mandelbaum, 1971, pp. 134-135)
In "reading the past backwards," the historian greatly simplifies
history; a historical determinism is automatically accepted, as a chain of
events appear to be an organic whole characterized by a (mysterious)
inner necessity. Viewing individual or social change in terms of a
terminus which, as a final cause, may in some way activate and direct
the preceding development, constitutes commitment of the so-called
retrospective fallacy. An illustration made earlier is again relevant.
That illustration concerned the "adaptationist programme" (Gould &
Lewontin, 1979), that is, that all structures of an organism which now
serve a survival function were shaped by natural selection to fulfill that
function. However, that a given structure now aids survival, or is
"aptive" (Gould & Vrba, 1982), does not mean that it was designed or
altered via natural selection for its current function. It does not mean
it is ad-aptive (Gould & Vrba, 1982). Rather a structure can originate
with one function or 'purpose', or even with no purpose at all; that is,
it can be neutral to selection pressure (Gould & Vrba, 1982). Later,
this structure (e.g., the unfused sutures of the human neonate's skull)
could be co-opted by more current historical conditions to serve a
function (e.g., passage through the birth canal) for which it was not
originally selected or shaped. In general, the Darwinian view of adap-
tation does not require teleological explanation (Dewey, 1910;
Ghiselin, 1969; Mayr, 1976; Pittendrigh, 1958; Plotkin, 1982; Williams,
1966, 1982). Furthermore, natural selection is not committed to
progressivism, goal-directedness, cumulative progress, design, telos,
orthogenesis, or a given end-state (Ghiselin, 1969; Mayr, 1982; Wil-
liams, 1982).
In short, it should be clear from the foregoing that we are portraying
DP-SC as tending toward a perspective that emphasizes goal-directed-
ness and thus as potentially involving the retrospective fallacy. One
interpretation of the implications of this fallacy is that the goal-
directed ness - the telos, even the dialectic - of change processes lies
in the writing about individual and social change rather than in the
events that constitute that change. What difficulties might a model of

development with a weak concept of development avoid? Does, for
example, the dispersive, inherently non-integrative character of
contextualism avoid problems encountered by DP-SC as a consequence
of their tendency toward teleology? In the following section we intro-
duce one non teleological view of individual and social change, one that
we associate with developmental psychologies with a weak concept of
development.
A DP-WC alternative. As we mentioned above, contextualism is
subject to numerous legitimate, but often contradictory, interpretations
(see Rosnow & Georgoudi, 1986). Some of these viable interpretations
(e.g., Lerner, 1986, who, based in part on Pepper, 1942, associates
contextualism with organicism) might indicate that contextualism is less
a DP-WC than is assumed here. Nevertheless, in keeping with the spirit
of family resemblances, we have interpreted the weight of evidence to
be on the side of contextualism as a model tending towards a weak
concept of development and thus away from a teleological rendering of
processes of change constituting individual and social development.
According to Mandelbaum (1971) there are three major difficulties
avoided by such dispersive models (with what we call weak concepts of
development). First, those who have a tendency to view change proces-
ses (e.g., social change) in terms of a single developmental process are
committed to looking back upon the past as though it constituted not
only a single direction but also a single lineage. They may be,
Mandelbaum argued, justifiably accused of being unable to find a place
within (a) social human history, or (b) individual human history, for
much of what has occurred in the past of either societies or individuals.
There is a tendency for the scope of social or individual development
to be restricted to a single direction (but see Chapman, 1988). To the
extent that this is true, the significance of particular events (whether
social or individual in nature) and of the past per se is limited to a single
interpretive framework (a model, e.g., that is a DP-SC). Multidirection-
al accounts and pluralistic interpretations may be lost in such an account
of individual or social change; at the very least,the preservation of some
measure of multidirectionality becomes an intellectual task of some
urgency and, perhaps, intransigency (see Chapman, 1988).
Second, Mandelbaum (1971) suggested that individual differences
(among cultures in a society and individuals in a population) are
formidable at anyone point in time and this complexity is multiplied
when considering these cultures and individuals across their life times,
as well as successive generations. Even at any given time there is such
a diversity of structures (whether social or psychological) that,
Mandelbaum argued, it is historically implausible to maintain that all
were the result of any particular (or even single generic) underlying
process. In addition, by attempting to relate selected events to an
underlying process (e.g., the dialectic), historical understanding may
actually be impeded rather than advanced. For Marxism the means of
production was a salient factor motivating the march of social history.
But, Mandelbaum (1971) claimed, the empirical historiographer must
establish the historical importance of an event not by its type but by
tracing the specific effects it appears to have caused. This dictum may
be applied at any given level of developmental investigation. Although
the observer must approach the task of interpreting the data of in-
dividual or social change through some model (as well as with some
theory and incorporating some concept) of development,
Mandelbaum's views lead us to the conclusion that the plurality of the
structural and functional features of human life, and the potential
multidirectionality of changes which these features may undergo, are
best approached with a mind open to the diversity of causes and to the
possibility of a plurality of types of salient factors. These causes and
factors are not given in advance and may not be directly and logically
derivable from the model. Rather, the alternative model- the DP-WC
- suggests that the causes are identified as the products of empirical
(historical, developmental) investigation.
Third, Mandelbaum (1971, p. 132) cited a problem that is of
particular concern to developmental psychologists, one that we have
alluded to periodically above. Conceiving social change (or history) as
"a process of autonomous self-development takes inadequate account
of the possibility of significant external influences upon any social
order." It offers a relatively closed system of developmental change.
Novel external factors - nonnormative factors from the ecology of the
culture such as natural disasters or influences from other cultures -
are ill-considered in models with a strong concept of development. To
be sure, these external factors may in fact be mentioned in such treat-
ments of social change, but often they are, as compared to parallel
treatments by models with a weak concept of development, doomed to
serve a function that is more a logical facilitator of change than a link
in a causal chain. In the study of individual development, a similar
problem may exist. For DP-SC the potential explanatory role of novel,
nonnormative life and historical events for psychological development
(Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980) may be constrained by the fact that such
phenomena must be fit into a teleologically shaped individual-historical
progression and accommodated to the end-product or goal of the
progression. It appears, then, that for DP-SC incidental, chance, or
random events are epiphenomenal in that they are reinterpreted -
from the perspective of retrospection and in the intellectual context of
a legitimate world view - as ineluctably (or, less strongly put, exten-
sively) shaped by directionality and the endstate.
Does contextualism, as an example of a DP-WC, offer a contrasting
approach? Certainly, one interpretation of the model does. In this
interpretation (e.g., Dixon, 1986) novel, incidental events are taken as
actual and potentially explanatory phenomena. Contextualism is taken
to suggest that there is no completely a priori knowable (or specifiable)
direction, nor causally controlling outcome, to either individual or social
development. Instead, the focus of attention is on the observable
matrix of organism-environment interactions. At any point in time,
multiple directions are available and possible; both the human agent
and the ecology play an active part in the option that occurs. Contex-
tualism, as a DP-WC, does not necessarily deny that goal-directed
change occurs in individual development, that there are some change
processes that are less interactional than described above. Biological
maturation is one example. Contextualism differs from a DP-SC such
as organicism in the extent to which it takes such change processes as
paradigmatic. Thus, it is fair to say that, despite the shared develop-
mental perspective and other similarities, contextualism may differ from
DP-SC on the representation of the directionality of change. For the
contextualist, human social history in general, and individual develop-
ment in particular, are without a specifiable, knowable direction and
certainly not a prospectively progressive one (Kagan, 1983; Lerner,
1986). That is, although psychologists who attempt to wed a develop-
mental perspective with a contextual model see development as a
coherent and organized process, there is a marked stress on the prob-
abilistic character of developmental phenomena (Gottlieb, 1970, 1983;
Lerner, 1986; Lerner & Kauffman, 1985; Schneirla, 1956, 1957; Tobach
& Schneirla, 1968). The emphasis, therefore, is on the role of non-
normative events and, as a consequence of the multiple directions that
may, therefore, result, on the successive (as opposed to the necessarily
progressive) character of developmental change. Thus, although con-

textualists and even many contemporary dialecticians would agree that
at any point in history there are multiple alternatives available, contex-
tualists would interpret this probabilism as indicative of the potential
multiplicity of developmental endpoints, and would stress that a
pluralistic approach to interpretation is required (Dixon &
Nesselroade, 1983). The meanings that are given to individual and
social 'historical' events are local meanings, and subject to modification
in light of ecological differences and historical change.
In sum, from the perspective of a model of development with a weak
concept of development, social development (social history) will appear
not as a (single) developing process, but rather as a:
... very complex web whose individual strands have separated
through interlacing histories.... No one set of aspects of social life
will be seen as constituting the subject matter of history.. ,. Because
of the diversity of the elements within cultures, it is also rarely if ever
possible to construe all of them as sharing a common developmental
pattern. (Mandelbaum, 1971, p. 133)
On whatever level of organization - both the individual and the
social - history forms an indefinitely complex network. In this net-
work, a variety of strands from a variety of factors lead into and out of
a given event, and most importantly, to potentially different endstates.
The empirical investigator may be obliged to trace different strands into
and out of events and across the life span. Even causes may be complex,
for example, as the result of the meeting of two previously independent
strands of development. To interpret an event on the basis of pre-
selected strands and pre-determined causes, and to evaluate the event
exclusively or primarily in terms of a particular process of development,
is perhaps to misunderstand it on the side of simplification
(Mandelbaum, 1971). It is such a perspective, of course, that leads to
the retrospective fallacy described above. Thus, DP-WC, such as con-
textualism, are neutral about any putative design or direction of in-
dividual or social development. Contextualism seeks to avoid the
providentialism that DP-SC may have inherited from Hegel, Herder,
Lamarck, and perhaps even Marx. Contextualism, like the Darwinian
theory of evolution, does not suggest that there is any single or even
primary, all-embracing cosmic process or direction (Toulmin, 1972). If
such processes are found, they are in large part a product of the observer
(developmental psychologist, historian, sociologist) and the observer's
model of development with a strong concept of development (e.g.,

organicism and, perhaps, dialecticism).
The individual and social level of explanation. Does removing
(end-state directive) purpose from general individual and social change
imply that there is no purpose or intentionality in individual agents? We
think not. That is, while it is not an empirical question whether there
is an overall design for the progression of human society or individual
development, in any given situation individuals may act intentionally,
purposively, in a goal-directed manner. Such behavior may be
portrayed and studied in numerous ways consonant with several models
of developmental psychology (see Chapman, 1984). Drawing from
evolutionary theory, a contextual perspective would suggest that even
emphases on ends-guided processes, fit, adaptation, goal-directed be-
havior, utilities, and functions do not imply that explanations are
derived from within a teleological framework (Campbell, 1970; Plotkin,
1982). On whatever level of organization - individual or social change
- when progress is rendered progressively a contextualist may chal-
lenge it. But when change is rendered in light of present contingencies,
individual histories, nonnormative influences, decision-making proces-
ses, descriptive functions, and so forth - even when teleological con-
cepts are involved in the description of the data - the contextualist
code may not be violated. Intentions enter into psychological analysis,
but less in terms of the outcome than as an active feature of the ongoing
'aptive' problem-solving process itself. Mandelbaum (1987) pointed
out that individual decision-making and intentionality may have a
special role in theories of individual and social development which allow
for a strong interaction between the two levels of analysis. He argued
as follows:
Given this reciprocal relationship between the characteristics of in-
dividuals and the structures of social life, it is not surprising that the
concept of purpose has often been regarded as the explanatory
category best suited to serve as the basis for any social theory.
Individuals obviously have the capacity to act purposely for remote
ends, and since social institutions provide a common matrix within
which different individuals pursue their ends, it is natural to look to
human purposes when one attempts to explain how these institutions
originally developed, why they persist, and why they have been sub-
ject to change. (Mandelbaum, 1987, p. 38)
We have suggested that DP-SC and DP-WC may be differentiated
by the degree of interaction allowed between the individual and social
levels of change. This claim is simple and, importantly, falsifiable. We
do not make such a claim with respect to the explanatory adequacy of

either level. The phenomena of interest to the social scientist are
generally described in one of two ways: (a) with a class of terms referring
primarily to individuals or individual attributes, or (b) with a class of
terms referring primarily to groups of individuals, attributes of those
groups, or manifestations thereof. In the former category is found most
of what constitutes psychological research, including mechanistic and
organismic research traditions, as well as psychological social psychol-
ogy. In the latter category is found most of what constitutes sociological
research, including the more sociological social psychology. The dis-
tinction, of course, especially in workaday social science, is far from
perfect; in the study of human development, there has been consider-
able blurring of the distinction and potentially fruitful overlap (e.g.,
Dannefer, 1984; Dannefer & Perlmutter, in press; Featherman &
Lerner, 1985). Nevertheless, an important issue remains: while social
change phenomena may be described in both individual and collective
terms, it is another question whether they may be explained in both
ways. In general, whereas methodological individualism (MI) is the
explanatory analogue of the individual description, methodological
collectivism (MC) is the explanatory analogue of the group description.
The previous statement was characterized as general (rather than
precise) in that on the explanatory level one (or the other) of the
methods is typically advanced as the most appropriate under both
descriptions. That is, the distinction between (for example) a
psychological and a sociological social psychology arises not so much in
the everyday description of the target phenomena but in the level
(individual or social) to which the explanation resorts. In their extreme,
MI would maintain that, in terms of individual and social historical
explanation, the only methodologically valuable moving agents in his-
tory are human individuals; MC would maintain that superhuman
agents over and above individuals are the primary causative agents in
the making of human history.
The issue has long vexed philosophers of social sciences, and will
not be resolved in this chapter. Rather than providing a solution, we
raise a question: is there a relationship between the strength of the
concept of devlopment of a given developmental model and the ten-
dency toward MC and MI? Our tentative answer is in two parts. First,
for a model of a developmental science with a strong concept of
development - one emphasizing universal, progressive, irreversible,
qualitative developmental change - the choice of MC or MI depends
on the predominant or emphasized level of descriptive analysis. For
example, Marxism, a developmental science operating predominantly
at the social level, may emphasize methodological collectivism
(Mandelbaum, 1971, 1987). In several locations Marx wrote as though
political upheavals - qualitative or revolutionary development - were
functions of conflict between productive forces and modes of produc-
tion, and that such conflicts existed independently of the intentions and
actions of individuals, even those who appear to have initiated or
nurtured the change (Marx & Engels, 1947). The lack of interaction
between the two levels - and the explicit explanatory primacy of the
collective - is illustrated in Marx's The Eighteenth BlUmaire of Louis
Napoleon:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.
(Marx, in Padover, 1978, p. 227)
An (admittedly extreme) implication of this perspective is that,
although individuals are influenced by the structures of their society,
individual thought and actions may be explicable primarily in terms of
social institutions. An analysis of the development of knowledge,
thought, or action will involve an analysis of social organization. In this
sense, then, the interaction between the individual and society exists
descriptively, but is of little explanatory value. When it comes to the
explanation of social phenomena, the interaction is rendered in a way
reminiscent of one-way causation, from the social system to the
individual. This illustration is of one cardinal pole of a continuum, a
position that is occupied as well by developmental psychologies with
strong concepts of development, but at a different level of analysis.
That is, DP-SC, focusing on the descriptive level of the individual and
eschewing a strong conception of individual-society interaction, are
likely to be methodological individualists.
The second part of our answer to the question we posed above, then,
is that developmental sciences with weak concepts of development are
more likely to offer a strong descriptive interaction between the in-
dividual and social level of change and to be flexible (or even pluralistic)
with respect to the level of explanation. As we noted above, the
distinction between MI and MC is necessarily incomplete, perhaps even
somewhat artificial. As Radnitzky noted, it could be one of altitude:
Viewed from a low altitude the individual- the great man, the wrong
decision, the unforeseeable accident - seems the most important
thing; viewed from a high altitude, the ensemble itself embraced by
the historian's schematizing glance ... appears to reveal a kind of
tendency to develop in a certain direction. ... (Radnitzky, 1968,
p.111)
Developmental scientists with weak concepts of development may
not possess the "schematizing glance", the strong conception of how to
interpret change processes. Thus, explanations from various altitudes
(from the individual biological through the individual psychological to
the social institutional) may be more likely to appear. This may be the
case not only for DP-WC, who focus descriptively (and professionally)
at the individual level of change, but for other social scientists who focus
at more macro-levels of analysis.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that the models of developmental
psychology may be distinguished most fruitfully in terms of a pattern of
positions taken on several issues along which the concept of develop-
ment may be defined. These issues include universality, reversibility,
qualitative versus quantitative change, and directionality. On the basis
of the pattern of positions taken on these issues, we distinguished
between stronger and weaker concepts of development. So charac-
terized, the concept of development of a given developmental psychol-
ogy has numerous implications for both theoretical and empirical work.
As one illustration, we selected a particularly potent issue - that of
directionality or teleology - and examined its meaning, use, and ap-
plication to the study of human development. We found that such
conceptual issues have implications for the portrayal of individual and
social development. One example is that developmental psychologies
with strong concepts of development may be less likely to describe the
interaction between the individual and social levels of change in strong
terms than would developmental psychologies with weak concepts of
development. Finally, we suggested that it is possible that the relative
strength of the concept of development may be associated with tenden-
cies with regard to the explanatory primacy of the individual or social
level of change.
Although we have not explicitly 'taken sides' on any of the continua
(and dichotomies) we have discussed, we have been more positive in
our discussion of the DP-WC. We acknowledge value in all the models
and we do not explicitly or implicitly intend to de-value DP-SC. Our
goal has been to explore and compare concepts of development that
have long histories in the study of evolutionary, institutional, and in-
dividual change. Thus, we began by linking our analyses to portrayals
of change in related disciplines. The developmental perspective would
suggest that this is an appropriate starting point in our inquiry and that
important lessons may be gained from such an analysis. We conclude
this chapter by extending this linkage. In particular, it now seems
possible to associate, on the one hand, the providential view of evolu-
tion with features of a strong concept of development and, on the other,
the populational view of evolution and change with features of a weak
concept of development (see Toulmin, 1972, for more on this contrast).
Whereas the providential view has emphasized (since before Darwin)
such features of change as directionality, and is associated with such
scholars as Hegel, Herder, Lamarck, and perhaps Marx, the population-
al view focuses on organic species, social institutions, and individuals as
modifiable populations and is associated with such scholars as Darwin.
In focusing on populations it is assumed that there is no 'specific
essence' to them but rather "a statistical distribution of properties; and
... the 'peak' or 'mean' of these populations [is] shifting in the face of
ecological changes ... " (Toulmin, 1972, pp. 324-325). The focus is not
on, for example, social structures or groups of individuals as a system
but as a population, one that is adapted to the needs of the individuals
and which individuals change in accordance to their changing needs.
Our recommendation for further scholarship in the study of individual
and social change is to follow up the popUlational portion of analyses
such as that of Featherman and Lerner (1985), pursuing the proposition
that the populational approach may provide "an entirely general mode
of historical explanation; and one that is a healthy antidote both to
excessively systematic and ahistorical analyses of developing systems"
(Toulmin, 1972, p. 337). This last quotation is crucial. Although there
are clear differences between the approaches of DP-SC and DP-WC-
as between providentialist and populationist portrayals of systems of
change - one important similarity should not be overlooked. These
developmental psychologies are members of the same family of
developmental sciences; that is, they approach the study of individual
and social phenomena from a developmental perspective. These
developmental psychologies, inheritors of the discovery of time over a
century ago, stand together against static portrayals of social and in-
dividual phenomena. They are united in emphasizing, in whatever
divergent ways, that to understand social and individual phenomena one
must look at both the proximal context of these phenomena and the
developing context of their emergence.
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4
On the Concept of Development:
Contextualism, relative time, and the role
of dialectics
John C. Cavanaugh
Let us begin this commentary with a story. There once lived a deeply
religious and philosophical man named Qoheleth who decided to reflect
on one of the ultimate questions confronting humanity: what is the
meaning of life? Initially, Qoheleth despaired. He realized that one
generation arises on the scene, plays out its part, and dies, only to be
replaced by another generation. Only the world, it seemed, stayed
forever. He found no comfort in the thought that death was the end.
No, there had to be something else, some reason for existence that
transcended death. A live dog did not have to be better off than a dead
lion. All memory of people did not have to be lost. So, one by one
Qoheleth considered potential reasons for or meanings of life. He
rejected the hypotheses of money, power, and possessions as being
empty - those who had them still lacked something essential. Finally,
he decided that love was the only meaning that fit; love is the reason for
living. Love gives life purpose. And the ultimate love - universal,
noncontingent love - is the ultimate goal of life.
The story of Qoheleth, related in the book of Ecclesiastes, provides
a nice context for the paper by Dixon, Lerner, and Hultsch because it
strips away all excess baggage and gets to a fundamental issue: is there
some purposiveness to life, and, if so, what is it? It seems to me that
this question is related to the question of whether human development
has a purpose posed by Dixon et al. Interestingly, both questions are
John C. Cavanaugh Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State

University, Bowling Green, OH 43403.

326 John C. Cavanaugh
resolved similarly. One can believe that life (or development) has a
purpose without necessarily also accepting the belief that this purpose
implies teleology. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. We have
considerable ground to cover.
In this commentary, I hope to show that Qoheleth and Dixon et al.
are on the right track. Developmental psychologists tend to be sloppy
at times in their use of concepts, theories, and models, often with utter
disregard for their meanings or limits. As Dixon et al. eloquently point
out, this can create a great deal of trouble.
Reflections on the Concept of Development

The importance of Dixon et al.'s contribution lies not only in what
they have said, but also in their very willingness to say it. Many develop-
mental psychologists seem to use terms such as 'world view',
'contextualism', and the like for the same reason that Yuppies drive
BMWs - they want status. For the most part, neither group bothers
to examine critically what they do or why they do it. Dixon et al. are not
part of this uncritical, accepting crowd. To their credit, they layout the
reasons why we need to be concerned with the concept of development,
however fuzzy this concept turns out to be. They cogently argue that
to ignore the underlying assumptions and their implications is to go
about the 'doing' of developmental psychology with little forethought,
tantamount to leaping without looking first.
Laying out the groundwork for a concept of development is an
enormous contribution. Although one can always quibble about how
many continua are needed and what these continua should be, the four
identified by Dixon et al. (universality, reversibility, nature of change,
and teleology) reflect those that are of considerable interest to develop-
mental psychologists. Many developmental psychologists take posi-
tions on these continua without being aware of it. However, these
implicit positions become apparent through statements deriding
theories grounded in models other than the one implicitly accepted.
One relatively common such statement criticizes social learning theory
(which is grounded in mechanism) for being 'nondevelopmental'.
It is clear from Dixon et al.'s analysis that such criticisms are unin-
formed (or are at least myopic), and result from being unaware of one's
assumptions. I believe that if these criticisms are carefully analyzed, it
becomes apparent that they are most often grounded in organicism. As
argued by Dixon et aI., mechanistic, organismic, and contextual theories
4 Commentary on Dixon, Lerner and Hultsch 327
can all be developmental; it is just that such theories are based on
different concepts of development.
The point is that a great deal of the criticism and rejection of ideas
that occurs in developmental psychology may stem more from using one
model to judge another than from a critical evaluation of the ideas
within the model in which they were originally proposed. Criticism of
the former type fails because it is little more than a restatement of
differences that are given (e.g., theories based on organicism are, by
definition, quite different from theories based on mechanism), whereas
criticism of the latter type may result in significant improvement in or
refinement of understanding or explanation of a phenomenon (e.g., an
organismic theory, such as Piaget's, being extended to include universal,
qualitative cognitive growth during adulthood). As Henle (1986) clear-
ly documented, the danger of not being aware of one's underlying
assumptions is that one's criticisms are ill-founded and perhaps il-
legitimate. Henle adds that such ill-founded criticisms have an unfor-
tunate way of gaining acceptance and credibility. Psychologists tend to
be intellectually lazy at times and fail to become knowledgeable about
the original ideas by reading the primary sources so that they may learn
what the assumptions are. Reading and reflecting on the issues raised
by Dixon et al. will help developmental psychologists avoid such lazi-
ness.
Contextualism: All Things to All People?

I strongly agree that contextualism has a great deal to recommend
it as a viable model for developmental psychology, and have argued
quite strongly in this regard (see Cavanaugh & Morton, 1989). In our
(where 'our' refers to those individuals strongly arguing the case for
contextualism) zeal to evangelize, however, we may have forgotten or
overlooked the need to carefully explicate what we are advocating. To
an outsider looking in, contextualism may appear as little more than a
complex but weakened version of mechanism, or as almost too good to
be true.
Much of the problem stems from overlapping terminology. For
example, the term 'context' is used in several ways, many of which are
incompatible. In mechanism, one may refer to 'context effects', which
refer to some force exerted by some component of the environmental
situation in which a behavior occurs. In this usage, it is assumed that
context exists as an independent entity from the individual, the
behavior, and so forth. In contrast, in contextualism, 'context' does not

exist independent of individuals. Contextualism postulates that every-
thing is interconnected, that absolute predictions are impossible, that
goal-directedness mayor may not occur, that chance or randomness may
happen, that individual differences are important and that they mayor
may not preclude aggregation, that all knowledge is relative, and that
historical change mayor may not be prospectively progressive. As
indicated in Figure 2 in Dixon et aI., these positions are closer to
mechanism than to the assumptions underlying organicism. Conse-
quently, there may be a tendency to ignore the fundamental differences
in assumptions between contextualism and mechanism and remain at a
surface similarity in terminology. Figure 2 also gives the false impres-
sion that contextualism represents a moderate, middle of the road
position between the two extremist positions of organicism and
mechanism, adding to the tendency to downplay the importance of
differences in the underlying assumptions.
There are clear dangers in this type of presentation. I think it may
be easy for individuals who are not completely familiar with contex-
tualism to get the impression that it represents one or more of the
following: little that is new, sloppy science (or no science at all), nihilism,
or sheer idle speculation. Other criticisms could also be listed. My point
is that I believe there is a misconception that contextualism is 'easy' and
consists oflittle more than the ultimate theoretical and methodological
stock pot - everything gets put in, including the kitchen sink, only to
be rejected on the grounds that Clark Hull tried the same thing decades
ago and failed.
I believe that if we carefully and critically examine the literature on
the application of contextualism to developmental psychology, we
would find little in the way of caveats to the reader pointing out the
overlapping terminology, nuances of differences in meaning, and ex-
plicit examples of how various models would interpret the same
phenomena in fundamentally different ways. The discussions are there
at a theoretical level (many of which, including Dixon et aI., are excel-
lent); less effort has gone into concretizing the theory. By this I mean
we have done an excellent job in promoting the benefits to be gained
by adopting contextualism as the main model, but we have done very
little to explain or illustrate what a contextualist developmental psychol-
ogy would actually look like. We need to make it clear that contex-
tualism is not complex mechanism Gust because some of the words are
the same does not imply that they mean the same things), it is not
anti-science (in fact, it is very complex science), it is not nihilistic
(embeddedness and interconnectedness do not necessarily imply that
relational statements cannot be made, as evidenced in modern physics),
it is not idle speculation devoid of intellectual homework (in fact, it is
exceedingly difficult to specify relational theories), and it is not a middle
ground between organicism and mechanism (it is a set of assumptions
fundamentally different from either of these).
In short, I think in our effort to convince developmental
psychologists that contextualism deserves at least a careful considera-
tion, we have failed to point out that contextualism involves hard work.
Moreover, we may be underestimating the hold (or power) that or-
ganicism (which appears to be the dominant model currently) has in
shaping the fundamental assumptions developmental psychologists
hold. Describing (or perhaps explaining) the course of human develop-
ment by resorting to a set of principles that is based on the belief that
our collective developments are headed toward some common end state
provides a more convincing or appealing or more comfortable account
for many psychologists than describing (or perhaps explaining) human
development by using dispersive, non-universal, non-teleological prin-
ciples that may imply we are all going in different directions individually.
So what does this mean? I think Dixon et al. provide an essential
beginning by defining what is meant by the concept of development.
What we need now is guidance in how contextualism gets 'done'. It is
one thing (and an important thing at that) to lay the philosophical
groundwork. Dixon et al. among others have done that. It is quite
another to provide an example of how one takes the concept of develop-
ment as defined by contextualism and turns it into viable frameworks,
and turns these frameworks into empirical research. The missing link
in the contextualist critique of developmental psychology is the explicit
description of viable empirical models of research that offer alternatives
to the extant models available in organicism and mechanism.
An interesting and useful way to begin this discussion would be to
consider how the concept of science is defined within various models.
This analysis could be done in ways similar to the analysis provided by
Dixon et al. on the concept of devleopment. For example, it is impor-
tant to understand how issues such as prediction and control are defined
within each model. One would speculate that important differences
would be uncovered that would have profound implications for how one
conducts research. Moreover, an additional benefit from such an

analysis would be to make it clear that how one chooses to conduct
research reflects sets of assumptions (positions on continua) that leave
room for diversity of opinion.
I have aruged elsewhere (Cavanaugh & Morton, 1989) that one
alternative research method that is compatible with contextualism is
naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). However, multiple
appropriate methods undoubtedly exist. By considering different views
of science (and by extension different methodologies) within different
models, families of methods that are more appropriate for a particular
model could be identified. Once these families have been identified, I
believe the business of making contextualism a viable model in develop-
mental psychology can continue.
On the Notion of TIme

Dixon et al. argue that it was the discovery of time that allowed the
study of developmental processes to arise. This is an intriguing and, as
I want to argue, a very important point that I would like to push a bit
further. Hawking (1988) also argues that the late nineteenth century
was a crucial turning point in physics because of fundamental changes
in the understanding of the concept of time. The realization that time
is not absolute, but rather is relative (and perhaps a construction) was
an important discovery that fostered the development of relativity and
quantum theory. Moreover, as Hawking points out, reconceptualizing
time forces a rethinking of the concepts 'cause' and 'effect', since
traditionally these concepts were linked temporally. More recently, the
discovery of wormholes in space (which some believe to be gateways for
time travel) has also forced a rethinking of traditional views of causality.
Some authors (e.g., Sinnott, 1981) have noted parallels between the
movement in psychology from mechanism (and perhaps organicism)
toward contextualism and the movement in physics from Newtonian
mechanics to relativistic and quantum theory. Irrespective of the his-
torical validity of the analogy, it serves a useful heuristic purpose
because it draws attention to a fundamental issue in developmental
psychology: if time is not absolute, and cause and effect are relative (that
is, dependent on the context in which they are measured), then con-
structing theories about human development that assume an absolute
concept of time may be problematic. Of course, for local (i.e., a specific
point in space-time) use, such theories may be adequate, just as New-
tonian models of force are adequate in determining whether a particular

configuration of ropes will support a rock climber. But if (and this is
clearly an assumption) we want to understand the process of develop-
ment in any other way (e.g., non-locally), the issue of relative time
becomes important.
For example, adult developmental psychologists are particularly
interested in identifying the time-dependent processes responsible for
aging; time per se is not the 'cause' but is rather a metric we use to judge
some other process. The formation of rust is an example; it is the
time-dependent process of oxidation that is of interest. The key here
is that this search appears to assume that time is absolute; that is, 20
years now is the same as 20 years two centuries ago. But what if this
assumption were false? What happens to theories of aging based on
absolute notions of time when the target of our inquiry is the proverbial
space traveller moving near the speed of light rather than the Earthling
who stays at home? Among the many questions that arise is one that
goes to the heart of developmental theory: has the Earthling 'aged'
more than the space traveller because the elapsed 'time' on earth is
longer? If so, then perhaps we need to view 'time-dependent' processes
as 'time-dependent' relative to the individual in question rather than in
relation to some external, objective, absolute cosmic clock.
Clearly, the implications of relativizing time in developmental
psychology cannot be fully addressed in this chapter. The crises that
confronted physics on this issue are well documented, and may provide
insight for psychology. I simply wish to raise the issue because it is one
we will have to face sooner or later, if for no other reason than
long-distance high-speed space travel will give us no choice. Whether
a contextual model provides a way to handle relative time should
perhaps be explored.
Dialecticism: Model or Process?

We come now to an issue that is not prominent in Dixon et al.'s
chapter, but is, I believe, indicative of a nagging problem. The problem
is a confusing use of the term 'dialecticism'. Part of the problem is
historical, dating to the introduction of the term into the developmental
psychology literature. But part of the problem is also an uncertainty in
what dialecticism is in the context of developmental psychology.
Ever since Klaus Riegel popularized the term in the 1970s, dialectics
(dialectical, dialecticism) has appeared in numerous accounts of
theoretical developmental psychology. While it was arguably the intro-

duction of dialectics that started the current debate about positions on
philosophical assumptions, it is nonetheless the case that the role of
dialectics in developmental psychology remains unclear. It seems to me
that the issue is essentially whether the word stem 'dialectic' should end
with 'ism' and adopting it as a fourth model, or whether 'dialectic' should
be viewed as a process (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) or method within
one or more models. Dixon et al. appear to use both meanings. This
confusion is not unique to their paper; indeed it has been with us since
Riegel (e.g., Georgoudi, 1983; Reese, 1982).
Whether dialectics is viewed as a model (dialecticism) or as a process
within a model is an important distinction. Viewed as a developmental
model, dialecticism, following Dixon et al.'s lead, would postulate posi-
tions on the four continua (universality, reversibility, nature of change,
and teleology) that would define its concept of development. Although
there is some support for viewing dialecticism as a separate develop-
mental model, how it would differ from contextualism is unclear. View-
ing dialectics as a process is somewhat less problematic, although it
remains to be seen how such a process would fit in the various models.
The solution to the confusion is straightforward - choose one
usage or the other. My bias is to restrict the concept to mean a process,
but this decision would profit from debate.
Parting Thoughts
Making it clear that what one believes about human development
is a decision is an important contribution to developmental theory.
Continued pursuit and expansion of the discussion begun by Dixon et al.
will promote a healthy debate that is, I believe, long overdue. Unless
we become clear in our beliefs, recognize the assumptions we make, and
know the implications of them, we will not advance our understanding
of human development. If we do these things, then we, like Qoheleth
did about life, may come to know the reason why human development
occurs in all its infinite variety.
References
Cavanaugh, J. c., & Morton, K. R. (1989). Contextualism, naturalistic inquiry,
and the need for new science: A rethinking of childhood sexual abuse and
everyday memory aging. In D. A Kramer & M. Bopp (Eds.), Transfor-
mation in clinical and developmental psychology (pp. 89-114). New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Georgoudi, M. (1983). Modern dialectics in social psychology: A reappraisal.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 13, 77-94.
Hawking, S. M. (1988).A briefhistory oftime: From the big bang to black holes.
New York: Bantam.
Henle, M. (1986).1879 and all that: Essays in the theory and history ofpsychol-
ogy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Reese, H. W. (1982). A comment on the meaning of 'dialectics'. Human
Sinnott, J. D. (1981). The theory of relativity: a metatheory for development?
4
Self-organization as Developmental
Process: Beyond the organismic and
mechanistic models?
Michael Chapman
One of the great intellectual problems of this century for scientists

working at the boundary between physics and biology was reconciling
the Second Law of Thermodynamics with the principles of biological
growth and evolution. According to the Second Law, the entropy or
disorder characterizing a physical system tends to increase with time.
Organic development, however, is a process of increasing order, on both
ontogenetic and phylogenetic scales. In order to reconcile this
apparent contradiction, the physicist Schrodinger (1944/1967)
appealed to the concept of "negentropy", upon which organisms were
said to sustain themselves (p. 75). But the appeal to "negative entropy"
was more a description of the problem than a solution.
A more convincing solution was formulated by Prigogine (e.g.,
Prigogine, Nicolis, & Babloyantz, 1972), based on the concept of "open
systems" that maintain exchanges of energy with their environments.
Prigogine's basic insight was to divide net entropy change dS of a system
into two components, one (diS) representing entropy production within
the system and the other (deS) representing the flow of entropy result-
ing from exchanges of matter or energy with the environment. Al-
though diS can only increase with time in accordance with the Second
Law, the quantity deS may increase or decrease depending on the nature
of the exchanges occurring during the interval. In the event that deS
decreases by an amount greater than the increase in diS, then the net
Michael Chapman. Department of Psychology, University of British

Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T lY7.

336 Michael Chapman
entropy change dS will be negative: that is, the order of the system will
have increased.
Another approach to the problem is represented by Brooks and
Wiley (1986). In systems undergoing rapid expansion, the maximum
possible entropy of those systems may increase more rapidly than their
actual entropy. The difference between the two is a measure of the
order in the system. If the former increases more rapidly than the latter,
then order will increase with time, even though actual entropy is also
increasing in accordance with the Second Law. The theories both of
Prigogine, and of Brooks and Wiley are representative of recent
theories of self-organization. Other examples of such theories include
the work of Atlan (1972), Eigen (1971), Haken (1978), and Maturana
and Varela (1980), among others (for an overview, see Jantsch, 1980).
In this chapter, I intend neither to review nor to compare any of these
theories in detail. My intent is rather to consider the implications of
such theories for the issues so cogently described by Dixon, Lerner, and
Hultsch in "The Concept of Development in the Study of Individual
and Social Change" (this volume). A necessary preliminary to this end
is to show that theories of self-organization are indeed relevant for the
kind of individual and social changes they discuss in their chapter.
Self-organization of Psychological and Social Processes

Although the theories of self-organization referred to in the preced-
ing paragraphs were developed as a means of solving concrete problems
originating in the interstices of biology, chemistry, and physics, they are
based on principles potentially applicable to other domains as well. The
possibility that models of self-organizating processes should prove use-
ful in explaining psychological development and social change has been
explored by a number of leading theorists and commentators. The
special relevance of Prigogine's models for developmental psychology
has been pointed out by Brent (1978), and specific applications of
various models of self-organization in psychology have been discussed
by Buerger (1970), Molenaar (1986), Nicolis (1980), and Thelen, Kelso,
and Fogel (1987; see also Fogel & Thelen, 1987), among others. Poten-
tial applications for explaining social organization and change have
been discussed by Bailey (1984), Luhmann (1984, 1985), Prigogine
(1976b), and Zeleny (1985).
The generality of principles of self-organization for developmental
processes occurring at the biological, psychological, and social levels of
reality is nowhere more apparent than in the case of Piaget. In a recent

book (Chapman, 1988a), I have argued that Piaget's theoryofequilibra-
tion was a theory of self-organization before the fact. In his autobiog-
raphy, for example, he recounts his early insight that "in all fields of
life," including the organic, the mental, and the social, relational
totalities exist as forms of dynamic equilibrium between the respective
parts and wholes (Piaget, 1952). Although his model never attained the
precision nor the explanatory power of later theories of self-organiza-
tion, his life's work may be interpreted as a grand attempt to describe
processes of equilibration as they occur in psychogenesis (Piaget,
1975/1985), in organic evolution (Piaget, 1974/1980), in social organiza-
tion and change (Piaget, 1965/1977), and significantly, in the history of
science (Piaget & Garcia, 1983). The connection between Piaget's
theory of equilibration and contemporary theories of self-organization
is made explicit in his references to the work of Atlan (see Piaget,
1974/1980) and in his 'dialogue' of publications with Prigogine (see
Piaget, 1975/1985; Piaget & Garcia, 1983; Prigogine, 1975, 1976a, 1982).
The point is not to determine whether Piaget's model of equilibration
was or was not adequate to the task of explaining progressive develop-
ment on all these levels of reality. Rather, the connection between the
theory of equilibration and theories of self-organization enables us to
view his theory in a new light, in respect both to its origins and to its
potential for further development (Chapman, 1988a). Because Piaget
is one of the most influential theorists in development psychology, this
connection also makes it easier to see the relevance of theories of
self-organization for developmental psychology.
Criteria for Concepts of Development

I begin with a consideration of the four criteria for concepts of
development enumerated by Dixon et al.: the issues of universality,
reversibility, continuity, and progressiveness. I will save the issue of
universality for last, because, I believe, it will be more tractable once
the other issues have been considered. The point of viewing theories
of self-organization in the light of these criteria is to characterize the
concept or model of development they imply. We will then be in a
position to decide which of the 'root metaphor' models of development
(mechanism, organicism, contextualism) they most closely resemble. I
will treat "theories of self-organization" as a family resemblance con-
cept (as Dixon et al. did with respect to mechanistic, organismic, and
338 Michael Chapman
contextualist theories), ignoring for the time being specific differences

between individual theories. For simplicity, I will generally refer to
Prigogine's theory when illustrating principles of self-organization and
to Piaget when discussing their relevance for psychological develop-
ment.
Reversibility versus irreversibility. The theme of the reversibility
of change is a central one in Prigogine's writings. For example,
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) describe the difference between classical
mechanics and thermodynamics in these terms. The causal dynamics
considered in classical mechanics are inherently reversible in character;
any change brought about by the action of dynamic forces could
theoretically be reversed by forces operating in the opposite direction.
Thermodynamics, however, brought the irreversibility of time into
physics; except for short-term fluctuations, the increase of entropy in a
closed system is irreversible. Prigogine and Stengers' book, Order out
ofchaos, is a fascinating account of the effects that this growing aware-
ness of the unidirectionality of time had on the development of physics,
chemistry, and biology. Their conclusion is that the reversibility of
dynamic processes in classical mechanics was an idealization, and in
order to accommodate certain phenomena that do not approximate this
ideal (e.g., the evolution and development of organisms), these sciences
have to consider both reversible and irreversible processes. Indeed,
that is what is accomplished in Prigogine's central formula, dS = deS +
diS: net entropy change (dS) is viewed as the sum of reversible entropy
flow (deS, which can be either positive or negative) and the irreversible
increase of entropy within the system (diS, which can only be positive).
Piaget viewed psychogenesis as a process which likewise included
both reversible and irreversible changes. Piaget did not view equilibra-
tion as the sole principle of development, as is often claimed. Besides
equilibration, he recognized at least four other factors, including
maturation, the physical environment, and the social ~nvironment
(Piaget, 1960). His strong emphasis on equilibration was a result of his
argument that the other three factors were not sufficient, in effect, that
equilibration was also necessary. He was especially interested in the
contribution of equilibration, because this factor was what explained
novelty and progress in development (Chapman, 1988a). The present
point is that the acquisition of knowledge through familiar learning
mechanisms is potentially reversible; what is learned can be unlearned
or extinguished. The acquisition of knowledge through equilibration,
however, is irreversible; what is constructed through equilibration can-
not be 'deconstructed' or 'de-equilibrated' (although it might be lost
through some pathological process such as brain damage). The irre-
versibility of knowledge acquired in this way is succinctly illustrated in
the words, frequently cited by Piaget, of one of his subjects: "Once you
know, you know forever" (Piaget, 1971, p. 5).
There is another way in which Piaget considers the issue of revers-
ibility and irreversibility: in connection with thought itself. Thus, the
transition from preoperations to concrete operations is described as a
movement from irreversibility to reversibility, and that from concrete
to formal operations as a progressive coordination of two forms of
reversibility, negation and reciprocity. As I have pointed out previously
(Chapman, 1987), Piaget's distinction between the 'irreversibility' and
'reversibility' of thought partly coincides with the distinction between
'successive' and 'simultaneous' cognitive processes, respectively. On
occasion (e.g., Piaget, 1941), he employs these terms himself, to my
knowledge unaware of Luria's (1966) use of these same terms. Thus,
development is described in terms of children's increasing ability to
consider different aspects of a situation simultaneously and, thereby, to
coordinate them. This progressive increase in simultaneity, however, is
irreversible; for Piaget, cognitive development is the "irreversible
march toward greater reversibility" (Piaget, 1957, p. 37).
Continuity versus discontinuity. Just as theories of self-organiza-
tion recognize the occurrence of both reversible and irreversible
processes, so do they recognize the possibility of both continuous and
discontinuous changes. In addition to the gradual, quantitative changes
typically occurring in linear systems, abrupt qualitative phase transitions
may also occur in nonlinear systems. The behavior of such systems may
be characterized by bifurcations; that is, a gradual increase in one
parameter of the system may, beyond some threshold value, result in a
qualitatively new solution for the equations describing the behavior of
that system. A series of successive bifurcations of this kind can result
in a stage-like sequence through which the system passes. According
to Prigogine (1980, p. 106), such successive bifurcations introduce
history into the evolution of the system.
A geometrical representation of the qualitative changes attendant
upon bifurcations is provided by Thorn's (1975) "catastrophe theory."
The cusp catastrophe is particularly interesting in this connection,
because it treats the continuity-discontinuity of change as being itself
340 Michael Chapman
under the control of an identifiable parameter. Given certain values of

this bifurcation parameter, change will occur gradually and continuous-
ly; given other values, change will occur abruptly and in a discontinuous
manner.
An example from developmental psychology will help to make the
significance of these points clearer. As indicated by Dixon et aI., the
extent to which individual development is described as continuous or
discontinuous in character is an issue that has divided developmental
psychologists more inclined toward a mechanistic point of view from
those more inclined to an organismic model. Thus, learning theorists
have tended to view individual development as an incremental
accumulation of gradual acquisitions, but structuralists have tended to
see it as a successive of relatively abrupt, qualitative transformations.
Bifurcation theory, especially as modelled by Thorn's "catastrophes,"
suggests instead that the continuity-discontinuity of development could
be considered as an individual difference variable: the development of
some children might be more gradual and continuous, that of others as
rather abrupt and discontinuous. The problem is to identify the control
factor that determines where along this continuum a given child will fall.
Progressiveness versus randomness. Dixon et a1. equate the
progressiveness of development with its goal-directedness, and in so
doing they follow time-honored practice. But a significant charac-
teristic of theories of self-organization is that they allow for changes
that are progressive, but indeterministic and nonteleologica1. Such
changes are progressive in the sense they lead to an increase in order,
where 'order' is defined in a precise, mathematical sense (e.g., Brooks
& Wiley, 1986). But they are indeterminant in the sense that their
ultimate trajectory is inherently probabilistic and unpredictable, and
they are nonteleological because there is no final goal toward which
they tend. Prigogine (1980) explains this indeterminancy by the fact
that as systems approach bifurcation, their subsequent behavior is
determined by small random perturbations that can be ignored under
more normal conditions (e.g., those described in classical mechanics).
According to Prigogine and Stengers (1984, pp. 271-272), if God in his
omniscience calculated the trajectories of all possible outcomes in an
unstable dynamic world, he would obtain the same result that we would
using the calculus of probabilities. (On the nonteleological character
of theories of self-organization, see Jantsch, 1980.)
Universality versus relativity. The issue of the universality of

developmental change actually consists of several sub-issues, depending
on what aspect of development is claimed to be universal. There are
debates about the rates at which children move along a given develop-
mental trajectory, about the universality of the trajectories themselves,
about the universality of end-points of development, about the univer-
sality of processes by which development occurs. All of these debates
can be illustrated in the literature on Piagetian theory. Thus, it has been
debated whether all children develop through the Piagetian stages at
the same rate (i.e., at the same ages), whether all children develop
through the same stages in the same sequence, whether all individuals
develop toward the 'final stage' of formal operations, and whether the
development of all children is characterized by the kind of equilibratory
processes that he describes.
The position assumed by theories of self-organization on the first
three of these sub-issues would appear to be clear enough. Given the
prevalence of bifurcations in the evolution of dynamic systems and the
potential effects of small perturbations on which branch of a bifurcation
is realized, the rate, sequence, and end-points of development are
recognized to be relative to the internal and external conditions prevail-
ing at certain critical junctures. Only under relatively uniform condi-
tions would universality be expected, the degree of uniformity necessary
for universality to be determined empirically. Thus, both heterogeneity
and universality in development are recognized as possibilities; which
of them better characterizes development depends on the extent of
variation occurring in the conditions under which development is ob-
served.
In regard to processes, theories of self-organization aim to specify
processes that characteristically distinguish organic from inorganic
change. Accordingly, these self-organizing processes are universal with
respect to the class of organic phenomena they are meant to explain.
At the same time, they co-exist with the physical (i.e., inorganic) proces-
ses of disorder and disintegration implied by the Second Law. Despite
the universality implied in Jantsch's (1980) rhapsodic title (The self-
organizing universe), self-organizing processes co-exist with disorganiz-
ing tendencies in the universe at large. The problem is to define the
boundary conditions that result in self-organization rather than in
disorder and disintegration.
342 Michael Chapman
Does viewing Piaget's theory as an incipient theory of self-organiza-

tion change one's interpretation of his universality claims? Although
individual and cultural differences in the rates at which children develop
through Piagetian stages has often been understood as contradicting
the theory, Piaget himself did not predict any such university of rate
(Chapman, 1987, 1988a, Chap. 7), nor did he regard formal operations
as the absolutely final stage of cognitive development. In one little-
known passage, he even suggested the possibility a stage of axiomatic
thought beyond formal operations (Piaget, 1950/1973, p. 226).
In contrast, Piaget wrote as if he did believe the sequence of
developmental stages that he described to be universal. This apparent
claim to universality of sequence, however, might be construed as an
artifact of the particular problems that he pursued. As I have previously
described (Chapman, 1988a), Piaget was specifically interested in ex-
plaining the development of scientific thinking. He intended to use the
results of his investigations of cognitive development in childhood to
explain certain problems in the epistemology of science. For this par-
ticular problem, only those developmental trajectories which led to
scientific thinking (i.e., to formal operations) were relevant. Thus, the
absence of any discussion regarding alternate developmental pathways
in most of Piaget's work may reflect his choice of problems rather than
a unidirectional model of development as such. Some of his late
remarks on the course of cognitive development during certain epochs
of Chinese civilization indeed reflect on a recognition of the possibility
of alternative developmental pathways (Piaget in Bringuier, 1977/1980;
Piaget & Garcia, 1983). Contrary to many popular views of Piaget's
theory, I conclude that the theory does not involve universality claims
regarding the rate, sequence, or end-point of human development.
Instead, I suggest that the theory involves universality claims regarding
the role of equilibratory processes in development (see also Rowell,
1983). The point is not that equilibration is the only motive factor in
development, only that equilibration is necessary along with other
factors for explaining development. In particular, equilibration is
necessary for explaining the novelty and progressivity of development:
how qualitatively new and more highly ordered forms of thinking,
reasoning, and knowing develop from existing and less highly ordered
forms. I have previously argued that claims regarding the universality
of equilibratory processes can co-exist with a multidirectional model of
development (Chapman, 1988b). Indeed, if equilibration is identified
with self-organization, then multidirectionality is implied. This con-

clusion seems inescapable insofar as models of self-organization desribe
processes of change that are neither predetermined nor teleological.
Models and Metaphors

Having viewed theories of self-organization in relation to the four
criterial issues of universality, reversibility, continuity, and progressivity,
we can now ask what sort of a concept of development they imply. In
particular, how do they compare with the other models of development
discussed by Dixon et al.: the mechanistic, organismic, and contextualist
models? The fact that such theories seem to embrace both sides of each
criterial issue at the same time makes any straight-forward comparison
difficult. Theories of self-organization as described here do not seem
to qualify either as a strong or as a weak model of development, nor can
they be identified exclusively with anyone of the three developmental
models.
In fact, if theories of self-organization succeed in their stated aim of
resolving the apparent contradiction between the Second Law of
Thermodynamics and the facts of organic evolution, then they would
appear to represent a synthesis between the mechanistic and organismic
models. This conclusion follows, because the Second Law describes the
directionality of change in closed mechanical systems, and the principles
of evolution reflect the directionality of change in open organic systems.
And if the sequence of bifurcations characterizing the evolution of
self-organizing systems effectively introduces history as a factor into this
evolution (Prigogine, 1980), then theories of self-organization embrace
the heart of contextualism as well. In Prigogine's own theory, for
example, small fluctuations in the boundary conditions governing the
functioning of dynamic systems (including those that can be ascribed to
'contextual factors') may have decisive effects on the subsequent evolu-
tion of the system under far-from-equilibrium conditions.
If the model of development implied by theories of self-organization
are more than an eclectic concatenation of mechanistic, organismic, and
contextualist models of development, then one is obliged to seek a 'root
metaphor' that characterizes it. The first such metaphor that comes to
mind is 'system', for the notion of system includes both mechanical and
organic systems as special cases. Moreover, the dynamic relation be-
tween an organism and its social or ecological contexts has frequently
been described in systems terms. Implied in this metaphor is the idea
344 Michael Chapman
of the reality of the functional relations among the elements of whatever

elements make up the system in question. These functional relations
make the system a totality and not merely a collection of elements.
In this connection, it is perhaps relevant to point out that Piaget
often used the term 'system' as synonomous with 'structure'. Thus, he
wrote of stlUctures d 'ensemble and systemes d'ensemble interchangeably
(Piaget, 1947/1950), the former term emphasizing the formal aspect of
the totalities in question and the later term their functional or dynamic
aspect. Moreover, the structure or system was described by Piaget as
the sum of its elements (typically actions or operations) plus the rela-
tions, or potential relations among those elements (Kitchener, 1985,
1986; Chapman, 1988a, p. 6n.).
What is missing from the metaphor of 'system', however, is the
temporal dimension. Although one can speak of 'dynamic systems' and
'evolutionary systems', these compound terms only underscore the fact
that dynamic change is not part of the systems concept itself. Relatively
static systems are also possible, as illustrated by the example of simple
servo-mechanisms governed solely by negative feed-back which serves
merely to reverse deviations from a static equilibrium. One searches
instead for a metaphor that includes the temporal dimension as one of
its intrinsic characteristics.
One possible metaphor that satisfies these requirements is that of
process, defined by Whitehead (1956, p. 198) as "a complex of activity
with internal relations between its various factors." In addition to the
idea of the reality of the dynamic relations among various 'factors', the
concept of process implies activity and change as part of its essential
character. In Whitehead's words, "process, activity, and change are the
matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing" (p. 2(0).
The link to Whitehead is a significant one, for no philosopher with
the possible exception of Bergson has done so much to introduce the
ideas of time and change as fundamental categories of reality. Signifi-
cantly, both Piaget and Prigogine were influenced by Bergson at critical
moments in their intellectual development (Pia get, 1918; Prigogine,
1982), and the relation between Whitehead's philosophy and theories
of self-organization has been hinted at by Prigogine and Stengers
(1984). (On potential relations between Whitehead's philosophy and
Piaget's theory, see Fetz, 1984).
The conclusion that theories of self-organization imply a model of
development that cannot be identified with anyone of the three models
considered by Dixon et al. reminds one of the meta theoretical character
of Pepper's (1942) "world-hypotheses" from which those models were
originally derived. In effect, Pepper provides a meta-theory about the
'root metaphors' presumed to underlie previously existing theories
about the world. As such, the theories themselves provide the 'meta-
data' for the meta-theory. Just as new facts may force one to revise
one's theory, so might new meta-data force one to revise one's meta-
theory. In this spirit, I have argued that recent theories of self-organiza-
tion provide new meta-data for Pepper's meta-theory. These new
meta-data could possibly be accommodated by the postulation of a new
process model of development which subsumes the mechanistic, or-
ganismic, and contextualist models as special cases. Whether or not this
solution is the best response to the meta-data in question is a matter
open for discussion.
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systems: Its relevance for developmental psychology. Human Develop-
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Bringuier, J-C. (1980). Conversations with Jean Piaget. Chicago: University of
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Chapman, M. (1988a). Constructive evolution: Origins and development of
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Fetz, R L. (1984). Zur Genese ontologischer Begriffe: FOr eine Verbindung

Whiteheadscher und Piagetscher Ans:itze. In H. Holz & E. Wolf-Gazo
(Eds.), Whitehead und der Prozessbegrijf/Whitehead and the idea ofprocess
(pp. 220-239). Munich: Alber.
Fogel, A, & Thelen, E. (1987). Development of early expressive and com-
municative action: Reinterpreting the evidence from a dynamic systems
perspective. Developmental Psychology, 23,747-761.
Haken, H. (1978). Synergetics: An introduction (2nd enlarged ed.). Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
Jantsch, E. (1980). The self-organizing universe. New York: Praeger.
Kitchener, R F. (1985). Holistic structuralism, elementarism and Piaget's
theory of 'relationism'. Human Development, 28,281-294.
Kitchener, R F. (1986). Piaget's genetic epistemology. New Haven, cr: Yale
University Press.
Luhmann, N. (1984). Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft als autopoietisches
System. Zeitschrift fUr Soziologie, 13, 308-327.
Luhmann, N. (1985). Die Autopoiesis des Bewusstseins. Soziale l*lt, 36,
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4
For a More Adequate Concept of
Development with Help from Aristotle and
Marx
Charles W. Thlman
Conceptual Criteria
I do not believe that the concept of development can usefully be
characterized on a continuum of strength in exactly the manner
proposed by Dixon, Lerner, and Hultsch. To explain, let me begin by
drawing attention to the definition of 'concept' in Antony Flew's A
Dictionary of Philosophy:
That which a person has when he understands or is able to use some
portion of his language. Criteria for possessing a concept may be
weak, requiring only an ability to pick out or distinguish that to which
an expression applies. For example, to possess the concept sheep
could require no more than the ability to say 'sheep' in the presence
of sheep. Stronger criteria might involve the grasp of the logical or
grammatical behaviour of the expression ('sheep' is a common noun,
not a proper name), factual knowledge (sheep are a source of meat),
or the ability to define or give the essence of a sheep. (Flew, 1984,
p.69)
Strictly speaking, by Flew's definition, the adjectives 'weak' and
'strong' apply not to the concept, but to the criteria for possessing one.
Criteria that reveal more about the thing or penetrate more deeply into
its essence are stronger than those that merely point. This under-
standing is consistent with the three 'indisputable' meanings of concept
given by Heath:
Charles W. Tolman. Department of PSYChology, University of Victoria,

Victoria, Be, Canada V8W 2Y2.

350 Charles W. Tolman
1b have a concept 'x' is ... (a) to know the meaning of the word 'x';
(b) to be able to pick out or recognize a presented x (distinguish
non-x's, etc.), or again to be able to think of (have images or ideas ot)
x (or x's) when they are not present; (c) to know the nature of x, to
have grasped or apprehended the properties (universals, essences,
etc.) which characterizex's and make them what they are. (Heath,
1967,p.177)
Although Heath does not explicitly mention strength, the third
meaning is not just broader in that it embraces the first two, it implies
stronger criteria as all.
It follows that scientific discourse requires stronger criteria than
everyday discourse, this being one of the main differences between
scientific and everyday concepts. Moreover, scientific criteria are more
exacting regarding the correctness with which they represent real
objects. This, however, does not guarantee an absence of error in the
concept. Indeed the very diversity of criteria that must be included in
a scientific concept increases the risk of error. Scientific concepts are,
therefore, more or less correct (or true), with improvements and resolu-
tion of differences coming about by virtue of inclusion of additional true
criteria and exclusion of false ones.
Now the notion of strength suggested by the authors differs sig-
nificantly from the one described by Flew. (I won't quibble further over
whether we are talking about the concept itself or the criterion used for
saying that a person possesses it - the notion of a "strong concept"
serves at least as a useful shorthand.) Their notion t,;uns on the strin-
gency of "requirements [criteria] for change processes to be counted as
developmental." What this means is apparent from their Figure 2: a
criterion is not viewed as stronger or weaker in comparison with other
criteria as in the standard definition, but rather varies internally in
strength. Unless the metric is carefully specified, possibilities might
suggest themselves such that if a concept (or its criteria) were asserted
with great vigor or passion it (they) could be taken as stronger than if
asserted timidly. It is also implied that a weak concept may be as or
more acceptable to science than a strong one, again at variance with the
customary understanding.
Perhaps problematic inferences like these can be avoided or their
problematic nature resolved through a more precise justification of
internally varying criterion strength, even if some confusion with the
more common notion results. But there are more problems here than
just this. First, since the nub of the matter appears to be the 'strength'
4 Commentary on Dixon, Lerner and HuItsch 351
with which development is distinguished from mere change, then it is
hard to see how concepts can vary in the manner described. They can
only vary in the accuracy with which they capture the strength of the
distinction. For instance, if development really is very distinct from
mere change, then a concept that says it isn't is not weak, it's wrong.
Second, the criteria 'selected' by the authors do not appear to
distinguish anything from mere change. There are many changes not
ordinarily regarded as developmental that are qualitative in nature.
The change from ice to water to steam is an example. And there are
similar changes that are irreversible, as when the egg hardens with
boiling. It would also appear that changes are universal: there is no
flower that does not finally wilt and decompose; there is no planet that
does not constantly change its position in space. As for 'goal-directed'
as opposed to 'random and chance' there is no ball on earth, once
beginning its descent on an unobstructed inclined plane, that does not
reach the bottom. Now if the 'strong' forms of these criteria are found
in instances of mere change, they can hardly be of much use in isolating
the distinguishing features of development that is not mere change.
Third, the criteria are not really mutually exclusive as end-points of
bi-polar continua ought to be. The most obvious in this regard is
quality/quantity. One would be hard put, as Engels demonstrated in his
Dialectics ofNature (1954, Chap. XII), to find any change of quality that
does not involve a change in quantity, nor any change of quantity that
does not ultimately lead to a change of quality. In any case, it seems
hardly reasonable to suggest that the everyday qualitative concept of
ice is stronger than the scientific quantitative one. With regard to univer-
sality, the very claim that every child develops differently depending
upon context implies by itself that every child develops. With regard to
goal-directedness, the dialectical nature of necessity and chance is well
known: toss enough coins and a predictable bell-shaped curve results.
And children don't just develop, no matter how much chance is in-
volved; they inevitably develop into adults. The dialectic of reversibility
and irreversibility is harder to demonstrate. Suffice it to say here that
both developmental and nondevelopmental changes probably involve
both (compare eggs, ice, and Freudian regression).
The real difficulty with these criteria and the approach being taken
to them, however, is that they appear to be aimed at telling us more
about the three or four 'models' targeted by the authors than about
development itself. The problem is not to debate the number of teeth
in the horse's mouth, but to count them. A contrasting emphasis on

actuality or truth would suggest that we need to discover the reversible
and irreversible factors in development, its qualitative and quantitative
characteristics, its progressive and nonprogressive aspects, and the
extent of the generality of its various features. It may well be that it is
the particular configuration of the concrete unities of these opposites
that distinguishes development from mere change.
This implies of course that a 'pre-concept' (Holzkamp, 1983,
pp. 50ft) of development must be held by psychologists prior to these
discoveries. Such a concept exists and it is something like pointing to
those fuzzy gray creatures in the field. We know, for instance that a
child's competencies do not, and cannot, remain in their childish state.
They become, in the course of growing up, the competencies of an adult.
How does this happen? There has been a general agreement on
observations and questions like this at least from the time of G. Stanley
Hall. This agreement makes up a weakly determined concept (a fuzzy
one, as the present authors have called it). The point is to fill it with
new criteria to make it strong in Flew's sense, that is, to make it ever
more comprehensive and true.
Aristotle and Thleology

The authors present us with what seems to me a confusing picture
of teleology. The impression that they are uncomfortable with it is
inescapable. I believe, however, that a consideration of teleology or
final cause, is absolutely essential to developmental theorizing. I shall
explain here why I think that is so.
First we need to clear the decks of some seriously distorted notions
of final cause. These tend to take the form of an end causing the process
that leads up to it, or the end existing somehow preformed in the
process. One searches in vain for these and similar notions in Aristotle.
That great thinker made a very clear distinction between final cause and
efficient cause; these distortions all turn on a conflation of the two. As
Randall (1962, p. 229) observed, " ... final causes or ends are for
Aristotle never to be identified with efficient causes: never for him does
what a process brings about itself bring about the process."
Another distortion is to equate final cause with purpose. I refer
once again to Randall:
For Aristotle, there are no purposes in the world outside human
actions and makings. Final causes, tele, are for him a much broader
class than the subclass of 'purposes'. That broad class includes not
only human purposes, but also all natural ends and outcomes in the
processes that take place by nature. (Randall, 1962, p. 125)
Final cause was one of four causes listed by Aristotle and one of the
three out of the four that have been eliminated or neglected by many
thinkers since the rise of modern science in the 17th century. In
retrospect, the reason for this is clear. Formal, material, and final causes
had no place in the prevailing mechanistic thinking of the 17th and 18th
centuries. They only began to emerge again from our scientific subcon-
scious with the rise of biology and functionalism in the 19th century.
This is not accidental; it was precisely the biological and functional
emphases of Aristotle's thinking that led him to distinguish the four
kinds of causes. Aristotle advanced the other three causes, particularly
the final, as part of an opposition to the mechanistic thinking of
Empedocles and Democritus.
We now find ourselves once again in a post-mechanicist stage of
intellectual historical development and one of the most urgent tasks we
face in current developmental theory is to find ways of transcending the
limits of mechanicism, of formulating genuine and effective theories of
development that reflect its processual nature. Aristotle, as it turns out,
had quite a bit to say about this problem. Surely we cannot afford to
neglect or, worse, distort his conclusions about it.
What did Aristotle intend? His introduction to the 'causes' in the
Posterior analytics says it clearly: "We think we have scientific
knowledge when we know the cause, and there are four causes ... "
(Aristotle, 1941, p. 170). The four causes represent, in short, the kinds
of information we must possess about something in order to lay claim
to genuinely scientific knowledge about it.
What was important to Aristotle about the object of investigation
was its motion: "We ... must take for granted that the things that exist
by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion - which is made
plain by induction" (Aristotle, 1941, p. 219). The form of motion that
most interested him was "becoming in its widest sense" (1941, p. 230),
the "coming to be and passing away" (p. 240). "We say that one thing
comes to be from another thing, and one sort of thing from another sort
of thing" (p. 230). It is clear enough from these passages that Aristotle
was interested in the kind of changes that includes what we ordinarily
understand as development.
Why is final cause important for understanding these kinds of

change? Randall (1962) sums it up neatly with the question "What is
an egg?"
Democritus can tell us it is a chemical process, but it is clearly not a
'mere' chemical process: it is a chemical process that grows into a
chicken. We can go back, find the elements out of which the egg is
made up, either Aristotle's elements or our own, we can find the
material of the egg, its From What. We can find the hen and her
reproductive system, the cock and his, we can find the agents that
generated the egg, the efficient cause of the egg, the By What. Both
material and agent are necessary and important. But we clearly do
not understand what an egg really is, unless we recognize the egg as
a possible chicken (Randall, 1962, p. 26).
And we surely cannot claim to understand the psychological processes
of the child if we have no idea of what they may become, or worse, if we
pretend that they do not become.
What about the claim that the dialectical thinkers such as Hegel,
Marx, and Engels were teleologists? There can be no doubt that they
were - in the original Aristotelian sense. This is understandable in
terms of their opposition to mechanicism and their recognition of the
world as becoming. But there can be equally little doubt that they
rejected the distortions of final cause that made it ridiculous. This is
clear from the discussion of method in the introduction to Marx's
Gmndrisee (1973; cf. Sayer, 1979, p. 92) and from Engels' Anti-Duhring
(1947, e.g., p. 86). Hegel's Phenomenology ofmind (1967, pp. 294-296)
condemned the mechanical notion of teleology, although the author
was admittedly prone to overgeneralize purpose.
The point is that anyone who has seen through the errors of
mechanicism must necessarily gravitate to some version of final cause.
And this comes not out of some kind of metaphysical prejudice, but, as
exemplified by Aristotle, from respectful regard for the nature of reality.
Marx, Society and the Individual

Is it true for Marx that "although individuals are influenced by the
structures of their society, individual thought and actions may be
explicable primarily in terms of social institutions," that" ... the inter-
action between the individual and society exists descriptively, but is of
little explanatory value," and that "when it comes to the explanation of
social phenomena, the interaction is rendered in a way reminiscent of
one-way causation, from the social system to the individual?" These are
the conclusions the authors draw from the following quotation from
Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire: "Men make their own history, but they do
not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past" (1969, p. 398). Granted, the authors offer
their interpretation cautiously - they admit that it is extreme - but
they offer no alternative. The question is, however, why this obviously
faulty interpretation is offered at all. As a deduction from the quota-
tion, it is a blatant nonsequitur. Indeed, Marx here states very plainly
that "men make their own history" and then goes on to remind the reader
that this is not done in a vacuum, but under conditions which they do
not choose willy-nilly. (Who could possibly object to this?) The whole
point of the passage is to deny that history is something that simply
happens to people. It represents anything but "one-way causation" or
"methodological collectivism."
The following passages are offered as evidence of Marx's more
dialectical understanding of the matter:
M. Proudon the economist understands very welI that men make
cloth, linen or silk materials in definite relations of production. But
what he has not understood is that these definite social relations are
just as much produced by men as linen, flax, etc. Social relations are
closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new produc-
tive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing
the way of earning their living, they change alI their social relations.
The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill,
society with the industrial capitalist .... The same men who establish
their social relations in conformity with their material productivity,
produce also principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with their
social relations. (Marx, 1963, p. 109)
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made
in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and
the material conditions under which they live, both those which they
find already existing and those produced by their activity. These
premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way. (Marx &
Engels, 1970, p. 42)
Passages of this sort are innumerable, and they all affirm a genuinely
dialectical and reciprocal interaction between the individual, social
relations, and the physical environment.
If we misunderstand Marxism, then we make it all the harder for
ourselves to appreciate the real contributions to the understanding of
human development made by Vygotsky, Luria, Leontyev, Davydov and
356 Charles w. T~lman
other developmental psychologists who have adopted a Marxist
perspective of their work. And they have adopted this perspective
because they believed it served well the interests of all who are
concerned with understanding the human developmental process, not
mechanically or metaphysically, but on its own terms. Those who share
that concern can no more afford to misunderstand Marx than they can
afford to misunderstand Aristotle.
References
Aristotle. (1941). The basic works ofAristotle. (R. McKeon, Ed.). New York:
Random House.
Engels, R (1947).Anti-Dahring. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Engels, R (1954). Dialectics of nature. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Flew, A (1984). A dictionary ofphilosophy. London: Pan Books.
Heath, P. L. (1967). Concept. In P. Edwards (Ed.), The encyclopedia of
philosophy (VoL 2) (pp. 177-180). New York: Macmillan.
Hegel, G. W. R (1967). The phenomenology of mind. New York: Harper &
Row.
Holzkamp, K. (1983). Grundlegungder Psycholgie. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
Marx, K. (1963). The poverty of philosophy. New York: International
Publishers.
Marx, K. (1969). The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In Karl Marx
& FrederickEngels: Selected Works (VoL 1). Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse. New York: Vintage Books.
Marx, K., & Engels, R (1970). The German ideology. New York: International
Publishers.
Randall, J. H., Jr. (1962).Aristotle. Sussex: Harvester Press.
Sayer, D. (1979). Marx's Method. Sussex: Harvester Press.
4
Maneuvering Among Models of
Developmental Psychology
Roger A. Dixon, Richard M.l.erner and David E Hultsch
We have been fortunate to receive three interesting and divergent

commentaries on our chapter. We venture to characterize them
(alphabetically, by author) briefly. Cavanaugh's commentary is largely
supportive of the mission we have adopted for ourselves in this chapter,
and mentions several questions and issues we overlooked. These
include problems with our portrayal of contextualism and future direc-
tions of contextual developmental psychology. Chapman examines the
four criteria we propose for distinguishing among concepts of develop-
ment, describing in considerable detail Piagetian (and organismic) posi-
tions on these issues. He offers some reasonable arguments regarding
Prigogine's self-organization theory as a possible companion (or alter-
native) model. Tolman asserts that our entire mission is misbegotten,
as are several details of our argument, choices of emphasis we have
made, and interpretations we have offered. In brief, both Cavanaugh
and Chapman have taken our paper as a point of embarkation for
commentary on the implications and validity of our arguments for
specific concerns in developmental psychology. We will comment
further on these extensions. Tolman, on the other hand, focused on
three points of disagreement, each associated with what he regards as
limitations in our discussions of Aristotle and Marx. Given this focus,
the brief commentary format did not allow him to make positive state-
ments regarding his alternative program. Overall, there are points of
Roger A. Dixon & David E Hultsch Department of Psychology, University

of Victoria, Victoria, Be, Canada V8W 2Y2. Richard M. Lerner. Depart-
ment of Human Development and Family Studies, The Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA 16802.

358 Roger A. Dixon, Richrd M. Lerner and David F. Hultsch
both concordance and divergence between the views of the commen-

tators and our own positions. Given the number and complexity of
these points, we will organize this reply by themes raised in the three
commentaries.
The Very Concept of the Concept of Development

Both Cavanaugh and Chapman grasp (and accept) the purpose of
our discussion of this topic, as well as the historical and theoretical
context of work on the concept of development. It has long been
evident that the concept of development is both multifaceted and
essentially contested. Even a cursory reading of some of the classics in
the field (e.g., the 1957 volume, The Concept ofDevelopment, edited by
Dale Harris) reveals that: (a) developmental scientists possess multiple
concepts of development, (b) these concepts of development are logi-
cally related to superordinate meta theories or models of development,
and (c) theoretical fertility, internal consistency, empirical implications,
and passionate advocacy are characteristics of multiple concepts of
development and conceptions of developmental psychology. Scientists
committed to a particular model - even zealots - can contribute to
the elaboration of that model, as well as to the articulation of points of
similarity and dissimilarity between the favored and disfavored models.
It is a matter of grave doubt, however, whether devotees of a given
model can refute an alternative model and, by implication, concept of
development.
Immersion in the post-1957 literature in developmental theory may
provide one's perspective with certain blindspots. We, as well as per-
haps two of the commentators, saw nothing unusual or debateable
about: (a) using the expression concept of development, (b) relating
concepts of development to models of developmental psychology, or
(c) operationally defining concepts of development in terms of several
criteria especially pertinent to the study of individual and social change.
Cavanaugh even went further than this in expressing a pluralistic
perspective on models of developmental psychology. Agreeing that
more than one model can produce legitimate families of developmental
theories, he argued for continued discussions regarding salient and
divergent assumptions but against the final validity of cross-paradigm
criticisms. Chapman agreed (implicitly, at least) that concepts of
development may be usefully characterized in terms of several criteria.
In his discussion of the four criteria we identified, he pointed to several
novel interpretations and variations in the context of the theories of

Piaget and Prigogine. Tolman, however, began his commentary by
rejecting both the very notion that the concept of development could
be properly called a concept and that it could be characterized on a
continuum of strength-weakness as we described in our chapter. Did
Tolman identify a critical blinds pot of our perspective on developmental
theory?
We agree that there may, in fact, be yet another level of assumptions
to consider in scholarship on models and concepts of development.
Despite our best efforts, we have used some unexamined and undefined
terms. To a certain extent it is useful to identify such terms and to agree
on common - or at least a set of commonly understood - definitions.
To this extent, Tolman's criticisms are valuable. Had they stopped there,
we would have little further comment. However, Tolman attempted to
carry his point much further and, unfortunately, committed a serious
error of argumentation. One error in the first part of Tolman's essay
can be seen in his arguments for rejecting our implicit concept of
concept. One of our major goals was to address one aspect of the
"conceptual confusion" (Wittgenstein's term) attendant to develop-
mental psychology. Two important aspects of this (Wittgensteinian)
approach to the clarification of conceptual confusion in psychology are
as follows. First, concepts are not purely matters of fact (of truth or
falsehood), but are to an important degree matters of meaning. Scien-
tific concepts, such as the concept of development, may mean some-
thing quite different to different investigators. In our chapter, we show
that this was the case. Second, the meanings of scientific concepts
change with time, a point that numerous philosophers of science (e.g.,
Toulmin, 1972) inherited partly from Wittgenstein. Conceptual con-
fusion in science can be clarified through articulating the various mean-
ings of concepts, both in their present usages and in their historical
development. Relating this Wittgensteinian argument to the concept
of development is the notion of 'cluster concepts' (e.g., Brandstaedter,
1987). The meaning of such concepts can be understood only in terms
of a complex network of specifications. Without much of the above
rationale, we attempted in our chapter to provide such a network of
specifications for the concept of development.
Perhaps our blinds pot was that we viewed this rationale too uncriti-
cally; we thought that it would be unnecessary to begin by defining a
concept. To be sure, had we begun by defining a concept we would not
have begun with the two definitions quoted by Tolman. Indeed, the
relevance of these two definitions, and the accompanying commentary,
is not apparent. We share Tolman's interest in conceptual clarity. We
believe it is a mistake, however, to force conceptual unanimity and
homogeneity on living, breathing, changing, scientific models and
concepts. The concept of development, as we view it, is more akin to a
cluster concept than it is to the concept sheep (which Tolman uses as
an example). Specifying the network of meanings of a cluster concept
is not an activity in which (paraphrasing Tolman) 'indisputable',
'correct', and 'true' criteria are always included and 'false' ones
excluded.
Thus, the strength-weakness of a concept refers not to the exactness
with which criteria 'represent real objects', but to relative clusters of
positions on a set of criteria. (What is the external real object to which
the concept of development refers?) Our goal was to make a selected
set of these criteria for the concept of development as explicit as
possible and, thereby, contribute to conceptual progress. For most of
the chapter we eschewed the temptation to judge these criteria, posi-
tions on these criteria, or any version of the concept of development in
terms of truth or falsehood. To the extent that Tolman attributes this
judgmental purpose to us, he is mistaken; to the extent that he seeks to
correct us and to urge us to adopt this purpose, we must resist.
The Criteria
Cavanaugh recognizes that the four continua we identify - univer-
sality, reversibility, qualitative-quantitative nature of change, and goal-
directedness - are not absolute. We agree with him that there could
be others, or that there could be fewer. We agree, further, that our
Figure 2, which presents patterns of positions on the four criteria, may
be misleading if interpreted literally. As he notes, it appears to depict
contextualism as a 'middle ground' between organicism and mechanism.
This is an unfortunate repercussion of our choice of a simple geometric
representation of the continua. Cavanaugh directs some specific atten-
tion to the thorny issue of purposiveness: as a contextualist, he must
rescue a sense of purpose from a non teleological world. Chapman has
much to say about this criterion, as well. His family of theories of
self-organization allow changes to be progressive, "but indeterministic
and nonteleological." In this section we discuss issues raised about this
and other criteria of the concept of development.
Whereas Cavanaugh extends the limits of our portrayal of the

contextual concept of development (along the continua of these four
criteria), Chapman focuses on exceptions to our portrayal of
organicism. Some of the points he raises seem to be truly novel ideas,
such as the notion of the quantitative-qualitative dimension as an
individual differences variable. Some points serve to clarify Piaget, such
as the discussion of reversibility. Chapman argues that Piaget viewed
psychological development as including both reversible and irreversible
change. This would appear to contradict our placement of organicism
at the irreversible end of the continuum. Given that it is not reversibility
of thought itself to which we refer (Chapman's second meaning of
reversibility), the question is whether the acquisition of knowledge is
reversible. Chapman suggests that reversibility is possible when the
acquisition of knowledge occurs through 'familiar learning
mechanisms," but not possible when it occurs through equilibration.
This, then, appears to leave our placement of organicism on this con-
tinuum only slightly modified. The familiar learning mechanisms to
which Chapman refers are not likely to be considered as true develop-
mental change by Piagetians. (According to our analysis of the concept
of development, one reason is that these changes are in fact reversible!)
The process of equilibration is an important aspect of organismic
stage-like cognitive development. This equilibration is normally irre-
versible. Thus, despite the presence of both reversible and irreversible
change in Piaget's theory, it appears that change that is developmental
is typically irreversible.
Chapman successfully softens our position that the organismic
model tends toward universality claims. There appear to be some
aspects (e.g., rate), characteristics (e.g., post-formal stages), and proces-
ses that were not treated by Pia get quite so universally as others (e.g.,
sequence). This may, as Chapman points out, be especially true insofar
as Piaget's theory is related to Prigogine's theory of self-organization.
(Prigogine's ideas may also be compatible with Werner's, 1957, version
of organismic developmental theory, specifically his orthogenetic prin-
ciple; see Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981.) It may still be possible to
argue, however, that in practice the family of theories that make up the
organismic model would cluster in their positions on this criterion
relatively close to the universal end of the continuum - relative, of
course to mechanism.
362 Roger A. Dixon, Riehrd M. Lerner and David F. Hultseh
Tolman provides several terse examples of how the entire scheme

fails. He refers to (a) the qualitative change of ice to water to steam,
(b) the irreversible change of an egg hardening when boiled, (c) the
universal change of all flowers eventually wilting, and (d) the goal-
directed change of balls rolling down inclined planes. These examples
indicate that a major point about our scheme of four criteria has been
misunderstood. As we mentioned above, the concept of development
is multidimensional. One would not decide about whether a given
change is developmental on the basis of how it matches only one of the
criteria. Even artificial (non-psychological) examples such as these
must be queried along each of the criteria. If a developmental scientist
were interested in (say) the development of motion in balls, he or she
may certainly grant that there is a sense in which the change down an
inclined plane is goal-directed. One must also ask, however, whether it
is, for example, universal. Perhaps anticipating this criterion, Tolman
subtly provided some important contextual limitations in his own
example, most notably: (a) a "a ball on earth" and, therefore, subject to
the pull of gravitation, (b) a ball already descending on an inclined
plane, which is a unique circumstance for balls in the real world, and (c)
a ball on not just any inclined plane, but an unobstructed inclined plane.
One must also ask similar questions regarding the qualitative-quantita-
tive and reversibility dimensions. It is only then that a 'decision' can be
reached about whether this change is developmental or not. This
decision is made only on the basis of a given model that requires a
particular pattern across the four continua, as well as any other criteria
that may be included. Most importantly, adherents to different models
will accept and generate different answers. The entire scheme must be
applied in order for it to make maximum sense. Tolman's examples
illustrate vividly that even selective application of artificial examples
often contains assumptions and implicit consideration of more than one
of our criteria.
We perhaps did not emphasize enough in the chapter that there is
some element of convention involved. For example, not everyone
would agree that the change from ice to water to steam is plainly
qualitative, as Tolman asserts it is. That is, not everyone would agree
that there are not quantifiable gradual steps in these transitions. But
even if everyone agreed that there were in fact two qualitative leaps in
this process, one still must entertain the remaining three continua
before deciding whether that change meets one's own criteria for
development. Tolman gets tangled in conventions when he argues (with

Engels) that all qualitative changes involve changes in quantity, and all
quantitative changes lead to changes in quality. Here he confuses his
own assumptions about the nature of change with absolute fact, which
he supports by reference to the authority of Engels, almost as though
if Engels said it then it must be true. He compounds this confusion by
insisting that strength and weakness are synonymous with truth and
falsehood (but we alluded to this problem above). We suggest that
Tolman's view is one of several viable positions on the nature of change,
and that the positions may be arrayed along a continuum as we described
originally.
Are we able to maintain our position on this simply because of
problems peculiar to the examples that Tolman used? Of course,
practicing developmental psychologists do not deal sufficiently with
philosophical puzzlers such as steam and rolling balls. This does not
mean that they should not, and Tolman is justified in pushing our scheme
to its limits in this way. What if these examples had been successfully
employed to illustrate shortcomings of our scheme? Better yet, what if
Tolman (or someone else) were to challenge our scheme successfully
with examples from human psychological phenomena? We pose these
questions in order to offer a confession that Tolman's examples have
actually brought upon us. The confession is that we would not be too
embarrassed if such examples could be found. Finding a few counter-
examples would not necessarily diminish the heuristic usefulness of the
scheme. Indeed, the search for genuine developmental/change
phenomena that escape our scheme should be encouraged. Important
exceptions are often useful in clarifying fuzzy or cluster concepts. For
now, the scheme seems to be useful in addressing the major questions
we set out to cover. These questions include: (a) What specific features
of the concepts of development can be identified? (b) How might the
differences among the models be related to the concept of develop-
ment? (c) What can this effort at conceptual clarification contribute to
our understanding of developmental psychology?
Managing Models
We highlighted three prominant models of contemporary develop-
mental psychology. In addition to their prominance, these models were
selected partly because they represent relatively non-overlapping posi-
tions on the continua of the concept of development. Thus, as we
364 Roger A. Dixon, Riehrd M. Lerner and David F. Hultseh
admitted above, Cavanaugh is correct in noting the potential for con-

ceptual confusion derived from the geometry of our second figure.
Each of the commentators point out some errors of commission and
omission in our discussion of either the three main models or dialec-
ticism, which we use as a point of comparison at the end of the chapter.
We will mention some of these issues, focusing on those likely to
influence our subsequent treatments of the concept of development, as
well as those with which we disagree.
First, with respect to contextualism, Cavanaugh notes that we did
not extend our chapter to include examples of what a contextual
developmental psychology would look like. We agree on the critical
importance of such specifications. In other writings we have tried to
provide such extensions in the areas of personality and social develop-
ment (Lerner & Lerner, 1989), developmental psychopathology
(Lerner, Hess, & Nitz, in press), and adult cognition (Dixon, 1986).
Second with respect to dialecticism, Cavanaugh notes that it does not
playa central role in our paper, and seems willing to forgive us for our
imprecise (but conventional) use of certain terms (especially dialectics
and dialecticism). We did not attempt to introduce or review the model,
much less address attendant conceptual confusions. We hinted at some
differences between contextualism and dialecticism, but left an exhaus-
tive discussion of this topic to others. Cavanaugh is correct in noting
that, insofar as dialecticism is a separate model of developmental
psychology, it could sponsor a concept of development that is possible
to characterize along the four criteria. The pattern of its positions on
the four criteria would be ascertained by examination of the literature
of dialectical developmental psychology. This literature would include
theoretical, historical, and empirical sources, that is, what dialectical
psychologists say they believe and what they actually practice.
This literature in dialectical psychology - including some of its
major sources such as Marx - plays only a minor role in our chapter.
Nevertheless, our interpretation of the dialectical view of goal-
directedness and level of explanation is enough to get us branded by
Tolman as purveyors of "crude anti-Marxist propaganda." Interest-
ingly, Tolman brooks no ambiguity in the interpretation of Marx, as
though the last 50 years of Marxist scholarship had thundered to a close
on ... well, at least these two issues. Marx was a writer of immense
power and imagination. Like others of his considerable level of produc-
tivity, he left a corpus of work to be dissected and interpreted by normal
scientists (including historians, philosophers, and psychologists from

numerous corners of the globe). It takes but a glance at twentieth
century scholarship in the name of Marx to see that more than one
position on numerous issues may be supported by reference to Marx or
a Marxist scholar. We are not Marxist scholars and this fact, coupled
with some ambiguity in Marxist scholarship, led us to tread carefully and
with qualification when discussing dialectical positions on goal-direc-
tedness and level of explanation. Tolman noted our tentativeness and
our explicit qualifications, but scolded us for disagreeing with what he
takes to be the voice of Marx.
Let us consider further the two issues we addressed that had an
explicit connection to dialecticism. First, with regard to teleology,
Tolman agrees with us that Marx and Hegel can be read as teleologists
- "there can be no doubt about that," he writes - but despite Hegel
being "admittedly prone to overgeneralize purpose," both of these
thinkers really held the correct view of teleology, not the nasty mechani-
cal one. The 'error' of those who disagree with Tolman's view of Marx,
Hegel, and Aristotle, is that they fail to hold a "respectful regard for the
nature of reality." As we noted above, we believe that there is more
than one "respectful regard for the nature of reality," and these are
represented by the models we have described. Although it is probably
more explicit in this reply than in the original chapter, we argue for a
respectful regard for more than one model of the nature of reality. This
essentially pluralistic position is necessary for the kind of enterprise that
was our original chapter. It may be that this pluralistic position is the
most basic problem Tolman has with our chapter. Whereas terms such
as 'correct', 'error', 'faulty', 'truth', 'false', and 'accuracy' simply do not
appear in our chapter, they appear in all their finality on every page of
Tolman's commentary. Although we did not attempt to maintain a
dispassionate balance throughout the chapter, we operated under the
assumption that our credibility could be easily squandered in any
obviously prejudiced attempt at conceptual clarification.
Second, with regard to explanatory level, our main goal was to
explore the possibility that strong and weak concepts of development
may be related to the degree of interaction implied between the
individual and social levels of change. The distinction between descrip-
tion and explanation is an important one, but, as we note, it is often
blurred in workaday social science, and this blurring may, in fact, be
justifiable, if not inevitable. We make no judgments regarding the
explanatory adequacy of either level; we have no illusions of solving that

vexatious problem in our chapter. Marxism is used as one illustration.
We write that "Marxism, a developmental science operating
predominantly at the social level, may emphasize methodological
collectivism (Mandelbaum, 1971, 1987)." After a few comments
supported by Marx and Engels (1947), we offer the quotation that
Tolman finds so egregiously misinterpreted. We agree that our brief
interpretation may be extreme. In fact, as Tolman notes, we explicitly
say immediately following the quotation that we are focusing on an
"admittedly extreme" implication. Why do we offer no alternatives to
this extreme implication? Because the quotation and Marx's actual
position on this matter is completely immaterial to the point under
discussion, a point that Tolman seems to have missed entirely. The point
is to draw the implications of the various cells of the interaction between
two dimensions, namely, strong versus weak concept and methodologi-
cal collectivism versus individualism. A subsequent point is that the
distinction between Me and MI may be best viewed not as separate
mutually exclusive cells in a 2 x 2 matrix, but as an issue of explanatory
altitude. Thus, we find Tolman's comments here rather puzzling. As
we imply, virtually all observers would claim to be interactionists, so
Tolman's defense of Marx as an interactionist is unsurprising. The point
of his conclusion, in which he mentions Marxist-informed Soviet
psychology, is similarly unclear. Surely he is not suggesting that the
dialectical model of developmental psychology is a finished, monolithic
product. Surely he is not suggesting that there are not differences -
real differences - in the 1920s and 1980s Soviet psychology. Surely he
is not suggesting that all Soviet psychologists - or even the four he
mentions by name - have adopted precisely the same Marxist perspec-
tive, or more importantly, that they apply this perspective in precisely
the same way in their developmental research. We would suggest simply
that readers interested in understanding a model thoroughly consult not
only theoreticians' statements of principle regarding the study of human
development, but also the practice of actual developmental
psychologists working within that model. In this case, it is not just what
Soviet psychologists say they are doing that counts, but what they
actually do when they do it. Our guess - without being experts on
dialectical psychology - is that (a) it is typified by a family of theories,
not a single monolithic set of principles adopted from a 'correct' under-
standing of Marx, and (b) some of what dialectical developmental
psychologists do in the name of Marx is not dramatically different from

that which is done under the aegis of other models of developmental
psychology.
It is troubling to some observers that the 'old grey models just ain't
what they used to be' and, worse still, that they have yet to finish
changing. Chapman, however, is not one of those troubled observers.
He seems to grasp this point clearly with respect to Piaget. Piaget
himself will never write another word, but Chapman's commentary
shows how Piaget's writings - his lessons, his interpretations, his
emphases - are still being written, are still changing. Piaget, like Marx,
wrote voluminously and was enormously influential. But just what was
the true message of his fertile mind? Any single characterization of
Piaget or organicism - a model he epitomizes - must be bound by the
same qualifications we offered regarding Marx. That is, it is limited by
the fact that it comes not after the conclusion, but somewhere in the
midst of the process of interpreting and re-interpreting the message and
the man. It also comes about by fallible observers selecting a reasonable
interpretation, from among several, of the meaning of a portion of his
work. Chapman recognizes the inherent historical nature of Piaget's
thought and, in fact, contributes to its future development. The future
orientation is captured in his exploration of possible connections
between Piaget, Prigogine, Bergson, and Whitehead. What would
organicism look like if it incorporated more of Prigogine? Managing
the organismic model does not include closing it off to further change,
or in any way restricting further intellectual inquiry. The same is true
for those managers of the contextual model (such as Cavanaugh) and,
we hope, the dialectical model.
Conclusion
We have found the exercise of considering the points and issues
raised by the three commentators - points with which we both agree
and disagree - to be enlightening. All three of the commentators have
made valid criticisms of our original chapter, as well as valuable con-
tributions to advancing intelligent discourse on the topics we addressed.
Even the occasional misinterpretations have provided us with an op-
portunity to explore our own assumptions and conclusions in more
depth. Had we to do the chapter over again, or to write a new draft, it
would certainly benefit from the commentaries of each of these
scholars. Of course, this is not to say that at some point in a continuing
dialogue we would reach full agreement with any or all of them. It is

rather to confirm that we accept that we are fallible observers of the
field of developmental psychology, and that we are delighted to
continue exploring the many fascinating quandaries the field presents.
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Author Index
A Beth, W.E. 346

Bhavnani, R 109,132
Aber,M.S. 153,158 Bijou, S. W. 101, 116, 130
Ackerman, P. 158 Bijstra,J. 21,51
Ainsworth, M. S. D. 98,103,130 Bisanz,J. 71,207,232
168,174, 221,230 Bjorklund, D. E 67,70
Akabane, Y. 231 Blalock, H. M. 140, 148,157
Allen, V. L. 138,185,189 Blank,M. 21,54
Altman,J. 189 Blehar, M. C. 168,174,221,230
Amatruda, C. S. 104,132 Bloom,B. 110, 130
Ambrose, A 53 Bloomingdale, J. 152,159
Ambrose, J. A 23,51 Bopp,M 332
Anderson, E. 153,158 Boring, E. G. 346
Aristotle 353,356 Bornstein, M. H. 318
Arminger, G. 154,157 Bowers, K. S. 219,231
Aronson, L. R 318 Bowlby,J. 168,174,221,231
Artemieva, E. 165,174 Boyd,R 36-37,51
Atkinson, M. 34,51 Brainerd, C. J. 65,66,70-71
Atlan,H. 336, 345 97,102,123,130
Ayala, EJ. 299,316 Braithwaite, R B. 297,299,316
B Brandon, R N. 298, 316
Brandstaedter, J. 359,368
Babloyantz, A 335,347 Brent, S. B. 336, 345
Baer,D.M. 101, 116,130 Bricker, W. 116, 135
Bailey, K. 336,345 Brim, o. G. J. 54
Baker, W. J. 59,63,297,316 Brim, O. G., Jr. 133, 138, 185, 188
Baltes, P. B. 53-54, 117,132, 134, 136 Bringmann, W. G. 317,323
151, 153,157, 184, 187-189 Bringuier, J-C. 342, 345
259,282,304,309,31~321
Brooks, D. R 336,340,345
Bandura,A 252, 258 Brown,AL. 168, 174
Barratt, B. B. 203, 230 Bruner, J. S. 100, 131, 135
Baumrind, D. 301,316 Bryant, N. R 168, 174
Bayley, N. 104,130 Bryant, P. E. 41,51
Beckner,M. 297-298, 316 Buerger,AA 336, 345
Beilin, H. 105,130, 203 Bunge,M. 225,231
206,211,218,230-231 Burt, C. L. 109,131
Bell,RO. 119,130 Buscaglia, M. 301,316
Bentler, P. M. 93, 104, 126,130, 132 Busch-Rossnagel, N. A 36,38,53
Bereiter, C. 117,130 119,133,368
Berko, J. 59,63 Buss, A R 152,158, 301,316
Berlyne, D. E. 96,100,130
Bernstein, P. 23,53 C
Bertalanffy, L., von 6,51 Cairns, R B. 283, 317
203,230,301,316 Caldwell, B. 130
369
370 Author Index
Campbell, D. T. 311,317 Dingley, H. L. 65,71

Campione, J. C. 168, 174 Dixon,R.A 282-283
Campos, J. J. 318 309-310,317-318,368
Cantor, J. H. 321 Doise, W. 42, 52
Carey, S. 68, 70 Dromi,E. 49,52
Carr, E. H. 279-280, 317 E
Carroll, J. D. 57,63
Case, R. 48,52, 65,68, 70 Eastman,M. 304,318
Cassedy, J. H. 170, 174 Eckhardt, G. 317,323
Castell, A 247 Eddington, A 203,207,231
Cattell, R. B. 117,131,134,137,151 Edey,M.A 301,319
154-155,157-159, 185,188 Edwards, P. 316, 356
Cavanaugh,J.C. 327,330,333 Eigen,M. 336, 345
Chang,J.J. 57,63 Eisert, D. C. 116, 137
Chapman, M. 296,298,301,307,311 Elkind,D. 131,136
317, 337-339,342,344,345,368 Ellis, N. R. 160
Chay, T. R. 69-70 Elster, J. 300, 318
Churchland, P. M. 203,231, 298, 317 Emmerich, W. 109,131
Churchland, P. S. 203,218, 231 Engels,E 302-303,305,313,318
Clarke, A D. B. 132 320,351,354,356, 366, 368
Clarke, A M. 132 Epstein,D. 125,127,134
Cohen, G. A 300, 317 139,145,147,157,158
Cohen, L. B. 103, 134 Erikson, E. H. 34,37,52,124,131
Cohen, R. 317 Estes, w. K. 96,131,152, 159
Colby, A 107, 131 Eye, A, von 184,189
Cole, M. 52, 323 F
Collingwood, R. G. 299-300, 303, 317
Collins, W. A 115, 131 Farr, J. 304, 318
Connell, J. P. 127, 131 Featheringham, T. R. 165,174
Cooke, R. E. 322 Featherman, D. L. 36,52, 152, 157
184,18~ 280,294,312,315,318
Cornelius, S. W. 304,316
Costa, G. 198, 233 Feigl, H. 319
Cronbach, L. J. 97,131, 181,188 Ferrara, R. A 168, 174
Crutchfield, R. S. 94, 131 Fetz, R. L. 344, 346
Cudeck, R. 158 Field, T. 259
Cutino, S. 152,159 Fine, A 203, 231
Finley, G. 259
D Fischer, K. W. 107,131
Damon, W. 368 Flavell, J. H. 66,70, 101-102, 105
Dannefer, D. 280,312,317 123,131,136,196,219,231
Darwin, C. 301,317 Flew, A 349,356
Datan, N. 286,316-317 Foch, T. T. 122, 136
Davidson, D. 298,317 Fodor,J. 16,52, 94, 131
Davies, P. 203,231 Foerster, H., von 203, 231
DeLisi,R. 259 Fogel, A 82,89, 336, 346-347
Dennett, D. C. 257,258 Ford,D.H. 125,134,155,160
Derwing, B. L. 59,63 Fosberg, I. A 168, 174
Devereux, G. 166,174 Fox,R. 54
Devoe,S. 95,116,138 Frederiksen, N. 63
Dewey,J. 306, 317 Fusaro,L. 95,116,138
Author Index 371
G Hardy-Brown, K 116,137
Harper, R. V. 119,130
Gadamer,H. 196, 231 Harre, R. 193,202,218,232
Gallagher, J. M. 174 Harris, C. W 117,130,132,137
Galperin, P. J. 2,35,37,40,52 Harris, D. B. 137, 235, 282, 288
Garcia, R. 337,342,347 319-320, 322-323,358, 368
Gardiner, P. 322 Harris, D. H. 115, 132
Gardner, H. 106, 132 Hawking, S. M. 330, 333
Geert, P., van 4-6, 9, 19,21,24 Heath, P. L. 350, 356
36,39-42,51-54 Hebb, D. O. 67, 70
Georgoudi, M. 287,307,317 Heisenberg, W 200, 203, 232
322, 332, 333, 368 Henle, M. 327, 333
Gergen, K J. 203,229, 231 Hersen, M. 368
Gergen, M. M. 203,229, 231 Hertzog, C. 127, 132
Gesell, A. L. 104, 132 Hess, L. E. 364, 368
Geweke, J. 154,157 Hiebsch, H. 52
Gewirtz, J. 98, 132 Hill, K T. 103, 134
Ghiselin, M. 298,306, 318 Hinde, R. A. 221,232
Gibbs, J. 107,131 Hofstadter, D. R. 257, 258, 265, 277
Gibson, E. J. 218, 231 Holden, A. V. 69,70
Gibson, J. J. 218, 231 HOlliday, R. 318
Gleick, J. 69, 70,224, 231 Holz, H. 346
Globerson, T. 48, 53 Holzkamp, K 352, 356
Goldschmid, M. L. 104, 132 Honderich, T. 300,319
Goodfield, J. 281,288,297-298, 322 Hood, K 113, 132
Gooding, D. 298, 318 Hooper, F. H. 116, 132
Gorman, B. S. 54 Horn, J. L. 144,151,157,158
Goslin, D. 133 House, B. J. 152, 160
Gottfried, A. W 115, 132 Houston, A. 259
Gottlieb, G. 309, 318 Howe, M. L. 65,71
Gould, S. J. 220,231,288,301,306, 318 Hudelson, R. 304,319
Goulet, L. R. 53, 134, 136, 189, 259, 321 Humphreys, M. S. 151,158, 185,188
Grant, M. J. 65, 71 Hunt, J. McV. 103-104
Greco, P. 16, 53 109-111,132135,137
Green, D. R. 130, 347 Hutt, C. 109,132
Greenberg, D. F. 140, 158
Greenberg, J. R. 221,232 I
Grene, M. 298-299,301,319 Ihde, D. 228, 235
Griffiths, D. 151,157 Inhelder, B. 347
Grize, J. B. 16, 53 Innes, S. J. 59,63
Grusec, J. 121, 137 Izard, C. E. 103,132
Guba, E. 330, 333
Gulliksen, H. 63 J
Guttman, L. 60, 63 Jackson, S. 21,51
Jakobson, R. 41,53
H
James, W 237,247,2%,319
Habermas, J. 196-197,227,232 Jantsch, E. 336,340-341,347
Hairfield, ? 152, 159 Johanson, D. C. 301,319
Haith,M.M. 318 John-Steiner, V. 323
Haken, H. 336, 346 Johnson, M. 202-203,209,232
Hanson, N. R. 210,232 Johnson, S. C. 61,63
372 Author Index
Jones, M. B. 145, 158 Laudan, L. 203-204, 206

Joravsky, D. 304,319 211,213-214,232
JOreskog, K. G. 12~ 132, 140, 145,158 Laurendeau, M. 103,136
K Leary, D. E. 165,175
Lehrman, D. S. 318
Kagan, J. 109-110, 112,132-133 Leiter, R. G. 105,133
138,185,188,309,319 Lenoir, T. 297-299,319
Kahle, L. R 116,137 Leontiev, A N. 4453
Kail, R 71,207,232 Lepin,J. 204 231, 233
Kandel, D. B. 130 Lerner, J. V. 186,188-189,364,368
Kanfer, R 158 Lerner, R M. 36,38,52-53,109-110
Kauffman, M. B. 185,189 113,115,118-119,125,133
218,233,309,319 137, 184-186, 188-189,218,233,280
Kearsley, G. P. 154158 282-283,286,288,294,296,307,309
Keasey, B. 116, 137 312,315,317-319,323,361,364,368
Keating, D. P. 229,232 Levin, L 52-53
Keats,J.A 154158 Levin, S. 322
Kelso, J. A S. 336, 347 Lewis,M. 132
Kendler, H. 100,133 Lewontin, R. C. 301,306,318
Kendler, T. S. 100-101,117,133,136 Liben, L. S. 106,133,219,23~235
Kessel, E 94,%,133 Lieberman, M. 107,131
Kessen, W 71, 207, 232,317 Lincoln, Y. 330,333
Kessler, R. C. 140,158 Lipsitt, L. 133
Kindermann, T. 94137 Lipsitt, L. P. 130,133, 136,309,316,321
Kitchener, R. E 344,346 Lisi, R, de 234
K1uwe,R.H. 135 Littman, R. A 116, 135
Knop,J. 115,136 Loehlin, J. C. 140,158
Koch, S. 175 Lompscher, J. 53
Kohlberg, L. 106-107,131,133 Lorenz, E. N. 69,71
Kolakowski, L. 304,319 Lowy,M. 305,319
Kontos, S. 132 Luhmann,N. 336, 346
Kot,M. 69,71 Lukacs, G. 305,319
Kramer, D. A 332 Lumsden, C. J. 37,53
Krech, D. 94,131 Luria,AR. 100,134, 165,174,339,346
Kuenne, M. R. 100,133
Kuhlman,C. M
71
Kuhn,D. 97, 133 Mace, C. A 298, 319
Kuhn, T. S. 181,188, 210, 232 Magnusson, D. 138, 185,189
Kumanev, V. A 304,319 Maltzman, J. 52
L Mandelbaum, M. 282,288,304-308
310-311,313,319-320,366,368
Laird,AJ. 168,174 Mandelbrot, B. 69,71
Lakatos, L 206,211,232 Mandler,J. 219,233
Lakoff, G. 203,209 Mann, M. B. 154 159
232,250,254,257,259 Manton, K. G. 154 159
Lamb,M.E. 318 Martin,J.A 119-120,134
Lambercier, M. 114,135 Marx,K. 300, 303, 313
Lancaster, J. B. 189 320, 354, 356, 366, 368
Langer,J. 6,53, 115, 133 Marx,M. 138
Langley, P. 67,71 Maslow,AH. 96, 134
Last, C. G. 368
Author Index 373
Mason, R. 144,158 Nelson, G. K. 33,50,53

Matter, J. 100, 131 Nesselroade, J. R. 108,117,125,127
Maturana, H. 203, 233 132,134-135, 144, 153-154,157-159
Maturana, H. R. 336, 346 184,189,282,310,316,31~321
May, R. M. 154158 Nesselroade, J. W. 259
Mayr, E. 197,233,297-299,306, 320 Newman,J. 256
Mays, W. 346 Newman, J. L. 234,259
McArdle, J. J. 125, 127,134, 139 Newtson, D. 15 4 159
144-145,147-149,153,157-158 Nicolis, G. 335, 347
McCall, R. B. 97,111,134 Nicolis, J. S. 336, 346
McCartney, K. 119-120,128, 136 Nisbet, R. A 288,297-299,302-303,320
McCauley, R. N. 250, 259 Nitz, K. 364, 368
McDonald, R. P. 140, 159 Novikoff, A B. 300,320
McGraw, M. B. 104, 134 Nunnally, J. C. 58,63
McHale, S. 113, 132 o
McKeon, R. 356
Meacham, J. A 296, 322 O'Brien, D. P. 198, 233
Mead, G. H. 298, 320 O'Connor, B. 296, 320
Mednick, S. A 115, 136 O'Neill, J. 304,320
Mehler, J. 54 Osgood, C. E. 100, 135
Meredith, W. 145,159 Osofsky, J. D. 134, 136,259
Merola, J. 15 4 159 Overton, W. 174
Messick, S. 158 Overton, W. F. 2, 6, 53, 92-94
Miller, D. J. 103,134 106, 118, 135-136, 181, 189, 198
Miller, J. 305,320 200,203,206,208,210,217-218,220
Mischel, W. 219,233 226, 233-234, 250-252, 255-256, 259
Mitchell, S. A 221, 232 264-265,269,27~284,286
Mitroff, I. 165-167,174 296,301-302,305,321
Moessinger, P. 35, 53 Owens, K. 297,321
Molenaar, P. C. M. 154,159, 336, 346 p
Monod,J. 20~ 233,29~ 320
Morf, A 114,135 Padover, S. K. 313,321
Morgenbesser, S. 233 Papanek, M. L. 100, 131
Morton, K. R. 327,330,333 Papert, S. 16, 53
Mos, L. P. 316,322-323 Papousek, H. 23, 53
Moshman, D. 95,134 Paraskevopoulos, J. 104,135
Moss, B. M. 51 Parkes, C. M. 232
Moylan, P. M. 152,159 Pascual-Leone, J. 105,135
Muchow, H. 98, 134 Patterson, G. R. 116,135
Muchow, M. 98, 134 Pepper, S. C. 6, 53, 94, 135, 181
Mugny, G. 44 52 189, 198,234,283-284,286
Mussen, P. H. 133,136-137, 317 301,307,321,345-346
Perlmutter, M. 218, 234, 280, 314 317
N Perret-Clermont, AN. 42,52
Nagel, E. 198, 233,288,297-299,320 Perry, R. B. 298, 321
Naroll, R. 317 Peters, D. 132
Nassefat, M. 95, 134 Peterson, T. 15 4 157
Neches, R. 67,71 Piaget, J. 16,35,53,65, 71
Neimark, E. D. 152, 159, 234, 259 103,114,124,135,173,174,223,234
Neisser, U. 259 258,259, 337-339,342,344,346-347
Pinard, A 103, 136
374 Author Index
Pittendrigh, C. 299,306,321 S
Plomin,R. 122, 136
Plotkin, H. C. 306,311,320-321,323 Sacksteder, J. L. 231
Popper, K 206, 234 Sage, S. 67, 71
Popper,KR. 304,321 Sakharov, L. 168,174
Porges, S. 252, 259 Sameroff, A J. 38,54, 119, 128,136
Postman, L. 131 Sandland, R. 151,157
Prigogine, I. 200,203,224,234 Sarbin, T. R. 193,231,234
335-340, 343-344, 347 Sayer, D. 354, 356
Putnam,H. 197,203 Scarr, S. 119-120, 128, 136
209,211,213,228,234 Schaffer, W. M. 69,71
Schaie, K W. 36, 54, 115, 136
Q Schneirla, T. C. 288, 309, 322
Quay,H. 259 Schoggen, P. 99, 136
Scholnick, E. K 220,234
R
Scholnik, E. K 230
Rabinowitz, E M. 65-66, 71 Schr&linger, E. 335,347
Radnitzky, G. 314,321 Schulenberg, J. E. 118, 125, 137
Ramsey, J. O. 152, 159 Schulsinger, E 115, 136
Randall, J. H., Jr. 352-354, 356 Schwartz, D. P. 231
Reese, H. W. 6, 53-54, 92-94 Schwartz, S. P. 3, 54
106, 118, 133, 135-136, 153, 157, 181 Scribner, S. 323
184,189,218,231,234,250-251 Sellars, W. 319
258,25~27~282,284,286,302,309 Semeonoff, B. 168, 174
316-317, 321,332,333,345 Shapere, D. 202, 235
Resnick, L. B. 67, 71 Sherrod, L. R. 189
Revell, W. 185,188 Shipley, C. 194,235
Revelle, W. 151,158 Shirley, M. M. 104,136
RiCCiuti, H. 130 Siegler, R. S. 105,136, 194, 235
Richards, R. J. 282, 321 Silverman, H. J. 228, 235
Richerson, P. J. 36-37,51 Simon, H. A 65, 71
Ricoeur, P. 193, 234 Simpson, G. G. 321
Riegel, K E 5,33,54, 184, 186 Singleton, K 154, 157
18~233,286,296,30L322 Sinnott, J. D. 330, 333
Robinson, D. N. 297, 322 Sipple, T. S. 116, 132
Roe, A 321 Skinner, B. E 218, 235
Rogosa, D. 144, 159 Smedslund, J. 102, 136
Rorty, R. 203,234 Smith, J. M. 318
Rose, S. A 2L54 SOrbom, D. 140, 158
Rosen, H. 219,234 Sou berman, E. 323
Rosenblatt, J. S. 318 Spada, H. 135
Rosenblum, L. A 132 Spelke, E. S. 29, 54
Rosenthal, R. 167,174 Spence, D. P. 229-230, 235
Rosenwald, G. C. 233 Spiker, C. C. 130
Rosnow, R. L. 287,307,317, 322, 368 Sprung, L. 317,323
Rossi, A S. 189 Sroufe, L. A 103, 122, 124,136, 221, 235
Rowell, J. A 342, 347 Stace, W. T. 195,208,235,273,277
Royce, J. R. 152,158,316,322-323
Rozeboom, W. 144,159 Stengers, I. 200,203,224
Russell, B. 304, 322 234,338,340,344,347
Rychlak, J. E 296-298,322
Author Index 375
Stephenson, w. 58, 63 W
Sternberg, R. J. 71,232
Stevenson-Hinde, J. 232 Waber, D. P. 152, 159
Stolzenberg, G. 203,235 Wachs, T. D. 103-104, 137
Strauss, S. 118, 136 Waddington, C. H. 347
Sugarman, S. 206,215,222,235 Wainer, H. 158
Suppe, E 202,211,235 Wall, S. 168,174,221,230
Wapner, S. 98,137,178-180,188,189
T Wartofsky, M. 198, 235
Thbor, L. E. 117,136 Waters, E. 168,174, 221,230,235
Thnaka, J. S. 127,131 Watzlawick, P. 231, 235
Thnner, J. M. 347 Weimer, W. B. 297, 323
Thponier, S. 114,135 Werner, H. 101, 115
Thschdjian, E. 316 13~223,23~ 288,323
Thelen, E. 82,83,90,336,346-347 Wertheimer, M. 288, 323
Thom,R. 339,348 Wessman, A E. 54
Thomre,H. 4,54 White, S. H. 92, 137, 288, 323
Thompson, W. R. 121,137 Whitehead, AN. 344, 348
Thorngate, W. 171,175 Wiley, E. o. 336, 340,345
Tisak, J. 145,159 Willett, J. B. 144, 159
Tobach, E. 309,318, 322 Williams, G. C. 298, 306, 323
Tolman, E. C. 298, 322 Wilson, E. O. 37, 53
Thmlinson-Keasey, C. 116, 137 Wimsatt, W. C. 298-300, 323
Thniolo, T. A 116, 132 Winfree, A T. 69, 71
Thulmin, S. 165,175, 281 Winnicott, D. W. 271, 277
288,297-298,303-304 Wishart, D. 62, 63
310,315,322,359,368 Wittgenstein, L. 287,323
'frautner, H. M. 4,54 Wohlwill, J. 161, 175
'froll, L. 259 Wohlwill, J. E 5,54,59,63,94-95
Tucker, L. R. 57, 63, 95-96 97-98,101-104,115-117,119,123
125,137, 145, 159 128,131,137, 139, 144, 159, 161,175
Tuma,N.B. 157 179, 182, 184,18~ 282,323
Turiel, E. 107,137 WOlf-Gazo, E. 346
Tyszkowa, M. 44,54 Woodbury, M. A 152, 159
Wright, S. 148, 159
u Wuketits, E M. 298-299,323
Urry,J. 302, 322
Z
Uzgiris, I. C. 103,137
Zeaman,D. 152,160
V
Zeleny,M. 336, 348
Valsiner, J. 92,137, 165-166, 175 Zigler,E. 94,138
Varela,E 203, 233
Varela,EJ. 336, 346
Vasta,R. 232
Vondracek, E W. 118,125,137
Von~che,J. 347
Vrba,E. 301,306, 318
Vygotsky, L. S. 38, 54, 296, 323
Topic Index
Chapter 1. Theoretical problems in developmental psychology
Purpose of theoretical reflection in developmental psychology, 1-3, 55-56

Theoretical foundations of developmental psychology, 3-32
Conceptual foundations, 3-9
What is psychological development? 3-6, 56-57, 73-74
What is subject matter of developmental psychology? 6-9, 56-57, 62-
63,74-79
Logical foundations (meaning of fundamental concepts), 9-19
Methodological foundations, 20-31
Experimental methodology, 20-30, 59-62, 74-79
Mathematical methodology, 30-31, 57-60, 62f.
Person versus variable focus, 57ff.
Theory building in developmental psychology, 32-42, 50-51
Models for developmental transitions, 33-42, 65-68, 79-88
Time levels of transitions, 33-37
Thpology of developmental dynamics, 38-40, 81-88
Transition forms, 40-42, 65-68, 79-81
Time structure of developmental processes, 42-50, 79-88
Structure of 'life-lines', 43-44
Substructure relationship to overall structure, 44-45
(Ir)reversibility of time structure, 45-48
Dissimilar rates of processes, 48-50, 68-70
Chapter 2. Relations between method and theory in developmental

research: A partial isomorphism view
Theory-method relationship in developmental psychology, 91-92

A partial isomorphism (oftheory and method) view, 114, 129, 139-140, 154-
157,161-163,172-174,181-183
Data construction and theoretical innovation, 163-166
The vanishing 'cult of data', 164-166
Psychology in the process of knowing construction, 166ff., 183-184
Reasoning in science: inductive versus deductive - or synthetic, 166-168
Methodological drifts: context driven methodology, 168-172
Current views on the theory-method relationship, 93-98
Two case histories of the theory-method relationship, 98-102
The case of Martha Muchow, 98-100
The case of Tracy Kendler, 100-102
377
378 Topic Index
Theory and method relationship: specific developmental issues, 102

Stage issue, 102-108
Stages of sensori-motor development, 103-104
Stages of cognitive developmental in childhood, 104-106
Stages of moral development, 106-108
The stability and continuity issues, 108-113, 140-144
Methodological consequences of a developmental focus, 115-129
Concept (meaning) of 'development', 115
Focus on change, 115-118, 144-148
Focus on individual organism, 118-122, 152-154, 184-186
Focus on structural relations in development, 122-129, 148-152,
185-186
Wohlwill, J.F., 177-182, 186-188
Chapter 3. The structure of developmental theory
The quest for a 'good' developmental theory, 191-193,237-240,249-251

Science and values, 193-197,237-240,261-263
Philosophy and science, 197, 25lff.
Aims of science, 197-198,240-246
The origin of scientific activity, 198-199
From common sense to scientific knowledge, 199-200
Route of realism, 200-210
Realism and aims, methods, and theories of science, 203-206
Realism and developmental theory, 206-208
Meanings of realism, 208-210, 263-264
Route of rationalism, 210-216
Interpretation, 210-211
Relationship of epistemology to ontology, 211-213, 262-264
Rationalism and aims, methods, and theories of science, 213-214
Rationalism and developmental theory, 214-216
Developmental theories, 216-217, 240-246
Metaphors (world-views) of developmental theories, 251-254
Inherent tensions among realist and rationalist world views, 254-258,
261-264
Reconciliation among world-views, 267-276
Material explanation and realism, 217-220, 264-265
Pattern explanation and rationalism, 220-226, 24Off., 249ff., 264ff.
Hermeneutic, narrative, and scientific empirical knowing, 226-230, 243-246, 265-276
Topic Index 379
Chapter 4. The concept of development in the study of individual

and social change
Developmental psychology: interplay between individual and social development, 279-

281,311-314,354-356
The concept of development, 281-293, 335-336, 358-360
Models of developmental psychology, 283-287, 331-332, 343-345, 364-367
Criteria for the concept of development, 287-293, 326-327, 337-343, 349-352,
360-363
Reversibility versus irreversibility, 338-339
Continuity versus discontinuity, 339-340
Progressiveness versus randomness, 340
Universality versus relativity, 341-343
Implications for the study of individual and social change: weak versus strong con-
cepts of development, 293-295, 314-316
The problem of directionality and teleology, 296-314, 352-354
Some meanings of teleology, 297-299
Thleology and the study of human behavior and development, 299-302
Some criticisms of teleology, 304-307
Weak concepts of 'development': contextualism, 307-311, 327-330
The individual and social level of explanation, 311-314, 354-356
On the notion of time, 330-332
Self-organization of psychological and social processes, 336-337
Models and metaphors of development, 343-345, 364-367
Contents of Earlier Volumes
Volume 1 (Joseph R. Royce & Leendert P. Mos, Eels., 1984)
1. Cognition: Its Origin and Future in Psychology

Dalbir Bindra
2. Schema and Inference: Models in Cognitive Social Psychology
Carl F. Graumann and Michael Sommer
With commentaries by Thomas K. Scrull, Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Arie W.
Kruglanski, and Kenneth J. Gergen, and a reply by the authors
3. Freud's Secret Cognitive Theories
Mary Henle
With commentaries by Joseph F. Rychlak, Lisa Gaelick, and Robert
S. Wyer, Jr., and a reply by the author
4. Limitations of the Dispositional Analysis of Behavior
Walter B. Weimer
With commentaries by Gunnar Andersson, Gerard Radnitzky, and
William W. Rozeboom, and a reply by the author
5. The Place of Individual Differences in a Scientific Psychology
Hans J. Eysenck
With commentaries by Jeffrey A Gray, James A Wakefield, Jr., and
D. Cartwright, and a reply by the author
Volume 2 (Joseph R. Royce & Leendert P. Mos, Eds., 1984)
1. Sociobiology: Towards a Theory of Individual and Group Differences in

Personality and Social Behavior
J. Philippe Rushton
With commentaries by Arthur R. Jensen, Robin J. H. Russell, J.
Philippe Rushton, Pamela A Wells, and Philip E. Vernon, and a reply
by the author
2. Psychoanalysis as a Scientific Theory
Benjamin B. Wolman
With commentaries by David A Freedman, Rudolf Ekstein, and
Gordon F. Derner, and a reply by the author
3. The Nature and Challenge of Teleological Psychological Theory
Joseph F. Rychlak
With commentaries by Walter B. Weimer, Daniel N. Robinson, and
William J. Baker, and a reply by the author
381
382 Earlier Volumes
4. The Hypotheses Quotient: A Quantitative Estimation of the Testability of

a Theory
K B. Madsen
With commentaries by Lewis W. Brandt, Mark E EUin, and Dirk L.
Schaeffer, and a reply by the author
5. What is Necessarily True in Psychology
Jan Smedslund
With commentaries by Herman Thnnessen, Fred Vollmer, and K V.
Wilkes, and a reply by the author
6. Interaction and the Person x Situation Debate: A Theoretical Perspective
Michael E. Hyland
With commentaries by Philip K Peake, Lawrence A Pervin, Joel O.
Raynor, and William T. Powers, and a reply by the author
Volume 3 (K. B. Madsen & Leendert P. Mos, Eels., 1985)
1. Psychological Metatheory
KB. Madsen
2. The Place of Theory in the World of Facts
Hans J. Eysenck
With commentaries by Edward Erwin, Stephen P. Stich, and
Alexander Rosenberg, and a reply by the author
3. From Mindless Neuroscience and Brainless Psychology to Neuro-
psychology
Mario Bunge
With commentaries by M. C. Corballis and P. C. Dodwell, and a reply
by the author
4. Is Psychoanalysis Therapeutic Technique or Scientific Research?
A Metascientific Investigation
Carl Lesche
With commentaries by Bo Larsson, Lars B. Lofgren, and Gerard
Radnitzky, and a reply by the author
5. Psychology and Philosophy of Science
C. Sanders and H. V. Rappard
With commentaries by Hubert C. J. Duijker and Willis Overton, and
a reply by the authors
6. The Problem of Theoretical Pluralism in Psychology
Joseph R. Royce
With commentaries by Michael E. Hyland, Stig Lindholm, and
Richard E. Kitchener, and a reply by the author
Earlier Volumes 383
Volume 4 (Leendert P. Mos, Ed., 1986)
1. From the Testimonies of the Senses to the Paradoxes of World View

Herman Thnnessen
With commentaries by James R. Brown, Mario Bunge, Thomas M.
Nelson, and Ingemund Gullvag, and a reply by the author
2. On the Possibility of Establishing a Metascientific Foundation for
Psychoanalysis
Anders Lindseth
With commentaries by Arild Utaker, Marek Aftowicz-Bieleclci, Zofia
Rosinska, Morris Eagle, and Robert S. Steele, and a reply by the
author
3. Personality Psychology and the Hypothetical-Deductive Model of
Explanation
Fred Vollmer
With commentaries by William P. Alston, Joseph E Rychlak, and Tad
S. Sloan, and a reply by the author
4. A Cognitive Reinterpretation of Classical Introspectionism
Harry T. Hunt
With commentaries by Rand B. Evans, David Bakan, and Paul Swartz,
and a reply by the author
5. The Concept of Belief in Cognitive Theory
Owen Egan
With commentaries by Stephen P. Stich, John Macnamara, L.
Jonathan Cohcn, and a reply by the author
6. The Right Stuff: A Review of D. N. Robinson's The Philosophy of
P!!>ychology
James Deese
Volume 5 (Arthur W. Staats & Leendert P. Mos, Eds., 1987)
1. Unified Positivism: Philosophy for the Revolution

A. W. Staats
2. A Good Divorce is Better than a Bad Marriage
Howard H. Kendler
3. The Growth of a Unified Scientific Psychology: Ordeal by Quakery
Hans J. Eysenck
4. Toward the Integration of Individual Psychodynamic Theories and
Family Systems Theories
Paul L. Wachtel
384 Earlier Volumes
5. Behavioral Intervention: An Old Aspiration with a New Profile

Vicente Pelechano
6. Psychoanalytic and Cognitive Dissonance Theories: Producing
Unification Through the Unifying Theory Review
Earl S. Hishinuma
7. The Psychological Level of Organization in Nature and the
Interdependencies Among Major Psychological Concepts
Albert R. Gilgen
8. Metatheory in Unification
Paul Fraisse
9. Toward a Unified Psychological Science: The Meaning of behavior
Mariano Yela
10. A Strategy for Developing Unifying Theory in Psychology
Joseph R. Royce
11. Disunity in Psychology: Implications For and From Sociology and
Anthropology
John H. Kunkel
12. A Comparative Analysis of the General Theories of Modem
Behaviorism: Unification Through Generational Advance
KarlA Minke
13. Integrity or Unity?
Leendert P. Mos
Volume 6 (Daniel N. Robinson & Leendert P. Mos, Eds., 1990)
1. Introduction: Explications of Explanations

Daniel N. Robinson
2. On Explanation
George A Miller
3. Explicating Actions
Joseph Margolis
4. The Need for a Radically New Human Science
Paul F. Secord
5. Explaining Actions
Peter Manicas
6. Explicating Actions: Reply to Commentaries
Joesph Margolis
Earlier Volumes 385
7. Explanation in Psychology
RomHarr~
8. The Scope of Psychological Explanation

Jeff Coulter
9. Locating Agency
C. Thrry Warner
10. Explanation in Psychology: Reply to Commentaries
RomHarr~
11. Explanation in the Psychology of Personality

James T. Lamiell
12. For Whom the Bell Curve Toils: Universality in Individual
Differences Research
Reuven Dar and Ronald C. Serlin
13. Individual Differences and the Explanation of Behavior
Daniel J. Ozer
14. Are Individual Persons Motivated to Construct Categories or Do They
Merely Intend Meanings?
Harwood Fisher
15. Let's Be Careful Out There: Reply to Commentaries
James T. Lamiell

Paul Van Geert (Auth.), Paul Van Geert, Leendert P. Mos (Eds.) - Annals of Theoretical Psychology (1991)

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Paul Van Geert (Auth.), Paul Van Geert, Leendert P. Mos (Eds.) - Annals of Theoretical Psychology (1991)

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Annals of

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

Annals of theoretical psychology.-Vol. 1- -New York, N.Y.: Plenum Press.

ISBN 978-1-4613-6714-7 ISBN 978-1-4615-3842-4 (eBook)

1991 Springer Science+Business Media New York

Ali rights reserved

Wm J. Baker, Department of Psychology, Concordia College, Edmon-

Ellin Kofsky Scholnick, Department of Psychology, University of

This is the first of a two-volume work in the Annals series devoted

compares and contrasts both these to current hermeneutical and nar-

The contribution by Willis E Overton and commentaries by Ellin

Chapter 1. Theoretical problems in developmental psychology 1

Paul van Geert

Developmental psychology: person-centered, not variable-

Development: sequences, structure, and chaos 65

Mark L. Howe & F. Michael Rabinowitz

Paul van Geert

Chapter 2. Relations between method and theory in developmental

Structural models of developmental theory in psychology . 139

Theories and methods in the service of data construction in

Theory and method in the study of behavioral development:

Richard M. Lerner & John R. Nesselroade

Chapter 3. The structure of developmental theory 191

Questions a satisfying developmental theory would answer:

The development of world views: towards future synthesis? 249

Ellin Kofsky Scholnick

Metaphor, recursive systems, and paradox in science and

Chapter 4. The concept of development in individual and social

Roger A Dixon, Richard M. Lerner, & David E. Hultsch

On the concept of development: contextualism, relative time,

Self-organization as developmental process: beyond the

For a more adequate concept of development with help from

Maneuvering among models of developmental psychology 357

Roger A Dixon, Richard M. Lerner, & David E. Hultsch

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 369

Topic Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 377

Contenu of Previous Volumes .. . . 381

SUMMARY: The present paper aims at providing a general framework

1. Introduction: The Purpose of Theoretical ReOection in

Paul van Geert Department of Psychology, University of Groningen,

Annals of Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 7

(e.g., Overton, 1984). Thus, there is no agreement on what is develop-

matter of developmental psychology is very diversified - it covers the

2. Theoretical Foundations of Developmental Psychology

2.1 Conceptual foundations

it rigidly refers to a specific referent (all instances of 'development' in

A process P is called the development of X if

Most of the classical theories of development fit in with this

A process P is called the development of X if:

Examples of such theories are 'developmental dimension' theories

'development', 'learning', 'change', 'evolution', and so forth; 'y' is a

and linguistic intuition - or they are borrowed from psychology. Strict-

single-case observational studies remain where these are accompanied

developmental psychology of language is the study of how a formally

the set of possible states of any system that is characterized by

a state from {S}

next-state-operation, that is, an operation which picks a next state of a

4. <5 : (Si, {S}) = > Sj

dypamics equation (simplest form) stating that Sj from set S succeeds

Figure 1. Logical components of a general theory of state changes in

observed sequence of states in P is developmental and why this is so

developmental sequence described in Section 2.1. It is easily

Figure 2. Logical components of a developmental theory.