Saint Michaels College

Avicenna and Al-Ghazali

Causality and The Eternity of The Universe

Ahmed Albluwi
PH-350
Professor Nicholas Kahm
07/5/2017

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Introduction

Avicenna argues that everything happens because of a preceding incident, and that

preceding incidents, when happen, cause an effect. They cause a necessary effect. On the other

hand, Al-Ghazali think that our understanding of the relation between causes and their effects

are formed habitually, and, thus, they are not necessary. Illustrating the difference using an

example that both used, according to Al-Ghazali, one cannot say that fire always burns cotton

when touched, since we acquired this information by habit. However, for Avicenna, fire burns

whatever it touches. The significance of this causality argument relies on its potentiality to

explain core philosophical concepts, such as the eternity of the universe. This paper is intended

to explain Avicennas and Al-Ghazalis concepts of causality, while relating them to their

arguments about the eternity of the universe.

Avicenna
Avicenna, before discussing causes and effects, divides all existences into possible or

contingent, impossible, and necessary existents. This is another topic that we will not discuss in

depth, but we need to briefly explain some of these concepts that well need. In summary, a

possible existent is anything that when not existing no absurdity occurs. In other words, a

possible existent is one that could or could not exist. It includes almost everything around us.

On the other hand, a necessary existent is one that when not existing an absurdity occur, and

Avicenna further divides this into necessary through itself and necessary through another.

There are many examples of necessary existents through others, but when Avicenna talks about

the necessary through Himself he always means God. Thats why he would define the necessary

through itself as an existent that is the origin of all existence, or the first cause. Finally,
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impossible existents are ones that contradict their definition, like a square triangle, or a human

animal.

Now, Avicenna defines a principle as anything that already has a completed existence

(either through itself or through another), and from which the existence of another thing occurs

and subsists by it. Then, he derives four causes that relates to any principle, which are the

same causes that Aristotle had derived. Although they are not necessarily applied all at once,

they are, in addition to form and matter, the efficient cause (the agent), and the final cause (the

end). These causes can be applied to anything that has a completed existence. According to Jon

McGinnis:

Avicenna again defines the formal cause as that part of a subsisting thing by

which that thing actually is what it is, while the material cause is that part of a

subsisting thing by which that thing is potentially is what it is and in which the

potentiality of its existence resides. The final cause or end is that for the sake of

which the existence of something distinct from the cause is realized. As for the

efficient cause or agent, Avicenna defines it as that which provides or bestows

some existence essentially distinct from its own. (McGinnis, 2010)

To illustrate these definitions, the material cause of a bed is wood, since wood can be

potentially a bed and the potentiality of beds resides on wood. The formal cause is the form of

that bed, it is the aspect of the bed that makes it what it is (a bed). Further, a carpenter

bestows an existence, a bed, distinct from its own, and thus, the carpenter is the efficient cause

of the bed. Finally, beds are used for sleep or rest, and this is the final cause or the end.

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 Avicenna further divides the efficient cause to two types: the natural efficient cause,

and the metaphysical efficient cause. The natural efficient cause is responsible for motion,

whether with respect to category (as small and big), quality (as hot and cold), place (as close

and far), or position (as clockwise rotation and counterclockwise). On the other hand, the

metaphysical efficient cause is responsible for absolute existence, such as the Necessary

Existent or forms. In our previous example of the bed, the carpenter is the natural efficient

cause, dealing with places and positions, and applying the metaphysical efficient cause, the

form of the bed. Note that the metaphysical efficient cause differs from the formal cause in

definition and use. The form of the bed is what makes it a bed, but when the carpenter uses

that form (in his mind) to make a bed, he is using a metaphysical efficient cause.

For Avicenna, when all these causes exist, their effect must exist. In other words, if

there was a matter that is formed into a form by efficient causes (natural and metaphysical) for

a final cause, their effect must occur. According to him, there can be no temporal gaps

between so-called essentially ordered causes and their effects (McGinnis,2010). What he

means by essentially ordered causes is any cause that an effect of a principle depends upon

simultaneously. To illustrate, Avicenna distinguishes the essentially ordered causes from the

temporally ordered causes. For example, a temporally ordered cause of humans is their

parents, while their essentially ordered cause is the concept or form of a human. For Avicenna,

as an example, a person can exist without his parents existence, but cannot exist without the

form of human. In fact, here, he draws an argument that is similar to his necessary existence

argument, since, according to him, if an effect existed without its essentially ordered cause, an

absurdity will occur.

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 He uses a proof by contradiction. It is similar to saying that exists if, and only if,

exists, and then concluding that can exist by itself. This leads to a contradiction in one of the

two statements (not both). It is either not true that exists if, and only if, exists, or it is not

true that existed by itself. Consequently, if we were sure that one of the two statements is

true, then the other statement must be false. Referring to the previous example, if we said that

a human exists if, and only if, the essentially ordered causes of humans (humans form) exist,

and then we say that humans can exist without their form existence, then one of the two

statements must be false. If, for example, we were sure about the statement that a human

exists, then we can conclude that humans and their essentially ordered causes need not to exist

simultaneously, which is an absurdity for Avicenna.

Furthermore, the example that Avicenna used to explain his argument, and later Al-

Ghazali disagreed with, is fire and cotton. According to Avicenna, given that fire has the active

causal power to burn, and cotton has the passive power to be burned, when fire and cotton are

brought into contact, cotton must be burned. Assume on the contrary that cotton doesnt burn.

Then, one of two contradictions must have occurred: either fire doesnt have the power to

burn, which is the first possible contradiction, or that cotton doesnt have the causal power to

be burned, which is the second possible contradiction. Since we are sure that none of the two

possible contradictions is true, namely that fire doesnt burn and that cotton cannot be burned,

our statement must be correct. Therefore, Avicenna concludes that causes must necessitate

their effects.

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Avicenna on the eternity of the universe

As we said earlier, the significance of the previous arguments relies on their power to

explain core philosophical arguments. Hence, if the previous arguments had flaws, the concepts

they attempt to explain would have flaws too. In this paper, the concept we were to discuss,

using the previous arguments, is the eternity of the universe. However, the cause and effect

this time is not regarding a created thing, such as a bed or a human being, rather it is regarding

the Necessary Existent: God.

According to Avicennas arguments, since God is eternal, and has the eternal active

power to create, the effect of this power of creation must be eternal too. If otherwise, one of

two contradictions must have occurred: either God is not eternal, or that He is not a creator.

Since both contradictions contradicts the definition of God, i.e. God and his ability to create

must be eternal, Avicenna concludes that the universe must be eternal. In other words, God

must have creation to be a creator, and saying that the universe is created implies that there

was a period of time where the universe didnt exist, which will deprive God of the faculty of

being a creator for some time in the past, and will imply that Hed changed. Again, both

contradict the definition of God.

Note here that Avicenna give the actual existent a higher state than having the will to

create that existent. That is, one may say that God has the eternal Will to create the universe at

a particular time, which make him a creator who chose not to create. To illustrate, a person

may have the ability to read for many years, but chooses to read now. For Avicenna, this person

after actually reading is better the him before reading, even though he had the ability to read

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all the time. Also, there is something that has changed, either in this person or beyond his

control, that made him read at the time he chose. Similarly, if God had the ability to create but

didnt create, this may imply that He has changed, or was waiting for something beyond His

control to change. For Avicenna, we can conclude from this argument, along with the fact that

God doesnt change, that the universe is eternal.

Al-Ghazalis response

Al-Ghazali, who was born about twenty years after Avicenna had passed away, wasnt

convinced by Avicennas causality arguments. In fact, being one of the most influential mystics

of Sunni Islam, he thinks that, although logical arguments presented by philosophers are true,

they are not sufficient to explain causes and effects. The only way, in his opinion, to grasp

knowledge of causes and effects is through mysticism. In addition, he believes that

philosophers in the Islamic world, including Avicenna, were blindly following ancient

philosophers. He disagreed with many of their arguments, including Avicennas causality

argument, in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers.

Regarding Avicennas causality, which essentially states that whenever causes of an

effect exist their effect must exist, Al-Ghazali didnt completely disagree with it or accepted it as

it was. To begin, the name he gave to that argument provides an insight on his opinion about it;

he called it The Necessity of Habits. Although he agrees that whenever causes of an effect exist

their effect must exist, i.e. the necessity, he still believes that effects occur habitually, not

necessarily. The connection of these occurs because the decree of God preceded their being

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created in this sequence. Therefore, the necessity of effects is not because of the principles

themselves, but because of God, either with intermediation or without.

Al-Ghazali argues that effects are created temporally besides causes, not by them. He

asks: besides watching them happen after the causes, what is the proof that effects happen

because of causes? Watching them proves that they happen after their causes, no by them. We

habitually know that fire burn whatever it touches, but not necessarily. He gave the example of

Ibrahim, who miraculously didnt burn when thrown into fire, and the example of the blind man

to illustrate his idea.

Suppose that a blind person, who doesnt know the difference between day and night,

suddenly opens his eyes and finds out that he can see the colors around him. This person would

think that the cause of seeing the colors is in his eyes. Referring to Avicennas argument, this

guy would think that whenever he opens his eyes, he will necessarily see. But, this is not true.

He will see as long as there is light, and since this person has not heard of light, he will believe

that the only cause is having a sound eye. Al-Ghazali compares this example to Avicennas

causality. How do we know that these are the only causes, and that whenever they happen

their effect will necessarily exist? According to Al-Ghazali, although Avicennas causes are true,

no one can prove that there are no other causes. In Al-Ghazalis words:

The connection between what is customarily believed to be a cause and what

is believed to be an effect is not necessary, according to our opinion; but each of

the two is independent of the other. The affirmation of one does not imply the

affirmation of the other, nor does the denial of one imply the denial of the

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 other; the existence of one does not necessitate the existence of the other, nor

does the non-existence of one necessitate the non-existence of the other

(Hyman, Walsh, and Williams, 2010).

Further, regarding the eternity of the universe, Al-Ghazali believes that no one can

prove that the actually creating principles is better than the ability, or the will, to create these

principles. Referring to an example we discussed earlier, Al-Ghazali doesnt think that the

person after reading is better than him before reading. Although he didnt provide a counter

example, he asks Avicenna, How do you know? In his opinion, having the will to create is the

same as actually creating. Thus, God has the eternal will to create the universe at a certain

time, but this doesnt necessarily mean that something has changed, either in God or beyond

His control. He also argues against the eternity of the universe in terms of Gods will, and the

universe as a creation.

Avicennas argument suggest that the universe is an effect of the necessary existent,

and, thus, it has to be eternal. And, he says that God is the first cause, and the creator of all

creations. For Al-Ghazali, what Avicenna suggests is similar to saying that a person creates his

shadow, or that the sun creates light. He compares the shadow and the light to the universe; a

person doesnt choose to create his shadow, nor does the sun choose to create light. Thus,

instead of saying that a person creates his shadow, we should say that the shadow is an effect

of that person. However, if we said that the universe is an effect of God, we would deprive Him

from the ability to choose, which causes two contradictions. The first is regarding God as a

creator, and the second is regarding God as God. In general, a creator must create willingly, and

this cannot be applied in the case of the universe, since it is an effect of God; we cannot say
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that a person creates his shadow. Secondly, God, by definition, must have a free will. Again,

since the universe is an effect, this implies that God didnt choose to create it, as the sun didnt

choose to create its light.

Regarding the universe as a creation, the argument Al-Ghazali uses is more of a linguistic

rather than a philosophical one. In the Tahafut, he says that since a creation is something that

has been created, brought to existence after non-existing, we cannot say that the universe is

created and eternal at the same time. Bringing something to existence after not existing is a

condition for anything to be considered as a creation. Therefore, if, as Avicenna says, the

universe is eternal, then it was not brought to existence after non-existing, and thus, it is not a

creation1.

Notes

Another implication of Avicennas and Al-Ghazali arguments is defining principles by

their effects. According to their different opinions, their definitions of principles would be

different. A teacher, for example, is someone who teaches for Avicenna, and someone who can

teach for Al-Ghazali. This example doesnt make a big difference in real life, but its

generalization would definitely lead to significant differences in the way we understand life in

general, including physics, metaphysics, and ethics.

First, since Avicenna believes that actually creating something is better than having the

will to create it, and since causes are known by their effects, we can say that we know God, or

that God is The Creator, by knowing His creation. To illustrate, first, even though humans, for

1
Translated from Al-Ghazalis Tahafut Al-Falasiafa
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example, do not complete God, they approve His existence; He is the creator of all creatures

and He is complete by Himself. However, since God must be eternal, His attributes must be

eternal too, and one of His attributes is being a creator. This attribute along with others cannot

be grasped without a contrast. Happiness cannot be known without the existence of sadness.

Similarly, the creator cannot be known without creation. The most merciful is not known

without creatures that need His mercy. Consequently, Avicennas argument imply that the

effects of God define Him. Regarding the eternity of the universe, it must be eternal to contrast

that God is a creator. To know that there exists a creation is to know that there is a creator,

and, although it is eternal, the universe is a creation.

On the other hand, Al-Ghazali believes that God, having the will to create, and God after

creating is the same. Creating or not creating doesnt change Him, nor make any difference. He

would still be the creator regardless of the existence of His creation. However, this thought is

restricted to God only, since He is the most knowing, and doesnt need the contrast humans

need.

Conclusion

This paper was intended to explain Avicennas and Al-Ghazali causality arguments, and

relating them to their opinions about the eternity of the universe. We can conclude that both

had objective arguments, and it is difficult to not be convinced by both. Avicennas causality

argument details the subject, and provides a comprehensive understanding of causes and their

effects. However, Al-Ghazali believes that Avicennas knowledge is limited, no matter how

comprehensive it was. He, being one of the most influential mystics in the Islamic history,

believes that not everything is understandable by logic and philosophy; he refuted many of
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their arguments in his book, Tahafut Al-Falasifa. He sometimes challenges them linguistically,

which probably is another way to prove that there are concepts that just cannot be explained.

(Furthermore, the problem of Al-Ghazalis doctrine is that, although applicable on

metaphysics, we cannot apply it to physics. First, in metaphysics since it will make knowledge

impossible. According to him, we cannot be certain that when causes occur their effects must

occur, since Gods will may interfere and halt or change the effects. If we cannot be certain,

how can we build our knowledge? A person, instead of saying that fire burns cotton, would

say that fire may or may not burn cotton. This uncertainty will make it impossible for us to

learn and improve. )

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References:

McGinnis, J., & Reisman, D. C. (2007). Classical Arabic Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN:

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

McGinnis, J. (2010). Avicenna. Oxford, UK: OXFORD.

Adamson, P. (2016). PHILOSOPHY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD. Oxford, UK: OXFORD.

Hyman, A., Walsh, J. J., & Williams, T. (2010). Philosophy in the Middle Ages (3rd ed.).

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Al-Ghazali. Tahafut Al-Falasifa (4th ed.). Egypt: Dar Alma'aref.

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