Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 6

Shauf v. Court of Appeal G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990, 191 SCRA 713.

where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to
law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen,
etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without
its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

Animos et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al.


. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on
the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the
public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however,
where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to
comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of
plaintiff or petitioner. . . . .
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of
immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that [t]he State may not be
sued without its consent, reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. As has been aptly observed by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not
too infrequently, is derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because it
grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply
invoking its non-suability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however,
that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability
of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.

Is the rule absolute, i.e., that the State may not be sued at all? How may
consent of the State to be sued given?
Held: The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; its clear import
then is that the State may at times be sued. The State's consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law (i.e.,
Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445 [Sections 49-
50], which requires that all money claims against the government must first be filed with
the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the
claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari
and, in effect, sue the State thereby) or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general
law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between the private parties.

Implied consent
When the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or
when it enters into a contract.

Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise
of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

United States of America v. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487), where the questioned
transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at
Subic Bay, we held:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principle of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them - between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule
in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.

(Amado J. Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. 102667, Feb. 23, 2000, 2 nd Div. [Quisumbing])
When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?
Held: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the
suit must be regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of the judgment
against the public official concerned will require the State itself to perform a positive
act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not
exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad
faith.

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official
capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position.

(Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.])
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter
himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when
his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991 (Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]), this doctrine still found application, this Court
saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic.

Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.])
Instances when a suit against the State is proper.
Held: Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
1) When the Republic is sued by name;
2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

Has the government waived its immunity from suit in the Mendiola massacre,
and, therefore, should indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola
incident? Consequently, is the suit filed against the Republic by petitioners in
said case really a suit against the State?
Held: Petitioners x x x advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation
made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the
Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the
aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.

Xxx

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the


heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in
any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note
that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have
a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that
took place. In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is
relevant to Our discussion reads:

1. Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of
any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient
compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising
therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court.

In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve
as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the
end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State
immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is
precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or
said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit.
The Presidents act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean
that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words
of petitioner x x x, it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people.
Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquinos speech promising that the government
would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that
the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented
to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that
such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.

Xxx

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain
to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party
defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on
the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in
the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal
units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing
by them in dispersing the marchers.

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by
the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are
wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991 (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193
SCRA 282 [1991]), this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that
immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor
grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military
and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly
as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to
protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the
unruly crowd to disperse the latter.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has
given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case,
when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part
of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State
in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants
claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
This Court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the government does
not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths
that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants
in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this Court in Shauf v. Court of Appeals
(191 SCRA 713 [1990]), herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond
the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. (Republic v. Sandoval,
220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos, Jr.])

May the Government validly invoke the doctrine of State immunity from suit if
its invocation will serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen?
Held: To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for
us to defeat petitioners-contractors right to be duly compensated for actual work
performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for
years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits
of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor.

Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the
instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State,
otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.

Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of State


immunity finds no application in the case before us.

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak of invincibility
against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True
enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not
be sued under any circumstances. (Citations omitted)

Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud
which shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of
Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is
just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. (Citations omitted)

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the
States immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated
property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned
cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would
be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the States immunity
from suit.

To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and
welfare cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an
instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the
States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that
petitioners-contractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project. (EPG Construction Co. v.
Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, Mar.16, 2001, 2nd Div. [Buena])

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi