Accession Natural

G.R. No. L-17645 October 30, 1962

JULIANA ZAPATA, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, opponent-appellant.

Abel de Ocera for applicant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for opponent-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

It appears that Juliana Zapata owns two parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Santo Tomas, province of Pampanga, adjoining a non-
navigable and non-floatable river called the Candalaga Creek. The two
parcels are designated as Lot No. 25 and the northern part of Lot No. 16 of
the Cadastral Survey of San Fernando, Pampanga.1 The first lot contains a
superficial area of 6,592 square meters and is registered in her name, as
show by transfer certificate of title No. 12907 issued by the Register of
Deeds in and for the province of Pampanga (Exhibit A). Her ownership or
title to a part of Lot No. 16 was confirmed by a decree entered on 21
November 1955 by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga ordering that
the "remaining portion of Lot No. 16 with an area of 474 square meters"
be registered "in the name of Juliana Zapata" [(Exhibit A-1]; Cad. case No.
1, G.L. R.O. Cad. Record No. 137).

In 1915, when the cadastral survey of San Fernando was begun, the width
of the Candalaga Creek adjoining the two parcels of land owned by Juliana
Zapata was about 90 or to 100 meters. At present, the width is 15 meters
because soil had been accumulated by the water current of the river on
the banks of Lot No. 25 and of that part of Lot No. 16 owned by Juliana
Zapata. The accreted land is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated
as Lot 1, 2 and 3, the first containing an area of 6,260 square meters, the
second, 449 and the third, 2,238 (Exhibit B) and described in the technical
descriptions (Exhibit C).

In a verified petition filed on 16 June 1956 in the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga, Juliana Zapata claims that the aforesaid three lots belong to
her by accretion, was provided for in article 457 of the Civil Code, and
prays that the same be registered in her name under the Land
Registration Act (Land Reg. Case No. N-273, L. R. C. rec. No. 1167). On 19
October 1956 on her motion the court entered an order of general default
against all persons except the Director of Lands. On 24 October 1956 the
Director of Lands objected to the petition and prayed that the registration
of the three lots in the name of Jualiana Zapata be denied and that they
be declared to form part of the public domain.

After trial, on 26 December 1956 the court rendered judgment, as follows:

 WHEREFORE, the Court, overruling the opposition of the Director of
Lands, and confirming the order of general default herein entered,
and the applicant's title to the aforesaid Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3,
referred to in plan Psu-140515, aforecited, hereby orders that the
same be registered in the name of Juliana Zapata, the herein
applicant . . . . Once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree issue.

The Court of Appeals certified to this Court the appeal taken by the
Director of Lands because only questions of law are involved.

The appellant contends that article 457 of the Civil Code providing that —

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the

accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters,

cannot apply and does not support the appellee's claim that the accretion
or deposit of alluvial soil, which is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and
designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, belongs to her as riparian owner, because
such accretion it "was not due to the natural effect of the current but was
artificially induced on account of the erection of the fish traps on the
creek." The contention cannot be sustained. The appellant does not
dispute that the accreted land delimited in plan Psu-140515 and
designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3 adjoining Lot No. 25 and that part of Lot No.
16. both owned by the appellee, had been formed gradually due to the
effect of the water current of the Candalaga Creek, but claims that the
accretion was artificially brought about by the setting up of fish traps,
such as salag net, bunuan (Bamboo trap), sabat (cutting of channels) and
fencing that the fishermen had built in the stream. True, those fish traps
might have slowed down the current of the Candalaga Creek and might
have brought about or caused the accretion, but as there is no evidence to
show that the setting up or erection of the fish trap was expressly
intended or designed to cause or bring about the accretion, the appellee
may still invoke the benefit of the provisions of Article 457 of the Civil
Code to supper her claim of title thereto. Moreover, the fishermen who
since 1894 used to set up fish traps in the creek (P. 7 t.s.n.), later on
secured permit from the Government that auctioned off the right or
license to set up fish traps in the creek (p. 6, t.s.n.), and the setting up of
such fish traps stopped or was discontinued even before 1926 (p. 7 t.s.n.),
all go to show that the alluvial accretion was no entirely due to the setting
up of such fish traps.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon,

Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-4012 March 25, 1908

MAXIMO CORTES Y PROSPERO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellee.

J.R. Serra for appellant.

M. Reyes for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On the 26th of September, 1906, Maximo Cortes filed a written application

for the registration of a parcel of land owned by him, free of all
incumbrances, situated in Calle Aguilar, corner of Calle Cecilia in the
district of Binondo, this city, together with the buildings erected thereon,
which land has an area of 1,172.21 square meters, its boundaries being
stated in the application. The land was acquired by the applicant by
purchase from Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to a deed of sale
dated July 3, 1894, recorded in the registry of property, no other person
having any title to or interest therein, and the property was assessed, for
the purpose of taxation of the last fiscal year, at $1,444, United States
currency. The buildings erected thereon were paid for by the applicant
with his own money, and the application is accompanied by the deed of
sale, plan, and technical description of the land.

The examiner of titles reported, in due course, that the said building lot
was attached by reason of certain proceedings instituted against the
applicant for reason and rebellion, yet, inasmuch as the land was acquired
by him more than ten years previously, he could be considered the real
owner thereof by prescription; but that, in order to obtain title, it was
necessary for him to show that said attachment had been discharged or
canceled, for which reason he considered the title of the applicant to be
defective and that it could not be registered.

Against the claim of the applicant the attorney for the city of Manila
objected and reproduced the verbal opposition offered in the case,
alleging that both the plan and the technical description exhibited
contained errors; that there was an excess in the measurement which
affected the interests of the city, and that, should the application be
granted, an area of 33.40 square meters of the Meisic Creek would
become the property of Maximo Cortes, when, as a matter of fact, the said
creek was one of public use and belonged to the city of manila. For these
reasons he asked that the registration applied for be denied in so far as it
affected the Meisic Creek, with costs against the applicant.

Upon an examination of the evidence adduced, the judge rendered his

decision on the 11th of March, sustaining the opposition of the city of
Manila, and ordering that the said land, including its walls, be adjudicated
and registered in favor of the applicant upon presentation of an amended
description, showing the measurements of the property, including its walls
but excluding therefrom the rest of the land shown in Exhibit A.

The applicant asked that the case be reopened on account of his having
discovered very important proof; to this end he filed an affidavit stating
that he had learned the whereabouts of the original owner of the land,
who was better informed with respect to its conditions and location; but,
as said motion was overruled, he excepted to the judgment and also
moved for a new trial on the ground that the decision of the court was
contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence. This motion was
likewise denied and exception taken.

The dominion of the applicant, Maximo Cortes, over the land or building
lot acquired by him from Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to the
public deed executed before a notary on the 3rd of July, 1894, registered
in the registry of property, is unquestionable and has been fully proven;
and, in view of the validity of his title, the city attorney had to limit his
opposition to the registration simply to its effect upon the Meisic Creek.
The court, upon previous declaration of general default, then ordered the
adjudication and registration of the title of the applicant, Cortes, to said
building lot upon submitting an amended description of the land.

It having been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included in the
technical description presented by the applicant, situated between the lot
to which said instrument refers and the bed of the Meisic Creek, has been
gradually formed by alluvion, as the result of the current in the said
stream, it can not be denied that said portion of land with an area of 33.40
square meters, belongs by right accretion to the owner of the land
referred to in the instrument of the 3rd of July, 1894, exhibited by the
applicant.

The Law of Waters, promulgated by royal decree of the 3d of August,

1866, and extended to these Islands by a royal decree dated April 8, 1873,
provides in article 84 that —

The accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or sedimentation from

the waters belongs to the owners of land bordering on streams, torrents,
lakes, and rivers.

Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that —

The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually received from the
effects of the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering
thereon.

There is no evidence whatever to prove that the addition to the said

property was made artificially by the owner; therefore, the facts alleged
and proven in the proceedings must stand. The increase or accretion
which in a latent, incessant, and spontaneous manner is received by the
land from the effects of the current depositing, in the course of time,
sediment and alluvial matter along the shore, is undeniably the work of
nature and lawfully belongs to the owner of the property; and from the
fact that all or almost the whole area of said increased portion is soft and
unsettled, one is naturally convinced that it was formed by alluvion, and
that for such reason it appertains to the owner of the land bordering
thereon by virtue of the right of accretion recognized by the law.
The reason therefore is quite evident because, if lands bordering on
streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to destructive force
of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as
may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by
the right of accretion.

And, although the acts of possession exercised over the bordering land
are always understood legally to cover that portion added to the property
by accretion, in this case shrubs have been planted there, which furnish
additional proof that Maximo Cortes has exercised rights of ownership and
possession over the whole area of the property the registration of which
he requests.

For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be reversed, as we do hereby reverse the same,
and that the court below should direct that the land to which the appellant
refers be recorded in the registry of property in accordance with the law,
including that portion of the same added by accretion up to the water line
of the Meisic River, without any special ruling as to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19570 April 27, 1967

JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA,
FERNANDO BUSUEGO and EUGENIO SESE, defendants-appellants,
MAXIMO CALALANG, intervenor;
DIRECTOR OF MINES, intervenor.

Maximo Calalang for plaintiff and appellant.

Gregorio Ejercito and Leandro L. Arguelles for defendant-appellee City of
Manila.
Office of the Solicitor General for other defendants and appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land — around
49 hectares in area — located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1
Upon his death, this property was inherited by his son, herein plaintiff-
appellant Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title2 was issued.

During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on
the western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the
land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the
northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the
northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However,
in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the
entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The river
destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered
into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place
of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip
which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course.4

In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the
premises5 and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and
sand from the nearby areas the River. The operations eventually extended
northward into this strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was
filed with the U.S. War Department by Luis Hilario, the then administrator
of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S. Army paid.6 In 1947, the plant was turned
over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its
operations and continued the extractions and excavations of gravel and
sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.

On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint7 for injunction and
damages against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer
of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-
charge of the plant. It was prayed that the latter be restrained from
excavating, bulldozing and extracting gravel, sand and soil from his
property and that they solidarily pay to him P5,000.00 as damages.
Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense, that the extractions
were made from the riverbed while counterclaiming with a prayer for
injunction against plaintiff—who, it was claimed, was preventing them
from their operations.

Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were

respectively allowed to join the litigation as intervenors. The former
complained that the disputed area was within the bed of the river so that
plaintiff should not only be enjoined from making extractions therefrom
but should also be ordered to pay the fees and penalties for the materials
taken by him. On the other hand, the latter claimed that he was
authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed area but this
notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal collected from him a
sand and gravel fee which would be an illegal exaction if the disputed area
turns out to be of private ownership. Answers to the two complaints in
intervention were duly filed by the affected parties.

On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against

plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter
have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement8 had
between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein he defendants
were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome
of the pending suit. It was prayed that plaintiff and intervenor Calalang be
ordered to remove the fence and allow defendants' men to continue their
operations unhampered. Opposition to this petition was filed by the other
side, with a prayer for counter injunction. On March 23, 1954, the lower
court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing the
defendants to continue their extractions from the disputed area provided
a receipt9 in plaintiff's favor be issued for all the materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as
additional defendants were the City of Manila,10 the Provincial Treasurer of
Rizal,11 and Engr. Eugenio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant.
Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed
against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in
the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949,
as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their
operations.

Came the separate amended answers of the several defendants. Manila

City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that the City Engineer,
acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works Director. The other
defendants12 put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff
and the Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim
for damages against plaintiff. The rest13 renewed the same defense; that
the disputed area was part of the public domain, since it was situated on
the riverbanks.

On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a

petition to delimit the area of excavation and asked the lower court to
authorize his men to extend their operations west of the camachile tree in
the disputed area. This met vigorous opposition from plaintiff and
intervenor Calalang. On May 27, 1955, the petition was denied.

Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on
the merits. The dispositive portion provided:14

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants

City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, to pay solidarily the
herein plaintiff the sum of P376,989.60, as the cost of gravel and
sand extracted from plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise
hereby rendered against the defendant Provincial Treasurer of Rizal,
ordering him to reimburse to intervenor Maximo Calalang the
amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected.
Finally, defendants herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting
any sand or gravel from plaintiff's property which is two-fifths
northern portion of the disputed area.

It is so ordered.

None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they
all sought a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower
court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order, the dispositive
portion of which provided:15

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for

reconsideration filed by plaintiff and intervenor Calalang; dismisses
the complaint with respect to defendant City of Manila; holds that
the northern two-fifths portion of the area in controversy belongs to
the plaintiff with right to the immediate possession thereof and
hereby enjoins the defendants and intervenor Bureau of Mines to
vacate the same and to stop from extracting gravel thereon. The
Court however hereby dismisses the case against the defendant
 Bureau of Public Works and its agents and employees insofar as the
claim for money is concerned without prejudice to plaintiffs taking
such action as he may deem proper to enforce said claim against
the proper party in accordance with law.

It is so ordered.

Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration. The lower court stood firm on its ruling of August 30,
1957.16

Hence, this appeal.17 The defendants Director of Public Works, City

Engineer of Manila, and Engrs. Busuego and Sese have also appealed from
the declaration made by the lower court that the northern two-fifths of the
disputed area belongs to plaintiff Hilario.

The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of
law and fact for resolution and adjudication. Foremost among them is this
legal query; when a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course
and opens a new one through private property, would the new riverbanks
lining said course be of public ownership also?18

The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the Law
of Waters of August 3, 1866, the riverbanks are, by definition, considered
part of the riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the other
hand, plaintiff would have the question resolved in the negative. He
maintains that not all riverbanks are of public ownership because: (1) Art.
372 of the old Civil Code, which governs this particular case, speaks only
of the new bed; nothing is said about the new banks; (2) Art. 73 of the Law
of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" cannot be applied in
the case at bar in conjunction with the other articles cited by defendants
since that article applies only to banks of natural riverbeds and the
present, River is not in its natural bed; and (3) if all banks were of public
ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil Code and the second sentence,
first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have any
application.

Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before
the present Civil Code took effect,19 the question before Us should be
determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and
those of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.

We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of
public ownership — including those formed when a river leaves its old bed
and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil
Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it provides:

Property of public ownership is —

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,

torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of
the riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks
of a river" provides:

By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or

zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such
high floods as do not cause inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates
the intent of the law to consider the banks — for all legal purposes
— as part of the riverbed. The lower court also ruled — correctly —
that the banks of the River are paint of its bed.20 Since undeniably
all beds of rivers are of public ownership,21 it follows that the banks,
which form part of them, are also of public ownership.

Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot

apply because Art. 312 of the old Civil Code mentions only the new bed
but omits the banks, and that said articles only apply to natural —
meaning original — bed and banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines
beds of rivers and creeks, provides:

The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered

by its waters during the highest [ordinary] floods.22 (Emphasis
supplied)

Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —

Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from

natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the
new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate
shall recover it in the event that the waters leave it dry again either
naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this
purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The
nature of the banks always follows that of the bed and the running
waters of the river. A river is a compound concept consisting of
three elements: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the
banks. 23 All these constitute the river. American authorities are in
accord with this view:

'River' consists of water, a bed and banks.24

A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts

constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it
cannot exist without all its paints. Evaporate the water, and you
have a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed, instead of a river, you
would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have a
boundless flood.25

Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature,
i.e., it should either be totally public or completely private. And since
rivers are of public ownership,26 it is implicit that all the three component
elements be of the same nature also. As Manresa commented:

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de

suerte que al decir el Codigo Civil que los rios son de dominio
publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de
anquellos tres elementos que integran el rio.27

However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three
elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and
407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so
under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and
their banks. Plaintiff now equates the term "natural" with the word
"original" so that a change in the course of a river would render those
articles inapplicable. However, the premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La
Real Academia Española defines the word "natural" as follows:

NATURAL — perteneciente a la naturaleza o conforme a la calidad o

propriedad de las cosas; nativo, originario de un pueblo o nacion;
hecho con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni composicion alguna;
ingenuo y sin doblez en su modo de proceder; diceze tambien de
las cosas que imitar a la naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que
comunmente sucede, y por eso, facilmente creible; que se produce
por solas las fuerzas de la naturaleza, como contrapuesto a sobre
natural y milagroso, (Emphasis supplied)

"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the

contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to
the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the
definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word
"natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and
concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.

Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem

possible to acquire private ownership of banks under Art. 553 of the old
Civil Code which provides:

Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan
sujetas en toda su extension y en sus margenes, en una zona de
tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de
la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. (Emphasis
supplied) .

And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in

Commonwealth vs. Gungun,28 it was said that the private ownership
of the banks was not prohibited. His point is then neatly brought
home with the proposition that it is precisely when a river changes
its course and opens a new bed through a private estate that there
can be private ownership of the banks.

A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never
intended to authorize the private acquisition of riverbanks. That could not
have been legally possible in view of the legislative policy clearly
enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public
ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights
of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were able to
acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under the Siete
Partidas which was promulgated in 1834 yet.29 Under Law 6, Title 28,
Partidas 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following
the Roman Law rule.30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But
subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, riverbanks became of public ownership, albeit impliedly
only because considered part of the bed — which was public — by
statutory definition.31 But this law, while expressly repealing all prior
inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then existing.32 So
privately owned banks then continued to be so under the new law, but
they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. As Art. 73
provides:

Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonis laterales de sus

alveos que solamente sor bañadas por las aguas en las crecidas
que no causan inundacion. El dominio privado de las riberas esta
suieto a la survidumbre de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en
el interest general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el
salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied).1äwphï1.ñët

This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private

ownership of the banks, on the one hand, and the policy of the law on the
other hand, to devote all banks to public use.33 The easement would
preserve the private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy
of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only recognized and preserved
existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private
appropriation of riverbanks.

The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent Law of

Waters of June 13, 1879, which was principally based on the Law of August
3, 1865.34 Art. 36 of the new law, which was a substantial reenactment of
Art. 73 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, reads:

Las riberas, aun cuando sean de dominio privado en virtud de

antigue ley o de costumbre, estan sujetas en toda su extension las
margenes en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso
publico en interes general de la navegacion, la flotacion la pesca y
el salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds,
and the treatment of the banks as part of the bed.35 But nowhere in the
law was there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of the
banks. What it merely did was to recognize the fact that at that time there
were privately owned banks pursuant to the Siete Partidas, and to
encumber these with an easement for public use.

However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication.

But with the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1889, this fact was finally
made explicit in Art. 339 thereof. Riverbanks were declared as public
property since they were destined for public use. And the first paragraph
of Art. 36 of the Law of Waters of 1879 was substantially reenacted in Art.
553 of the Code.36 Hence, this article must also be understood not as
authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as recognizing
the vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the banks.

The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the
old Civil Code nor the Law of Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas.
Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida 3, which
provides for private ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this
jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, took
effect.37 Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937,
the new banks which were formed could not have been subjected to the
provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already been superseded by
then.

Coming to the factual issues: both parties assail the conclusion made by
the lower court that only the northern two-fifths of the disputed area
remained as plaintiff's private property. This conclusion was apparently
based on the findings that the portion where rice and corn were found 38 in
the ocular inspection of June 15, 1951, was on the northern two-fifths of
the disputed area; that this cannot be a part of the bed because of the
existence of vegetation which could not have grown underwater, and that
this portion is man-made. However, there is no evidentiary basis for these
findings. The area indicated by Nos. 1 and 2 in Exh. D-1 where no
excavations had been made, appears to be more on the south-western
one-fourth of the disputed area. The American cases39 cited by the lower
court cannot apply here. Our Law of Waters, in defining "beds" and
considers the latter is part of the former. Those cited cases did not involve
a similar statutory provision. That plants can and do grow on the banks
which otherwise could not have grown in the bed which is constantly
subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction between "beds"
and "banks" in the physical order. However, We are dealing with the legal
order where legal definitions prevail. And apart from these considerations,
We also note the considerable difficulty which would attend the execution
of the ruling of the lower court. The latter failed to indicate fixed markers
from which an exact delimitation of the boundaries of the portion could be
made. This flaw is conducive to future litigations.

Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by

flood waters, cannot be considered as within the banks of the River
because: (1) such floods are only accidental, and (2) even if they are
regular, the flooding of the area is due to the excavations and extractions
made by defendants which have caused the widening of the channel. 40
Defendants claim, however, that the area is always covered by the normal
yearly floods and that the widening of the channel is due to natural
causes.

There is a gravel pit41 located along the west side of the River. This is
about 500 meters long.42 A greater part of this pit occupies a portion of the
strip of land that was sliced by the River from the rest of the Hilario estate.
As shown in Exhs. D and D-1, this strip of land is that western segment of
the Hilario estate bounded on the west by the same lines connecting
stakes 23 through 27, which form part of the western boundary of the
estate, and on the east, bounded by the western waterline of the River.

Now, the disputed area, generally speaking,43 is only that part of the
gravel pit which is within the strip of land. Its northern tip is that point
where the so-called "secondary bank" line intersects the west River
waterline up north; its southern boundary is along the line connecting
stakes 23 and 24. From these two ends, the disputed area measures
approximately 250 meters long. The eastern boundary is the western
River waterline at low tide and the western boundary is the "secondary
bank" line, a line passing near stake 24 and running almost parallel to the
line connecting stakes 25 and 26. Around the later part of 1949, the
disputed area was about 150 to 160 meters wide.44 This increased to
about 175 to 180 meters by the later part of 1950. And by January, 1953,
the distance from the "secondary bank" line to the west waterline was
about 230 meters.45

This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the

gradual movement of the River to the east. Since it entered into the
Hilario estate, the River has not stayed put.46 Vicente Vicente, plaintiff's
witness declared47 that after the River changed its course in 1937, the
distance between the old and the new river sites was about 100 meters.
Exh. D-2 shows that in 1943, the south end of the River was about 5
meters southeast of stake 24.48 Honorato Sta. Maria, another witness for
plaintiff, indicated the flow of this course with a blue line in Exh. D-1.49 This
blue line is about 100 meters from the line connecting stakes 25 and 26,
which was also the east boundary of the old River.50 Around 1945 to 1949,
the River was about 193 meters51 east of this line. This measurement is
based on the testimonies of two defense witnesses52 and stated that
during that period, the River passed along the Excavated Area and the
New Accretion Area53 sites, as shown in Exh. 54. By the later part of 1949
up to November 1950, the west waterline was from 248 to 270 meters54
east of the aforesaid boundary line. And finally in January, 1953, based on
the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang, the west waterline was from 300 to 305
meters away already. Hence, from 100 meters in 1937, the River had
moved to 305 meters eastward in 1953.

There are two questions to be resolved here. First, where on the strip of
land are the lateral borders of the western riverbank? And second, where
have defendants made their extractions?

Anent the first question, the key is supplied by Art. 73 of the Law of
Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers —

By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or

zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such
high floods as do not cause in inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would,

therefore, be that lateral line or strip which is reached by the waters
during those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other
words, the extent reached by the waters when the River is at high
tide.
However, there is a difference between the topography of the two sides
immediately adjoining the River. The line indicated as "primary bank"55 in
Exh. 3-Calalang, which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and has a
steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the
watercourse level. The precipice here, which is near the east waterline, is
very easily detectible. But the opposite side has no such steep activity. In
fact, it is almost flat with the bed of the River, especially near the water
edge, where it is about 30 to 50 cms. high only. But it gradually slopes up
to a height of about 2 to 2-½ meters along the line indicated as
"secondary bank", which is quite far from the waterline. This "bank" line is
about 1-½ meters higher than the level of the gravel pit and there are
erosions here. This is about 175 meters west from the November 1950
waterline, and about 100 meters west from the camachile tree.56

During the dry season, the waterlevel of the River is quite low — about
knee-deep only. However, during the rainy season, the River generally
becomes swollen, and the waterlevel rises, reaching up to the neck.57
However, considering the peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking
the river, the rise in the waterlevel would not have the same effect on the
two sides. Thus, on the east, the water would rise vertically, until the top
of the "primary bank" is reached, but on the west, there would be a low-
angled inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the "secondary
bank" line is reached. In other words, while the water expansion on the
east is vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.

The evidence also shows that there are two types of floods in the area
during the rainy season.58 One is the so-called "ordinary" flood, when the
river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines, of the
"primary" and "secondary" banks. This occurs annually, about three to
four times during the period. Then there is the "extraordinary" flood, when
the waters overflow beyond the said banks, and even inundate the
surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen regularly. From
1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods.59 Now, considering that
the "ordinary" flood easily cover the west side — since any vertical rise of
the waterlevel on the east would necessarily be accompanied by a lateral
water expansion on the west — the "inundations" which the law mentions
must be those caused by the "extraordinary" floods which reach and
overflow beyond both "primary" and "secondary" banks. And since the
"primary" bank is higher than the "secondary" bank, it is only when the
former is reached and overflowed that there can be an inundation of the
banks — the two banks. The question therefore, may be stated thus: up to
what extent on the west side do the highest flood waters reach when the
"primary" bank is not overflowed?

Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent

reached by the ordinary flood waters. David Ross, a bulldozer operator at
the plant since 1945, testified60 that from 1945 to 1949, when the River
was still passing along the site where the camachile tree is located, the
annual flood waters reached up to the "secondary bank" line. These floods
usually took from 3 to 5 days to recede, during which time their work was
suspended. Corroboration is supplied by Macario Suiza, a crane operator
in the plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a plant employee since
1946. Suiza stated61 that from 1947 to 1949, the area enclosed within the
blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B — which includes the New Accretion
Area was always covered by water when it rained hard and they had to
stop work temporarily. The western extremity of this area reaches up to
the "secondary bank" line. Villafuerte stated62 that in the ordinary floods
when the water was just 50 cm. below the top of the "primary bank", the
waters would go beyond the camachile tree by as much as 100 meters
westward and just about reach the "secondary bank" line. Further
corroboration is supplied by plaintiff's own evidence. Exh. 1-Calalang
states that from 1947 to 1949, based on the casual observations made by
geologist David Cruz, the area between the "primary" and "secondary"
banks were always covered by the non-inundating ordinary floods.

From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated63 that
there were still floods but they were not as big anymore, except one flood
in 1952, since the River had already moved to the east. Engr. Ricardo
Pacheco, who made a survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and
who conducted actual observations of the extent of the water reach when
the river was swollen, testified64 that the non-inundating flood regularly
reached up to the blue zigzag line along the disputed area, as shown in
Exh. I-City Engineer Manila. This blue line, at the point where it intersects
line BB,65 is about 140 meters west of the waterline and about 20 meters
west of the camachile tree. His testimony was based on three floods 66
which he and his men actually recorded. Corroboration is again supplied
by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz' report, the floods in 1950 and 1951
barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy
season, the waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of
the gravel pit which used to be submerged. One cause for this was the
lesser amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951. But two floods occurred from
October 16 to 28, 1952, which overflowed the whole area and inundated
the banks. From 1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the
east, the flood waters still covered the west side. 67 Testifying on the extent
reached by the water during the rainy season in 1954, Ross stated 68 that it
reached up to the camachile tree only. The last and latest data comes
from Engr. Magbayani Leaño, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant from
August 1954. He testified69 that as of December 1955, when the disputed
area was underwater, the water reach was about 20 meters or less to the
east from the camachile tree.

From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to
1949, the west bank of the River extended westward up to the "secondary
bank" line; (2) that from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the
River, to the east its lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters
west of the camachile tree; and (3) that from 1953 to 1955, the
extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the
camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.

To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented

two rebuttal witnesses70 who told a somewhat different story. However,
their testimonies are not convincing enough to offset the dovetailing
testimonies of the defense witnesses who were much better qualified and
acquainted with the actual situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses
were corroborated by plaintiffs' own evidence which contradicts the
aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.

However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in
question are merely accidental and hence, under Art. 77 of the Law of
Waters,71 and following the ruling in Government vs. Colegio de San Jose,72
he is deemed not to have lost the inundated area. This is untenable.
Plaintiff's own evidence73 shows that the river floods with annual regularity
during the rainy season. These floods can hardly be called "accidental."
The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point. What was mainly
considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds
and pools. In the case at bar, none of these is involved.

Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the

disputed area was due to the continuous extraction of materials by
defendants which had lowered the level of said area and caused the
consequent widening of the channel and the river itself. The excavations
and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been
made only on the strip of land west of the River.74 Under the "following-
the-nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff, the River should
have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered.
But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore, it
cannot be attributed to defendants' operation. Moreover, plaintiff's own
evidence indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural
causes. Thus, Exh. 1-Calalang shows that the movement eastward of the
channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two
typhoons which caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of
materials on the west side which increased its level from as much as .93
to 2 meters.

Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural

widening of the River is unfounded. Reliance is made on the finding by the
lower court that in 1943, the River was only 60 meters wide as shown in
Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide as shown in
Exh. D. However, Exh. D-2 only shows the width of the River near the
southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how wide
it was in the other parts, especially up north. And Eligio Lorenzo, plaintiff's
own witness, admitted75 on cross-examination that the width of the new
river was not uniform. This is confirmed by Exhs. D and D-1 which show
that the new river was wider by as much as 50% up north than it was
down south. The 140-meter distance in Exh. D was at the widest part up
north whereas down south, near the mouth of the Bulobok River, it was
only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in
January 1953, the River, near the same point also, was less than 50
meters wide.

The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have

really confined their operations within the banks of the River as alleged by
them. To resolve this, We have to find out from what precise portion in the
disputed area the defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they
did not extract indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of the
parties' briefs were very helpful but the evidence on record discloses that
defendants made their extractions only within specified areas during
definite periods.

From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their
operations only in the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal
zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This zone, marked as Exh. 2-City
Engineer Manila, is about one (1) km. long and extends northward up to
pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However, no extractions nor excavations were
undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the "temporary bank" line.76
These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses. That the extractions
were near the river then finds support in Vicente's testimony 77 while Leon
Angeles and Mrs. Salud Hilario confirm the fact that defendants have not
gone westward beyond the "temporary bank" line.78 This line is located
east of the "secondary bank" line, the lateral extremity of the west bank
then.

In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from

extracting along the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across
the same. This forced the defendants to go below southeast of — the
"Excavated Area" and the New Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54.79 Engr.
Busuego, testifying80 in 1952, indicated their are of extraction as that
enclosed within the red dotted line in Exh. D-1 which lies on the south end
of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the southeastern boundary of
the disputed area is included. The ocular inspection conducted on June 15,
1951, confirms this.81 Exh. 4-Calalang shows the total amount of materials
taken from within the area from 1949 to 1951.82 Thus, from 1950 up to
1953, although the defendants were able to continue their operations
because of the agreement between the plaintiff and the Director of Public
Works,83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the
disputed area. On the other hand, the lateral extremities of the west bank
then ran along a line about 20 meters west of the camachile tree in the
New Accretion Area.

From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther near of
the New Accretion Area. They were working within a confined area along
the west waterline, the northern and western boundaries of which were 20
meters away east from the camachile tree.84 Ross indicated85 this zone in
Exh. 54 as that portion on the southern end of the disputed area between
the blue lines going through the words "Marikina River Bed" and the red
zigzag line indicating the watercourse then. Engr. Leaño even stated, 86
that they got about 80% of the materials from the river itself and only
20% from the dry bed. The sand and gravel covered by Exhs. LL to LL-55
were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only corroborated by
Mrs. Hilario87 but even admitted by the plaintiff in his opposition88 to
defendants' petition to extend their area of operation west of the
camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could
not, and have not,89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east
from said tree, which has already been established as the lateral
extremity of the west bank during the period.

It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not

gone beyond the receding western extremities of the west riverbank. They
have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from within the
banks of the river which constitute part of the public domain — wherein
they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient
evidence that defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank,
as previously established, and have invaded his private estate. He cannot,
therefore, recover from them.

As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire

disputed area as part of the riverbanks would be tantamount to converting
about half of his estate to public ownership without just compensation. He
even adds that defendants have already exhausted the supply in that area
and have unjustly profited at his expense. These arguments, however, do
not detract from the above conclusions.

First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space
between the "secondary bank" line and the "primary bank" line, has
permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are only holding is
that at the time the defendants made their extractions, the excavations
were within the confines of the riverbanks then. The "secondary bank" line
was the western limit of the west bank around 1945 to 1949 only. By
1955, this had greatly receded to the line just 20 meters east of the
camachile tree in the New Accretion Area. All that space to the west of
said receding line90 would still be part of plaintiff's property — and also
whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by
the non-inundating ordinary floods.

Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his

property without any compensation at all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil
Code, the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners
either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And had the change
occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be
entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost.91

And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's

expense. They were not responsible for the shifting of the River. It was
due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And defendants
were extracting from public property then, under proper authorization.
The government, through the defendants, may have been enriched by
chance, but not unjustly.

Considering the conclusions We have thus reached, the other questions

involved in the remaining assignments of errors — particularly those
apropos the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the liability of
defendant City of Manila — are rendered moot.

Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside
and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:

(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and
his agents and employees are hereby absolved from liability to
plaintiff since they did not extract materials from plaintiff's property
but from the public domain.

(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from
the line running parallel to the western waterline of the river and
twenty meters east from the camachile tree in the New Accretion
Area measured along line AA in Exhs. 3-Calalang, 13 and 54, and
going to the west up to the western boundaries of the Hilario estate,
is hereby declared as not part of the public domain and confirmed
as part of plaintiff's private property. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia,

and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case
No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents
Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of
a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners'
consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the
owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at
barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name
said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan
PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime
in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same
boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a
gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the
current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and
an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or
less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court
of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said
portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous
possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for
damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958),
respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered
a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to
petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as
damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was
formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the
action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to
believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of
the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the
survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found
out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them
was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is
indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun
in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and
the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including
the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of
the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani,
to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since
1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness
Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that
the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in
1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh.
"2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence
to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled
Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax
under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that
defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948,
does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere
occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art.
714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the
mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to
the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code).
Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the
defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law
does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of
the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest
(Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation,
as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-
326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants,

granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since
1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming
that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering
that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not
been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could
not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and
1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part
 and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered
as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No.
496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which

rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the
beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual

process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact
conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law,
therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should
properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance
with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The
defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this
case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on
two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains
to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate
is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse
possession of the defendant began only in the month of September,
1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court,
is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared
by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the
land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title
established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not
extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To
hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually
deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given
therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and
area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit
in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land
Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by
the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions
do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of
Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17,
1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the
trial court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have
been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied
the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as
claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually
increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was
superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the
municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses,
both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age,
who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that
the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since
1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the
same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession
started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was
then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much

greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande
and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the
defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he
called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the
plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then
that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in
question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro
Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in
April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the
accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last
fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished
their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of
some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their
possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in
itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not
the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and
by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in
prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would
have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse
they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their
copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of
funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy
to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's
fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the
certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their
hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was
legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had
been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon
consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
 possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when
they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be

reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have
acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial
property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins.
The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered
land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title
thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased
by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a
river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration
and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up
to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance
of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription
by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through
acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The
Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-
appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at
by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by
the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190
and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in
1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in
force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial
lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and

Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-
appellees.

Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin

V. Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a

parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with
an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by
alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of
accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano
and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his
opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a
portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor
his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having
acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by
possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his
turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit
granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and
approved by the President.

It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the
applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free
patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in
question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant
Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with
api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous,
adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was
distributed by oppositor Valeriano.

On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore,
formed part of the public domain.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the
parcel formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the
following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an
accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to
him but forms part of the public domain.

II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public
domain, the lower court nevertheless erred in not declaring the
same to be the necessary for any public use or purpose and in not
ordering in the present registration proceedings.

III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question
now belongs to the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain
and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.

IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director
of Lands is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a
land of the public domain.

Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion,
having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and
he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code),
which provides that:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the

accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or

deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case
was caused by action of the Manila Bay.

Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are
not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and
that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the
same:

Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all
sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea,
distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or
of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of
Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on
Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6
Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay,
where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is
property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505,
involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).

Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed
part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court
should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or
purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private
ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial

deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of

Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held
that:

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion

of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall
declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so
gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or
for the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard
service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments,
the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs.
Director of Lands, supra.)

The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case
of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in
Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).

. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon,

nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to
be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government,

through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the
land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use
or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question
through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten
years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not
subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs.
Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said:

The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the

shore by accretion, without previous permission from the proper
authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as
owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is
illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of
the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is
intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live
nearby.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with

costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,

Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO

REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO,
respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII,
which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their
registration in the names of the private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should

be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709
situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the
registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property and
particularly described as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Lot 1-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio

of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on
the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines
2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by
Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina
Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY
THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE
METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the

Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S.,
along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3
of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano
Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 3-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the

Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot
1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S.,
along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1
of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano Tancinco
(Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of
Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in

representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the
application for registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the

application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line
with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and
trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-
131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the
private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are

accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said
property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2
situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and
their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of
Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes,
married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City;
Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay
Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco, married to
Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati,
Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent

Court of Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming

in toto the decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa

kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina
Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that
this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of
said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable
the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in
question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article

457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the
private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river
bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak
of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs.
Virginia Acuña to the effect that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already
dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and
that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the
land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new
Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the
old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime
in 1951; that the new lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in
this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes

the fact of accretion without human intervention because the transfer of
the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites

before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have
taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the
New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must
be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that
it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came
into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be their
overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the
four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The
respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken
place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939. However,
the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the
area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was
telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence
that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the
exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The
alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of
the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards
the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not
even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on
the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private
respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two
meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one
meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land
or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of
loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering
on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said
estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is
proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof
should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to
his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring
about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and
not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of
the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony
of the private respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939
there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It
should be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey
of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral
Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the
years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation
purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently
formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not
have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951.
What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of
a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the
names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of
the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public
domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from

is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered
to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and
return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente,

JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY,

DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA,
FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG
and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.:p

The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in

Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The
western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an
elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the
national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically
go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the
coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear
during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under
water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during
the rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to

another. On 9 May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65
hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad.
The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela,

containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded
on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road;
on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan
River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681
in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P
750.00. . . .

Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from

Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan
Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent
Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land,

and containing an area of 18,000 square meters, more or
less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a
Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed
at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2

During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21

October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo
were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307,
Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of
the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares
out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey
was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from
Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not
included in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was
identified by respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running
from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the
western and the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with
water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the
submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent
Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at
the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river
water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists,
the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River when the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of
land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan
River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on
12 December 1969. 4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209
hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822
is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot
821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter
only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season
and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion
of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that
Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion
of the property to which it is adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist
that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the
river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the
unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled respondent
Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969.
The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for
failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent
Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter
case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court
of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then

Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession
and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2)
parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio
Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering
petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion.
Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring
him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the

complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach
an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10
November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court

renders judgment against the defendants and in favor of the
plaintiff and orders:
 1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful
owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described
in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the

premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described
in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the

premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described
in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and

costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the

decision of the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without
success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the
two (2) branches of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found
otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial
court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot
307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up
for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821
becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed owned
by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion
of petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates
Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to
great respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the
part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the
Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a
conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law
cognizable by this Court. 11

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below

apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the onset of and
during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the
Cagayan River. The trial court held:

The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the

nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears
that during the dry season, the body of water separating the
 same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two
(2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from
Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a
marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12)
meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W",
"W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our
Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian land which
receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to
make an express act of possession. The law does not require
it, and the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12

The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by

the trial court, thus:

As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an

island in the strict sense of the word since the eastern portion
of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the
Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the
action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season
especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes
swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip
of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated
with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river
gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the
whole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was

held that —

According to the foregoing definition of the

words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay
during the dry season is the ordinary one, and
the highest depth they attain during the extra-
ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the
one which is regular, common, natural, which
occurs always or most of the time during the
year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends
the general rule, order and measure, and goes
beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If
according to the definition given by Article 74 of
the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural
bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered
by their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at
their highest depth during the dry season, that
is up to the northeastern boundary of the two
parcels of land in question.

We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at

bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan
 River is that attained during the dry season which is confined
only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the
natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water
between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream
already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan
Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and
uneroded. 13

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the
present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a
lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the
character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court
applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article
74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is
involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August

1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar:

Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the

ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.
(Emphasis supplied)

We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a

creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during
the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the
river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed
portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most
part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the
periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to
December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river
waters.

The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests
upon evidence of record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open
court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in
Lot 307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was
included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western
boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba
to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina
Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the
eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan
attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western
branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not
only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch
of the Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct

examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures,
marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time
when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which
according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-
3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up
portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has
dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are
vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is
compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the
eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner
Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a
"cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the
depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a
height of eight (8) meters. 17

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its
eastern channel on the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit "E" 18 for
the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the
name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed
even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed
in parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private
ownership over the submerged portion—is an implied admission of the
existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by
respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte
de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the
eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo
did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the
river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could
not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,

canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a

composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and
(3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was
taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:

La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute

general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su relacion de
dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en
todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el
 alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos
ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?

Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin

ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios son
de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por
otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la
declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion
publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que
concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas],
segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces
de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y
2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la extension
que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas
ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied)

The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion

is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan
River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would
then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private
ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent
Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers
are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of
the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion
acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that
instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the
case, the Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821
is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). 22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by
respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo
may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the
claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to
Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds
of Sale transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the
western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court
are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow
and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court
made mention of several floods that caused the land to reappear making
it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of
flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of
the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil
deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares.
Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of
22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as
Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size.
The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares
(8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio
Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821
which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that
Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If
respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a
span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by
what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As
already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the
depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography
of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that
Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow
and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern
branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's

claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior
possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan
Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's)
tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took
over the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation
purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property,
he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court
of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior
possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their
respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession
of Lot 821 since 1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically

to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The
testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not
indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for
forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela
pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not
to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations presented by
petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least
have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than
satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the
ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor
respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR

CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby
declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an
appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter
se. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 108065 July 6, 1993

SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Lorenzo F. Miravite for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the respondent

Court of Appeals which affirmed in totothe ruling of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 0460-P, the dispositive portion of which read thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and

void TCT Nos. 14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT
No. 29593's derivative titles TCT Nos. 124725, 124726,
124727 and 124729, and ordering the Register of Deeds for
Pasay City to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead
in the name of the plaintiff after segregating from TCT No.
29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C (covered by
cancelled TCT No. 11043) belonging to defendant Felix Baes.
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds

for Pasay City.

SO ORDERED.

The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a canal on a

private parcel of land, identified as Lot 2958 and covering an area of
P33,902 sq.m., to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.

This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name
under TCT No. 10990 and then had it subdivided into three lots, namely:
(a) Lot 2958-A, with an area of 28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot 2958-B, with an area
of 3,588 sq.m.; and (c) Lot 2958-C, with an area of 452 sq.m., covered by
TCT Nos. 11041, 11042 and 11043, respectively.

In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by the canal, the
government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as Lot 2958-B
through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. 1 The
property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2956-C, was
denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix Baes
under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up
the old bed of the creek.

Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A designated
as Lot 1, Blk., 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On January 12, 1968, he
submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and subdivision plans,
claiming that after the said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it
was found that there were errors in respect of their bearings and
distances.

The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the Court of First Instance

of Pasay City in an order dated January 15, 1968. 2

As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled and new
ones were issued, to wit: (a) Lot 1-A, Blk. 4, with 672 sq.m., under TCT No.
T-14404; (b) Lot 1-B, with 826 sq.m., representing the increase in area
after the resurvey, under TCT No. T-14405; (c) Lot 2958-C-1, with 452
sq.m., under TCT No. T-14406; and (d) Lot 2958-C-2, with 2,770 sq.m.
representing the increase after resurvey, under TCT No. T-14407.

Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this time further
subdivided into four (4) lots, namely, Lot 1, with an area of 147 sq.m.; Lot
2, with an area of 950 sq.m.; Lot 3, with an area of 257 sq.m.; and Lot 4,
with an area of 1,868 sq.m., which were respectively issued TCT Nos.
29592, 29593, 29594, and 29595.

In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B (with TCT
No. 14405 and an area of 826 sq.m.), on which the petitioners had erected
an apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a
filled-up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C
(covered by TCT Nos. 29592 to 29595, with an increased area of 2,770
after resurvey and subdivision) had been unlawfully enlarged.

On November 17, 1982, it filed a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos.

14405 and 29592 to 29595. 3

Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT Nos. 29592,
29594 and 29595 and was notable to prove during the trial that the
government utilized a portion of Lot 2 under, TCT No. 29593. The trial
court therefore decreed (correctly) that the original Lot 2958-C (with an
area of 452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the resurvey-
subdivision of Lot 2958-C.
The only remaining dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No. 14405), which the
petitioners, relying on Article 461 of the Civil Code, are claiming as their
own. The government rejects this claim and avers that the petitioners had
already been fully compensated for it on June 20, 1970 when they agreed
to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A belonging to the
government.

Article 461 of the Civil Code states:

River beds which are abandoned through the natural change

in the course of the waters ipso factobelong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to
the area lost. However, the owners of the land adjoining the
old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)

A portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a man-made canal

which totally occupied Lot 2958-B (with an area of 3,588 sq.m.) belonging
to Felix Baes. Thus, the petitioners claim that they became the owners of
the old bed (which was eventually filled up by soil excavated from Lot
2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.

The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino's interpretation of

this Article, to wit:

This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of a

stream. If the change of the course is due to works
constructed by concessioners authorized by the government,
the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the
concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the
abandoned river bed will belong to the owners of the land
covered by the waters, as provided in this article, without
prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient
title. (Citing 3 Manresa 251-252; 2 Navarro Amandi, 100-101;
3 Sanchez Roman 148)

We agree.

If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss

of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to
compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected
through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by
the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was
therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.

We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated.

Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B
through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This
was a fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value
and the agreement was freely entered into by the parties. The petitioners
cannot now claim additional compensation because, as correctly observed
by the Solicitor General,

. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up

portion of the creek would be a clear case of double
compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the
state.

The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the
result of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government could
still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent domain, upon
payment of just compensation, as the land was needed for a public
purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It

is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO

TAPIA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE
SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON.
ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and
HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private
capacities, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; ARTICLE 457; REQUISITES.- In the case
of Meneses vs. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of
acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a
case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or
streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Where the
accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
bounding petitioner's land, it cannot be claimed that the accumulation
was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters
or the current of the creek and the river. In Hilario vs. City of
 Manila, this Court held that the word “current” indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to
high and low tide. Not having met the first and second requirements
of the rules of alluvion, petitioners cannot claim the rights of a riparian
owner.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT DEPOSIT IS DUE TO THE CURRENT OF THE
RIVER, MANDATORY.- In Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current
of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil
Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently,
alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs.
Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but
is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of
man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the
public domain. In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct
result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations.
4. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; FINDINGS AS SUCH BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS,
RESPECTED.- The mere filing of the Miscellaneous Sales Application
constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public
land, having been the subject of a Survey Plan wherein said land was
described as an orchard. Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified
the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance
with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. This
Court has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by
this Court.
5. ID.; PUBLIC LAND LAW; JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LANDS.- Having
determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau
of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with
the Public Land Law. Under Sections 3 and 4 thereof, the Director of
Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over public lands. Here
respondent Palad as Director of Lands, is authorized to exercise
executive control over any form of concession, disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain. He may issue
decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as
long as they are based on the findings of fact. In the case of Calibo vs.
Ballesteros, this Court held that where, in the disposition of public
lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus
presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in
appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act
of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTED IN
CASE AT BAR.- The administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to
respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
 Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of
respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of
Lands." It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of
Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. In any case,
respondent Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an
"Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late
Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or
adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion
as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In
the case of Hamoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or
decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving
public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of
Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He
cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his
jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Manolo L. Tagarda, Sr. for petitioners.
Arturo R. Legaspi for private respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno

Tapia challenge the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of the verification,
report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands
regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners
exhausted administrative remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result
of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo
Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of
1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result,
Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was
rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of
judgment after the same became final and executory. Private
respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the
same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of
judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari with
prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise
dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the
private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they
occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau
of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view
to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by
him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,
however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer
Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis
conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional Director
recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to
Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled
and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land
applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the
survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom
the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may file
public land applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent
Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources
and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the
motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him to
vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered
that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia
Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of
the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario,
order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario
and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in
the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC
dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as
amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs
exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the
Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be
controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to
the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.[1]
 Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for
reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an
appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon
by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno
to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there was no
showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued
and executed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE
PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE
PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of
whether or not the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the
subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."

In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a

mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to
their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be present. However,
they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil
and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land.[3] It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila,[4] this Court held that the word "current" indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to
high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and
second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights
of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners
are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land, as
well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio
Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571.[5] The
mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land
being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan
No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which
was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous
Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said
description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by
respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on
the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry
portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The
investigation report also states that except for the swampy portion which
is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of
a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made
of light materials, including those of private respondents which were
erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978.[6]
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an
accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection
conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[7] This Court has often enough held
that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality.[8] Again, when said factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by this Court.[9]
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion
was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA,[10] this Court ruled that the
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of
the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of
Lands, et al.,[11] where the land was not formed solely by the natural
effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was
deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the
dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its
sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court were to take into consideration
petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late
Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River
bounding his land,[13] the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the
Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have Jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the
Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners'
complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative
remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to
appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent
Hilario who was the Regional Director of The Bureau of Lands. Said
decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands."[14] It
would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was
"Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources."
He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted
on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or
adopting respondent's Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as
an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the
case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,[15] This
Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of
Lands with respect to questions involving public lands under the
administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot therefore, be said to have
acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.[16]
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is
public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director
of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as
mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141)
which states, thus:

"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the

exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act
through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other
form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim,

arbitrariness or capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent
Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since
said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the subject land
was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the assailed
execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order
directing them to vacate the subject land practically changed respondent
Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that
respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private
respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued
patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely
directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land
which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they
were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private respondents were
actually in possession or were actually occupying the subject land instead
of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the
exercise of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate
the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a
preferential right, being the occupants thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application over
the land occupied by them, they nevertheless filed their protest or
opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same being
preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact directed to
do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely
implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners'
own application still has to be given due course.[17]
As Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise
executive control over any form of concession, disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain.[18] He may issue
decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as
they are based on the findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros,[19] this Court held that where, in
the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on
the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if
he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an
act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no
reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.