RULE 37

1. DOMINGO NEYPES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO
[G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005.]

FACTS:
Domingo Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the
heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed which petitioners
allegedly received on March 3, 1998.
March 18, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
July 1, 1998, the trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The Court of Appeals denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order"
appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal started to run on the day they received the final order
of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.

HELD:
YES
BP 129, as amended, provides:
o Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
o Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
o The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended
the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43, and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
2. A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
[G.R. No. 145420. September 19, 2006.]

FACTS:
17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented by its President, Rafael Dinglasan Jr., and Antrom, Inc. (Antrom), also
represented by its President, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby Antrom will extend credit accommodation
in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, will issue checks to guarantee the payment of its obligations.
Elmyra's indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58. As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank Check, but
postdated on 3 October 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment however, the said check was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
16 December 1985, an Information charging Dinglasan with Violation of BP 22 was filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62.
16 December 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for having committed the crime charged.
4 September 1992, Dinglasan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the same court for lack of merit.

25 September 1992, Dinglasan appealed to the Court of Appeals the adverse RTC Decision, and the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration.
26 October 1998, the appellate court handed down a Decision, dismissing the appeal, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC finding
Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating BP 22.

Aggrieved, the accused filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
28 June 1999, the Supreme Court resolved to deny the petition for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the CA.
26 August 1999, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Dinglasan, but the same was again denied by this Court in a Resolution for failure to
raise substantial arguments that would warrant reconsideration.
16 December 1999, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was merely noted without action by the Supreme Court
in view of the En Banc Resolution that no motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained. The Supreme Court directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

19 September 2000, by virtue of the final and executory judgment, the prosecution, filed a motion with the RTC for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest and writ of execution in order to satisfy the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-departure order be issued in order to
prevent Dinglasan from leaving the country until he has fully served his sentence.
21 September 2000, the trial court, issued a warrant for the arrest of Dinglasan and a writ of execution for the enforcement of his civil liability
and, enjoining him from leaving the country.
30 October 2000, Dinglasan filed the instant Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case based on newly
discovered evidence. He urges the Supreme Court to uphold substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discovered evidence he seeks to
introduce in this case is so material and of such weight that, if, admitted would probably change the judgment, hence, suspension of procedural
rules is warranted.
In contrast, private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered
evidence should be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally and substantially defective.
o Considering for the sake of argument that the instant action was filed within the reglementary period, still, the petition must fail for the
requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground for new trial were not satisfactorily complied with.
Let it be noted that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1995 was previously attached as evidence in a Petition for Review
filed by Dinglasan before the Ministry of Justice (now the Department of Justice).
The same letter was also introduced as evidence before the Court of Appeals when Dinglasan assailed the RTC decision.
o Hence, the claim that the alleged evidence was not available during the trial in the courts below, and is thus, newly discovered is
erroneous, if not misleading.
The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on their part, submitted that the instant petition should be dismissed because
it was filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be admitted is neither material nor newly discovered so as to warrant new trial or
reopening of the case. The alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not in any way alter the judgment.
o Upon perusal of the transmittal letter, it was nowhere stated therein that Solidbank Manager's Check was intended as partial payment
of Commercial Bank Check that bounced. The said letter was a mere proposal wherein a payment in kind or dacion en pago was
offered by Elmyra.
The Solicitor General likewise noted that the letter was already introduced as evidence in the Petition for Review with the Ministry of Justice
filed by Dinglasan

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the instant petition was filed on time
2. Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence should be allowed.
HELD:
1.
NO.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
o Rule 124 Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121.
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the
accused becomes final.
While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition should be filed before the finality of the judgment convicting the
appellant, he, however argues that judgment attains finality only upon the receipt of the order or resolution denying his second motion for
reconsideration.
Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration was denied as the subject matter thereof is
a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was merely noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc
Resolution dated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and was further emphasized
by the provision of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that
o Rule 52. Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at
some definitive date fixed by law.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration
would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the
first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases.
After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laid to rest. A decision that acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

2.
NO
The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change
the judgment
These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied
with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in
fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence."
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects:
a) a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and
b) a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.
Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest that
the transmittal letter was discovered recently or just before the time the affidavits were executed. The records, however, show otherwise.
Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be presented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a
desperate attempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause that has long been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this
Court but never did so in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked an evidence which was decisively claimed to
have such significance that might probably change the judgment
3. SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO v. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG
[G.R. No. 194702. April 20, 2015.]

FACTS:
April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders as seller, and respondent Ma. Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell"
of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.
Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of
absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver, prompting Cristina tofile a complaint for specific performance and
damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago (petitioners) before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina's favour.
SLR Builders appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board dismissed and denied, respectively,
the petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP).
November 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time.
Petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. should be applied to their case
July 26, 2007, OP denied the petitioners' motion with finality, stating that the "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals, such as in petitioners' case.
The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA denied the petitioners' petition for review. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration;

ISSUE:
Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals.

HELD:
NO
It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the "fresh period rule" applies to an appeal filed from the
decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the
"fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative
in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP
are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
18, series of 1987:
o Section 2. Appeal. Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners to the Of
o Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in case the aggrieved party files
a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office the said party has the only remaining balance of the
prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.