t .l .

l _J I '""' ,, _

A NEW GE N E R ATI O N
DRAWS THE LINE
KOSOVO, EAST TIMOR AND
THE STANDARDS OF THE WEST

NOAM CHOMSKY

VE R S O

London New York

D
 1

INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USE S

The twentieth century ended with terrible crim es. <1nd reac-
tions by the great powets that were widely heralded as open in g
a rcmukable ''newer~" in hurmm affairs, marked by dedication
to human righ ts and high principle with no historical prcCI...'-
den t. Th e tOrre nt of self-adulation, which may well ha"c bt'L'tl
unpreceden ted in scale and quality, was not merely a display or
millenarian rhetorical nourish es. Western leaders and imrllcc-
tuals ~ssured their a udiences emphatically tJ\atthc n ew era was
very real, and of unusual significance.
T h e new phase in human hislO ry opened with NATO's bomb-
ing of Serbia on March 24 l 999. 'The t'l<'W gen eration draws Llw
line," Tony Blair pro claim ed , fi ghting "for values," for "a ntw
inte mationalism where th e brutal repression of whole ethnic
groups will no longer be tolerated" and "th ose responsible
for such crimes h ave nowhere to hide." NATO has unleashed
the first war in history fought "in tJ1 e name of principle and
values,"Vaclav Have l d eclared, signalling "Lhe end of the nation-
state," which will no longe r be "the culminatio n of ever y national
 INTENTIONAl IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
community's history and ir.s highest earth ly value." The "enlig h t-
ened efforts of generations of democrats, the terrible exper;ence
of two world wars, ... and th e evolution of civilization h ave
finally brought humanity to the recogni tion that human beings
are more important than the state."1
The ne w generation is to carry out its good works under th e
guiding hand of an "idealistic New World bent on ending inhu-
manity," j oined by its British partner. In the lead articl e in
FoTeign Afjai1s, a legal scholar with a distinguished record in
defending human rights explained that the "enlightened
states," freed at last from the shackles of "restrictive old rules"
and archaic concepts of world order, may now use force when
they "believe it to be just," obeying "modern notions ofjustice"
that they fashion as they discipline "th e defiant, the indolent,
and t 11e miscreant," the "disorderly" elemen t<; of the world, with
a nobility of purpose so "evident" that it requires no evidence. 2
T he g ro unds for m embership in the club of enlig h tened
states- "t11e international communi ty," as they conventionally
describe themselves - are a lso self-evident. Past and curren l
practice a re bo1ing o ld tales that may be dismissed under the
docLrine o f "change of course," which has been regularly
invoked when needed in recent years.
Praising NATO troops in Macedonia for their achievement in
opening the new era, Preside nt Clinton "propounded a Clinton
Docbine of mili tary intervention," Bob Davis reported in the
Wall Street jo'Umal. The Doctrine "amounts to the following:
Tyrants Beware." In the President's own words: '1f someb ody
comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse
because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion ,
2 3
NOAM CHOMSKY
a nd it's within o ur powe r to sto p it, Wt' wi ll stop it"; ''Whl'l t: \ \C
can m ake a diffc n nce, we must try, a nd that is dc~trl >' the C.t M.'
in Kosovo." ''Thl;re a re Limes wh en looking awav si mpl}' 1o; not a n
o pti o n ," th e Preside nt expltt in c d t o th e na tio n ; "w<' l ;u \ 't
respond to every trag<'d )' in <.'very co rrwr of t h ~ worlc1, ~ hu t that
d oesn 't mean that '\ vt' sho uld d o nothing for no om'."~
We ll before th e dawn of th e tW\\ e ra, Clinton ':. "nt'O
Wilsoni an ism" had convin ced o bser vers tha t Amt:'t ican lot t'ig n
po licy had e nte re d a "no ble ph ase" with a "saintly g low," thollgh
some saw dangers fro m the outset, warning that b\ "gra n t in ~
idealism a near exclusive ho ld o n o ur rore ig n poli cy" W (' might
n eglect our own ime rests in th e ser vice o r o tlw r:.. Cl inton '!>
"ope n-ended e mbrace of humanita rian in w rvcntion " in 1999
::~ lso''has worried fo re ig n-po liC)' expe rt..'> in sick thl: admi nistra-
ti o n and out," Davis re po rted . Scna to r.J ohn McCain dtric'kd it
as "fo re ig n policy as social work"; o the rs agreed . To a ll e\ia tc
suc h concerns, C linton 's Natio nal Sccurit) Aclvist.'r San dy
Be rger und<"rscored th e fact tha t e thnic cleansing, which "hap-
pe ns in dozens of countri es a round th1. wo rld," cannot b~. tlw
o ccasion fo r interve ntion. In Kosovo, US n~Li o n al interest wa~> a t
stake: interve ntion "'invo lved bolste ring the cre dibilit) o f NATO
a nd ma king sure Kosovar re fugees d idn 't overwh e lm neighbor
ing countries" - as th ey did sho rtly afte r the NATO bom bing
comme nced, e liciting the massive e thnic clean sing th:H was a n
anticipated conseque nce . We are left. lhe n, ''~ lh "bolstc1'ing the
credibi lity ofNATO " as the survivingjustificatio n. 1
Wa hington's official ve rsion. which has re ma ined rairlv con
stantthroughout, was reitera ted in j anuar y 2000 by Sccretan of
De fen se William Cohe n a nd Chairman o f the joint Chiefs o r
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
Staff Henry Shelton, in a lengthy summary of the war provided
to Congtess. The US and NATO had three plimary interests:
, ~nsuring the s~bility of Eastern Europe, ~)Thwarting ethnic
cleansing," an<L"Ensuring NATO's credibility." Prime Minister
~Blair adopted lhe same slance5 :
The bottom line was we couldn 't lose. If we lost, iL's not just
that we would have failed in our strategic obj ective; failed in
te tms or the moral purpose- we would have dealt a devas-
tating blow to the credibility of NATO and the world would
have been less safe as a result of that.
Let us pu l aside untiJ later a closer look at Lhe official posi-
lions, and ask h ow the world outside the "imernational
com munity" understands NATO's efforts to assure its safety.
Some insight into the matter was provided in April 2000 at the
Sou th Summit of G-77, accounting for 80 per cent of the
world 's population. The m eeting, in Havana, was of unusual sig-
nificaJ1Ce, Lh e first meeting ever of G-77 (n ow 133 nations) at
the level of heads of state, prepared shortly befote by a summit
of fo reig n ministers in Cartagena, Colombia. They issued the
Declaration of the South Summit, declaring that 'We n~ject t.l1e
so-called 'right' of humanitarian inte rvention," along with
other forms of coercion that the Summit also sees as traditional
impe ria lism in a new guise , including the specific forms of cor-
po rate-led internation a l integration called "globalization" in
Weste rn ideology.('
The most respec ted voices of the South joined in condem-
n a ti o n of NATO's operative principles. Visiting England in
4
NOAM CHOMSKY
Apri1 2000, Nelson Mandcla "acruseclthc[Briti!.~ll gmtrt.llllt'tl t
o l en<"ouraging int<rnationttl chao!'>. tngetlwr '''Hh \nH'llt'H, ~>~.
ignoring otiH'r nations ancl pla}'ing 'pol iun.l.tll ot th~ " :01ld .
SiJ}ing that "he rcsl'llttd the h<'haviouJ of both Bttl.tlll .11t<l
Anwric~ in l'icling roughshod mcr till' l 1 n itt'd Nations and
launching military actions agains1 Iraq anct Ko:-.ow> ""Such <li:.-
fo 1 int<'l'nttLional con\'cntions was more cbutgct ~ut' ~o
regllrd
wodd pcan:' than anyd 1ing th;\1 wa~ rurn.tllly happtntng 111
ACrica, Mr Mandcla said." In hi:. own words, ''What tht'\ <lit'
doing is far more sedous what is happening in :\It ic a-
th iH'I
7
especially tht' US and Britain. Jc is propet for tnt' to'"" '.hat. " .
\!\'hilt: in progress a year earlkr, tATO'!> bomhmg o l
Yugoslavia h ad been biurrly condemned in thl' "'orlcl'~ lmgt!'t
democracy, and eve n in Washington's most lo\'al anrl clqwncl-
t'nl dicn t state, higlt ly rt'gmdNI s trmegic ilnaly:.ts 1 t'~arcll'clt hl'
operation with consickrable skq)t icism. A111os Gilboa cko;c-rilwd
NATO's reversion 10 the "colonial tra" in dw famili:lr "cloak of
moralistic righteousness" as "a dang('l to dH' worlcl," '"''rnitlg
thai it would lead lO pro I if<.' rat ion of weapons o{ lll <L'<t dC'>ll tJ('-
tion for clctcrre ncc. Otlll'rs :.imply took it to be a pnrt:dttu for
reson to force whe n deemed appropriate. If till" need :u i!.l'~.
military histol'ian Zc'cv SchilT comm<nted, "Israel will du. to
Lebanon what NATO did to Kosovo": bradi torn.'' ate bemg
n .:suucturcd for quick and dci>trt t<"tiw air w:tr, l t>lving pat tku
I arty on the Kosovo preceden 1. Simi Iat atlilll<ks wctT ~xpre~sed
in th<.' sem i-officia l press o f the st'cond llading ll"Ctpitnt of US
a id and el sc 1vhere.~'~
~mong East European dissidents, the one.> mo~t prom i-
n e ntly featured in th(; Wl'SI was Vacla,l hwd , with his wekotlW
5
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
NOAM CHO M SKY

appreciation for the high moral purpose of Western leaders.

Sollhcnit!.yn remains a man "whom man} ~l't' .ll> the rott ll
Long before, he had achieved top rank among the West's
trv's voice of conscie n ct," admired fot his "l'ltg;ull .llld
I
favorites, particularly in 1990, when he addressed a joint ses-
reasoned styh:" wll(.: n ht ('Otl< l tllHl~ gtwttnnwnt cot ruplioll in
sion of Congress, receiving a standing ovation and rapturous
R11ssia.11 Btu not when he provick!> the wrong intc.t pnt;ltion of
acclaim from commentators who were deeply moved by his praise tlw 11cw era. In this case, he n.:n:ivcd tlw same ll'tautwnt a-. tlw
for his audience as "the defender of freedom " who "understood
South Summi l, and o tltcrs who do not sec tlw l iglu .
the responsibility that flowed" from power. A few weeks before,
Though unw:wtc.cl world opinion h.ts sranth btt'Jl
the responsibility had been demonstrated once again when US-
reported, it has been watched wi1h connrn h) lllOil' pencpti\t
armed state terrorisrs fresh from renewed US training blew out
an alyst!o.. U nivcrsit) of Chicag-o politi ca l 'i( icnti"t J ohn
the brains of six leading Latin American dissident intellectuals
:-.1carslwimt ob!.crw d that the Culf '"'r ol 1991 .llld the
in the course of yet another parm;'sm
. of terror supervised by
Koscwo war of 1999 "h<lrckned Indi a'~ <lcttrmination to po:-.... t..,s
"the defender of freedom." One can imagine the reaction to a
n llckar weapon:." as a d<.:tcrn: n 1 to US vioknc:c. II an a rei gov-
similar performance in the Duma by a Latin Am erican dissi-
ernment profc!>SOr Samucllluntington warned that "in tlw eye"
dent, had the situation been reversed. The reaction in the West
of many countrks" - most, he indic:-nc.s- the US "is becoming
in this case is instructive, and not without import. 9
th e rogue supcrpowc.r," p~rce ivcd <l!> "llw single grc.att."t l''\.t~r
There once was a dissident intellectual named Alexander
nal thn.:a t to thti societies." I k quote:-. a Briti11h diplom<ll '' ho
Solzhe nitsyn , who was also highly respected when he had the
says, "On<.' reads about the wodd'!, de~irt for Amc1 iran llackr-
right Lhings to say. But not in 1999. He saw the new era ra ther
ship only in the Un ited States," while "[c]vcrywhcn tlsc one
in the mann er of the South Summit, Mandela, and others out-
reads about American arroganct. and ttnilmetalism," which ''ill
side of the circles of enlightenment:
lead to consolidation or COl111Lcrforccs. H II 11 I i ngtoll sugg-e:-.h.
Five years earlier, shortly after publicity about a possihlc Non h
The aggressors have kicked aside the UN, opening a new era
Korean nuclcat' arsenal, ''LhcJapancsc named the Uni1cd State!.
whee m ight is right. There shou ld be no illusions that
as 'the biggest threat lo world pcacc,' followc:d by Russia and
NATO was aiming to defend the Kosovars. If the protection
only then by lonh Korea," Chalmers johnson recalls. During
of the oppressed was their real concern , they could have
the Kosovo war, suatcgic anai)'Sl o.m d former NATO plaunt:t
been defending for example the miserable Kurds
Michael MccGwire writes.

-"for example," because that is only one case, though a rather

the world a t large saw a political-mi litary alliance that tOok
striking 011e. 10
unto itself the role of judge. juqr and executioner, ...

6
7
I NTENTIONA L IGNORANCE AND ITS USES NOAM CHOMSKY

[which] claimed to b e acting on behalf of the international 2. Rt''pomihilit)' i!-. tnl1~tnccd bv pdvikgl'. by till' oppottunit\' to
community and was ready to slight the UN and skirt inter- il<'t with nlatiw impunity and .1 dtgnt of t:lk< tht'llt'''
national law in order to enforce its collective judgement. :t For prof<'s'>ion of high principlts w bt t.l'-.tn WI iothh, tlw
The world saw an organization given w moralistic rhetoric, pdncipk., mu't fin;,t and fonmo~tlw applitd lU <>IH''tll , IHil
one no less economi cal with the truth than others of its only to oflicial <'l1l'micll or othtt l> dl'..,ign,ul'cl '" umm1 tin in
kind; a grouping of Western states with an unmatched the prcvailin~ poliLiral culture.
technical capacity to kill , maim, and destroy, that was lim-
ited only by their unwillingness to put their ''warriors" at Ltt us a.'"mw the truism!> to bt llut. It i..,, h o\H'H'I , harclto
risk. miss the faCI that th 1c>ughout hi,tol ' .lnd in d1ttt.1lh .111 ~od
l'tics, they a1c: commonh honoltd in tlw h1~.Hh \ f.til
That seems a fair assessment, judging by the information avail- question, th en, is whether th<. lamilit11 p;:~uern ''" exhibited
able.t2 o n ce agRin in the ter minal yea1 of till' twentieth cttH\11 )'. ,\s
The world at large does not seem to be overly impressed by most of the world ~;e~ms to bllkv<. , or '' lwthet a tH'\\ t't .t ha~
the exploits and moral purpose of the new gene ration, or reas- dawned, "" the new gc:n<.1 ~ll ion and it~ adnlltt'l' dn l.lll'.
1 eally

sured by its commitment to ma ke the world safe by establishing On<. qucl.tion th.tt instant!\' COllll''> to mind i., lw" often , .tnd
the credibility of NATO. If evidence is deemed relevant, we lww carel'ull)'. tlw inquirr is nnck1 t.ll-\n. RaHI) to Ill\ 1-ltmd-
may ask which evaluation of th e new era is m o re credible: th e rdgc: th e conc lusions a rc taken to bl' :-.ell~evident. No inquit' j.,
flattering self~image wid1 its visionaqr promise, or the skepticism nl't-d ed, and l'H'Il w und<'rtakt it is <'<msidtnd di.,Jwnnt .tblt.
of those outside who see "more of the same." It is clear how \IICh an inqui1 \ \houlcl pro( l't'd. I o detl't
The matter should be examined carefully, ac least by those min e who h as the ~trongcr ca'l<'. thmt "ho h.lilthl' Ill''' t'l.l m

who are con cemed about the likely future, and who feel bound
by moral truisms. Among these, several might be mentioned as
particularly p ertinent:
l. People a tc responsible fo r the anticipated con sequences of
their choice of action (or inaction), a responsibility that
extends Lo the policy choices of one's own state to the extent
that the p o liLical community allows a degree of influence
over policy formation.
the skeptics, we -;hould examine how th e IH''' gener;uion
responds to circumstances in the. world when Wt' ran mal-.e a
differcnc<'" and th<.1ef'o1c "must try," as Cli nton ph1awd the
matter in propounding the Clin ton Ductdnc.
\'\'e therefore consider variom nwa\UtTS of l '~ im'llhl'l1ll'llt
in the world. One n itcrion is fonign aid: th<. '''mlcl's 1 i< ht't
and most privil<.gcd state would Mtrct r he able to "m,tke ,1 dif
fcrence" by helping those in need. T h e politica l kadtr.,hip ha.,
taken up this cha ll enge by compiling the most mi'i<' l h H'< mel in

8 9
 I NTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
the indusuial world, even if we include the major componen ~
aid to a rich counuy (Israel) and LO Egypt because of its associ-
ation with Israel. As the new era dawns, the record is becoming
still worse. The Foreign Aid Bill passed by the Senate in June
2000 "provided only $75 miUion for the world's poorest coun-
tries, a redu ction from the administration' $252 million
request," a shameful pirrance.l 3 In comparison, the Bill prO-
vides Sl .3 billion for the Colombian army, a matter to which we
return. Without proceeding, by this criterion the evaluation of
the skeptics js confirmed, with no contest.
Perhaps Lhis criterion is irrelevant for some (unclear)
reason. Let u s put it aside, then, and turn to the next natural
criteria: military aid and response to atrocities. The cop-ranking
recipienc of US military aid through th e Clinton )ears has been
T urkey, 14 the home of l 5 million of Solzhenitsyn 's "miserable
Kurds." That seems an appropriate place to begi11 .
At the peak of e nthusiasm over our dedication to pri nciples
and values, in April 1999, NATO commemorate d its fiftieth
ann ive rsary. It was not a celebration; rather, a somber occa-
sion, under the shadow of vicious a trocities and ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo. It was agreed th at Lhe "modern notions
of justice" crafted by the enlightened states do not permit
such honors so close to the borders of NATO. Only within the
borders of NATO: here large-scale atrocities and ethnic
cleansing a re not only tolerable, but it is furthermore our
duty to expedi te them. We must not merely "stand by and
watch the systematic state-directed murder of other people,"
but must go on to make an essential contribution to ensuring
that it reaches proper heights of terror and destruction , while
10
NOAM CHOMSKY
dirtning our gat.c wiLh lase r-lik~ int<'nsirv to tht tvil work ol
official t'llcmit's.
lr tool.. considerable cli'ocipline a t tlw NATO annin-t"u, lo t
parri cipanls and comnw tHators "not lO nOLin:" rhat some of
rhc won.r ethnic clean.!>ing of rht: l 990. \\,ts tak.ing place ''1thr11
NATO irst: lC in ~outh-ca~tern Turk<v; ,llld lunht mor c. th.ll
these massive ;Hrociries Hliccl on a huge llo"' of anus fm111 till'
\'\'csr, O\'crwhclrningh from tlw Cniwd Staw..,, "hit h pn)\idl'cl
about 80 per cent of Turkey'.!> arms as tlw arrodtit.., peak.td b,
the' mid-1990s. As a strategic all) and milrtan <HIIJ>0'-1, J utl..l'\
had received a substantial now of US .trill' throughomtlw po~t
Worlcl War 11 tr<t. Arms rransf<.rs imrea~cd sharph 111 H>H..J, '"
furkq initiart:d a military campaign ,,gaino;r it!-. mi\t't.lhh--
oppressed Kurdish population. Militan, policl. aucl
paramilirary opcril tions incrcaM.:d in intcnsiry and' ioltnct 1n
the 1990'>, along with atrocitjcs and US arms and militan u a in
ing. Turkcv set two records in 1994, correspondt'tlt .Jonath.m
Ra ndal observed: 1994 was ..the ycnr of the worst nptc,,ion tn
the Kurdish pto\'in ce~." and dw vea when Tur kev lxcamt "tlw
biggest single importer ofAmericaJl milit<1ry hardware and thus
rhe world 's largest arms purcha\et," including advanced .trnM-
menL<;, all of which wer( eventually ustd ag<linst rhe Kwd.,,"
along with extensive co-producrio n and other co-operation with
Turkey's militar}' and it~ mi litar)' indtr'oll')'. In tlw )car 1997
alone, arms from the Cli nton Administration surpa,st:d tlw
en tire period from 1950 to 1983. 1!'
Thanks lO the steady llupply of heavy armament'>, militaJ,
training, and cliploml'ltic suppon, Turkey was able to crush
Kurdish resistance, leaving cen!l of Lhousands killed, 2-3 millio n
,,
INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
refugees, and 3,500 villages destroyed (seven times Kosovo
u nder ATO bombing).
In this case, responsibility is easy to determine. Oppression
of Kurds, and T urks who called for justice, has been outrageou s
since the founding of the modern Turkish state. The brutalit:y
of the counter-insurgency war has been ampl)' recorded b y
highly credibl e sou rces. There is not th e slig h test question
about the contribution of "the idealistic New World bent on
ending inhumanity." Presumably, it is the impossibility of con.-
jllling up a pretext of even minimal plausibility that accounts
for the virtual suppression of these auocities and Washington 's
role in implementing th em. 1G
On the rare occasions when the matter breaks through the
silen ce, the typical reaction is that the "American fa ilure to pro-
tect Kurds in Turkey is inconsistent with its self-declared
intention Lo p rotect Kosovars," in the words of T h omas
Cushman. Or, according to Arych Neier, that the US "toler-
ated" the abuses suffered by the I<.urds. 17 These regrettable
lapses sh ow that we are sometimes "in co nsistent" and "look
away"- because of the limits of o u r capacity LO stop injustice,
accordi n g to a common theme, articulated by the leader of th e
enlightened stales in the manner quoted above.
Such reactions constitute a particularly sharp rejection of
th e moral truisms mentioned earlier: they are cyn ical apolo-
getics for mqjor atrocities for whi ch one shares direct
responsibility. There was n o "looking away" in the case of
Tmkcy and the Kurds: Washington "looked right there," as did
its a llies, saw what wa.c; h appen ing, and acted decisively to inten-
sify th e atrocities, particulady during d1e Clin ton years. T h e
12
N OAM CHOMSKY
LIS did not "!~ti l to protect tlw Kurds" o t "tolt1atl'" th( .tbtt-.t''
thl'\ ~nfknd, any more than Ru ...-.i.t "htil!'> to pmtnt"tlw JH'oplt
ol (;roiiW or ''tolnaws" thei1 :-.ttf'fc: ring. llw ll('W gtnct.ttimt
dtl'W the line O\ ron~ciomh pulling a ... man) gum,,, pn...-.ihlt
into the hands of lhc killtrs ancltonunt ., -not just gum. hut
jet plant' tank\, hclicopl<' r gunships, all tlw tnO'il ach.mnd
instruments ofu1 rot - somtlimc' in !ll't nt, bt'LIIt'>t' at Ill\ \H'tt
\{'Ill in violation or congrn.sional lc:gisl,\1 ion.
At no point '''l' then. ,\11) dt'lensin.: put J>O'>C, nm <ll1\ 1clauon
to the Cold War. That should come a~ no surpriS<': IIIli< h tlw
same. has been true: cl..,ewhtrc as \\<'11 tht ough tlw Cold \\';u H.:ar....
Thi-. we karn from dost' allcntion Lo tilt' hiswriral t'\'t'Jils au<l
intt'l nal planning ncord, though great pow<.' I t unfmlHatton-.
wc.~rc alwa}'S in the background and prm idcd u:.<.'lul ptttn.h fot
tlw 1 <:"SOrt to force, terror and economic warfaH'. F111 thtt mon.
the ch arge of "inlOll/>istcnry" rcquins pmof. not nwn '''trtimt
it is nccc<:sary to cil:mon<;trmc. not merclv prorlaim, tlMt ot htt
a< tions art' humanitari<ul in inttnt, a po.,tun~ th.lt .\CCOlllJ>anie...
virtuall)' cwry resort to f(>rce tJt roughout history.
.\more rcali:.tic imcrpntation is gi,cn b) I im Jud.th in hi'
account of' 1he confli ct in Kosovo: "Wesl<.'l n coun tde:.lll.l) wl'll
S) mpathitt' with the plight or the Kurds 01 Tibt(,\Jl'i," 01 Lilt' \i(
tims o f Russian bombing in Chechnya, "but rralpobtth nw<m~
that there i-; liu.lc they are wi lling, or able, to dow help them. "1x
In the case ofTibet an s and Chcchcns, hl'lping them might k.\cl
to a major war. ln the case o f the Kurds, helping them would
interfere with US powe1 intereSL'>. Acconlingl). we cannot help
them but must rather join in p<.'rpctnuing atrociti<'s again.;t
Lhem; and respon.,ible intellectuals mmt keep Lhc lruth IHddtn
13
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
under a veil of silence, apologetics, and deceit while hailing
their leaders, and themselves, for their unique devotion to
"principles and values."
One of the regions most devastated by the US- Turkish assault
was Tunccli, nonh of the Kurdish capital of Dyirbakir, where
one-third of the villages were destroyed and ,ast tracts were set
aflame by US-supplied helicopters and jets. "The terror in
Tunceli is state terror," a Turkish minister conceded in 1994,
reporting that village burning and terror had aheady driven 2
million people from their homes, left without even a tent to
protect them. On April l 2000, 10,000 Turkish troops began a
n ew sweep of the area, while 5-7,000 troops with hel icopter
gunships crossed into Iraq to attack Kurds there once again- in
a "no-fly zone," where Kurds are protected by the US Air force
from the (temporarily) wrong oppressor. 19
Recall Lhal in Serbia, NATO was "fighting because no decent
person can stand by and watch the systematic state-directed
murder of olher people," as Vaclav Havel puts iL V\'hile, accord-
ing to Tony Blair, the "new generation" ofleaders wa!) enforcing
"a new internationalism where the brutal repression of \\hole
ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated" and "those responsi-
ble for such crimes have nowhere to hide. " And, in the words of
President Clinton, "If somebody comes after innocent ci,ilians
an d tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their
ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power
to stop it, we will stop it." But it is not within our power to stop
our own enthusiastic participation in "systematic state-directed
murder" and "brutal repression of whole ethnic groups," and
those responsible for such crimes have no need to hide; rather,
14
NOAM CHOMSKY
they enjoy the accolades of the cducatC'd classes, who marvel at
the saintly glow" of theit deeds and the high ideals that inspire
them.
Furthermore, "decent people" are expected to understand
that NATO powers are not only emicled to oppress and terror-
ize their own populations, with our lavish assistance, but also to
invade other countries at will. The same prerogative extends to
non-NATO client states, notably [sracl, which occupied South
Lebanon for twenty-two years in violation of Security Council
orders, but with US authorizat ion and assistance, and during
those years killed tens of thousands of people, repeated ly driv-
ing hundreds of thousands from their homes and destroying
civilian infrastructure, again in early 2000 - always with US
support a nd anns. Virtually none of this had to do with self-
defense, as is weU mcognizcd within Israel and by human 1;ghts
organ izations, though different stories are preferred in the US
in formation system. 20
In June 2000, Israel did at last withdraw from Lebanon , or
more accurately, was driven out by Lebanese resistance. The
UN General Assembly voted to provide almost $150 million for
UN (UNIFIL) monitors to e nsure sectuit)' in southern Lebanon
and facilitate reconstruction of the devastated t-egion. The res-
olution passed 110-2. The US and Israe l voted agai nst it
because it also called upon Israel to pay the UN some $1.28 mil-
lion in comp ensation for its attack on a UN compound, killing
over 100 civi lians wl1o had taken refuge there, dming its 1996
invasion of Lebanon. 21
The achieveme nts of Western terror are highly regarded.
J ust as Turkey was lau nching new military campaigns in its
15
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
south-east region and across l.he border on April 1 2000, Secretary
of Defense William Cohen addressed the American-Turkish
Council Conference in a festive event ,,~th much laughter and
applause. He praised Turkey for taking part in the humanitar-
ian bombing of Serbia and announced Lhat Turkey would
participate in developing the Pentagon's advanced Joint Stlike
fighter, just as it was co-producing Lhe F-16s that it has been
using to such good effect in approved forms of ethnic cleansing
and other atrocities-with in NATO, not near irs borders. "This
is an exciting time to really not only be alive, but tO be in posi-
tions of public service," Cohen continued, as "we have entered.
with the turn of the century, a brave ne\.v world" with "so much
creative opponuni[y out there that all of us can lake advantage
of," symbolized by the US-Turkey jet fighter project that will
"put Turkey in the forefront and leadership of building a secUJe
and stable Middle East" along with its close Israeli ally.
Shortly after, t11e State Department released its "latest
annual report describing the adm inistration's efforts to combat
terrorism, " Judith Miller reported. The report singled out
Turkey for praise for its "positive experiences" in showing how
"tough counter-terrorism measures plus political dialogue
with non-terrorist opposition groups" can overcome the
plague of violence and atrocities, reponed without a trace of
embarrassment.22
The first case sr:udy strongly confirms th e evaluation of the
new era by the skeptics. Perhaps it even gives some insight into
the "moral purpose'' that inspires us: "A gross injustice had
been done to people, right on the doorstep of the European
Union, which we were in a posit..ion to prevent and reverse, and
16
NOAM CHOMSKY
we had to do th at," in the words of Tony Blair.23 Blair is not
referring to t;ghleous terror and ethn ic cleansing that his gov-
ernment and its allies h elp to implement within NATO, but
rather the atrocities that were being carried o ut by an official
enemy, under NATO's bombs.
rn 1999, Turkey relinquished its position as the leading
recipient of US military aid, replaced by Colombia.24 We there-
fore have a second natural case study for the inquiry into the
alternative ~;:valu ations of the new era.
Colombia has ha.d the worst human Tights record in th e
Western hemisphere through the 1990s and has also been the
hemisphere's leading bcneliriary of US miHtary aid and training,
a longstanding correlation.25 Colombia receives more Lhan Lhe
rest of Latin Amel-ica and the Caribbean combined, with a three-
told inc1ease from 1998 to 1999. The total is sch edu led to
increase sharply wit11 the US contribution to the $7.5 billion "Plan
Colombia," atuibuted to Bogota t110ugh ''with heavy coaching
from the Americans, as the Wall Streetjournal puts it; according to
non-US diplomats, the Plan was written in English. Plan
Colombia calls for the US to provide over $ 1 billion in military
aid, while others are lO fund social, economic, and human rights
programs. The military component was put in place during 1999,
extending earlier programs; the rest is in abeyancc. 26
The shift in rank reflects the fact that Turkey's eLhnic cleans-
ing operations and other aLrocities lhrough the 1990s largely
succeeded, at severe human cost; while state terror in
Washington's client state of Colombia is still fa1 from having
achi eved its goals, despite some 3,000 political murders and
300,000 refugees a year, th e total by now perhaps approaching
17
 I N T ENTI ON A L IG N O RAN CE A N D ITS USES
2 million, the third largest population of displaced people i n
the world after Sudan and Angola. A political party outside the
traditional elite power-sharing arrangement was permitted to
function in 1985. It was soon "annihilated," with over 3,50 0
members "murdered or disappeared , ~2 7 including presiden tial
candidates, mayors, and others, a feat accomplished without
tarn ishing Colombia's democratic credentials in Wash ington.
The overwhelming mass of atrocities are atrributed to para-
militaries, who are closely linked to Lhe military lhat receives US
aid and train ing, all heavily involved in narco-traffickin g_
According to the Colombian governmem and leading human
r ights groups (lhe Colombian Commission of jurists and
others), the rate of killings increased by almost 20 per cent in
1999 and the proportion atrributed to the paramil itaries rose
from 46 per cent in 1995 to almost SO per cent in 1998, contin -
u ing through 1999. The State Department confirms the gen eral
picture in its annual human rights reports. Its report covering
1999 concludes that "security fo rces actively collaborated with
members of paramilitary groups" while "Government forces
con tinued to commit numerous, serious abuses, inclu d in g
extrajudicial killings, at a level that was roughly similar to that of
1998," wh en th e Department attributed to the military an d
paramilitaries about 80 per cent of atrocities \\~th an iden tifi-
able source.
Massacres reached over one a day in early 1999 as Colombia
displaced Turkey as the leadin g recipient of US arms. In
J une-August 1999,200,000 more people were drhen from their
h omes, according to Colombian and inter nati ona l human
rights organizations.
18
NOAM CHOMSKY
T he escalating US military aid is under the pretext of a drug
war that is taken seriously by few competent observe1s, for sub-
stantial reasons. Quite apart from the matter of p lausibility, it is
noteworthy that the p retext is baseu on the remarkable presup-
position, virruall)' unquestioned, that the US has the righ t to
carry out military actions and chemical and biological warfare in
other counuies to eradicate a crop it does not like, though pre-
sumably "modern notions ofj ustice" do not encitle Colombia-
or Thailand, or China, or many others- to do the same in North
Carolina, to eliminate a far more lethal d rug, which tl1ey have
been compelled to accept (along with advertising) under threat
of trade sanctions, at a cost of millions of lives.
The second case study leads to the same conclu sion as the
first: the new era is much like earlier ones, including the fami l-
iar "cloak of moralistic righteousness."
Let us turn to a th ird example, perhaps the most obvious
test case for evaluating the conflicting interpretations of the
new era.
While Colombia replaced Turkey as leading recipient of US
militar y aid, and the US and Britain were preparing to bomb
Serbia in pursuit of their moral purpose, important events were
underway in another part of the world, the scene of one of the
worst human rights catasrrophes of the late twentieth centur y:
East T imor, which in 1999 was subjected to new atrocities, so
exueme that they came to rank alongside of Kosovo in the con-
cerns of the new era for human rights, humanitarian
interven tion, and limits of sovereignty.
T h e mod ern tragedy of East T imor has unfolded since
December 1975, when Indonesia invaded and occupied the
19
INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
former Portuguese colonr after it had declared independence,
later annexing iL. The invasio n led to the slaughter of some
200,000 people, almost one-third of Lhe population, and vast
dcsLruction, torture, and terror, renewed once again in 1999.
To determine how the second major example of 1999 bears on
the conflicting interpretation of the ne\'' era. we want to deter-
mine what ha!> taken place, and how it i'> depicted. I \\il1 keep
here to a summary, returning to a closer look in chapter 2.
The events of 1999 are re\iewed in the January 2000 issue of
the American journal of Intrnwtional Law. offering the standard
Western version: that the auocitics in E~t Timor took place six.
months after Kosovo - thai i!'l, after the August 30 1999 tefer-
endum on independence- but that:
Un like the case ofKoso\o. which precedNILhe e\enL<> in East
Timor by six months, no state. (including the United States)
advocated a forcible miliLaq' intcrvemion in East Timor. The
apparenL reasons for this reluctance were that Jndonesia pos-
sessed a sLrong military, that such a n intervention was likely
to be sbongly opposed by nearby China, and that concerned
states believed that Indonesia's consent LO a multinational
force would, in any case, soon be fonhcoming. 28
The account is indeed standard. To select a nother example Yir-
tually at random, consider William Shawcros'>'s recent sLUdy of
the interaction of the three "benign forces" in the world- the
UN, the NGOs, and the liberal dcmocracic!'l- a nd the "mal ign
force" of "warlords who have dominated the 1990s," Sad darn
Hussein and Slobodan Miloscvic being "the two who stand
20
NOAM CHOMSKY
out."29 Some places were "bath ed by the light of the Wesl's con-
cern - Bosnia and Kosovo, for example," though "others were
obscured by our lack of interest. " The book ends with a chapter
entitled "From Kosovo to East Timor," reOcctjng the perceived
order of evenL'i in these two major crises of 1999: "in both cases
the imernational cornmunity was forced to confront a human-
itarian disaster which was in part the product of its own neglect,
and had to decide what price it was prepared to pay to right it."
Many commentators have described the intervention in
Kosovo as a precedent for the dispatch of peacekeeping forces
to East Timor. Hence even oitics of the NATO bombing agree
that it had benign effects. Others point ou t tl1at ''Lhc United
States does not waHL to be a 'globocop' now any more than iL did
in the past, sacrificing Amedcan resource:. and live!) to the East
Timors of the world," as when a UN peacekeeping force entered
"Indonesian tcrriwry ... to sLOp the killing" at US initialivc.:~o
Virtually none of this is tenable. The truth of the matter,
readily established, tells us a good deal about the norms of con-
duct that are likely to prevail if self-serving doctrine remains
immune to critical reflection, and moral Ltuisms arc kept at
the margins of consdousness.
The humanitar-ian catastrophe in East Timor was not "the
product of [the] neglect" of the liberal dernocracies.ll was sub-
stantially their creation, as in the previous cases discussed.
When invading East Timor in 1975, indonesia relied almost
entirely on US arms and diplomatic suppon, renewed as auoc-
it ies reached near-genocidal levels in 1978 and pe rsisting as
violent oppression took its w it at the hands of a criminal who
ranks high among the elite of Shawcross's "malign force," and
21
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
was roULinelv praised as a "mocleraw" who is "at heart benign -
"our kind of guy,"' in the word., of the Clinton Administration -
until he lost comrol in 199i and had to be di carded. In 1978.
as Suhano's slaughter in East Timor peaked in fury, the D s
was joined b) Britain, along with France and other powers_
US-British uppon and panicipation continued through the
escalating humanit.arian catastrophe of 1999 and its consum-
mation after the August 30 referendum on independence. East.
Timor was "'Indonesian tcrritorv" only in that leaders of the
liberal democracies effectively, authorized the conquest in vie-
lation of Security Council direCli\'es and a \'\'orld Court ruling_
The order of events in th e standard \'ersion is cru cially
reversed. The latest wave of atrocities in Easr Timor was under-
way from ovember 1998. \\'ell before the referendum on
indep endence, atrocities in l 999 alone had reached levels
beyond Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing, the relevant stan-
dard of comparison. Funhermore, ample public information
was availabJe indicating that much worse was to come unless the
population submitted to Indonesian terror, and far more was
known to Australian and surely US intelligence. Nonetheless,
the new generation continued to provide military aid, even to
conduct joim military exercises jusr prior to the referendum,
while opposing any move to deter the further atrocities they
had every reason to expect Even after the August 30 referen-
dum, the US insisted that Tndonesia must remain in control of
the illegally occupied territory while its forces virtually
destroyed the counlry and drove 750,000 people- 85 per cent
of th e population- out of their homes.
Whatever one thinks ofKosovo, it could not have served as a
22
NOAM CHOMSKY
precedent for humanitarian intervention in East Timor because
of the riming alone; and more fun damentall}' because humani-
tarian intervention never took place. There was, in fact, no
"intervcn Lion" at all in any serious sense of th e term, nor could
there have been, if onl}' because there was no question of sover-
eignty. Even Australia, the one Western country to have granted
explicit de jure recognitio n to rhe Indonesian annexation (in
large measure because of its interest in j oin t exploitatio n of
Timoresc oi l), had renounced that stand in J anuary 1999.
Indonesia's sovereign rights were comparable to those of Nazi
Germany in occupied Eu rope. They rested solely on great power
ratification of aggression and massacre in this Portuguese-
administered territory. a Ul\: responsibility. The Russian drive to
the West during World War II and the Normandy landing were
not interventions; a joTiiori, the entry of Australian-led UN
peacekeeping forces after the Indonesian army withdrew does
not quali fy as intervention. The issue of humanitarian inter-
vemion does not even arise, though this is one of the rare cases
when it is possible to speak seriously of humanitarian intent, at
least on the pan of Australia, or, more accurately, iLS population,
who were bitterly critical of their government's fail ure to act as
the toll of victims mounted from early 1999.
One element of the standard version is correct: no state
advocated military intervention - reasonably enough, since
there is Jiu le cason to suppose that any form of "i ntervention"
wou ld have b een n eeded to terminate the atrocities, either
those of 1999 or of the preceding decades of horror. There wa
110 need to impose sanctions or to bombjakana. Even the hint
of withdrawal of par ticipation in mid-September 1999 sufficed
23
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
lO make it clt-ar to the Indonec;ian genentls that the game ,,-as
O\'er. The result could \'erv likeh ha,e been achieved in similar
,,~avs long be fmc, had Lhc:re been .uw willingness to interfere
with the exploito; of the ~malign force" who was so ably serving
the interests of \\'e:-.tcrn powtr and pli,ilege.
The standard reasom put fonh to dic;Linguish Kosovo from
East Timor, just qumed, arc not ,en comincing. Serbia ..pos-
sessed a SLrong militan." th t main reason "hy invasion was never
contemplated and bomber\ ~cptto ,\safe di ranee. More impor-
tant, Indonesia\ armv, unlike that of Serbia, is heavily depende.n. t:
on the United States, as was rc,ealed in mid-Septemb er 1999,
when Clinton finally give the sit-,rmtl LO desi l. Russia strongly
opposed the NATO bombing, but that did nol deLcr the U S and
its allies. Pdor to mid-September, there ,,~.t..., no expecta tion that:
In donesia would ~conse nt w a multinational force," if Only
because the "concerned state~" had C\inccd no serious interest
in this outcome (and Indonco;ia firmly rejected it). The main
opponent of even unarmed "imer\'cnlion" in the earlier mon th.s
of 1ising terro r had been Washington, <lllcl its opposition per-
sisted at the height of the posH eferendurn aLrocities.
Washington 's principles were ou tlined succinctl} b y the
h ighly regarded Australian diplomat Richard Butler, who
transmitted to his fellow countrymen what he h ad learned from
"senior American analysts": the US will act in its ovm perceived
interest; others are to shoulder the burdem and face the costs,
unless some power interest is ser ved.'' That seems a fair rendi-
tion of the reality of the new era of enlightenment and high
principle, as the case of East Timor dramaticall)' illustrates,
adding another informative case study to the list.
24
NOAM CHOMSKY
One of the leading principles of the new era is that sover-
eignty may now be d isregarded in the imerest o r de fe nding
human rights; disregarded by the "enlightened states," that is,
not b)' others. Thus, the US and Britai n accordLh emselvcs the
right to carry out military and economi c warfare \\~Lh [}l c
altcged intent of' conLaining Saddam H ussein, but there is no
thought of endorsing an Iranian invasio n of Iraq to ovcnhrow
Lhe tyram , though Iran suffered grievously f'rom the Iraqi inva-
sion oflran , backed by the US and Britain, among others. The
proclaimed principle has merit, or would, if' it were upheld in a
way that honest people could take seriously. The rcsuiction of
agents already undercuts that possibi lity. The two prime exam-
ples brougln forth in 1999 suffice to eliminate any f'unher
illusions.
Indonesia's non-existent claim to sovereignty in East Timo1
wa<> acc01ded the most d elicate respect under the operative
prin ciples of the enlighten ed states. T hey insisLed thal its mili-
tary forces must be assigned responsibil ity for security while
th ey were conducting yet another reign of ten or. A<; for Kosovo,
the US and its allies r equire that it must remai n under Serbian
sovereignty, probably out of fear of a "greater Albania." But the
sovere ignty that NATO insists upon in Serbia is "uumped " by its
claim that it is defending h uman rights, unlike East Timor,
where non-sovere ign ty "trumps" any concern for th e human
rights that th e leaders of NATO are brutally violating.
The new era is a dazzling one in deed.
The realities that Richard Butler described were well illus-
trated in East Timor in April 1999, the peak mom ent of
exu berance about the new era. By th en massacres organized by
2S
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
the lJ oopl> arrnt:'d and trained ))\ the VS and Britain were a
regular occurrence, '>ome cxtraordinan. exten ively repo~ed
in Australia particular!\'. On Augmt 6- by coincidence the day
of the repon on the nc.:" Clinton Oocu-ine wid1 its commitment.
"to stop" the killing of "innocent civilians" if "it's within our
power" to do so - the Church in Eal>t Timor reported t..hat.
3-5,000 people had been killed so far in 1999. about twice the
number killed on all sides in Kmovo in the year before the
NATO bombing, according to :-.:ATO. And under ,ery different
circumstances. The East Timorcse ,;ctims of Western-supported
Indonesian aggression were defenseless ci,ilian . There was no
active fighting, no takeo\'er of sub,tanlial territory by foreign_
based guerri llas, no attacks on police and chi lians with the
avowed goal of eliciting ,iolent retaliation that would lead to
Western mili tary intervention. The small resistance forces 'vere
confined to isolated mountain areas with "irtually no interna-
tional cont.act, and th e atrocities were almost entirely
attributable to the occupying arm} and its paramilitary associ-
ates, and of course to their foreign backers, pri marily the Ds
and Britain, as had b ee n true for twent,-fmu )t:ars. The situa-
tion in Kosovo, to which we tum in chapter 3. was differe nt in
all of these respects.
In East Timor in 1999, the principle and values of the
enligh tened states dictated the sa me conclusion as in T urkey
and in Colombia, where massacres had reached over one a day:
supp ort the killers. There was also one reponed massacre in
Kosovo, at R.acak on January 15 (forty-five killed). T hat event
allegedly inspired such horror among Western humanitarians
that it was necessary to bomb Yugoslavia ten weeks later with the
26
NOAM CHOMSKY
expectation, quickly fu lfilled, that the consequence might be a
sharp escalation of atrocities. 32
These examples constitute only a partial sample of the cir-
cumstances that evoked the remarkable ch o rus of
self-congratulation about lhe new era in which Western leaders
devote themselves to their "moral purpose" in the name of "the
international community" -which objects, strenuously and
irrelevantly. Putting aside the actual facts about Kosovo, the
performance was gready facilitated by silence or deceit about
what would h ave been highligh ted at the same time, if the
moral truisms mentioned at the outset could be entertained.
T he test cases most directly relevant to the conflicting evalu-
ations of the new era are those just briefly reviewed: major
atrocities of th e curren t period that could have easily been mit-
igated or terminated merely by withdrawal of d irect and
decisive participation- or in the terminology favored by ap ol-
ogists for State violence, atrocities that the US utolerated" while
"failing to protect" the victims. The preferred test cases, how-
ever, are Chechnya, Tibet, and others that have the advantage
that the current phase of the crimes can be attributed to o thers.
The only questions that arise have to d o with our reaction to the
other fellow's crimes. a far more comfortable stance.
The most extreme examples of this categor y are the African
wars. Putting aside highly relevant h istory, the atrocities are not
directly sponsored by the new gen eration, as in the examples
reviewed. H ere Washington's attitude is very much as outlined
by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and diplomat
Richard Butler: there is no perce ived gain in assisting the vic-
tims of terror, so there is no need to respond (except by
27
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
~ending ar rns to fud the conflicts) A.., plans to bomb Serbia
were eachmg their final <;t<tKes in f(bruan 1999, Western
diplomat.s dec;c JJb<:d Clmton ., policic., in Africa as "leaving
Africa tO '>Oh( it'i own c1 i\e,. Eu1 opt an and t:N diplornat:.s
reponed th at Mthc L nitecl tatt'' ha' anin-h thwarted efforts by
the United ~at1ons to t.tkC" on pearekct>ping operations t:hat:
might han: pc,cnrtd .,omc of Africa\ wars.K In the Congo,
Clinton's refusal to pm\lde tmial ~o,um' for L':\ peacekeepers
''Lorpedoed" the C~' proposal. acrorcling to the UN' senior
Africa envoJ. SJ<.:rrn Leone 1 ~ a su i~ing e>-ample. In 1997.
~Wash ington dragged out di ..cu<;sions on a British propo al to
deploy peacekeepers," then did nothing in the face of mount:-
ing h orrors. In Ma) 2000, U Secretan-General Kofi Annan
called for mil ita y support for the L':\ peacekeeping forces that
were unable to contain the auociti(''>. But US officials reported
that "the Clinton admini!)U-ation would not budge from offer-
ing on ly logistical and technical !>uppOt l ," \\llich turn ed out t:o
be a fraud. Climon offered US planes, bm only for an exorbi-
tant fee. "Wh en Washington offero; support eq uipm ent, like
planes to fly in other countries' troops, 'the t;S offer are usu-
ally three limes the comm<.rcial rate'," Annan said, and
"Washington will not put an American officer on the ground.,.
I t rs
. d J'f ficult for the UN to afford C\en commercial rates
because of the US refusal to pa) ir,!) debt.' 3
. Again the same conclusions. With a degree of dari[)' rare in
mternational affairs, the cvaluatjon of tbe new era by the skeptics
wins hands down. Though wir:hout any possible effect, because
of th e impe netra ble cocoon spun by respon.,ible intellectuals:
a t worst, we "tolerate" the crimes of others, and we may then
28
NOAM CHO MSKY
proceed lo castigate ourselves for fai ling to reaCL properly to
them, thereby revealing our commitment to high moral princi-
ples and willingness to acknowledge even our most selious flaws.
While elementary considerations suffice to put to rest the
tri u mphalism thal accompan ied th e bomb ing of Serbia,
nonetheless the quesdon of why the decision was made to go to
wa remains open, as does the question of its legitimacy. It
remains possible that there really is an "inconsistency," though
not of the kind d iscussed in the apologetic literature: it i pos-
sible tha t in the special case ofKosovo, the new generation was
vio lating standard operating procedure and acting with a
"moral purpose," as claimed- wi th considen-lble passion, but
little delectable argument.
As noted, the official justifications, which emained fairly
constant throughout, were reiterated by Secretar y of Defense
William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Henr y
Shelton in j anuar y 2000: the primary motivating factors were:
1. "Ensuri ng the stability of Easte rn Europe "
2. "Thwar ting ethnic cleansing"
3. "En suring NATO 's credibility"
tho ugh the second alone wou ld not have sufficed, National
Security Adviser Sandy Berger elaborated. "Nationa l imcrest"
must be at stake, the fi rst and third reasons.
The third reason is the one that has been most insistently
advanced, and it has merit, when pro perly understood: "credi-
bili ty of NAT O" means "credibility of US power"; the "disorderly"
elements of the world must understand the price they will pay if
29
INTENTIONAL IGN ORANCE AND I TS USES
they do not heed the orders of the master in Washington.!S<l The
first reason - "ensuring stabilt'ty" - a ISO has p IaUSI'bili' I)', t110Ugh
agam terms must be understood properly: not in their literal
~ut in ~ei~ ~o~uinal sense. Correctly understood, a region i~
stable tf It ts mcorporated within the US-dominated global
syste_m with approved interests served and the right power cen-
ters m charge.
In the literal but not the doctrinal sense, Eastern Europe wa~
mo~tly stable under Kremlin mle. In the doctrinal sense, the
regiOns
T
dominated by Jakarta became stable in 1965 when .~\
m1 ttary dictaLOrship was imposed after a Rwanda-style slau gh ter
that destroyed the mass-based party of poor peasants, the PIQ
which "h a c1 won wtdespread suppor t not as a revolutionar,
party but as a n organizalion defending the interests of th e po
'th or
WI m the existing system," developing a "mass base among the
peasantry" th rough its "vigor in defending the interests of
Lhe . poor." Concern that the PKI could not be blocked b
i:
.. d'
or mary democratic means" was a primary reason fo \
Washington's clandestine war aiming to dismantle Indonesia
1958, and when that failed, support for the military, whose goal
was "lO exterminate the PKI."35 For this reason, along with i ~
pro-china stance, the PKI was a source of "instability." US-UK
Partietpauon
m subsequent atrocities of the perpeu-ators of th
1965 slaugh ter s un d erstandable, gven
. e
. .ts "so
that Indonesa
central to the stability of the region," as explained once again in
Sep~ember 1999 as Indonesia's assau lts mounted in ferocity.
. Stmilarly Wa~h
..., mg t on h a d to .tmpose a murderous mthtar
.. , 'Operation Horseshoe', would have led to even more home-
dtctatorship 1n G uatemala because .1ts first democratic gover )
"h n-
tn ern as bee ome an .mcreasmg . threat to the stabili ty of
30
NOAM CHOMSKY
r londuras and El Salvador," State Department officials warned.
Stability in the doctrinal sense was threatened because
Cuatemala 's "agrarian reform is a powerful propaganda
\\Capon; its broad social program of aiding the workers and
peasants in a victorious suuggle against the upper classes and
large foreign enterprises has a suong appeal to the populations
of Central American neighbors where similar conditions pre-
\'ai l. " After forty years of terror, there are no such programs, so
Guatemala is not a threat to stabili ty. ln the doctrinal sense, it is
t'ven possible, without contradiction , to "destabilize" in order to
bring "sta bili ty." Thus Nixon-Kissinger "efforts to destabilize a
freely elected Marxist govern ment in Chile" were undertaken
because "we were determined to seck stability," a leading for-
eign affairs analyst observed. 3fi
Understanding terms in their doctrinal sense, it is reason-
able to suppose that "ensuring the stability of Eastern Europe"
was a goal of the bombing, along with "ensuri ng NATO's cred-
ibility."
The secondjustificatjon- "thwarting ethnic cleansing" - had
little cred ibility during the war, and that little has diminished
considerably in the light of extensive evidence that has since
been provided by the US and other Western sources.
Elaborating this second justification, Coh en and Shelton assert
that prior lO t.he bombing, "lhe Belgtade regime's cruel repres-
sion in Kosovo [had] created a humanitarian crisis of staggering
proportions," and "Milosevic's cam paign, which h e dubbed
lessness, starvation, a nd loss of life had his ruthlessness gone
unchecked." Before the March 24 1999 bombing, Milosevic was
31
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
"finalizing this barbaric plan,'' and on March 2 1, the day after
the withdrawal of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) mon-
itoJs, Serb forces "launched a m~or offensive," "dubbed
'Operalion Horseshoe'." Testifying before Congress a few
months earlier, Cohen said that "now we know, in retrosp ect,
that he had an Operation Horseshoe whereby he was deter-
mined he was going to carry out his objectives. and he believed
that he cou ld carry them out in a very short period oftime, in
a week or so," had the bombing n ot th warted his plans.37
"Operatio n Horseshoe" has been adduced by many knowl-
edgeable commentators as a justification for the bombing. To
memion only one example, Brookings Institution seni or fel-
lows Ivo Daalder and Mi chael O 'lfanlon, with expeiience in
and out of government on Balkans-related issues, write that in
late 1 998, "Milose,ic approved Operation Horse hoe -a plan of
truly evil proportions designed to reengineer Kosovo by push-
ing much of itS civilian population permanently ou t of th e
province." Therefore current "problems in Kosovo are nothing
compared with what would have happened if NATO had not
intervened. "38
One fact is unquestioned: the NATO bombing was foll owed
by a rapid escalation of atrocities and ethnic cleansing. But
that, in itself, is a condemnation of the bombing, not a justifi-
cation for it. As for the rest, d1e picture has several problems.
One problem is that th e massive documentalion provided by
Washington, NATO, and other Western sources provides no
meaningful evidence of a Serb offensive after the with drawal of
the monitors, though it provides rich evidence of Serb e thni c
cleansing operations immediately afler the bombing began. We
32
NOAM CHOMSKY
return Lo this matter. noting, however, that even if a Serb oflen-
~hc wa'> launched after the withdrawal of the mon itors in clear
preparation for a military assault, that would hardly serve to jus-
tify their withdrawal over official Serbian objection (a fact not
ret reported in the mainstream, though it was public knowledge
19
t11c da}' before the bombing)/ and the military attack that it
em.ctivcly announced.
Anoth er problem has to do with the distinction between
plans and implementation. The contingency plans of the great
powers and their clients, insofar as they are known, are hor-
rendous; those that are unknown arc doubtless worsc. 10 That
Milosevic lute! plans "of truly evil proportions" for Ko. O\O has
scarcely been in doubt, C\'Cn without access to imernaltecords,
ju:;t as it is a neat certainty that Israel has plans to expel much
of the Palestin ian population, and if under serious threat of
bombing and invasion by Iran or Syria, would be preparing to
carry them out. It is also hardly in doubt that in March 1999,
under constant and highly credible threats of bombing and
invasion by the reigning superpower and the mi lita1y alliance it
dominates, Serbian military forces were preparing to carry out
such plans in Kosovo. But it is a long step from the existence of
plans and preparation to the conclusion that the plans will be
implemented unless the planner is su~jcctcd to military attack -
e liciting the implementalion of the plans, which retrospectively
justifies the attack by an impressive feat of logic.
lt is appropriate to be "in no doubt that the ctl1nic cleansing
was systematically planned before the NATO bomhing"; it
would be astonishi ng if that were not true, under the circllln-
st.ances. But evidence is rcqui red to support the statement that
33
 I NTENTIONAL IGN ORAN CE A N D ITS U SE S
"Western intelligence confirms [ethnic cleansing] was already
underway before the first NATO airstrikes" - and before the
withdrawal of the monitors, if the evidence is to have any
force. 41 It is also necessary to account for Washington's inabil-
ity to make the evidence public in the extensive documentation
it has released, to which we return.
Further questions arise \\rith regard to "Operation
Horseshoe," allegedly discovered by German authorities two
weeks after the bombing began and known only "in reoospect,"
according to Secretary of Defense Cohen, hence not a motive
for the bombing. Curiously, the plan was kept secret fr o m
NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark, who, when asked
about Operation Horseshoe a month after the bombing began,
informed the press that plans for it "have never been shared
with 'lle."42 Retired German general Heinz Loquai, who works
for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), alleges in a new book that "the plan was fabricated
from r un-of-the-mill Bulgarian intelligence reports," and h as
"come to tl1e conclusion that no such operation ever existed."
According to the German news weekly Die Woche, the alleged
plan was "a general analysis by a Bulgarian intelligence agency
of Serbian behaviour in the war." The journal reports further
tllat "maps broadcast around the world as proof of NATO's
information were drawn up at the German defence headquar~
ters," and that the Bulgarian report "concluded that the goal of
Lhe Serbian military was to destroy the Kosovo Liberation Army,
and not to expel the entire Albanian population, as was later
argued by [German Defence Minister Rudolf] Scharping an d
the Nato leadership." Loquai claims further that the German
34
N OA M C HOMSKY
defense ministry "even coined the name 'Hor eshoe'." He also
notes "a fundamental flaw in tlle German account: it named the
operation 'Potkova'. which is the Croat.ian word fo r horseshoe,"
instead of using the Serbian word "Potkovica." Loquai's book
was favorably received in the German press, which also criti-
cized Scharping's "propaganda lies" (eg, doubling the alleged
number of Serbian troops prior to the bombing from 20,000 to
43
40,000) and his evasion of the charges.
Yet another problem is that General Clark also had no
knowledge of any plan to "thwart et h nic cleansing." When the
bombing began on March 24, he informed the press- repeat-
edly, insistently, forcefully- Lhat brutal Serb atrocities would be
an "entirely predictable" consequence of the bombing, later
elaborating that NATO militar y operations were not designed
to block "Serb ethnic cleansing" or even to wage war against
Serbian forces in Kosovo. US government and other sources
available at the Lime lent con idcrablc plausibility to Clark's
judgment. Substantial documentation has been released since
by the State Department, NATO. the KVM, the OSCE, and
other Western and independent sources, much of it produced
in an effort to justify NATO's war. We retnrn to all of this in
chapter 3, merely noting here that it strongly confirms General
Clark's analysis, to an extent! found surprising. Even more sur-
prising, the documentation lends little support to the belief
that atrocities mounted significantly after withdrawal of the
KVM monitors on March 20, contrary Lo what seemed to me a
natural expectation at the Lime.
The conclusions about the anticipated effects of NATO's
policy choices do noL comport well wiLh the stance of nobility.
35
_ _ ____._ .
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
Acco,dingly, the preferred account during the bombing.
repeated endle~sly since, is that its objective was "to s t.en1
Belgrade's expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo" under
Operation Horseshoe- the expulsion apparently precipi t:a t:ed
by the bombing (or its \irtual announcement, according to the
Secretary of Defense, contrary to \1\'ashington's official record
to which we return), and an o~jcctive unknown to the milit.arv
commander and forceful!)' denied by him, just as he '\va~
unaware of Operation Horseshoe. Similarly, critics of the air
war as ineffectual conclude "that air power fa iled to prevent the
very ethnic cleansing that prompted Western leadet-s to act in
the flrst place," a reversal of the chronological order of even. ts~
at least that much seems reasonably clear, whatever one'sjndg-
ment about the actions undertaken. In a widely praised book
on the war, historian David From kin asserts without argun1.en t
that the US and its allies acted out of "altruism" and "moral
fervor" alone, fo rging "a new kind of approach 10 the use of
power in world politics," as they "reacted to the deportation of
more than a mill ion Kosovars from their homeland" by bonlb-
ing so as lo save them "from horrors of suffering, or from
death." He is refen;ng to those expelled as the anticipated con-
sequence <>f lhc bombing. International affairs and security
specialist Alan Kuperman writes lhat in East Timor and Kosovo.
"the threat of economic sanctions or bombing has provoked a
lragic backlash," and ''Western intervention arrived too late to
prevent th e widespread atrocities." In Kosovo, the threat o
bombing did not arrive "too late to prevent the widespread
atrocities," bu t preceded them, as did the bombing itself if offi-
cial documents are to be believed. In East Timor, no Western
36
NOAM CH O MSKY
action "provoked a tragic backlash." The use of force was not
proposed, and even the threat of sanctions was delayed until
after the consummation of the atrocities; and there was no
44
"Wester-n inletvention" in any significant sense of the tcrm.
\\'e arc left with two plausible justifications for the bombing:
ensuring "stabilit)"' an d "the credibility of NATO," bOLh under-
stood in the doctrinal sense.
The sun~ving official reasons will plajnly not do as !)upport
lor the thesis that 11-ne nevl generation was pursuing a "moral
purpose" in the case of Kosovo, let alone the more visionary
theses about the new era. Therefore other arguments have been
soughL One, noted earlier, is that the war served as a precedent
for "humanitarian intervenLion"tn East Timor six months later.
Even if correct, that would not justifY the bombing, plainly, but
since the conclusion has no basis, the question is academic.
A common current version ofWcstern motives for the 1999
bombing of Serbia i~ that the West was shamed by its fai lure to
act in Bosnia. NATO chose to bomb, Fouad Ajami asserts,
against the advice of the pollsters and realists and ~clievers
in the primacy of "geoeconomics," to prosecute a JUSt war,
pulled into Kosovo as they had earlier been _into Bosnia by
the shame of what they had witnessed, by the m1age of them-
selves they had seen in that Balkan mirror.
According to Aryeh Neier, what "inspired the advocates of
t an 1ntervention" in Kosovo was that "many persons
I1umant a t1
in and out of government were determined not to allow a re-
. B . 4'>
petition in Kosovo,. of what had happened m osma . .
37
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
These claims are presented withour argument as self-e'--idenl
Lrulhs, following the norm for justification for state violence.
The claim5 reject the official reasons offered at the tirn.e or
since. ThaL aside, lhough offered in justification of "the ad,o-
cates of humanitarian imenention ~in Kosovo, these claims are.
in facr, a severe indicunem of them, and of Western political
and moral culture generally. According to this account. in rad-
ical "iolation of moral truisms the \\'est is shamed by its image in
the "Balkan mirror,~ where it is guilty only of inadequate
response to the crimes of others, but not by iLS image in <>t.her
mirrors, where the crime5 trace right back home: those dis-
cussed earlier for example, where the We L did not "tolera~e
atrocities as Neier and others prefer to see ir, but participated
actively in escalating them. Furthermore, on this interpretation.
while the guiding principles and values call for determination
not to allow a repetition of crimes committed by an ofliciaJ
enemy, they say nothing about repetition of our own conlpa.ra__
~le or worse crimes, and thus free lhe agents of "humanitarian
mter ventJOn
" and the "many persons" who support them from
any concern over these, even recollection of them.
Because of the pairing ofKosovo and East Timor in public dis-
course in 1999, the latter o!Ters a parrkularly striking ilJustration
of these conclusions. It sh ould therefore be stressed Lhat t:he
huge slaughter o f ear1er years m East T1mor
s (at 1east) compar-
able to th "b .. .
Mi . : tern le atrocJiles that can plausibly be attnbuted to
loseVJc
. m the earltenvars m u..
1ugoslavia, and responst"bil"1ty IS far
easter to ass .
the .. . .gn, WI tb no complicating factOrs. If proponents o
repettuon
. of Bos n1a
" th es1s
tmend
. .
It senously,
r.h ey s h Ould
certain ly have b .
een calltng for bombing of j akarta- indeed
38
NOAM CHOMSKY
Washington and London - in early 1999 so as "n ot to allow a
repetition in East Timor" of the crimes that Indon esia, the US,
and UK had perpetrated there for a quarter-century. And when
the new generation of leaders refused to pursue this honorable
course, they should have been leading honest citizens to do
so themselves, perhaps joining the Bin Laden network. These
conclusions follow su-aightforwardly, if we assume that the thesis
is intended as something more than apologetics for stare violence.
Quite apart from the startling self-indictment, and the lack
of even a pretense of evidence, the argument must be one
or the most remarkable justifications for state violence on
record. According to lhis doctrine, military force is legitimate if
fai lure LO apply it might induce the target of the attack to
carry out. aurrocities (as it did, as anticipated, afte1 the attack and
presumably in response to it). By that standard, violent states are
free to act as they like, with the acclaim of the educated classes.
Another device for evading the consequences of "advocacy
of humanilarian intervention" in Kosovo is to hold that NATO
should have invaded outright, not bombed. That is easy to say,
and could be taken sed ously if accompanied by a reasoned pro-
posal, at the time or since, taking account of the likely
consequences of invasion (particularly in the light of US mili-
tary doctrine), quite aside from non-trivial logistic and other
problems. 4 6 One wil1 search in vain for that, clearly the mini-
mum that is required tO meet tl1e heavy burden of proof that
must be borne, always, by advocates of the use of force, what-
ever the alleged intent.
Another useful mode of justification is to invent and refute
absurd argumenLS against the bombing, while ignoring those
39
 INTENTIONAL IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
anuall\ prt')Cilltd. A famme tat get i-. the argu ment, attributed
to unnamed ~lcllisL'>" or "rc\isionists," that the US has no right
to intervene becaust of it-. &.graceful record. That the record
ol a Stale ~hould be ~aken imo account in considering the right
of intcrven Lion i~ another trui-;m, accepted by everyone ,,~ho
e\'en pretends to be -.crious. But the argument that a disgrace-
ful record automatically rescinds that right would be ~,~boll~
irrational, hence eas.. to refute. This exercise can only be
underaood, once agai,n. as a fot m of tacit recognition of in.abil-
ity to bear the burden ofjustification for the resort to violence -
always hea\'y though not insuperable in principle, apart from
dedicated pacifists.
The conclusion becomes even more clear when we inspect
the occasional efforts to cite an actual source. This is rare bur
there are a few examples. Thus, correspondent Ian Willia.rns.
who has compiled a distinguished record on other issues, '.vrites
that Edward Said and 1 "looked at the record of inaction by the
West, in Palestine, East Timor, Kurdistan and o on, and there-
fore deduced that any action ovet Kosovo could not he for
good motives and should therefor<' be opposed." To support
the charge, and his ridicule of this "excessivel)' theological atti-
tude" and "moralizing element" that was "common to leftists
across th e spectrum," he cites nothing by Said and one state-
47
ment of mine that says nothing even remotely relevant. Even
the most cursory reading of what I wrote makes it obvious,
without th e slightest doubt, that my position was exactly the
opposite, even to the extent of revie,ving the few examples of
military intervention with benign consequences, hence
arguably legitimate despite the ugly records of the agents. More
40
NOAM CHOMSKY
striking is the way \Villiams falls so easily into lhe common
mode of apologetics for staLe '~olcnce. Said and I did not look
m lh<' "record of inaction"' of the West in the cases he men1.ions,
but m the record of quite decisi\"e action, a fact that evident!)'
can not be assimilated by many Westen~ imcllectuals. Again, the
on ly reasonable conclusion is that th e burden of justification
cannOl be met.
It t.akcs considerable effort notlo recogn ize the accuracy or
the report to the UN Commi:;sion on I Iuman Rights in March
2000 by former Czech di sidemJiti Dicnstbier. now UN Special
Jnvestigatot fot the former Yugoslavia: "The bombing hasn't
solved any problems," he reponed: "lt only multiplied the exist-
ing problems and created new ones." Or the corroborating
assessment of Michael MccGwi1e that "while Serb forces were
clearly the instrument of the unfolding 'humanitarian disas-
ter'. NATO's long~trailered urge to war was undoubtedly a
primary cause," and reference to the 'bombing as 'humanitar-
ian imervenlion "'is "really grotesque":
No one questions the underlying good intentions, but one
suspects that much of the moralistic rhetoric, the demoniz.~
ing, the claim w be pioneering a foreign policy based on
values as well as interests, was a form of denial. It served to
conceal from all of us the unpalatable fact that leaders
and their people have to accept their share of the blame for
unintended consequences- in this case the humanitarian
disaster and the civilian casualties in Serbia,
which are, in fact, only part of th e disaster. 48
41
 I NTENTIONAL I GNORANCE AND ITS USES
MccGwire 's comments seem realistic, with qualifications
about the matter of "intentions." The phrase "unintended con-
sequences" obscures the fact that they were anticipate d, even i
they were not as "entirely predictable" as the NATO com-
mander felt at the outset, in words that MccGwire quotes.
Furthermore, it is far from true that "no one questions t:he
underlying good intentions." They are most definitely ques-
tioned by those MccGwire calls "the world at large, as he
emphasizes (see pp. 7-8). The conviction about unquestionabl e
good intentions is particularly dubious against the background
of the record of past and present practice, including the crucial
test cases just reviewed in an effort to evaluate the conflicting
interpretations of the new era.
Quite generally, it is hard to find significant inconsistency in
the practices of the great p owers, nor in the principles and
values that actually guide policy. None of that should be in the
least surprising to those who do not prefer what has sometimes
been called "intentional ignorance. >49 We turn next to a closer
examination of the two humanitarian catastrophes that have
been adduced to ground the thesis of "moral purpose" and the
vision of the furure that has been constructed on that basis.
Notes
1. Tony Blair, in "A New Generation Draws the Line," Newswel!k, April
19 1999; Vaclav Havel, "Kosovo and the End of the Nation.State."
New Yen* Review, June 10 1999.
2. ~ichael..Wines, "Two Views of Inhumanity Split the World, Even in
Vtctory, New York Times Week in Review, lead article, June 13 1999;
42
NOAM CHOMSKY
Michael Glennon, ''The New lntervemionism," Foreign Affairs
(Council on Foreign Relations, New York), May/june 1999.
3. Bob Da,~s. "Cop of the World? Climon Pledges U.S. Power Against
Ethnic Cleansing, but His Aides Hedge." Wall Streetjottrnal (hence-
forth W-1'). August6 1999. William jefferson Clinton, "A .J ust and
Necessary War," New York Times (henceforth NYD, May 23; Ap ril l ,
speech at 'orfolk Air Station, NYT, April 2 1999.
4. Sebastian Matlaby, ''Uneasy Partners," NYT Book Review, September
21 1997. Senior Administration policymaker cited by Thomas
Friedman, NY7:.January 12 1992. Davis, op. cit., paraphrasing Sandy
Be rger in an interview.
5. Department of Defense Report to Congress. Kosouo/Operation Allied
ForCP Afl"Aclion &port, January 31 2000. Tony Blair, Alan Li ulc.
"Moral Combat: NATO At War," BBC2 Special, March 12 2000.
6. Declaration of Croup of 77 South Summit, April 10-14 2000. For
background, see Thini World Reswgence (Penang), no. 117, 2000.
7. Anthony Sampson, "Mandela accuses 'policeman Britain,"
Guardian, April 5 2000.
8. Schiff, Amnon Barzilai, Ha'arelt., April 5 2000. On Indian. Israeli,
and Egypt.ian reactions, see my The Nw Military Humanism: Lesson.~
of Kos(JTJO (Monroe. ME: Common Courage. 1999), chapter 6; hen c~
fo rth NMH.
9. On these events, see my Detening Democracy (London, New York:
Verso, 1991 ), and NMH
10. Ibid. On Turkey .and the Kurds, see NMH, and some comments
below.
J 1. Andrew Kramer, "Putin following Yeltsin 's misguided po licies.
Solzhenitsyn says, ... AP, Boston Globe, May 17 2000.
12. John Mearsheirner. "India Needs The Bomb," NYFop-ed, March 24
2000; Samuel H unrington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affair~.
March/April 1999. Chalmers johnson, Blowback (New York: Holt,
2000), 59. Michael MccGwire, "Why did we bomb Belgrade?"
International Affairs (Royal Academy of International Affairs.
Lo ndon), 76.l, .January 2000.
13. Christopher Ma,quis, "Bankro lling Colombia's War on Drugs,"
Nn:June 23 2000, last paragraph.
14. TamarGabelnick, William Hartung, andjennifer Washburn, Anning
&pressio11: U.S. Arms Sales to Turke; Duritzg the Clinton Administmtion
43
 INTENTIONAl IGNORANCE AND ITS USES
(~cw \brk and \\ ~hint;LOrr \\'odd PoliC\ Institute and Fe deration
of Atomic Sdt-num, Ouobct 1999). For funher sources, see ~"r-.'-1H.
On LaLin .\medea and th( Caribbean, ~ee Adam Isacson anct J 0 ,.
Olson, ju5t llu Farfl. 1999 t:dition (\\'<t~hi ngton: Latin Arnenc;
\-\'orkin g Group and Ccnwr for International Policy, 1999). 1-Iere
and below, tlw perennial (rom-runners [srael and Egypt. "\Vhich
bt:long to a separate r.ttegon. arc excluded. Ranking~ are for fiscal
rear~. and arc qualitaU\e, dcpenrling on exactlv '"hich aspects are
counted (granL~. ~e~. training. co-producdon,joint exercises, etc.)_
15. See preceding note. jonath;m R.utdal, . \ftC'Y Surh K11owledge, l<Vhat
For{!;lvem.11: M)' l~ncmwlt'T's w1th 1\urdisttm (Boulder, CO: Westvie'\v
1999).
16. On the events and their refraction th rough doctrinal prisms, see
NMH. For an updat<', nn Rogui'StntPS (Cambridge MA: South Enct.
2000), chapter 5.
17. Thomas Cushman, editor, ''I Iuman Right!. and the Responsibility of'
lntellectuab,'' Human Rights /Vrlll'W. Januarr-1\Iarch 2000; Aryeh
Neier, "Inconvenient Facts, .. f)i.ssmt, ~piing 2000; in both cases. reac-
tion to the redew ofUS-bad.cd Turkish atrocities in NlV/H.
18. Tim Judah, KDs()tJo: 11~n am/ RPvmgp (~ew I-11\\'cn: Yale Universin
Pre%, 2000), 308.
19. Ferit Derner, Remers. datelined Tunccli, Turke)'. April 1; Chris
Morris, Guardian (London), Apnl 3 2000. AP, Los Angt>Les Times.
April 2 2000.
20. See my FtltPjul Triangle: US., l~raPI, and thr Pnll'~tmians (Cambridge
MA: South End, 1999, updated from 1983 edition ). The Leban ese
govcmment and international relief agtncie!> report 25,000 killed
since 1982; the toll of the 1982 invtl'>ion is estimated at about 20,000.
21. "Israel, US vote against funding for U\l force in Lebanon, .. AP
Worldstream.Junc 15; Marilyn Henry, "Israel, US anger-ed by Kana
cla\tse in UN peacekeeping package,~ jml.Wll'm Post, June 18 2000.
On the circumstances of the invasi011. see Flltejuf "Hinngle. For
derailed documentation , including the Amnel>t)' International and
UN inquiries that concluded that the J.heUing or the compound
was intentional, see Shifra Stern, J~ml'l't OjJC'Yfltion "Grapes ofl'Vrath"
and lite Qana Massacre, ms.. April-May 1996.
22. Fe_d~ral News Service, Department of Defense Briefing, Sectetary
Wrllaam Cohen, "Turkey's Imponance to 21st Centuq lntemational
44
NOAM CHOMSKY
Sccndty," Grand Hy:m Hotel, Washington DC, Mtlrch 3 1; Charles
Aldinger. "U.S. praises ke y NATO all) Turkey," Remers, March 31
2000. Judith Miller, "Sotath Asia Called Ml\ior Terror fl ub in a
Survey by U.S., .. NYT, Apdl 30 2000, lead story.
23. Little, op. ciL
24. Set note I 4.
25. Sec Lars chouhz, Comparative PolitiQ,.January 1981; Schoultz is the
alllhor of tl1e leading :;cholarly study of human rights and US policy
in Latin America. Fur broader confirmation and inquiq, which
helps explain the reasons, see the studies by economist Edward
Herman rcpotcd in Chomsky and Herman, Political Ec0110m) of
Human Rights (Boston: South End, 1979), vol. I. clmpter 2.l.J, and
Herman, The Jtml Tmvr Nrtwork (Bo:;ton: South End, 1982), 126fT.
Note tl1;H these reviews precede the Reagan years, when inq11 iry
would ha\c been superfluous.
26. Carla Anne Robbins, "J low Bogota Wooed Washington to Open New
War on C.ocaine," \VS). June 23 2000. For sources on whm follows,
and further infonnation and discussion, see RogtteS/ales, chapl<'r 5.
27. Rafael Pardo, '"Colombia's Two-Front War,.. Forrign Affain
Jui)'/AugusL 2000; Pardo was special government achisct on peace
negotiations and Minister o f Defense while the guerdlla-backcd
pany was desuoyed b) assassination.
28. Scan ~1urphy, '"Comcmponty Practice of the Uni'tcd State\ Relating
to l mcrnalional Law," Amnimnjournal of Jntrmational Law (h<'ncc-
fonh Aj/1.) . 94.1, J anuar y 2000.
29. William Shawcross, Drliver Us From Evil: PPacekPepl!l:\, \'\'tlrlmds Oil(/ a
\o\0rld of EndlRsr Qmjlitt (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 261T.
Shawcros~ auribULes this picture to US Depmy ecretaq of tate
Strobe Talbott, but then adoptS it with little qualificatjon. In t1 <Titi-
cal review, Wall SMet.Jounwl editor Max 13oot prais<:. Shawcross fm
his "progress" in h aving come to understand that the US i~ a
"benign force," after having sunk so IO\\ as LO clidcite MU .S. a11ac 1..~
on North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia" (the approverltt>l'lll for
Cambodian civilians). Forn1,m AJfflirs. ~larch/April 2000.
30. Newsweek diplomatic correspondent Michael ll irsh, "The Fall Guy,"
Foreign Affairs, Novembcr/ Decembt:r J 999.
Richard Buller, "East Timor: Principle v. Reality," TliP l~yp (i\u~tralia ),
3J.
7- 20, 1999.
45
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. ~------
 INTENTIONAL IG N ORANCE AND ITS US ES
32. On the reponing of the Racak ma.~sacre, And the available e vidence.
sec Edwat d I Ierman and Oarid Ptlerson, "Ci\'N: Selling Nato's \1\'""ar
Globally." m Philip Hammond and Edward Herman, eds., Degradect
Capabzlit): TIIP .1/rdw nnd tilt KoJor.to Cnsis (London: Pluto, 2000).
33. Colum Lynch, "t:S seen h:avi ng Africa to solve iLS own crisis, Boston
Glebe (hencefonh Bt:). Fcbruar~ 19 1999. john DOJ1n e lly and J oe
Lauria, uN peace effon:. on lrial in Africa; Annan angry as U.s .
holds to limi!l> on militarv role," BG, May II; Barbara C r osseu:e
"U.K Chief FaulL'> Relucmnce of U.S. To Help in Africa," NYT. Ma:
13 2000.
34. On the nouon of "crcdibilil).- and ill> nature and scope as under-
StOod b) top planners and pol in imdlectuals, see NlvfH, chapte r 6.
35. PRJ succe~!>. I larold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca.
1\IY: CornclJ University Press, 1978), 351, 155, a standard source. See
nexl chapler, and source:. cited.
36. Pi~ro Cle ijese~. Shauerrd Hope (Ptinceton, 1991), 365. Foreign Affairs
ed1torjames Chace, .VYT Mnl{milu, Mav 22 1977.
37. Note 5, above; William Cohen's testimony aLthe Headng of the
Senate Armed Services Commiltee on Ko ovo operations, October
14 1999, Federal :'\ews Senice.
38. l\"o Daalder and Michael O'Jlanlon, "\>\lithout the air war, th ings
could have been worse," Washington Post National Weekly, A p ri l 3
2000.
39. See NMH, 22, and chapter 3 below.
40. Se_e NMH, chapter 6; and chapter 3 below.
41. Michael Tgnaticff, ''What is war for? And should we have done it?"
Nationtd Post (Canada). April 18 2000; length)' excerpts from his
correspondence with Robert Skidelskr, taken from his book Virtual
War.
42. "Panorama: War Room," BBC, April J9 1999.
43.
J oh n CoeJ:Z and Tom Walker, "Serbian etJ1nic cleansing scare was a
~ake, says general," Sut1day Times, April 2 2000. Franziska Augstein,
Im Kosovo wares anders," Frankfurter Alll{nnPhu Zeitung, March 25;
a lso_ Die Wodte, March 24; Der Spiege~ March 17; SueddPulsche Zeitung,
~n\ 4: ~..e Monde, .April 1 l 2000. Heinz Loquai, Der Kosov()-Konjlict:
ege n nnen VI!Y?rmdbarm Krieg (Baden-Baden: omos Verlag, 2000).
44.
~ulh Wedgwood, "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia," AJIL, 93.4,
ctober 1999, a legal defense of the bom bing. Donald Byman a n d
46
N O AM C H O MS K Y
Matthew Waxm:m of Rand Corporation , "Kosovo and the Crear Air
Powc,- Debate," lllte-mational Smtrity, 24.4, spring 2000. David
Fromkin, Kosor10 Craning (Free PlT!>S, 1999); Alnn Kuperman,
"Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Ajjai1:~. jan u ary/ February 2000. For
many other examples, see NM/f and chapter 3, below.
45. Fouad Ajami, "War~ and Rumors of War," NYT Book Rroirw,junc 11
2000; Arych cier, op. cit., and many others. leicr's point is th:H i1
is "dishonest" for me (in NMH) to ignore this self-evide nt rrutJ1
while keeping to thej u~tilications that were actually put fonh. and
contin tte to be, as 110tcd.
46. Testifying before the Defenc~ ciC:'ct CommiHec, Britain's second
mo'ol senior defence minister during the war, Lord Gilbert, defence
minister of state forma lly responsible for imelligcncc, t;d iculed the
l>llggcstion 1hm NATO could have invaded even b) cp1ember 1999.
informing the Commiuee that "a land invasion of J<osovo would
have been po~o;iblc by September, b\l t by September this year
[2000], not by Sep1embcr las1 year." Patrick Wimour, "War ::.Lratcg)'
ridiculed," Cumdirm,July 21 2000.
47. Jan \'l'ill iam'>, ""Left Behind: Amedcan Socialist~. Jlum:m Right!., and
Koso,o," Human Right' Reuif'w, I- 2, J anuary-March 2000.
48. Jiri Dicnstbicr, BUC ummary of World Broadcasts, March 25;
Naomi Koppel, "Ground Troops Urged for Yngo~J :wi:.1," AP Online,
March 29 2000; Elizabeth Sulli,-an, "A Threatening Thaw in the
Balkans," Clnlllmul P/nin Dtaltl', April 3; Laura CoffC)'. Pmg111' Pn11,
March 20 2000. MccGwire, op. cit. Dicnstbicr '"''~a leading Czech
dissident, imp1isotwd in the late 1970s and early 1980s, later the li1 ~t
post-Communist foreign minister.
49. Donald Fox and Michael Glennon, 'Report to the lntNnational
!Iuman Rights Law Group and the Wash ington Office on Latin
America," Washington DC, April 1985, referring to State
OcpanmenL evasion of US-backed state terror in El Salvado1.
...
47
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