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PHILOSOPHERShaverecentlydiscussedwhetheran eventmaybe

causedby anotherlaterthanitself. I shalldiscussissuesconnectedwitha lessobviousquestion-


namely,whethereventsmay
be explainedby earlierevents. What makesthisparticularly
interestingisthatithasarisen,ina livelyway,notfroma marginal,doubtfuland above all
exofficioparadoxicalpursuitsuchas
research,norinformalphilosophy,butfromthedayto psychical
dayworkofa respectableempiricaldiscipline,socialanthropolog p. 182

An anthropologistnaturally
hasa greatersenseofachievementifhesucceedsinshowingthat
somethingwhichseemstoperformoneroleinfactalsoorprimarily
performsanother,orthatsomethingwhichseemsto performno
roleat alloronethatonlymakessenseintheidiomofthesociety
concerned(butnotobjectively),doesperforman intelligiblerole
afterall. Moremeritattachesto showingthat a feudreally
contributesto thecoherenceofthegroup,orthatthereligious
ritualhasimportanteconomicconsequences,etc.,thanto saying
thattheovertlyor apparentlyeconomicreallyis such,orthat
theapparentlypointlessritualreallyhas no pointat all. This
naturaland legitimatepreferencefordiscoveringthenewrather
thanthe obviousmay of coursedegenerateinto a pursuitof
paradox,oran exaggerationofthewayinwhichvarioushuman
activitiesareinterrelated.But still,anthropologyis,moreperhaps than othersciences,the studyof how
thingsare more
and otherthantheyseem. P. 183

Thereare analogiesbetweentheFunctionalistanthropologist
and the linguisticphilosopher.The latter, having abjured
thedoctrinesleadingto translation,reduction,ofactuallymade statementsto
simplermodels,seeksinsteadtheirmeaningin
theiruse(function?)intheactualsituationsinwhichtheyoccur.
The anthropologist,debarredby his callingfromdiscounting
primitivereligion,magic,etc.,simplyas error,mistakentechnology,etc.,againseekstheir" meaning"
intheirfunction(use?)
intheirsocialcontext. Ironicallyenough,attheverytimewhen
philosophers,in analysingand classifyingtypesof" meaning"
areturningtotheactualcontextandactivityfora clue,weshall
see one whoseprofessionalconcernis withjust thoseactivities
and contextsturnto philosophyand whatis perhapsa slightly
datedtheoryofmeaning(parallelism,mirroring)foraid p. 184 clue, dica, aid, ajuda.

The habit of drawingconclusionsfroma singlefieldstudymayhave beenstimulatedby


thefactthatearlystudiesweresometimesmostinterestinginas
far as they constitutedsuch demolitionsof generaltheories.
Anotherpointis thattwoyearsinthefieldand n yearswriting
up thematerialis a longtime,duringwhichtheanthropologist
has muchtimeto think; he cannothumanlybe expectedto
restrainhis theoreticalingenuityand inventivenesssimplyin
deferencetoatextbookmethodologythatwarnsagainstpremature
generalisation.The gatheringof empiricalmaterialtends to
take longerin the social sciencesthan it does in the natural
ones,and thecustomaryratiobetweenthequantityoffactand
theorymustadaptitselftothis,ifonlyforsuchpurelypragmatic
reasons. .p. 185
Thereforeconceptscannotcorrespondto reality.
He seemstofeelthatconceptsdescribingchangewouldthemselves
havetobechangingconcepts. A muchearlierphilosophermight
haveputhispointthus: youcannotenterthesamesocietytwice;
nay,you cannoteven do it once. Leach goes on to conclude
therefore,conceptsdo not referto realitydirectly,but only
throughan intermediary,a schizophrenicbroker(to borrow
ProfessorRyle'sexpressionusedinanothercontext)whohasthe
abilityto lookbothways. As changingand disorderlyreality
cannotbetheobjectsofdeterminateandneatconceptsdirectly,it
can be theirobjectonlyindirectlythrougha ThirdMan. This
latterassistantLeach callsa model. P. 187

p. 187

Roughlyspeaking,Leach believesthatlanguage,systeiiisof
propositions,describerealityin virtueofreflectingit in some
fairlyliteralsense,in otherwordshe believesinwhatmightbe
calledtheparallelismtheoryofmeaning. Thisis whatweneed
knowofhisphilosophy. Asa matterofanthropology,hebelieves
thatritualreflectsthesocietyinwhichitoccursina similarway.
Furthermore,he seemsto equate " socialstructure" withideas
inpeople'smindsas tohowtheirsocietyshouldbeideallyorganised,withhowpowershouldbe
distributedwithinit. We thus
getfourentitieswhichare parallelor "reflecteach other", or,
in thelast case, are actuallyidentical: verbaldescriptionofa
societyby an anthropologist,ritualin thatsociety,theideal of
thatsocietyas envisagedbyitsmembers,andfinallythestructure
ofthatsocietyitself. Leach musttakea very" dispositional"
viewof" ideas" forthislastidentitytohold,andthereisindeed
independentevidencethathedoestakesucha view. ThisequationinLeach's terminologyis
facilitatedbythepartialoverlaps
in thenormalmeaningsofthemembersofthefollowingseries:
' Ideal ' correctbehaviour, ' expected behaviour 'social
structure'. Readers who mightboggle at the equation of
'ideal ' and ' structure' mayseeitsjustificationinthiscontext. P. 189

If we invent rapidly changing concepts to deal with changing societies, or


contradictory concepts to cope with societies in conflict, we may find
ourselves with an unmanageable language, but we shall still not be able to
be sure that the concepts change or internally conflict in just the way that
the society is changing or conflicting

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