Natres 2

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No.
165448
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
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DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in
Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of
Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the
Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an
inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of
14 trees under the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate
place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant
within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and
protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and regulations
shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with
existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as the
herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan,
Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at
Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino
(petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also
found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with
Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The
volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without
permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and
the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against
petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market price as
P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest
charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the
permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in
possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet
high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were
present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in
possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two
were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed
petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was
issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing
cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly
informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he
still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of
the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just
alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL
CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25,
representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and
to pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted
on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty
in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and
February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut.
The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago
and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found
guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty
to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit
which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the
sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he
was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner could have
informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention
that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for
cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were
not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals
found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals
likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not
have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions
of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[10] For questions
to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.[12]
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1)
Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.[13]
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of
the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the
contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber
was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to
commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees
more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have
informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner
administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer
of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in
possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of
the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
SESINANDO MERIDA, G.R. No. 158182
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - AZCUNA,
CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 12, 2008
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DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May
2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando
Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68,[3] Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),[4] as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioners motion
for reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] a
lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which
private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.[6]
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a
narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,[7] Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco.
When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree
but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner,
bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner
showed to Royo Calixs written authorization signed by Calixs wife.[8]
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When
Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that
he cut the tree with Calixs permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk
into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into
lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property
and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of
the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to
petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the matter.[10]
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the
narra tree with Calixs permission. The Provincial Prosecutor[11] found probable cause to indict
petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez
who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner
testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-
cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced
him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongcos favor.[12] The trial court dismissed petitioners
defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod
Property with Calixs permission. With this finding and petitioners lack of DENR permit to cut the tree,
the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended
that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint
filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty
imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but ordered the
seized lumber confiscated in the governments favor.[13] The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts
finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod
Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the
complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent
preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced
petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its
ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,[14] the same penalty the
trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not
admit his motion for having been filed late.[15]
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING,

COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES
TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX
AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS
AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING
AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D.
705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.[16]
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the
complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:[17]
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on
a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over

Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSGs claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint
filed by specified individuals,[18] non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying
such cases.[19] However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity[20] and
not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,
shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall
file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon[21] that the phrase reports and complaints in Section 80 refers to
reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials,
for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence.[22]
Here, it was not forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be
faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine if there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report.[23] At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or
the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioners alleged
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.[24]
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private

Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25] penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber
or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting,
or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[27] Petitioner stands charged of having cut,
gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private land[28] without x x x
the necessary permit x x x thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber, under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence
showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of gathering, collecting, or removing but only the act of
cutting a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner cut x x x timber
in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.[29]
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit,
petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the
authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calixs permission.
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts
rulings that petitioners extrajudicial admissions bind him.[30] Petitioner does not explain why Royo and
Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to
implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calixs authorization to
Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use
of Calixs authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes timber
under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define timber, only forest product (which
circuitously includes timber.)[31] Does the narra tree in question constitute timber under Section 68?
The closest this Court came to defining the term timber in Section 68 was to provide that timber,
includes lumber or processed log.[32] In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with
specified dimensions[33] or certain stand age or rotation age.[34] In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[35] this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 -
lumber - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the
affirmative, we held that lumber should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to
processed log or timber, thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa)
of the same section in the definition of Processing plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the
market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber
without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we.[36] x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term timber under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery.[37] Indeed,
tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs
cannot be considered timber.[38]
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into several pieces
of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x
x x. These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on
26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence.[39] Further, Hernandez testified that the
larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property measured 76 something centimeters [at the
big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters.[40]
Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was timber fit for building or for
carpentry or joinery and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property
stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing
stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet
were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the
amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandezs
testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his estimates based
on prevailing local price.[41]
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a
mere uncorroborated estimate of such fact.[42] In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix
the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.[43] In People v.
Dator[44] where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,
for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecutions evidence for the lumbers value consisted of
an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was
compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence.
Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)[45] of the RPC.[46]
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the
Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008
AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized
a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered
with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado
Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information
against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan,
Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate
No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of
lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One
Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine
Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found
them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but
Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison,
who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to accused-
appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the
lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved
Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found
that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were
accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts
proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.
The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest
products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at
the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and
Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest
products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)
2. xxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).
The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in
relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional
period of four years for the excess of P47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower
to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and
one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period11 of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two
months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16
years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado
Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and
CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191,
denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to
annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had
denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as
(b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting
an application for a Writ of replevin..[2] h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as
follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of
illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain]
Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety
seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents
and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber
at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to
accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed
before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal
Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[6] Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the
custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..
[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a
composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry
Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent
volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against
Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for
violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all
other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao
who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it..[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles
with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court
granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992..
[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in
the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor
vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured
place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct
order of the Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said
petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition..[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere
seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to
the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the
conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized
under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of
the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a
report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply
with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by
the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of
the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to
the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis..[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that private respondents
complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves
under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not
yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent
appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for
illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject
vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings..[17]
Their petition was found without merit.[18] Rtc spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO
SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID
CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE
SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO
SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an
offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or
Penal Codeslx mis
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal
documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in
Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with
forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and
transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although
as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the
public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense
in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same
Code. They read as follows: Sc
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either
by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department]
or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of
any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in
favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative
such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are
authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and
their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field
officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may
be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that
could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles
and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from
the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded
for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor
give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court
and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation
order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in
our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action
for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise..[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the
case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already
impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the
government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff
could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate
action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return,
and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In
Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel
earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution
of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined
by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21] Scslx
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles,
with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent..[22] And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the
State ultimately liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice
or corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the
seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and
did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the
States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the
defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that
exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for
dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.[27] Mesm
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated
May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject
motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by
petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate
action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City,
Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN,
NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of
offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and
NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the
Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the
owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision
regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is
quoted herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay
Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy
two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining
any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
Thereafter trial was conducted.
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On
November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San
Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora
passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings
inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In
his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He
asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy.
Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso
Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the
assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took
photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint
Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for
some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his.
Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from
the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in
the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero,
Calbayog City.
The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution
and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely
corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the
admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the
photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer
corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure
some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral
Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay
Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop
owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches
in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were]
being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood
shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in
Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself
personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the
furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao,
Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted
lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca
Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog
City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to
tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca
Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the
vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not
returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog
City and told the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community
and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted
administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private
respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and
transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the
Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty.
Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to
forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by
RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII,
Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended
that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and
that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had
exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry
Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of
Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take
the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the
lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent
Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and
ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on
procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign
the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the
owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused
Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of
the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest
products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber.
xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final
and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR
Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be
owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan
Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D.
705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68
of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown
by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has
committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995
nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged,
and the decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property
already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of
its officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2)
whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the
criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order
issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under
Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all
conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two
relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation
of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over
the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any
Penal Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either
by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and
applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its
intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment
covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and
implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These
terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing
guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft,
whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of
transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized
representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes
of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper
authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or
conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD
705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified and
perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed
its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had
approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty.
Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum
recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial
environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in
connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle
because it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the
review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was
private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture
Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter
cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the
confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of
which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are
factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to
reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of
the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705
contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator
with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings
for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack
of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705
contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other
persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents
Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not
appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial,
because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest
products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess
criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of
the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation
of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the
criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the
movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat
the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO
277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of
the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected
only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount
public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or
unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no
longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial
prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval
thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to
release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175289

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners,
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
August 31, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations
makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as
amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 22,
2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City
by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under
the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner
Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of
Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution[8]
dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only
against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria was
likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan
de Oro City.
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and
their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public
officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage
of his official position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named
accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a
total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00,
without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that
the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the
Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations
against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted
that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses
like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime
charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27, 1997,
directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997,
only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not
based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the
interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that
Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.
[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada
(Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver,
petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the
rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to
15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another
prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and
owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president of a community-based organization
which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to
count the timber.[21]
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that
the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled
repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the repair.
After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered
the timber.[23]
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of
January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of
timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas),
a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut
leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the
following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which
consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and
subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then
Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the
requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on
December 31, 1995.[27]
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received
and signed for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all
in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was
allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from
Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches
were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera
Cruz, the security guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs demise.[28]
However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of
Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty
as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of
the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and
Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to
the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were
intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No.
110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the
flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains
though that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary authority and legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the
RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-
[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in
its Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS
ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT
A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL
LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS
MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO
REDUCE PENALTY].[36]
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a
denial of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being
included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim
that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear
to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation
because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally
prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors
Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was
conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise
claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which were the object
of the offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada,
Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did
not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the
complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-
affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a
respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of
Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that
Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted
prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied
any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit
countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a
preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the
certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this
case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is
presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was
implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief,
Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of
witnesses.[41]
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have
been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own
investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused,
as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the
requisite preliminary investigation.[42]
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against
him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in
the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of
the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be
raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in
the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
timber or other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.[45]
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal
documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not
submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the
incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
petitioners culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It
presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on
January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally
Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the
custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the
timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala
who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the
timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and
gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber.
However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and
pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December
31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest
lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several
persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber
will be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to
load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay
Captain of Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay
Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at
Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his
house and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the
bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered
the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was
delivered.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the
delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from
Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How much?
A P2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.
[52] (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess
(animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate
physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of
the crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found.[54]
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite
legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage
without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the
offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was
not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been
established. They assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause
of the prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single
witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor.
Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph
proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves
stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged
with were likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a
trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or
circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the trial
courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]
The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite
legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the
prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure
Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber exceeding
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its
maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since
none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the
penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00,

which results to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the
maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances.
The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the
minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.
Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered
its Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated
September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners
Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol
(Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under Article
177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a
Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned
stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational meeting were
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio
Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson
of TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General
Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to
regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to
transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest
products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while
the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria
(Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177
of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and
official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and
Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and
committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to
(person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of official position
and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The details for each Information are as follows:5
Criminal
Case No. Date of
Commission Description of Forest
ProductPerson Given the
Permit Official
Receipt No.
0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/
marang David Villareal Jr. 1623446
0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463
0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat
(assorted sizes) Francisco Mendoza 1708352
0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board
ft good lumber Edmundo dela Vega 1708353
0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321
0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322
0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1625521
0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber
(assorted sizes) Naty Orozco 1623421
0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415
0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela Vega 1623041
0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314
0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310
0051 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced
lumber Conchita Odi 0830825
0052 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 0830826
0053 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang
lumber Agosto Astoveza 0830829
0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Edna E. Moises 0943941
0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced
lumber (assorted sizes) Dante Z. Medina 0943964
0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Johnny A. Astoveza 0943975
0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1
piece 18 roda Sonny Leynes 1181827
0058 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood
carvings) Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
0059 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Nestor Astejada 1181917
0060 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood,
kisame & sanipa Arthur/ Lanie
Occea 1182207
0061 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto
Aumentado 1708810
0062 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood
(assorted sizes) Nestor Astoveza1182413
0063 6 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Remedios Orozco 1182366
0064 10 March 2003 1,500 board ft malaruhat
0065 11 March 2003 900 board ft sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Fernando Calzado 1182233
0066 13 March 2003 1,408 board ft hard wood
0067 20 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Remy Orozco 1182157
0068 21 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Rene Francia 1182168
0069 25 March 2003 500 board ft lumber
(assorted sizes) Thelma Ramia 1182179
0070 26 March 2003 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra)
finished product Roy Justo 1182246
0071 14 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs.
post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw Anita Solloza 3651059
0072 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber
(assorted sizes) Remy Orozco 3651101
0073 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Dindo America 3651101
0074 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber
(assorted sizes) Amado Pradillada 3651268
0075 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber
(assorted sizes) Romy Buendicho 3651237
0076 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel
Buendicho 3651324
0077 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber
(assorted sizes) Mylene Moises 3651335-C
0078 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Carlito Vargas 3651336
0079 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs.
60 x 75 bed (ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product Fely Justo 3651519
0080 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 3650927
0081 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Amando Lareza 3651783
0082 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 3651529
0083 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 3651532
0084 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500
board ft finished product Anneliza Vargas 3651531
0085 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Danny Sanchez 3651585
0086 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 3651394
0087 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 3650943
0088 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber
(assorted sizes) Lea Astoveza 3651161
0089 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft
lumber cut woods Jose Noly Moises 3651809
0090 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 3651169
0091 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749
0092 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102
0093 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Dante Medina 1247205
0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221
0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber
(assorted sizes) Emmanuel Lusang 1247167
0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good
Lumber Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175
0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173
0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452
0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/
lumber Dante Medina 1247180
0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182
0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188
0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129
0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428
0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191
0106 01 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198
0107 05 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853
0108 08 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang
woods Rosa Turgo 1322862
0109 12 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa
Adornado 1322865
0110 25 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted
lumber Romy Buendicho 1322929
0111 28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879
0112 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber
(assorted sizes) Marilou Astejada 1323056
0113 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods
(assorted sizes) Rosa Turgo 1322834
0114 05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Agustin Vargas 1323064
0115 08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124
0116 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 1323023
0117 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted
species)Noling Multi
Purpose Corp. 1323072
0118 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071
0119 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber
0120 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128
0121 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041
0122 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 1322951
0123 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Decembrano
Sabiduria 1323085
0124 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095
0125 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100
0126 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/
Marang Virgilio Villareal 1323252
0127 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/
Marang Virgilio Villareal 1323252
0128 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Nestor Astorza 1482662
0129 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Virgilio Villareal 1482666
0130 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat
(assorted sizes) Amado Pradillada 1482815
0131 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867
0132 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716
0133 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717
0134 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Mylene Moises 1482670
0135 13 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan
(assorted sizes) Winnie Acebaque 1482734
0136 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat
(assorted sizes) Nestor Bautista 1482740
0137 13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan
(assorted sizes) Trinidad Guerero 1482774
0138 16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782
0139 17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Nenita Juntreal 1482787
0140 20 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat
(assorted sizes) Belen Ordinado 1482793
0141 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber
0142 25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good
lumber Dante Medina 1323277
0143 27 Oct. 2003 1,800 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Dante Medina 1482951
0144 28 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Jonathan Supremo 1323281
0145 28 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes) Rolando Franela 1323280
0147 03 Nov. 2003 850 finished products
(cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs) Naty Orozco 1483020
0148 03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber
(assorted sizes) & 6
bundles of sticks Elizabeth Junio 1483022
0149 10 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good
0150 10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033
0151 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Federico Marquez 1483041
0152 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good
lumber (assorted sizes) Rizalito Francia 1483042
0153 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs
balusters (assorted sizes of
stringers, tassels) Annie Gonzales 1483070
0154 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287
0155 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat
lumber (assorted sizes) Federico Marquez 1483072
0156 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7
pcs. 1x10x14 Belen Ordinado 1483023
0157 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Leonardo Aveno 1623003
0158 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483027
0159 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished products Naty Orozco 1483031
(assorted sizes) Armando Pradillada 1483134
0161 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 1632059
0162 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good
(assorted sizes) Maria Teresa
Adornado 1323288
0164 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Romeo Sabiduria 1483080
0165 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat
0167 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090
0168 25 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan
(assorted sizes) Manuel Buendicho 1483095
0169 28 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished
products (cabinet and
components) Nenita Juntareal 1623019
0170 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061
0171 01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123
0172 01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Belen Ordinado 1623063
0173 03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125
0174 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127
0175 04 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted
sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks Nenita Juntareal 1483128
0176 05 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131
0177 08 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Elenor Rutaquio1623082
0178 08 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) William Rutaquio 1623010
0179 09 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090
0180 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good
lumber (assorted sizes) Angelo Avellano1623099
0181 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good
lumber (assorted sizes) Angelo Avellano1623099
0182 12 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147
0183 16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033
0185 16 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986
0186 18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992
0188 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco
lumber Felecita Marquez 1322998
0189 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209
0190 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211
0191 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda Crisostomo 1623210
0192 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215
(assorted sizes) Francisco Mendoza 1483086
0194 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut
lumber Mylene Moises 1247126
0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished
and semi-finished products Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q
0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q
0197 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin
lumber Nemia Molina 200647
0198 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
0199 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood
(Bulakan) Elizabeth Junio 1708899
0200 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang
wood Roda Turgo 1867608
0201 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted
sizes) Necito Crisostomo 1708891
0202 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890
0203 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Leonardo Aveno 1708863
0204 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes) Ronnie Astejada 1708774
0207 04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Pepito Aumentado 1708486
0208 1 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted
sizes) Atan Marquez 1708878
0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Decembrano
Sabiduria 1708487
0210 06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547
0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Pepito Aumentado 1708534
0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Leonardo Moises 1708528
0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Pepito Aumentado 1708518
0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber
(assorted sizes) Amando Pradillada 1708368
0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Pepito Aumentado 1708517
0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good
lumber (assorted sizes) Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
0218 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber
0219 11 March 2004 300 pieces or 1, 200 board
ft. sliced lumber (assorted
sizes) Ernesto Aumentado 1708975
0220 02 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good
lumber Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451
0222 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1623096
0223 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted
species Naty Orozco 1483048
0224 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa
Adornado 1483019
0225 21 Oct. 2003 1,770 board ft. good
(assorted sizes) Leonardo S. Aveno 1323271
(assorted sizes) Annie Gonzales 1323273
0228 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 1482835
0229 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834
0230 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door
(finished product) Roy Justo 1482743
(assorted sizes) Analiza Vargas 1482710
(assorted sizes) Engr. Mercado 1482760
0233 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Wennie Acebuque 1482703
0235 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat
lumber (assorted sizes) Decembrano
Sabiduria 1323076
(assorted sizes) Junier Franquia 1323027
0237 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830
0238 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber
(assorted sizes) Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200
0239 06 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802
0240 25 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024
0241 26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096
0242 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587
0243 23 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted
sizes) Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
0244 20 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/
Melita Masilang3651574
0245 02 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Armando Lariza 3651656
0246 17 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Efren Tena/ Romeo
Serafines 1182204
0247 07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece
narra panel door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
product) Roy D. Justo 1182060
0248 05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647
(assorted sizes) Luz Astoveza 0943618
0250 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced
lumber (assorted sizes) Arceli Fortunado 0830698
0251 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling
Manok Roy Justo 0830646
0252 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber
(assorted sizes) Roy Justo 0830625
0253 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced
lumber (assorted sizes) Inna L. Customerado 0830771
0254 23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced
lumber (assorted sizes) Normelita L.
Curioso 0830610
0255 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood
carvings) Floredeliza D.
Espiritu 686642
0256 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood
Espiritu 090549
0257 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood
Espiritu 090769
0258 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks &
1,450 board ft. Bollilo
(assorted sizes) Lea A. Rivera 7786333
0259 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the
presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the documentary
evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the
prosecution submitted their respective memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to
transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also
those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted as well as those that are
necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGUs efficient and effective governance. The LGU is likewise
given powers that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general
welfare clause provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of
authority that enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that will benefit their local
constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the
DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to
manage and control communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees levied by the
municipality for the use of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a)
Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c)
Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power
to create its own sources of revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is denominated
"Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber;
hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to transport the said
forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits
issued by the accused were never taken as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why
said permits contain the annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued by accused
Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon
the accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been committed in the issuance
thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport permits
through the Provincial Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under the
pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there
was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting
Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official
Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold
rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221
charges. The cash bond posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused
upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting
and auditing procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set
aside and the Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of
Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits
with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To
the graft court, Ruzols issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of
the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation
revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the
question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product
is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.

Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue
transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No.
705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to
Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and authority
over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including watershed reservations presently
administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation of
forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the
taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation of
multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection, development and
preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures
and programs to prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration
with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public domain; and
the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and
other wood processing plants and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest products.
(Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following
functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and mineral
resources and in the process of exercising such control the Department shall impose appropriate
payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or
gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the countrys forest, land
and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation, licensing and
regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and
monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for the extraction, exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of programs and
measures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the
private sector; the effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of lands of the public
domain; and the enforcement of natural resources laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint venture or
production sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and
arrangement concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the countrys natural resources
and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders,
and for all other causes which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of
the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest products, grading
and inspection of lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and
other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the
permittee should secure the necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved
wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the
entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permita "permit issued by the DENR to
gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon
damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed
to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for
Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the authority to regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.1wphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products" is
not one of the DENRs functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No.
7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs
and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects.
(Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the DENR to
the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry products; (2)
management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers;
and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects.13 It also
referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the
forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs,
as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations, except at least one
project per province that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and
those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in protected areas and
critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to policies and
procedures prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of
1990 and other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers
or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs
shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which are sources
of local water supply as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed areas and
communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other implements used in the
commission of offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above
mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in
the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits
remains with the DENR15 and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly,
the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and
ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by
law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of
the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in
ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or
"exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any
of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities,
i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENRs supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of
local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec.
16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the
municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is
upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances
aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate
measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As
can be deduced from Ruzols memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it
was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzolto
regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence,
prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest
products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done
either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall
share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable
management and development of the environment and natural resources within their territorial
jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint
Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU
Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the
DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative Order
No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU
partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable
development of the countrys environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and development
of the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall
endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and efficient
management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other
government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an integral activity of comprehensive
land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local,
regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable management
of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in
the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs
in the management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs capacity in forest management is enhanced,
the primary tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role
of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic]
additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements with
them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community empowerment, DENR
and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking
and strengthening the participation of local communities for forest management including enforcement
of forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of
usurpation of DENRs authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENRs duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGUs territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules
or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately
uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.22
Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded
from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules
or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to
comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied by
the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by
law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGUs power to create its own sources of
revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. Local government units may impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government units may exercise the
power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein
or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable
laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as
Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the
subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges
under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate
ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of
the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from
sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to
issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as
the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which
endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakars Revised Municipal Revenue
Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of
the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and
transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.
Ruzols insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGUs devolved function to "manage and control
communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the
LGUs authority in the management and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We
reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural
parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same
Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGUs authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to
national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has a well-defined and technical
meaning.31 Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence and knowledge on forest
resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf
of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments shall
be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual identification and
assessment of existing communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing
communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these communal forests may be disestablished.
The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU
assessment Team through the PENRO and the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as
still suitable to achieve their purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is located shall pass resolution
requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon
receipt of said resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring
said communal forest to the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the
concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said communal
forest to the city or municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate
and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan governing the sustainable
development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination with
the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest
resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest management planning
to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include provision for replanting by the
communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning to be
undertaken jointly between the DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall
indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests within the production forest
categorized as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the passage by
the LGUs sanggunian of a resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order
declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required administrative order shall be issued
within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU shall
formulate the management plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall
include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure
sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis
Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following
requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within the
geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate,
among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary
through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued
by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with.
Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there
was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the management and
control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the
issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the
DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute,
the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged
forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a
Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to
transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined
and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person who shall knowingly and falsely
represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any
act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by
knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do
so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the
crime of usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to
transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being
lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the
present case because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by
the prosecution.36 As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the
accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction
will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of
his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt
proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and
it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As explained by
this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the
State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands;
with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as
public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in
striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for
life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction
when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan,
We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions theory that the
DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority
to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to
the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery
Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his
authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said
permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a
defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily
used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of
all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."44 Good
faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying
not on ones self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzols claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject
permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the various NGOs, Peoples Organizations and
religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject permits
even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was legally
empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required by law.
That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he
had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-up.46
(Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to
draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an accused sought another persons approval. Neither
is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or
affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public
consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzols good intentions to regulate and
monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal
logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzols
decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the
Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the
participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of General Nakar,
through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latters authority as local chief executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzols good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly
believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and
obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft courts above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol
willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the
prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and
credibility to publicly object against Ruzols allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO
Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzols claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the
shoulders of DENR aloneeach and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or
her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a right
for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation,
environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to
contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as
municipal mayoran act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-
governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar.
Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically
demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable
doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the
accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist," as
"there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed
that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as
municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in
order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for
these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing
advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that this
case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions
under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary,
We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and, in the
interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of
the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as
charged.
SO ORDERED.

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ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING,

The petition raises the following issues:[17]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private

The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

We will now resolve both issues.

Costs against private respondents.

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

The Petition is meritorious.

G.R. No. 175289

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

August 31, 2011

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Version of the Prosecution

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

Q What did the conductor say?

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime

The Proper Penalty

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00,

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,

The petition is partly meritorious.

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