ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
The problem
Facts:
As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or procedure,
particularly petitioners personality or sufficiency of interest and the
question whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside.
Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President issued
in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671)
o L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution in the Manila, CFI
for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses
and lots for residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal.
o L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner.
Respondents refuse to issue the required export license on the ground
that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by EO
No. 192 (aims to control exports from the Philippines)
o L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the
Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225
(appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes)
o L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226 (appropriates P6M to
defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug
of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to
prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."
As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their
oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the
proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect),
constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.
Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act declaring a state
of total emergency as a result of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and
authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution.
is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness
Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect
Held and Ratio
YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the
Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify
the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not be
said to be an emergency.
It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in
view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the Constitution,
and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that
new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with
the Constitution either.
Moreover, the fact that Sec. 4, CA No. 471 (which stipulates that "the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect
until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide") is silent
regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of
it only means that the National Assembly believed that there was no
necessity to provide for a provision regarding the repeal of the authority
itself. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and
regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in
force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and
regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the
legislature.
It would anomalous to have two legislative bodies (Legislative and
Executive) operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while
Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the
anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional
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 recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between
sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.
Aside from these anomalies, Sec. 3which provides that the President
shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress report
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers
herein grantedimplies that there was to be only one meeting of Congress
at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.
Moreover, Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act,
if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be
entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, that CA No. 671
was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These connote automatic extinction of the law upon the
conclusion of a certain period. A new legislation was necessary to keep
alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.
What then was the contemplated period? Pres. Quezon said he issued the
call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was
most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942." From that, the conferring
of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific
view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet, as no other factor
than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast
as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority.
HELD: Thus, the Court held that the period contemplated from the
foregoing was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to
function, a period ending with the convening of that body. Particularly,
CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met, not in the first
special session where the Congress may "consider general legislation or
only such as he (President) may designate." (Art. VI(9), Constitution) but
in regular session on May 25, 1946 where the power Congress to legislate
is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
The Court further held that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law (because they were issued when CA No. 671 was
not in full force and effect).
Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court need not decide the question
as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the
contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or
another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue.
What the Court in this case did is to find out the will of legislature and,
once found, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in
proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional
prerogative and duty.
No legal principle can be found to support the proposition that the Chief
Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war has not ended, and
may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the
law as the courts have construed it.
Another peg to the ratio decidendi (naks! Method ang dating! Haha!) Acts
Nos. 600 and 620 even imparts by express provision that the rules and
regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620,
were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the
following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed
by the National Assembly." From this the idea was fixed that the Acts
themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The
design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations
necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best
simultaneous repeal of their source.
The question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we
were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still
raging, the elusion would not be altered.
In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency
Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a
result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending
invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the
consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the
impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was
one which called for immediate action and with which the National
Assembly would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos
and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National
Assembly been in a position to operate.
A Note on the System of Separation of Powers: The Constitution has
set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The
Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice
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 that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system,
with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of
government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not
expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. The truth is that under
our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more
than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative,
and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and
discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." (Thus, the
President should not retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and
other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the
Philippines)
Votes:
MORAN, C. J., concurring
PARAS, J., concurring
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting
TORRES, J., concurring
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained.
However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by
resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.
Rodriguez vs Gella
2nd Emergency Powers Cases
Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546
issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities.
2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of
war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy
that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he
may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was
vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent
resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative
NO.
1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The
Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating
funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must
be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself
and to withdraw the same from the President.
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2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be
assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited
period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and
such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may
never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the
President may wield his veto.
entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our
democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and
unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general

appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations;
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the
President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make
new appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations

which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the
general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for
about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and
legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary
powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping,
if not conflict.

5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a
limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus

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