Best Evidence Rule and Its Exceptions (Complete)

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Best evidence rule and its exceptions
BEST EVIDENCE RULE (Rule 130 section 2-8)

SECTION 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any
material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered
as proof of their contents. (n)
1. Best Evidence Rule
SECTION 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office. (2a)
SECTION 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals. (3a)
2. Secondary Evidence
SECTION 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
SECTION 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document is in the
custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
SECTION 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
SECTION 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. A party who calls for the production of a
document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
Rule 132 section 25 and 27
SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
SECTION 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO; 18 SCRA 155; 1996

FACTS:
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"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March
30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
Carrascoso traveled through the agent of Air France, PAL from Manila to Rome. PAL issued a first class ticket
to Carrascoso, it having marked "ok". From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso was seated in the first class
accommodation but he was forced to vacate his first class seat upon arriving at Bangkok as there was a white
man who had the better right to such seat. A commotion ensued yet the captain refused to intervene. When
asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso
and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man'; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat
in the plane." Carrascoso was transferred to the tourist accommodation against his will. Hence, an action for
damages was instituted against Air France.
Air France contended that Carrascoso was aware of the that he had no confirmed reservations in the first class
accommodation.
One of the pieces of evidence was the log book of the purser who entered the incident in his log book, stating
'First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to
intervene'. Air France objected to its admissibility.
The trial court ruled in favor of Carrascoso and awarded the latter among others, moral damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Carrascoso had the right to the first class accommodation.
2. Whether or not the record on the log book is admissible.
RULING:
The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the evidence presented for the defense or to specify in the
decision the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirement of the law and the Constitution. There is no law that so requires. A decision is
not to be clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result.
The Court of Appeals properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the fact that
seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air passenger will be placed in the hollow of
the hands of an airline, because it will always be easy for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket
and say that there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
The testimony of a witness that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene," is competent and
admissible because the subject of the inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. It does not come within the
prescription of the best evidence rule.
Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. 49
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been
an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry
was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8.Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.
(favor of the respondent)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Br. XIII, PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, ANGELITA CENTENO, JULIA CARPIO,
CALIXTO HERMOSA, and CRISPULA R. PAGARAN alias PULA, July 31, 1959
Facts: A criminal case for falsification of public documents were charged against Madrigal-Gonzales, et al in
their capacities as public officials and employees by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise were purchased by Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such
quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the
said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and
supposedly purchased by said Madrigal Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever been made.
To prove the said charge, the prosecution presented a booklet of receipts (Exh. D) which contained the triplicate
copies. The witness (the salesman who issued the triplicates, Exh D-1) said that the original invoices were sent
to the Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the
booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the three
sheets, the original, the duplicate and the triplicate, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the
used of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals.
Hon. Tan, then presiding in the court below, interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not
admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and can not be produced.
Another witness, accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in Manila, testified that the sales in the provinces
were reported to the Manila office of the Metro Drug Corporation, and that the originals of the sales invoices are
transmitted to the main office in support of cash journal sheets, but that the original practice of keeping the
original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicate or
pink copies are submitted to the central office in Manila.
After the cross-examination of this last witness, the prosecution again went back to the identification of the
triplicate invoice, Exh. "D-1". It was at this stage that the judge below told the prosecution that the law applicable
is Section 46, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which requires the production of the originals. In response to the
above ruling, the special prosecutor claimed that the evidence of the prosecution the originals on account of their
loss.
Issue: Whether the production of the originals is required for the carbon copies of it to be admissible
Ruling: The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question and we need not elaborate
on the reasons for the rule.
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or
exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may
be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.' (Moran, 1952 ed., p.
444.)
People vs. Quinones, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 1520, 1525: The said confession Exhibit B, being carbon copy of the
original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant, is admissible in evidence and possess all the
probative value of the original, and the same does not require an accounting for the non-production of the
original
Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of the admissibility of duplicate
originals, as follows:
"SEC. 386.. . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to
prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip' (People vs. Stone, 349 Ill. 52, 181 N. E. 648) has been held
to be primary evidence, p. 616.
"SEC. 420.Duplicate originals. Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the
original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface
at the same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may be introduced in evidence without
accounting for the nonproduction of the other. (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, p. 661).
"SEC. 100.Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are
duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 168.)
We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon papers
are not admissible in evidence, without accounting first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be
reversed. The court below is hereby ordered to proceed in the trial of the case in accordance with this ruling.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, December 4, 1990.
Facts:
May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. A buy-bust operation at Makati was conducted by PNP. Detective Singayan
was to pose as the buyer and waited at a store. Soon 3 men approached him one of whom offered drugs. The
exchange was made then and there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked
ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. They made a body search of
Tandoy and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.
They brougth him to the police staton for investigation. Forensic chemist NBI confirmed the substance positive
for marijuana. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit.
The lower court admitted in evidence against Tandoy Exh. E-2-A which is a xerox copy of the bill allegedly
used as a buy-bust money. After trial, it found Tandoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 6425
and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay fine P20K.
Issue: Whether the xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill should have been excluded under the best evidence
rule
Ruling: No. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the
accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police
officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the
failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
accused-appellant.
THE UNITED STATES vs. BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY, December 17, 1910
Facts: In a suit initiated by Salazar as a creditor against Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of Libog, for
the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered wherein Balistoy was sentenced to pay him
P275.92 with interest and cost. For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the
debtor were attached and 27th of May, 1908 was set for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties
to the highest bidder. On the 18th of the same month, Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said
realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the
properties levied upon, for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the
filing of the compliant. By reason of this claim and petition the judgment creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond, in
view of which the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the said property, and of another, also attached for the sum
of P300, and both were adjudicated to Salazar.
For his claim of intervention, Gregorio attached thereto a document, Exh. D, at the end of which and among
other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio
Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in
the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such
vendor.
A complaint was filed in CFI against Balistoy and Gregorio for the falsification of a private document. The charge
consists in that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor, Salazar, and for the purpose of avoiding the attachment
and sale of one of the properties belonging to him, to secure the payment of the judgment obtained by his
creditor in the aforementioned suit, did, with disregard of the truth in the narration of the facts, execute or write
the said memorandum whereby, on February 25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the
attached properties in favor of Gregorio, according to the aforesaid copy, when in fact the said memorandum
was written in April, 1908. CFI adjudged them both guilty.
Issue: Whether there was proper evidence to indict the accused of falsification of private document
Ruling: No. The mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated public document could not legally produce the
effect of suspending the sale of the said land, inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of the
intervener and opponent, being a mere copy of a private document whose legality has not been proven.
As the original document, setting forth the said memorandum, was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and
furthermore, as it could not be ascertained who had the original of the document containing the memorandum in
question, nor the exact date when the latter was written; the said memorandum, presumed to be simulated and
false, was not literally compared by the sheriff who testified that he had seen its original for but a few moments,
nor by any other officer authorized by law to certify to documents and proceedings such as are recorded in
notarial instruments, nor even by two witnesses who might afterwards have been able to testify before the court
that the copy exhibited was in exact agreement with its original; therefore, on account of these deficiencies,
doubt arises as to whether the original of the document, Exhibit D, really existed at all, and whether the
memorandum at the foot of the said exhibit is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of the
said original document.
In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have
before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find,
pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and
also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification
under prosecution. Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it
is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and
although, judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there
is reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendant's innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish
decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. Defendants in a
criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable
doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In view of the
evidence produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes can only be terminated by such a
finding.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to acquit,
and we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo Gregorio.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA vs. HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of First Instance of
Pampanga, and ANDRES GUEVARRA, August 5, 1931
Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra wherein the
latter, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13,
1930, a squib in verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein, intended to impeach the
honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit (information in criminal cause No. 4501) and of Mariano
Nepomuceno (information in criminal cause No. 4502).
A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the
prosecution Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the liberous article with
the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish.
Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court.
Issue: Whether the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information,
and should therefore be admitted;
Ruling: Yes. The general rule is that the complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory
words as published, and a statement of their substance and effect is usually considered insufficient." But this
general rule does not exclude certain exceptions, such as, cases where the libel is published in a non-official
language. "When the defamation has been published in a foreign tongue, it is proper, and in general, necessary,
to set out the communication as it was originally made, with an exact translation into English;
If the libelous article had been published in one of our official languages, English or Spanish, it would have been
necessary to follow the general rule; but since the article in question was published in the Pampango dialect, it is
sufficient to insert a Spanish translation in the information. The justice of this exception to the general rule
becomes more evident if we consider a libelous article published, for instance, in Moro or Chinese, who use
characters different from our own.
The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The
evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production
of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous
article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself
is the best evidence of an article published in it. (Bond vs. Central Bank of Georgia, 2 Ga., 92.)
The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion to admit or reject the evidence offered by the fiscal; but in the
instant case his refusal to admit such evidence amounts to an abuse of that discretion, which may be controlled
by this court by means of mandamus proceedings. In so far as the jurisdiction of this court is concerned, we
believe the doctrine is applicable which was held in Orient Insurance Co. vs. Revilla and Teal Motor Co. (54
Phil., 919), namely, that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of mandamus to
compel a Court of First Instance to permit the attorney of a litigant to examine the entire written communication,
when part of the same has been introduced in evidence by the other party.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga should
be issued, requiring him to admit Exhibits A, B, C, and D, in question in criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502 of
that court,
COMPAIA MARITIMA vs. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, SALVADOR T. LLUCH, MARIANO LL.
BADELLES, individually and in their capacities as President and Vice-President, respectively of the
Allied Free Workers Union, NICANOR HALIBAS and LAURENTINO LL. BADELLES, individually and
officers of Allied Free Workers Union, May 24, 1977
Facts: August 11, 1952 the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written
contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the company's vessels at Iligan
City. Union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the
union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would
be paid "by the owners and consignees of the cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan City" But it
later found out that the stipulation was oppressive and that the company was unduly favored by that
arrangement.
The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring
service. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the
bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense. The company refused to
pay for the stevedoring service because the contract (Exh. J) explicitly provided that the compensation for both
arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees, as was the alleged practice in
Iligan City,
The union requested to be recogniazed as exclusive bargaining unit but the company ignored it. So the union
filed in CIR a petition to be certified as sole collective bargaining unit. Then the compnay served the union a
notice that it will be terminated. So the union filed in the CIR charges of ULP against the company.
The company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. Then
the union members picketed for 9 days the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from
performing arrastre and stevedoring work. The company sued the union and its officers in the CFI for the
rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and
unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision (1) declaring the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated on
August 31, 1954; (2) dismissing the union's counterclaim; (3) ordering the union and its officers to pay solidarily
to the company P520,000 as damages with six percent interest per annum from September 9, 1954, when the
complaint was filed; (4) permanently enjoining the union from performing any arrastre and stevedoring work for
the company at Iligan City, and (5) requiring the union to post a supersedeas bond in the sum of P520,000 to
stay execution.
Jose C. Teves, the company's branch manager at Iligan City, testified that on August 24, 1954 he terminated the
arrastre and stevedoring contract with the union (Exh. J) upon instruction of the head office. The contract was
terminated in order to avoid further losses to the company caused by the union's inefficient service.
The company supposedly suffered losses as a result of the union's inefficient service since September 1, 1954
(91). Teves hired auditors to ascertain the losses suffered by the company during the period from January 1 to
September 11, 1954. The trial court awarded actual damages amounting to P450,000 on the basis of the
auditor's reports, Exhibits A to I.
Issue: Whether trial court erred in awarding to the company actual damages amounting to P450,000, moral
damages of P50,000 and attorney's fees of P20,000, and in holding that the four officers of the union are
solidarily liable for the said damages. Whether the award of actual damages is unwarranted on the ground that
the auditors' reports, on which they were based, were hearsay.
Ruling: The trial court did not carefully examine the said exhibits. Contrary to the trial court's impression,
Exhibits B, C and D are not auditors' reports. The trial court did not bother to make a breakdown of the alleged
damages totalling P450,000. The reports of the two hired accountants, Demetrio S. Jayme and M. J. Siojo, show
the following alleged damages in the aggregate amount of P349,245.37 (not P412,663.17, as erroneously added
by the company's counsel, 161, 163-4 tsn March 11, 1960)
Teves, the company's branch manager, submitted a statement (Exh. K) showing the alleged cost of three
forklifts, 200 pieces of pallet boards, 530 pieces of wire rope slings and two pieces of tarpaulins in the total sum
of P27,215. In that statement, he claims that the damages to the company by reason of the depreciation of the
said items of equipment amounted to P38,835 or more than the cost thereof.
The company's counsel, in his summary of the damages, ignored the alleged damages of P38,835 indicated by
Teves in Exhibit K. The company's counsel relied only on the auditors' reports, Exhibits A and E to I and on
Exhibit B, the chief clerk's statement. As already noted, those documents show that the total damages claimed
by the company amounted to P349,245.37.
The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of the oral
testimony of Teves. He did not produce the sales invoices.
On the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages claimed by the company, as a matter of simple
addition, does not reach the sum of P450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages shown in the accountants'
reports and in the statement made by the company's chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or
much less than P450,000.
The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the
original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole", the original
writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to
the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like"
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as
to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and
analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529).
A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value.
Unrealized freight and passenger revenue for 1954 ascertained by Accountant Demetrio S. Jayme. - It would not
be proper to allow Accountant Jayme's estimates as recoverable damages. They are not supported by reliable
evidence. They can hardly be sanctioned by the "generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in Jayme's
report. The pertinent records of the company should have been produced in court. The purser and steward did
not testify.
The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or inferences (29 Am Jur 2d 519). His
opinion is not evidence.
Accountant Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which were not produced in
court. The union objected to Jayme's report as inadmissible under the hearsay rule or as not being the best
evidence.
Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been dispensed with, yet the
company, to show good faith and fair dealing, could have brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading,
receipts for the freights, if any, etc.) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant to
verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries.
Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was not able to collect the
stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should have been presented in evidence as supporting papers
for Jayme's report. No such exhibits were presented.
Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante. The company also claims as damages for the period from
September 12 to December 28, 1954 lost freight charges on shutout cargoes in the sum of P62,680.12, and the
sum of P20,000 as "overhead expenses for delay of vessels in port", as set forth by Salvador M. Magante, the
company's chief clerk at Iligan City, in his statement, Exhibit B (items 9 and 10 of the tabulation of damages).
Magante did not testify on his statement. Instead, accountant Jayme, substituting for Magante, testified on that
statement. Jayme said that he verified the company's records on which Magante based his statement. Jayme
assured the court that the figures in Magante's statement were supported by the company's records. But as to
the damages of P20,000, Jayme said that he could not certify as to their correctness because he had not
finished his investigation. In spite of that admission, the trial court allowed that item of damages.
The trial court erred in allowing the damages totalling P82,680.12 because Magante's statement, Exhibit B, is
hearsay. Magante should have been presented as a witness. Jayme was not competent to take his place since
the statement was prepared by Magante, not by Jayme. More appropriate still, the documents and records on
which the statement was based should have been presented as evidence or at least brought to the court for
examination by the union's counsel and its accountant. The trial court required the production of the manifests
supporting Magante's statement (85-86 tsn March 9, 1955). Only one such manifest, Exhibit C, was produced.
The non-production of the other records was not explained.
Lost freight revenue and operating expenses for the forklifts. The said damages were computed in the reports
of Miguel J. Siojo, an accountant who, for two days and nights, March 8 to 10, 1960, or shortly before and during
the trial, allegedly examined the company's record at Iligan City, such as its cash book, cash vouchers, reports
to the head office, shipping manifests, and liquidation reports. Those records were not produced in court. Their
non-production was not explained. If the accountant was able to summarize the contents of those records in two
days, they could not have been very voluminous. They should have been offered in evidence.
To avoid fraud or fabrication, the documents evidencing the alleged expenses should have been presented in
evidence. Siojo's reports were not the best evidence on the said operating expenses.
The trial court erred in ordering the union and its officials to pay the amount of the said expenses as damages to
the company.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK) vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR
WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND SPOUSE, July 29, 2005
Facts: Solidbank extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos evidenced by a
promissory note executed by respondents on the same date wherein the respondents bound themselves
solidarily to pay Solidbank the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a
month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full
amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Despite oral and
written demands from Solidbank, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness.
Solidbank attached to its complaint filed before the RTC for recovery of sum of money against respondents as
Annexes "A," "B," and "C," respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account
pertaining to respondents' loan.
Respondent corporation filed a manifestation attaching its answer that the promissory note in question is void for
want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration involved as defendant herein did not
receive any consideration at all; Respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer wherein he
likewise renounced any liability on the promissory note, saying that he has never signed the promissory note
attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity as such
Solidbank presented Lavarino, then the manager of its Collection Department, and identified the following
exhibits: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit "A;"
petitioner's 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit "B;" Tolentino's letter to petitioner dated 10
February 1983 and marked as Exhibit "C;" and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents
marked as Exhibit "D."
Solidbank made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A" could no longer be
found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was
identified and marked as Exhibit "E."
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted respondents' motion that they be allowed to
amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. Respondent corporation filed a manifestation
and motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order admitting into evidence petitioner's Exhibit "E."
Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E" should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant,
was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit "E" was not
properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of
petitioner's exhibits, one of which was Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A" which were not
contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly,
respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted
that Exhibit "E" was not the original of Exhibit "A" which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which
respondent corporation based its own answer.
Trial court granted respondents' motions for reconsideration. 14 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
order which was denied by the court a quo. Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar
ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents'
alleged indebtedness.
The case before the trial court was dismissed. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether Exhibit 'E', the second original of the promissory note, should be excluded despite the fact that
the original of exhibit 'a' (xerox copy of the duplicate original of the promissory note) was actually in the
possession of private respondents, thus warranting the admission of secondary evidence.
Ruling: The "best evidence rule" is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The "best evidence rule," according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when
in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the
usages of trade and that "the best proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only required." Over the years,
the phrase was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule that the terms of a document
must be proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the document; it was
also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court and not subject to
the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the group of rules by which
testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to that of others.
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, "the only actual rule that the 'best evidence'
phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing" the rationale being:
(1)that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance,
particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in
the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting
to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of
written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the
preference for the original writing is justified.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the "best
evidence rule," we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents
never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the
parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for
disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents' principal defense rests on the alleged lack of
consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in
his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the "precise wording" of the promissory note
which should have paved the way for the application of the "best evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for
the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted
earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the
possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the
opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit "A" was in the
possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the "best evidence
rule."
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory
note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original
of said note.
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the
defendant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' decision affirming RTC decision is hereby reversed
and set aside.
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, July 17, 2006.
Facts: Arceo obtained a loan from Cenizal, P150,000.00. Arceo then issued then in favor of Cenizal, BPO
Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizal's house located at 70 Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo
promised on several times that he would replace the check with cash. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal]
brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the BPI informed [Cenizal] that the check
bounced because of insufficient funds. Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the
dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter
to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check.
Arceo still failed to make good the amount of the check. So Cenizal executed before the office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and
[v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed
against Arceo. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that
occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss
of the check in question and the return slip. After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. CA affirmed in toto.
Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to
present the dishonored check during the trial.
Ruling: The best evidence rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the
inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he
presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The
City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding
information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by
Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to
adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss
as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admitted that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented
for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, August 17, 2004
Facts: An information was filed charging Magdayao with violation of BP22. The prosecution presented the
private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the Magdayao
drew and issued to him PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The
said check was drawn against the latter's account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in payment of
the petitioner's obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account with the
BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that when informed that his check
was dishonored, the petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis
then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992, docketed
as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the
dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for
P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the
check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the
P600,000.00.
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the latter's
absence and that of his counsel, the direct examination on the witness could not be terminated. The prosecution
moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date, and that the petitioner be ordered to
appear before the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court granted
the motion and set the continuation of the trial. After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he
and his counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial.
In the meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit "A," and the dorsal
portion thereof as Exhibit "A-1." , offered it in evidence and the court admitted.
The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order declaring the case submitted for decision. Magdayao filed a motion
for recon; denied. In a Special Manifestation, Magdayao insisted that the photocopy of the subject check was
inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution's failure to produce the original thereof.
Trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because
the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 adduced in evidence by the prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence
under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no probative weight;
Ruling: it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No.
399967 to prove the contents thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and
amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by
the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter
evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its
production would expose and defeat. As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive
in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that
the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted
when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the
adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the
offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document is in the custody or under
the control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered
does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power
to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or
via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the
same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latter's offer to pay the amount of the check by
drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still
failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis.
In his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he received the original
copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that he caused the non-payment of the
dishonored check. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of
PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy
thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February
8, 1996, and in his Special Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecution's
violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much less
offered to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip
for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his
numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE.
FILIPINA Y. SY, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY,April 12, 2000.
Facts: Filipina Sy filed a petition for legal separation. The action was later amended to a petition for separation
of property on the ground that her husband, Fernando Sy, abandoned her without just cause. Judgment was
rendered dissolving the conjugal partnership of gains and the court approved a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May, 1988, Filipina filed a
criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband in which the Regional Trial Court convicted him of a
lesser crime of slight physical injuries. Filipina later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent. RTC granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to Filipina, and their son
Frederick to respondent. In 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
her husband Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC denied the petition. It stated that the
alleged acts of the respondent as cited by Filipina do not constitute psychological incapacity, which may warrant
the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. CA affirmed. Filipina moved for reconsideration, which was
denied by the appellate court. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack
of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony;
Ruling:Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage
itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out
that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of
the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which
was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of
Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial
court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on
January 22, 1993 during her direct examination.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was
no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly
state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of
the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of
their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during
the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with
no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was
interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence,
with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts
contained therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
DELA CRUZ VS CA
Facts: On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages 4 against private
respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area of 3,277
square meters. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-
interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18,
1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property.
However, sometime in October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain
a Torrens Title over the said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said document
exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit petitioners' possession of the land, they
assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated demands that the former relinquish the same.
Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought
the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976. 5
During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost. Consequently, they
were constrained to offer, as Exhibit "A," a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale
in an effort to prove the transaction.
in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit "A" was admissible in evidence for failure of the private
respondents to object when it was offered during the trial.
Issue: WON Exhibit A is admissible in evidence

Ruling: Yes, although its probative value leaves much to be desired.
Before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for
Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about
five (5) copies. 7 Hence, it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence
can be presented. 8 These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was
even presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the
National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office.
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts
must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as
established until all its parts are unavailable.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed, not
only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public
Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when it was presented, the same becomes
primary evidence. 11 To be sure, even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to
convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value.
MEYERS VS US
Facts: Bleriot H. Lamarre and the appellant, Bennett E. Meyers, were jointly indicted for violating the District of
Columbia statute 1 which denounces perjury and subornation thereof.
Meyers was an officer in the United States Army. In 1939, while stationed at Wright Field, near Dayton, Ohio, he
organized under the laws of Ohio a corporation called Aviation Electric Corporation. The newly organized
company engaged in manufacturing parts and accessories for airplanes, and soon had on hand orders from the
Signal Corps of the United States Army aggregating about $20,000.
The appellant had become acquainted with Lamarre and his wife as early as 1936 or 1937 and apparently was
fond of them. Late in 1939, he went to see Lamarre in California, where the latter was employed by an airplane
company, and suggested that he come to Dayton to become associated with Aviation Electric in an executive
capacity.
Desiring to ascertain whether there had been instances of waste, fraud, corruption, mismanagement, excessive
profits or inefficiency in the nation's war effort, entailing as it did the hurried expenditure of billions of dollars for
national defense, the United States Senate created the investigating committee to which reference has been
made. In the course of an inquiry into government contracts with a large airplane supplier, the appellant testified
before that committee. It developed during the hearing that Aviation Electric Corporation had been a sub-
contractor on government work and that Lamarre had been its president from 1940 until its dissolution in 1946.
In order to ascertain what connection, if any, the appellant had had with Aviation Electric, the subcommittee
subpoenaed Lamarre.
It was discovered during the hearing that Lamarre knowingly and wilfully testified in favour of Meyers, and that
this was because Meyers induced him to testify such.
William P. Rogers, chief counsel to the senatorial committee, who had examined Lamarre before the
subcommittee and consequently had heard all the testimony given by him before that body, was permitted to
testify as to what Lamarre had sworn to the subcommittee. Later in the trial the government introduced in
evidence a stenographic transcript of Lamarre's testimony at the senatorial hearing.
Meyers asserts it was reversible error to allow Rogers to testify at all as to what Lamarre had said to the
subcommittee, on the theory that the transcript itself was the best evidence of Lamarre's testimony before the
subcommittee.
Issue: WON the best evidence rule applies
Ruling: No. The rule is limited to cases where the contents of a writing are to be proved
Here there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing; the issue was what Lamarre had said, not what the
transcript contained. The transcript made from shorthand notes of his testimony was, to be sure, evidence of
what he had said, but it was not the only admissible evidence concerning it. Rogers' testimony was equally
competent, and was admissible whether given before or after the transcript was received in evidence.
Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved by any person who heard them, as well as by a reporter who
recorded them in shorthand.
SEILER VS LUCAS FILM

Facts: Lee Seiler, a graphic artist and creator of science fiction creatures, alleged copyright infringement by
George Lucas and others who created and produced the science fiction movie "The Empire Strikes Back." Seiler
claimed that creatures known as "Imperial Walkers" which appeared in The Empire Strikes Back infringed
Seiler's copyright on his own creatures called "Garthian Striders." The Empire Strikes Back appeared in 1980;
Seiler did not obtain his copyright until 1981.
Lee Seiler, a graphic artist and creator of science fiction creatures, alleged copyright infringement by George
Lucas and others who created and produced the science fiction movie "The Empire Strikes Back." Seiler claimed
that creatures known as "Imperial Walkers" which appeared in The Empire Strikes Back infringed Seiler's
copyright on his own creatures called "Garthian Striders." The Empire Strikes Back appeared in 1980; Seiler did
not obtain his copyright until 1981.
Because Seiler wished to show blown-up comparisons of his creatures and Lucas' Imperial Walkers to the jury at
opening statement, the district judge held a pre-trial evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Seiler could produce no
originals of his Garthian Striders nor any documentary evidence that they existed before The Empire Strikes
Back appeared in 1980. The district judge, applying the best evidence rule, found that Seiler had lost or
destroyed the originals in bad faith under Fed.R.Evid. 1004(1) and denied admissibility of any secondary
evidence, even the copies that Seiler had deposited with the Copyright Office. With no admissible evidence,
Seiler then lost at summary judgment.
Issue: WON drawings are covered by the best evidence rule
Ruling: Yes. We hold that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the meaning of Rule 1001(1); they
consist not of "letters, words, or numbers" but of "their equivalent."
To hold otherwise would frustrate the policies underlying the rule and introduce undesirable inconsistencies into
the application of the rule.
By requiring the possessor of the original to produce it, the rule prevented the introduction of altered copies and
the withholding of originals.
We observe that the importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the
human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplication are
the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that justify the best evidence rule. Seiler alleges infringement
by The Empire Strikes Back, but he can produce no documentary evidence of any originals existing before the
release of the movie. His secondary evidence does not consist of true copies or exact duplicates but of
"reconstructions" made after The Empire Strikes Back. In short, Seiler claims that the movie infringed his
originals, yet he has no proof of those originals.
The dangers of fraud in this situation are clear. The rule would ensure that proof of the infringement claim
consists of the works alleged to be infringed. Otherwise, "reconstructions" which might have no resemblance to
the purported original would suffice as proof for infringement of the original.
REPUBLIC VS MARCOS-MANOTOK
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino
was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1,
the PCGG was given the mandate of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand
E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents
Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the
latter objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the
Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for
its failure to present the originals. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok
in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These
exhibits also sought to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.
Issue: WON petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule
Ruling:
Yes.
Petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves
It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner's allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as
the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any
compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of
the witnesses who had executed them.
Documents obtained by petitioners were not public documents
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:
SECTION 19.Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are: HETDAC
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country;
(b)Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
SECTION 20.Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a)By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The fact that these
documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se public
records referred to in the quoted rule.
ATIENZA VS BOARD OF MEDICINE

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on
February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC
who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal.
It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent
kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for
gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the
fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors,
including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent's fully functional right kidney, instead of the left
non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
Private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for
the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was
operated.
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM].
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule
Issue: WON the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence for violating the best evidence rule
Ruling: No. The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January
30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha's medical case. The documents
contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as
annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III's counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which
was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits
in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her
operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha's exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory
judicial notice.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence
in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper
anatomical locations of Editha's kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha's
kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
TEGIMENTA CHEMICAL VS OCO
Facts: Starting 5 September 2001, respondent worked as a clerk, and later on as a material controller, for
petitioner Tegimenta Chemical Philippines, Incorporated (Tegimenta), a company owned by petitioner Vivian
Rose D. Garcia (Garcia).
By reason of her pregnancy, Oco incurred numerous instances of absence and tardiness from March to April
2002. Garcia subsequently advised her to take a vacation, which the latter did from 1 to 15 May 2002.
On her return, Oco immediately worked for the next four working days of May. However, on 21 May 2002, Garcia
allegedly told her to no longer report to the office effective that day. Hence, respondent no longer went to work.
She nevertheless called petitioner at the end of the month, but was informed that she had no more job to do.
Immediately thereafter, on 3 June 2002, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for
reinstatement and back wages before the LA. Later on, she amended her Complaint by asking for separation
pay instead of reinstatement.
Petitioners invoke the best evidence rule, saying that the payroll sheet and not the allegation of Oco is the best
evidence that they did not terminate her.
Issue: WON petitioners properly invoked the best evidence rule
Ruling: No. Petitioners seem to miss the whole import of the best-evidence rule. This rule is used to compel the
production of the original document, if the subject of the inquiry is the content of the document itself. 28 The rule
provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in nature, such as a
photocopy, as long as the original evidence of that document can be had. 29
Based on the explanation above, the best-evidence rule has no application to this case. The subject of the
inquiry is not the payroll sheet of Tegimenta rather, the thrust of this case is the abundance of evidence present
to prove the allegation that Oco abandoned her job by being on AWOL. Consequently, the employer cannot be
logically stumped by a payroll sheet, but must be able to submit testimonial and other pieces of documentary
evidence like leave forms, office memos, warning letters and notices to be able to prove that the employee
abandoned her work.
DE VERA VS AGUILAR
Facts: Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona,
married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May
10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land.
The disputed property was mortgaged by Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When
the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn
Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe,
they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be
charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the
property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to
allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
Ruling: No. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument.
The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution loss; contents although this order may be changed
if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular
case. 2
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss
or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a
xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who
executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and
saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the
parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has
been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The
loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of
the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates
or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can
be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent
or by a third person or the like). 6
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged
deed of sale has about four or five original copies. 7 Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted
for three out of four or five original copies.
Country Bankers va Lagman
Facts: Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the
business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay valued at P5,250,000.00 in his warehouse
at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as
amended, 3 the approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real
estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA
Administrator at not less than thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum
quantity of rice to be received.
Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond No.
03304 4 for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and Warehouse Bond No. 02355 5 for P749,925.00 on 13
December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal,
Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration
of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements 6 were executed by Santos, as bond principal,
together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors.
The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses,
costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney's fees and legal costs,
which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond.
When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse
receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. 9 By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was
compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73048
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid
only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes,
cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which allegedly cancelled the 1989
Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has
been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence.
Issue: WON a mere photocopy of the 1990 bond is admissible in evidence
Ruling: No. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must
prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original
or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which
the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents. 28
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually four (4) duplicate
originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac,
the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. 29 A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the original instrument. 30 When more
than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for
the other originals. 31
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a
photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had
already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself
reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989
Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original from any
of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original
with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to
exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL VS BF CORPORATION

Facts: Petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builder's
Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project 4 that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA
Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the
contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work
accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that months progress billing.
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed
upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP86,501,834.05. 7
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work done, did not
prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this
regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the
assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a
sum of money and damages.
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to
petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the
action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF
explained that it could not present the original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI
which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests.
Issue: WON the photocopies are admissible
Ruling: Yes. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is
lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance,
however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. The progress
billings were with EDSA.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question as
secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
The counsel for BF had requested the trial court that EDSA be allowed to produce the original progress billings
before they present secondary evidence. In a subsequent hearing, counsel for EDSA said he had already
informed his client but he has not yet heard from the latter.
Reasonable notice may be in the form of: (1) a motion for the production of the original or (2) made in open court
in the presence of the adverse party or (3) via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original
documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3)
ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (REE) RULE 2 SECTION 1; RULE 3 RULE 4
RULE 2
Definition of Terms and Construction
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are
defined, as follows:
(a) "Asymmetric or public cryptosystem" means a system capable of generating a
secure key pair, consisting of a private key for creating a digital signature,
and a public key for verifying the digital signature.
(b) "Business records " include records of any business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted
for profit, or for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.
(c) "Certificate" means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature
which purports to confirm the identity or other significant characteristics of the
person who holds a particular key pair. CDaSAE
(d) "Computer" refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by
electronic, electro-mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other means with
the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process, correlate,
analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information, data, text, graphics,
figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any
one or more of these functions.
(e) "Digital Signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of
an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric
or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed
electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine:
(i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and,
(ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the
transformation was made.
(f) "Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document or electronic data message
bearing a digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored
by electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
(i) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive
information that crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only
with a matching electronic key.
(j) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in
electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or
logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document
or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and
executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating,
signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.
(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained. cAHITS
(l) "Information and Communication System" refers to a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or
electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar
devices by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related
to the recording or storage of electronic data messages or electronic
documents.
(m) "Key Pair" in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its
mathematically related public key such that the latter can verify the digital
signature that the former creates.
(n) "Private Key" refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.
(o) "Public Key" refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.
SECTION 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases.
The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of
Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act.
RULE 3
Electronic Documents
SECTION 1. Electronic Documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents.
Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any
other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these
Rules.
SECTION 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies
with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by these Rules.
SECTION 3. Privileged communication. The confidential character of a privileged
communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.
RULE 4
Best Evidence Rule
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. An electronic document shall be regarded
as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such
copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent
as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the
original.
NPC vs CODILLA
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent
Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner's Power Barge 209 which was then moored at
the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for
damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner's
power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower
court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof.
Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective
objections to petitioner's formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and eThe
record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the
admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the
document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence excluding from the records petitioner's Exhibits.
Issue: WON the photocopies are covered under the Rules on Electronic Evidence
Ruling: No. The information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or
an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. 5 It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only
in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as
proof of its contents. 7 However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded
or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person's signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the
offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES VS SSAYONG CORPORATION; GR NO 170633, OCTOBER 17 2007

Facts: MCC, a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. The two corporations
conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the
pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager
[also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220
metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf
of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter. On April 17, 2000,
Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of
the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. As
stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable
letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to
be made after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel
manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea and paid the same in full. Because
MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two, one for 110MT
covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2,
both dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax
transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested
that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the
same, by fax, to Ssangyong. However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit.
Consequently, on August 15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not
opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for breach
thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehouse expenses, related
interests and charges.
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by
Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-
POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per
invoice and the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said
August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager
Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT
of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 . The goods covered by the said invoice
were then shipped to and received by MCC. MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000
signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-
1, considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of
money due to a recent strike. Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand letter
to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said L/C was
not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference, warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of
August 15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales
contract under ST2-POSTS0401- 1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing
losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges. Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil
action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. The lower court
denied the demurrer and ruled that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted and their
admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per
MT, the contract was perfected.
Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible.
HELD: As such Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not
fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax
transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an
electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims
that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2- POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the nonproduction of
the original fax transmittals.
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows: Admissibility of Pro Forma Invoices; Breach of
Contract by Appellants Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma
Invoices with Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2- POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218,
Records), appellants argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best evidence
rule.
The argument is untenable.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although they
are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic
Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2,
Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01- SC). The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it
is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic
data message" or an "electronic document." The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data
message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792, which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, as
follows:
Xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical
or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used
interchangeably with "electronic document."
xxxx
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably
with "electronic data message." The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this
phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress
of the said phrase is significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" was
the result of the Senate of the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase "electronic data
message" and the House of Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term "electronic
document." In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working group of the
Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each one. Be
that as it may, there is a slight difference between the two terms. While "data message" has reference to
information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right
or extinguish an obligation, unlike an electronic document.
Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction. The Rules
on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxxx
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and
print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably
with "electronic data message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission
an electronic data message or electronic document? The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means.
The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model
Law, further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document from one
place to another via a fax machine.
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 provides that Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard
to its international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith in international trade relations. The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on
electronic commerce shall likewise be considered. Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this
section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL's definition of "data message":
"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means
including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. is
substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data message." However, Congress
deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data
message." This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has bred
uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed,
in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine
the intent and spirit of the law. The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of our bill. The record is the data. The record may be on any medium. It
is electronic because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a similar device. The amendment is
intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would not
apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations since the information is
not recorded. It would apply to voice mail since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a
computer. Likewise, video records are not covered. Though when the video is transferred to a website, it would
be covered because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact
disc would be covered. In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a
similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all
devices that create or store data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a
computer system are omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible under other rules of law. This
provision focuses on replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of systems instead of that of
individual records and using standards to show systems reliability. Paper records that are produced directly by a
computer system such as printouts are themselves electronic records being just the
means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record
subject to the usual rules about copies, but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of
this bill. However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again
called on are treated as paper records. In that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the
record is irrelevant to its reliability. Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic
data message," it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the
United Nations model law on electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after
the Ecommerce Law of Canada, Senator Defensor- Santiago had in mind the term "electronic data message."
This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has
assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It
accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, explains the term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act,
in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations: "Electronic
record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be any medium. It is "electronic"
because it is recorded or
stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on
magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-
generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to
regular digital telephone conversations, since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail,
since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise
video records are not covered, though when the video is transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the
involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would be covered. In
short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar device has to be
involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store
data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are
omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible under other rules of law.
This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of that of
individual records, and using standards to show systems reliability. Paper records that are produced directly by
a computer system, such as printouts, are themselves electronic records, being just the means of intelligible
display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual
rules about copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose computer origin is never again called on,
are treated as paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system that
produced the record is relevant to its reliability. There is no question then that when Congress formulated the
term "electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the term
"electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes
telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on
"paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. In fact, the
deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based. A fax machine is
essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. The
scanner converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data
over a phone line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. Thus, in
Garvida v. Sales, Jr., where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines, we ruled
that: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone
of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular
telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area
in the proper position and the correct shade.
The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile. x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an
original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based
documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as
all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals.
Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
"electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paperbased
copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and
have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a
newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term "electronic data message." Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law
when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the
exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested
in the Legislature.91 Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule
or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuancean administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress. Had the Legislature really
wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it
could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission is not
an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as
electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic
evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2- POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2
(Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence,
contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
NUEZ VS CRUZ-APAO; 455 SCRA 288
FACTS: This was the painful lesson former Court of Appeals employee Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent). The
complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of P1,000,000.00 from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange
for a speedy and favorable decision of the latters pending case in the CA, which was initially lodged with the
Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network. The case referred had been pending
with the CA for more than two years. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, he sought the assistance of
Elvira sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latters employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena
David. During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via
SMS, he informed her of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, he thought that she would be able to
advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case. However, a week after their first telephone
conversation, Elvira allegedly told him that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the
person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for P1,000,000.00. Complainant expostulated that he
did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time then tried to ask for a reduction of the
amount but Elvira held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to
make the decision. He then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the
decision.
Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter,
he communicated with Elvira again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting
with her. Upon learning that her offer of a favorable decision in exchange for P1,000,000.00 was still standing,
the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2 nd Floor of
Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan, a
researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied him and posed as his sister-in-law. During the meeting, he clarified
from Elvira that if he gave the amount, he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter
together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. She also claimed that
she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some. Zaldy tried once again to
bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but Elvira asserted that the amount was fixed. They then the next
meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over
by Zaldy to Elvira then.
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at
Jollibee. Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by
the two agents, Banay and Villena. Zaldy had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten bundles
of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. The three other PAOCTF agents were
seated a few tables away and there were also three crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating
a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction. Elvira arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She
appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. Ironically, she repeatedly said that Zaldy might
entrap her, precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador. She thus refused to receive the money then
and there, weary that there might be policemen nearby. They negotiated for almost one hour. When Elvira finally
touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited
her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning and was later
detained. During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation
and not an entrapment.
RULING:
on record, what happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as shet would like to
claim. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator practically
induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-principal.
In this case, Zaldy and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because Elvira demanded the
amount of P1,000,000.00 from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latters pending
case. Zaldys narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in accord with the
circumstances that actually transpired and are more credible than Elviras version. He was able to prove by his
testimony in conjunction with the text messages from Elvira duly presented before the Committee that the latter
asked for P1,000,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA. The
text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule
2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ."
In this case, Zaldy who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof
testified on their contents and import. Elvira herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in Zaldys
cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt Elvira may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the
veracity of the text messages between her and Zaldy. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The Court has no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Zaldys testimony as to the discussion between him and Elvira on the latters demand for P1,000,000.00
was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was
present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties actual conversation since she
accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Elvira would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime, that the
offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from Zaldy and that it was him and the law enforcers who
instigated the whole incident. She thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling
and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos P1,000,000.00 as pre-arranged. This claim is preposterous to
say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really come from Zaldy and had she really intended to stop the
latter from corrupting her, she could have simply refused to answer the latters messages and calls. This she did
not do. She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent
the same messages to complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an
action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances. But
this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this way.
While claiming that she was not interested in complainants offer of a million pesos, she met with him not only
once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If she felt that telling Zaldy to stop pestering her
would be more effective if she did it in person, the same would have been accomplished with a single
meeting. There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was
really an understanding between them that the P1,000,000.00 will be handed over to her then. She even claimed
that she became afraid of Zaldy when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using
illegal drugs. This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.
Anent Zaldys narration of her refusal to reduce the amount of P1,000.000.00 based on the lesson learned from
a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually said the same, she wants the Court to believe that she
said it merely to have something to talk about. If indeed, she had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it
escapes the Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged
boast that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an
honest government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants believe that court decisions
may be bought and sold.
Premises considered, Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of
SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED
from government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except
accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.

Best Evidence Rule and Its Exceptions (Complete)

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Best Evidence Rule and Its Exceptions (Complete)

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YOURE NOTHING BUT A SECOND-RATE TRYING HARD COPYCAT

Best evidence rule and its exceptions

BEST EVIDENCE RULE (Rule 130 section 2-8)

Rule 132 section 25 and 27

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO; 18 SCRA 155; 1996

(favor of the respondent)

The case before the trial court was dismissed. CA affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

Issue: WON Exhibit A is admissible in evidence

Issue: WON the best evidence rule applies

SEILER VS LUCAS FILM

Issue: WON drawings are covered by the best evidence rule

ATIENZA VS BOARD OF MEDICINE

Issue: WON a mere photocopy of the 1990 bond is admissible in evidence

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL VS BF CORPORATION

Issue: WON the photocopies are admissible

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (REE) RULE 2 SECTION 1; RULE 3 RULE 4

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES VS SSAYONG CORPORATION; GR NO 170633, OCTOBER 17 2007

interests and charges.

The argument is untenable.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

NUEZ VS CRUZ-APAO; 455 SCRA 288

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