The fundamental principles of Buddhist psychology and their relevance to

Buddhism as a religion By Prof. Y. Karunadasa and Corey Bell

1. Introduction
This article presents a summary elucidation of the key principles of early -
Buddhist psychology, and a brief discussion of the overall significance and main
functions this psychology has with regards to Buddhism as a religion. It shall
begin by bringing attention to how this psychologys flavour and distinctiveness
draws from its application and elaboration of the key Buddhist concepts of non-
self (atman) and dependant origination (paticca samuppada) by elucidating
three of its fundamental underlying principles: 1) the conditional nature of
consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and ob ject; 2)
consciousnesss non-independent nature; particularly with regards to its
inextricable interdependence with the other four aggregates of existence (ie, form,
feeling, perception, and volition), and; 3) consciousnesss mutual dependence
with nama-rupa (mental factors and elements of matter). Drawing upon the
implications of these principles and further scriptural evidence, it shall then
discuss the three main ways in which this psychology contributes to Buddhism as a
religion: 1) in terms of underlying a systematic articulation of, and solution to,
what Buddhism perceives to be the root causes of mans fundamental existential
problem; a fact that challenges the assertions put forward by some modern
scholars that early Buddhism was of a strict behav iouralist inclination narrowly
focusing on the observation of precepts ( sila); 2) defining the Buddhist
worldview in terms of the impact of the mind on the world of experience - a
position, in conjunction with the first point, relevant to refuting the pe rception that
early Buddhism had a nihilistic or more broadly pessimistic inclination, and; 3)
by supporting Buddhisms identity and claims to pre -eminence as a philosophy/
religion amongst other philosophies/ religions, and indeed as a middle doctrine
between extreme views, through underlying the Buddhas critique of the

1
contemporaneous and dichotomous philosophical trends of sassatavada, or
spiritualist ideologies, and ucchedavada, or materialist beliefs.

2. Not-self, dependant origination and the fundamental principles of Buddhist

psychology

2.1 The guiding role of not-self and dependant origination in Buddhist

psychology

As decisively established by Y. Karunadasa in his work The Buddhist Critique of

sassatavada and ucchedavada: The Key to a proper Understanding of the Origin
and the Doctrines of early Buddhism(1), Buddhism arose as a critical response to
the mutual conflict between the spiritualist and materialis t ideologies of
contemporary India (sassatavada and ucchedavada respectively); the doctrinal
foundation of this response being defined principally by means of: a) Buddhisms
demarcation from these ideologies common affirmation of the existence of a self
or soul (atman) through the promotion of the doctrine of not -self (anatta),
and; b) its transcendence of these views and their extreme personal and social
ramifications via the middle doctrine (majjhima-dhamma) which describes the
doctrine of dependant origination (pacnicca samuppada). Indeed, as noted by
Nyanatiloka, in Buddhist philosophy, these two elements could be deemed to refer
to different aspects of a single truth; the first ( anatta) proceeding analytically to
reduce the supposed self to a series of impersonal and impermanent elements,
whilst the other (paticca samuppada) proceeds synthetically to show that all
these phenomena are, in some way or other, conditionally related to each
other(2). Collectively and individually, thus, these two themes constitute
important and pervasive defining attributes of the Buddhist teachings, and also

2
serve as key standards and conceptual tools by means of which truth is appraised
in the Buddhist tradition.

In early-Buddhist psychology, it is particularly poignant that both these key

aspects of Buddhist thought, and the matter of their integration, are central to
defining its flavour and distinctiveness; particularly in contrast to the
psychological understandings that certainly stemmed (in addition to those that
most probably would have stemmed) from
the sassatavada and ucchedavada positions. In particular, the elaboration of these
doctrines in the context of Buddhist psychology gave birth to three basic
principles which I will elaborate in this section; 1. the conditional nature of
consciousness with regards to the duality of sense organ and object; 2.
consciousnesss non-independent nature in terms of its inextricab le
interrelationship with the other four aggregates of the five aggregate series and; 3.
consciousnesss mutual dependence with nama-rupa.

2.2 The conditional nature of consciousness with regards to the duality of sense
organ and object
Rather than existing as the concomitant active manifestation of a permanent/semi -
permanent independent substance or identity ( atman), or as being produced mainly
as a product of its own momentum or self -as-cause (as propositioned in some
later Abhidharma schools), consciousness in early Buddhism is seen as necessarily
arising in dependence of conditions; a concept captured by the key phrase aatra
paccaya natthi vinnassa satbhavo (lit: there is no arising of consciousness
without reference to a condition). Specifically, consciousness is deemed to arise
in dependence on a duality defining the simultaneous co -existence of a sense
organ and its corresponding sense object. The following point is made in the P?li
Suttas:

3
What is this duality? It is [in the case o f eye consciousness, for example] the eye,
the visual organ, which is impermanent, changing and becoming -other and visual
objects which are impermanent, changing and becoming - other. Such is the
transient, fugitive duality (of eye-cum-visible objects). Eye-consciousness too is
impermanent. For how could eye-consciousness arising by dependence on an
impermanent condition be permanent? The coincidence, concurrence and
confluence of these three factors, which is called contact, and those other
phenomena arising as a result are also impermanent.(3)

From this we can see that consciousness as it is regarded in Buddhism, particularly

in virtue of both its essential conditioning and transience or impermanence
(anicca), has neither the requisite stability, self -efficacy or continuity to be
associated with the notion of a soul or self -entity. Indeed, the understanding of
this connection between the conditionality of conscio usness and its not
corresponding to a soul or self is clearly articulated in the Mah?ta?h?sa?khaya
Sutta, where the Buddha introduces the notion of the conditionality of
consciousness on a sense organ and corresponding sense object in the context of a
critique of a Bhikkhus belief that consciousness transmigrates through
existences, not anything else (ie, essentially constitutes a soul in a
spiritualistsense). Further emphasising this conditionality, as well as undermining
the notion that an unchanging, homogenising unity (ie, self nature) exists in
consciousness as a basis of its association with a self notion, the Buddha went on
to state in this Sutta that consciousness should be reckoned by the conditions
attributing to its arising (ie, eye consciousness for consciousness dependant on
the visual organ and visual object) just as a fire is reckoned based on whatever
that fire burns - fire ablaze on sticks is a stick fire, fire ablaze on twigs is a twig

4
fire etc. This point is pressed home by the fact that immediately following this
passage we see an explicit reference to the doctrine of dependant origination.

2.3 Consciousnesss non-independent nature; the inextricable interrelationship

between consciousness and the four other aggregates.
In addition to being impermanent and conditioned, consciousness according to
Buddhist thought can neither be equated as the abiding place of an individuated
and metaphysical self or soul, as propositioned by the berated Bhikkhu
mentioned above, as it has in fact no independent existence of any kind, residing
perpetually in an inextricable interrelationship with the four other aggregates into
which an individual may be (conventionally) analysed. These four aggregates are
as follows: 1. form/corporeality (rupa); 2. feeling (vedana); 3. perceptions
(saa), and; 4. volition/mental formations (sa nkhara). The Pali Suttas state the
following:

Whoever declares that apart from corporeality, apart from feeling, apart from
perception, apart from mental formations, I will show forth the coming or the
going, or the decease or the birth, or the growth, the increase, the abundance of
consciousness is misguided.

In Buddhist literature we see the statements sabbe sankhara anicca and, more
popularly, anicca vata sankhara. As stated by Y. Karunadasa, both these formulae
amount to saying that all conditioned things or phenomenal processes, mental as
well as material, that go to make up the samsaric plane of existence are transient
or impermanent. Indeed, the above statement plainly rejects the spiritualist
position akin to the berated Bhikkhus statement that a unitary consciousness
transmigrates through existence, and states consciousness is merely one of many
constituent elements of the psychophysical co ntinuum perpetuated through

5
dependant origination, being itself without an independent, self defining essence
as is the case of other forms of impersonal phenomena. Being without such an
essence, it is thus also portrayed as being incapable of functionin g as a receptacle
for a soul or self-defining individuality.

2.4 Consciousnesss mutual dependence with n ama-rupa

Another related basis underlying the view consciousness cannot exist
independently is the Buddhist theory of a mutual dependence between
consciousness on the one hand, and on the other hand what is known as nama-rupa
(vianna-paccaya nama-rupa?; nama-rupam-paccaya vinna); the latter of
which may be described as the combination of a conventionally designated
person or sentient beings key mental-factors and elements of
matter. According to Buddhist theory, nama, or mental factors, is a collective
name for five elements: feeling (vedana), perception (saa), volition (cetana),
sense-impression (phassa) and mental advertance or attentio n (manasikara),
whilst rupa refers to the primary elements of matter ( mahabhuta); earth, water,
fire and wind; in addition to secondary material phenomena ( upada rupa) upon
whose existence these four elements depend.

With regards to this formula of mutual independence, it can be seen that Buddhism
rejects the notion that consciousness exists in the form of an eternal/semi -
permanent ground or base of experience, or a subjective self. Indeed, according
to this paradigm consciousness cannot be described a s having any of the qualities
of a self in terms of being a) a subject of mental factors such as feelings,
volitions, etc, b) a source for them, nor c) a container of them, for its own
existence is itself dependant on their very functioning. Similarly, consciousness
can neither be perceived as an appropriator, creator (in an idealist sense) or
completely subjective experiencer of material phenomena, nor can it be seen to

6
 be either in an essential dichotomy with form (duality principle - as is the
spiritualist view, orsassatavada), nor a product of it (identity principle - as is the
view of materialist ideologies, orucchedavada). This last point in particular is of
considerable significance for understanding Buddhist psychologys formation in
the context of the Buddhas response to the religio -philosophical milieu of his
time, and shall be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

3. The relevance of Buddhist psychology to Buddhism as a religion

As with the foundational theories of dependant origination and not-self that
inform it, Buddhisms psychology also both cuts to the core of the Buddhist
soteriological mission, and has a variety of applications in its broader religious
framework. Certainly with regards to the former this k ey role logically progresses
according to the rational Buddhist approach to humanitys existential problem,
which may be condensed as follows:

1. The ultimate goal of Buddhism is the liberation of the mind,

2. In order to liberate the mind it is first necessary to develop its faculties, and
3. To develop the mind, it is necessary to understand it.

Yet to understand both the parameters and distinguishing features of the Buddhist
psychological approach to mans existential problem under thi s framework we
must again return to the Buddhist response vis --vis
thesassatav?da and ucchedav?da viewpoints. Firstly and most distinctively, it is
apparent that having rejected the notion of self common to these positions as
mentioned above, early Buddhism had to, in the words of Y. Karunadasa
psychologise without the psyche it both needed to explain the nature of the
mind without positing the notion of the soul, and at the same time account for
the near universal belief in, and functioning of, t his self notion. In doing so,

7
other parameters more specifically defining the sassatavada and ucchedavada
positions had to be observed namely, Buddhist psychology had to work within
the bounds of an empirical approach deprived of the conveniences of
metaphysical attribution or speculation (ie, available to sassatav?dinsor
spiritualists), and at the same time avoid condemning psychological processes to
the eternal mechanical repetition of stimuli -response reactions (which would
rationalize or naturalize the ucchedavada doctrine of kamasukhalikanuyoga, or
sensual indulgence).

Based on the foundation of the above principles, the conflation of these key
notions the matter of the perception and psychological response to sensual
stimuli (or more correctly, objects), in addition to the formation and functioning
of a self notion, play a prominent role in the Buddhist depiction of both the
nature and solution to mans existential problem. Also, and reflecting this above
mentioned formative dialectic context, they underlie Buddhism adapting a
predominantly psychological approach to two other religious aspects of its
doctrine a) Buddhisms understanding of the world, which we may define in
terms of an articulation of how the mind impacts on the wo rld of experience, and
b) Buddhisms critique or response to the viewpoints of competing philosophical
schools, which includes what Y. Karunadasa has coined the theory of the
psychological mainspring of views and speculative ideologies, and, more
positively, the establishment of a new theory concerning the mind -body
relationship. We will now briefly discuss each of these theories.

3.1 The early Buddhist theory of sense perception and cognition a Buddhist
articulation of psychological suffering
In addition to the more prominent twelve-factor formulae of dependant origination,
one early Buddhist theory for describing the process of the formation of

8
psychological suffering in accordance with the notions detailed above begins with
sensory contact, develops through the consolidation and application of the self
notion, and culminates at a stage of conceptual proliferation ( papaca). The
following passage appears in the Pali Suttas:

Depending on eye and visible form arises visual consciousness. The correlation of
the three is sensory contact (impingement). Depending on sensory contact arises
feeling. What one feels one perceives. What one perceives one investigates. What
one investigates one conceptually proliferates. What one conceptually prolif erates,
due to its perception being based on diverse conceptual proliferations in respect of
visual objects of the past, the future and the present, begins to assail and
overwhelm the percipient individual.

This process, it can be seen, contains seven distinct steps: 1) (eye) consciousness
(cakkhu-viana); 2. sensory contact (phassa); 3. feeling (vedana); 4. perception
(saa); 5. investigation (vitakka), 6. conceptual proliferation (papaca), 7. The
overwhelming impact, on the percipient individual, of the conceptual
proliferations(4). These steps can be further reduced to three stages: 1. the
formation of consciousness (step one), 2. contact (step 2), and 3. the arising o f the
I notion as a pretext for conceptual proliferation (3 -7). Following is a brief
analysis of the internal mechanics defining and linking each of these stages:

1. (eye) consciousness (cakkhu-viana)

As discussed above, this stage marks the existence of an impersonal causal process
by which consciousness arises dependent on a sense organ and a corresponding
sense object. This stage represents the pre-cognitive stage of mere seeing
(dassana matta), for there is an image, but not yet a complete conceptual
identification (or knowing cognition) of it.

9
2. sensory contact (phassa)
At this stage there is a unification of these three elements (sense organ, a
corresponding object, and the corresponding consciousness that has just arisen).

3. feeling (vedana) > overwhelming impact of conceptual proliferations on the

percipient individual
This stage arises immediately after contact. Upon the arising of feeling a
previously impersonal process begins to become in a conventional sense
personalised by the introduction or creation of an I notion, or a subject of
sensual experience. As stated by Venerable Nanananda, it is at this stage that the
latent illusion of the ego awakens and thereafter the duality between ego and non -
ego is maintained until it is fully crystallised and justified at the stage of
conceptual proliferation. The conditioned nature of consciousness, dependant
origination and the other factors defined by the principles of psychology discussed
above are at this stage obscured by the delusional segregation of reality into this
dichotomy of external perceptual experience, and a subjective experiencer,
giving rise to the notion that a subject distinct from the cognitive act itself is the
persisting experiencer of each fleet ing occasion of cognition roughly
corresponding to what Buddhism describes as the notion of unthought thinker,
and the unknown knower (a description of the idea of a soul). Rational support
essential for the stabilization and justification for this idea of a self or soul is
then found and consolidated by the identification of me and mine with the five
aggregates of grasping (ie, form, feeling, perception, etc). From these notions in
turn craving develops, and from attachment to the objects of craving are born the
essential consequences of the fear of the loss of, separation from, or annihilation
of what is self or what is desirable, and the repulsion of what is unpleasant or
ego-reducing.

10