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Pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery
is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense,
it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offenders
innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act,
including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it
relieves him from nothing more. To say, however, that the offender is a new man, and as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense; is to ignore the difference between the
crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal,
though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it
places no restraints upon him following his conviction.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while
they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.
The power to pardon, which is a form of executive clemency, is given to the President
under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution. It reads:
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
The limitations provided under the Constitution are: (1) No pardon may be granted
in impeachment cases; (2) No pardon may be granted when otherwise provided under the
Constitution, specifically Sec. 5, Article IX-C, which provides that No pardon, amnesty,
parole or suspension of sentence for violation of elections laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the [COMELEC];
and (3) It may only be granted after conviction by final judgment.
Probation and pardon are not the same. Probation is a disposition under which a defendant,
after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and
to the supervision of a probation officer. Probation is a part of the judicial power, while
pardon is a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence under probation
simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction
and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when
judgment is rendered.
What is parole?
In 2007, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo granted pardon in favor of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. In 2008, President Arroyo granted pardon to Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Sources: Section 3, Presidential Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation Law; Monsanto
vs. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, 9 February 1989; People vs. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, 16
November 1937; Castrodes vs. Cubelo, G.R. No. L-47033, 16 June 1978; People vs. Abesamis,
G.R. No. 140985, 28 August 2007.