CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; SECRET AGENTS; EXEMPTION FROM FIREARM LICENSE OR

PERMIT.Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least by the subject matter thereof, that "peace
People vs Macarandang officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused
as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently puts him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. People vs. Moro
Macarandang, 106 Phil. 713, No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
Illegal possession of firearms; Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense. The fact that a person, found in possession of
an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt him from criminal liability. The law does not contain
People vs Mapa any exception for a secret agent.
Courts; Statutes; Fundamental duty of courts. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." It is not within the
power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. People vs. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164, No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
Supreme Court; Judgments; Decisions of Supreme Court evidence of what law means.-Decisions of this Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
People vs Jabinal Code, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system x xx. The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this
Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinetthe
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
Criminal law; Criminal liability; Applicability of rule permitting special agents to possess firearms without license which rule
prevailed at time of appointment of accused as special agent and of his apprehension for possession of firearm without license. - At
People vs Santayana the time of the accuseds apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang, holding that
the appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by Section 879. The case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of the accuseds appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol.
Statutory Construction; Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application.The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow
an expanded construction that would include the opening of trust accounts within the coverage of the term deposit. Accordingly, we
must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under
Land bank of the phil vs ca Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, G.R. No. 118745 July 5, 1996
 1. Labor Law; Commissions; The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered
demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of petitioners wage or salary.- We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia
argumenti, that the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put a little
more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which
SONGCO v. NLRC contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig. Commission is the recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman,
executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on
the profit to the principal (Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the
work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of
petitioners wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on
commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists.
2. Labor Law; Commissions; Separation Pay; Purpose of; The Purpose of separation pay is to alleviate the difficulties which confront a
dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.- Bearing in mind the preceding discussions, if We adopt the
opposite view that commissions do not form part of wage or salary, then, in effect, We will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not
receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. Will this not be absurd? This
narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to
alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
3. Labor Law; Commissions; Separation Pay; The average commissions earned by petitioners during their last year of employment
should be used in computing the separation pay, applying the case by analogy in Soriano vs. NLRC, et al. (155 SCRA 124).-
Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the issue of the salary base that should be used in computing the separation
pay, We held that: The commissions also claimed by petitioner (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly
includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying
this analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners, these should
be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned
during their last year of employment.
4. Labor Law; In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Codes provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration.-The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Codes
provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind
of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor
Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No 71812, July 30, 1987, 152 SCRA 140;
Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78763, July 12, 1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: DISTRAINT AND LEVY; POWER OF MUNICIPAL TREASURER TO SEIZE AND DISTRAINT
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR FAILURE TO PAY TAX WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED, INSTANT CASE. The clear and
COMPANY vs. explicit language of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distraint any
MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA personal property" of the individual or entity subject to tax upon failure "to pay the same at the time required . . . ." There was such a
failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance
with the above provision therefore came into play.

Borja vs. CA
Ortigas & Co., Limited
Partnership vs Feati Bank and
Trust Co.
Primicias vs Mun. of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
ATTACHMENT; ISSUANCE IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO SETS UP A COUNTERCLAIM; DISCRETION OF TRIAL
COURT. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued in favor of a defendant who sets up a counterclaim. For the purpose of the
protection afforded by such attachment, it is immaterial whether the defendants simply presented a counterclaim or brought a separate
civil action against the plaintiff. To lay down a subtle distinction would be to sanction that formalism and that technicality which are
discountenanced by the modern laws of procedure for the sake of speedy and substantial justice.
Statutory Construction; Foreign Jurisprudence; American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines. In the
first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must
necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; To be valid, an ordinance must not contravene the statute.-
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is among others, that it must not contravene . . . the statute, for it is a fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. Following this general rule, whenever
there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Requisites necessary for a municipal to pass a valid ordinance regulating
traffic in a highway.- A local legislative body intending to control traffic in public highways is supposed to classify first, and then mark
them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner.
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Regulatory ordinances must be clear, definite and certain.-
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more im- portant so that an average
man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or
courses of conduct.
Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to
the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.- Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle
that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the
duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branchthe legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of
the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.
Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
2. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; Criminal Law; As it is written, the Plunder Law
contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation;
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.-As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and condi- tions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty
and particularity. x x x As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
3. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them; much less do we have to define every word we use.-Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
foundinSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2,and the word pattern in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
4. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.- It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographersto use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Websters New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words combination and series:
Combinationthe result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as
to obscure individual characters. Seriesa number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
5. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Combination,
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
6. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Series, Explained.- On the
other hand, to constitute a series there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for combination and series, it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
7. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Pattern, Explained.- As
for pat-tern, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term
issufficientlydefinedinSec.4,inrelationtoSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2.As for pattern, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan
that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a pattern
consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant
to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of action or
method which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In
the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
8. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Criminal Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Words and Phrases; The void-
for-vagueness doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statuteit can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot
be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
9. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Criminal Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Due Process; When a statute
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respectsit violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid, and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.- A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respectsit violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be saved by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
10. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Criminal Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; The test in determining whether
a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice; The vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statute to be upheldnot absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.- The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void
for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common

Gonzaga vs Court of Appeals
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheldnot absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
11. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Criminal Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial
Challenges; The allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.- Moreover, we
agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations
that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validityThe void-forvagueness doctrine states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected
freedoms. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not
apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
12. Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Criminal Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Overbreadth Doctrine; Statutory
Construction; Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics
who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law; It will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law.- In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists,
cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in
the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more
than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered
his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
Statutory Construction; Application of the terms of a statute where the terms thereof clear.Where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be
obeyed. Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 381, No. L-27455 June 28, 1973

People vs Nazario
People vs Concepcion
Alonzo vs Intermediate Appelate
Court
Statutory Construction; Vague Statutes: A vague statue is one that lacks comprehensible standards that men of Common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Statutes; To be declared null and void, an act must be utterly vague on its face i.e. it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified
by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that
had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by. Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all because one may never know in advance what annoys some
people but does not annoy others.
Same; Same; Same; A perfectly vague act is to be distinguished from a legislation couched in imprecise language.Coates highlights
what has been referred to as a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin which case, it
may be saved by proper construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A perfectly vague act is to be distinguished also from a statute which is apparently ambiguous, yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities.It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities. In
Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, conduct unbecoming
an officer and gentleman), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces
trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted
military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186, No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
STATUTES; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION; IN GENERAL. - In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the
primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.
STATUTES; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION; SECTION 35 OF ACT No. 2747; PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT
LOANS. -The purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 35 of Act No. 2747 was to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a
director of the Philippine National Bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may
serve two mastersthat where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers.
STATUTES; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION; SECTION 35 OF ACT No. 2747; ID.-A loan to a partnership of which the
wife of a director is a member falls within the prohibition in section 35 of Act No. 2747 against indirect loans.
Statutes; We test a law by its results. A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice. But as has also been aptly observed,
we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Same; Law and justice are inseparable. Laws must be applied in consonance with justice. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
 laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
Same; Judges must not unfeelingly yield like robots to the literal command of the law .As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret
the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
Municipal Corporation; Attorney; Legislative intent in the prohibition. - The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing
Ramos vs Court of Appeals private counsel in its lawsuits is further implemented by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides
that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality, shall act as legal counsel of the municipality
and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council. The municipal attorney is paid out of
municipal funds (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 5185, Decentralization Act of 1967). He can represent the municipality even without the
fiscals collaboration (Calleja vs. Court of Appeals, L-22501, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 895). Evidently, the lawmaker in requiring that
the municipality should be represented in its court cases by a government lawyer like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal
intended that the municipality should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the
interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal
attorney and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the municipalitys interests and that, as civil service employees, they could be
held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty.
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200);
Chaves vs Gonzales Garci Tapes; Given all the unsettled facets of the Garci tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.- This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the
presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of
the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press
failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the
evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different
versions. The identity of the wiretappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of
this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200);
Garci Tapes; Not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the pressthe totality of
the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the
Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press; The need to prevent the violation of
laws cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.- We rule that
not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds
and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort
but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot
support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed
in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and
public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these
factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of
law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to
repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has
no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of
the State.
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200);
Garci Tapes; It is not decisive that the press statements made by Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission
were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circularsit is sufficient that the press statements were made by them while in
the exercise of their official functions; Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity
is covered by the rule on prior restraintthe concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular.-This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements
of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of
their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its
statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of
prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
22. Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200);
Garci Tapes; Chilling Effect Principle; There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on recordthe warnings given
to media came from no less the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of
Authority of the radio and broadcast media, and they also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields
the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land.- There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the
complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate
of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields
the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the
NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom
 of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of
misinterpretation.

Courts; Judges; Searches and Seizures; Privacy of Communications; Anti-Wire Tapping Act; The recording of private conversations
Mamba vs Garcia without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law,
and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.- The Investigating Judges reliance on the tape-recorded conversation
between Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties
contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications, as in this case. Thus,
the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of respondent judge.
Courts; Judges; Serious Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Serious Misconduct, Explained; For serious misconduct to warrant a
dismissal from the service, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law.- In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the evidence.
We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such
conduct which affects a public officers performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a
private individual. For serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal from the service, there must be reliable evidence showing that the
judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. It must: (1) be serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling; (2) imply wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment; and (3) have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties.
Courts; Judges; Serious Misconduct; The standards of integrity required of members of the Bench are not satisfied by conduct which
merely allows one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.- In the case at bar, it is clear that the crime of bribery was committed.
Although the evidence may not be sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal case, it is adequate for the purpose of these
proceedings. The standards of integrity required of members of the Bench are not satisfied by conduct which merely allows one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. In an administrative proceeding, such as this case, only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
Courts; Judges; Serious Misconduct; Bribery; Elements.- To constitute bribery, the following must be shown: (1) the offender is a public
officer within the scope of Art. 203; (2) the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another; (3) such offer or promise is accepted, or gift received by the public officer, (a) with a view to committing some crime; (b) in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, but which is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and (4) the act which he agrees to perform is connected with the performance of his official duties.
From the records, it is evident that P/Sr. Inspector Salvador, a public officer, solicited money from Bulatao in consideration of the
withdrawal of the case against the latter. The former categorically told the latter that he would withdraw the criminal case against
Bulatao if Bulatao gives him P30,000.00, which was later lowered to P6,000.00, The fact that two of his men came for the preliminary
investigation and, without hesitation, followed respondent judge to his chambers after hearing that Bulatao had the money, bears out
Bulataos allegations. Although these circumstances do not show conclusively that respondent judge was privy to the crime of bribery,
there is substantial evidence showing that he was at least an accomplice to the crime who cooperated in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals
Gaanan vs Intermediate Appelate
Court
1. Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; Privacy of
communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.- Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
2. Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; A person by contracting
marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.- The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
3. Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; The law insures absolute
freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.-The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
1. Criminal Law; Evidence; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction: Wiretapping Law; The pkrase any other device or
arrangement in R.A, 4200 known as Anti-Wire Tapping Law does not cover an extension line.- The law refers to a tap of a wire or
cable or the use of a deviee or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary
office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isoiated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in ftxing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
2. Criminal Law; Evidence; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction: Wiretapping Law; The phrase device or arrange-ment in the
Anti-Wire Tapping Law should be interpreted to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature used to tap, intercept or record a
telephone conversation, not an extension line.- Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments
the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
3. Criminal Law; Evidence; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction: Wiretapping Law; A person calling another by phone may
safely presume that the other may have an extension line and runs the risk of being heard by a 3rd party.-
 An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by
wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension teiephone and he runs the risk of a third party iistening as
in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
Civil Law; Remedial Law; Change of name; Eight of legitimate child to use the surname either of her father or her mother;
Alfon vs Republic of the Interpretation; Word principally in Art. 364 of the Civil Code interpreted.The only reason why the lower court denied the
Philippines petitioners prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the
surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word principally as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to
exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to
which it is equally entitled. Alfon vs. Republic, 97 SCRA 858, No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
Sales; Husbands and Wives; The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.The
Ching vs Gayonco proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-
Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al., 129 SCRA 675 (1984): Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void
for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his
family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was
subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Article 1409 of the Civil
Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order, or public policy.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly,
donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were
allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to
prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. Those provisions are dictated by public
interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. . . .
Ching vs. Goyanko, Jr., 506 SCRA 735, G.R. No. 165879 November 10, 2006
Statutory construction; Omission must be remedied by adherence to its avowed objective.If there is ever any occasion where the
Matabuena vs Cervantes principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise
the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective. Matabuena vs. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284,
No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal meaning would lead to
Melchor vs Commission on absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the law-makers.It is a rule of statutory construction that the
Audit court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684 [1962]) For this Court to draw a narrow and stringent
application of LOI 968 would be to lose sight of the purpose behind its enactment. The rationale for LOI 968, which is to ensure that
there are available funds to finance a proposed project, was already served by the chief accountants issuance of a certificate of fund
 availability. Melchor vs. Commission on Audit, 200 SCRA 704, G.R. No. 95398 August 16, 1991

Same; Same; Election returns; All votes cast must be considered, disregard, effect of; Irregular and manufactured returns.All these
Mutuc vs COMELEC serve to underscore the need to count all the votes cast in an election. Only when the returns are palpably irregular or obviously
manufactured may they be rejected but even then the board must exercise "extreme caution." And where a return is falsified, the board
may apply to the Comelec for authority to use another copy which is genuine and authentic. Why must all the votes be counted when
there is a need to finish the canvass on time so that proclamation can be made before the beginning of the term of office? Because to
disregard returns is in effect to disfranchise the voters. Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 662, No. L-28517 February 21,
1968
Same; Same; Same; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
BloUmparAdiong vs COMELEC citizens private property which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not
more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether
public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence
of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,
207 SCRA 712, G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992
UNITED STATES vs. CRIMINAL LAW; DEFENDANT DISCHARGED IN ORDER TO TESTIFY; SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION. Held, That an
VENANCIO DE GUZMAN order discharging one of several defendants charged in a complaint or information with the commission of a crime, in order that he may
be called to testify against his codefendants, entered before this defendant has been arraigned and brought to trial, under an agreement
with the fiscal that he would appear at the trial of his codefendants and truthfully testify as to certain facts within his knowledge, does not
exempt the defendant thus discharged from future prosecution for the same offense, when it is made to appear that he failed to comply
with his agreement to appear and testify, or that having appeared he testified falsely.
Rabadilla vs. CA CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS TRANSMITTEDFROM MOMENT OF DEATH OF DECEDENT.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent andcompulsory heirs are called tosucceed by
operation of law.The l egitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his
mother and sisters,as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.Jorge Rabadilla,succeeded the latterbyoperationoflaw,without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.