Understanding the Roman Catholic Church in China

I. Introduction

Over the centuries, Christianity attempted on several occasions to take root and flourish in China,
but each time it met with very limited success. When foreign missionaries were expelled in the
early 1950's, the prevalent opinion was that once more Christianity would almost disappear from
China. What a surprise then, when in the early 1980's, The West discovered that the Christian
faith not only had survived but was growing. Today in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the crisis in international communism, and the rapid socio-economical changes in China, some
observers think that Chinese Christianity may well be on the verge of entering its "golden age".
May be is the key word; predictions about China have often been proven wrong. Nonetheless
signs of a renewed opportunity for Christianity are certainly abundant and call for a cautious
optimism.
As many of you know, it is almost impossible to generalize about China because of its vastness
and diversity. Its more like a multicolored mosaic with the reds more pronounced in one area
while the yellows or the blues may dominate in others. The same goes for the Roman Catholic
Church: the situation varies from place to place. "It is not an exaggeration to say that everything
you hear about the church in China is true at some time and at some place; and not true at
another time and in another place." My hopes for tonight are twofold: first, to provide an
understanding of a church that suffered a lot, is still struggling for unity but is very much alive.
And second, especially for those of you who are in the news reporting profession, to dispel some
of the misinformation so common in the West and too often rehashed in the press.

II. A Survey of the Catholic Church between 1950 and 1976

Most missionaries left China or were expulsed in the early 1950s. Sweeping arrests against
Chinese bishops, priests, sisters and laity did not begin however until the fall of 1955.
Afterwards, the Catholic resistance movement crushed by mass arrests and condemnations to
forced labor went underground. The witness of Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai and many
others who chose jail, labor camps, and even death for the sake of their faith and their loyalty to
the pope would sustain countless people in the years ahead.
Meanwhile a movement for carrying on church activities on a self-administrating, self-
supporting and self-propagating basis had gained a wide acceptance among Protestant
denominations and was being promoted by a small but vocal group of Catholic clergymen and
lay people. The communist regime latched on to it as it saw in this so-called Three Autonomies
Movement an opportunity to establish national Churches independent from the West but firmly
under its control. In 1954, at the instigation of the government, representatives from the major
Protestant Churches gathered in Beijing for their first National Christian Conference formally

I am not a spokesperson for the Roman Catholic Church but a person who knows the church
well, studied it for many years, and has many personal friends within the Church in PRC. You
should also understand that for reasons of discretion, I rarely refer to these persons by name.

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established the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Sanzhi Aiguo Yundong (TSPM). Three years
later, representatives of every Catholic diocese met also in Beijing and approve the formation on
the same three principles of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association Zhongguo Tianzhujiao
Aiguohui (CCPA). A political organization of the Catholic masses, its role was to serve as a
bridge between the Church and the state. However, instead of emphasizing the ideas of
independent Church or reforming the Church, which could be interpreted as aiming to
change the structure or the nature of the Church, the accent was put on displaying love for ones
country, which no Christian could reject. To prove its patriotism and commitment not to act
contrary to the interests of the country, the Patriotic Association voted to sever all political and
economic ties with the Vatican and to obey the pope only in matters pertaining to faith and
church law.
By the late 1957, due to the prior expulsion of foreign bishops and the subsequent imprisonment
of Chinese prelates who oppose the regime or rejected the CCPA, 120 out of 145 dioceses and
prefectures apostolic were without ordinaries. The clergy in several districts considered filling
the vacancies a real apostolic need and, at the urging of their local CCPA branch, began the
process of choosing a new bishop. After electing a candidate each, the dioceses of Wuchang and
Wuhan in Hubei province telegraphed the names to the Holy See for the popes approval. The
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith turned down their requests because it saw these
independent selections of bishops by the Chinese as an attempt to put in place patriotic
ordinaries who would simply carry out the communist government policy. There is certainly no
doubt that the Chinese government was, and still is, trying to exercise a large measure of control
over the Church. Yet in all fairness, one has also to acknowledge that the requests came from a
Chinese clergy who, in the midst of intense pressures, still acknowledged the popes privilege to
appoint bishops. Only when their plea was rejected, did they decide to proceed anyway on the
ground that the Holy See had failed to realize the difficulty of their situation. On April 13,
1958, patriotic bishop Li Daonan of the neighboring diocese of Puqi performed the consecration
of the two bishops in the Hankou cathedral. Thus began the ordinations of bishops sponsored by
the CCPA but not recognized by the pope. In Church parlance, such bishops are illegitimate.
In canonical terms, however, their consecration although illicit remains perfectly valid.
Saddened by the news of the consecration of two new bishops, Pope Pius XII issued the
encyclical Ad apostolorum principis in which he expressed his disapproval of the CCPA and
reiterated that the authority for making episcopal appointments was his alone. Not unexpectedly,
the government reacted by forbidding church authorities to have further contact with the Vatican.
A question was even inserted in the ritual of episcopal ordination that made the new bishop-elect
promise to be detached from all control of the Roman Curia. The intention of the question, as
explained by a patriotic bishop, was not to reject papal authority but to object to the Vaticans
rejection of Chinese elected episcopal candidates.i Bishops, priests, Sisters and lay people who
refused to go along with the government and the Patriotic Association stance were sent to jail
and to labor camps. The gap between the patriotic and Rome loyalist Catholics had widened
even further. By 1962, the number of patriotic bishops had reached 42 while those formerly
appointed by Rome had fallen to about 20.
As bad as the situation may look, it did not result in the formation of schismatic Church because
the division never amounted to a doctrinal different nor a total breach of communion with the
worldwide Roman Catholic Church. Moreover the Holy See has never issued a formal
declaration of a Chinese schism nor did it explicitly excommunicate any patriotic bishop. No
doubt there are Chinese church officials and lay people who would be happy to have nothing to

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do with Rome. Only these individuals might be considered schismatic and not the whole portion
of the Catholic Church that operates under some control of the government.ii
With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, all public religious activities ceased and all
church properties were confiscated. Church buildings that were not demolished or badly
damaged were converted into factories or storehouses. The Red Guards used torture and beating
to force Christians to give up their faith. The CCPA was suspended. Many religious leaders and
Christians had to endure public struggle session and were sent to prison and labor camp to join
those who in the first place had refused to adhere to the Association. Some bishops and priests
married but in most cases these marriages seemed to have been in name only to satisfy
government regulations and prove that they had become men again. In fact many of these
marriages were with religious sisters who otherwise would have had no other means of support.
Public church activities in China did not resume until 1971 when two churches reopened in
Beijing for the benefit of foreign Protestant and Catholic students and diplomats. In 1976, the
ten-year nightmare of the Cultural Revolution came to an end. Religious leaders, priests and
sisters were set free and resumed their ministry while the ban on religious belief and practice was
relaxed.

III. Freedom of Religion to an Extent

A further sign of a more benevolent attitude toward religion came in 1978 with the reappearance
of representatives from the five officially recognized religionsTaoism, Buddhism, Catholicism,
Protestantism, and Islamat the meeting of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative
Conference. This consultative body has no political power but serves a bridge-building function
among the constituencies the constituencies of the delegates, the Communist party, and the
government. The CCPA resurfaced and, since 1979, has been instrumental in the return of
church properties to their former religious purpose. In 1982, Chinas new Constitution dropped
the ultra leftist content of the preceding ones and recognized the freedom of religious belief for
all Chinese people. The right to engage in normal religious activities was also affirmed but
has remained strictly controlled by the Religious Affairs Bureau since only what the government
permits is considered normal and what it does not permit is not only considered not normal
but can even be construed as illegal. This submission of the Churches to government control is
therefore not done without danger of putting the integrity of the faith at some risk and, as a
consequence, of jeopardizing authentic Christian living.
The 1980s saw also the rise of the Cultural Christians phenomenon. These Chinese academics
and intellectuals read the Bible, study Christian philosophy and theology, and write extensively
on religious topics, but for the most part they do not seek baptism or join a Church. Thanks to
their translation efforts, important patristic and theological works are now also available in
Chinese.
Meanwhile the government, wary of the popular interest in Christianity and the substantial
increase in church attendance, spoke of Christian fever. It was also worried by the resilience
of the Catholic and Protestant Underground composed of Christians who refused to submit to the
control of the TSPM or the CCPA. This led the government in February 1989 to introduce a
number of administrative measures to enact a stricter control over the membership and
leadership of religious activitiesthe so-called Document 3. These measures were further
clarified in a February 1991 circularDocument 6which among other things required the
registration of all places of religious activities. The ban against the Falun Gong spiritual

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movement in July 1999 has since further intensified the nationwide crackdown on all
unauthorized religious activities. Arrests of Protestants and Catholics who gather without
official permission have been on the rise. In some regions of Fujian and Zhejiang for instance,
every time they built a church, the police systematically tears it down. Even harsher has been the
treatment of Protestant Evangelicals whose illegal gatherings the police construes as prohibited
cult activities rather than services belonging to one of the five recognized religions. As of 2002,
the Communist regime still pursues a policy of allowing registered Christian communities to
develop while eradicating many others. There are over 17,000 registered Protestant and Catholic
churches, but this number falls short of meeting the needs of the widely spread and growing
Christian communities.
Even with the reopening of China to the West, religious activities of foreigners within China
have remained strictly controlled. The issuance in September 2000 of a new set of government
regulations has added fresh measures to restrictions already spelled out in 1994 and 1995.
Except for the attendance to religious services at lawfully registered monasteries, temples,
mosques and churches, foreigners cannot engage in religious activities or friendly cultural and
academic exchanges with Chinese religious circles without the prior approval of Chinese
religious bodies. For Catholics this means the permission of the CCPA at the county or even the
provincial level. The regulations make it difficult for foreigners to contact underground
communities and further curtail the communities influence in government-approved religious
bodies.

IV. Towards Reconciliation within the Chinese Catholic Church

First of all, let it be clear that, contrary to what some organizations like the Cardinal Kung
Foundation like to report, the Roman Catholic church in China is one church and not two
churches: One faithful to Rome and the other not. It is certainly a wounded and divided church
but there has never been a schism within that church because no breach of faith exists between a
particular segment of the Chinese Catholic Church and the worldwide Roman Catholic Church.
In fact there are more and more hopeful signs that healing and reconciliation between the
different segments are in the making.
The reality of the Roman Catholic Church in China remains complex and is still evolving. As of
today, it exists under several forms, the two extremes being most talked about being one that is
recognized by the government and one that is not while in fact more and more Catholic believers
belongs to a the gray area of the in between category. The government-recognized part of the
Catholic Church functions openly in churches registered with the government and is linked to the
CCPA. It is therefore often referred to as the Open Church guanfang or gongkai jiaohui. The
other extreme, often referred to as the Underground Church dixia jiaohui, refuses any control
from the CCPA and usually operates in private homes or buildings without seeking government
approval.
There are no perfect terms to identify these two clearly distinct manifestations of the Catholic
Church. I like expressions that state things as they are without passing judgment. So I would
recommend staying away from labels like Patriotic Church to describe the government-
recognized segment of the Church because it implies either that all its members belong to the
CCPA or that the underground is not patriotic minded, neither of these being true. In the same
way, the names Suffering Church and Loyal Church to describe the Underground segment of the

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church are wrong and divisive as they imply that the government-recognized has not suffered
and is not loyal to the pope.
Chinese Catholics all love their country: their moral values and hard-work habits make them
model citizens and therefore patriotic. The vast majority worship openly or would like to do so
provided they would not be controlled by the CCPA. Many, even in the government-recognized,
remain suspicious of the CCPA and would like to see it disappear.

A. The Government-Recognized Segment of the Catholic Church

Although its roots can be traced back to the emergence of the CCPA in 1957, the division itself
became really apparent only after the clergy returned to their dioceses in 1978 and 1979. Since
the new policy of the government allowed them to function in public, rather than in hiding, many
did so. With less than 30 bishops still alive, some who had been imprisoned for their unswerving
loyalty to the pope and had refused any relationship with the CCPA were now more willing to
cooperate with the association for the future of the Catholic Church in China. After 1981, the
requirement in force since 1958 that both consecrators and consecrated ones should swear their
independence from Rome was dropped and resulted in more priests willing to accept the
episcopal ordination. Several of these bishops have secretly obtained legitimization of their
status from the pope. Some even actively sought higher positions within the CCPA in order to
influence its decision and curb its tendency toward unilateral control.
In late May 1980 more than two hundred delegates representing the government-registered
Catholic Church gathered in Beijing to attend the Third National Convention of the CCPA and
the National Catholic Representatives Assembly. These two meetings held back to back resulted
in a major reorganization of structures within the Open Church with the creation of two
additional national organizations: the Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Commission and
the Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference. From this point forward, the CCPA relinquished its
role as overseer of all Church concerns, relegating itself to look after external affairs and church-
state relations. Responsibility for doctrinal and pastoral affairs was given over to the clergy and
church leaders. In 1992, further reorganization placed the Bishops Conference on an equal
footing with the CCPA while reducing the Church Administrative Commission to a committee
responsible for pastoral affairs under the control of the Bishops Conference. Five additional
committees were also set up to oversee Seminary Education, Liturgy, Theological Study,
Finance Development, and International Relationships. Initiatives in the areas of pastoral work,
training of clergy and in the social apostolate of the Church indicate that the new structures are
effectively implemented.
With many ups and downs, the Open Church attitude toward papal primacy has gradually
improved. The prayer for the pope that had been removed from the book of Collection of
Important Prayers was reintroduced in 1982. In February 1989, the already mentioned
Document 3 of the government allowed spiritual affiliation with the Holy See, so in April of the
same year the Bishops Conference promptly acknowledged the pope as the spiritual leader of
the Chinese Church. By the end of the decades, most congregations had also restored the prayer
for the pope during Mass.

B. The Underground Segment of the Catholic Church

Many clergy released at the end of the Cultural Revolution were still unwilling to join any
Catholic organization registered with the government. They refused to live at a church with
other priests who had married, had betrayed others, or had publicly denied the primacy of the

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pope. Therefore they carried out religious activities in private, and gradually attracted a great
number of Catholics to join with them. Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding diocese in Hebei
province was released in 1979 and acted as the leader of the Underground Church.
Recognizing that urgent need for bishops in several dioceses, he ordained in 1981 three bishops
without recourse to government or Open Churchs approval. When the pope learned of the
circumstances that prompted such a procedure, he legitimized the new bishops and granted them
and Bishop Fan special faculties to ordain successors a well as bishops for vacant seats of
neighboring dioceses. By 1989 the Underground Church had more than fifty bishops who set up
their own episcopal conference. Rome also gave underground bishops the authority to ordain
priests without the required lengthy seminary training. This has accounted for the overall poor
doctrinal instruction of many priests in the Underground. . Moreover, signs of excess and lack of
coordination have appeared with some dioceses having as many as three bishops claiming to be
the legitimate ordinary.
Since 1989, the Underground Church has been the target of mounting pressure from the
government. The same government document of February 1989 that recognized the spiritual
leadership of the pope spelled out how to deal with the Underground Church. Communist cadres
were asked to differentiate between underground forces that clang to their hostility and stirred up
believers and those who did not join the Open Church because of their faith in the pope. The
formers, said the document, must be dealt with severely while patience should be used with the
others. Accordingly the government regarded the setting up of an episcopal conference by the
clandestine bishops in November 1989 as a provocation. It resulted in the arrest of several
leaders including Bishop Fan. At the local level the implementation of that policy has remained
vague and vacillating, resulting in sporadic destruction of unregistered religious buildings,
temporary detention and the levy of heavy fines. However, since the ban of the Falun Gong in
July 1999, repressive measures against not officially registered Catholic communities have also
greatly increased. Several priests and bishops remain in prison or have their activities curtailed.
Many Underground Catholics play a prophetic role by their refusal to participate in a
government-sanctioned organization. They dare to challenge the government policy regarding
human rights and freedom of religion from a Catholic standpoint.

C. Reconciliation in the Making

The bitter division has pitted those who chose to worship under the supervision of the
government and those who refused to do so. During the past twenty years the two sides have
gradually moved away from mistrust and bitter accusations to an attitude of understanding
respect and to concrete acts of cooperation and genuine efforts at reconciliation. The dividing
lines between the two are becoming increasingly blurred. Fidelity to the Holy See has become
less of an issue since the pope has legitimized most the bishops in the Open Church and a
number of new ones are being ordained with his approval. For an ever-growing number of
clergy, sisters and ordinary Christians, the division does not make much sense anymore. Many
in a courageous and prophetic manner act as bridges between both sides of the Church.
Pope John Paul II has made repeated pleas to the Catholics of China to display toward one
another a love which consists of understanding, respect, forbearance, forgiveness and
reconciliation. In many ways a complete normalization of diplomatic relations between China
and the Vatican cannot happen unless reconciliation first occurs within the Chinese Catholic
Church itself.

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V. Sino-Vatican Relations

Informal talks between the Vatican and the PRC about the normalization of diplomatic relations
have taken places off and on since the late 1980s. Beijing realizes that it has much to gain from
restoring such ties but insists on two main points: Rome should sever its relations with Taiwan
and not interfere with the election of bishops. The Vatican sees in the diplomatic normalization
a greater freedom for the Church and possibilities for a solid implantation. Church officials have
indicated that they were ready to establish relations with Beijing, but that it was first necessary to
reach an agreement over the Holy Sees relationship with Chinese Catholics. In late 1999, the
news spread that both sides had made substantial progress toward breaching the gap between
Beijings demand for a total and complete independence of the Chinese Church and Romes
insistence on an autonomous Chinese church in communion with the pope and the universal
Church. But during the course of the year 2000, two eventsthe ordinations of bishops without
papal mandate on January 6 and 25, and Romes canonization of 120 China martyrs on October
1have seriously undermined the process. These misunderstandings point to the distance that
still separates the Holy See and the Chinese government.

A. The Election of Bishops

This constitutes a major source of contention between China and the Holy See. Canon Law #377
states clearly that the supreme pontiff freely appoints bishops or confirms those lawfully
elected. So Rome refuses to sanction any bishops named independently by Chinese or any other
civil authority while Beijing defies church laws and claims the right to appoint bishops since
1958. Meanwhile Rome through secret channels has authorized the ordination of underground
bishops. Therefore presently they are four categories of Bishops in China:
- Underground bishops: they are recognized by the pope but with very few exceptions are not
approved by the government.
- Illicit open-Church bishops: they are approved by the Chinese government but not
recognized by the pope.
- Legitimized open-Church bishops: they are approved by the Chinese government and were
ordained without the consent of Rome. They have however subsequently contacted the Holy
See and been recognized by the Pope. They are therefore not illicit anymore, but only Rome
knows their exact number. The consensus is that nowadays the majority of bishops in the
Open Church are in that category.
- Licit open-Church bishops: those are bishops recently ordained with the approval of the
government but who prior to their ordination seek and receive the approval of Rome.
Circumstances surrounding the January 6, 2000, ordination of five bishops not approved by the
Holy See clearly point to a rift within the Open Church. We know now that original plans called
for an even larger ordination ceremony but that only five succumbed to the pressure of the
government and the national CCPA to be ordained without seeking prior papal approval.
Several Open Church bishops disapproved and refused to attend the ceremony and so did the
teachers and the seminarians of the national seminary in Beijing. This clearly shows that the
mood within the Open Church is to be totally in accordance with church laws. Repressive
measures from the government have been unable to reverse the trend.
How the Vatican chooses bishops in China remains a problem but not an insoluble one. A likely
compromise is for the Vatican to choose bishops in consultation with the Chinese government.
But no agreement can be reached until the two sides resume dialogue.

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B. The Canonization
On October 1, 2000, as a proud China celebrated its 51st anniversary, the worldwide Roman
Catholic Church proclaimed saints 120 Catholics who died on Chinese soil, 86 of them at the
hands of the Boxers. This chain of events resulted in a bitter exchange of words between the two
parties that once more derailed precarious efforts toward reestablishing diplomatic relations. The
history of turbulent relations between China and the Catholic Church is littered with elements of
cultural disparity, which in this instance centered on the meaning attached to dates.
The Month of October in Modern Chinese History
For Chinese people, October dates are beacons that highlight key events in the transformation of
a nineteenth century weak and crumbling empire into a contemporary proud and rapidly
modernizing nation. On this journey, October 18, 1860 stands as a stern reminder of how low
China had fallen. Beijing abandoned by the court fell prey to British and French troops that
ransacked and burned down the magnificent summer palace resort known as the Yuanming
Yuan. Forty years later precisely during this same month of October, another rampaging foreign
force was too in the midst of pillaging the capital that had been once again forsaken by the court.
By contrast, Oct. 10, 1911 (the beginning of the republican revolution), and Oct. 1, 1949 (the
birth of the PRC) stand as symbols of the indomitable spirit of the Chinese people and their
resolve to forge their own destiny.
In October 1999, I became acutely aware of the dual significance of these dates being passed on
to news generations when a young Shanghai student told me how me learned in school that, in
October 1860, foreign troops humiliated China by destroying and looting many of its national
treasures. I could not but wonder. Did he also know that the execution of Father Auguste
Chapdelaine in 1856 gave France a pretext for joining forces with Great Britain? Was he told
that Catholic missionaries in Beijing celebrated the allied victory with a religious service of
thanksgiving and a prayer for Emperor Napoleon III? A few days later, I saw the same student
and his friends proudly waving flags while millions of Chinese viewers watched on TV the
lavish celebration of China's 50th anniversary. The following October, I noticed that exhibits and
even websites commemorating events that shook China in a hundred years before in 1900
focused more on the destruction caused by the Baguo lianjunthe international force sent to
relieved the beleaguered legations of Beijingthan on the turmoil fomented by the Boxers.
The Month of October in Roman Catholic Devotions
In the Catholic Church, October is also punctuated by important celebrations. First it is the
month of Our Lady of the Rosary. At Lepanto on October 7, 1571, Christian forces crushed the
Ottoman Empire's Muslim forces that threatened to overrun Western Europe. Subsequently, a
feast in honor of Mary was established on that day because the victory was attributed to her in
response to the prayer of the rosary by Catholic faithful. Gradually, the entire month became
dedicated to her through the daily recitation of the rosary.
Western missionaries brought to China the cult of Mary and the recitation of the rosary so much
so that in some part of Hebei Catholics are know as "Old Rosary Sayers." Today, the two most
common pictures found in Catholic churches and homes are still those of the Sacred Heart of
Jesus and of the Virgin Mary and the most popular form of devotion remains the prayers of the
rosary. There is no doubt that the easy acceptance of the cult of Mary by converts was due partly
to her resemblance to Guanyin, the Buddhist goddess of mercy, and to the striking similarity
between the rosary and the Buddhist prayer beads. But even more significant for Catholic
communities so often in the minority and always at the mercy of persecutions must have been the

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portrayal of Mary as the one who helps in periods of trials and protects against enemies' attacks.
In 1900 Zhili province, one intriguing detail found in church accounts of attacks against Catholic
villages was the sighting of a mysterious lady dressed in white who seemed to float over the
place and scared the Boxers away. The apparitions were invariably linked to the unrelenting
prayers of the Catholic community, especially the recitation of the rosary. I wonder if some of
my colleagues more familiar than I am with non-Christian sources on the Boxers have found
references to sightings of this mysterious lady in white. The most spectacular and publicized
apparition occurred in June 1900 at Dongl near Baoding. In thanksgiving the villagers built a
shrine to Mary, help of Christians and queen of China, which until today remains the most
revered Marian pilgrimage site on Chinese soil.
October is also often referred to as Mission Month because special emphasis is put on reminding
Catholic faithful of their responsibility to ensure that the Christian belief is spread to the entire
world. The month opens with the feast of St. Theresa of the Holy Child, patron saint of
missions. Although she was a cloistered nun who never went to a foreign country to preach the
Gospel, she spent her life praying for the conversion of non-Christians. Chinese Catholics have a
great devotion to St Theresa with whom they readily identify because, not being allowed to
preach openly the Gospel, they too rely on the power of prayer.
Each October, the third or fourth Sunday is set aside as Mission Sunday to promote mission
awareness among the faithful and to secure funding for the missionary enterprise. Since it was
established in 1926, Mission Sunday has been closely related to China because it was on the 28th
of October that year that the first six Chinese bishops of modern times were ordained by Pope
Pius XI in Rome.
Mission Sunday is emphasized by a papal message that always pays special tribute to those who
died a violent death because of their faith. The year 2000 being a "jubilee year," that is a most
holy year to mark the beginning of the third millennium of the Christian era, Pope John Paul II
stressed even more the "indispensable" role of martyrs in the development of the church. But
more than that, he opened Mission Month with the canonization of 120 martyrs who died in
China. What prompted the decision was the fact that close to 75 percent of these people added to
the list of saints were killed by the Boxers exactly 100 years earlier.
Rome acknowledged that the canonization had been postponed several times in the past because
it was a "highly sensitive question." Yet this time, it went ahead insisting the decision was "a
purely religious matter" with no political overtone. It simply "rendered justice to the historical
reality" of some thirty thousand innocent people killed by "Boxer rebels." Pointing to another
historical reality, Beijing, on the other end, denounced the event as a painful reminder of how
until recently missionaries and Chinese converts had been agents and lackeys of colonialist and
imperialist nations. It called the canonization ceremony of October 1 an "open insult" to the
Chinese people who on that same day celebrated the 51st anniversary of getting rid of all foreign
control and aggression. In stark contrast, when a few months earlier the Russian Orthodox
Church canonized 222 Chinese Orthodox martyrs, the Chinese government did not raise any
criticism. Many of these Christians were killed during the nights of June 11 and 24, 1900, during
the same Boxer uprising.
On October 24, 2001, almost a year after the canonization dispute, the pope acknowledged that
historically members of the church had had to work within the context of complex historical
events and conflicting political interests, and that their work was not always without errors.
These errors, the pope said, may have given the impression of a lack of esteem for the Chinese
people on the part of the Catholic Church, making them feel that the Church was motivated by

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feelings of hostility towards China. For all this I ask forgiveness and understanding of those who
may have felt hurt in some way by such actions on the part of Christians. But this was not
enough for China. On October 30, a Chinese spokesperson, although viewing the apology as a
positive move, said that the pope had not made a clear-cut apology for the canonization
incident, which seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
Since the beginning of this year, the Chinese government has sent mixed signals as to its
readiness to resume talks with the Vatican.

VI. The Catholic Church at the Turn of Twenty- First Century

In 1950, China had a Catholic population of about three million plus with1,900 Chinese priests
and 3,700 Chinese sisters. In 1980, it was estimated that less than 1,300 elderly Chinese priests
were actively engaged in ministry. The fate of Chinese sisters had not been less terrible than that
of priests and seminarians and by 1980, just over one thousand remained. Obviously the training
of new church leaders and the reopening of seminaries and novitiates was a most urgent priority.
Sheshan Regional Seminary near Shanghai was the first Catholic house of formation to reopen in
1982. At the turn of the 21st century, 24 major seminaries are allowed to operate with
government permission and another 10 exits in the Underground Church. Altogether they house
1,700 seminarians. Sisters in formation total 2,500 spread over 40 novitiates in the Open Church
and 20 in the Underground, With a total of 2,200 priests and 3,600 sisters, the number of
religious workers seems on the rebound. Churches and chapels reopened to the cult with
government approval have multiplied and stand at 5,500. The Catholic Church population is
estimated at 12 million plus, but this fourfold growth is not so significant when we realize that
percentage wise this is only one percent of the population or about where it stood in 1949. By
comparison the Chinese Protestant Church has displayed much more vitality by growing from
less than three million to at least twenty-five million members. Factors behind the slow growth
of the Catholic Church are complex and many, one being certainly the bitter inner dispute that
has just begun to fade away.
The Catholic Church educational activities came to an abrupt end in the 1950s. In the early
1980s, under the impetus of Deng Xiaoping, private schools reemerged but the government made
a clear distinction between private schools as houses of religious formation and training, and
private schools as alternative options within the public education system. While the five
recognized religions of Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism are permitted
to open the first kind under certain conditions, they are barred of any involvement in public
education. In July 1997, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a long decree
that gave private schools official recognition by integrating them into the overall Socialist
educational enterprise. It encouraged social organizations to engage in all domains of
educational activities, higher education, compulsory nine years of primary and middle schools,
preschools, and even vocational and adult training. But among the long list of regulations, first
and foremost stood the stern reminder that "no social organization is allowed to operate open or
covert religious schools." This provision came as a big disappointment for the government-
recognized Open Church because, despite the greater freedom it has enjoyed in recent years, it
finds itself still barred from entering the field of education. Neither can it "interfere with the
State's education" nor can the State "use religion in its own service."
Yet in a country where Church educational activities remain drastically curtailed, Catholic
publishing houses such as Sapientia Press in Beijing, Guangqi Press in Shanghai and Hebei Faith

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Press in Shijiazhuang, together with the Protestant Amity Press in Nanjing, are important means
for reaching and educating a great number of Christian and non-Christian Chinese. They
publish the Bible and Christian literature and journals. They have also reprinted in simplified
characters many of recent years Chinese translations coming from Taiwan and Hong Kong such
as the documents of Vatican II, the liturgy of the Mass, the new code of Canon Law and the new
Universal Catechism (The Catechism of the Catholic Church). Unfortunately, excerpt for the
official journal of the CCPA Zhongguo Tianzhujiao (The Catholic Church in China) that can be
ordered through the mail, all other Church publications remain subject to the government censure
and are allowed to be sold only on church premises.
The Hebei Catholic press also publishes a biweekly newspaper called Xinde (Faith). In spite of
the restriction just mentioned, it has a distribution of 45,000 copies throughout most of the
provinces of China, which amounts to a readership of over half a million people in the
Underground and Open Catholic Church as well as among non-Christians. Besides relaying
news of the Church within and outside China, the newspaper also encourages readers to act
responsively by sending funds for various charitable causes and major catastrophes. Responses
have been so enthusiastic that it has led to the establishment of a Catholic social service center
called Beifang Jinde (Progress) to handle donations for charity work in society.

VII. Conclusion

The present policy of the Chinese government to keep control over religions should not surprise
us. After all, since the third century BC, Chinese emperors have always taken an active interest
in regulating religions. As for outside organizations that propagate a confrontational and
adversarial position on the situation of the Chinese Church, they are in direct defiance of the
popes pleas for understanding, forgiveness, reconciliation and unity among Chinese Catholics.
The Chinese Catholic Church today is quite different even from what it was in the 1980s when it
emerged from long years of repression. It is growing in numbers, enjoying relative freedom of
worship, and experiencing a renewal of vocations to the priesthood and religious life.
In this presentation, I have alluded to several difficult and constraining realities:
- Chinese Church issues: reconciliation within itself and with Rome
- Political issues of the relationship between the Chinese government, the Chinese Church
and the Vatican
- Social issues: Religious freedom as linked to freedom of thought and expression,
At the same time Chinese society is also undergoing profound social and economic changes.
This transformation is confronting the church with new issues and challenges as it begins to shed
its ghetto mentality and to fulfill a meaningful role for various segments of the society. But this
is a topic that I wont have the time to address tonight.

Jean-Paul Wiest
Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese Society
Presentation made at The French Centre For Research on Contemporary China
Hong Kong
June 20th, 2002

Do not quote without the prior permission of the author

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i
For more on this question, see Kim-Kwong Chan, Towards a Contextual Ecclesiology: The Catholic Church in the
Peoples Republic of China (1979-1983): Its Life and Theological Implications ( Hong Kong: Chinese Church
Research Center, 1987), pp. 81-82, 443-448. Chan also points out that Church patriotic leaders were careful in
their use of expressions. They usually employed terms like Roman Curia and the Vatican instead of terms like
the Holy See or the Apostolic See. The former denotes political status whereas the latter terms signify the
religious and ecclesiatical dimension. (p. 79).
ii
On this question, see the excellent article of Geoffrey King, A Schismatic Church?A Canonical Evaluation in
Edmond Tang and Jean-Paul Wiest, eds., The Catholic Church in Modern China: Perspectives (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 19930, pp. 80-102. An explicit decree of excommunication was issued to the vicar-general of
Nanjing, Li Weiguang , for publishing a declaration promoting the communist interpretation of the three autonomies
and accusing the pope and his nuncio of collusion with the imperialists. But this excommunication took place
before Lis ordination as a bishop without Romes approval.

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