Family Code Complete Set of Digested Cases Beda

DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: FAMILY CODE 4 S (AY 2017-2018)
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER (ART. 7)
1. Rodolfo G. Navarro v. Judge Hernando C. Dumagtoy

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088; July 19, 1996
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, the Judge Dumagtoy allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondents courts
jurisdiction. Such wedding was solemnized at the respondents residence in municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within the respondents jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.
For his defense, Dumagtoy maintained that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that
Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction.; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the
respondents courts jurisdiction.
HELD:
NO. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member
of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO,
ANDE, APA, BAACO, BULUSAN, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING ,
EDILLOR, HUAB, MABANGLO, MACALINO, MARAJAS, MINA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VIRAY ||
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VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE
2. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica B. Kho

G.R. No. 187462; June 1, 2016
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel's parents instructed the clerk in the office of
the municipal treasurer to arrange and prepare the necessary papers required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take place at around midnight of June
1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. Petitioner and
respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place
at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972.
Twenty-five (25) years later, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and respondent on the ground of the absence of marriage license. He argued that
he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had
not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license. He presented a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither
record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
ISSUE:
Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record
or copy of the marriage license adequate to prove the non-issuance of such license, thus,
sufficient to declare the marriage null and void?
HELD:
Yes. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53
of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract which include a
marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void.
In this case, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license
ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the
presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it
becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. However, the respondent was not able to discharge that burden. Respondent failed
to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate
of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage
license. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent and
the marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.
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3. Engrace Nial v. Norma Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778; March 14, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones, out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Subsequently, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?
HELD:
Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by
the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by
free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
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basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
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4. Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado v. Luis G. Anson

G.R. No. 204494; July 27, 2016
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado
(Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 and
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the survivng spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration
of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while
Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was
no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their
conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new
certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating herself as
Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in
defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code
for lack of marriage license.
RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?
HELD:
No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited
as the reason therefor.
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof
that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for
the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer
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be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made
shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying
a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties
are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the
subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records.
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between
the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or
regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of
Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are:
prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied
with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character
and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.
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5. Republic of the Philippines v. Jose A. Dayot

G.R. No. 175581; March 28, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa were married. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried,
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Thereafter, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud.In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
RTC rendered that the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid, and affirmed by
the CA. The latter ruled that did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76
of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein.
ISSUE:
Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
HELD:
Yes. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for
the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection
of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage
license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law.
The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
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Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
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FOREIGN MARRIAGE DIVORCE (ART. 26(2))
6. Grace J. Garcia, a.k.a. Grace J. Garcia-Recio v. Rederick A. Recio

G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a divorce decree was issued by an
Australian family court dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen.
Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent, were married in 1994 in Cabanatuan.
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved
by a divorce decree. On July 7, 1998, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia dissolving his marriage to petitioner. Hence, he moved for the
dismissal of the case. The RTC declared the marriage dissolved because of the divorce decree.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. He also
contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, their marriage was void ab initio.
ISSUES:
1. Does respondent need to comply with the abovementioned registration requirements?
2. Is respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
HELD:
1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
2. No. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Hence, the case was remanded to the lower court.
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7. Republic of the Philippines v. Cipriano Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines. A few years later,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Later on, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code which traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
OSG contends that Article 26 paragraph 2 is not applicable because it only applies to valid mixed
marriage and that the proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
Since there is also no law governing Ciprianos case, it is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.
ISSUE:
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
HELD:
YES. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Supreme
Court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing,
we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (1) There is
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; (2) A valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
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Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
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8. Alice Reyes Van Dorn v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1995
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Alice Van Dorn, petitioner, is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton, private respondent,
is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties got divorced in Nevada,
United States. Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property". For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary
to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Is a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse binding in the Philippines?
HELD:
YES, it is binding provided they are valid according to the aliens national law.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Here, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound
by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Moreover, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.
Hence, the divorce decree obtained by respondent and validly recognized in Nevada is binding
in the Philippines.
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9. Republic of the Philippines v. Crasus L. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Crasus Iyoy, married to Fely with whom they had five children, filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Felys alleged psychological incapacity. He
discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.
Later, Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A, leaving all of their five children, the youngest then
being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus because of financial reasons. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely
got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Respondent Crasus did not
bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain
she had caused him. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent argued that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Fely
refuted the allegations and counter-argued that she left for the U.S because of respondents
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household.
The RTC declared the marriage of respondent and Fely null and void ab initio which decision the
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts as abovementioned are sufficient to support a finding of Felys psychological
incapacity
HELD:
NO. The totality of evidence presented during the trial and the acts of Fely leaving her family,
among others, are insufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, on psychological incapacity may be defined as a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
a) Gravity. It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
b) Juridical Antecedence. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
c) Incurability. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
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is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. According to the Court, [H]er hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven
to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
Therefore, the Court granted the petition and declared that the marriage of respondent Crasus L.
Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
[SC: At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds
to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answer to every individual problem.]
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10. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay

G.R. No. 196049; June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other. Marinay later met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon
City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki later filed a petition under Rule 108 in
the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage). Fujiki prayed, inter alia, that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The RTC immediately issued on Order dismissing the petition. It ruled that only the husband or
the wife, in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
ISSUES:
1. Is the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) applicable?
2. Can a husband or a wife of a prior marriage file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy?
HELD:
1. No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the
setting of pre-trial, the trial, and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate
the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that [i]f every
15
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. A foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
2. Yes. The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and
a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code
and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this
is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
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11. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571; August 11, 2010
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. Later, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He left
for Canada soon after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, he
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Thus,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. However, the RTC denied
Gerberts petition, holding that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alien spouse can claim a right under Art. 26 of the Family Code
HELD:
NO. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. In other words, only the Filipino
17
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.
18
BIGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE (ART. 34 (4))
12. Leonila Santiago v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200233; July 15, 2015
SERENO, CJ:
FACTS:
Petitioner Leonila Santiago was convicted of bigamy for her marriage with Nicanor Santos who,
during the celebration of their marriage, was still married to Estela Galang.
Petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the case, because she was not aware of
Santos's previous marriage. Furthermore, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy,
a valid second marriage must be proven. She contends that her marriage to Santos is void
because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall
under any of the exemptions from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
The RTC appreciated the testimony of Galang that 2 months before said marriage, she already
introduced herself to petitioner as Santos legal wife, and that it was incredible for a learned
person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecutions evidence. It likewise disbelieved
the testimony of Santos and also simply stated that the claim of lack of marriage license was a
vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
ISSUE:
Should the validity of the second marriage be first proven in order for one to be convicted of
bigamy?
HELD:
Yes. For the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have
all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he
or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of
the criminal case.
In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned the validity of her marriage to Santos on the
ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab
initio. Record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Although they did not submit an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 FC, it
appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had
actually cohabited for at least five years. Thus, the SC cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts
of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. Consequently,
it will be the height of absurdity for the SC to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to esc ape
criminal conviction.
Note: The second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.
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13. James Walter P. Capili v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 183805; July 03, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner James Walter P. Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig
City. James was married to Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, he contracted another marriage with Shirley G. Tismo.
James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of
the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Meanwhile, the RTC of Antipolo rendered a decision declaring the voidness or invalidity of the
second marriage between James and Shirley on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
James filed a Motion to Dismiss, praying the dismissal of the bigamy case on the ground that the
second marriage had already been declared void by the RTC. The RTC granted the motion to
dismiss, but on appeal the CA reversed the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy?
HELD:
NO. The declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for the dismissal of the
bigamy case.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In this case, all the foregoing elements are present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. What makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
20
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
21
14. Veronico Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758; February 18, 2004
YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner and it was confirmed by Villareyes in a handwritten letter
that the petitioner was her husband.
Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner admitted having
cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied
that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from
the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.
ISSUES:
1. WON the first marriage exists despite absence of record in the Civil Registry
2. WON the petitioner was guilty of bigamy
HELD:
1. Yes. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity
of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would
indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart
from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
2. Yes. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
22
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
23
15. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano

G.R. No. 181089; 22 October 2012
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter, filed a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent, Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent
filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage
of respondent with Socrates null and void.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint for
bigamy alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003,
thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior when he married Silverio. The prosecution
argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity.
RTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the compliant for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Is the declaration of nullity of the first marriage justifies the dismissal the case of bigamy?
RULING:
NO. The subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial.
The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that
the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage. The subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage is
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio, her first
marriage with Socrates was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared
void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were present at the time
respondent contracted the second marriage. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Therefore, the complaint for bigamy filed should not be dismissed.
24
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH (ART. 41)
16. Republic v. Tampus

G.R. No. 214243; March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. Three days
thereafter, Dante, a member of AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was
assigned. The couple had no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
RTC granted Nilda's petition. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975 and
from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light,
she believes that he had passed away especially since his last assignment was a combat mission.
Moreover, the RTC found that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to
the presumption of death. CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Dante has been correctly declared as presumptively dead.
HELD:
No. Dante was incorrectly declared as presumptively dead.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they
also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters
to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of
the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. She could have inquired from the AFP on the status
of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.
To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her
purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not
satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief' of his
death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource
persons were not even named.
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to
support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears
from the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time
without actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as
constituting a "well-founded belief' that her husband is dead.
25
17. Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Sareogon

G.R. No. 199194; February 10, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before the RTC
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareogon (Netchie). Said petition
was directed to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz
and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then
followed.
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became
sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.
However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While
still abroad, he tried to contact Netchies parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchies
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because
of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before
the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
In its Decision, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is
entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie
had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was
indeed already dead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife is sufficient to support a well-
founded belief that respondents wife is probably dead
HELD:
No, respondent failed to show that he exerted diligent and reasonable efforts in locating his
missing wife to support a well-founded belief that his wife was already probably dead.
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon
a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Before a judicial declaration of pres umptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.
26
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
discussion), the holding is that the mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee
spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Given the Courts imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTCs
finding that Joses Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in
reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Joses pathetically anemic efforts to
locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchies whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search.
27
VOID SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

PREVIOUS VOID MARRIAGE (ART. 40)
18. Roberto Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera

G.R. No. 104818; September 17, 1993
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Delia Soledad A. Domingo (Domingo) filed a petition for the "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo alleging among others that: they were married on November
29, 1976; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25,
1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; and that she discovered that
he was cohabiting with another woman.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. He
argued that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is
illegal and void and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary.
The trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, explaining that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
A motion for reconsideration was filed. Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a
special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
ISSUES:
1. Is a judicial decree necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage?
2. Should the petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage be filed only for purposes of
remarriage?
HELD:
1. Yes. The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what
is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection
of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
28
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy.
2. No. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage" in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant
the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
29
19. Renato A. Castillo v. Lea P. De Leon-Castillo

G.R. No. 189607; April 18, 2016
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon-Castillo married Benjamin Bautista. On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo.
On 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to his subsisting marriage with Benjamin. Lea
opposed the petition and contended that her marriage with Benjamin was null and void as they
did not secure a marriage license.
On 2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage with Benjamin void. The RTC granted
such. Meanwhile, Lea filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that Renatos proof was insufficient
to prove bigamy. On the other hand, Renato contends that the belated judicial declaration of nullity
did not erase the fact that she entered into marriage with him when her first marriage was
subsisting.
The RTC declared the second marriage null and void ab initio. Benjamin moved for MR insofar
as the distribution of their properties is concerned, but this was denied. Upon appeal, the CA
reversed the decision and upheld the second marriage. The CA noticed that Leas marriages were
celebrated in 1972 and 1979 which is prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (1988). Thus, the
applicable law should be the Civil Code which does not dictate that a judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of marriage.
ISSUE:
What is the status of the second marriage?
HELD:
The second marriage is valid. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined
in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at
the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. Hence, the Court must resolve this
case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,
82 and 83 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83, 85 and 86.
The Civil Code differentiates void and voidable marriages: in a void marriage no judicial decree
to establish the invalidity is necessary, while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.
At that time, the first marriage Lea was void for lack of license and consent. Thus, there was no
need for judicial declaration of its nullity before she could contract a second marriage.
That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. The
Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license.
30
20. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano

G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012
PERALTA, J:
FACTS:
Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married Socrates Flores (Socrates) on April 8, 1976. On January 24,
1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio Cipriano (Silverio).
In 2001, Lourdes filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of the latters psychological incapacity. On 2003 the RTC declared the marriage of Lourdes with
Socrates as null and void.
On May 14, 2004 Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed a
complaint for Bigamy against Lourdes alleging that the latter failed to reveal to Silverio the fact
that she was still married to Socrates.
Lourdes argued that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003,
thus there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on Januar 24, 1983.
Hence, the element of bigamy requiring that there be two valid marriage is therefore wanting. She
also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed.
For the part of the prosecution, it argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the law punishes the
act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still
subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal
of the Information for bigamy filed against her
2. Whether Article 40 of the Family Code should be given a retroactive effect because Lourdes
2 marriages were contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code
HELD:
1. NO. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged
2. NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondents clear intent was to
obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.
31
21. Norberto A. Vitangcol v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207406; January 13, 2016
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol was charged with the crime of bigamy. The complaint was filed
by Norbertos second wife, Alice G. Eduardo-Vitangcol.
It was alleged that Norberto contracted his first marriage on July 17, 1987 (prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988) with a certain Gina M. Gaerlan. Said first marriage was
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. On Decem ber 4,
1994, Norberto married Alice with whom he had three children. Alice later heard rumors of her
husbands first marriage which lead to the discovery of the aforementioned marriage contract and
the filing of the present complaint.
Norberto countered that Alice had always known that he had a fake marriage with a college
girlfriend. He also claimed that the first marriage was void for it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Lastly, he claims that the present complaint was filed by Alice because the latter was
having an affair with another man.
ISSUE:
May Norberto validly raise as a defense the invalidity of his first marriage to escape the charge of
bigamy against him?
HELD:
NO. Norbertos first marriage was not judicially declared void and neither was his first wife
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Even assuming that petitioners first marriage
was solemnized without a marriage license, the first marriage is still valid and subsisting.
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. That parties to a marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party
who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The
commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code.
Therefore, even if Norbertos first marriage was celebrated prior the effectivity of the Family Code,
the judicial declaration of nullity is still required before any person can enter into a second
marriage without any fear of being prosecuted for the crime of bigamy.
32
22. Susan Nicdao Cario v. Susan Yee Cario

G.R. No. 132529; February 2, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner
Susan Nicdao Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee
Cario. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig, while respondent received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life,
Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying that
petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00. During the trial,
respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that
she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of
sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears
no marriage license number; and 2) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila that the office has no record of the marriage license of the said marriage.
ISSUES:
1. Is the marriage between petitioner and the deceased valid?
2. Is the marriage between respondent and the deceased valid?
HELD:
1. No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The Court held that a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed
validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. However, petitioner failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, the
first marriage, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is void ab initio.
2. No. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would
now be awarded to respondent. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
33
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
34
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (ART. 36)
23. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina
G.R. No. 108763; February 13, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
MOLINA DOCTRINE. Specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) challenging the decision of the CA which
affirmed in toto the decision of RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Molina (wife) to Reynaldo Molina, void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Because of this case, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code, also known as the Molina Doctrine.
Respondent Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. The petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on 1985 at the San Agustin
Church and that they have a son, Andre O. Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Later, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. Later, the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
run the household and handle their finances.
Solicitor General: Insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' and made an incorrect application thereof
to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
The Republic argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
35
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of respondent Roridel to Reynaldo Molina should be declared void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
NO. The trial court, as well as the CA, erred in interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code, and in
applying the ground of psychological incapacity in this case.
In another landmark case of Santos v. CA, the Court ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
In this case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence
adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. Expert testimony (of Dr. Sison) showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court adopted the following guidelines 1 in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the FC and handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
36
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spous e, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation/s
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 10952 of the New Code of Canon Law.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
15 days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
Hence, the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
37
1
The Court was able to come up with the guidelines with the help of 2 amici curiae: the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee.
2
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
38
24. Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos

G.R. No. 136490; October 19, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Wilson G. Marcos and Brenda B. Marcos first met in 1980 when both of them were assigned at
the Malacaang Palace. The couple got married in 1982.
After leaving the military, Wilson engaged in different business ventures that did not prosper. Due
to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often have violent quarrels. He
would beat her and even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. By 1992, the two were already living separately. In the case study conducted by
Social Worker, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them. Brenda
submitted herself for psychological evaluation, while Wilson, on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children. The CA reversed the RTC decision holding that psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented because Wilson was
not subjected to psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
ISSUE:
Is personal medical or psychological examination of respondent a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
NO. Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
does not show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The guidelines in Republic v. CA and Molina do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that
he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
39
25. Mirasol Castillo v. Republic of the Philippines and Felipe Impas

G.R. No. 214064; February 06, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe were sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe
sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled.
They got married on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with 2 children.
In 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. She alleged that after 13
years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different
women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But
to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not
bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and
stopped any communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than
ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.
Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Montefalcon who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report,
concluded that Felipe is encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure that rendered him incapacitated
to perform his marital duties and obligations.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void. The CA reversed and set aside the, ruling that
Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe is null and void on the ground of the
latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No. The Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's
psychological incapacity.
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she did not interview
Felipe personally and evaluated Felipes psychological condition indirectly from the information
gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about
his personality disorder was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There
was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the
psychologist or presented before the trial court.
True, the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically

incapacitated is not required. However, the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically
identified," and adequately established by evidence. Here, the manner by which such conclusion
was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
40
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's

unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there
must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a
manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or
clinically established.
J LEONEN, dissenting
The totality of evidence presented by Mirasol is more than enough to prove Felipe's psychological
incapacity. Hence, Mirasol and Felipe's marriage is void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Because of the intimate nature of marriage, Mirasol knows best whether Felipe has fulfilled his
marital obligations as well as his responsibilities to his children.
Felipe's continuous philandering, albeit having his own family, manifests an incurable
psychological disorder of utmost gravity. If Felipe's sexual infidelity were merely caused by his
"refusal or unwillingness" to assume his marital obligations, then he would not have been
indifferent about being seen publicly with the other women with whom he had other affairs. What
Felipe has done apparently caused much pain to his family and should be put to an end. It is cruel
for this Court to rule that Mirasol should remain married to Felipe.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code to introduce
restrictions not found in the text of the law. Worse, it was inspired by a conservative, religious
view of what marriages should be. This has caused untold hardships and costs for many Filipinos.
It is time we review this doctrine and allow intimate relationships to be what they truly are: a life
of celebration, rather than a living hell.
41
26. Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi

G.R. No. 119190; January 16, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Chi Ming Tsoi appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Trial Court's decision.
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the Gina Lao (plaintiff) married the Chi Ming Tsoi (defendant) at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went
and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There, they slept together on the same bed
in the same room for the first night of their married life. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night, and even in succeeding nights of their marriage.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag,
a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of their physical examinations were that
she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. The doctor said, that he asked
the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
42
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in
that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the annulment case filed by the plaintiff-
respondent. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Should the annulment case be granted on the ground of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
YES. The annulment case should be granted, as Chi Ming Tsoi is psychologically incapacited. It
must be noted that contrary to Chi Ming Tsois argument, the size of his penis is not the indication
of psychological incapacity, but rather his failure to engage in sexual intercourse with his wife
from the beginning of their marriage.
We are not impressed by petitioner's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can
be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission
that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder
that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
Chi Ming Tsoi (petitioner) further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and Gina Lao (respondent) to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because
there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
It must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno
vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is
43
so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go
a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
44
27. Noel Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127358; March 31, 2005
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated, such act being willful warrants the award
of moral damages
HELD:
No. The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond

the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same
set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it
removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private
respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of
the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
45
28. Juanita Carating-Siayngco v. Manuel Siayngco

G.R. NO. 158896; October 27, 2004
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel Siayngco are married. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy.
After 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. Respondent Manuel is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support
and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. Respondent Manuel presented Dr. Garcia
who concluded that both petitioner and respondent contributed to the marital collapse. In her
defense, Juanita allege that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having
extra-marital affairs. Dr. Maaba testified for Juanita finding the latter psychologically capacitated.
The trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage holding
in part that the psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in
evidence. The CA reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manuel and Juanita are both psychologically incapacitated
HELD:
NO, they are both not psychologically incapacitated.
"Psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability
RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

The only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent
Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due
to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel
has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
point."
RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes
psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not
from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,
her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Dr. Garcias
46
report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who
pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during
his direct examination.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window
into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting
apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and
wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
47
29. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te

G.R. No. 161793; February 13, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Sharing similar angst towards their
families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards
each other. Three months after their first meeting, Rowena and Edward eloped. They left Manila
and sailed to Cebu. Since they could not find a job, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home.
Rowena kept on calling Edward threatening him that she would commit suicide if Edward does
not agree to stay with Rowena at her uncles place. Soon, Rowena and Edward got married. The
two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner. Her
uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then
hid him from Rowena and her family.
Edward asked Rowena to live with him in his parents house. Unmoved by his persistence and
upon knowing that Edward was disinherited by his parents, Rowena said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. After almost four years, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of
his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent.
The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. For its part, the OSG
contends that the purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity
HELD:
Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and void.
48
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
While there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, the totality of evidence presented should be enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
In the present case, the psychological assessment produced the findings that both parties are
afflicted with personality disorders.
Petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
With respect to respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard
for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed
by society. Moreover, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted is thus, null and void.
49
30. Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn** B. Matudan

G.R. No. 203284; November 14, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were
married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.
In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with
her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.
Twenty-three years later, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, alleging
that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of
fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide
petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and
sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation conducted
by Dr. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable. The Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder amounts psychologically incapacity.
HELD:
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits
and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation
report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of
Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant
the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that
the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.
50
Version 2
Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan

G.R. No. 203284; November 14, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Nicolas S. Matudan filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Marilyn B.
Matudan when the latter went to abroad and never heard of again.
Matudan alleged that Marilyn was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife
and mother ,and that based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether Marilyn Matudan is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code
HELD:
NO. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and
'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the only reason
why he wants their marriage dissolved. Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological
incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.
51
VOID FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (ART. 38)
31. Oscar P. Mallion v. Editha Alcantara

G.R. No. 141528; October 31, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara alleged psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied
the petition. After the decision in the latter attained finality, petitioner filed another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and
void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the
principle of res judicata.
On the other hand, respondent, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different
ground, it still involves the same issue raised former case, that is, the validity of petitioner and
respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
lack of marriage license?
HELD:
Yes. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there
is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes
of action.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence
necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity
of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is
simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has
the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the
ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially
split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy,
that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
52
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because
no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the
former case, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard
in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter
offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that
the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred by the decision in the former case.
53
32. Republic of the Philippines v. Merlinda Olaybar

G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June
24, 2002. She denied having contracted said marriage and that the signature in the certificate
was forged. She filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract.
The RTC ruled in favor of Olaybar. Petitioner moved for MR, but was denied. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that granting the cancellation of the entries is in effect declaring the marriage
void ab initio, thus the petition is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise
of a Rule 108 proceeding.
ISSUE:
May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, in effect, which nullifies the marriage, be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
HELD:
Yes. It was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated. To
be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and
all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction
of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of. Hence, petition is denied.
54
33. Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon v. Ma. Lourdes
Belen, for and in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121; July 31, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during
the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to
the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In
order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
In a Decision, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the
time of Eliseos death in 1992.
ISSUE:
Is the Amelias marriage to Eliseo void ab initio, as it was claimed to be bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage?
HELD:
YES. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Nial v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain
terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
55
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and
the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists
does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of
marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
56
GROUNDS MUST EXIST AT TIME OF MARRIAGE (ART. 45)
34. Fernando Aquino v. Conchita Delizo

G.R. No. L-15853; July 27, 1960
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino, petitioner, filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent
Conchita Delizo. The complaint was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner, concealed from the latter that
fact that she was pregnant by another man, concealed from the latter that fact that she was
pregnant by another man (petitioners brother, Cesar Aquino). That about four months after their
marriage, she gave birth to a child. In her answer, respondent claimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the petitioner.
During the trial, only petitioner testified. The only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Respondent did not appear nor presented any evidence.
The CFI dismissed petitioners complaint, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari
to review the decisions.
ISSUE:
Does concealment of pregnancy constitute fraud and may be a ground for annulment of marriage?
HELD:
YES, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband, constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage pursuant
to Article 85, par. (4) in relation to Article 86, par. (3) of the New Civil Code.
Respondent was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage.
At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was
naturally plump or fat. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy,
the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement
is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know,
merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because
she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
Hence, it is sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by petitioner.
57
35. Aurora Anaya v. Fernando Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930; November 26, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora Anaya and defendant Fernando Palaroan were married on 4 December 1953.
Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was
dismissed and upheld the validity of marriage and granted Aurora s counterclaim. While the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated to settle the judgment, Fernando had divulged
to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with his close
relative. Defendant, in his Answer, denied having pre- marital relationship with a close relative
and denied having committed any fraud against her.
ISSUE:
WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the
same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
58
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
36. Sarao v. Guevara

G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263
REYES, A.J.:
FACTS:
In the afternoon of their wedding day, plaintiff tried to have coitus with defendant but the latter
begged for him to wait until that evening. When night came, plaintiff again attempted to have
carnal knowledge with his wife but the latter complained that her vagina was in pain. Plaintiff
noticed purulent matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital. Afterwards, several
attempts were made by the plaintiff to have coitus but to no avail because defendant was still in
pain.
After a visit to the physician, defendant was advised to submit herself to an operation wherein her
uterus and ovaries will be removed because they were affected by a tumor. Defendant was
operated on with the consent of the plaintiff. The removal of said organs rendered defendant
incapable of procreation, but not of copulation.
Plaintiff declared that from the time of the operation, he lost all desire to have sexual relations
with defendant and has not tried since then. He filed a complaint for annulment of marriage on
the ground of impotency. The CFI dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Can the defendants incapacity to procreate be construed as physically incapable of entering into
the married state and is such a valid ground for annulment?
HELD:
No, it may not be construed as such.
According to Article 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be annulled if either party was, at
the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity
continues, and appears to be incurable. It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to
procreate, but the ability to copulate.
In this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as
supported by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not
necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus
and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse.
Thus, the defendants sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as
a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.
ALTERNATIVE RULING
The annulment cannot be granted because the apparent impotence of the wife was merely
temporary, and as a matter of fact, she is no longer impotent. Sterility, on the other hand, is not a
ground.
59
If both the husband and wife are impotent, the marriage cannot be annulled because neither can
claim that he or she has been aggrieved by the other.
60
ROLE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
37. Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607; April 10, 1996
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the RTC a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint,
she alleged that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated
to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward. She claimed
that her husband inflicted physical injuries on her, used dangerous drugs, cohabited with three
women in succession, refused to pay their childrens tuition fees, among others. In addition to her
prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save
the conjugal properties from further dissipation. Petitioner answered denying the imputations
against him.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced. 2 days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel
for petitioner moved for a postponement to the first week of June, which was granted. However,
petitioner failed to appear on the reset date. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. The RTC declared the nullity of the marriage.
Petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment. The
same was denied. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the appeal was dismissed. Petitioner
contended that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment should be set aside due to prosecuting attorneys failure to intervene
for the state.
HELD:
NO. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer.
Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private
respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and
cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
61
EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE
38. Espiritu v. CA and Masauding

G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Teresita Masauding filed a petitioner for habeas corpus against petitioners Reynaldo
Espiritu and Teresita Layug to gain custody over her 2 children with Reynaldo.
Reynaldo and Teresitas marriage deteriorated until they decided to separate. During the
marriage, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio right there in the family home
in Pittsburg. The record shows that the daughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the
traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record
also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California.
When Perdencio was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his
company in a Cebu hotel. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded
by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims,
however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.
The RTC awarded full parental authority in favor of Reynaldo but on appeal, the CA reversed the
judgment and gave full parental authority to Teresita.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in reversing the decision of the RTC based on Art. 363?
HELD:
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, Art.
363 presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record.
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
paragraph of Article 213 of the FC. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article
no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should
have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years
mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant
custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and
have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
62
39. Susan Lim-Lua v. Danilo Y. Lua

G.R. Nos. 175279-80; June 05, 2013
VILLARAMA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children,
petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge
earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
After hearing, the judge granted support pendente lite in the amount of P250,000 monthly, and
the amount of P135,000 needed for the medical attendance expenses needed by Lim-Lua.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, thus, the court ordered the
payment of P1,750,000 as support in arrears from the time complaint was filed up to the date of
the hearing.
On appeal, the CA reduced the amount to P115,000 monthly and respondent was ordered to pay
the arrears. This decision became final. In Compliance, respondent submitted a copy of the check
in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. He contends that he deducted from the
amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA --
P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalling P2,645,000.00, the
advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16. These
advances were expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of
the two cars (a Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i for the 2 children), payment of tuition fees,
travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but to petitioner as well.
Petitioner questioned the deduction from the support in arrears of the advances, claiming that
such deduction is not proper, as the items purchased are not indispensable to the sustenance of
the family or in keeping them alive. Respondent counters that these items are to be considered
advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed
that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had
never in their entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals at
carinderias. Hence, the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the childrens day-to-
day living, the value of which was properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite.
ISSUE:
May certain expenses already incurred by the respondent be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children?
HELD:
YES. Some but not all, of the expenses incurred may be deducted from the total support in
arrears.
Article 194 provides that support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family. Rulings by US Courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the
requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. The
general rule is that the parent cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the
63
children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting
such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to
her.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. The monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial
court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner
and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing)
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly
support, the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the
trial and appellate courts.
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the
accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children: (1) medical expenses of Susan Lim -
Lua (P42,450.71); (2) dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan (P11,500.00); (3) credit card purchases of
Angelli (P365,282.20); and (4) credit card purchases of Daniel Ryan (P228,869.38), in the total
amount of Php 648,102.29.
64
40. Ma. Belen B. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041; June 30, 2006
CHICO- NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a
Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite. On
16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled
on 11 August 1975.
Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and
Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of
America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved
to and finally settled in. However, despite admission to universities, Rica and Rina were financially
incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
Petitioner made demands to respondent Federico and Francisco, the grandfather of twins.
However, these demands remained unheeded. As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica
and Rina are entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation
to Articles 194(1 and 2) [14] and 199(c) of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these
provisions, in case of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support falls
upon the grandparents of the children.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly declared that
petitioner and respondent Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed by their
twin daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Francisco, the grandfather, should be held liable for the support pendente lite.
HELD:
Yes. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support
their childrens college education.
In view, however, of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by
respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of
their parents.
It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. It having been established that respondent
65
Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of
petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
66
41. Roberto Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818; September 17, 1993
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Separation of Property against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
Unknown to private respondent, petitioner had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz
which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime
in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. While on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consen.The petition prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect.
Petitioner contends that petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary since their marriage is a
bigamous one. On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide
a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Is a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage necessary only for purposes of remarriage?
HELD:
NO, it may be obtained for other purposes.
Article 40 denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation
of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
Petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Private
respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them.
Therefore, he lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise
clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO
67
GROUNDS OF LEGAL SEPARATION (ART. 55)
42. Gandionco v. Hon. Senen C. Pearanda

G.R. No. 79284; November 27, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed a complaint against petitioner Froilan Gandionco for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal
complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendente lite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Should the civil action for legal separation be suspended pending the resolution of the criminal
case for concubinage?
HELD:
No, the civil action for legal separation may proceed independently notwithstanding the pendency
of the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage. A civil action for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children,
support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Futhermore, it may be noted that under Article 55(6) of the Family Code of the Philippines, sexual
infidelity or perversion of either spouse has replaced adultery on the part of the wife and
concubinage on the part of the husband as defined by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 97, New Civil
Code) as one of the grounds for legal separation.
68
43. Samson Sabalones v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106169; February 14, 1994
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of
duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones,
the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their
children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at
San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years
old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray
the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and
that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and
lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her
husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate
residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three
children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also
prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park
property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage.
The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. The petitioner opposed this motion and
filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes Park
property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent.
CA granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Can a court issue a preliminary injunction in favor of the wife to prohibit a husband from interfering with
the administration of their conjugal properties?
HELD:
Yes, the court can issue such preliminary injunction.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO ANDE,
APA, BAACO, BULUSAN, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING, EDILLOR, HUAB,
MABANGLO, MACALINO, MARAJAS, MINA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VIRAY ||
69
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining
the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a petition
for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between
the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and
thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court
of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years
now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown,
that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that
the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given
his share of the rentals.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate
wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent
has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence
to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident
disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier
declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow
him in the meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering
the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation
of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
70
COOLING-OFF PERIOD (ART. 58); SEC. 19, RA 9262
44. Lucy Somosa-Ramos v. The Honorable Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental and Clemente G. Ramos
G.R. No. L-34132; July 29, 1972
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a case for legal separation against respondent Clemente Ramos
on the grounds of concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life. She
likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return of her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos.
There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code, alleging
that if the motion be heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more
dim.
Respondent Judge Cipriano Vamenta, Jr. issued an order granting the motion of respondent Ramos to
suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction in view of the absolute
tenor of such Civil Code provision, which reads thus: "An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition." Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Does Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the
lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit?
HELD:
NO. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior
to the expiration of the six-month period.
It is understandable why there should be a period during which the court is precluded from acting.
Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible. Justice to parties would not thereby be served. The
sooner the dispute is resolved, the better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is
something else again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach the
quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not
of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the
spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss affection on the part of one or both may be
discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the
wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the
conjugal union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery
on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against
the life of the other, it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit for legal
separation lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together
abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his
or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-
month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties
alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view
of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be
71
acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal
provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to
assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage
their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if
the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the
administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of
the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." There would appear to be
then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left
unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the
management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court
suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There
is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent
Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life
would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property,
an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v.
Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Artic le
103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between
the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for
dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not
have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these
should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts
close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused."
Therefore, the lower court should act on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
72
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF PETITION
45. Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong v. Lucita Ong

G.R. No. 153206; October 23, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for
Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. Lucita claimed that: soon after three years
of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick
her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his
hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William would
also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever
she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her. One day after
a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked
her to leave the house which she did. Lucitas statements about Williams abusive behavior were
corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left
her conjugal home also testified about her injuries. The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal
separation which the CA affirmed. William then filed this petition for review on certiorari on the decision
denying all of Lucitas allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their children. He
also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive him of his
control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita. That the CA overlooked some facts of the
case which warrant an exception to the general rule that questions of fact cannot be the subject for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and
their parents doctor Dr. Elinzano since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since
Lucita abandoned the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should
NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code Where both parties have given
ground for legal separation
ISSUE:
Whether Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
HELD:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the conjugal
properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husbands repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have
been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her
family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children.
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship
alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness testimony as biased and unworthy of credence.
Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that
their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation
73
46. Benjamin Bugayong v. Leonila Ginez

G.R. No. L-10033; December 28, 1956
FELIX, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Bugayong was married to Respondent Leonila Ginez on August 27. 1949. They lived
with Benjamins sisters in Pangasinan. But when Benjamin was requested to report for the US Navy, he
left Leonila with his sisters in Manila.
On July 1951, Leonila left her sister-in-laws house and moved to Pangasinan to enroll at a local college.
During the same month, Benjamin received letters from his relatives and anonymous writers informing
him of his wifes infidelity. Benjamin also said that he received a letter from Leonila, admitting that a
certain Eli kissed her.
Because of these, Benjamin went home to Pangasinan and sought for his wife. She came along with
him, and they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day. On both nights they slept
together. This situation ceased when Benjamin tried to ask Leonila about the truth. Leonila, instead of
answering his question, packed up and left, which Benjamin took as a confirmation of the acts imputed.
On Nov. 18. 1952, Benjamin filed a case for legal separation. Leonila, on the other hand, denied the
accusation and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint saying (1) it is barred by the statute of limitations,
(2) the acts of Benjamin constitute a condonation, and (3) there was no sufficient cause of action.
The Court dismissed the motion based on the second ground. Benjamins MR was denied, so the case
was taken up for review to the CA. And as the questions were merely questions of law, the CA certified
the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
Will Benjamins act of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights, despite his alleged belief that he was unfaithful
to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?
HELD:
Yes. Reconciliation was effected between Leonila and Benjamin. The act of the latter in persuading her
to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and slept as husband and wife for two nights
have no other meaning than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. This reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Such acts implied forgiveness. Therefore, the assailed
petition is affirmed.
Notes:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred.
74
47. Alfredo Romulo Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 196842. October 9, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa Busuego has been married to petitioner Alfredo Busuego since 1975. Rosa
filed a case of Concubinage, violation of RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children),
and Grave Threats against her husband.
Rosa alleged that she discovered love letters and photographs from other women addressed to Alfredo.
Alfredo also rarely stays home as he was always at work or with friends. When Rosa started to prepare
to work in the US as a nurse, Alfredo allegedly took his loaded gun and pointed it at Rosas right temple,
threatening and taunting Rosa to attempt to leave him and their family. When Rosa left for the US, Alfredo
remained in Davao. Several years later, Rosa learned that a certain Emily Sia was living in their conjugal
home. When Rosa asked Alfredo about Sia, Alfredo claimed that he was merely giving Sia a place to
stay since Sia was allegedly being raped by Rosas brother-in-law. Rosa believed him and continued to
stay with him during her annual return home.
Years after that discovery, Rosas son told her about Alfredos illicit affairs with Sia and one Julie de Leon
who Alfredo allowed to stay in their conjugal dwelling and the conjugal bedroom. Rosa returned without
telling Alberto and gathered and consolidated information about her husbands affairs.
Alfredo denied having any illicit relationship with Sia and de leon. Alfredo also allege that from Rosas
own admission, she had condoned and pardoned Alfredos Concubinage. She already knew about the
alleged relationship with Sia and yet continued her relationship with her husband.
ISSUE:
Can Rosa be considered to have condoned or pardoned the Alfredos Concubinage?
HELD:
NO. Nowhere from Rosas acts can it be inferred that she had condoned her husbands illicit affairs.
Be it noted that condonation as a ground for legal separation applies in equal force in a prosecution for
concubinage as a felony. Indeed, Rosas admission was that she believed her husband had stopped
womanizing, not that she had knowledge of Alfredos specific acts of concubinage with Sia and de Leon,
specifically keeping them in the conjugal dwelling. This admission set against the specific acts of
concubinage listed in Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code does not amount to condonation. Their
continued cohabitation as husband and wife construed from Rosas annual visits to Davao City is not
acquiescence to Alfredos relations with his concubines. It is true that Rosa has to a considerable extent
been patient with her husband's shortcomings, but that seems to have been due to his promises of
improvement, it doesnt appear that Rosa consented to her husbands immorality or that she has
acquiesced in his relations with his concubine.
75
48. Carmen Lapuz Sy, represented by her substitute Macario Lapuz v. Eufemio S. Eufemio alias
Eufemio Sy Uy
G.R. No. L-30977; January 31, 1972
REYES J.B.L., J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmen filed a petition for legal separation against respondent Eufemio, alleging that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until her husband abandoned her; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which would order that the
respondent should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be
completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute
the deceased by her father, Macario. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition. The court issued the
order under review, dismissing the case.
ISSUES:
1. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
HELD:
1. YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100 (now
Article 56 of FC), by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108
(now Article 66 of FC), by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
2. YES. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved because these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself. Without the decree, such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
76
EFFECTS OF DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
49. Mario Siochi v. Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Gil Tabije, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., and
Elvira Gozon
G.R. No. 169900; March 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Outline
1. Petition for Legal Separation filed by Elvira

2. Agreement to Buy and Sell between Mario and Alfredo pending the Legal Separation case
3. Decree of Legal Separation granted; CPG was dissolved and liquidated
4. Deed of Donation by Alfredo in favor of Winfred
5. Through SPA, Alfredo sold the land to IDR
6. Mario filed a case for specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale against
Alfred, Winifred and IDR (Gil Tabije is an irrelevant party here)
Respondent Alfredo Gozon and Elvira are married, and they have a daughter, the other respondent,
Winifred. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the
name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains (CPG).
Elvira filed a petition for legal separation. She later filed a notice of lis pendens which was then annotated
in the lots TCT.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell with
Petitioner Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with
notice of lis pendens.
Later, RTC granted the legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, being the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite
RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property.
After, Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued
new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi,
nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father,
Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty (IDR) for P18 million, which the later paid
in full. A new TCT was issued to IDR.
Mario then filed a case with Malabon RTC to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to IDR, and to
remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void
the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to IDR.
However, CA said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without
the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favor of
Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
77
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Agreement to Buy and Sell between petitioner Mario and respondent Alfredo is valid
2. Whether the donation made by Alfredo to Winfred is valid
3. Whether the sale to IDR is valid
HELD:
1. NO, the agreement between Mario and Alfredo is invalid for lack of consent of Elvira.
Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties
which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse.
Here, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated
in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole
administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent
of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for
the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus,
the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo
to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
However, the SC disagrees with the finding of the CAs decision that undivided share of Alfredo in the
property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred. The CA misconstrued the ruling of the
RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to Winifred.
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
2. NO, the donation made to Winifred is invalid because the same was made without the consent of
Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse
without the consent of the other spouse.
3. NO, the sale to IDR is invalid. IDR is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the
CA, IDI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. The representative of IDRI
testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT and the legal separation
78
case filed before the Cavite RTC. Thus, IDR could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision
declaring the property as conjugal. Further, if IDR made further inquiries, it would have known that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly irregular.
79
50. Virgilio Maquilan v. Dita Maquilan

G.R. No. 155409; June 8, 2007
FACTS:
Virgilio and Dita Maquilans marriage turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, prompting Virgilio to file a case of adultery. The court convicted Dita and
her paramour. Thereafter, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part
of Virgilio. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement which was given
judicial imprimatur. However, Virgilio filed a Motion for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement
contending that since Dita was convicted of adultery, her share should be forfeited in favor of the common
child. When the Judge denied his Motion, Virgilio filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was
denied. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE:
Is a judgment for annulment and legal separation a pre-requisite before a spouse convicted of either
concubinage or adultery be disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property?
HELD:
NO. The separation of property is allowed under the law even if the proceedings for the declaration of
nullity of marriage was still pending.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to a subsequent marriage terminated because of the reappearance
of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present
case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground
of psychological capacity. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise
Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and
does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a
circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly
such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings
for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this
voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains
and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
80
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (ART. 68-73)
51. Eloisa Goitia de la Camara v. Jose Campos-Rueda

G.R. No. 11263; November 2, 1916
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
One month after their marriage, Jose demanded of Eloisa that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs, she spurned the obscene demands of Jose and refused to perform any act other
than legal and valid cohabitation. Jose, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on her, who always spurned them, which just refusals exasperated
him and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body. As Eloisa was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from
his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Eloisa filed an action against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. The lower court
held that Jose cannot be compelled to support Eloisa, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of
a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
It is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation,
as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for
living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the
instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking.
ISSUE:
Is the power to grant support in a separate action dependent upon a power to grant a divorce?
HELD:
No. The power to grant support is not dependent upon the power to grant divorce that is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contrac t of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to
the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife
to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable
either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is
done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the
husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by
which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair
the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
Hence, the power to grant support is not dependent upon the power to grant divorce.
81
52. Mariano B. Arroyo v. Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo

G.R. No. L-17014; August 11, 1921
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage
in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as
man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home
with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband.
After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this
action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife.
The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home
without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled
to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband.
Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live
apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff
should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the
case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband
was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification
for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE:
Is a wife, who had left her husband, duty-bound to return and live with her husband?
HELD:
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's
cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife
is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the
Civil code. Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for
her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees,
necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step
involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses a state which is abnormal and fraught
with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made
for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair
has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and
none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
82
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself
without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-
bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the
cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
83
53. In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Potenciano Ilusorio, Erlinda K. Ilusorio v.
Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner, Sylvia K. Ilusorio-Yap, John Does and Jane Does
G.R. No. 139789; July 19, 2001
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago,
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in
consortium.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano
Ilusorio.Thus, Erlinda filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have
custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order
giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
Petition for habeas corpus was dismissed for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of
Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
ISSUE:
Whether the wife can compel the custody of his ailing husband in consortium
HELD:
No. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and
that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is
her desire to have her husband's custody. Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano
Ilusorio to live with her.
One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia
were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure
greed. She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano
and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano
retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she
would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the
corporations.
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999. Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and
that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before
the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his
wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
84
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated
from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge.
Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
85
54. Pastor B. Tenchavez v. Vicenta F. Escao, et al.

G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Vicenta Escao a "sheltered colegiala" exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, an engineer
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with
the local civil register.
Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. She filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. A decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She then
acquired American citizenship.
Tenchavez initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint against Vicenta F. Escao asking for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. While, Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and
an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran.
The court did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to indemnity for failure of Vicenta to perform her martial obligations
HELD:
YES. Pastor is entitled to indemnity from Vicenta.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao,
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: Laws
relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially
in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code. Even more, the grant of effectivity in this
jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
86
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means
do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law,
on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
87
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY DURING MARRIAGE (ART. 76)
55. Efren Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.
G.R. No. 164201; December 10, 2012
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others were charged with the crime of murder. Efren was
acquitted of the charge but Melecia and the other accused were found guilty as charged. The RTC
ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to the SC, the conviction of both accused was affirmed. The decision became final and
executory. Upon motion, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. The
spouses motion for reconsideration was also denied. The CA affirmed said decision, prompting Efren to
file the present petition for review on certiorari.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given
that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement. The heirs of the deceased victims argued that since the transitory provision of the
Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that
property relation between the couple was changed to the system of absolute community of property when
the Family Code took effect in 1988.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took
effect
2. Whether the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case
HELD:
1. No. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be
said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code
does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all
conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior
to marriage.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or
industry in the common fund.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married
88
under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would
be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage.
2. Yes. Article 122 of the Family Code provides that the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
Since Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the
decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. If the conjugal
partnership is insufficient to cover the said liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties.
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on
his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that
such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated
in the preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such offending
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
*Article 105 of the Family Code states, the provisions on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256." Consequently, the SC referred to the Family Code provisions in deciding
whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities
imposed on Melecia in the murder case.
89
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
56. Romana Locquiao Valencia and Constancia L. Valencia v. Benito A. Locquiao, now deceased
and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao, Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of Deeds of Pangasinan
G.R. No. 122134; October 3, 2003
TINGA, J:
FACTS:
Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias covering among
others dour parcels of land in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his prospective bride,
respondent Tomasa Mara. The donees then got married.
With the permission of Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia and Constacia took possession
and cultivated the subject land. Since then, they have been in possession of the land. After sometime,
Benito filed a Complaint seeking the ejectment of Constancia from the subject property.
Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered that the donation did not observe the form required by
law, as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid donation propter nuptias
HELD:
YES. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those
"made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses."
The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same
rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations
propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the
Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be
enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity
of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
CAVEAT:
The provisions of the Old Civil Code was applied in the case at bar.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the
property donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of the marriage
between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to
effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
90
DONATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING THE MARRIAGE
57. Cornelia Matabuena v. Petronila Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771; March 31, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
The plaintiff Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation
made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant Petronila Cervantes, was
void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship
HELD:
Yes. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. If the policy of the law is, in the language of
the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor. Then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that
the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.
Therefore, the lower court decision dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in
question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion.
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58. Cirila Arcaba v. Erlinda Tabancura Vda. De Batocael, Seigfredo C. Tabancura, Doris C.
Tabancura, Luzelli C. Tabancura, Belen C. Tabancura, Raul A. Comille, Bernadette A. Comille,
and Abner A. Comille
G.R. No. 146683; November 22, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Francisco Camille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters. After the death of Zosima,
Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisc and the same was registered.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,
the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his
house, as well as the store inside.
When Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. A few months
before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which
he ceded a portion of Lot together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being
made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years."
The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
Respondents who are the heirs of the decedent filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages.
ISSUE:
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife?
HELD:
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the
two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said
they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just
a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are
other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented
documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an
application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real
estate lessor with a health certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents show that
Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name.
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she
was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled
to a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served
him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's
common-law spouse.
92
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima were owners of Lot No. 437-A located in Dipolog, Zamboanga del
Norte. Following the death of his wife, and with his mother-in-law waiving her share of the lot to
Francisco, the latter became the absolute owner of the lot. Having no children, he asked his niece, Leticia
and her cousin Luzviminda, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house.
Eventually, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. In 1991, a few months before his death,
Francisco executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of the lot, consisting
of 150m, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. This was
apparently for services rendered by Cirila over the past 10 years.
After Franciscos death, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code
which states that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and the CA affirmed the same.
The MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply Art. 87 of the Family Code to this case?
HELD:
YES. In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife"
means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of
course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman
of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such.
In this case, at the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda
Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that
Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently
signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a business
permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents show that Cirila saw herself as
Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Finally, the fact that
Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse.
Hence, the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. The
CA decision was AFFIRMED.
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EXCEPTIONS TO ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
59. Josefina V. Nobleza v. Shirley B. Nuega

G.R. No. 193038; March 11, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION NOT RELEVANT IN DETERMINING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
FACTS:
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1,
1990. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina
where they had planned to eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13, 1989,
Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) from
Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989,
she settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer through SSS8
financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following
year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had
brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and was able to
confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as
his wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC
of Pasig City. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling
the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor and
petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) - of the existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio
and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and terminated.
Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject property
to petitioner without Shirley's consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P380,000.00), including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property with
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
ISSUE:
Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for
value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances
relevant to the sale.
The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's financial contribution in
the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece
of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property
shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
acquired thereafter.
94
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the
Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as
the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they
shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the
community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore
forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective
contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears
in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
95
ACP ADMINISTRATION AND DISPOSITION
60. Arturo Flores v. Spouses Enrico and Edna Lindo

G.R. No. 183984; April 13, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000. To secure the
loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (the Deed) covering a property in the name of
Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents).
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency
of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents, in RTC Branch 33. Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. It also found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of
Enrico. The Deed was executed on October 31, 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed
by Enrico was only dated November 4, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether the mortgage of a land, belonging to the conjugal partnership, without the husbands consent is
valid
HELD:
NO, because in the absence of such authority or consent from the other spouse, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on October 31,
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on November 4, 1995. The execution of the SPA is
the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the
parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Therefore, the Deed of Real Mortgage over the conjugal property of respondents is valid.
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ACP REMEDIES OF PRESENT SPOUSE IN CASE OF ABANDONMENT
61. Estrella De la Cruz v. Severino De la Cruz

G.R. No. L-19565; January 30, 1968
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her
but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. Six children were born
to them. According to the plaintiff, since 1955 the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling,
although in the said year he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955
up to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode, and when he was in
Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. Allegedly, he has abandoned her and their children,
to live in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
In his defense, the defendant denied having abandoned his wife and children, but admitted that in 1957,
or a year before the filing of the action, he started to live separately from his wife. When he transferred
his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as it never has been,
to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely
jealous of every woman He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not
concentrate on his work as she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he could pass the nights
in peace. He averred that he has never missed even for a single month to give them financial support
(P500 for the wife and allowances to his wife and children from his office of a total ranging from P1,200
to P1,500 a month).
The RTC, however, ordered the separation and division of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE:
Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a
separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
HELD:
NO, the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been abandoned by the
husband for at least one year are the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the
powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178, there
must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation to the alternative remedies
granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership, administration
by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to
assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the
full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society
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of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support
to his wife.
In the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently.
The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from
the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the complainant, although she minimized the amount of
support given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good reason to believe, however, that she
and the children received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children
continued to draw from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos
Ganaban, whose declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that
the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly,
that she frequently played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on
his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and right.
NOTE:
This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies
granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act
but are designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore,
a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but m erely points up the
insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.
Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept
of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which
amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as
circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without
interest. No pronouncement as to costs.
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PROPERTIES UNDER CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
62. Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya, and Pacita Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and the Heirs
of Eusebia Napisa Retuya
G.R. No. 143286; April 14, 2004
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Nicolas and Eusebia got married on October 7, 1926. During their marriage, they acquired real
properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City and Consolacion, Cebu. Also, Nicolas is a co-
owner of a parcel of land which he inherited from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary
shares of approximately 8 parcels of land in Mandaue City.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita. Nicolas, then, was
the only person who received the income of the properties. Procopio, their illegitimate son, started
receiving the income of the properties after Nicolas suffered stroke.
Natividad, Nicolas and Eusebias child, sought the administration of and the turnover of all the proceeds
of the conjugal properties but Procopio brushed her aside. No settlement was reached in the barangay
level. Hence, Eusebia filed a complaint before the RTC of Mandaue City seeking the reconveyance from
Nicolas and Pacita of several properties, claiming that these are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
The CA concurred with the findings of the RTC. Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are
conjugal in nature. On the other hand, petitioners failed to meet the standard of proof required to maintain
their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas, contrary to the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code that the subject properties are conjugal.
ISSUE:
Are properties acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage by a person living with his illegitimate
family conjugal in nature?
HELD:
Yes. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas
and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family
Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before
the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-
balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Since the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of
Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not
conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an
obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property
of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing.
Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
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The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act
that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation
cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia
continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all
property acquired from October 7, 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until November 23,
1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor
proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
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63. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-34583; October 22, 1931
VILLAREAL, J.:
FACTS:
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze and Rosario Gelano got married in 1914. While he was in Germany, Adolphe
executed a will wherein he named his wife as his universal heir. When he died, petitioner BPI was
appointed as the administrator of his estate.
Among the personal property of the deceased was found a life insurance policy with the estate as
beneficiary. BPI received from Sun Life Assurance Company the proceeds of the insurance policy, which
they delivered to Rosario.
Respondent Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, imposed an inheritance tax upon the transmission
of the proceeds of the policy. BPI paid under protest but Posadas refused to give a refund. Petitioner
brought an action to recover half of the sum paid, contending that half of the proceeds of the insurance
policy is community property so no inheritance tax can be levied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half of the proceeds of the insurance policy is community property
HELD:
YES. With the exception of the premium for the first year, all the money used for paying the premiums, i.
e., from the second year, or January 16, 1914, or when the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married
Rosario Gelano, until his death on February 2, 1929, is conjugal property inasmuch as it does not appear
to have exclusively belonged to him or to his wife. As the sum of P20,150 here in controversy is a product
of such premium it must also be deemed community property, because it was acquired for a valuable
consideration, during said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of
the common fund, except for the small part corresponding to the first premium paid with the deceased's
own money.
The amount of the policy represents the premiums to be paid, and the right to it arises the moment the
contract is perfected, for at the moment the power of disposing of it may be exercised, and if death occurs
payment may be demanded. It is therefore something acquired for a valuable consideration during the
marriage, though the period of its fulfillment, depend upon the death of one of the spouses, which
terminates the partnership. So considered, the question may be said to be decided by articles 1396 and
1401: if the premiums are paid with the exclusive property of husband or wife, the policy belongs to the
owner; if with conjugal property, or if the money cannot be proved as coming from one or the other of the
spouses, the policy is community property.
As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, were paid
out of the conjugal funds, with the exceptions of the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding the
proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute community property, notwithstanding the
fact that the policy was made payable to the deceased's estate, so that one-half of said proceeds belongs
to the estate, and the other half to the deceased's widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de
Schuetze. Therefore, the CIR was ordered to return one-half of the tax collected upon the proceeds.
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64. Moises Jocson v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez
G.R. No. L-55322; February 16, 1989
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offspring of
spouses Emilio and Alejandra Jocson, who at the time of the institution of the case were both dead.
Moises assails 3 documents executed by Emilio during his lifetime. These documents purportedly
conveyed, by sale, to Agustina what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his 1/3 share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner claimed, among others, that the properties covered are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra, which Emilio, therefore, cannot validly sell.
The RTC ruled in favor of Moises but the decision was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Was the sale between Emilio and daughter Agustina valid despite the claim that the properties sold were
part of the conjugal property?
HELD:
Yes. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Before
the presumption may be validly invoked, one must first present proof that the disputed properties were
acquired during the marriage.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete"
is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. The import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra. SC held that registration of the property in the name of
only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal. But this ruling is not inconsistent with
the above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the properties, though registered in the
name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the
marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented
proof to rebut the presumption.
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises, presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties
were acquired during his parents' coverture, the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio alone,
are conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
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65. Wilhelmina Jovellanos, Mecy Jovellanos-Martinez and Jose Hermilo Jovellanos v. Court of
Appeals, and Annette H. Jovellanos, for and in her behalf, and in representation of her two
minor daughters as natural guardian, Ana Maria and Ma. Jennette, both surnamed Jovellanos
G.R. No. 100728; June 18, 1992
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Wilhelmina Jovellanos et al. are children of Daniel Jovellanos and Leonor Dizon. Private
respondents are Annette Jovellanos, the second wife of Daniel, and their 2 minor children.
In 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a
contract denominated as a lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, including a bungalow
thereon. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children,
the petitioners herein. In 1959, Leonor Dizon died. In 1967, Daniel married Annette H. Jovellanos with
whom he begot 2 children.
In 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos and her husband, at the behest of Daniel, built a house on the back
portion of the premises. In 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale. The next day, Daniel donated to petitioners all his rights, title and
interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the property was acquired by her deceased husband
while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Philamlife.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property, specifically the lot and the bungalow erected
thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable title thereto, were acquired by their parents during the
existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife in 1955.
After trial, the court declared Annette as pro-indiviso owner of 1/2 of the property. Thus she and her
children were owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the other half of said property. Mercy and her husband
were declared exclusive owners of the two-storey house erected on the property at the back of the said
bungalow.
On appeal, the CA held that since the contract was one of lease and conditional sale, the full ownership
was transferred to Daniel only upon full payment of the stipulated price.
Hence, petitioners seek this review, arguing that the lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow
is conjugal property of the second marriage of the late Daniel Jovellanos.
ISSUE:
Are the lot and the bungalow part of the conjugal property of the second marriage?
HELD:
Yes, they are conjugal property of the second marriage.
The contract was denominated "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement." The contract was in the nature
of a contract to sell, where ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. In a lease agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased.
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Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, what was vested by the contract in
Daniel was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His monthly payments were made in the
concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if he faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the
contract the same would in effect be considered as amortization payments to be applied to the
predetermined price of the said property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full
payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since 1955, it
was only in 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Therefore, Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed
of sale in his favor. Since, as early as 1967,he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property
necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
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66. Marcelo Castillo, Jr., Felicisimo Castillo, Encarnacion Castillo, Amelia Castillo, Jaime Castillo,
Ronaldo Castillo, Victoria Castillo, Leticia Cinco, Levi Cinco And Daniel Cinco v. Macaria
Pasco
G.R. No. L-16857; May 29, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous
husbands. Petitioners were children and grandchildren (representing their deceased parents) of Marcelo
Castillo, Sr. by his previous marriage. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married
her fourth husband, Luis San Juan.
Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale
conveying said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for the sum of P6,000.00,
payable in three installments.
Against the contention of petitioners-appellants that the fishpond thus bought should be considered
conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture, the Court of Appeals declared it to be
paraphernalia because it was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco. She was
admittedly a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and the latter's principal
source of income was only his P80 a month salary, as provincial treasurer.
The Court of Appeals found that the initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond now in litigation was made
up of P600, that one of the vendors (Gabriel Gonzales) owed to appellee Pasco, and P400 in cash, which
the latter paid out of the proceeds of the sale of one of her nipa lands. The second installment of P2,000
appears to have been paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond
was mortgaged by both spouses. Dr. Jacinto later assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. The last
payment of P3,000 was derived from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the
name of Macaria Pasco, and one of which she had inherited from a former husband, Justo S. Pascual,
while the other lot encumbered was assessed in her exclusive name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the litigated fishpond is part of conjugal property
HELD:
No. The litigated fishpond is partly exclusive property and partly conjugal property.
Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which was the applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for
onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the
source of the funds employed for its acquisition.
The following provisions of the said Code are relevant:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:

4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.
ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only
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The Court of Appeals determined that the initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond now disputed was
made out of private funds of Macaria Pasco. Appellants, however, argue that since there is no express
finding that the P600 debt owed by Gabriel Gonzales came exclusively from private funds of Pasco, they
should be presumed conjugal funds, in accordance with Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889. The
argument is untenable. Since the wife, under Article 1418, cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
the consent of the husband, her private transactions are presumed to be for her own account, and not
for the account of the partnership. The finding of the Court of Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales owed this
particular indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the husband authorized
her to use community funds therefor, the appellate Court's finding cannot be disturbed by us.
Appellants next assail the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the other two installments of the
purchase price should be, like the first one, deemed to have been paid with exclusive funds of the wife
because the money was raised by loans guaranteed by mortgage on paraphernalia property of the wife.
The position thus taken by appellants is meritorious, for the reason that the deeds show the loans to have
been made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, and by Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations of the conjugal
partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the
securing mortgage is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the
lenders could, waive, if they so choose, without affecting the principal debt which was owned by the
conjugal partnership, and which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so
desired.
We, therefore, find that the two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price of the fishpond were paid with
conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money belonging to
the wife Macaria Pasco.
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the
conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common,
in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth
(1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal
partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
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CPG EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF EACH SPOUSE
67. Epifania Magallon v. Hon. Rosalina Montejo, in her Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch XXI, Concepcion Lacerna, Eleceria Lacerna and
Purita Lacerna
G.R. No. 73733; December 16, 1986
NARVASA, J:
FACTS:
A writ of execution was issued by respondent judge Rosalina Montejo against Martin Lacerna.
A case was instituted by Concepcion, Eleceria and Purita Lacerna against Martin Lacerna to compel the
partition of a parcel of land. The plaintiffs claimed that they are the common children of Martin Lacerna
and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan.
The title of the land clearly states that Martin Lacerna is married to Epifania Magallon. Consequently, the
judge issued the writ of execution both against Martin Lacerna and Epifania Magallon. Epifania filed a
motion of intervention and to stay execution alleging that the parcel of land is part of their conjugal
property.
ISSUE:
Is a bound, not party to the action, bound by a judgment against her husband with respect to a community
property?
HELD:
YES. The wife, even if not a party to the action, is bound by the judgement therein.
It has been held that a judgment against the husband in an action involving community property, is
conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party, but it has also been held that a judgment against either
husband or wife with respect to community property in an action to which the other spouse is not a party
does not prevent the other spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of course,
a judgment against both husband and wife is binding on both.
Here, the Court can adopt the affirmative view and hold the petitioner bound by the judgment against
Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact been impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling
presumes that petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to
the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner
cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna.
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68. In re testate estate of Narciso A. Padilla. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla v. Isabel Bibby
Vda. de Padilla
G.R. No. L-48137; October 4, 1943
BOCOBO, J.:
FACTS:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late Narciso Padilla. In order that
his property may be divided according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the
conjugal partnership.
On December 12, 1912, Narciso Padilla and Concepcion Paterno were married. The husband, being a
medical student contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership while the wife brought to the
marriage considerable property in real estate, cash and jewelry.
On February 12, 1934, Narciso died. Having no children, he executed a will giving his whole estate to
his mother, Isabel Bibby vda. De Padilla. The property included in the inventory was appraised at P
261,000. 7 pieces of the real estate are in controversy since the remaining 10 were left by Narciso as
part of the conjugal partnership.
Concepcion filed a petition praying that her paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried
estate and delivered to her together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she
be given of the conjugal partnership property and that the usufructuary right over of the portion
pertaining to the heir in Narcisos will be recognized
CFI ordered that certain pieces of real estate property , jewelry and cash were paraphernal and as such
should be delivered to Concepcion
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal owing to the improvements made which came
from conjugal funds;
2. Whether or not improvements made on the paraphernal properties could be reimbursed to the wife.
HELD:
1. Yes, the properties in question are conjugal in nature. Art. 1404 (2) of the Spanish Code provides that
the improvements made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either the husband or wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one
of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.
In the instant case, the husband constructed buildings on the wifes lots. Isabel alleged that the CFI erred
in since from the time of the construction of the buildings, the conjugal partnership became the owner of
the whole property, that any increase in value should accrue to the conjugal partnership and any
depreciation should be suffered by the same.
Based on the above provision, the ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value
of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Mere construction of a building from
common funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wifes land to the conjugal partnership.
Construction and improvements are simply an exercise of the usufruct pertaining to the conjugal
108
partnership over the wifes land. Subsequently, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent
during the occupation of the wifes land. Before the payment of the value of land is made from the
common funds, all the increase or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss and she can only
demand payment after the conjugal partnership is liquidated. Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed
to demand payment of the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would disturb the
husbands management of the conjugal partnership.
2. Yes, the improvements made on the paraphernal properties could be reimbursed to the wife. However
small the value of the buildings at the time of the demolition, it should be, considering the principle of
justice and equity, reimbursed to the wife.
There is also the issue of money borrowed by the husband for horse race, pastime and for payment of
personal debt of the husband. Applying Art. 1386 of the Spanish Code which reads, the personal
obligations of the husband cannot be enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal property, unless it is
proven that they redounded to the benefit of the family, said amount cannot be applied to the conjugal
partnership and should be paid by the husband alone. While it is true that under Art. 1408, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband during the marriage are chargeable to against the conjugal
partnership, Art. 1386 is an exception and exempts the fruits of the paraphernal property from the
payment of the personal obligations of the husband unless there is proof that the redounded to the benefit
of the family. In this case, it clearly did not and as a result, they should be taken from the husbands
funds.
If the conjugal partnership assets are derived almost entirely, if not entirely, from the fruits of the
paraphernal property, as in this case, it is neither lawful nor equitable to apply article 1411 because by
so doing, the fruits of the paraphernal property would in reality be the only kind of property to bear the
husband's gambling losses. In other words, what the husband loses in gambling should be shouldered
by him and not by the conjugal partnership if the latter's assets come solely from the fruits of the
paraphernal property. This is but just, because gambling losses of the husband cannot by any process
of reasoning be considered beneficial to the family. By the same token, to charge the gambling losses
against the conjugal partnership in such a situation would fly in the case of the stern prohibition of article
1386, which protects the fruits of the paraphernal property precisely against expenses of the husband
that are of no help to the family.
109
69. Aleko E. Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company

G.R. No. 42551; September 4, 1935
GODDARD, J:
FACTS:
In G.R. No. L-39587, Aleko E. Lilius, a well-known and reputed journalist, author and photographer and
a staff correspondent in the Far East of the magazines The American Weekly of New York and The
Sphere of London, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and their daughter, Brita Marianne Lilius, met an accident,
wherein their Studebaker car, collided with locomotive No. 713, Manila Railroad Companys train. They
sustained life-threatening wounds, fractures and other injuries, which left them permanently disfigured
and as a result thereof, Aleko suffered great financial loss as he was unable to concentrate and write
articles and short stories for the newspapers and magazines. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Aleko
Lilius, et al, awarding them in the amount of P33,525.03 as damages, including interest and costs. Laura
Lindley Shuman, the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Manila
Motor Co., Inc., have appealed from an order of the CFI of Manila fixing the degree of preference of the
claimants and distributing the proceeds of the judgment of this court in the case of Lilius v. Manila Railroad
Co. the amount of which judgment including interest and costs, was deposited by the railroad company
with the clerk of the lower court in that case.
Under her third assignment of error this appellant contends (1) that the funds separately awarded the
wife, Sonja Maria Lilius, partake of the nature of conjugal property, at least to the extent of the sum of
P800 awarded to her as interest on the principal award of P10,000 made in her favor by the trial court,
and as such should respond for the support of the family, including medical expens es and (2) that even
assuming that the sums awarded separately to Sonja Maria Lilius are not conjugal property, but her own
paraphernal property, still under the provisions of the Civil Code payment may be required out of said
funds, her husband being insolvent, under her liability for the medical expenses incurred by her husband,
one of the obligations imposed by law upon the wife.
ISSUE:
WON the amount of damages arising from an injury suffered by one of the spouses should be considered
part of the conjugal or separate property
HELD:
It appears that there are two distinct theories as to whether damages arising from an injury suffered by
one of the spouses should be considered conjugal or separate property of the injured spouse. The theory
holding that such damages should form part of the conjugal partnership property is based wholly on the
proposition, also advanced by the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., that by the injury the earning capacity of
the injured spouse is diminished to the consequent prejudice of the conjugal partnership. Assuming the
correctness of this theory, a reading of the decision of this court in G. R. No. 39587 will show that the
sum of P10,000 was awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius "by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral
damages." The pertinent part of that decision on this point reads:
"Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius
is-in the language of the court, which saw her at the trial "young and beautiful and the big scar, which
she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures
her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very
difficult for her to walk', and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum of
P10,000, adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages,
excessive."
110
It should be added that the interest on that sum is part of the damages "patrimonial and moral" awarded
to Sonja Maria Lilius. Furthermore it appears in the decision of the trial court in G. R. No. 39587 that
Aleko E. Lilius claimed the sum of P10,000 as damages on account of the loss of the services of Sonja
Maria Lilius as secretary and translator, her particular work as a member of the conjugal partnership. The
trial court disallowed this claim and neither of the plaintiffs in that case appealed to this court. In view of
the foregoing it is held that the sum of P10,000 with interest thereon awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius as
damages is paraphernal property.
111
CPG RULE IN CASE OF IMPROVEMENT OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
70. Consolacion Villanueva v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus Bernas and Remedios Q.
Bernas
G.R. No. 74577; December 4, 1990
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas inherited Lot 13-C from his parents after their demise. Modesto died; his wife, Victoria
Comorro, predeceased him. They had no children.
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro
C. Aranas. These two borrowed a sum from Jesus Bernas secured by a mortgage of their father's
property, Lot 13-C, where they described themselves as the absolute co-owners of said lot.
For failure to pay the loan, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C
and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. Consequently, the title (in the name of
Modesto) was cancelled and another issued in his name.
Later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas praying that the
latter's title over Lot 13-C be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land on the ground of their
alleged discovery of a will executed by Victoria which allegedly bequeathed to Consolacion and
Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro indiviso, all of said Victoria 's "interests,
rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net share from (the) conjugal partnership property with
her husband, Modesto Aranas . . ."
The trial court rendered judgement declaring the spouses Bernas as legal owners of Lot No. 13-C
including all the improvements thereon.
ISSUE:
Is Lot 13-C, together with the improvements thereon, conjugal property of Modesto and Victoria, so that
Consolacion and Raymundo may be said to have acquired a right over them by succession, as voluntary
heirs of Victoria?
HELD:
No. Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not "conjugal partnership property" of Victoria and her
husband, Modesto. It was the latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his parents
and registered solely in his name. Whether Modesto succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to
his marriage to Victoria the record being unfortunately none too clear on the point is inconsequential.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. This is what Article 148 of
the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter
alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which each acquires, during the
marriage, by lucrative title." Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot
13-C took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his "exclusive
property" because acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria died ahead of her husband, Modesto. Victoria never therefore inherited any part of
Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion or anybody
else.
112
And as to the improvements standing on Lot 13-C, the Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for
utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership,"
and buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same." Proof, therefore, is needful of the time of the making or construction of
the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character of the
improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof was
presented or proffered by Villanueva or anyone else. What is certain is that the land on which the
improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto Aranas and that where, as here, property is
registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was
acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to
declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.
113
CPG CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS
71. BA Finance Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Augusto Yulo, Lily Yulo (doing
business under the name and style of A & L Industries)
G.R. No. 61464; May 28 1988
GUTTIEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner as evidenced by a promissory note he
signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an
alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L
Industries and under whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo
to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto
Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. Petitioner filed its
amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. The
trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L
Industries.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had already
abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already
separated when the promissory note was executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in
the special power of attorney procured by Augusto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be made answerable to the obligation
HELD:
No. The petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal
properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue against the
said properties.
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship
was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is
presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for
the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation
was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had
already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly
authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there
must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his
conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said
properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amounting to P660,000.00.
114
72. Security Bank and Trust Company v. Mar Tierra Corporation, Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa
G.R. No. 143382; November 29, 2006
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000
credit accommodation with Petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). The application was
approved. The credit line agreement was then secured by an indemnity agreement executed by Wilfrido
C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with Mar
Tierra Corporation for the payment of the loan.
The credit line was increased. Mar Tierra Corporation availed P9,952,000 and was able to pay
P4,648,000. However, Mar Tierra Corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business
losses.
Unable to collect from Mar Tierra Corporation, SBTC filed a complaint for sum of money. The RTC
dismissed the case with respect to Lacson and Lopa, leaving Martinez as sole respondent. SBTC filed a
writ of attachment, which the RTC issued on the Spouses Wilfrido and Josefinas family home. The RTC
then held Mar Tierra Corporation and Martinez jointly and severally liable, but lifted the attachment on
the conjugal house of the Martinez Spouses.
Dissatisfied, SBTC appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. SBTC also sought
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party?
HELD:
No. Where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal
presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand,
if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence
of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. Wherefore, the
petition is denied.
115
73. Arcadio and Maria Louisa Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino De Guzman

G.R. No. 160347; November 29, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Arcadio and Maria Louisa Carandang were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Spouses
Carandang and Quirino De Guzman are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS).
The capital stock of MBS was increased twice, both instances of which the Spouses Carandang
subscribed to a part of the newly issued capital stock. De Guzman advanced the payment of the stocks
by issuing checks drawn from his joint account with his wife. Three out of the four checks issued were
named under De Guzmans wife, Milagros. When De Guzman demanded for the payment of the newly
subscribed capital stock, Spouses Carandang refused to pay on the ground that there had been a pre-
incorporation agreement whereby De Guzman promised to pay for the shares subscribed by Arcadio
Carandang in exchange of the latters services.
De Guzman filed an action for the collection of a sum of money against the spouses. Milagros is not
impleaded as a party. The RTC rendered judgment holding the spouses jointly and severaly liable for the
payment of the newly subscribed shares.
One of the contentions was that the case should be dismissed for the failure to state a cause of action
by virtue of the non-inclusion of Milagros. Also the spouses contend that they cannot be held solidarily
liable as it was not one of those obligations required by the law as solidary.
ISSUES:
1. Is the non-inclusion of Milagros as a co-plaintiff fatal to the case for its failure to state a cause of action
since the action was not brought by a real party in interest?
2. Is it proper to hold the Spouses Carandang solidarily liable for the debt?
HELD:
1. NO. Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal property.
Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest.
Hence, Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was allegedly
not brought by a real party in interest, is unwarranted.
2. YES. For marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into
by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which
is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the
obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the
116
conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability,
as between them, does not apply.
Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although
the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property.
117
74. Spouses Josephine Mendoza Go and Henry Go v. Leonardo Yamane

G.R. No. 160762; May 3, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
FACTS:
The subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees of Atty. De Guzman who handled a
civil case for the Pucay sisters. Prior to the auction sale, respondent Leonardo, the husband of Muriel
Pucay, filed a Third-Party Claim to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is their
conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay
sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and sold the subject property to petitioners
Spouses Go. Respondent filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of auction sale upon the same
ground stated in the third-party claim.
ISSUES:
1. Is the subject property conjugal property?
2. May the charging lien be properly enforced against the subject property?
HELD:
1. YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code (now Article 116 of FC) provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. As a condition sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal
partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage. In this case, petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the subsistence of
the marriage of Muriel to respondent. Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that
the property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands.
2. NO. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to have
been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest
when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them.
Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel are her exclusive responsibility and certainly
cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property. Before a conjugal property could be held
liable for the obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some advantage or benefit
that accrued to the conjugal partnership. Concededly, the burden is on the petitioners to prove that the
services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in handling the case for the Pucay sisters had, somehow,
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of respondent and Muriel. This onus, petitioners,
however, failed to discharge.
118
75. Alfredo Ching and Encarnacion Ching v. Court of Appeals and Allied Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 124642; February 23, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9M from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo
and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its
loans. Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations
by representing themselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not
have such capacity.
In the meantime, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of
Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. Petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband
Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of
conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. She, likewise, alleged
that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release
of the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
ISSUES:
1. Do the 100,000 shares of stock in the name of Alfredo Ching belong to the conjugal partnership?
2. Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?
HELD:
1. YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they
are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were
acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered
conjugal.
Here, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the
Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the
petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on 1979. This was done during the
subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be
the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. ABC failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The fact that the shares of stocks were registered
in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband
does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
2. NO. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the
objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family
as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
119
Here, the ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the
PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the
petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such
benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
120
76. Carmelita Borlongan v. Banco De Oro

G.R. Nos. 217617 and 218540; April 5, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita acquired a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). When they went to the Registry of Deeds to obtain a copy of
the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property, they discovered that the title
contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale.
Carmelita found out that Banco de Oro (BDO) filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank, but she was among those
impleaded for supposedly having signed security agreements to guarantee the obligations of Tancho.
However, Carmelita was not served with any summons. The RTC Makati rendered a Decision holding
the defendants in the collection case liable and issued a Writ of Execution. Because the defendants failed
to settle their obligation, a public auction conducted where the subject property was sold to BDO as the
highest bidder.
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and
Other Documents. He alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to
the conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife.
ISSUE:
Is the conjugal partnership benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety?
HELD:
NO. In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property was attached on the basis of a surety
agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf of Tancho Corporation. In Spouses Ching v.
Court of Appeals, the SC elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited
when a spouse enters into a contract of surety holding that no presumption can be inferred from the fact
that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the
conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited and that the private respondent was burdened to
establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
Furthermore, it is not apparent from the records of this case that BDO had established the benefit to the
conjugal partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita. In the present
case, Eliseo and his wife discovered the attachment of their conjugal property only after the finality of the
decision by the RTC Makati. There was, therefore, no opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case
before the RTC Makati which attached the conjugal property, as a motion to intervene can only be filed
"at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court." Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity to
question the attachment made by the RTC Makati in a separate and independent action will be to, again,
refuse him the due process of law before their property is taken.
121
77. Soledad L. Lacson v. Abelardo G. Diaz

G.R. No. L-19346; May 31, 1965
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
In connection with a final decision rendered by the CFI sentencing Diaz to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P97, 532.93 with legal interest, the court issued a writ of execution. The Sheriff sent to the manager of
Talisay-Silay Milling Company, wherein Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish 1/3 of his monthly salary
and of any other personal properties belonging to Diaz, to cover the total amount of P132, 718.30.
Diaz filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment of his salary, on the
ground that the same are not enforceable against his present family. It was claimed that since the money-
judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage said judgment cannot be
enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage. Plaintiffs
opposed this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for extinction of obligations.
The MTQ was denied. Hence, this appeal. Diaz cites Article 163 of the new Civil Code and the ruling of
this Court that the right of the husband to one-half of the assets of the conjugal partnership does not vest
until the dissolution of the marriage.
ISSUE:
Is the conjugal partnership of Diazs second marriage liable for the obligations which arose during the
pendency of his first marriage?
HELD:
No, the conjugal partnership of Diazs second marriage is not liable for the obligations which arose during
the pendency of his first marriage.
As a general rule under Art. 163, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as
well as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive
property or the same is insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the
husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent
upon the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are
obtaining.
In the instant case, although it is not controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs -appellees a
certain sum of money from the appellant-debtor a personal obligation yet, it has not been established
that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to satisfy appellees'
claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil
Code have already been covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband may be made
chargeable against the properties of the second marriage.
The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, in accordance with the aforestated
observation.
122
78. Efren Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.
G.R. No. 164201; December 10, 2012
ABAD, J:
FACTS:
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the spouses
has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs.
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before
the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City. On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated
decision acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another
person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
The decision became final and executory. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the
RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution8 were issued.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion.
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently
show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed orders.1
ISSUES:
1. Does the provisions of Family Code on property regime apply retroactively to m arriages contracted
before its effectivity?
2. Is the CA in error in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case?
HELD:
1. NO, Art. 256 and other relevant provisions of the Family Code must be taken into consideration. To
determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the
properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses property relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given
that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement. Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that
it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system
of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia.
The reasoning goes: Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code. But that fact does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family
Code because their property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds
support in Art. 256 of the Family Code.
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above. Efren and Melecias property relation was admittedly
conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions
retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between the couple
was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988.
123
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse
in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains
and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident
that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute
community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only
those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior
to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before
the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community
or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses
who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial
separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause
or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under
Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or
industry in the common fund. This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights
of ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate
properties.
2. NO. Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the
conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia
in the murder case. Article 122 is enlightening. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts
contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose
above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the
above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
124
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on
his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that
such indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior liquidation of those
assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that at the time of liquidation of
the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
mentioned.
125
79. Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan, Leonardo Joson, Juanito Santos, Emerito Sicat and
Conrado Lagman v. IAC and Romarico Henson
G.R. No. 70082; August 19, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. During the marriage, Romarico bought a
parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money borrowed
from an officemate. His father need the amount for investments in Angeles City and Palawan.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within
the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of
Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was
charged with estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the ground that Katrina's liability
was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment
of a pre-existing obligation.
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband
Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid
court.
RTC ruled in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in
Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina.
About a month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in
Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties levied upon and sold at public auction may be reconveyed to Romarico,
upon finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina
HELD:
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court disagrees with the appellate
court that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and Katrina
had been living
separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively
owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had
borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it
out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this
matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property
acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.
126
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with
them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior
to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
127
ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
80. David V. Pelayo and Lorenza* B. Pelayo v. Melki E. Perez

G.R. No. 141323; June 8, 2005
FACTS:
David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of agricultural land by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Loreza
Pelayo, wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed.
Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses on account of which
Perez application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds was denied. Perez
thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he
instituted a complaint for specific performance against defendants Spouses Pelayo.
Defendant Pelayo claimed that the deed was without his wife Lorezas consent, hence, in light of Art. 166
of the Civil Code which provides: Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis
or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent . . .it is null and void.
The trial court, found that there was no marital consent to nor actual consideration for the deed, held that
the deed was null and void and accordingly rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads.
The RTC Decision was appealed to the CA. whereby it ruled that by Lorenzas signing as witness to the
execution of the deed, she had knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given her consent
to the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent
HELD:
NO. We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on
the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied.7
A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or
set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or
approval was indeed given.8 In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that
Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document
point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the
sale.
Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of serious problems such as threats to her
husbands life and the reasons for such threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners problems over
the subject property had been going on for quite some time, so it is highly improbable for Lorenza not to
be aware of what her husband was doing to remedy such problems. Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza
Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon. Neither
do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject
document. Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her
husband and respondent.
128
Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.10
Petitioners did not even attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever
presented to show that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental faculties and, hence, could not
have fully understood the ramifications of signing the deed of sale. Neither did petitioners present any
evidence that Lorenza had been defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened either by her own husband
or by respondent into affixing her signature on the subject document. If Lorenza had any objections over
the conveyance of the disputed property, she could have totally refrained from having any part in the
execution of the deed of sale. Instead, Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect
on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Said
provisions of law provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property
of the conjugal property without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest
in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action
brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.11 In the present case, despite respondents
repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale, showing
respondents insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the
deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991
when petitioners brought up Lorenzas alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the
transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenzas consent, we find it quite puzzling why for more
than three and a half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the assailed
contract.
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of the
transaction between respondent and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale,
she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.
129
81. Homeowners Savings & Loan bank (HSLB) v. Miguela C. Dailo

G.R. No. 153802; March 11, 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage,
Miguela and Marcelino purchased a house and lot from a certain Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife.
Pursuant to the SPA executed by Marcelino in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 was obtained from petitioner HSLB secured by a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property. The said transactions took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
Upon default in payment, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. HSLB was declared as the highest bidder and the ownership over the property was consolidated
after the lapse of the redemption period. In the meantime, Marcelino died.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted an action to nullify the REM and the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale against petitioner.
The CA affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature. The appellate
court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the
knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. Hence, this
petition.
HSLB insists on the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelinos share in the conjugal
partnership. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493
of the Civil Code. HSLB also insists that the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained
by the late Marcelino on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the
family may be imposed on the conjugal partnership.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the real estate mortgage is valid to the extent of the late Marcelinos share in the
conjugal partnership
2. Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the loan?
HELD:
1. No. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of
the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership do not apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner.
The property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by the provisions
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
130
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The
aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition
or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code
does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Thus, the real estate mortgage on the subject property is void for lack of respondents consent.
2. No. Under Article 121 (3) of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than HSLBs bare allegation, there is nothing from the records
of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded
to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
131
82. Jose Uy and Glenda J. Uy and Gilda L. Jardeleza v. Court of Appeals and Teodoro L. Jardeleza
G.R. No. 109557; November 29, 2000
PARDO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza instituted before the RTC of Iloilo a petition to declare her husband Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. incapacitated, in view his comatose condition, and to authorize her to assume sole powers
of administration of their conjugal properties and to dispose the same, with the approval of the court, to
their daughter and son-in-law, her co-petitioners herein, to defray the mounting expenses for treatment
and hospitalization of her incapacitated husband. The RTC granted the petition and made a
pronouncement that the petition filed by petitioner was pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and
that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under
Article 253 of the same Code.
Teodoro, son of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. moved for reconsideration contending, among others, that the
rules governing special proceedings of Guardianship in the Revised Rules of Court should be followed.
ISSUE:
Whether provisions of the Family Code is applicable at bar
HELD:
NO. The proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of
such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse
is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the
wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers
of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. Consequently,
a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe
the procedure for the sale of the ward's estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
132
83. Thelma A. Jader-Manalo v. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa

G.R. No. 147978; January 23, 2002
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the
Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay,
Rizal. Petitioner was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through
a real estate broker authorized by respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties
to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma
Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed
upon the purchase price. This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When
petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity
and consent to the sale.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for
the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that
they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the
consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly
perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner.
Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance
and damages against respondent spouses before the RTC to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to
sign the contracts to sell.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleging that the wife's written consent was not obtained in the contract
to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
HELD:
No. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
133
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transac tion is not
consent.
134
84. Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang v. Court of Appeals and Gilda Copu
G.R. No. 125172; June 26, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Koronadal, South
Cotabato. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila in 1989 to find work in the Middle East. While she was in
Manila, she found out that her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses, Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang,
one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood, over her
objection. When she returned, she still stayed in the conjugal dwelling, hence spouses Guiang filed
complaint before the Barangay authorities. The parties thereafter signed a document known as "amicable
settlement", which stated that Gilda and her children will voluntarily leave the house. However, Gilda later
alleged that the barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion. Hence, respondent Gilda filed a complaint against husband and petitioner-spouses, seeking
the declaration of a deed of sale null and void.
The RTC declared both the Deed of Transfer of Rights amicable settlement null and void. The CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition. The petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of
Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private respondent when
she entered into an amicable settlement with them.
ISSUE:
Is the contract void or voidable?
HELD:
VOID. The contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court explained the amendatory
effect of the above provision. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is merely voidable. Art. 173 of the CC (giving the wife ten (10) years .
. . during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance) was not carried over to the Family Code.
It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after the Family Code took effect without the
consent of the wife is null and void.
135
A void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer
following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate
the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and
Resolution.
136
CPG DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION
85. Brigido B. Quiao v. Rita C. Quiao, Kitchie C. Quiao, Lotis C. Quiao, Petchie C. Quiao,
represented by their mother Rita Quiao
G.R. No. 176556; July 4, 2012
REYES, J.:
NET PROFITS = FRUITS OF THE SEPARATE PROPERTIES AND PRODUCTS OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRY
FACTS:
Herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision. As such, the herein parties shall
be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subjec t to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of []45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children.
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
ISSUE:
What is the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of forfeiture under
Article 63 of the Family Code?
HELD:
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their labor and industry. The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net
profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article
63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
defines "net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the
Family Code applies.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. Moreover, as to the
definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to
both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
137
86. Melecio Domingo v. Spouses Genaro Molina and Elena B. Molina, substituted by Ester Molina
G.R. No. 200274; April 20, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half
undivided portion of a parcel of land.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina
(spouses Molina). 10 years after Floras death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses
Molina to answer for his debts. In 1986, Anastacio died. The sale of Anastacios interest was registered
under Transfer Certificate of and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the
spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina. The former
claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money
that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property
without Floras consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for
his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have
been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have
religiously paid the propertys real estate taxes and that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he
accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent is invalid
HELD:
Yes. The conjugal property was dissolved upon Floras death pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code
(now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code).
The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidationand partition of the
conjugal partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Floras surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
respect to Floras share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the
other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactios sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacios rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively
transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios
interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest).
138
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any
portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition.
Version 2
FACTS:
The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac. Their property relation
is governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the
respondent Spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). Ten years after Floras death,
Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts.
The sale of Anastacios interest was registered in a Transfer Certificate of Title and transferred the entire
one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio
and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership
(Complaint) against the spouses Molina. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the
spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have
validly sold the interest over the subject property without Floras consent, as Flora was already dead at
the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for
his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina also
asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow
money.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of a conjugal property without the wifes consent is valid and legal
HELD:
YES, as to the portion pertaining to the undivided interest of the husband.
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died pursuant to Article 126
(1) of the Family Code.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, the court ruled that the properties of a dissolved
conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an actual
and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and
segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. Anastacio, as co-owner,
cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being first
done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactios sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacios rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively
transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios
interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
139
UNION WITHOUT MARRIAGE (ARTS. 147 and 148)
87. Antonio A. S. Valdes v. RTC, and Consuelo M. Gomez-Valdes

G.R. No. 122749; July 31, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition in 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC declared their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
The trial court made the following clarification: Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common
by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.
On the other hand, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling: he argues that Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated. Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court correctly apply Art. 147 of the Family Code vis--vis the nullity of the marriage of
Spouses Valdes on the ground of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Yes, the trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers
to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
140
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party
who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed
The Court further emphasized that the trial court did not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as
in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses.
NOTE:
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status
of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice.
RTC orders are AFFIRMED.
141
88. Alain M. Dio v. Ma. Caridad L. Dio

G.R. No. 178044; January 19, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Alain and Caridad were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together until they decided
to separate. They later decided to live together again. They were married before the mayor of Las Pias
City. Alain filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caridad, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinic psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which
was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The RTC ruled that Alain was able to establish Caridads psychological incapacity. The marriage was
declared null and void ab initio and the regime of absolute community of property was dissolved. The
dispositive portion of the decision further stated that, A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Shall a decree of absolute nullity of marriage because of a partys psychological incapacity be issued
only after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code?
HELD:
No. In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code (Valdes v. RTC Branch
102, Quezon City). Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as Alain and Caridads.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between Alain and Caridad. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Alains marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article
40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by Alain and Caridad are
the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
142
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
143
89. Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato

G.R. No. 176492; October 20, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
During their marriage, Leonardo Nonato and Marietta Barrido were able to acquire a property consisting
of a house and lot. Later, their marriage was declared void due to psychological incapacity. Thus,
Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused. This prompted Leonardo to file a complaint
for partition before the MTCC.
The MTCC, applying Art. 129 of the Family Code, adjudicated the property to Marietta, the spouse with
whom majority of the children chose to remain. The RTC ruled that it was error for the MTCC to award
the house and lot to Marietta alone, so it ordered the equitable partition of said property. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision insofar as it ordered the equitable partition, but held that it was error for the RTC to rely
on Art. 129 instead of Art. 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 147 of the Family Code should be applied to this case
HELD:
YES. Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
while Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.
The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either
spouses. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found
to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapac ity.
In the analogous case of Valdez, it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the correct law
that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab
initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.
The Court held that the court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family
Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in
common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The rules which are
set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages. Here, the former
spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage.
Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
jointly owned by them in equal shares.
144
90. Erlinda A. Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) V. Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 116668; July 28, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Carlina Palang, the legitimate spouse of Miguel Palang, instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession of 2 real properties against Petitioner Erlinda Agapay, who Miguel married
while his marriage with Carlina was still subsisting.
Carlina alleged that Miguel married the then 19-year old petitioner when he was already 63 years old and
claims that the subject properties were purchased by Miguel alone during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that she and Miguel jointly bought the first property to which she
paid her share, and that the second was her sole property having bought it with her own money.
The RTC dismissed the case after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal properties of Carlina and Miguel. On appeal, the CA revered the
decision in favor of Carlina.
ISSUE:
Should the properties allegedly bought jointly by Miguel and respondent be considered as part of Miguel
and Carlinas conjugal property?
HELD:
Yes. Article 148 of the FC applies to cases of cohabitation where a man and a woman who are NOT
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage
of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation. Erlinda tried
to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store
but failed to persuade the Court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject property. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
145
91. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Trinidad Teodoro

G.R. No. L-20530; June 29, 1967
MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November 29,
1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of
matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr.
Respondent Trinidad Teodoro (Teodoro) met Jose Corominas, Jr. (Corominas) in Hongkong on October
30, 1955. On March 26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their
return to the Philippines they resided in Manila. On September 5, 1961, Teodoro and Corominas were
married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada, U.S.A.
While Teodoro was out of the country, the provincial sheriff levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances
and personal properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to Teodoro. This was pursuant to
a writ of execution for a favorable obtained by petitioner Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc. (Manila
Surety) against Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Corominas.
To stay the sale, Teodoro filed with the CFI on November 3, 1961 a complaint for injunction. However,
the court declared that the properties in question are community properties of Trinidad Teodoro and
Corominas. Teodoro appealed. Meanwhile, a third alias writ of execution was is sued, and the sheriff
levied upon the same properties.
Teodoro filed an original petition for injunction in the CA to stop the scheduled sale. Manila Surety
counters that the said properties pertain to the co-ownership established between her and Corominas ,
pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon on execution for the
satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt.
ISSUE:
May the properties of Teodoro be levied upon for allegedly belonging to the co-ownership between her
and Corominas?
HELD:
No. The properties may not be levied upon, because they do not belong to the co-ownership.
Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
"When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."
While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the CA declined to apply
it in this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting marriage of Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an
impediment to a valid marriage between him and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment,
according to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the establishment of a co-ownership
under said article, and (2) the funds used by said respondent in acquiring the properties in question were
"fruits of her paraphernal investments which accrued before her marriage to Corominas."
146
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under
Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose
Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was
terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is
bigamous and void.
The precise scope of the "no impediment to a valid marriage" dictum will deserve closer examination,
since it establishes an exception to the broad terms of Article 144. However, in the present case, there
is no need to pass on this question. The particular properties involved here, which were admittedly
acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found
by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were
fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In
other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under
Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the
judgment debt of Corominas.
147
92. Josefina Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Works, et. al.
G.R. No. 151967; February 16, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then
employed as the vice president in a private corporation. A little more than a year and seven months
thereafter, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for 320,000.00 in
favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house thereon located in Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. On the basis of the said deed of
sale, 2 TCTs were cancelled and, the Register of Deeds (RD) issued new TCTs in the name of "Josefina
Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.
Later, the RD made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver
executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two
parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving
whatever claims he had over the property.
Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought
7,500 bags of cement worth 768,750.00 from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC)
but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC then filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for
the return of the said commodities, or the value thereof in the amount of 768,750.00. Accordingly, the
Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff Master Iron Works And Construction Corporation against
the defendant [Eduardo] Francisco ordering the latter to replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50 kilos/bag of
Portland cement or, in the alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount of 768,750.00.
WRIT OF EXECUTION. The court issued a writ of execution Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a public auction
one stainless, owner-type jeep for 10,000.00 to MIWCC. Sheriff Alejo issued a Notice of Levy on
Execution/Attachment over the lots covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551) for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 90-3251.
Then, Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Paraaque for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-2260. She alleged then that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff
Alejo in Civil Case No. 90-3251; hence, the levy on execution of the property was null and void. In its
answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family Code of the Philippines and averred that
the property was the conjugal property of Josefina and her husband Eduardo, who purchased the same
on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on January 14, 1983.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to
Eduardo in the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, on the ground that when they were married on January
15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. The trial court ruled that petitioners
marriage with Eduardo was null and void for being bigamous.
As regards the propriety of execution, the trial court rendered judgment finding the levy on the subject
property and the sale thereof at public auction to be null and void. But this decision was reversed by the
CA. The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and Josefina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco
148
HELD:
YES. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows
that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner on August 31,
1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on September 4, 1984
after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15, 1983.
The Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in
Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256
of the Family Code, the law can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.
The petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question.
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and
Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article
105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership
established before the Code took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the
New Civil Code or other laws. Thus, even if Eduardo and Carmelita (I think it should be Josefina) were
married before the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the property still cannot be considered
conjugal property because there can only be but one valid existing marriage at any given time. Article
148 of the Family Code also debilitates against the petitioners claim since, according to the said article,
a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid
marriage provided that the parents prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and
only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon.
Also, the SC agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the
age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties
as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that
the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield
the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of waiver executed by Eduardo on February
15, 1985, stating that the property is owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative weight. We are
convinced that he executed the said affidavit in anticipation of claims by third parties against him and
hold the property liable for the said claims.
The decision of the CA was affirmed.
149
93. Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda De Castro

G.R. No. 169698; November 29, 2006
GARCIA, J:
FACTS:
Lupo Atienza had an intimate relationship with Yolanda despite the fact that he is a married man. They
lived together and 2 children were Born out of their union. After the birth of their 2nd child, their
relationship turn sour.
Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with
improvements. In his complaint, he alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. He further alleged
that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto
was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent.
Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property using her exclusive
funds and the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely
manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his 2 to raise the amount needed therefor.
RTC declared that the property be owned in common by the parties. However, the CA declared the
property be exclusively owned by Yolanda De Castro.
ISSUE:
What is the property regime that should govern an adulterous relationship?
HELD:
The property should be governed Art 148 which provides that only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions and proof of actual contribution is required.
Petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast,
aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in
this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
evidence.
Therefore, the property is properly adjudicated by the CA to Yolanda De Castro.
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MANDATORY PRIOR RECOURSE TO COMPROMISE (ART. 151)
94. April Martinez, Fritz Daniel Martinez and Maria Olivia martinez v. Rodolfo G. Martinez
G.R. No. 162084; June 28, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of
land by TCT No. 54334, as well as the house constructed thereon. On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr.
executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots
18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then handed down the three lots to each of his sons, namely,
Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. After the
death of the spouses, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15,
1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila.6He also discovered
that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale.
Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his
brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was
elevated to the Department of Justice.
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the
property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the
owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1508, the matter was referred to thebarangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was reached.
They appended the certification to file action executed by the barangay chairman to the complaint.
In Rodolfos answer he alleged that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that
earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that
none was reached. He also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay before the
complaint was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 150 of the Family Code or earnest efforts for amicable settlement is necessary before
the filing of this case
HELD:
No, Art. 151 of the Family Code provide, thus:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
151
(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. In this case, the decision of
the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of the Family code and that they
failed to do so is erroneous.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 which should be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as
party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiffs
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code
because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for
unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after
due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance
of a certificate to file action.
152
95. Pedro Gayon v. Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva De Gayon

G.R. No. L-28394; November 26, 1970
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
substantially that said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera a parcel of
unregistered land subject to redemption within five (5) years. It is also alleged that said right of redemption
had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors,
despite the expiration of the period. Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed
of sale, sold the land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon. Plaintiff had introduced improvements on the land and paid
the taxes therein. Plaintiff now prays that an order be issued in his favor for the consolidation of ownership
in and to the property.
Mrs. Gayon alleged that the deed of sale between them and Pedro Gelera is fictitious because the
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers and that being a brother of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his
complaint. The case was dismissed on the ground that Silvestre Gayon, as seen in the deed of sale, is
the absolute owner of the land and since he is already dead, his wife, Mrs. Gayon, has nothing to do with
the land. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pedro Gayons failure to seek a compromise bars the present action
HELD:
No. Plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our
Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained
between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 and Silvestre Gayon must
necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar
the same.
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FAMILY HOME
96. Florante F. Manacop v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97898; August 11, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with
a bungalow. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC to collect an indebtedness. On July
15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at
public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and
to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory.
They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was no showing that they
had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected.
The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution. Finding that petitioner and his company
had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables, the lower court held that the
case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code
be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectively of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Hence, petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment "by sheer force of exclusion
embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family
Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption
provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and
lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house
and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
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August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided
that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code, Article 162 does not state that provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
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97. Pablito Taneo, Jr., Jose Taneo, Nena T. Catubig and husband, Cilia T. Moring and husband v.
Court of Appeals and Abdon Gilig
G.R. No. 108532; March 9, 1999
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
The two parcels of land owned by Pablo Taneo located at Barrio Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental were levied
to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 590 for recovery of property in favor of private respondent Abdon
Gilig. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent
as the highest bidder. After Pablo Taneo failed to redeem the said properties, a final deed of conveyance
was executed on February 9, 1968, in favor of the private respondent. On February 12, 1977, Pablo
Taneo died. And on November 5, 1985, the herein petitioners as legal heirs of Pablo Taneo, filed an
action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land claiming that one parcel of
land had been acquired through free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and the other parcel of
land is a family home, hence, both parcels of land are inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance
for the payment of debt. After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged family home is exempt from execution
HELD:
The applicable law in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family
home is a prerequisite. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24,
1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was registered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that
time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners alleged family home, as constituted by their father, is not exempt as it falls under the exception
of Article 243 (2).
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicially and extrajudicially,
the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the
recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the family
home. The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the
Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code.
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary. Article 153 of the Family Code
provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in
the family residence. However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on
the family home has been clearly laid down by jurisprudence in the sense that while Article 153 of the
Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have
retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Since petitioner's debt was incurred as clearly as November 25,
1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment.
156
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such
constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned. By the very definition of the law that the family home
is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated, it is
understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.
157
98. Jose Modequillo v. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, Francisco Salinas, Floriper Abellan-Sali-nas,
Juanito Culan-Culan and Deputy Sheriff Fernando Plata
G.R. No. 86355; May 31, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
On March 16, 1976, a vehicular accident between Francisco Salinas and Jose Modequillo occurred. On
Jan. 29, 1988, the CA rendered judgment holding Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable. Since the judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. For
Joses part, the sheriff levied (1) a residential land in Davao Del Sur, and (2) an agricultural land in
Bulacan.
Jose then filed a motion to quash and/or set aside the levy of execution. He asserts that the residential
house and lot in Davao Del Sur was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly
constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Because of
this, Jose argues that it is exempt from execution, attachment or forced sale under art. 152 and 153 of
the Family Code.
The RTC denied the motion. Jose filed for a MR which was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the family home of Jose exempt from execution of the money judgment?
HELD:
No. A family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law.
However, in the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner is deemed constituted as a family
home only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Articles 152 and 153 does not have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Since the debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on January 29, 1988, both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. The
petition is dismissed.
158
99. Perla Patricio v. Marcelino Dario III

G.R. No. 170829; November 20, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two
sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.
Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. The title
to the residential house was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private
respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the RTC.
The trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6;
Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. Private respondent appealed the decision
of partition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition. It held that the family home should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The appellate
court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Patricio, was a
minor beneficiary of the family home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home cannot be partitioned while
a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son. He argues that as long as the minor
is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private
respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino, the
subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, who is a
beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving
heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of
death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent
Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
ISSUE:
May the partition the subject property be allowed even if the minor grandson of the decedent is still
residing therein?
HELD:
NO. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
159
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in
the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
The third requisite is not present. The grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother,
the current head of the family who owns the family home, if he has parents who are capable of supporting
him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed
on the grandparents.
Since the grandson is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father, despite
residing in the family home and his being a descendant of the deceased, the grandson cannot be
considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite.
160
100. Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad V. Eulogio v. Paterno C. Bell, Sr., Rogelia Calingasan-Bell,
Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felecia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and
Paterno Benerano Bell IV
G.R. No. 186322; July 8, 2015
SERENO, CJ:
FACTS:
The respondents Bell siblings lodged a complaint for annulment of a contract of sale in the RTC against
petitioners Enrico and Natividad. The RTC granted respondents prayers finding the sale to be an
equitable mortgage, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12%
interest per annum. The RTC then issued a writ of execution as a result of which respondents property
was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court ordered the lifting of the writ of the
execution on the ground that the property was a family home. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the lifting of the writ of execution invoking Article 160 of the Family Code that the current market value
of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial
area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for 1million.
ISSUE:
May respondents family home be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code?
HELD:
NO. Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution provided the following conditions
obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below
the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Thus, to warrant the execution sale of respondents family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any
of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
In this case, none of those facts was alleged much less proven by petitioners. The sole evidence
presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract
was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and
Spouses Bells executed the Deed of Sale, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property
in dispute. Therefore, by failing to prove that its value had increased beyond the statutory limit,
respondents family home may not be sold on execution.
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LEGITIMATE CHILDREN GENERAL RULE
101. Jinkie Christie A. De Jesus and Jacqueline A. De Jesus minors, represented by their mother,
Carolina A. De Jesus v. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, et al.
G.R. No. 142877; October 2, 2001
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in 1964. Out of their marriage, petitioners Jinkie
(1979) and Jacqueline (1982) were born. In 1991, by virtue of a notarized document, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina. Juan
died intestate in 1992. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a
complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina and deceased Juan Dizon.
The TC dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It
decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as
petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are illegitimate children of deceased Juan Dizon, and thus, entitled to inherit from
him.
HELD:
NO. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates
of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there
is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of
the Family Code the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
162
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners'
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent is irrelevant in this case. This issue, i.e whether petitioners
are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without
an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. It is strongly settled that the paramount declaration
of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
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102. Social Security System v. Rosanna H. Aguas, Janet H. Aguas and Jeylnn H. Aguas
G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas was a member of the Social Security System (SSS). Upon his death, his wife, Rosanna,
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits indicating that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child,
Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. After receiving a sworn letter contesting Rosannas
claim, the SSS suspended the payment of monthly pension and conducted an investigation to verify the
allegations. It was found that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna; Rosanna left the deceased s ix
years before his death and lived with Romeo dela Pea while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn; and
that Pablo was infertile. Hence, the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of their
pensions.
Rosanna and Jeylnn filed a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social
Security Commission. Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the Pablo and Rosanna, joined
them as claimant. The SSC ruled among others that even if Jeylnn was Pablos legitimate child. It
deduced that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded that she was the daughter
of Rosanna and Romeo. As for Janet, the SSC ruled that she was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.
The claimants then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 who rendered a
decision in their favor. In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that
they were the children of the deceased.
ISSUES:
1. Is a child born during the marriage of his/her parents legitimate?
2. Is a child who was not legally adopted a legitimate child of his adopter?
3. Is Rosanna qualified as a primary beneficiary?
HELD:
1. YES. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way
that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during
his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested. The
presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed
by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
2. NO. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her
date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof
of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception
or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. It should be noted that respondents likewise
submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth
164
certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnns because it was not verified in any way by the civil
register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no
confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janets birth on the date stated in the certificate.
A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Here, the witnesses were
unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia
also testified that Janets adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers
to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only legally adopted children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court
cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
3. On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must
prove that she was the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee. The claimant-
spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that
she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she
is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the
civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still
dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is
something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as
one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else
for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of
someone else. It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent spouse as the
legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the member or pensioner. In that case, the Court found it
obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived
with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire
period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits. The obvious conclusion then is that a wife
who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon
the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife
were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on
the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
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RULES ON IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY GROUNDS
103. Gerardo B. Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte

G.R. No. 123450; August 31, 2005
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave
birth to Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived. Gerardo filed
a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine
years before their marriage, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. He
also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa
did not deny marrying Mario and averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with
Mario at all.
The TC ruled for the validity of Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario and annulled her subsequent marriage
to Gerardo for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the above decision INSOFAR ONLY as it granted to
Gerardo the visitation rights between 8am to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. She further maintained that Jose
Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the
rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname. The MR was denied.
The CA affirmed the TCs decision. However, upon reconsideration, the CA reversed its earlier ruling and
held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
It held that Ma. Theresa was married to Mario and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with
Gerardo since the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. Hence, Jose Gerardo under the
law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario.
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1. Does Gerardo have a right to impugn Jose Gerardos legitimacy?
2. Whether or not Gerardo is entitled to visitation rights
HELD:
1. No. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his
wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
To overthrow the presumption of legitimacy on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to
father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
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The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility
of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that
no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not
such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Moreover, the fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born
to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be
at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or
birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is
determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
sought to be established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as
it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his
heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
2. No. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company.
There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right
to visit Jose Gerardo.
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104. Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Joanne Rodjin Diaz, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian,
Jinky C. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713; December 17, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted.
This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to
a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal
Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz was conceived.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid
all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing
the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give
support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision, declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate
child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support
pendente lite should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation
informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by
said counsel.
The Court of Appeals remanded to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to
make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of
DNA analysis.
Petitioner assails that the Court of Appeals should grant his legal arguments on presumption of legitimacy
and should have not remanded the case for DNA testing. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the presumption of legitimacy of a child born while a marriage is subsisting conclusive?
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HELD:
NO. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden
of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor
of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption of
legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code] provides:
ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:

1. By the impotence of the husband;
2. By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3. By the serious illness of the husband.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to
the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
169
105. Marissa Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Victoria Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar
G.R. No. 105625; January 24, 1994
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel
died and Vicente followed her in the grave, dying intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. Private respondents Victoria Benitez -Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) a special Proceeding before the RTC
of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
Petitioner opposed alleging that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal
postures.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division
of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Can private respondents question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth?
HELD:
Yes. Private respondents can question or impugn, directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissas birth.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the
case at bench cannot be sustained.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it
was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
170
106. Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos

G.R. No. 197099; September 28, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed
a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the petititoners Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property consisting of one half of the parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan and
belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that
defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as
the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question.
Three defendants disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in
as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridads sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir being the legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondents filiation
was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. The trial court held
that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have brought an
action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Respondent, asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action, thus her civil status may not be
assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit.
Petitioner alleges the lower courts reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is totally
misplaced, it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child, and the
father [or, in proper cases, his heirs] denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that
respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child of Rufino Geronimo at all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Art. 170 and 171 of the Family code is applicable in a the present case where the
issue is whether respondent Karen is the child of the deceased spouses Geronimo
HELD:
NO. Art 170 and 171 of the Family Code is not applicable in the present case.
Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct
and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. However, in the instant case, the filiation of
a child herein respondent is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate
child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is
not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his
Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and
ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible
under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove
171
ones filiation. In the following cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of
secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a
particular couple even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the
proof admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on
record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad.
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which
is a public document.
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107. Narciso Salas v. Annabelle Matusalem

G.R. No. 180284; September 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. Petitioner rented an
apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including
the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer
of petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left
them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
In support of her claim, respondents presented the following testimonial and documentary evidence:
a) Certificate of Live Birth in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed
by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document.
b) Baptismal Certificate also indicating petitioner as the father
c) Handwritten notes and love letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent
inside their rented apartment unit.
d) The testimonies of respondent and Murillo
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling
that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. The CA held
that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate
child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to
petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Was the filiation of Christian Paulo duly established?
HELD:
No. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The totality of respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo
for the following reasons:
a. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or
other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
b. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.
c. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence
to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the hospital where respondent herself was indicated
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as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child
as an act of charity. The handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement
of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic,
they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
d. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her at
the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial to prove filiation of Christian Paulo.
*Petitioner had died on May 6, 2010. The action for support having been filed in the trial court when
petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. The death of the putative
father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.
The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus applies. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
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108. TEOFISTA BABIERA v. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493; June 15, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J:
FACTS:
Presentacion Catotal filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte a petition for the cancellation of the entry of
birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.
Catotal asserted that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Carinosa. Flora Guinto, the natural mother of Teofista Babiera and the housemaid of the late
spouses, caused the registration of the facts of birth of her child, without the consent of the s pouses, by
simulating that the Babiera was the child of said spouses. Teofista argued that Art. 171 of the Family
Code shall be applied thus, Catotal has no legal capacity to impugn the formers legitimacy.
ISSUE:
Whether Catotal has legal capacity
HELD:
YES. A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and
which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance
rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for
the cancellation of the said certificate.
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein
is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is
not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
175
109. Arnel L. Agustin v. Court of Appeals and Minor Martin Jose Prollamante, Represented by
His Mother/Guardian Fe Angela Prollamante
G.R. No. 162571; June 15, 2005
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel
courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe.
Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock.
The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal
and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child. Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of
the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and
resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for
support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner,
Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
HELD:
No. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but
merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying
the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution
and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid
and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration of an
action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz v. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we
said: There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale
for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends
completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given
how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation
is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
176
110. Belen Sagad Angeles v. Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya

G.R. No. 153798; September 2, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles, alleging that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased
and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second
marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent. Petitioner opposed and prayed that she be granted the
letters of administration. Petitioner alleged that although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Moreover, petitioner contended that
respondent has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union.
Respondent alleged that per certification, the appropriate records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of
Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed.
The RTC dismissed respondents petition, but the CA reversed. The CA cited Tison v. Court of Appeals,
as basis, i.e. that since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence", the presumption on
respondents legitimacy stands "unrebutted."
Hence, petitioners instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that CA erred in holding that
respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco and in decreeing respondents appointment as
administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate.
ISSUE:
Is respondent the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD:
No. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164
of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate."
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a
child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of
such child cannot be attacked collaterally. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting
respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful
marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no
presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no
proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage
certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage,
if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing
authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two.
None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that
supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter.
Moreover, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie
evidentiary value of filiation.
177
111. Artemio G. Ilano v. The Court of Appeals and Merceditas (sic) S. Ilano, represented by her
Mother, Leoncia De los Santos
G.R. No. 104376; February 23, 1994
NOCON, J.:
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MAY FILE ACTION FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND SUPPORT
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business
of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted
her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they
eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962.
Private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium.
Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and
Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was
confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully
satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following: 1) petitioner and Leoncia
were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas' conception; 2) testimony of Melencio that he
frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed
with her; 3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner; 4) petitioner denied his
signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and 5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that
support was given by petitioner to Merceditas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
May an adulterous child file an action for recognition?
HELD:
Yes. It is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and
support. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived,
she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other
than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to
support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these
rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be
visited upon them. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of
paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring
not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the
rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because
under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. Private respondent's evidence
to establish her filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed
aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials
of petitioner.
178
112. Rosendo Herrera v. Rosendo Alba, minor, represented by his mother Armi A. Alba
G.R. No. 148220; June 15, 2005
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, respondent, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against Rosendo Herrera, petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The trial
court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi
Alba.
Petitioner filed an MR. He asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled
to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional. The trial court denied the MR.
ISSUE:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation
HELD:
Yes, DNA analysis may now be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.
In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, the Court stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating
acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need
not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides,
which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: 1. how the samples were
collected, 2. how they were handled, 3. the possibility of contamination of the samples, 4. the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, 5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and 6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
179
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the
DNA test result must state that there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father.
However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100%) does not immediately
result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically
become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child
(Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo
Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological
father? Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-
incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting
of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
180
ACTIONS TO CLAIM LEGITIMATE / ILLEGITIMATE STATUS
113. People of the Philippines v. Nixon Malapo

G.R. No. 123115; August 25, 1998
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the RTC finding the accused-appellant Nixon Malapo
guilty of rape.
Mrs. No, Amalias guardian, told the court that, sometime during the first week of September 1991, she
found Amalia, the victim, inside their house crying. Mrs. No tried to find out why Amalia was crying, but
she would not say anything. On May 18, 1992, when she was about to give birth to her baby, Amalia
finally told Mrs. Nos cousin, Bernardita Marquinez, that she had been raped by accused-appellant.
In his defense, the accused averred that he was elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime
and Amalias baby was a full term baby, it is unlikely, nay unbelievable, that same baby was the fruit of
the alleged rape perpetrated sometime in September 1991, because from September 15, 1991 to May
18, 1992 when the baby was born, is a period of only eight (8) months and three (3) days, contrary to the
Certificate (Exh. 1 and 1-A) that the baby was full term when delivered.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of rape. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the accused-appellant overcome the presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her
having been raped?
HELD:
No, the accused-appellant failed to overcome the presumption pursuant to the pertinent provision of the
Family Code.
Article 166 of the Family Code provides: Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following
grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; . . .
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant
is alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in
September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the
presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991
only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of
impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia
had sexual intercourse with another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these.
The Court added that since Amalias baby was begotten as a result of the rape, accused-appellant is
liable for support. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, in addition to the indemnification of the
181
offended party, persons guilty of rape must in every case support the offspring. Although said article also
provides for the acknowledgment of the child unless the offender is married, this Court has already ruled
that:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and
likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no
further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married
which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the
offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the
offspring, if there be any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family
Code, the amount and terms thereof are to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and
hearing.
The Court affirmed the accused-appellants conviction. He was ordered to pay support, the amount of
which is to be determined by the trial court, and to acknowledge the filiation of complainants offspring.
182
114. Casimiro Mendoza v. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuacao

G.R. No. 86302; September 24, 1991
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Teopista filed a complaint for compulsory recognition in RTC Cebu City. She alleged therein that (1) she
was born to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and Casimiro, married at that time to Emiliana Barrentos;
and (2) Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the
rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa
Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house.
When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so
he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her
husband. Casimiro later allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave
her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro opened a joint savings account
with her as a co-depositor. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiros adopted daughter, took the
passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita.
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because
Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would give him
money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him jackfruits. When his grandfather learned
that he was living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the formers land. Two
other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives
of Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with
him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as
a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving
birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopistas baptism. Casimiro
also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiros
brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiros boat and
whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00
to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to
Teopista.
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist
Teopistas claim. Vicente, who professed to be Casimiros only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring,
declared that Teopistas father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned
her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half-
sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiros lot. This witness stressed that
when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiros niece, who also
affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiros boat. She flatly declared she had never
met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a mechanic.
183
ISSUE:
Was Teopista in continuous possession of the status of a child of Casimiro by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family?
HELD:
No. To establish the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, it is necessary
to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. Continuous does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another
method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her
father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses,
such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida, the hiring of Teopistas husband to drive the
passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista
and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito to build a house on his land after he found that the latter
was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with
Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro. In so
holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent
to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the
facilities of modern medicine and technology.
184
115. William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia v. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao
G.R. No. 138961; March 7, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Corazon Garcia was legally married to, but living separately from Ramon Yulo. She cohabited with
William Liyao from 1965 to 1975 with her two children by Ramon. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth
to William Liyao, Jr. (Billy).
When William died, Billy, represented by his mother, brought an action for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of William. Witnesses supported the allegations that William visited and stayed with
Corazon at the hospital, paid all the expenses, asked his secretary to secure a copy of Billys birth
certificate, consistently supported Billy financially, brought him to his office and acknowledged him during
his last birthday. For their part, respondents witnesses claimed to have seen Ramon with Corazon during
the time she was cohabiting with William.
The RTC declared Billy as Williams illegitimate son and ordered Williams wife and children to recognize
and acknowledge him as a compulsory heir entitled to all successional rights as such. The CA reversed
such decision, holding that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a child may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed
father.
HELD:
NO. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should
be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to
his memory.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy
of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
185
116. Verceles v. Maria Clarissa Posada, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor Verna Aiza,
Constantino, and Francisca Posada
G.R. No. 159785; April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Clarissa Posada, and her parents Constantino and Francisca filed a case for damages
coupled with support pendent lite before the RTC against petitioner Teofisto Verceles, for begetting a
love child- Verna Aiza, with their daughter Clarissa.
Respondent Clarissa alleged that when she worked as a casual employee for respondent who was then
the municipal mayor, the latter seduced her to which she succumbed. Clarissa gave as evidence the love
letters petitioner gave her, and testified that he gave her money during her pregnancy.
Petitioner contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere
expressions of concern and advice. Furthermore, he argues that the issue on filiation should have been
resolved in a separate action.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Can paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages with support pendent lite?
HELD:
Yes. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In determining the nature of an action,
it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are
controlling.
A perusal of the Complaint shows that although its caption states "Damages coupled with Support
Pendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support
for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. SC have held that the due recognition
of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
186
ADOPTION
117. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311; March 31, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
The petition was granted by the trial court, and ordered that pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration, praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. The trial court denied the same,
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition. He contends that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there
is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of
the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit
and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig
or Garcia families.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?
HELD:
Yes. The illegitimate child, upon adoption of the father, may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name.
Adoption is the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
187
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, as aptly
stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name
will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18,
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother
in the future.
188
118. In Re: Petition for the Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93; May 21, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Monina Lim is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim).
They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P.
Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner.
Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. Unfortunately, her husband died.
Petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552
(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The trial court
dismissed the petitions because petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
Petitioner argued that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age.
Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age
of majority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt
HELD:
NO. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
1. He must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
2. He must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption;
3. He must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
4. He has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
5. The adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
189
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority
or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child,
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely
just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
1. Sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter;
2. Deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
3. Give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to:
i. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
ii. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as:
1. To bear the surname of the father and the mother;
2. To receive support from their parents; and
3. To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
190
SUPPORT
119. Ma. Belen B. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041; June 30, 2006
CHICO- NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration
of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support against respondents, Francisco Delgado and
Francisco Delgado.
Petitioner and Federico were allegedly civilly married. However, the marriage was annulled due to lack
of the required consent by the law. Within 7 months after their annulment, petitioner gave birth to twins.
She stated that the twins were raised together with her 2nd husband becaus e respondent abandoned
them. However the twins are legitimate daughters of the respondent because they were born within 7
months from the annulment of their marriage. She also averred that demands were made against
Federico and his father, Francisco
However, Francisco stated that the birth certificates of the twins do not bear the signature of Federico,
hence, the legitimacy of the twins must first be established. And even if the legitimacy of the twins is
established, Federico, the supposed father, should be the one liable.
RTC ordered respondents to give monthly support which is affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
May a grandfather be liable to give support?
HELD:
YES. A grandfather may be held liable if the person principally liable does not have the means to do so.
Obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the
more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of the
twins, they should be primarily charged to support their children. In view however of their incapacities,
the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Respondent Francisco,
as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default
of their parents. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support
his granddaughters, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support
pendente lite.
191
120. Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva v. Rafael Villanueva

G.R. No. L-29959; December 3, 1929
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an action against her husband Rafael to
obtain separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor children Guillermo
and Sergio and attorneys fees and other costs.
The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, upon hearing the cause of the trial (in light of a doctrine
laid down in a former case)a decision that the plaintiff now appeals.
Aurelia sought separate maintenance on the ground of cruelty and infidelity. Proof showed that the
defendant is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4 different women and another one
before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the plaintiff, pushing the latter to finally leave
their home and establish a separate abode with the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from respondent-appellee after she
left their domicile
HELD:
Yes. While the Court ruled in Arroyo vs Vasquez de Arroyo that unproved or insufficient charges of cruelty
are not enough to establish a case for separate maintenance, it maintained that in cases where spouses
are found guilty of conjugal infidelity, innocent parties are entitled to right to relief.
In the case at bar, the Court holds that the law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in
marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common
habitation with him unbearable. The respondent, being a recurrent, gravely offends the sanctity of the
marriage tie and should thus, not be relieved from his duty to support his wife as provided by law.
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs right to custody of her children will no longer be disturbed and that she
is entitled to P500 monthly allowance, attorneys fees and other expenses.
192
121. Maria Quintana v. Gelasio Lerma

G.R. No. L-7426; February 5, 1913
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
This is an action by a wife (petitioner) against her husband (respondent) for support. It is based upon a
written contract. The evidence shows that they both got married in 1901.
In 1905, they entered into a written agreement of separation whereby each renounced certain rights as
against the other and divided the conjugal property between them. The respondent also obliged himself
to pay the petitioner P20 every month for her support and maintenance.
In the original answer, the respondent set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to
support by committing adultery. This allegation was stricken out by the lower court upon the ground that
adultery is not recognized as a ground upon which the obligation to support ceases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not adultery is a defense in an action for support filed by a wife against her husband?
HELD:
YES, the Court is of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by the respondent in his
answer to petitioners complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the
action for support.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, with instructions to
permit the interposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and
answer as may be necessary to carry this judgment into effect.
193
122. Luis Francisco v. Francisco Zandueta

G.R. No. 43794; August 9, 1935
GODDARD, J.:
FACTS:
Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, two years old, through his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco on the allegation that the therein
plaintiff is the acknowledged son of petitioner and as such is entitled to support. Petitioner denied the
allegation.
Notwithstanding this denial of paternity the respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order in
favour of Eugenio granting him support pendent lite, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of that order
on the ground that it was issued in excess of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of the
plaintiff was placed in issue by the pleadings; that the plaintiff has no right to monthly support from the
defendant until his status as a child of the latter is finally determined in his favor and that as the guardian
ad litem of the plaintiff admits his lack of means to defray even the ordinary expenses of existence it
would be impossible for the defendant to recover whatever amount he may have advanced to plaintiff as
support pendente lite, should it finally be decided that he is not the father of the plaintiff.
The respondent judge, denied that motion, hence this special proceeding.
ISSUE:
Is a child entitled to support while his civil status is in litigation?
HELD:
NO. Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and
wife, (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the
legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of
natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation
which is the basis of the action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
In the present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who
alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as
such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted
upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person
who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a
fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by
a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to
support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is
a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which
that person is declared to be in possession of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such tine when
nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any
other amount as monthly support, pendente lite.
194
123. Jose V. Ramirez and Eloisa De Marcaida v. J. R. Redfern

G.R. No. 26062; December 31, 1926
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to England and left them there. He returned
to the Philippines the following year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern
provided his wife with funds for her expenses. When the wife returned to Manila. Mr. Redfern is now
furnishing his wife P300 per month for the support of herself and one child. The two grown sons are
employed and are earning their own living. In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her
sister, Mrs. Ramirez, the sum of 600. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional 185 from her sister in
England. Mrs. Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922. Eight hundred seventy-five pesos
were advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez to Mrs. Redfern after the latter had returned to Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether J.R. Redfern is liable to Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez for the sum of money sought to be recovered
HELD:
The case falls squarely within the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1894 of the Civil Code. This
article provides: "When, without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give support to a
dependent, a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the former, unless
it appears that he gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to recover
under the provisions of article 1894 of the Civil Code, it, must be alleged and proved, first, that support
has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the
support was supplied by a stranger; and third, that the support was given without the knowledge of the
person charged with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the
expectation of recovering it. Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez did not supply Mrs. Redfern with money out of charity.
The third requisite of the law is also taken out of consideration since Mr. Redfern is the first to
acknowledge that the money was handed to his wife by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez without his knowledge.
The point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had
ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. Hence, J.R.
Redfern is not liable.
195
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
124. Leouel Santos, Sr., v. Court of Appeals, and Spouses Leopoldo and Ofelia bedia
G.R. No. 113054; March 16, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession, were married
in 1986. They had one child Leouel Santos, Jr.
From Leouel Jr.s release from the hospital, his parents both agreed to place him in the custody of his
maternal grandparents the Respondents Spouses Bedia. Meanwhile, Julia went to the US, but still sent
financial support for his son.
When Leouel, Jr. was already 3 years old, Leouel, Sr. visited him in the Bedia household. During that
visit, the Spouses Bedia contended that Leouel, Sr. abducted the boy and brought him to Negros Oriental.
The Spouses Bedia then filed a Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos, Jr.
They alleged that Leouel, Sr. did not spend a single centavo for his son; that he cannot take care of him
because he is always assigned to different places; and that his act of abducting his child speaks of his
unsuitability as a parent.
The court decided in favor of the Spouses Bedia. Leouel, Sr. appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
RTCs decision. Since his MR was denied, he brought this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the now 6-year old Leouel Santos, Jr.?
HELD:
Leouel Santos, Sr. The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when
the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental
authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by Spouses Bedia as grandparents should not be seen
as incompatible with Leouel Sr.s right to custody over the child as a father.
196
125. Teresita Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye

G.R. No. 116773; January 16, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. They had two daughters, Leslie Eslao
and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondents house.
When Reynaldo Eslao died, petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her. Respondent implored
petitioner to entrust the custody of Angelica to her as she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mothers house
in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Petitioner remarried and later migrated to San Francisco, California, USA to join her new husband. When
petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States,
respondent resisted explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Petitioner then filed the present action to recover the custody of her daughter from her mother-in-law.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioner abandon Angelica as to be a sufficient ground of awarding the custody of the child to
the grandmother?
HELD:
NO. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except
in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows
a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home
or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
197
126. Bonifacia P. Vancil v. Helen G. Belmes

G.R. No. 132223; June 19, 2001
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Bonifacia is the mother of Reeder, a US Navy serviceman who died in his country. Reeder had
two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, respondent Helen. Petitioner
commenced a guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent.
At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. As the natural mother of
the minors, respondent submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asserting that
she is in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors in Zamboanga del
Sur where they are permanently residing. She alleged that petitioner was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A.
being a naturalized American citizen. The trial court ordered petitioner to perform her duty as such
guardian. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the order ruling that parents are ipso facto guardian
of their minor children without need of a court appointment. While the case is pending, Valerie reached
the age of majority, thus, she is no longer a proper subject of the guardianship proceedings.
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
HELD:
The mother should be the guardian of Vincent. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Indeed,
being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to
his custody. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability pursuant to Article 214 of the
Family Code.
In this case, petitioner has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent. Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and
a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations
required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else
who may not also qualify as a guardian. Therefore, as between the two claiming for guardianship of the
minor Vincent, the mother should be preferred.
198
127. Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug v. Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding
G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and private respondent Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common
law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his
employer to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind Therese. After
a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently,
they had a 2nd child, Reginald Vince. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second
chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma
Layug. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
TC denied the petition for HC; it suspended Teresitas parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority but with rights of visitation. On appeal, the CA reversed the TCs decision giving
the custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
ISSUE:
Whether the custody over the 2 children was properly awarded to their mother Teresita
HELD:
NO, the CA erred in blindly applying the age proviso of Art. 363 of the Civil Code and of Art. 213 of the
Family Code.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court
is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody
to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Here, at the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice
of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that
Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found suffering from emotional shock caused by
her mothers infidelity.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit, well in fact he has been
trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position
to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship
had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
199
128. Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Maria Lourdes
Santos, and Sixto Salumbides
G.R. No. L-68374; June 18, 1985
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Horacio Luna is married to Liberty Hizon-Luna (the Lunas). Respondent Maria Lourdes Santos
is married to Sixto Salumbides (the Salumbides), and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also
known as Shirley Luna Salumbides.
Months after Shirleys birth, her parents gave her to the Lunas who thereafter showered her with love
and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them
Mama and Papa. She calls her natural parents Mommy and Daddy. In 1980, the Lunas decided to
take Shirley abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. However, when
the Lunas asked for the Salumbides written consent to the childs application for a U.S. visa, the
Salumbides refused to give it. As a result, the Lunas had to leave without Shirley whom they left with
the Salumbides. Upon their return, they learned that the Salumbides had transferred Shirley to the St.
Scholastica College and refused to return Shirley to them. Neither were they allowed o visit Shirley. The
Lunas filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Salumbides. A decision was rendered declaring the
Lunas entitled to the childs custody and forthwith granted the writ prayed for. On appeal to the CA, the
decision was reversed and set aside and another entered, ordering the Lunas, among other things, to
turn over Shirley to the Salumbides.
After the finality of the decision, the Lunas who filed a motion to set aside the writ of execution on the
ground of supervening events and circumstances. During the hearing on the motion, Shirley manifested
that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and
Papa and forced to stay with the Salumbides.
ISSUE:
May the execution of a final judgment which run contrary to the childs welfare and future be set aside?
HELD:
YES. In child custody cases, the childs welfare and future is paramount and execution of a final judgment
which may run contrary thereto may be set aside.
The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be
taken away from the Lunas and forced to live with the Salumbides, made during the hearings on the
motion and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court, and during the hearing of the case before
this Court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered in Special
Proceeding inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latters welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor
can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this
case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise
an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to
that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will
provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counselling, and moral and material
security. But, what if the threat is for real?
200
Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and
cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist,
Shirley has grown more embittered, cautious and distrusting of her biological parents. To return her to
the custody of the Salumbides to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining
of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not
destroy her future.
Dissenting Opinion (Makasiar, J.):
The right of the parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or by the decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of parental relationship.
Since the rights of parents to the custody of their minor children is both a natural and a legal right, the
law should not disturb the parent-child relationship except for the strongest reasons, and only upon a
clear showing of a parents gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child.
As long as the parents are living and they have not lost their parental authority, patria potestas is limited
to them. Other ascendants have no authority over the children, even if the parents of the latter are minors.
A nine-year old girl, although already at the age of discernment, is not capable of knowing or defining
varied feelings like love, anger or cruelty when such a girl has been exposed to two contrasting conditions,
the first for more than eight years and the second, for barely four months. The child grew up amidst
affluent surroundingsthe grandparents being well-off. The lolo and lola, as most lolos and lolas are,
doted over Shirley. In fact, she attended Maryknoll College, a school for the elite, and rode in a chauffeur-
driven car. She grew up amidst a luxurious atmosphere. Perhaps, in their own way of loving their
granddaughter, they showered her with all material needs and pampered her. Thus, the child had not
been made to experience disappointments, much less hardships. Life with her lolo and lola meant having
what she wanted. In the process, Shirley moved about in a limited world, created by her Mama (Lola)
and Papa (Lolo)a world felt and seen through rose-colored lenses. The child addresses her natural
parents as Daddy and Mommy.
Four months is too insufficient a time for a nine-year old girl to comprehend and accept a home
atmosphere strikingly distinct from one where she had lived for more than eight years. Four months is a
very short time for the child to be able to understand, to absorb and to appreciate two vastly different
home conditions. Whatever set of values the second home has to offer, the same cannot settle in a child
for only four months exposure. To Shirley, therefore, any attempted discipline imposed by her natural
parents means cruelty and lack of affection for her. Where before she could choose the food she wanted,
now she has to take whatever food is available within the limited means of her parents. She cannot realize
that in a middle-class family, the choice of food is restricted by the amount appropriated therefore. The
gauge is what and how much food could benefit all the members of the household and not just one
member. Choice for particular needs becomes secondary to what the family budget can afford for the
entire family. This explains why Shirley had a dislike for the conditions existing in respondents house
which did not cater to her tastes.
Evidently, the present petition for custody of petitioners runs counter to the parental preference rule.
Under the so-called parental preference rule, a natural parent, father or mother, as the case may be, who
is of good character and a proper person to have the custody of the child and is reasonably able to
provide for such child, ordinarily is entitled to the custody as against all persons. Accordingly, such
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parents are entitled to the custody of their children as against foster or prospective adoptive parents; and
such entitlement applies also as against other relatives of the child, including grandparents, or as against
an agency or institution.
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129. Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V

G.R. No. 154994; June 28, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D.
Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor
Rafaello, whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his when she decided
to abandon Crisanto. Santos testified that he was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on
Joycelyn and found that she is having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano. The same was
corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not care
for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping
the child.
Judge Ricafort awarded custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto. However, the Judge reversed her
decision and awarded custody to the mother. The CA affirmed the prior Order awarding provisional
custody to the father. Hence, these Petitions.
Joycelyn contends that in awardng the custody of the child to the father, the CA violated Art. 213 of the
Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Crisanto, on the other hand, cites immorality
due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged lesbian relations of Joycelyn is a compelling reason to deprive her of the
custody of her child
HELD:
No. Lesbian relations of Joycelyn is not a compelling reason to deprive her of the custody of her child.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody
of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling
reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the
mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care.
It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence
of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact
has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
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130. Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel, Francisca P. Miguel and Loreta P. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343; October 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel
and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court ordering the respondents to produce before this Court
the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son, out of wedlock, with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the
Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the
petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where
he finished the nursery course.
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the
petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they
be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they
will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not
bring him back as promised by them.
He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to
bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological
father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Can the natural father of an illegitimate child have the custody and parental care of his own child in the
absence of the mother who is away?
HELD:
No, the natural father cannot have custody and parental care of the illegitimate child while the mother is
away.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.
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Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally classified into two
groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous
or illicit. A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of
the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. On the other hand, a spurious
child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the
father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by
the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children
applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code.[ Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.[20]
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of
him.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground
for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the
mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father
assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority
over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She
cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it except in the cases
authorized by law.
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental authority,
shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past,
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
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131. St. Marys Academy v. William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos, Guada Daniel, James
Daniel II, James Daniel, Sr., and Vivencio Villanueva
G.R. No. 143363; February 6, 2002
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet
of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly,
on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned
by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly,
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court
of Dipolog City.
RTC ordered St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City to pay plaintiffs William damages, and defendants
James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel were also ordered to pay by virtue of their subsidiary liability.
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the CA, who promulgated a decision
reducing the actual damages but otherwise affirming the decision a
ISSUES:
Should St. Marys Academy be held principally liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos due to the
Special Parental Authority exercised by the former over the latter?
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals erred when it held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers;
or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other
affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
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However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause
of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva,
who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II,
a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
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CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
132. Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the
RTC. In her petition, she alleged that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her
early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries.
At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and
she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.
The RTC granted respondents petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
respondents ,medical condition does not make her a male.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH,
and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
NO, the trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with
the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes;
as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male
nor truly female. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
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either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and sc ientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth
certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals
with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
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133. Rommel jacinto dantes silverio v. Republic of the philippines

G.R. No. 174689; October 22, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the RTC of Manila. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."
The trial court granted the petition solely for the purpose of making petitioners birth records compatible
with his present sex. The Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. The CA granted the petition. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
ISSUE:
Should the petition be granted?
HELD:
No. A persons first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
a. Procedural aspect
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. Under the law, jurisdiction over applications for change
of first name is now primarily lodged with the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Petitioner intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications
in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not
within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
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proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
b. Substantive aspect
NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS T O SEX ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts. These acts, events
and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED
ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences:
First, the petition was petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women,certain felonies under the RPC and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the ROC, among others. These laws underscore the public policy
in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
Lastly, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment.
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SURNAME
134. Emelita Basilio Gan v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207147; September 14, 2016
REYES, J:
FACTS:
Emelita Basilio Gan, born out of wedlock to Pia Gan and Consolacion Basilio, filed a Petition for correction
of name with the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The Emelita sought to change the full name indicated
in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed that she had been
using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from elementary until college, employment
records, marriage contract, and other government records.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition filed sought not merely a correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of
name
HELD:
YES. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist
before a person may be authorized to change his name. The reason cited by Emelita in support of her
petition for change of name, i.e., that she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her
records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition.
Emelita merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the
time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a
natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth, either of her
parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant
to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was
acknowledged by her father.
However, Emelita failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly acknowledged
by his father. Emelitas evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her mother, school
records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records.
Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not
insist on using her father's surname.
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135. Grace M. Grande v. Patricio T. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248; February 18, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. O ut
of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio. On the Other hand, the CA,
maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the
father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it
is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children
of his surname without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon
his recognition of their filiation as provided in Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255
HELD:
No. Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken
to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondents
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest.
213
136. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and Spouses Van Munson and Regina Munson
G.R. No. 117209; February 9, 1996
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson and Regina, filed a petition to adopt
the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same petition, they prayed for the change his first
name to Aaron Joseph, the name with which he was baptized and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents. Hence this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law
allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to c onform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted.
Respondents argue that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change
of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
ISSUE:
Did the court a quo err in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of
the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption?
HELD:
YES. The court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name
of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption.
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the
adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The
214
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder
of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between
these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common
question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder.
Hence, the SC ruled that the legally adopted child of private respondents shall be officially known as
Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.
215
137. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966; March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition
for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
ISSUE:
Should the petition be granted?
HELD:
No. the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. Applying these laws, an
illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting
his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. Accordingly, the registration in the
civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given
or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the
cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least,
and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
216
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
217
138. Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676; September 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to
male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is
a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan
presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University
of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically
is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether a person suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia may change gender classification as
appearing in the birth certificate.
HELD:
Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Supreme
Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahans body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
In so ruling the Court do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deal with what nature has handed out. In other words, the Court respect respondents congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, the Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.
218
139. Rommel Jacinto Dates Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 174689; October 22, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as
a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
The trial court granted his petition stating that such decision would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. Also, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition. The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.
The CA favored the Republic ruling that the RTC decision lacked legal basis.
ISSUE:
Can a persons first name and sex, appearing in his birth certificate, be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment?
HELD:
NO. A persons first name and sex cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
As to Change of First Name

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). Under the
law, the petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
219
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
In the case at bar, RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person c an legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In
this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
As to Change of Sex
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: Acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The acts, events or
factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
Lastly, a persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special
law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause. Under
the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error, is immutable.
The petition was denied.
220
140. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong

G.R. No. 97906; May 21, 1992
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong adopted Maximo Alcala, Jr. and Margaret Alacala, the
legitimate children of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Alcala. Upon reaching the age of 22,
Maximo Wong filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. He averred that his use
of surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being
ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that
his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision granting the petition. The Solicitor General contends that for
Maximo to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the
latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition. He further
posits that the reversion of Maximo to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code,
which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with
his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his
adoptive parents.
ISSUE:
Is embarrassment and isolation from relatives and friends, desire to erase any implication of alien
nationality, and the hampering of ones business and social life valid grounds for the grant of
change of name?
HELD:
Yes. A man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which
he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, of in speaking of or dealing with him. Names
are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of
persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held
that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others; (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can
be without a name; (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings; (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa; and
(5) It is imprescriptible.
221
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
provide his best interest. In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. In the absence
of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a
proper and reasonable cause for change of name. Justice dictates that a person should be
allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice
or injury to the interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown in the
record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other
persons would result in the change of Maximos name.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d)
Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause
is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory
to the court and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for
change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request,
but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that
the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings.
We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be using a
name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person
may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other
surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention [?] of the requisite judicial sanction.
What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
222

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DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: FAMILY CODE 4 S (AY 2017-2018)

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER (ART. 7)

1. Rodolfo G. Navarro v. Judge Hernando C. Dumagtoy

VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE

2. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica B. Kho

3. Engrace Nial v. Norma Bayadog

4. Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado v. Luis G. Anson

RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

5. Republic of the Philippines v. Jose A. Dayot

FOREIGN MARRIAGE DIVORCE (ART. 26(2))

6. Grace J. Garcia, a.k.a. Grace J. Garcia-Recio v. Rederick A. Recio

7. Republic of the Philippines v. Cipriano Orbecido III

8. Alice Reyes Van Dorn v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr.

9. Republic of the Philippines v. Crasus L. Iyoy

10. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay

11. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

BIGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE (ART. 34 (4))

12. Leonila Santiago v. People of the Philippines

13. James Walter P. Capili v. People of the Philippines

14. Veronico Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

15. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano

Therefore, the complaint for bigamy filed should not be dismissed.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH (ART. 41)

16. Republic v. Tampus

17. Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Sareogon

VOID SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

18. Roberto Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera

19. Renato A. Castillo v. Lea P. De Leon-Castillo

20. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano

21. Norberto A. Vitangcol v. People of the Philippines

22. Susan Nicdao Cario v. Susan Yee Cario

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (ART. 36)

24. Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos

25. Mirasol Castillo v. Republic of the Philippines and Felipe Impas

True, the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's

26. Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi

27. Noel Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond

28. Juanita Carating-Siayngco v. Manuel Siayngco

RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

29. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te

30. Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn** B. Matudan

Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan

VOID FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (ART. 38)

31. Oscar P. Mallion v. Editha Alcantara

32. Republic of the Philippines v. Merlinda Olaybar

GROUNDS MUST EXIST AT TIME OF MARRIAGE (ART. 45)

34. Fernando Aquino v. Conchita Delizo

Hence, it is sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by petitioner.

35. Aurora Anaya v. Fernando Palaroan

DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION

36. Sarao v. Guevara

ROLE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

37. Tuason v. Court of Appeals

EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

38. Espiritu v. CA and Masauding

39. Susan Lim-Lua v. Danilo Y. Lua

40. Ma. Belen B. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals

41. Roberto Domingo v. Court of Appeals

RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

GROUNDS OF LEGAL SEPARATION (ART. 55)