636 Striving for Superiority
those directly involved in the policy issue under
consideration.
Stuart Astill
See also Granovetter, Mark; Networks, Power in; Small
Worlds
Further Readings
Granovetter, M. S. (1973) . The strength of weak ties.
American journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360-1380.
STRIVING FOR SUPERIORITY
Striving for superiority [Streben nach Uberlegen-
heit] was a concept introduced by Alfred Adler
(1870-1937), an early psychoanalyst who broke
with Freud in 1911 over the relative importance of
sexual and aggression motives. Over time Adler's
views gradually evolved and broadened. Aggres-
sive drives were elaborated into a will to power by
Adler, who sees them often being an overcompen-
sation for feelings of weakness or inferiority. For
example, later-born children may strive to urpa
their more powerful older siblings. Such triving
are usually neurotic if they reflect poor adjustment
to one's social surroundings.
Later, Adler broadened his ba ic motivational
concept still further, into the striving for superior-
ity. Adler saw this striving not as a variable of
personality but rather as an innate, univer al, and
unending human drive found in every individual
person, a psychological parallel to phy ical growth.
It originated at the beginning of life and increa ed
over the course of evolution to improve adaptation
to the external world. As Adler put it 'The urge
from below to above never ceases" (1973 p. 103) .
The striving for superiority is abstract but
becomes concretized in a variety of activitie : for
example, self-pre er:vation, having and raising chil-
dren, adju ting to other people and society and
victoriou elf-as ertion. With the concept of striv-
ina for uperioriry Adler thu combined interper-
onal power' ith power a capacity or ability (e .g.,
"pow r of concentration").
Adler r alized that people follow different path
to up riority; oft n there i no' ay to knO\ which
path is correct. Some paths to perfection are mis-
guided and will fail because they do not fit reality.
In this category Adler included many forms of neu-
rotic behavior, such as the need to dominate over
others, the need to avoid failure, and excessive
dependency. In the long run, Adler believed, natural
selection would render these conceptions extinct, as
well as people and groups who hold them.
In later years, Adler suggested that the striving
for superiority is directed by social interest
[Gemeinschaftsgefiihl], which involves a person's
cooperation and identification with the group.
Social interest does not stand in antagonism to the
striving for superiority, but rather expands it still
further, as people strive to help society as a whole
become perfect, an ideal community.
Perhaps Adler's description of striving for supe-
riority as the great upward drive seemed out of
date even when he wrote it in the early 1930s-
following the carnage of World War I and during
the Great Depression, just as Hitler and the Nazis
were coming to power. It recalls the optimistic
Darwinist beliefs of the pre-World War I years, as
for example in Shaw's 1903 play, Man and Super-
man. Perhap this is why psychologists rarely use
the term striving for superiority nowadays.
David G. Winter
ee also Adler, lfred ierz che, Friedrich; Power To
and Pm er Over Will to Power
Further Reading
Adler . ( 19 3 ). On the origin of the triving for
uperiority and of ocial intere t. In H. L. Ansbacher
r R. R. n ba her (Ed .) Superiority and social
interest: A collection of later writings. r ew York:
iking. (Original work published 1933 )
An bacher, H. L, & An bacher, R.R. (1956). The
individual psychology of Alfred Adler: A systematic
presentation in selections from his writings.
ew York: Ba ic Book .
STRUCTURAL POWER
Structural power i particularly hard to define
given that the notion of structure ha o many

dfferent
1
uses across the social sciences. This entry
.Jl look at different understandings of structural
wiwer in particular those found in functionalism
po ' . . '
structuralism, Marxist structuralism, and struc-
tural realism. However, as a general definition we
can say that structural power p.laces primary
emphasis on the role of structures m determining
outcomes as oppose.cl to the role. of agents. Hence
the workings of society or a social process can be
xplained in structural terms while the actions of
:gents can be explained as the outcomes of struc-
tures. Power therefore resides w ithin structures,
while the powers of agents are either determined,
constituted, or severely limited by the structures
that they find themselves inhabiting (although the
final section will look at structural power in an
enabling sense) .
Structural-Functionalism
The approach of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons,
Robert Merton, and others might be termed struc-
tural-functionalism . Emphasis is placed on the social
system, which is seen as made up of interdependent
parts. Particularly important for this approach is the
idea of social integration. Durkheim's approach
looks at social order through a combination of
structural and normative factors. Social structures
reproduce the system and maintain social cohesion.
On the normative side, Durkheim stresses the
importance of shared values, which are institution-
alized. Durkheim considers social integration
through his notion of solidarity. Less developed
societies depend on mechanical solidarity, which is
maintained by collective beliefs, rules, customs,
and obligations. Organic solidarity is based on
more specialized and individualized social rela-
tions. Interestingly, Durkheim claims that the
more individualized a society is, the stronger the
social bonds may become.
Critics of the structural-functional approach
focus on its oversocialized conception of human
agency, claiming that it leaves little room for active
consent. When problems of social cohesion emerge,
these are dealt with through system adaptation.
Parsons' system theory, in particular, sees society
as a self-regulating, self-adjusting system, and his
work places emphasis on stability rather than
change and on social norms rather than deviancy.
Mechanisms of social control are exercised against
Structnral Power 637
tendencies to violate role expectations. Power, in
these accounts, is something that is more or less
taken for granted. Issues of power and domina~on
are transformed into issues about social cohes10n
and the maintenance of equilibrium. At its worst,
these approaches place emphasis on stability and
order to the point where inequalities in power,
status, and wealth can be justified so long as they
contribute to the reproduction of the social syste~.
Critics of this approach will also argue t~at it
emphasizes structure and system to the pomt of
denying human agency.
Structural Realism
Systems theory and the so-called behavioralist
revolution in American political science have had
a major impact on realist approaches to interna-
tional relations (IR ). Structural realism, an account
of power found in IR, more often goes by the name
of neorealism and is particularly associated with
the work of Kenneth Waltz, notably in his Theory
of International Politics. It is distinguished from
classical realism by its focus on the system or struc-
ture of international relations as opposed to the
units, namely states, groups, and individuals . For
Waltz, the international system is an entity distinct
from the units that make it up. He criticizes reduc-
tionist accounts that look at the capabilities of the
units rather than the system as a whole. This is
clearly a criticism of the state-, individual-, or
group-based approach of classical realism. Struc-
ture, for Waltz, is based on differently juxtaposed
units that interact and thus produce different out-
comes. Because of the lack of an overarching
authority, Waltz defines the ordering principle of
the international system as anarchy (rather than
hierarchy) . But if realists believe that the interna-
tional system is anarchical, can it also be a struc-
ture? Waltz's solution is to compare the anarchy of
the international system to that of the market. He
argues that political systems at the international
level are analogous to econ omic markets in the
sense that they are individualist, spontaneous, a nd
unintended. Both markets and international po liti-
cal systems form and maintain themselves on the
basis of their agents acting in a self-interested m an-
ner. Structural power thus refers to the w ay the
system reacts upon the units, forcing them to
behave in a particular way. The assumption behind
638 Structural Power
this approach is that states (units) are individual,
rational actors that carefully calculate their deci-
sions and react to the pressure of the system in a
predictable way. Within the rationalist approaches
to IR (neorealism and neoliberalism), rational
choice theory and discussion of relative and abso-
lute gains have been particularly prominent.
However, this raises the question of whether the
focus of these approaches is really on structure or
on the rationality of actors. If we follow the game
theory approach, then structural power should
really be called something like the structure of
individual decision making.
The specific theoretical problem for IR is
whether the self-interested behavior of states is due
to the compelling structural power of an anarchic
system, or, as critics have argued, is Waltz's notion
of anarchy as a self-help system in fact based on a
prior assumption of rational, self-interested states?
Indeed, this raises another crucial question for
theorists of international relations: what kind of
structure is involved? The realists and neorealists
are adamant that the structure of the international
system is made up of nation-states. This makes
it almost impossible to develop a meaningful
dialogue with those supporting a notion of global-
ization, given that the two positions have very dif-
ferent conceptions of international structure and
its most relevant agents.
Structuralism
A very different notion of structure emerges from
linguistics and the work of Ferdinand de Saussure,
who places emphasis on the role of the system in
determining the meaning of words . Saussure
argues for a semiology that focuses on the underly-
ing system of language (langue) rather than its
expression (parole) . This in turn influences anthro-
pology, especially the analysis of kinship and ym-
bolism offered by Claude Levi-Strauss. Structural
anthropology is concerned with how meaning is
produced within a culture or a community; the
cultural system is seen as resembling a language.
Anthropologists have looked at how meaning is
contained in rites and rituals; structuralism's con-
cern is with the set of logical principles underlying
the sociocultural system. The view is also influen-
tial in psychology and psychoanalysis through the
work of Jacques Lacan, who moves away from
focus on the individual to look at symbolic d
. f f orer.
These vanous orms o structuralism challe
empiricist approaches by proposing the ide ng~
deep structure, irreducible to its effects, and \~t
directly observable.
Marxist Structuralism
It is perhaps the importing of structuralism int
Marxism by Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzao
that has been most influential in the study of polit~
ical processes. The Marxist a pp roach is clearly
already structural in various ways, while the notion
of power is omnipresent, if undertheorized. Marx-
ism's main focus is on how the distribution of pow-
ers and resources to different classes is based on
their relation to the means of production and the
ongoing social practices related to production and
capital accumulation. This has led Jeffrey Isaac to
comment that "Marx's theory of capitalist produc-
tion is a theory of power; and his theory of power
is a theory of capitalist production" (1987, p. 87).
Drawing a sharp distinction between the human-
ist work of the early Marx and the "scientific"
work of the mature Marx, Althusser, in his For
Marx, rejects any focus on the human subject in
favor of a theory of history based on the develop-
ment of social structures and the mode of produc-
tion. These structures, however, cannot be reduced
to the mode of production (economic reduction-
ism), but have a relative autonomy. This means
that society is a complex combination of different
levels not an ' original, simple unity," as suggested
by Hegel or reductionist Marxism, but rather an
eternal structurally complex unity. Althusser
imports the term overdetermination from psycho-
analy is to describe how the social body is created
by the variou levels and instances that form and
animate it. Overdetermination gets at the complex
causal powers that structures and social practices
posse s.
Poulantzas, drawing on the work of Antonio
Gramsci, emphasizes the importance of hegemony
as the means by which power is socially con-
structed. But he does this by emphasizing the struc-
tural aspect of hegemony; that is, the state's role in
securing the cohesion of society in the face of the
power politics of competing groups and factions .
Indeed, Poulantzas, in Political Power and
Social Classes, uses the term power bloc to describe

d. rorY unity of politically dominant
coorra fie ctions under the protection of the
rJie nd ra
dasses a c fraction" (~ 62). . . would see an overemphasis on the role of structure
ege111ot11 is 0 ffenng a particular solution to
IJ pouIantzas
. of hoW to com b.me t he analysis of
die que 5t1 0 with that of state power. This is a
~Jt,ss Powerssue that has trou ble d many Marxists
ent 1 .
prorl110 . question 1s whether the role of the state
. l 1be understoO d in
l he cruc1a . re lation
. toth e process
cafl sirn/uition or has some sort of autonomy. An
of pro ntalist approach to the state sees it simply
. srrurne
10 . srrurnent of ruling. cl ass power. This is best
as afl U1ed in the Communist Manifesto's claim
e,xpress he executive o f t h e mo d ern state 1s
. but a com-
that. t . 1
for managing t 1e common a ffairs . o f the
rr11hrtee
le bourgeoisie. Or is . the state, as Poulantzas
wao ests a complex condensation of class rela-
suog
. ns:> Both' views raise. questions. a bout whether
no
the state has any power of its own, or whether
rate power is only ever expressed through its
~aents. Poulantzas is himself torn between a struc-
r~ral-functionalist view of the state as securing the
cohesion of the social formation, and a relational
view of the state as the effect of class struggle.
Critics of Marxist strucnualism will again point
ro the reifying effect of emphasizing the power of
structures over agents, although Poulantzas, in his
later State Power Socialism, moves toward a more
relational view of power and the state, particularly
in his view that the state is a strategic terrain for
rhe exercise of power. However, in Althusser s
work, subjects are understood as located within
social practices and interpellated (constituted as
subjects) by the ideologies these practices secrete.
This tends to undermine the cau al power of
agents, something most notoriously expressed in
Althusser's claim that agents are mere bearers of
structures, while history, we are told, is a process
without a subject. In attacking historicism,
Althusser, as well as non-Marxist structuralists,
favors a synchronic (structural) explanation over a
diachronic (historical) one. As Isaac argues, struc-
turalists like Althusser and Poulantzas emphasize
the determining influence of the "relational system
of material places" at the expense of the efficacy of
the agents who exercise these structurally given
powers (Isaac, 1987, p. 86). One might look to
Annales historians like Fernand Braudel to restore
a diachronic view, although he too clearly favors
deep structures over surface events.
Structural Power 639
If we take all these views together, a common
t heme seems to be t he td ea t hat structural power is
t e power that structures have over agents. Critics
at the expense of agency and human conduct.
Enabling Aspects of Structural Power
Seen through the Althusserian, Durkheimian, or
neorealist lens, negative views appear of agency as
a secondary effect of structural processes. But
structural power can also be thought of as the
power agents have by virtue of their positions
within structures. In this positive sense, structure
comes to be seen, not as a reification or as some-
thing that simply exercises power over us, but as
something enabling, which allows us within cer-
tain limits to act in certain ways. Adopting this
view of structure as enabling means chat power
should be understood in the sense of pouvoir in
French or potere in Latin; that is, power to rather
than power over. Power then comes to mean the
capacity human beings have by virtue of the struc-
tures they inhabit.
One way of seeing power in relation to
structures is as transformative power. Anthony
Giddens's notion of structuration emphasizes this
by insisting on the mutual constitution and
codetermination of structure and agency. Roy
Bhaskar's realist approach also emphasizes that
structures are borh the necessary condition and the
reproduced outcome of human activity. In these
senses, human agency has the power to transform
structures though only within a given structural
context; this context gives agents powers, but also
places liabilities and limitations on them. The clas-
sic statement of this position is found in Marx's
claim rhar "r 1en make their own history, but not
of their own free will; not under circumstances
they themselves have chosen but under the given
and inherited circumstances with which they are
directly confronted" (Marx, 1973, p. 146). Social
change therefore has to be seen as the product of
borh structure and agency. Agents have the poten-
tial ro change structures, but they do so using the
powers such structures have conferred upon them
and the possibilities that such structural conditions
allow.
The realist view, in linking power to structure,
also argues that powers exist that may or may not
640 Structural Suggestion
be exercised depending on the context or circum-
stances. Power may be latent in the structural
context or emergent in new and perhaps unex-
pected ways. An emergent phenomenon is one that
owes its existence to a prior or lower structural
level, but that develops its own irreducible proper-
ties and powers. These realist approaches to
power are structural in the sense that they focus on
the sociostructural preconditions for the operation
of power. However, it is important to be clear in
such discussions whether we are talking of the
power that structure have over agents, the power
that agents have to change structures, or the pow-
ers that agents have by virtue of their relation to
structures.
Jonathan Joseph
See also Althusser, Louis; Determinism; Marx, Karl;
Marxist Accounts of Power; Miliband-Poulantzas
Debate; Realist Accounts of Power
Further Readings
Ashley, R. (1984). The poverty of neoreali m.
International Organization, 38(2), 225-286.
Isaac, J. (1987). Power and Marxist theory: A realist
view. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pres .
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1973). Manifesto of the
Communist Party. Moscow: Progre Publishers.
(Original work publishe.d 1848)
Merton, R. (1957). Social theory and social structure:
New York: Free Press.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The
social construction of power polirics. international
Organization, 46(2), 391-425.
STRUCTURAL SUGGESTION
The agency-srructure problem concerns the rela-
tionship between agents and environmental influ-
ences. For some writers, power i exclu ively a
property of agents; for others it is exclu ively a
property of structures. Ir is clear that agent act,
and that agents such as organizations or collec-
tives act through the agency of people. However,
with organizations it can also be clear that the
nature of the actions that people take on behalf of
the organization might be severely constrained,
and completely enabled by the operating rules
interests, and resources of that . organizatio~
rather than by what the person believes might b
the best actions. In other words, the perso ,e
environment fully determines how that persn s
will act on behalf of the organization. Some wr~n lt-
ers see all actions carried out by an agent as full
constrained or enabled by the structure in whic~
the agent is located. Structural determinism is the
idea that while we might see agency through the
actions of people, those actions are fully deter-
mined by factors external to the individual. Oth-
ers dispute the idea that the actions of people are
so fully determined. They argue that, while people
decide their interests and the interests of those on
whose part they might act based upon informa-
tion received from the world around them, that
same information will not lead every person to
act in the same way. Structuralists reply that
while there might be some noise in the system
such that each person does not behave identically
in the same environment, behavior is nonetheless
largely determined by structure.
For example, we might define two elements
entering into the explanation of any given out-
come: first, the structure composed of institutions,
property relations, resources, and technology at
any given rime t, R/ and second, a list of every
per on and their preferences at that time t, Pr We
could combine R, and P, to explain R, _ 1 or we
could combine R, and P, to explain P, 1 In other
word , we can u e the structure and preferences at
one time to explain rrucrure ar the next point in
time, or we could use them to explain the prefer-
ence of everyone at the next point in rime.
Hm ever, if preferences can be fully explained by
tructure then they can be left of the explanation.
Keith Dowding introduced the idea of structural
suggestion in order to overcome the fully deter-
minist nature of trucrural determination and leave
a role for individual agency while recognizing
that trucrure largely determine preference .
Dowding argued that trucrures suggest actions ro
people. ometimes those structures suggest obvi-
ous cour e of acrion that few people would not
follow, though uch "obvious suggestions., are
weaker than determination.
However, often structure leave open courses
of action -their "sugge tion " are not so strong
and here we see human action as random and