Law on Natural

Resources &
Environmental
Law

CASE DIGESTS
COMPILATION
FIRST BATCH

Submitted by:
FIDER, Cyrus Dominic B.
LL.B. Section II-C

Submitted to:
Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada
Professor
University of the Cordilleras
College of Law
 Page |1

Table of Contents
FILINVEST Credit Corporation vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court ........................ 2
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al. .................................. 5
Magbanua, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court................................................... 7
Oposa, et al. v. Hon. Factoran, Jr., and Hon. Rosario ....................................................... 9
Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court ............................................................... 13
Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ............................................... 15
Hernandez vs. National Power Corporation ..................................................................... 17
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission ................................................................................ 20
 Page |2

CASE NO. 1
FILINVEST Credit Corporation vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-65935. September 30, 1988

166 SCRA 155 165
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries
Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit, filed for damages against petitioner.
Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor
center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978 with a promissory note
executed to cover the amount of P62,592.00 payable monthly in the amount of
P2,608.00 for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of each month starting
May 1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980. On the same date, however, a
chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor of the Motor Center, Inc. The
Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to the Filinvest Credit
Corporation with the conformity of the plaintiff.
Nestor Sunga claimed that on October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized
by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation upon
orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los Santos, without any receipt,
who claimed that he was delinquent in the payments of his vehicle. The
plaintiff reported the loss to the PC. After proper verification from the office
of the Filinvest, the said vehicle was recovered from the Crisologo Compound
which was later released by Rosario Fronda Assistant Manager of the Filinvest,
and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of the compound. The police blotter of the
Integrated National Police of Dagupan City shows that Nestor Sunga and
T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the 153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the
Dagupan police and one Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the
minibus was confiscated because the balance was already past due. After
verification that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia admitted it was
their fault. The motor vehicle was returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.
The Court rendered its decision ordering defendant (herein petitioner):
(1) to pay the plaintiff the following damages:
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00
(2) and to pay the costs.
Dissatisfied with the decision, the defendant appealed but the
respondent court affirmed the decision in toto except with regard to the moral
damages which, under the circumstances of the accounting error incurred by
Filinvest, is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
 Page |3

Hence, the petitioner came filed this instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in granting the award for damages.
Whether or not the Court acted contrary to law and jurisprudence, making of
its judgment a nullity.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and
in granting litigation expenses. In those respects, the petition is granted and to
that extent the questioned decision is modified.
There is no gainsaying that the plaintiff-appellee (respondent Sunga did
not appeal from the decision of the court a quo which awarded him the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. "Well settled is the rule in this
jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has
not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below." Verily the
respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule when it increased the
award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, notwithstanding the
fact that the private respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the trial
court, an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." Be that as it may
and in amplification of this generalization, we set the criterion that "in the case
of moral damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded should
not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court xxx.
Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of
the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels xxx.
There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and
owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is entitled to
moral damages due to the unwarranted seizure of the minibus Mazda, allegedly
because he was delinquent in the payment of its monthly amortizations, which
as stated above, turned out to be incorrect. Such intent tainted private
respondent Sunga's reputation in the business community, thus causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Considering, however, that respondent
Sunga was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three days, that is, from
October 21, 1978 to October 23, 1978, possession of which was restored to
him soon after the accounting errors were ironed out, we find that the award of
moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be
emphasized that "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
 Page |4

expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable
action.
It behooves us therefore to reiterate the caveat to lower courts "to guard
against the award of exorbitant damages that are way out of proportion to the
environmental circumstances of a case and which time and again, this Court
has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraints and
measured objectivity.
The statement: FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED
JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE
PRAYED FOR should not be treated as a substitute for appeal as required by
the rules.
The petition is partially GRANTED.
 Page |5

CASE NO. 2
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 110120. March 16, 1994

231 SCRA 292 309
Ponente: Romero, J.
FACTS:
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the
operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents
and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
After the investigation conducted, the LLDA Legal and Technical
personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan (CGC) was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), as required under P.D. No. 1586, and clearance from
LLDA, as required under R.A. No. 4850 and issued a Cease and Desist Order
(CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority,
their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
The CGC filed with the RTC Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of the CDO wih prayer for the issuance of a writ of injuction. The
RTC Caloocan City issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. LLDA filed a motion to
dismiss asserting that the CDO is reviewable by the CA and not by the RTC.
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the Writ
of Preliminary Injuction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting
for and on its behalf, from enforcing the CDO to CGC from dumping garbage
during the pendency of the case. On. November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a
petition for certiorari prohibition and injuction with prayer for restraining order
with the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the order by the RTC denying its
motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case and the preliminary injuction issued
in the said case was set aside. It held that LLDA has no power and authority to
issue a CDO under its enabling law. Hence, LLDA filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer that the TRO be issued until after the
determination of the case, which was eventually granted.
LLDA now assails the ruling of the CA, contending that, as an
administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by the R.A. No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, P.D. No. 813 and
E.O. No. 927, series of 1983, it invested with the power and authority to issue a
CDO.
 Page |6

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not LLDA have the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by CGC
(2) Whether or not LLDA can issue Cease and Desist Order.
RULING:
(1) Yes. LLDA has authority. It must be recognized that the LLDA, as a
special administrative agency, is specifically mandated under R.A. No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provines of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, presenvation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such broad
grant and power of authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from
the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

(2) Yes. The issuance of CDO by the LLDA is a proper exercise of its
police power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
While it is a fundamental rule that administrative agency has also such
power as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In
the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority to issue a CDO is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a toothless paper agency. However,
writ of mandamus and injuction are beyond the powers of LLDA to
issue.
 Page |7

CASE NO. 3
Magbanua, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court

Nos. L-66870-72. June 29, 1985;

137 SCRA 328 - 333
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
The six plaintiffs (herein petitioners) filed a petition against the
respondents all surnamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the
defendants, and that the latter diverted the flow of water from their farm lots
which caused the drying up of their landholdings and asked to vacate their
areas for they could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They
prayed that they be declared leasehold tenants and that defendants be ordered
to pay damages.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered
the defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The
defendants appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting
the award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees to be awarded
to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not
agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former believe that as
shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in
peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenants of defendants are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages.
RULING:
The Court cited the case of Buenaventura Garcia vs. Eduardo Jalandoni,
Salud Garcia and Chester Garcia wherein, thru Justice Porfirio V. Sison, the
Court stated:
The law forbids the use of tenants like balls on a pool table, whacked and
volleyed and pocketed at the whim and caprice of the player, or their positions
placed on the auction block like slaves to be sold to the highest bidder. Such a
calamitous situation erodes wholehearted dedication to the soil; it is destructive
of the system itself as such an attitude takes away the freedom the emancipated
tenants won under the aegis of the New Republic.
Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (petitioners) are entitled to a
measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of
moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code which
stipulates that Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. It appears that petitioners were denied
irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their
 Page |8

landholdings. The defendant violated the plaintiffs right and caused prejudice
to the latter by the unjust diversion of water.
 Page |9

CASE NO. 4
Oposa, et al. v. Hon. Factoran, Jr., and Hon. Rosario

G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The principal plaintiffs (now the principal petitioners) are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners. Because of the number of the complainants, a class suit was
instituted. The minors asserted that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." In a move to stop the environmental distortion and
disturbance of the natures balance which have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, they pray that (1) a judgment be rendered cancelling
all timber-license agreements in the country, (2) cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements, and (3) be granted other reliefs equitable and just.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge ordered dismissal of the complaint,
claiming that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question. The respondent Judge further ruled that the granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
The respondents asserted that the petitioners should lobby in Congress
for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time - usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised
nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
 P a g e | 10

have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have a legal standing to file a class suit.
(2) Whether the cancellation of TLAs violates the Constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue:
YES. The Supreme Court found no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
Although the plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Second Issue:
NO. The non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
 P a g e | 11

political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different

category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come -
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
All licenses may be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause;
it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation
or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually
been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its
very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right
 P a g e | 12

of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare.
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
The petition is impressed with merit and is hereby GRANTED.
 P a g e | 13

CASE NO. 5
Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

No. L-74816. March 7, 1987

148 SCRA 605 - 618
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed on December 16, 1980, an action for
abatement of a public nuisance with damages against defendant (private
respondent herein). Respondent contended that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to hear the instant case and for lack of cause of action. On June 30,
1982, the court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and against
defendant, declaring the operation of the cement hatching plant of the
defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its permanent closure; and
ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., Ernesto LL.
Rodriguez III, and SACHA del Rosario damages. The trial court upon motion
of plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in
the motion that the continued operation of the cement batching plant of the
defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health
and property." On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a petition for relief which was
however denied by the lower court. On July 29, 1982, defendant filed a petition
for injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court which found the petition
unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
Appellate Court, defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
which denied its petition for lack of merit.The petition for injunction having
been denied by both the IAC and this Court, defendant pursued the remedy of
appeal in respondent IAC. On March 21, 1986, respondent court promulgated
its decision, setting aside the decision appealed from and remanding it to the
court of origin for further proceedings and judgment. Hence this petition to
review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation
of defendant's (Daytona Construction) cement batching plant because it posed
"a great menace to the neighborhood both in point of health and property.
RULING:
YES. The trial court thus stated:
From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the
plaintiffs, there is hardly any question that the cement dust
coming from the batching plant of the defendant corporation is
injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the
area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated
by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be
causing them serious discomfort and untold miseries. Its
 P a g e | 14

operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and

causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement
justified. (Decision, p. 5; p. 90, Rollo)
With reference to defendant's allegation that it thought that the period
within which to answer (after its motion to dismiss had been denied) had been
suspended by its having filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court,
same is without merit. The circumstances of the case point to a deliberate
desire to delay: the corporation, governed as it is by knowledgeable business
executives, should have taken steps to prevent its being declared in default. The
corporation waited six (6) months before verifying the status of the case: in the
meantime it had been declared in default, a judgment by default had been
rendered against it, execution was already pending before it woke up to file the
case at hand.
The assailed decision and resolution in this case are hereby SET ASIDE,
and a new judgment is hereby rendered REINSTATING the decision of the
trial court with the modification that all awards for nominal damages are hereby
eliminated.
 P a g e | 15

CASE NO. 6
Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 94759. January 21, 1991

193 SCRA 147 - 152
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
Technology Developers, Inc. (TDI) a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting
mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring
before the office of the mayor its building permit, mayor's permit, and Region
III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
TDI undertook to comply with the request to produce the required documents.
It sought to secure the Region III-Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a
Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued by the
National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management
Bureau). Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure a mayors permit but were not entertained.
Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the stoppage of plants
operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.Left with no
recourse, TDI then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan
RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his
closure order and allow TDI to resume its normal business operations until the
case has been adjudicated on the merits. Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor
presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the manufacturing process
and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may
contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As
such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage
of TDI
RULING:
 P a g e | 16

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ
of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed
to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of
his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community
from the emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted
by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner
was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation
was made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes
emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper
air pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.
Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati
on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the
then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the
permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort
to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the
pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community.
The petition is DENIED with cost against petitioner.
 P a g e | 17

CASE NO. 7
Hernandez vs. National Power Corporation

G.R. No. 145328. March 23, 2006

485 SCRA 166 - 185
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:

NAPOCOR began the construction of steel poles or towers in

connection with its Power Transmission Project. Petitioners, in search of the
adverse effects, got hold of published articles and studies linking the incidence
of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses
range from cancer to leukemia. Petitioners aired this growing concern to the
NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them. NAPOCOR
received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who in his
Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with
which Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned
project. Negotiations being unsuccessful, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. The lower court
then issued an order temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No.
1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary
Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of,
and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR
stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing
and installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners
homes and from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication

The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial courts order hence,
this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the steel
poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No.
1818.
 P a g e | 18

RULING:

YES. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued prohibiting judges from
issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part,
the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure
project." Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued
different circulars to implement this particular law.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving
the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary

injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right
to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to conduct

prior consultation with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark
violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no
project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners

constitutionally protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR
had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior
consultation with the affected communities are veritable questions of law that
invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a
preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from the
protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained,

the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the
judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that

the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the
petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Moreover, the Local Government Code requires conference with
 P a g e | 19

the affected communities of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably,

made a shortcut to this requirement.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do

not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to
establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
What Presidential Decree aims to avert is the untimely frustration of
government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the
detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government
projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation. P.D. No.
1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the
fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of the community guaranteed
by the fundamental law of the land.
 P a g e | 20

CASE NO. 8
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. L72119. May 29, 1987

Ponente: Cortez, J.

FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles
who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal to access government records
to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees

RULING:
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular
public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not
being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or,
if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ."
(87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right,
every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review
by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times
 P a g e | 21

accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective

positions.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not,
civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when,
as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service
eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations
under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Mandamus, therefore lies