POLICE POWER

(1)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22008 November 3, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO POMAR, defendant-appellant.

Araneta and Zaragoza for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act
No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

It appears from the record that on the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of
Manila presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of
section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint
alleged:

That on or about the 27th day of August, 1923, and sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la
Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a
corporation duly authorized to transact business in said city, and having, during the year 1923, in
his employ and service as cigar-maker in said factory, a woman by the name of Macaria Fajardo,
whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by reason of her
pregnancy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said
woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as her
regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and
confinement which took place on the 12th day of August, 1923, despite and over the demands
made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do so.

To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an
offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial all of
the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon
which the complaint was based were illegal, unconstitutional and void.

Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant, the Honorable
C. A. Imperial, judge, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint, and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of said Act, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error: That the
court erred in overruling the demurrer; in convicting him of the crime charged in the information; and in
not declaring section 13 of Act No. 3071, unconstitutional:

Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is as follows:

Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be
pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,
under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months
counted from the day of her discharge.
Section 15 of the same Act is as follows:

Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a
fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred and fifty, or by imprisonment for not
less than ten days nor more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the case of firms or corporations, the presidents, directors or managers thereof or, in their
default, the persons acting in their stead, shall be criminally responsible for each violation of the
provisions of this Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
factory, shop or place of labor of any description, and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The question presented for
decision by the appeal is whether said Act has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the
police power of the state.

In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in fact, within
said power, it becomes necessary first, to determine what that power is, its limits and scope. Literally
hundreds of decisions have been promulgated in which definitions of the police power have been
attempted. An examination of all of said decisions will show that the definitions are generally limited to
particular cases and examples, which are as varied as they are numerous.

By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing civilization, the term police power
has never been, and we do not believe can be, clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. One
hundred years ago, for example, it is doubtful whether the most eminent jurist, or court, or legislature
would have for a moment thought that, by any possibility, a law providing for the destruction of a
building in which alcoholic liquors were sold, was within a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
power. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.) The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with a desire on the part of the masses and of the government to
look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power of
the state many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. In a republican form of
government public sentiment wields a tremendous influence upon what the state may or may not do, for
the protection of the health and public morals of the people. Yet, neither public sentiment, nor a desire to
ameliorate the public morals of the people of the state will justify the promulgation of a law which
contravenes the express provisions of the fundamental law of the people the constitutional of the state.

A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law and the particular facts
to which it is to be applied. The many definitions which have been given by the highest courts may be
examined, however, for the purpose of giving us a compass or guide to assist us in arriving at a correct
conclusion in the particular case before us. Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest expounders of the
common law, defines the police power as the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their
general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. (4 Blackstones Commentaries, 162.)

Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, gives us the following definition: Police
is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its business may
be distributed into eight distinct branches: (1) Police for the prevention of offenses; (2) police for the
prevention of calamities; (3) police for the prevention of endemic diseased; (4) police of charity; (5)
police of interior communications; (6) police of public amusements; (7) police for recent intelligence; (8)
police for registration.

Mr. Justice Cooley, perhaps the greatest expounder of the American Constitution, says: The police
power is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subject of the same. . . . (Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, p. 830.)

In the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53), we find a very comprehensive
definition of the police power of the state. In that case it appears that the colony of Massachusetts in 1647
adopted an Act to preserve the harbor of Boston and to prevent encroachments therein. The defendant
unlawfully erected, built, and established in said harbor, and extended beyond said lines and into and over
the tide water of the Commonwealth a certain superstructure, obstruction and encumbrance. Said Act
provided a penalty for its violation of a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 for every
offense, and for the destruction of said buildings, or structures, or obstructions as a public nuisance. Alger
was arrested and placed on trial for violation of said Act. His defense was that the Act of 1647 was illegal
and void, because if permitted the destruction of private property without compensation. Mr. Justice
Shaw, speaking for the court in that said, said: We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be
injurious to the equal environment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property nor
injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as
that bordering on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the government and held subject to
those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. Mr. Justice Shaw further adds: . . . The power we
allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

This court has, in the case of Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser (24 Phil., 250), in discussing the police
power of the state, had occasion to say: . . . It is a well settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered and civilized society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to
the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
The state, under the police power is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition
of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

Many other definitions have been given not only by the Supreme Court of the United States but by the
Supreme Court of every state of the Union. The foregoing definitions, however, cover the general field of
all of the definitions, found in jurisprudence. From all of the definitions we conclude that it is much easier
to perceive and realize the existence and sources of the police power than to exactly mark its boundaries,
or prescribe limits to its exercise by the legislative department of the government.

The most recent definition which has been called to our attention is that found in the case of
Adkins vs. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia (261 U. S., 525). In that case the controversy
arose in this way: A childrens hospital employed a number of women at various rates of wages, which
were entirely satisfactory to both the hospital and the employees. A hotel company employed a woman as
elevator operator at P35 per month and two meals a day under healthy and satisfactory conditions, and she
did not risk to lose her position as she could not earn so much anywhere else. Her wages were less than
the minimum fixed by a board created under a law for the purpose of fixing a minimum wage for women
and children, with a penalty providing a punishment for a failure or refusal to pay the minimum wage
fixed. The wage paid by the hotel company of P35 per month and two meals a day was less than the
minimum wage fixed by said board. By reason of the order of said board, the hotel company, was about to
discharge her, as it was unwilling to pay her more and could not give her employment at that salary
without risking the penalty of a fine and imprisonment under the law. She brought action to enjoin the
hotel company from discharging her upon the ground that the enforcement of the Minimum Wage Act
would deprive her of her employment and wages without due process of law, and that she could not get as
good a position anywhere else. The constitutionality of the Act was squarely presented to the Supreme
Court of the United States for decision.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that said Act was void on the ground that the right to
contract about ones own affairs was a part of the liberty of the individual under the constitution, and that
while there was no such thing as absolute freedom of contract, and it was necessary subject to a great
variety of restraints, yet none of the exceptional circumstances, which at times justify a limitation upon
ones right to contract for his own services, applied in the particular case.

In the course of the decision in that case (Adkins vs. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261
U. S., 525), Mr. Justice Sutherland, after a statement of the fact and making reference to the particular
law, said:

The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the
 due process clause of the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about ones affairs is a part of
the liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court, and is
no longer open to question. Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making
such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the
best terms they can as the result of private bargaining. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578;
591; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)

xxx xxx xxx

The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the
necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only
whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to
sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as
an alternative for going on at a loss. Within the limits of the minimum sum, he is precluded,
under penalty of fine and imprisonment, from adjusting compensation to the differing merits of
his employees. It compels him to pay at least the sum fixed in any event, because the employee
needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the employee. It (the law) therefore
undertakes to solve but one-half of the problem. The other half is the establishment of a
corresponding standard of efficiency; and this forms no part of the policy of the legislation,
although in practice the former half without the latter must lead to ultimate failure, in accordance
with the inexorable law that no one can continue indefinitely to take out more than he puts in
without ultimately exhausting the supply. The law . . . takes no account of periods of distress and
business depression, or crippling losses, which may leave the employer himself without adequate
means of livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially
indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and
therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody,
belongs to society as a whole.

The failure of this state which, perhaps more than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is
that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no
casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do. The
declared basis, as already pointed out, is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous
circumstances that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her
subsistence, health and morals. . . . The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and
these arise outside of the employment, are the same when there is no employment, and as great in
one occupation as in another. . . . In principle, there can be no difference between the case of
selling labor and the case of selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer to buy
food, he is morally entitled to obtain the worth of his money, but he is not entitle to more. If what
he gets is worth what he pays, he is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs
more; and the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in
any peculiar sense with the question of his customers necessities. Should a statute undertake to
vest in a commission power to determine the quantity of food necessary for individual support,
and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more
than a fixed maximum, it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy of any
argument in support of the validity of such a statute would be quickly exposed. The argument in
support of that now being considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it may not be
so plain. . . .

It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose
end freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of the individual to do as he
pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the common good,
and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor
unalterable, may be made to move, within limits not well defined, with changing needs and
circumstances.

The late Mr. Justice Harlan, in the case of Adair vs. United States (208 U. S., 161, 174), said that the right
of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person
offering to sell. In all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract, which no
government can legally justify in a free land, under a constitution which provides that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law.

Mr. Justice Pitney, in the case of Coppage vs. Kansas (235 U. S., 1, 14), speaking for the Supreme Court
of the United States, said: . . . Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property
partaking of the nature of each is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief
among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchange for
money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a
substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to
the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other
honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money.

The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts. In the case of
Gillespie vs. People (118 Ill., 176, 183-185) it was held that a statute making it unlawful to discharge an
employee because of his connection with any lawful labor organization, and providing a penalty therefor,
is void, since the right to terminate a contract, subject to liability to respond in a civil action for an
unwarranted termination, is within the protection of the state and Federal constitutions which guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The court said in
part: . . . One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can anyone be
compelled to be employed against his will. The Act of 1893, now under consideration, deprives the
employer of the right to terminate his contract with his employee. The right to terminate such a contract is
guaranteed by the organic law of the state. The legislature is forbidden to deprive the employer or
employee of the exercise of that right. The legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of
an innocent act criminal when the public health, safety, comfort or welfare is not interfered with. The
statute in question says that, if a man exercises his constitutional right to terminate a contract with his
employee, he shall, without a hearing, be punished as for the commission of a crime.

Xxx xxx xxx

Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to
contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such contracts, and to refuse to make such
contracts. The legislature cannot prevent persons, who are sui juris, from laboring, or from
making such contracts as they may see fit to make relative to their own lawful labor; nor has it
any power by penal laws to prevent any person, with or without cause, from refusing to employ
another or to terminate a contract with him, subject only to the liability to respond in a civil action
for an unwarranted refusal to do that which has been agreed upon. Hence, we are of the opinion
that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal constitutions, which guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The statute in question is exactly analogous to the Minimum Wage Act referred to above. In section 13
it will be seen that no person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory shop, or place of labor of
any description, can make a contract with a woman without incurring the obligation, whatever the
contract of employment might be, unless he also promise to pay to such woman employed as a laborer,
who may become pregnant, her wages for thirty days before and thirty days after confinement. In other
words, said section creates a term or condition in every contract made by every person, firm, or
corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant, and a
failure to include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law
has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of
any description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such
terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a term in every such contract, without the
consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of
the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to
contract.

It is believed and confidently asserted that no case can be found, in civilized society and well-organized
governments, where individuals have been deprived of their property, under the police power of the state,
without compensation, except in cases where the property in question was used for the purpose of
violating some legally adopted, or constitutes a nuisance. Among such cases may be mentioned:
Apparatus used in counterfeiting the money of the state; firearms illegally possessed; opium possessed in
violation of law; apparatus used for gambling in violation of law; buildings and property used for the
purpose of violating laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors; and all cases in
which the property itself has become a nuisance and dangerous and detrimental to the public health,
morals and general welfare of the state. In all of such cases, and in many more which might be cited, the
destruction of the property is permitted in the exercise of the police power of the state. But it must first be
established that such property was used as the instrument for the violation of a valid existing law.
(Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., [U. S.], 36; Butchers Union, etc.,
Co. vs. Crescent City, etc., Co., 111 U. S., 746 John Stuart Mill On Liberty, 28, 29.)

Without further attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of the police power, it may
safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the
public peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. But the state, when providing by
legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to and
is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to
violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the execution of the powers and
rights guaranteed to the people under their law the constitution. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.)

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the
growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that
power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express
inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that
law.1awphil.net

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the
employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will
hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty
days during which no services were rendered.

It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to
contract about ones affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the due process of law
clause of the constitution. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578, 591; New York Life Ins.
Co. vs. Dodge, 246 U. S., 357, 373, 374; Coppage vs. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1, 10, 14; Adair vs. United
States, 208 U. S., 161; Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S.; 45, 49; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)

The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. (Art.
1255, Civil Code.)

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of
section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they
violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the
United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p. 238.)

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the
defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

(2)

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL

MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-
stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par.
3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion
of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter
to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and
bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of
the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive,
a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining
room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years
old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4
of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after
July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding
the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business
in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether
on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action
and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary
to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in
the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del
Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity
to sue and be sued;
 2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive
of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting
City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections
661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex
B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments
advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations
of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to
the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining
issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda
and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional
grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable
objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor
and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation
of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived
or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety
and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. 7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to
the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication
in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against
the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to
those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to
an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in
the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels
being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled
law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng
case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact
a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been
upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by
the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range
of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-
appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means
of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover,
petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise
within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x
x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently
is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation
of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems
to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than
vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate
of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It
may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with
such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

EMMINENT DOMAIN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12792 February 28, 1961

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Ledesma, Puno, Guytingco, Antonio and Associates for defendant-appellee.

DIZON, J.:

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend
Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.
To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the
San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able to
reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the present expropriation
proceedings.

On May 27, 1957 the trial court, upon application of the Government hereinafter referred to as
appellant issued an order fixing the provisional value of the property in question at P270,000.00 and
authorizing appellant to take immediate possession thereof upon depositing said amount. The deposit
having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order
directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.

On June 8, 1957, as directed by the Rules of Court, the herein appellee, in lieu of an answer, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds:

I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is
not subject to expropriation.

II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail
less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property
dedicated to education.

IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.

V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its project of
constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate
defendant's property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its
property.".

The government filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-37) while
appellee filed a reply thereto (Id., pp. 38-48). On July 29, 1957, without receiving evidence upon the
questions of fact arising from the complaint, the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto filed, the
trial court issued the appealed order dismissing the case.

The appealed order shows that the trial court limited itself to deciding the point of whether or not the
expropriation of the property in question is necessary (Rec. on Ap., p. 50) and, having arrived at the
conclusion that such expropriation was not of extreme necessity, dismissed the proceedings.

It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other
properties, the portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga
street extension, and that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with
Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had authorized the
acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as
evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President of the Philippines, a copy of which was attached to the complaint as Annex "C" and made an
integral part thereof. In denial of these allegations appellee's motion to dismiss alleged that "there is no
necessity for the proposed expropriation". Thus, the question of fact decisive of the whole case arose.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon
payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public
good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether
or not there is a genuine necessity therefor (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957).

Upon the other hand, it does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed
opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on
Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally
took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be
established by means of evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the parties should have been
given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of
direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the
extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Without costs.

(2)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.

Crossfield and O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier and Sycip, Delgado and Delgado, Filemon Sotto, and Ramon
Salinas for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila,
may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?

That question arose in the following manner:

On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance
of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:

That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain
parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and
within the jurisdiction of this court.

The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the
petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese
Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels
be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of
communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,
which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting
places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been
used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said
cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead,
would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some
other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing
monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and
injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which
would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery
or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as
a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the
complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to acquire the parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a
cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and tombstones of great value were
found thereon; that the land had become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and
used for the burial of the dead and that many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it
necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and still offers to grant a right of way for the said
extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of
his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so offered, free of charge, would answer every public
necessity on the part of the plaintiff.

The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the
other defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that presented by
the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.

The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show the
general character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the
expropriation was necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a
street for public purposes.

Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del
Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance
of authorities, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any
finding as to costs.

From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of
appeal.

The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to
expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the
land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to
render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied.
Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may
condemn private property for public use."

The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into
effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said
authority may be exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right
of eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine
Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or
private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise
that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."

Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint
shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be
condemned together with the interest of each defendant separately.

Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question
exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.

Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248
provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said
section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the
plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall
remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the
possession of the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the
possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find
the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the
plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to
proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative
and not a judicial question.

Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and that the courts cannot
intervene except for the purpose of determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal
legislature. Much has been written upon both sides of that question. A careful examination of the
discussions pro and con will disclose the fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular
constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should
grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the
courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.

If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in
this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue
properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in
fact, public. In other words, have no the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions
relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190) for final decision, to ask
whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in a particular case, it should be denied that the
property is not private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or, suppose
the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not public butprivate, or that there exists no public
purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?

The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Can it be possible
that said authority confers the right to determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is
public, and that the people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who
are directly affected, may not question one or the other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfully
contended that the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that
such right exists," means simply that the court shall examine the statutes simply for the purpose of
ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right of eminent domain? Or,
when the case arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall
determine that no right of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court shall also
examine the enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not a law exists
permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?

We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation
is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right
or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second,
the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance
with law.

Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact.
Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon
the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those
questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in this jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute
while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to
pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands,
without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those who happen for the
time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are
called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public necessity?

As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the court to question the
necessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found
to depend upon particular statutory or constitutional provisions.

It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that contention, and section 158 of
volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive that the necessity for taking property under the
right of eminent domain is not a judicial question. But those who cited said section evidently overlooked
the section immediately following (sec. 159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken in
the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken
for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. While many
courts have used sweeping expression in the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of
supervising the power of supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be safely
said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion
delegated by the legislature, by an attempted appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible
necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich City vs.
Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)

Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support of the contention of
the appellant, says:

The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public
use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that
the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of
the representatives of the people.

Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in
making the statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department of the government and that
department decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then
and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning
the necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106
Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section 158 above
quoted, the court said:

But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the
necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to
condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised
and decided in limene.

The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the precise property
which should be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general
authority to take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently
asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable
allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St.
Rep., 402, 407].)

There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision by the municipality that there exist a necessity for
the exercise of that right in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why
the right should be conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the right
to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power
cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case, and
especially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within the territorial authority was granted.

Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right
of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority
is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this
jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the
general authority.

Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a further conclusive
authority upon the question that the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a
legislative and not a judicial question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,

the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially
political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions (the necessity
and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative department is final and
conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it (the necessity and the expediency) . . . . It
 (the legislature) may designate the particular property to be condemned, and its determination in
this respect cannot be reviewed by the courts.

The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the doctrine quoted. While
time has not permitted an examination of all of said citations, many of them have been examined, and it
can be confidently asserted that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity
and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not
judicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case the legislature itself usually, by a special law,
designated the particular case in which the right of eminent domain might be exercised by the particular
municipal corporation or entity within the state. (Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125
[15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs vs. Armstrong, 45 N.Y., 234 [6 Am. Rep., 70];
Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S., 390;
U.S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U.S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668;
Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as
242 U.S.].)

In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power
of eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property.
For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize the taking
of private property against the will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."

In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find the Supreme
Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the
question which we are discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily
determine in the first instance whether the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the
power is a public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to
correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly
appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not
public but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.

Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any rate, the rule is quite
well settled that in the cases under consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a particular
piece or a certain amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo,
etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .

In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A., N. S., 1024]), the
Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent
Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the necessity of public utility of the proposed work or
improvement is a judicial question. In all such cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for
the purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for a particular purpose is a judicial one, upon
which the owner is entitled to be heard." (Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St.
Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power
of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222
Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)

In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the Supreme Court of the
State of Maryland, discussing the question before us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power
(eminent domain) where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist,
in order to accomplish the purpose of the incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the
exercise of the power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise.
Any rule less strict than this, with the large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right to
corporations, would likely lead to oppression and the sacrifice of private right to corporate power."

In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court said: "Its right to condemn
property is not a general power of condemnation, but is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to
private property is shown to exist. Such necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If
the necessary is denied the burden is upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc.
Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ;
Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137 Am. St. Rep. 338].)

It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and
many other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a
constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it
occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a
judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the
operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case
free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless
it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be understood with
this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every purpose
which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so,
irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that
it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great
necessity therefor.

In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely defendant on
the legislative body, without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this
country would be warranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them a power so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty lurked in any general grant of
legislature authority, or ought to be implied from any general expression of the people. The people ought
no to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without very strong and
direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La.
Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann., 182.)

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to own and possess land a
place to live separate and apart from others to retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be
molested by others is one of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written
into the organic law of every civilized nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29,
1916, which provide that "no law shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any
person of his property without due process of law," are but a restatement of the time-honored protection
of the absolute right of the individual to his property. Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to
the law already existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and
adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the private
property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment
of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied
with, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore
its possession to him , as the case may be."

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
(Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate
exercise of government authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may
be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of
the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which
are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only must the
authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly conferred and the use for which it is
taken specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must be
strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited;
Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take property for some public use
unless some public necessity existed therefor. The right to take private property for public use originates
in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch
as the legislature has given it general authority to take private property for public use, that the legislature
has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every case and that the courts are closed to the
owners of the property upon that question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429
of Act No. 2711, that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la
Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time the law was adopted? The
legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended that a
municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the
provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear
proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?

The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use. Suppose the
owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use:
Would the courts not be justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no
public purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If
the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or
not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If
there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand
how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use
exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73
Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise
it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other
entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned
by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is
a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right
to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City
of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)

And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that their
exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7,
and E clearly indicate that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the
proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead.

Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further
contend that the street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants
alleges that said cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila
cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small
portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)

Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other
public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts
which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)

The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The Spanish
Governor-General, in an order creating the same, used the following language:

The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by
the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials,
benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its
internal administration, government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and
traditional practices of those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which
animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of
Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the
cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.

But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public
street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should
be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.

While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a matter of public
knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed
by streets and daily trod by the feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of
the places of the dead should not be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an
eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres and the places of the burial of the dead are
still within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and
sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that
such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.

In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the wounded
sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a
common highway or street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy
of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared
to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for
laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained,
and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery
Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234;
Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)

In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the
record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows
that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.

For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.

TAXATION POWER

(1)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE

INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO
SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-
M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway,
Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter
facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency
(PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations
thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable
value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43,
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of title appearing in
the Commissioners Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated in
plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix A attached to
the Commissioners Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint;

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair
market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with
legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; and

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of commissioners, Atty.
Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. Pablo Domingo."[1]

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously
owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated
area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation
pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents
filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the
Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ
of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation
thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to
direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the
sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to
their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, [2] transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and
another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining
portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos
heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner
filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of
just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation
as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,
submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in
the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC
ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and
declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:

"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution of
the same by either a motion or an independent action having already prescribed in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

"2) denies the plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for
Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding paragraph
hereof; and

"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs
conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153
SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute in relation
with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said realty
to the Bulacan State University pursuant to Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph Ejercito."[3]

Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It
would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or
resolution interrupted the running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and
that if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the
remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of
such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now
reading thusly:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.

The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all cases still pending
with the courts at the time of its effectivity.
In Narzoles vs. NLRC,[4] the Court has said:

The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the
dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the
1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying
the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought
about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the
Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. x x x

The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila Bulletin
on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general
circulation.

In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as
curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which
they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the
statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela
Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are
retroactive. (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)[5]

At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated
property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and
to decide the case on its merits.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which
respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made
within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to
enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial
compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of
petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court.[6]
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five
years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for
payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55
by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period,
since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by
petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of
Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner
when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial
payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the
property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be
finally settled.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.[7] Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are
taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even
that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for
public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a
tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the
property whenever the public interest so requires it.[8]
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning
authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the
defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking.[9]
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use,
and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. [10] These twin
proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State
interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former
and affording protection to the latter.[11] In determining public use, two approaches are utilized -
the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as
society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted.[13]
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University
and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public
purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned
property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969
expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character
upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be
borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power
of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being
the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local
governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national
legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to
be.[16]
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years
after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots
have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings,
they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It
follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations
upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair
market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises'."[18]

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City[19] where the recovery of
possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no
requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of
recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not
only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property
condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. [20] Petitioner has
occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the
judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a
partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-
payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.[21] After condemnation, the paramount title is in
the public under a new and independent title;[22] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than
may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.[23]
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument
could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner
on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in
bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently
with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the
proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their
ownership and possession of the property.[24]
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.[25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court.[26] In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue
in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred.[27]
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of
the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per
annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time.[29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for
the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation
to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.[31]
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision
of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its
execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property,
deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment
of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at
12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due
amount shall have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March
2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the
proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 (2)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 44142 December 24, 1938

VICENTE NOBLE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

City Fiscal Felix for appellant.

Eusebio Orense for appellee.

AVANCEA, C.J.:

Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of Manila on October 18, 1926, the
former constructed on a piece of land of the latter on Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, a school building,
containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the instructions, specifications and conditions imposed by
the city. The contract contains the following two clauses:

Mr. Syquia shall lease the building to the City, after the construction thereof, for a period of not
more than three years, at a monthly rental of P600, payable within the first five days of every
month following.

The City shall buy the building from Mr. Syquia within three years from the occupancy thereof
for P46,600.lawphil.net

On April 13, 1927, this contract was amended in part by the following clauses:

(c) That the contractor shall lease the building to the City of Manila for a period of not more than
three (3) years and for a monthly rent of not more than P30 per room: Provided, however, That
the City of Manila, in turn, shall lease to the contractor for the same period of not more than three
years, the land of the City on which the building is to be constructed, for the nominal price of one
peso a month; and

(d) That the City of Manila shall buy the school building within the said period of three (3) years
according to the price stipulated in the contract: Provided, however, That, if at the end of three
years, the City of Manila, for any reason, shall be unable to pay the stipulated sales price, the
contract of lease of the land and of the building Annex shall be deemed extended for the same
period, and so on successively.

The terms and conditions of the contract of October 18, 1926 are kept alive and confirmed, as
forming a part of this amended contract, except as it is incompatible therewith.

On May 13th following, with the conformity of the city in consideration of the amount of P40,000,
Syquia conveyed to Lutgarda Sandoval all his right, title and interest or participation in the building, as
well as all his right, title or participation in the contract of lease thereof with the city under the stipulated
conditions.

On July 22, 1927, also with the conformity of the city, Lutgarda Sandoval, in consideration of the same
sum of P40,000, transferred the same building to Vicente Noble, with all her right, interest or
participation in the contract of lease thereof with the city under the same stipulated conditions.

Under the terms of these transfers, all the rights of Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were
fully transferred, first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble.

After the construction of the building, the City of Manila occupied it in accordance with the contract,
paying its monthly rental of P600.
On March 21, 1933, the then mayor of the city, Tomas Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in
order to comply with the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the sense that, the
lease be made renewable every year, instead of every three years (Exhibit 1), and for this purpose it was
agreed, by the document Exhibit J, that it be renewable from year to year until the leased building is
purchased in accordance with the original contract of July 22, 1927.

The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent corresponding to the month of February, 1934, and
following, whereupon Vicente Noble, on April 10, 1934, filed the complaint which gave rise to this case,
wherein he asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of P46,600, with legal
interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, and to pay the rentals at the rate of P600 a month,
corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the purchase of the building is effected
and the price thereof paid.

In this answer, the defendant City of Manila after admitting some allegations of the complaint and
denying others, prayed by way of cross-complaint that the lease of the building by the city be rescinded
and set aside and that the same be expropriated.

After the filing of the complaint and the answer, the court, upon petition of the defendant and by virtue of
the cross-complaint, ordered, on June 11, 1934, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the
defendant, the latter take immediate possession of the building for the purpose of the expropriation
thereof, convoking and hearing the parties on the appointment of the commissioners to appraise the
building. A reconsideration of this resolution was asked before it became final, as a result of which, the
court, then presided over by another judge, reconsidered the order of June 11, 1934, setting the same aside
and denying the petition for the appointment of commissioners on appraisal. The reconsideration of this
order was also sought, and it was agreed that the same be resolved when the case is decided on the merits.

On April 25, 1935, the court rendered its decision declaring that the City of Manila has no right to
expropriate the building and that it should comply with the terms of the contract of October 18, 1926, and
to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000, plus the rentals thereof,
corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the final and absolute conveyance of
the building is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid.

According to the original contract of October 18, 1926 under the clauses above-quoted, the city had to
buy the building within three years, or to lease it within the same period of time. The purchase constituted
the principal consideration with respect to Syquia, the lease being merely secondary because it was to
subsist only while the purchase has not been effected, but once this is effected, necessarily it has to cease.
If the purchase is not made after the three years, the lease has to cease just the same, but then Syquia
would be entitled to demand that the city comply with its obligation to buy the building. Consequently, it
may be stated that the purchase of the building by the city was the principal consideration which
prompted its construction.

When that original contract was amended on April 13, 1927, as to the clauses also above-quoted, it was
agreed that the period of the lease, instead of three years, be extended every three years in advance, if the
city, within the first three years, is not in a position to pay the purchase price. The only express
amendment in this second contract is the extension of the period of the lease and the elimination of the
obligation of the city to have to buy the building within the first three years. The original contract is
deemed amended only in these respects, leaving in force its other conditions except as they are
incompatible with the amendment. In this sense we say that the period within which the city should buy
the building, under the old contract, has been amended. But there is no inconsistency between the
extension of the period of the lease and the obligation itself of the city to purchase the building,
contracted by it when the original contract was entered into.

We conclude that, despite the amendment of the original contract, the obligation of the city to purchase
the building was kept alive, although not necessarily within the first three years of its occupancy. The
defendant itself has acknowledged this obligation on March 21, 1933 in Exhibit J, wherein it was stated
that the lease was renewable from year to year until the leased building is purchased pursuant to the
original contract of July 22, 1927.

The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have interpreted it, is in
force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being the case, the city being
bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being
agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies
only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement
as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the owner of the
building and the city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation.
Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation upon
private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human progress and
to the development of the general welfare of the community. In the circumstances of the present case,
however, the expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to be an instrument to
repudiate compliance with obligations legally and validly contracted.

It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against morals, not because it was so when it
was entered into, but because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the lease, if the sale is
now made, the same would be excessively favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial to the defendant. But
if this state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the purchase, this is attributable to the
defendant itself, for it was up to it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract was entered
into. Moreover, the fact that a contract turns out to be more favorable to a party than to another does not
of itself constitute a legal ground to set aside the contract. At any rate, the evidence shows that, at the
price of P46,600 the sale would not give the plaintiff more than 12 per cent profit, more or less, on his
invested capital, which cannot be considered as excessive.

As the defendant has abandoned the lease, we concur in the conclusion of the court that it is bound, under
its contract with the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, to purchase the building for P46,600 and that
it is not entitled to the expropriation proceedings. This conclusion resolves the other errors assigned on
his appeal.

Wherefore, we affirm the appealed judgment, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.