Van Dorn v Romillo and Richard Upton

GR no. L 68470, Oct 8, 1985

Facts: Petitioner, PH citizen and Private Respondent was a US citizen, they were married in HK and resided
in the PH; they begot 2 children and in 1982 they were granted a divorced in Nevada and on the same year
Petitioner got re-married to Theodore van Dorm.

In 1983, Respondent filed a case against Petitioner stating that the business in Manila was a
conjugal property and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and that
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss that case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceeding in Nevada
when respondent acknowledge that they have no community property. Court then denied the MTD on the
ground that the property is located in PH so that the Divorced Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held: The court ruled that the divorced obtained abroad is binding on the private respondent as an
American citizen. That owing to the nationality principle under Art 15, FC of NCC, only PH nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
PH, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Court dismissed the case.

Mabugay-Otamias v RP, rep by Col. Virgilio Domingo as officer of PGMC of the AFP
Gr no. 189516, June 8, 2016

Principles:
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as: a voluntary and intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person,
of a right known... by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.

[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of... which he is the owner or which belongs to him
or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do
not infringe... on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has
a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made... solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large[.]

Facts: Petitioner Edna and Col. Otamias were married and had 5 children and in 2000, spouses were
separated due to infidelity.

Edna filed a complaint-Affidavit against Col Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the
AFP. Petitioner demanded a monthly support of respondents retirement benefits equivalent to 75%. Thus,
respondent executed an affidavit stating that he is support his wife and children up to 50% of his
retirement. Respondent then executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary in favor
of petitioner and their children. Such Deed of Assignment was considered as a compromise agreement
between the parties.

Upon respondents retirement in 2003, the agreement was honored by the AFP until January 2006.
Edna alleged that the AFP suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between petitioner and
respondent. AFP PGMC informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognized
the Deed of Assignment.

Heeding to the advice of the AFP PGMC Edna filed before the RTC an action for support which ruled
in favor of petitioner and ordered an automatic deduction of the amount of support from the monthly
pension of respondent.

AFP PGMC appealed to the CA and CA granted the petition for certiorari and partly nullified the
TCs decision in so far as it directed the automatic deduction of support from the pension benefits of Col.
Otamias.

CA discussed that Sec 31 of PD 1638 ( AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of
1979) provides for the exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from execution and
attachment. In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support thus, it is
not bound by the decision.

Edna argued that the Deed of Assignment executed is valid and legal and claimed that Sec 31 of PD
1638 does not include support, hence, the retirement benefits of respondent can be executed upon

Edna, also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent's petition because it effectively
rendered the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect. On the other hand, the trial court's Decision
implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to support.

Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the agreement and had made payments to
them until it suddenly stopped payment. After Edna, obtained a court order, the AFP PGMC still refused to
honor the Deed of Assignment.
The AFP argues that it was not a party to the case. Thus, it cannot be compelled to release party of the
monthly pension benefits of the respondent in favor of Edna. OSG avers that the AFP PGMC never
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was not a party to the case as the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the AFP PGMC. Likewise, they also argued that Sec 31 of PD 16t38 and Rule 398,
Sec 13(1) of RoC support the CAs decision that Col Otamias pension benefits are exempt from execution.

Edna argues that the AFP should not be allowed to question the legal recourse they took because it was an
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who had advised them to file an action for support.

AFP argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers
to the "time when the retired officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private creditor[,]" who is a
third person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to separate the debts incurred by the retired
officer after his retirement from those which he incurred prior thereto."

Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refer to debts or
loans, not to support

Issue: whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial support of his
legitimate family.

Held: yes, when Col Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment he waived his right to claim that his
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to CoL
Otamias such waived does not infringe on the right of the 3rd person but even protects the right of his
family to receive support.

In addition the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties and its provision
should be respected in the absence of allegations that Col Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing
it.

The Deed of Assignment was not contrary to law and was in accordance with the provison on support in
the FC. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity. Clearly, the AFP PGMC
allows deductions from a retirees pension for as long as the retiree executes a SPA authorizing the AFP
PGMC to deduct a certain amount for the benefit of the retirees beneficiary.

Based on FC, respondent is obliged to give support to his family. However, his retirement was his only
source of income. That judgment in action for support are immediately executory yet under sec 31 of PD
1638 his pension cannot be executed upon. However, considering that respondent waived a portion of his
retirement benefits thru the DoA, resolution on the conflict between civil code on support and Sec 31
should be resolved in a more appropriate case.

The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the action for support was proper,
considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons obliged to give
support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party- in- interest. Nor was the AFP PGMC a necessary party
because complete relief could be obtained even without impleading the AFP PGMC.
Diaz v Encanto
Gr No. 171303. Jan 20, 2016

Principle:
Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are
present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.Article 19 of the Civil Code prescribes a primordial limitation on all rights
by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19
exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. This Court, expounding on the concept
of bad faith under Article 19, held: Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is
presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention
to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

Facts: Plaintiff, Elizabeth Diaz, was a professor in UP, she applied for sabbatical leave with pay for 1 year.
Cecilia Lazaro recommended to Dean Encanto that Diaz leave be granted. After such discussion, Lazaro
recommended that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she may be qualified for. Diaz sent a letter
indicating her unwillingness to teach. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diazs sabbatical leave be denied and to
hold her salary considering that her leave has not yet been approved and she did not teach during said
semester.

Tabujara recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable the CMC ( UP) to hire
a substitute. Diaz, sent a letter requesting to teach for AY 1988-89, with the instruction to Encanto that
until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of
CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent without official leave (AWOL) for
the University. Abad then issued a memorandum to confirm Diaz denial for sabbatical leave due to shortage
of teaching staff. Diaz manage to receive her salary during the first half of the AY and the other half was on
hold due on her failure to comply with her report for duty which she failed to submit.

Diaz filed a complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman against Abad, Tabujara and Encanto for violation of
Sec3(e) of RA 3019, involving the legality of a report for duty form as a prerequisite to the payment of her
salary. That the ombudsman dismissed the complaint.

Diaz then instituted a complaint against Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Metro Manila praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages.
She claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying her
salaries and claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diazs Petition stating: It is noted that the Ombudsman found no
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the private respondents
in denying the application for sabbatical leave of petitioner (Diaz) and in requiring her to fill up a Report for
Duty Form as a requisite for her entitlement to salary.

The RTC, ruled that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege, held that petitioner Diaz was entitled to
such privilege and found that the delay in the resolution of her application was unreasonable and
unconscionable.
On appeal to the CA the respondents mainly argued that the RTC erred in holding them liable for damages
despite the absence of bad faith on their part,

Issue: whether or not respondents U.P., Tabujara and Abad were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying
petitioner Diazs application for sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries.

Held: No. The court ruled that sabbatical leave is not a right and thus, Diaz cannot demand its grant and
that respondent didnt act in Bad faith when they denied petitioners sabbatical leave. It is an elementary
rule that good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith rest upon the party alleging the same.
There is nothing on the records to show that respondent purposely delayed the resolution of her
application to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of 6 months in resolving her
sabbatical leave application has never happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that occurred
was due to the fact that Diazs application didnt follow the usual procedure, hence, the processing of the
application took time.

Furthermore, given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for
any damages sustained by Diaz.

PCIB v Gomez
Gr no. 199601 11-23-2015

Human Relations; Abuse of Rights Principle; Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the abuse
of right principle. The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20
and 21 of the Civil Code. We explained how these two provisions correlate with each other in GF Equity,
Inc. v. Valenzona, 462 SCRA 466

Facts: Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account. The following day, Harrington presented two (2)
genuine bank drafts issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was payable to C.R. Harrington,
while the second draft was payable to Servants C/C.R. Harrington. The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged
that it was a certain Sophia LaO, as a representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for
deposit

Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the
drafts payable to Servants C/C.R. Harrington were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of
Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from the banks foreign exchange
supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the
deposit slip. Thereafter, the deposits were duly entered in Harringtons savings account.

On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of
P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals
was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank
drafts in his name. The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being
a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the job. She further alleged that she
had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.

PCIB deducted the amount of P423.38 from Josephines salary. Josephine wrote the
PCIB to ask why the deduction was made. After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established
operating procedures.

Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and liable to pay
the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter.
PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to Josephines letter, and explained that she was afforded due
process and the deductions made prior to January 15, 1986, were merely a withholding pending the
investigation.

Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and claimed that the PCIB
had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine, The RTC considered the PCIBs manner of deducting from
the salary and allowance of Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good
custom, and public policy. This was borne out by the fact that the PCIB had already deducted from her
salary before Josephine received the memorandum finding her liable for the P50,600.00. In addition, while
there were other individuals involved in this incident, it appeared that it was only Josephine who was made
solely responsible.

PCIB argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it was a labor dispute, which the labor
tribunals are more competent to resolve. It also maintained that there was no factual or legal basis for the
RTC to make it liable for damages and to pay Josephine.

CA affirmed RTC decision. It held that the PCIB was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
because it had filed an answer with counterclaims and even initiated a separate case before a different
branch of the RTC.

Issue: WON CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton disregard of Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.

Held:
In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how her
employer quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary.
Clearly, without having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction of our
civil courts because her right to fair treatment was violated.

In the case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute because it has something to do with
Josephines right under Article 19 of the Civil Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee
relation within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code. Josephines complaint was, therefore,
properly filed with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC.

Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code
and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of
negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made
deductions on Josephines salary even if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harringtons impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding
of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on
Josephines salary, allowances, and bonuses.
Loria v Munoz
Gr no. 187240, 10-05-2014

Unjust Enrichment; There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. There is
unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a
real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another persons expense or damage.

FACTS: Muoz filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with an application for issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against Loria with the Regional Trial Court.

Muoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under the name, Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr.
Construction. Loria visited Muoz in his office and invited Muoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a
subcontract of a P50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan.

Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Construction
and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co would
pay P8,000,000.00 to ensure the projects award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest would
subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muoz. Since Muoz had known Loria for five
years, Muoz accepted Lorias proposal. Muoz requested Allied Bank to release P3,000,000.00 from his
joint account with his business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace delos Santos. Loria then obtained
the money from delos Santos.

Four days later, P1,800,000.00 of the P3,000,000.00 was returned to Muoz. Loria collected Muozs
P800,000.00 balance. After deducting Lorias personal loans from Muoz, Muoz issued a check to Loria
for P481,800.00. Loria acknowledged receiving this amount from Muoz.

The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public
bidding. The project was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation. Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without
subcontracting Muoz. With the project allegedly finished, Muoz demanded Loria to return his
P2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.

Muoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa. This criminal case was dismissed for lack of probable
cause. Muoz then filed the complaint for sum of money. Loria answered Muozs complaint. He admitted
receiving P481,800.00 from Muoz but argued that the complaint did not state a cause of action against
him.

Loria also argued that Muoz was guilty of forum shopping. Muoz first filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against him and Elizaldy Co, which complaint the Municipal Trial Court of Daraga, Albay dismissed. The
subsequently filed complaint for sum of money, allegedly a complaint to recover the civil aspect of the
estafa case, must, therefore, be dismissed as argued by Loria.
Trial court ordered Loria to return the P2,000,000.00 to Muoz. Loria appealed to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Muoz failed to establish his receipt of the P2,000,000.00. Muoz failed to establish that he
obtained P3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace delos Santos. Loria also appealed the award of attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages for having no basis in fact and in law. Court of Appeals
sustained the trial courts factual findings.

ISSUE: whether Loria is liable to Muoz for P2,000,000.00.

HELD: yes. Loria must return Munozs P2,000,000.00 under the principle of unjust enrichment According to
the trial court, Muoz established with preponderant evidence that Loria received P2,000,000.00 from
Muoz for a subcontract of the river-dredging project.

Since no part of the project was subcontracted to Muoz, Loria must return the P2,000,000.00 he received,
or he would be unduly enriching himself at the expense of [Muoz].

Considering that Muoz did not benefit from paying Loria P2,000,000.00, the appellate court ruled that
Loria must return the money to Muoz under the principle of unjust enrichment

Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. There is unjust enrichment when a person
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a
real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another persons expense or damage.

In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a government project to dredge
the and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties agreement, Muoz
was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the P2,000,000.00.

Sps Rosete v Briones

Gr no. 176121, 9-22-2014

Solutio Indebiti; Unjust Enrichment; Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that whoever pays for
another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or
against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor.Sad to say, this Court cannot order a refund of Teodoricos overpayments. First of all, NHA
the recipient of the overpayment cannot be ordered to make a refund, since Teodorico never prayed to
recover from it; in all his submissions from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and all the way up to this Court
he consistently sought reimbursement only from his coawardees, not the NHA. Secondly, the specific
amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record; this being the case, it cannot be
determined how much exactly each of Teodoricos co-awardees owes him. Thirdly, this Court is not a trier
of facts; it cannot go out of its way to determine and analyze from the record what should be returned to
Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the matter. Suffice it to state that petitioners are indeed entitled
to be indemnified for paying for the value of the subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over and
above what was awarded to them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that [w]hoever
pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial
to the debtor. They may also recover from the NHA, applying the principle of solutio indebiti.

Facts:
The subject lot is a 152-square meter lot located at 1014 Estrada Street, Malate, Manila which is owned by
the National Housing Authority (NHA). the NHA conducted a census survey of the subject lot, and the
following information was gathered:
Tag No. 674 Ricardo Dimalanta, Sr. absentee structure owner
Felix Briones lessee
Neorimse Corpuz lessee
Tag No. 87-0675 Teodoro Rosete residing owner
Jose Rosete lessee .

The NHA awarded the subject lot to petitioner Teodorico P. Rosete (Teodorico). respondents, Jose and
Remedios Rosete (the Rosetes), Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz (the Corpuzes), and Felix and Marietta
Briones (the Brioneses) objected to the award, claiming that the award of the entire lot to Teodorico was
erroneous.

A Declaration of Real Property was filed and issued in Teodoricos name. On March 21, 1991, he made full
payment of the value of the subject lot in the amount of P43,472.00. He likewise paid the real property
taxes thereon.

The NHA informed Teodorico that after consideration of the objections raised by the Rosetes, the Corpuzes
and the Brioneses, the original award of 152 square meters in his favor has been cancelled and instead, the
subject lot will be subdivided. NHA likewise informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted
accordingly, but his excess payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees
amortizations. His coawardees shall in turn pay him, under pain of cancellation of their respective awards.
NHA also informed Teodorico that the matters contained in the letter were final, and that if intended to
appeal, he should do so with the Office of the President within 30 days. Teodorico protested and sought a
reconsideration of the decision to cancel the award, claiming that it was unfair and confiscatory. He likewise
requested that his co-awardees be required to reimburse his property tax payments and that the subject
lot be assessed at its current value.

The Rosetes and the Corpuzes appealed the NHA, Teodorico filed an undated letter In the said letter, he
directed the OPs attention to the Rosetes and the Corpuzes resolve not to question the 62-square meter
allocation/award to him. At the same time, he manifested his assent to such Allocation.

Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes sought approval of their request to subdivide the subject lot on
an as is, where is basis as per NHA policy, since it appeared that the parties respective allocations/awards
did not correspond to the actual areas occupied by them and thus could result in unwanted demolition of
their existing homes/structures.

The NHA informed the parties that the original awards/allocations were being retained; it also advised them
to hire a surveyor for the purpose of subdividing the subject lot in accordance with such awards.
Teodorico and his wife Pacita, the Rosetes, and the Corpuzes went up to the CA by Petition for Review, they
essentially claimed that pursuant to the pertinent laws on Beneficiary Selection and Disposition of
Homelots in Urban Bliss Projects, the Rosetes, the Corpuzes, and the Brioneses are not entitled to own a
portion of the subject lot since they were mere renters or lessees therein; thus the letter decision are
null and void. The Petition contained a prayer for the CA to order the NHA to allocate the subject lot on an
as is, where is basis; that the assailed Decision and Resolution be stayed; and that the Rosetes, the
Corpuzes and the Brioneses be ordered to reimburse Teodorico in such manner as originally prayed for by
him in the NHA and OP.

Petitioners argue that the NHA committed error in subdividing the subject lot, as it failed to accurately
survey the same before making the awards; that the NHA failed to review the sketch plans submitted by
the NHA District Office which reflected clearly the existing position of the structures built by the awardees;
that the NHA decision would result in the unwarranted destruction of such structures in order to conform
to the respective allocations of the awardees; and that their overpayments should be returned to them by
the respondents, lest unjust enrichment results.

The Corpuzes in their Comment claim that Teodoricos letter to the NHA cannot be treated as an appeal to
the OP, and the NHAs inaction or failure to act on the said letter should be construed as an implied denial
thereof which should have prompted Teodorico to take further legal steps to protect his interests. They
object to being required to pay for interests on the purchase price and taxes advanced by Teodorico,
claiming that this was unjust. Finally, they maintain that the NHA is correct in allocating the subject lot the
way it did among the parties; they should observe and yield to the law and policy of the NHA, even if it
required the destruction of their homes and structures.

Issue; won teodico is entitled for refund

Held: no

Notably, there is very little that petitioners can benefit from in obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision
of the CA. For one, they do not dispute the award of 62 square meters in Teodoricos favor; this has been
made clear as early as in Teodoricos undated letter to the OP which was filed on February 2, 1995, where
he indicated that he was satisfied with the award. For another, petitioners do not seek to question the
allocations made in favor of their co-awardees; in fact, in the instant Petition, they openly declared that
In closing and perhaps most important of all, petitioners would like to respectfully manifest to this
Honorable Court that they have deliberately not questioned the right of respondents to be potential
beneficiaries of the ZIP Census even if they had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondents were
mere renters. The reason for this is that, at the end of the day, the peace of the community is paramount.

The petitioners remaining point of contention is their claim for reimbursement. Sad to say, this Court
cannot order a refund of Teodoricos overpayments. First of all, NHA the recipient of the overpayment
cannot be ordered to make a refund, since Teodorico never prayed to recover from it; in all his
submissions from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and all the way up to this Court he consistently sought
reimbursement only from his coawardees, not the NHA. Secondly, the specific amount of overpayment is
not fixed or determinable from the record; this being the case, it cannot be determined how much exactly
each of Teodoricos co-awardees owes him. Thirdly, this Court is not a trier of facts; it cannot go out of its
way to determine and analyze from the record what should be returned to Teodorico, nor can it receive
evidence on the matter. Suffice it to state that petitioners are indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying
for the value of the subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over and above what was awarded to
them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that [w]hoever pays for another may
demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will
of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. They may
also recover from the NHA, applying the principle of solution indebiti.

Alano vs Magud-Logmao
GR No. 1755540 April 7, 2014

Facts: At around 9:50pm of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao then 18 y/o, was brought to (EAMC) in Quezon
City by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers Market
in Cubao, Quezon City. The patients data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave.,
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-
duty at the emergency room of EAMC, stated the patient is Angelito Logmao.

Dr. Cabrera reported that Logmao was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the
skull x-ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:30am of March 2, 1988, Logmao developed generalized
seizures and was managed by the neuro-surgeon resident on-duty; that the condition of Logmao
progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and ambu-bagging support was provided; that admission
to the ICU and mechanical ventilation support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and
all the ventilation units were being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKTI, who was
rotating at EAMC, suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI; and that after arrangements were made,
Logamo was transferred to NKTI at 10:10am.

At the NKTI, the name Angelito Logmao was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately
attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer
Misa, transplant coordinator was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr.
Enrique Ona, chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso
manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested the laboratory section to conduct tissue typing and
tissue cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite the necessary care and medical
management and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his family would consent to organ
donation, the organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible
beneficiary.

The identity of Lugmoso was verified by Misa from EAMC and she was furnished the patients data sheet.
She then contacted several radio and television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating
the family of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong who was confined at NKTI with severe head
injury after allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass, as well as police station no. 5 Eastern Police District.
Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead on March 3, 1988 7:00am. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed
that EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing thereby confirming his brain death.

He was found to be a suitable donor of the heart, kidneys, pancreas, and liver, and after the extensive
search, no relatives were found. Dr. Ona then requested the removal of the specific organs of Lugmoso
from the herein petitioners, Dr. Alano, the director of NKTI who thereafter issued a memorandum stating
that only after the requirements of RA 349 as amended by PD 856 was complied, they can remove the
specified organs of Lugmoso. Lugmosos remains was brought at La Funeraria Oro. A press release made
by NKTI announcing a double organ transplant led to the findings of the relatives of Lugmoso.

Issue: Whether or not the removal of Lugmosos organs were valid.

Held: Yes. The internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead;
thus the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot be in any way be
attributed to petitioner. Neither can the court find evidence or second to show that respondents emotional
suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her sons lifeless body be categorically attributed
to petitioners conduct.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency
of time allotted for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her sons death because the notices did not properly
state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioners door. The trial and appellate
courts found that it was the EAMC, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceaseds identity
to NKTI. The NKTI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as
found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to NKTI.

Sps. Hing v Choachuy

Gr no. 179736, June 26, 2013

Facts: Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuys) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the
Hings. The latter claimed that the Hings constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would
destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get
evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the
Hings property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hings then
filed a case against the Choachuys for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a
order granting the application of the Hings for TRO and directed the Choachuys to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuys appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs decision was annulled and set aside. The Hings then raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuys violated the Hings
right to privacy.

HELD:
Such act of the Choachuys violated the right of privacy of the Hings under Article 26(1) prohibiting the
prying into the privacy of anothers residence. Although it is a business office and not a residence, the
owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals.

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy.

As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business
office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as
are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house
or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

Beumer v Amores
Gr no. 195670, Dec 3, 2012

Facts:
Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was
declared a nullity by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed
a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were
acquired during their marriage.

During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of Avelina, but it
was purchased using funds he received from the Dutch government as disability benefit, and Avelina had
no sufficient income to purchase the properties. On the other hand, Avelina alleged that except for the
two residential houses and Lots 1 and 2142, all the other lots were her paraphernal properties and acquired
thru her funds.

After trial the RTC disposed of the properties as follows: It awarded to Willem several personal properties
(tools and equipments), the two houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 were declared as co-owned by Willem
and Avelina as there was no prohibition on aliens owning buildings and houses and were acquired during
the marital union. On the other hand, all the lots covered by several TCTs were declared paraphernal
properties , though acquired during the marriages, in view of the constitutional prohibition against aliens
owning real property in the Philippines. On appeal to the CA, Willem asserted that all the money for the
purchase of the lots came from his funds, and were registered only in the name of Avelina because of the
constitutional prohibition, hence he prayed for reimbursement of one half of the value of the lots. The CA
disagreed, ruling that he cannot invoke equity when he very well knew the constitutional prohibition on
aliens owning real property in the Philippines. Thus, Willem elevated his case to the Supreme Court to
assail the RTC and CA decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the purchase price of the lots subject
of the case.

Held:
No
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not
be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent
on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed
by the Constitution, to wit: petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been
paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It
may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties,
or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early
case of Holman v. Johnson: The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and
the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however,
that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has
the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be
sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect.

Padalhin v Lavina
G.R. No. 183026. November 14,2012.

Damages; Violation of Privacy of Ones Residence; Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions
concerning the privacy of ones residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent
intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavinas favor is
proper.As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he
caused the taking of the pictures of\ Lavias residence without the latters knowledge and consent. Nestor
reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestors surreptitious acts negate his allegation
of good faith. If it were true that Lavia kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorneys fees
in Lavias favor is proper.

FACTS: Lavia and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Lavia was raided twice.
Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the ambassadors
residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the
ivory souvenirs he kept therein. The two raid happened when the petitioner were not present.

Lavia received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an investigating
team was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin, on the
other. Lavia alleged that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged
furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks. Subsequently, both Nestor and Lavia were recalled
from their posts in Kenya.

Lavia filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin
(Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998, Lavia amended his complaint to
include Pasturan as a defendant. Lavias complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront
against his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids
conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated by Padalhin and participated by all the defendants
as conspirators; (b) infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures when the
investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his residence without a warrant, court order or letter from
the DFA Secretary and confiscated some of his personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and deceit
exhibited by the defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids, engaging in a
smear campaign against him, and seizing without authority his personal effects. Lavia sought payment of
actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages, attorneys fees and costs of suits.

Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted on Lavias residence. As counterclaims, he alleged
that the suit filed by Lavia caused him embarrassment and sleepless nights, as well as unnecessary
expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the charges.

RTC, upon oral motion of Lavias counsel informing the court that a settlement had been reached,
dismissed the charges against Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. As a consequence, the RTC
deemed it proper to no longer resolve the claims of Lavia relative to the alleged seizure of his personal
effects by the DFA investigating team. Lavia pursued his charges against Nestor, Annie and Pasturan.

The RTC rendered a Decision ordering Nestor to pay Lavia; and ruled that the invasion of the diplomatic
residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the taking of photographs of the premises and the elephant tusks
inside the residence upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith. The intention to malign the plaintiff is shown by the
fact that Nestor Padalhin even went to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported the raw
elephant tusks of Ambassador Lavia.

This incident reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but also the Filipino community in
Kenya, the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila and the circle of friends of plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff
felt insulted, betrayed, depressed and even feared for his life because the intelligence and local police were
involved in this incident. Plaintiff suffered humiliation, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation and wounded feeling.

Both Lavia and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC decision. Lavia ascribed error on
the part of the RTC when it absolved Annie and Pasturan from liability anent their supposed participation
in the raid conducted which CA denied both appeal.

In affirming, albeit with modification, the RTCs disquisition, the CA explained: There is no doubt in our mind
that defendant-appellant indeed participated in the first raid that happened on April 18, 1997 [sic]. This
conclusion of ours is based on the admission made by the defendant-appellant himself in his affidavit dated
October 10, 1997. Defendat-appellants affidavit constitute[s] as [sic] an admission against his interest.
Being an admission against interest, the affidavit is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration
corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.

Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that he was motivated by malice,
bad faith or deceit, which would warrant the award of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant. Plaintiff-
appellants complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil
Code.

ISSUE: whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-appellant when he did the acts
as embodied in his affidavit.
HELD: yes. Defendant-appellants participation in the invasion of plaintiff-appellants diplomatic residence
and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence
without the consent of the plaintiff appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find
that defendant- appellant was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed
out by the court a quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Filipino community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellants diplomatic
residence.

As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the
taking of the pictures of Lavias residence without the latters knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates
that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestors surreptitious acts negate his allegation of
goodfaith. If it were true that Lavia kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorneys fees
in Lavias favor is proper.

Test of Abuse of Right.Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are
anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under
the guise of exercising a right.
The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another,
because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just.