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JURISDICTION

1. Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction

Courts with original jurisdiction Courts with appellate jurisdiction

When actions or proceedings are originally filed with it. When they have the power of review over the decisions
or orders of a lower court

MeTCs, MCTCs and MTCs are courts of original jurisdiction without appellate jurisdiction. RTC is likewise a court of
original jurisdiction with respect to cases originally filed with it; and appellate court with respect to cases decided by MTCs
within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 22, BP 129)

CA is primarily a court of appellate jurisdiction with competence to review judgments of the RTCs and specified quasi-
judicial agencies (Sec. 9[3], BP 129). It is also a court of original jurisdiction with respect to cases filed before it involving
issuance of writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and prohibition. CA is a court of original and
exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs (Sec. 9 [1],[2], BP 129).

The SC is fundamentally a court of appellate jurisdiction but it may also be a court of original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and in cases involving petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus (Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution). The Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or
resolutions of a division of the Supreme Court may be appealed.

2. Courts of general and special jurisdiction

Courts of general jurisdiction Courts of special jurisdiction

Those with competence to decide on their own Those which have only a special jurisdiction for a
jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all cases, civil particular purpose or are clothed with special powers
and criminal, of a particular nature for the performance of specified duties beyond which
they have no authority of any kind.

3. Constitutional and statutory courts

Constitutional courts Statutory courts

Created by law other than the Constitution.


Created by a direct Constitutional provision.
All courts except the SC are statutory courts. SB
Example of this court is the SC, which owes its
was not directly created by the Constitution but by
creation from the Constitution itself. Only the SC
law pursuant to a constitutional mandate.
is a Constitutional court

4. Courts of law and equity

Courts of law Courts of equity

Decide a case according to the existing laws. Adjudicate a controversy according to the common
precepts of what is right and just without inquiring
into the terms of the statute.

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts.

This is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the
next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the
proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. This is an established policy necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further
clogging of the Courts docket.

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
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Courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with each others orders. The principle also bars a court from
reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION

Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of
that jurisdiction.

This principle also means that once jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The court, once jurisdiction has
been acquired, retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.

CASES:

ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION

1. Gomez-Castillo vs. COMELEC, 621 SCRA 499 (2007)

It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating the Rules of Court, the Supreme
Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts; consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which said
jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the substantive
law in determining jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section
251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper
venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises
such jurisdiction.

Castillos filing in the RTC Bacoor amounted only to wrong choice of venue but it does not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction
over the case.

2. DBM Procurement Service vs. Kolonwell Trading, 524 SCRA 591(2007)

Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 sets three (3) requirements that must be met by the party desiring to protest the decision of the
Bids and Awards Committee (BAC). These are: 1) the protest must be in writing, in the form of a verified position paper; 2)
the protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring entity; and 3) the payment of a non-refundable protest fee. The
jurisdictional caveat that authorizes courts to assume or, inversely, precludes courts from assuming, jurisdiction over suits
assailing the BACs decisions is in turn found in the succeeding Section 58 which provides that the courts would have
jurisdiction over such suits only if the protest procedure has already been completed.

In this case, Respondent was not able to comply with the above mentioned requirements. That respondent sought judicial
intervention of the RTC before even duly completing the protest process.

Where a disqualified bidders petition in the Regional Trial Court is filed in violation of the protest process set forth in
Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184, said court could not lawfullt acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.

It is Congress by law, not the courts by discretion, which defines the courts jurisdiction not otherwise conferred by the
Constitution. Through the same medium, Congress also draws the parameters in the exercise of the functions of
administrative agencies. Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 could not be any clearer when it mandates the manner of protesting the
decision of bids and awards committees. Similarly, there can be no quibbling that, under Section 58 of the same law, courts
do not have jurisdiction over decisions of the BACs unless the appropriate protest has been made and completed. The
absence of the IRR does not detract from the reality that R.A. No. 9184 requires a protest to be filed under the form therein
prescribed.
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Given the above perspective, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent Kolonwels petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

3. COMELEC vs. Aguirre, 532 SCRA 545 (2007)

Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote.

Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdictions of various courts. Hence, it may, by law,
provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by a specific court.

In this case, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, vested the RTC the exclusive jurisdiction on criminal cases in
violation of the same.

4. Sevilleno vs. COMELEC, 533 SCRA 385 (2007)

In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals by
mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of law, the
appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
We have a long standing rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by statute. Otherwise put, jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law.
Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law.
As petitioners' appeal solely involves a question of law, they should have directly taken their appeal to this Court by filing a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

5. Cosco Philippine Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company, 670 SCRA 343 (2012)

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In
order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision,
a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC,
Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.

Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial
courts jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage, since issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

6. Go vs. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., 671 SCRA 461 (2012)

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of
action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,
the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the
application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
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WHEN ACT IS DONE WITHOUT JURISDICTION EFFECT/S

1. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 665 SCRA 89 (2012)

There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment. An act is done without jurisdiction if the public respondent
does not have the legal power to act or where the respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its authority as
determined by law, or acts outside the contemplation of law. For the grant of the present petition, the petitioner must prove,
based on the existing records, action in the above manner by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Taglay vs. Daray, 678 SCRA 640 (2013)

It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject
matter of an action is conferred by law. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The Family Courts Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997. Section 5 (a) of
R.A. 8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of
the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is
a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a minor.
Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.

It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.
Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are
null and void.

TYPES/CLASSES OF JURISDICTION

ORIGINAL CONCURRENT JURISDICTION VIS--VIS


ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

1. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of the BSP, G.R. No. 191424, August 7,2013

Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within
the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As
a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower
courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the
Court.

2. Pacific Asia Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) vs. Yanizagawa, 669 SCRA 270 [2012]

The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and
exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their
respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously
hamper the administration of justice. The matter is further explained thus: It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."

In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of,
and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to
criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws;
and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such
considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the
process.

Thus, RTC Paranaque was not proper. the The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC.By insisting on ruling on the same issue,
the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

3. Civil Service Commission vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 178162, October 9,2012
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The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.
PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.
The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may
deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation.

The inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an
official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private
citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school.

The case of The Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, it is likewise instructive. In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC
validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed with it concerning violations of civil service rules
committed by a university president. This Court acknowledged that the board of regents of a state university has the sole
power of administration over a university, in accordance with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining
and removal of its employees and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive to it because all members of the civil
service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

Despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board of trustees of state school the authority to
discipline its employees, the Civil Service Commission still retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has
concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over administrative cases against state
university officials and employees.

In light of the circumstances, the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this
case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC.

4. Llamas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149588, September 29,2009

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable
law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved on August 14, 1981, which pertinently provides:

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.

Here, as alleged in the information, the value of the damage caused, or the imposable fine, is P12,895.00. Clearly, from a
reading of the information, the jurisdiction over the criminal case was with the RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the
information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.

5. Lastimoso vs. Asayo, G.R. No. 154243, March 6,2007

With regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all
the administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as
when the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a
private citizen against him. Said issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not
apply to the case.

6. Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005

Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First
Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over such
violations was vested in the said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as
modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan
include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.

It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The
soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings
is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or
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employees incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service. Following the same
analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions
for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.

While at present, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, the Ombudsmans
exercise of the correlative powers, to investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of illgotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986as
regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the authority to file forfeiture proceedings belongs to the Solicitor
General; The Ombudsman has the authority to investigate cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the
Ombudsmans general investigatory power under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.

7. Alejandro vs. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the
Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two
laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court.

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and
higher. Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, 625 SCRA 299 (2010), any act or omission of a
public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Since the
complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is
to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION VS. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

1. Maslag vs. Monzon, 698 SCRA 584

Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to
either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.

In the case at bench, the disputed property has an assessed value of P12,40033 only. Such assessed value of the property is
well within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been
repeatedly held that any judgment, order or resolution issued without [jurisdiction] is void and cannot be given any effect.
By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction
which cannot be countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases
involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the
proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is the type of jurisdiction actually
exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction was actually
exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical.
Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves the merits of the
appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with.

2. Maglalang vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he
or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort
to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
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administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the
courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there
is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice
the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions.

GENERAL JURISDICTION VIS--VIS SPECIAL OR LIMITED JURISDICTION

1. Yoshizaki vs. Joy Training Center of Auroa, Inc., G.R. No. 174978

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
before a court belong. It is conferred by law. The allegations in the complaint and the status or relationship of the parties
determine which court has jurisdiction over the nature of an action. The same test applies in ascertaining whether a case
involves an intra-corporate controversy.

The CA correctly ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the present case. Joy Training seeks to nullify the sale of the real
properties on the ground that there was no contract of agency between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson. This was beyond
the ambit of the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction The determination of the existence of a contract of agency and the
validity of a contract of sale requires the application of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. It is a well-settled rule that
[d]isputes concerning the application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction. Indeed, no
special skill requiring the SECs technical expertise is necessary for the disposition of this issue and of this case.

2. Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. vs. Africa, G.R. Nos. 184622, 184712-14, 186066 & 186590

There is an intra-corporate controversy when the dispute involves any of the following relationships, to wit: (a) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State in
so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (c) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code), effective on August 8, 2000, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and the other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 5.2 of the law.

The trial court is mandated to render a decision within 15 days from receipt of the last pleading, or from the date of the last
hearing, as the case may be.

3. Aguirre II vs. FQB+7, Inc., G.R. No. 170770

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. R.A. No. 8799 conferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies on courts of general jurisdiction or RTCs, to be designated by the Supreme Court. Thus, as long as the nature of
the controversy is intra-corporate, the designated RTCs have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over such cases.

To be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, and (b)
the nature of the question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation or the enforcement of the parties rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory
rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria are satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a
special commercial court, has jurisdiction over it.

4. Okol vs. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146

The issue revolves mainly on whether petitioner was an employee or a corporate officer of Slimmers World. Section 25 of
the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be
provided for in the by-laws. In Tabang v. NLRC, we held that an office is created by the charter of the corporation and the
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officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is
employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines
the compensation to be paid to such employee.

Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers World. The charges
of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against
respondents fall squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes. In a number of cases, we have held that a corporate
officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a
corporation. The question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor
problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The determination of the rights of a director
and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an
intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not
the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case.

5. WT Construction, Inc. vs. Caete, G.R. No. 157287

The deed of sale in question is the sale of the property of the estate to pay for taxes, a matter definitely within the power
of the probate/estate court to order. It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce obligations under such a deed
of sale. Otherwise, they would not be able to secure the proceeds to pay for the taxes and this would defeat the purpose
of the proceedings to settle the estate. Stated otherwise, the power to enforce obligations under the deed of sale of a
property ordered sold to pay debts of the estate is but a necessary incident of the power of a probate/estate court to order
and effect such sale in the first place.

6. Tamano vs. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603

Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal
actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and
Tamano were married under Muslim laws or P.D. No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to
Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim
laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.

The sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under
both civil and Muslim lawsRegional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19,
par. (6) of B.P. Blg. 129.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

1. Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission, 697 SCRA 567

In Puse v. Santos-Puse, 615 SCRA 500 (2010), it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the
Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body
charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of
the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or
more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
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COURT OF LAW and COURT OF EQUITY DISTINGUISHED

1. Muller vs. Muller, G.R. No. 149615

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done
inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the
instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

2. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing vs. Ignacio B. Tagyamon, G.R. NO. 191475

Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of
equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The
pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity.

COURT OF JUSTICE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES DISTINGUISHED

1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208

Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. They pertain to the executive department of the
government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power.

Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law. Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987, such lower
courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Sharia District
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Sharia Circuit Courts.
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. This was revised by P.D. No. 1606. The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860 and lastly by P.D. No. 1861.
Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: SEC.
4.
Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, (b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal,
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Court in cases originally decided by them in their
respective territorial jurisdiction. (2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. . . .
Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975.

2. Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD, G.R. No. 196425

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against
all presidential appointees in the government and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. The
IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases.

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
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controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law.

Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner
may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its
investigation. In any event, the Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.

MULLER vs. MULLER


G.R No. 149615, August 29, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany. The couple
resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines.
Respondent inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land
in Antipolo, Rizal and the property was registered in the name of the petitioner. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. The respondent filed a petition for separation of properties
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Furthermore, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that
it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed
for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the
respondent. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement on the ground of equity.


HELD:

No because the respondent is aware of the constitutional prohibition regarding the disqualification of aliens in acquiring lands
of the public domain and private lands. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the
said prohibition. Thus, his attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held
that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant
may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

UNIONBANK vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

FACTS:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay
City Court and not the MeTC Makati City that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. The case was referred to the court en banc
primarily to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio vs. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou V. Sy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized.

HELD:

Yes. MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is
to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. A finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences. The venues of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
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states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.

All the elements of perjury was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Tomas deliberate and
intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the certificate against forum shopping
before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true.
Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas.

CSC vs. ALFONSO


589 SCRA 88, June 11, 2009

FACTS:

Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP. Dr. Zenaida Pia and Dindo
Emmanuel Bautista jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of RA. 6713, charging the latter with grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The
affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission. Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent
repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUPs personnel department when the latter prepared and included his name in Special
Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to 20, May 22
to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. Thus making Alfonso considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible
conditions.

Respondent denied the allegations but CSC issued a Resolution formally charging Alfonso with grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. Aggrieved, he filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of preventive
suspension order and requested a change of venue from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. In the motion, he argued that it is
the CSC-NCR Regional Office that has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 and to hold
otherwise may deprive him of his right to appeal. The motion was denied. The respondent sought relief before the CA.
ISSUE:

Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.
HELD:

Yes. As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and
discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors
pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the
CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly
with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an
agency to conduct the investigation. Specifically, Sections 9(j) and 37(a) of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of
1975. The CSC is ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with dispatch.

ANG vs. ANG


G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
FACTS:

Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents)obtained a loan from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). The respondents
executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the amount of US$300,000.00, with
interest at 10% per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners. Sometime
on August 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding debt. Notwithstanding the
receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation. The petitioners who were then residing in
Los Angeles, California, USA executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Atty. Aceron for the purpose of filing
an action in court againstthe respondents. Thus Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground
that venue was not properly laid.

HELD:

No. The CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the orders of the RTC of Quezon City and
consequently dismissed the petitioners complaint against the respondents on the ground of improper venue. It is a legal truism that the
rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is
the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The
petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement
of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place where he
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himself or any of them resides, or where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or maybe found. The plaintiff or the defendant
must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced. However, if the plaintiff does
not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.

DOLOT vs. PAJE


G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed a petition with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted by
several ore mining companies puts the Municipality of Matnog in environmental changers and despite this fact the Governor issued to
the operators a small-scale mining permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did nothing to protect the
interest of the people in the same community, thus, respondents violated various laws. Dolot et al, prayed for the shutdown of mining
operations as well as the rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return of the iron ore mined in the area.

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.
However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to
violations of environmental laws within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve civil case.

HELD:

Yes. The SC held that RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within
its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 also states that jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in
the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction shall be exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction
is lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action
or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Therefore, RTCs motu proprio dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant the outright dismissal
of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue
is an essential element of jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case to the RTC of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.

CSC vs. SOJOR


G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Sojor, President of Negros Oriental State University was charged of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Civil Service Commission.
Respondent moved to dismiss the charged against him on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government, he has exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President (OP). He argued that
CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him, that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on
the investigation, discipline and removal of presidential appointees. The CSC dismissed respondents appeal as well as the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over presidents of state universities or schools with governing
boards exclusively granted by their charters the corporate powers of administration.

HELD:

Yes. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service a0s defined, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. Respondent, a State University President with a fixed
term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the University, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by
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the Chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who
is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

In this case, the CSC has also jurisdiction to discipline all members of the civil service, career or non-career. Hence, the CSC
has concurrent jurisdiction with the BOR of the university in the discipline and removal of its officials.

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING VS. TAGYAMON ET AL.


G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the
business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected
by petitioners retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs. They received a uniformly worded Memorandum of dismissal.
PCMC claimed that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective
Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim, with respect to Marcos, Ilao, Nemis and fifteen (15) other employees.

Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMCs decision to terminate their employment, respondents filed separate complaints
for illegal dismissal against PCMC. On the other hand, PCMC defended its decision considering that respondents accepted their
separation pay and voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of estoppels on the part
of the respondents to question their separation from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acceptance of respondents of their separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of
illegal dismissal case.

HELD:

Yes. It can safely be concluded that economic necessity constrained the respondents to accept the petitioners monetary offer
and sign the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents are supervisors and not rank-and-file employees does not make
them less susceptible to financial offers, faced as they were with the prospect of unemployment. The Court has allowed supervisory
employees to seek payment of benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a consideration, they executed
deeds of quitclaims releasing their employers from liability

With respect to laches, the court held that laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x xx
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v.
Court of Appeals x xx, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam
contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts
should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS


G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:

Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North Edsa pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission, and ordering the said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHRs jurisdiction stating that Commissioners
authority should be understood as being confined only on the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that the
rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business. Subsequently, CHR
issued an Order denying petitioners motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of an order to desist within the extent of the authority and power of the CHR.
HELD:

No. The issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section
18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights
violation, involving civil and political rights".
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The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any
court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding.

BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,


G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

FACTS:

President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.

Consequently, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds. They averred that E.O. No.1 illegally
amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

HELD:

No. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
do that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.

EVANGELISTA vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010
FACTS:

Teofilo Evangelista, a seaman who came from Angola was accosted by Arab policeman at the airport in Dubai for being in
possession of several firearms. Upon arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police and brought to the arrival area where
his passport was stamped and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration Form. He denied ownership of the guns and the fact that he
admitted having bought the same in Angola. Petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime imputed against him for he
was never in custody and possession of any firearm or ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines. He also contends that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him. He claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while
he was a the Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has ceased when he left for the Philippines. However, the RTC found him
liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not courts have jurisdiction over the said case when as alleged by the petitioner the said allegation was committed
in Dubai.

HELD:

Yes. Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is
an essential element of jurisdiction. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on or about January 30, 1996
petitioner was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City,
Philippines, certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
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Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs
Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the
Philippines.
REPUBLIC vs. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION
G.R. No. L-108208, March 11, 1994

FACTS:

Private respondent Alexander Dionisio, a member of the PNP was dispatched by his commanding officer to Dumalay Street
in Novaliches to respond a complaint that a person was creating a trouble on the said place. Dionisio proceeded to the mentioned
place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information charging
Dionisio with the crime of homicide with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The respondent judge dismissed the criminal case
for refilling with the Sandiganbayan on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction
over the case. This is in view with the SC decision in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo.

Furthermore, the petitioner opposed the RTC dismissal of the case due to courts jurisdiction. He asserted that crimes
committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts as provide in Section 46 of R.A. 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term regular courts includes the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:

Yes. Sandiganbayan is a regular court. Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely,
the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 means civil courts. This is in line with the purpose of the law to remove the jurisdiction of Court Martial over criminal cases
involving PNP members due to reorganization and turning PNP into civilian in character which in return mandates the transfer of
criminal cases against members of the PNP to the civilian courts.

The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular court
functioning within the framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a "trial court and bound by the rules go verning
trial courts. It is one of the 'inferior courts' in Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction may be questioned before the Supreme
Court and whose judgments are subject to its review, revision, affirmance or setting aside.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

FACTS:
President Aquino issued an Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Sometime on April 2011 Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function through and
E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

HELD:

No. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers. The OSG aptly
explained in its Comment, while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve
cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13
explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all
presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a
fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the
Court ruled in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To
be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
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authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and Nanette B. Crisologo vs. Judge George E. Omelio

Facts:

PETITIONERS are plaintiffs in a collection suit in Davao City. They obtained a favorable judgment which had become final and
executory on March 3, 2010. Accordingly, a Writ of Execution dated June 15, 2010 was issued for the satisfaction of said final
judgment. Subsequently, a Notice of Sale was issued by Sheriff Robert M. Medialdea, Shefiff on the subject properties. However, the
properties involved were already acquired by JEWM prior to the finality of judgment. Aggrieved with the said decision, JEWM filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Lien, with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Register of Deeds, Davao City,
Sheriff Robert Medialdea, JOHN and JANE DOES, and all persons acting under their directions on September 16, 2010. JEWM also
filed a complaint of an indirect contempt against Sheriff Medialdea and requiring the Register of Deeds of City of Davao to cancel the
auction sale annotated on the TCTs of the subject properties in favor of the Sps. Crisologo. This case was granted by the respondent
Judge and ordered the Register of Deeds of City of Davao to cancel any registration or annotation without notifying the Sps.
Crisologo.

Service of summons was made only upon the Register of Deeds and Sheriff Medialdea. The notice of hearing for the preliminary
injunction was likewise served only upon defendants Register of Deeds and Sheriff Robert Medialdea. Sps. Crisologo, through their
counsel, were pleading before Judge Omelio to recognize their entry of appearance as real parties in interest under defendants John
and Jane Does in the hearing for preliminary injunction. However, Judge Omelio refused to recognize Sps. Crisologo due to lack of
legal standing. Judge Omelio bases his refusal to recognize Sps. Crisologo on the ground of lack of the proper Motion to Intervene
with Pleading-in-Intervention. Judge Omelio argues that Sps. Crisologo are not indispensable parties because their participation is not
indispensable in the determination of whether or not the subsequent liens annotated on the titles of the subject properties may be
properly cancelled.

Sps. Crisologo claim that the case should not have proceeded because no summons were made upon the John and Jane Does
impleaded in the complaint. Since defendants John and Jane Does are unidentified persons, summons must be made with leave of
court and by publication. Judge Omelio, on the other hand, claims that the requirements for service of summons are not applicable
where the parties claiming entitlement to summons have already appeared in court during the hearing of the petition.

Sps. Crisologo further claim that JEWM filed a Motion to Render Judgment Granting Plaintiff the Relief Prayed for with
Memorandum Attached on 6 December 2010. The motion, however, was heard on 8 December 2010, in violation of the three-day
notice requirement.

The Spouses now charged the respondent Judge of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross dereliction of duty and
manifest bias for the acts showed by the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of the charges.

RULING: YES.

A. In refusing to recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable party


Parties with liens annotated on the certificate of title are entitled to notice in an action for cancellation of their liens.The cancellation
of Sps. Crisologos liens without notice to them is a violation of their right to due process.

B. Granting a contentious motion that was in violation of the three-day notice rule:

Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at
least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and Section 5 of the same Rule requires the notice to be directed to the parties concerned and to state the time and
place for the hearing of the motion. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is nothing but a useless piece of paper.

In this case, Judge Omelio granted a contentious motion which contained a defective notice of hearing. The notice of hearing was
defective because it was only served two (2) days before the hearing date, instead of the mandatory three-day notice rule. Such motion
should have been considered a mere scrap of paper. Judge Omelio should have denied the motion on the ground that it violated the
three-day notice rule, without prejudice to JEWMs re-filing of said motion in accordance with the Rules.
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C. Not complying with the rules on summons:

Judge Omelios failure to effect proper service of summons upon the defendants John and Jane Does in the complaint constitutes gross
ignorance of the law