U.S. vs. Toribio Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain.
Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial
court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from
the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the
slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the
municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the
municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for
the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To
justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general
public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the
purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to
make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and
slaughter of large cattle.
Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands which threatened
the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their
local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a
consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this
greatly affected the food production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from its
neighboring countries.
As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production of crops,
the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to
stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It
was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human
consumption. Most importantly, the respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm work.
These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.
taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private
properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the
owner must fail.
U.S. vs. Luis Toribio
Oct14
Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of Bohol, Toribio applied for a license to have his
carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found to be fit for agricultural work. Even
so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the purpose of human consumption. The trial court of Bohol found that the
respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.
The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter
of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle happened outside the
municipal slaughterhouse. They said that the prohibition and penalty is limited only to the large cattle slaughtered
at the municipal slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33
stated only the phrase at the municipal slaughterhouse.
They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise
of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited only to the slaughter of large
cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.
HELD:
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. The court is
of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that
it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.
Churchill & Tait v Rafferty; G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question one
involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in question and the other relating
to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that
the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance. The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter
aspect as correlated to the police power of the State.Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved
in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the
Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339. Appellees, in their supplementary
complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the
billboards in question re no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general
welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant decided that the
billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.
Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?
Held: The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are
offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new
principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience
of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to
the police power. Judgment reversed.
Roxas and Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals
GR 127876
December 17, 1999
Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these by the government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 9188.
Petitioner Roxas and Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely
Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President
Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131
instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms
necessary to initially implement the program. Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657; the Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws effectivity, petitioner filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of EO No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with the CARL.
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993,
petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioners application for conversion, respondent
DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the Philippines trust accounts as
compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22,
1993, from the title of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award No.
6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On December 18, 1991, the LBP
certified certain amounts in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioners land in
Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of
the CARL. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As
a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses. Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would
not exempt it from agrarian reform.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board praying for the
cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner alleged that the
Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not
suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-
agricultural. Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was
subject to agrarian reform; hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the
denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three
haciendas was denied. Petitioners petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were valid and in accordance with the law.
Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required first the Notice of Coverage
and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP,
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties and second, the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner
under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first notice, the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with
the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States
police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. In this case, respondent DAR
claims that it sent a letter of invitation to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico but he was not authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed that the failure of
respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give the SC
the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. The Court said, to assume the power
is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be
given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's
were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating
their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no
fault of their own, of the land they till. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the
three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents
Facts: Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No.
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of
Appeals, granting private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. However, upon motion filed by
private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated. Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the
Resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Aggrieved by the
alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land
pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents argued that Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
the opening of trust accounts by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated
by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section
16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the LBP merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that
before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. The respondent
court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but respondent court denied the same, hence, the instant petitions.
Issue: Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP bonds
Held: In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf
of the landowner as compensation for his property because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among
the valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed.
The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation
and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be
full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
Issue: Whether or not there should be a distinction the deposit of compensation and determination of just
compensation
Held: To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they
have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between deposit of compensation (provisional) under Section 16(e) and
determination of just compensation (final) under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
Reyes v. NHA G.R. No. 147511
FACTS: Petitioners sugarcane lands were ordered expropriated in favor of respondent National Housing
Authority (NHA) for the public purpose of the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate
the squatters relocated from the Metropolitan Manila Area. The trial court ordered the expropriation of said lots
and the payment of just compensation. Respondent allegedly failed to follow court orders as they allegedly did not
relocate the squatters to the expropriated land in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had
not paid just compensation fixed by the court. Petitioners also questioned the public nature of the construction of
low cost housing units on the expropriated land. Petitioners further aver that the land should be returned to them
for the failure of respondent to pay just compensation. Petitioners then prayed for respondent NHA to be enjoined
from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgement be rendered forfeiting all its rights
under the expropriation judgment. The trial court dismissed the decision which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking
for public purpose HELD: The court held that the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking for
public purpose as it is in compliance with the public use requirement. The constitution determined two cases
which connote public use: 1. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into smaller lots for resale at cost to
individuals and 2. the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to the government through the exercise of
his power. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector
is in furtherance of the social justice set in the constitution. The constitution provides for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. However, the court ruled in several
cases that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their
expropriated lots. Petitioners are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots devoted for public use
but may only demand for the market value of the same. However, respondents refusal to pay just compensation
because of the alleged failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax is unjustified. The expropriation judgment to
pay just compensation is not subject to any condition. And, although the right to enter upon and appropriate the
land to public use is completed upon payment, title to expropriated property shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. If property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid. Therefore,
petitioners are not entitled to the return of the expropriated property. However, respondent should pay the
outstanding balance of the property plus legal interest at 12% per annum. Note: Constitutional restraints of the
power of eminent domain: 1. Public use 2. Just Compensation Concept of Public use - synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. Whatever may be employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Constitutional limitation of just compensation - the sum
equivalent to the Market Value of the property
Case No. 46_Ferrer (Art 437)
NAPOCOR vsLucman Ibrahim, et al.
(GR No. 168732; June 29, 2007)
FACTS:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs,
instituted an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land
and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur. In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were
owners of several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 divided into three (3) lots, i.e. Lots 1,
2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square meters each respectively. Sometime in 1978,
NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence
of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November
13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the latters Acting Assistant Project Manager. The
tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of
NAPOCORs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanaodel Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao
del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned
down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992,
respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground
tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock
thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR
must be held liable for exemplary damages.
Disputing respondents claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely that (1) there is afailure to
state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion when they were never in
possession of the same, (2) respondents have no cause of action because they failed to show proof that they were
the owners of the property, and (3) the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands
are subject to such easement as may be necessary for the same.
On August 7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision favouring the Ibrahims, ordering NAPOCOR to pay
them fair market value, monthly rentals, and moral damages. However, it did not order the dismantling of the
tunnels.
On August 15, 1996, Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending
Appeal. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal by registered mail on August 19, 1996.
Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a vigorous opposition to the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal with a
motion for reconsideration of the Decision which it had received on August 9, 1996.On August 26, 1996,
NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its Notice of Appeal purposely to give way to the
hearing of its motion for reconsideration.On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting execution
pending appeal and denying NAPOCORs motion for reconsideration, which Order was received by NAPOCOR
on September 6, 1996.
On September 9, 1996, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by registered mail which was denied by the RTC on
the ground of having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of the RTC was executed pending appeal
and funds of NAPOCOR were garnished by respondents Ibrahim and his co-heirs.
In the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the CA set aside the modified judgment and reinstated the original Decision
dated August 7, 1996, amending it further by deleting the award of moral damages and reducing the amount of
rentals and attorneys fees, thus:
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation to respondents, and, by extension,
the basis for computing the same. The threshold issue of whether respondents are entitled to just compensation
hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were constructed does not belong
to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents owned the property, their right to the subsoil of
the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that
such property can normally give. In any case, petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject
property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G.
Maruhom, had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the underground
tunnels 115 meters below respondents property could not have caused damage or prejudice to respondents and
their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely conjectural and speculative
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Ibrahims are entitled to just compensation by way of damages
2. If they are entitled to just compensation, what would be the basis of valuation
HELD:
Yes, the Inrahims are entitled to just compensation by way of damages because the subterranean portion of their
lot also belongs to them and was unjustly taken by NAPOCOR for public purposes.
In the present case, NAPOCOR failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the application of the exceptions to the above rule.
Consequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the
property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be
disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property
similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals,this principle was applied to show that rights over lands are indivisible and, consequently,
require a definitive and categorical classification, thus:
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the
surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a well-known
principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and
the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their
practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the
economic utility which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners right extends to such
height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond
such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.
In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but
were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the tunnels
underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion
insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not
was appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of their property and
deprived them of its full use and enjoyment
In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the
property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the
event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that
persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon
payment of just compensation.
NAPOCOR contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of
respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created
by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to
them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be
deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then
see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of
law.
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner
took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the
acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents
use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing,
respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only
occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for
land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation
which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent
of said property.
The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having been settled, the issue now is on the manner of
computing the same. Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss and
is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the
expropriating authority.There is a taking in this sense when the owners are actually deprived or dispossessed of
their property, where there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of their property, or
when they are deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in this context when the expropriator enters
private property not only for a momentary period but for more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
Moreover, taking of the property for purposes of eminent domain entails that the entry into the property must be
under warrant or color of legal authority.
Under the factual backdrop of this case, the last element of taking mentioned, i.e., that the entry into the property
is under warrant or color of legal authority, is patently lacking. Petitioner justified its nonpayment of the
indemnity due respondents upon its mistaken belief that the property formed part of the public dominion.
In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be
grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate
the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels
under their property. Secondly, the improvements introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way
contribuuted to an increase in the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly
computed the valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the construction of the huge
underground tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started negotiations for their
purchase but no agreement could be reached.