Tancinco vs. GSIS and ECC, November 16, 2001, G.R.

132916

Facts:

SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men while off duty and repairing a
service vehicle in front of his house. His widow claimed for benefits. The GSIS and ECC denied the claim
for lack of proof that the death of Tancinco was work-related.

Issue:
Whether or not Tancincos death was compensable.

Ruling:

Tancincos death was not compensable.

The Court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding the decedents death failed to comply with
the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees compensation for the injury
and the resulting disability or death be compensable, to wit:(1) The employee must have been injured at
the place where his work requires him to be;(2) The employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.
The Court held that when the decedent died, he was not doing an act which is basically police service in
character though he be on active duty call or otherwise nor was he pursuing a task ordered by his
superior. He was, at the time he was killed, repairing his vehicle at his own home. Bereft proof of
compliance with the requirements, the death was non-compensable.
REMINGTON CORP. VS. CASTANEDA

November 20, 2006

G.R. Nos. 169295-96

FACTS: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-
payment of overtime services, non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. before the NLRC-NCR.

Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged
in the trading business and that she continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously
prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.

Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not
a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remingtons business
of trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products.

In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under
the personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director), finding that her work as a cook was not
usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation,
and that the latter did not exercise control over her functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor
arbiter found that it was the respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the
corporation transferred office and that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?

HELD: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED

She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE

In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an
industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms househelper or
domestic servant are defined as follows:

The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic servant and shall refer to
any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employers home and which
services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in
the employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers
family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners,
houseboys and similar househelps.

xxx xxx xxx

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case,
whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects
of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper
or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to
or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic
servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.

In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the
company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees lunch and merienda. Clearly,
the situs, as well as the nature of respondents work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr.
Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioners employees, makes her fall squarely within the
definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works
within company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan
and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioners right of CONTROL over her functions,
which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

NOTES:

1. THE OTHER ISSUE:

was there illegal dismissal? NO

Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondents part when she refused to report for
work when the corporation transferred to a new location in Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight
would make long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no longer called
for duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that her services were no longer
needed. She contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or authorized cause and that she
was not given prior notice, hence rendering the dismissal illegal.
We rule for the respondent.

As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor
Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal
and the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a
form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article
282 of the Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer.

For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and

(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified. This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.

Alongside the petitioners contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused
to return to work, greater stock may be taken of the respondents immediate filing of her complaint with
the NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be
said to have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for
illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus,
negating the employers charge of abandonment.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just
and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employers
case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employees
defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales
of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter

2. It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the
demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be decided according
to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of procedure are but
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents., G.R. No. 120592, Mar 14, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz entered into a retainer agreement
whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration
of the undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract.

During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its
members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
A complaint was filed by petitioner. NLRC favored the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential,
mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC
before the SC. The SC deleted the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the
award of holiday pay differential.

After private respondent received the decision of the SC he notified the petitioner union, the TRB and the
NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential, he
filed a motion before LA for the determination of his attorneys fees, praying that 10% of the total award
for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared
as his attorneys fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him.

Petitioner opposed said motion. LA favored private respondent. Petitioner appealed to NLRC but NLRC
affirmed LAs decision. Hence the petition at bar.

ISSUE:

Is the private respondent entitled to Atty.s fees aside from his retainer fee?

RULING:

Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for
the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be
paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such
award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer
but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.

It is the first type of attorneys fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. A claim
for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action. While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is
rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be
held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a
petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the
proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the
judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution.

The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter
actually rendered before the LA and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in their retainers
agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firms commitment to
render the services.

There are two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining
fee, and a special retainer.

A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general
counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred
to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client.
For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases
referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity
of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunities.

A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client.
A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a
separate and independent contract for attorneys fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.

The P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers
to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firms commitment to
render the legal services enumerated in said agreement..

Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should
receive for their professional services. However, the value of private respondents legal services should
not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:

(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees
equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.

The implementing provision 38 of the foregoing article further states:

Sec. 11. Attorneys fees. Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount
due the winning party.

The fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorneys fees recoverable as indemnity for damages
sustained by and payable to the prevailing part. The 10% attorneys fees fixes only the limit on the amount
of attorneys fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it
does not revent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than 10% ceiling prescribed by the article when
circumstances warrant it.

The measure of compensation for private respondents services as against his client should properly be
addressed by the rule of quantum meruit which means as much as he deserves, which is used in the
absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a lawyer is employed without a price
for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis.

But instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter erroneously set the amount of attorneys
fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of Article 111
when he fixed the amount of attorneys fees.

Article 111 of the Labor Code may not be used as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to
the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. While it limits the maximum allowable amount
of attorneys fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorneys fees in such
maximum limit. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, in
assessing the proper amount. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or
required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter;
(d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter
to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the
employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees to private
Villarama v. NLRC
GR.No. 106341,September 2, 1994

Petitioner Villarama, a materials manager, was charged with sexual harassment by Divina
Gonzaga, a clerk-typist on probation assigned in his department.
Facts that led to the act as stated in her resignation letter:
Mr. Villarama and Mr. de Jesus invited all the GIRLS of the Materials Department for a
dinner.
In the last minute, the 3 other girls decided not to join the group anymore.
The clerk-typist still decided to join since she thought that the two are her colleagues
and had nothing in mind that would in any manner prompt her to refuse a simple and
cordial invitation.
The 3 gentlemen were drinking while eating and even offered the lady a few drinks.
When they were finished, the gentlemen decided to bring her home.
While on their way home, the clerk-typist found out that instead of driving her to her
home, the gentlemen were taking her to a motel.
The Court ruled that because of the sexual harassment conducted by petitioner Villarama, there
is valid cause to terminate him from his employment