Property (Atty.
Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
OWNERSHIP
AVAILABLE ACTIONS TO RECOVER
POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP- IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Hilario v. Salvador
G.R. No. 160384 / April 29, 2005 / J. Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
The Hilarios (Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla) are co-
owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a
parcel of land located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon. This was
adjudged as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M.
Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which
adjudication was known by their fathers co-heirs. Sometime in
1989, Salustiniano Salvador constructed his dwelling unit of
mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs father without
the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-
interest. They demanded Salvador to vacate the premises but
the latter manifested that he had asked the prior consent of
their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador. To reach a
possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter
to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the
Certificate to File Action. The Hilarios filed a complaint with
the RTC.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. He
averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of
the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or
describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-
matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the
jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case,
however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally
absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing
in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining
the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by
the Hilarios.
Ruling
No. The Court does not agree with the contention of the
petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. The
Court finds and so rules that the action of the petitioners was
an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the
real property subject matter thereof. An accion
reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery
of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On
the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of
possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996
does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They
allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to
its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the
defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their
knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands
for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate
the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3,
1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. It states that the
jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or
possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of
the said property and not the market value thereof. The
assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the
real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value is the price
at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled
to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does
not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the
property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property,
it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
The Court quotes with approval, in this connection, the CAs
disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion
reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of
the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the
RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and
the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value
can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in the tax
declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax
declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is
Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property
was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is
absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the
fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax
declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value,
and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case,
therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over
the territory where the property is located, and not the court a
quo. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the
assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government
agency.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be
dismissed.
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
CESAR SAMPAYAN vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIAVASQUEZ GILSAN
G.R. No. 156360; January 14, 2005
FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by siblings
Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano against Cesar
Sampayan before the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for allegedly
having entered and occupied a parcel of land through strategy
and stealth, and built a house thereon without their knowledge,
consent or authority.
The private respondents, alleged that their mother
Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of Lot No.
1959; that after their mothers death on January 11, 1984, they
became co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the
same lot; that on June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily
absent from the lot in question, petitioner Cesar Sampayan,
through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house
thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated
demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the
possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do
so.
Defendant Sampayan denied the allegations and moved
for the dismissal of the complaint. He averred the following:
that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever
been in possession of the land and that he does not even
know plaintiffs identities or their places of residence.
he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy
because he asked and was given permission therefor by
Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in
Cebu City for business purposes.
plaintiff s claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in
dispute had been possessed and
declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo
Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960,and that in
1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to
the spouses Mr. and Mrs.Anastacio Terrado, while the
other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
Sambale-Occidain 1979. Both vendees have actually
possessed the respective portions purchased by them up
to the present.
On March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the
MCTC, the presiding judge thereof personally conducted an
ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the
parties and/or their counsels. Among those found in the area
during the inspection are: the house of petitioner Sampayan;
the dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon; and a portion of
the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one
of Sampayan's witnesses. Based on his ocular findings, the
judge concluded that the improvements he saw in the premises
could never have been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their
mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the same lot.
The MTC concluded that, from the appearance of the
improvements introduced by the predecessors-in-interest of the
now petitioner, it is showed that they have been in possession
of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the
private respondents, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de
possession.
The MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for
lack of merit. Therefrom, the private respondents appealed to the
RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact
that Cristita Quita was among the expositors in Cadastral Case
No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
over the lot. On the basis of such finding, the RTC concluded
that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest

private respondents, who was in actual prior physical the private respondents nor their mother had ever possessed
possession of the land. Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor,
Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to Dionesias statement commands great weight and respect.
the CA on a petition for review which was denied. His motion Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular
for reconsideration having been similarly denied. Sampayan inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay,
now files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of
ISSUE:
Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private
Whether or not the respondents have been in prior
respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in
physical possession of the property.
Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold that the mothers
being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself,
establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in
cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject
HELD:
thereof.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED
for the petitioner.
and the Decision and Resolution, respectively dated May 16,
To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested 2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals
findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed
the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that
his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by
planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in
question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that
plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the land,
and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita
Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in
possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively,
continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a
naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay
to the effect that she had been residing since 1960 onward on
Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither

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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner, Reuben Santos averred that he is the
registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision,
Matina, Davao City while respondent spouses Ayon are the
registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous
occupant of the property owned by the spouses Ayon built a
building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties.
Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985,
when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that
the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed
them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the
entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents
demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his
property and turn over to him their possession. But they
refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested
portion and even made improvements on the building. The
dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties
failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is
no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents
denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere
tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have
been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots
in 1985.
The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner which was
affirmed in toto by the RTC.
The CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and
held that petitioners proper remedy should have been
an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful
detainer.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error of law in holding that petitioner's complaint is within the
competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no error in the MTCC assuming
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding
of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is
an allegation in petitioner's complaint that respondents
occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of
his tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer
springs from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1)
year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the
instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful,
but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by
tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner.
Roxas vs. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case: "A person
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest

who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or

permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him."

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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
Ganila et al v. CA and Violeta Herrera
Facts:
Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment Complaints[4] before
the 16th MCTC in Jordan, Guimaras. alleging that she owns
Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an
area of 43,210 square meters; that she inherited the lot from her
parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct
residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of
the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996,
Herrera demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and
remove their houses and other improvements thereon.
Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by way of assistance
to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, herrera filed the
complaints.
In their Answers, eight of the petitioners claimed that
Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which they developed when
they constructed their respective houses. Another eight
maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral
Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three asserted that Lot
1227 is a social forest area. The MCTC decided in favor of
herrera ordering Ganila et al to vacate the disputed lot.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC and ruled
that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent
to possess Lot 1227. Private respondents position paper,
affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations. In
addition, the commissioners report and sketch plan showed that
indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other hand,
according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence
which would show that they are entitled to possess the lot.
Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases
against Gabasa and Amatorio since their houses occupy only a
small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio
believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was
part of the seashore. The other respondents ordered to vacate
the lot filed an appeal before the CA but was denied.
Issues:
(1) Did the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and
deciding the cases?
(2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTCs judgment?
(3) Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed
by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected?
Ruling: NO, NO, NO,
Ganila et al insist should have filed an action to recover
possession de jure or juridical possession and not a mere
complaint for ejectment because they possessed the lot in good
faith for more than 30 years and that there was no withholding
of possession of the lot.
The SC sided with herrera that there is no error in her
choice of remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the
allegations thereim and not the allegations made by Ganila et
al. Moreover the Ganila et al have admitted in their preliminary
statement that the complaints filed are indeed unlawful
detainer and that the only issue to be determined is mere
physical possession not juridical possession.
Futhermore, ganila et al confuse the action for forcible
entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough
that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior
physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable
only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon
termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact
that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not
automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest

issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to
at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or
possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of
admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or recover possession.
the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to
evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent, what her
acts initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment
In this case for ejectment, private respondents against socalled squatters is well within her rights.
allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She
alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners
to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her
tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to
vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year
from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful
detainer between the parties springs from the failure of
petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private
respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her
demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful.
Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it
simply, is not without sufficient basis.
Petitioners contention that private respondent should
have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the RTC
is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction
between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in
our jurisprudence.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful
detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from
a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the
first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible
entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed
to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary

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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Sps. Ong
Facts:
A complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against
respondents before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the
complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of
three (3) parcels of land. Petitioners likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to
theirs. Lawyer representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots
and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners
alleged.
It appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had
acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, this deed of sale and the transfers of
title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be
annulled by respondents in a complaint filed before the
Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per
record, this case is still pending resolution. Thereafter, Ross
Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc.
(petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime
Estate Realty through a sale.
MTC resolved the ejectment case in in favor of the
petitioner ordering respondents to vacate the premises in
question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to
petitioners.
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Respondents
appealed to the CA, which ruled that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over said case, as there was no contract between the
parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for
unlawful detainer.
ISSUE:
1.) W/n the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for
unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
2.) W/n petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the
possession of the subject premises.
Ruling:
1.) YES, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that
there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to
make out a case for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC.
The complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful
detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction over it in the MTC. The phrase "unlawful
withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other
source than a contract, express or implied, and which later
expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint
that despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and
still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of
the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an
unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they
are the registered owners of the lots. By their implied tolerance,
they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the
properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent
a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said
lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of
possession of the lots. 2.) With the conclusion of the first issue
in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the second
assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
Peralta-Labrador vs. Bugarin
G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership. She alleged that she is
the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m.
located in Zambales and that she purchased the same from
spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto in 1976. The following year
she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes
due thereon. In 1990, the Department of Public Works and
Highways constructed a road which traversed Cadastral Lot
No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of
petitioners lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration No.
02-2460R in 1991.
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly
took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the
same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January 18,
1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership against respondent.
In his Answer with Counterclaims, respondent
contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the
4,473 square meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous
possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended
Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to
allege that the questioned lot is covered by the aforementioned
OCT and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in
the property.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the action has prescribed.
II. Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction.
Held:
I. Yes. The action was brought after more than one (1) year
and it is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a
quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is
prescribed to complement the summary nature of such
process. The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is
made through stealth, then the one-year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
After the lapse of the one-year period, the party
dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right
of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.
II. No. The cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed
and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed
with the proper RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction over
the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express
consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription
stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will
not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
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Case Digest
REQUISITES FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY ART 434
SERIA V CABALLERO
G.R. No. 127382, Aug. 17, 2004
Facts:
On Aug. 11, 1982, spouses Dr. Jesus and Enriqueta
Seria filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against respondent Victor Caballero and
his tenants, Teodoro and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seria died
on Aug. 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children, petitioners
Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel
Petitioners allege that they are the absolute owners and
have been in actual and constructive possession for thirty-five
(35) years of a parcel of land described as follows: Lot No. 3533-
A, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, Tax Declaration No. 02161,
Location - Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental, Area - 2.5000
has Boundaries: North - Alejo Seria, South - T. Sabornido, East
- A. Seria & T. Sabornido, West - F. Caballero, and that they
discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership
over the said land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third
parties. They also discovered that the respondents Donelas
were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers. The
petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seria, bought the
land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella, as proved by a Deed of
Sale6 dated Aug. 23, 1947 and Tax Declaration No. 4029.
Petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon
since 1947 up to the present.
Respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful
owner, and had been in actual physical possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial and that it was originally
owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero.
RTC ruled in favor of Caballero. CA affirmed the
decision in toto.
Issues:
(1) whether the petitioners were able to establish the
identity of the land being claimed by them;
(2) whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated
in favor of the petitioners.
Held:
(1) No. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by the petitioners did not prove the identity of the land being
claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that
the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold
to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from
whom they purchased the land subject of their complaint.
A person who claims ownership of real property is duty-
bound to clearly identify the land being claimed, in accordance
with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership.
In order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully
proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the
property claimed, by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof.
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
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(2) No. Insufficient identification of the portion of land

claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership.
Petitioners were not able to prove that they have been in
possession of the property for the requisite number of years.
Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner
for ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with
just title.

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Property (Atty. Labitag)
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Case Digest
PROVE HIS RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP ART434
BASILIO PEREZ and PETRA MONTALBO, petitioners,
vs.
NICOLAS MENDOZA, MARGARITA MACALALAD and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was
an action to quiet title over a piece of land filed on March 20,
1959, by spouses Basilio Perez and Petra Montalbo with spouses
Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita Macalalad as defendants.
According to the complaint, the land in controversy is located in
barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan, Batangas, declared for
taxation purposes in the name of the "Heirs of Estanislao
Montalbo", and is "bounded on the north by a school site, on the
east by Calixto Flores, on the south by a creek, and on the west
by a creek and the land of Gregorio Mendoza."
On the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, the trial
court then presided by Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered judgment
on February 19, 1962, dismissing the complaint and declaring
the spouses Mendoza "to have a better right to the property in
question. The litigated parcel of land was originally part of a
bigger tract owned by Estanislao Montalbo.
When Estanislao died in 1918, his properties passed on
to his children Petra, Felisa, and Pedro all surnamed Montalbo,
and because Pedro died single the two women remained as the
only heirs. A part of the land was donated to by Andrea
Montalbo to be used as a school and the remaining was donated
to her daughter Margarita Macalalad on the occasion of her
marriage to Nicolas Mendoza, which was confirmed by a public
instrument. Petitioners contend that the disputed property was
inherited by Petra and Felisa Montalbo from their father
Estanislao who died in 1918 and since that date the two sisters
were in possession of said land.
In 1934 a deed of partition of the various properties of
Estanislao was executed between Petra and the heirs of Felisa,
and the land in question was divided equally, between them.
They claim that Felisa's husband, Jose Ortega, and children
sold their one-half share to spouses Petra Montalbo and Basilio
Perez, now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost a year after.
Sometime in 1946 petitioners leased the property to the
Mendozas and when the lease expired in 1951 they demanded
for the return of the land but the Mendozas refused and so
petitioners had to file an ejectment suit.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Nicolas Mendoza had better
right to the property in question.
Held:
Yes, the evidence has conclusively shown that the
defendants have been in continuous possession of the land since
1927 to the present time, and they have built a house on the
land in 1928 where they have resided and lived to the
present. Respondents Mendoza have been in possession of the
property since 1927 in concept of owners thereof. We have the
testimony of respondent Nicolas Mendoza that after the land
was donated to his wife in 1927 they built a house on it and lived
there continuously.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing
possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he
holds the thing under a claim of ownership. 8 Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property." In Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-27488, June
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Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest

30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, this Court upheld the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the litigated property belonged to the
private respondents therein based on their possession of the
property, not only because such findings of fact of the appellate
court are conclusive and binding on this Court but because the
conclusion is in accordance with Articles 433 and 531 of the
Civil Code.
The pretension of petitioners that the possession of the
Mendozas is that of a mere lessee was not believed by the trial
judge and the appellate court not only because of the absence of
any written or oral evidence on the matter other than the bare
testimony of petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the
circumstances present in the case which We indicated and
enumerated at pages 7 to 9 of this decision. In fine, it is a fact
that the Mendozas are presently in possession of the property
and the presumption of ownership in their favor has not been
successfully rebutted by evidence that they are mere lessees of
the land in their possession as claimed by petitioners

14
Property (Atty. Labitag)
II. OWNERSHIP
Case Digest
Dizon vs. CA
G.R. No. 101929
January 6, 1993
Facts
The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two
lots located in San Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor,
Province of Pampanga. They had six children, namely, Dionisio,
Marciana, Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes. The
spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged the aforesaid lots to
Camilo Angeles. It is alleged by the respondents that Dionisio
Galang redeemed these lots in his own name, despite the fact
that part of the funds used for the redemption came from his
sisters. Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's sisters, claim
that Galang and his five sisters had partitioned the subject lots
by virtue of an unnotarized affidavit executed by Galang. As a
consequence, Galangs sisters constructed a house therein that
was passed from generation to generation without being
questioned or disturbed. Petitioners contend that the issuance
of the original certificates of title in the sole name of Galang by
way of a cadastral proceedings was a proceeding in rem thus
binding to the whole world and without the respondents raising
an objection to it.
The Trial court favored the petitioner but the decision was
reversed by the Appellate court and upheld the rights of the
respondents on the ground that co-ownership existed between
respondents predecessors-in-interest and those of petitioners,
on the basis of Galang's affidavit which, although unnotarized,
was nonetheless an ancient document, pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, since it was executed on 27 June 1920.
As such, proof of its due execution and authentication could be
dispensed with, according to the appellate court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue/s
1. Whether or not the respondents have rights over the lots
owned by Dionisio Galang as successors-in-interest of Galangs
sisters
Held
No. The court upheld the decision of the Trial Court and
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the said affidavit is a sufficient or support for what is alleged by
respondents as a partition among Dionisio and his now
deceased sisters. It does not, as correctly stated by the trial
court, amount to anything insofar as the two lots involved. The
Court, likewise, agree with the trial court that in the absence of
definite proof establishing respondents' link/relationship to
their alleged predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang sisters,
they do not have any cause of action, and the suit for partition
must necessarily fall. They failed to establish their connection
or relationship with any of these five sisters save for their
unfounded averment that they are indeed descendants and
heirs of these deceased individuals.
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