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1.) Cebu United Enterprises v. Gallofin
Issue: Whether or not the duly executed acts of the
governmental agency can have valid effects even
beyond the life span of said agency.
Held: Yes. It is to be conceded that the agencys duly
executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the
lifespan of said government agency. The agency (ICC)
who issued the license was abolished, yet, the
license was still in effect or extended. Therefore, its
acts has valid effects notwithstanding the cessation
of its existence.
2.) Crisostomo v. CA
Crisostomo was apointed President of PCC but was
preventively suspended due to administrative
charges. Mateo was designated as OIC in his place.
PD 1341 was issued converting Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC) into PUP, and Mateo continued as
head. Crisostomos administrative charges were
dismissed, thus he ordered his reinstatement
pursuant to the dismissal of the charges.
Petitioner argues that PD 1341 which converted PCC
into PUP did not abolish the PCC. Hence, he may still
be reinstated.
Held: PD 1341 did not abolish but only changed the
former PCC into PUP. What took place was a change
in academic status, not in its corporate life, that is,
change in its name, structure and organization.
(CA said that PCC and PUP are 2 different entities
and Crisostomos term was coterminous with the
legal existence of PCC. Therefore, his term expired
upon the abolition of the PCC.)
Contentions of CA are hardly indicia of an intent to
abolish an existing institution. Nor will the changes
in its existing structure and organization will bring
about its abolition and the creation of a new one.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or
office, only an express declaration to that effect by
the lawmaking authority will do so.
3.) Viola v. Alunan III
Viola challenged the validity of the IRR of the
General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of
additional officers.
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Held: The creation of additional positions is
authorized by Sec 493 of the LGC which in fact
requires the board of directors to create such
positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. The creation of these
positions was actually made pursuant to the laws of
the Liga ng mga Barangay.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress
in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
the reorganization statutes authorizing the President
of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices
in the Executive Department.
4.) Larin v. Executive Secretary
Issue: Does the President have the power to dismiss
Larin?
No.
As Presidential Appointee, Larin comes under the
direct disciplining authority of the President for the
power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint. However, Larin enjoys security of tenure.
The fact that Larin is a Presidential Appointee does
not give the appointing authority the license to
remove him at will for Larin is likewise a career
service officer.
Therefore, as a recipient of tenurial protection, he
can only be removed only for any of the causes
enumerated in the Civil Service Decree in
accordance with procedural due process.
Issue: Was the removal for a legal cause under a
valid proceeding?
The removal complied with the requirements for
procedural due process but was not for a valid cause.
The basis used in Larins removal is the criminal
conviction against him, but this conviction was later
set aside by the SC. The acquittal of Larin in the
criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the
administrative action against him, because in such
case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to
maintain the administrative suit.
Issue: Does the President have the power to
reorganize the BIR?
Yes, the power of the President to reorganize cannot
be denied. Well-settled is the rule that
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is
pursued in good faith.
Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of simplicity, economy and efficiency. If
it is done for political reasons or to defeat the
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
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valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition
done is void ab initio.
What are the marks of bad faith in removal as a
result of reorganization?
Sec. 2, RA 6656 enumerates the circumstances
evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as
a result of reorganization:
(1) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
(2) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is
created;
(3) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
(4) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices;
(5) Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in sec. 3 hereof.
5.) Dario v. Mison
Issue: WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it
could have validly done under an "automatic"-
vacancy-authority and to remove them without
rhyme or reason.
Held: Reorganizations must be carried out in good
faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the
reorganization was indeed made in good faith
because he hired more people to replace those that
he fired and no legitimate structural changes have
been made.
To sum up, the President could have validly removed
officials before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution even without cause because it was a
revolutionary government. However, from the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not
lose its right to reorganize resulting to removals but
such reorganization must be made in good faith.
6.) Tondo Medical Center Employees vs. CA
President Estrada issued EO 102, which provided for
the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH.
Issue: Whether or not the EO NO. 102 violates the
constitution?
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Held: No. Reorganization of DOH under EO 102 is not
a usurpation of legislative power. EO 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), gives continuing
authority to the President to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President.
The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from
its effects in a particular case.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: The president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. It is an
exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code,
recognized by other statutes, and consistently
affirmed by this Court.
7.) Banda v. Ermita
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed EO 378,
amending Section 6 of EO 285 by removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies.
Held: Yes, reorganization was valid. In the present
case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization
under the general provisions of the law consisting
mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of
simplicity, economy and efficiency.
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases
that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices."
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of
1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.
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The Administrative Code provides that the Office of
the President consists of the Office of the President
Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies
under the Office of the President are identified in
Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative
Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the
President. The agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those
under the administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, those attached to it for policy and
program coordination, and those that are not placed
by law or order creating them under any specific
department.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing EO 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes,
and consistently affirmed by this Court.
8.) Dacudao v. Gonzales
The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa
against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after
the petitioners were defrauded in a business
venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department
Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the
country to forward all cases already filed against
Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action.
The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutors Office
of Cagayan De Oro City. They maintained that DO
182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against
passing laws with retroactive effect.
Held: No grave abuse of discretion and DO No. 182
enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity.
In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court
has extended the presumption of validity to
legislative issuances as well as to rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies,
saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by
administrative agencies to implement and interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the
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force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules
and regulations partake of the nature of a statute
and are just as binding as if they have been written
in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside
with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of
the questioned issuances, it became incumbent
upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality
and invalidity, either by showing that the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the
Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the
bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
other pertinent laws. They did not do so.
They must further show that the performance of the
DOJs functions under the Administrative Code of
1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the
impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That
was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive
petitioners in any degree of their right to seek
redress for the alleged wrong done against them by
the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were
designed to assist petitioners and others like them to
expedite the prosecution. Thereby, the Secretary of
Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against
petitioners.
9.) Balanguan v. CA
Held: No grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA
in setting aside the resolutions of DOJ.
(DOJ is not a quasi judicial body) HSBC maintains
that it is incorrect to argue that it was not necessary
for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution
recite the facts and the law on which it was based,
because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should
faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by
them should state clearly and distinctly the facts of
the case and the law on which the decision is based.
It must be remembered that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and
that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising
a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as
quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent
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that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an
officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point.
A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which
affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its
awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court.
Such is not the case when a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause to file an Information against a
person charged with a criminal offense, or when the
Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions.
In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds
no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified
the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBCs
motion for reconsideration.
10.) Olaguer v. RTC
Held: In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a
co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-
equal bodies have no power to control the other.
The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals
have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of
its powers under the applicable Executive Orders
and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain
or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG.
By the same token, the regional trial courts have no
jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG
acting for and in behalf of said commission.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be
sued in such capacity before the ordinary courts. The
tribunal for such purpose is the Sandiganbayan.
It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the
private respondents before the respondent judge to
the effect that petitioners are usurpers and have no
right to sit in the board of directors or act as
corporate officers of the PJI are issues which should
be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
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11.) Padua v. Ranada
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued a resolution
authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the
Metro Manila Skyway.
Issue: WON the TRB Executive Director Jaime
Dumlao, Jr. alone can authorized the provisional
increase.
Held: It is not true that it was TRB Executive Director
Dumlao, Jr. alone who issued Resolution. The
Resolution itself contains the signature of the four
TRB Directors.
An administrative agency may employ other persons,
such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to
receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports,
on the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity.
The Supreme Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings, one of which is that the tribunal or
body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate. Thus, it is logical to say that this
mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in
cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is
assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall
not merely rely on his recommendation but instead
shall personally weigh and assess the evidence
which the said subordinate has gathered.
Therefore, TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice, publication or
hearing, provisional authority to collect the increase
in rates.
An administrative agency may be empowered to
approve provisionally, when demanded by urgent
public need, rates of public utilities without a
hearing. Provisional rates are by their nature
temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity
with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.
12.) Eugenio v. CSC
Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service
Eligibility (CES). She was appointed as an CESB officer
but her appointment to said rank was impeded
when the CSC abolished the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB).
Issue: WON CSC usurped legislative function of
Congress by abolishing the CESB.
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Held: Yes. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as
CESB was created by law, and it can only be
abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the
power to reorganize under the Administrative Code
of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which
enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC.
CESB is not one of such offices. As read together, the
inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commissions power to reorganize is limited to
offices under its control as enumerated in Section
16.
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity,
albeit administratively attached to CSC. This essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by
its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain policy and program
coordination.
13.) Hijo Plantation, Inc v. Central Bank
Held: It therefore becomes convenient for the
legislative department of the government to provide
for the conduct, control, and management of the
work of the particular department of the
government to authorize certain persons in charge
of the management and control of such department.
Such regulations have uniformly been held to have
the force of law whenever they are found to be in
consonance and in harmony with the general
purposes and objects of the law. These are binding
upon all the parties, as if the regulation had been
written in the original law itself.
On the other hand, should the regulation be in
conflict with the law, the validity of the regulation
cannot be sustained. Respondent in gross violation
of the law, instead issued Resolution No. 1995 which
impose a 6% stabilization tax for the calendar year
January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972, which obviously is
in excess of its jurisdiction. It was further argued that
in directing its agent bank to collect the stabilization
tax in accordance with Monetary Board Resolution
No. 1995, it acted whimsically and capriciously.
It is evident that the Board acted beyond its
authority under the law and the Constitution.
Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic
law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
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14.) Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Santiago
Upon the complaints of respondents, the Public
Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine as penalty
against RCPI.
Issue: Whether the PSC had the jurisdiction to act on
complaints
Held: No. There can be no justification then for the
Public Service Commission imposing the fines. The
only power it possessed over radio companies, as
noted was the fix rates. It could not take to task a
radio company for any negligence or misfeasance for
it was bereft of such competence and not vested
with such authority.
A public official must locate in the statute relied
upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It
need not be express; it may be implied from the
wording of the law. Absent such a requisite, no
warrant exists for the assumption of authority.
15.) Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank
Held: Nowhere in the pertinent provisions of R.A.
720 is the monetary Board authorized to mete out
on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their
past due accounts with Appellant. While the
Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory
powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of
administrative penalties cannot be taken as a
measure supervisory in character.
There are, however, limitations to the rule-making
power of administrative agencies. A rule shaped out
by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations
to implement given legislation, all that is required is
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it,
but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. A rule is binding on the courts so long as
the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statute granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom.
However, administrative interpretation of the law is
at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means. Hence an
administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not
so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation
of the rules and regulations, much less one that is
applied retroactively.
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16.) Globe Wireless Ltd v. Public Service
Commission
PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible
for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service
complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act"
(due to non-delivery of message) and ordering it "to
pay a fine P200.00, thus the issue on jurisdiction.
Held: PSC without jurisdiction. Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which
petitioner was operating, limited respondent
Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the
rate which petitioner may charge the Public.
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having
allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of
private respondent to the addressee in Madrid,
Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had
nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of
the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over
petitioner.
Too basic in administrative law is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies,
like respondent Commission, are limited to those
expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body; and
any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective.
17.) Polloso v. Gangan
National Power Corporation (NPC) hired by way of
service contract Atty. Satorre, a private lawyer, to
perform and provide legal functions and services.
The unit auditor of NPC issued a Notice of
Disallowance for the payment of the services
rendered by Atty Satorre because it violates COA
Circular No 86-255 which requires that contract of
services should have the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or Corporate
Counsel and the concurrence of the Commission on
Audit (COA).
Held: (Doctrine: Prevention of Unnecessary
Expenses). The court ruled against the petition.
The COA circular was issued recognizing the problem
of hiring private lawyers in consideration of fixed
retainer fees, at times in unreasonable amounts,
paid from public funds.
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Contrary to the view espoused by petitioner, the
prohibition covers the hiring of private lawyers to
render any form of legal service. It makes no
distinction as to whether or not the legal services to
be performed involve an actual legal controversy or
court litigation.
COA conducts audit proceedings in order to prevent
the irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
or unconscionable expenditure of
government/public funds. Public funds will not be
disbursed to pay private lawyers unless there is prior
written conformity and acquiescence from the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel. The court said the circular was a safeguard
to prevent the irregular, unnecessary, excessive and
extravagant or unconscionable expenditure.
18.) Chavez v. National Housing Authority
1. WON respondents NHA and RBI have been
granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of
the public domain as this power is vested exclusively
in PEA as claimed by petitioner.
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. This does not
mean that it shall be responsible for all. The
requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project
are approval by the President (which were provided
for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA
(which were seen as a part of its recommendations
to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by the National
Government Agency (NHA is a government agency
whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation
with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
2. WON respondents NHA and RBI were given the
power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands.
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the
DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to
reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the
DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which
provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special
Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are
exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
above mentioned MOs that originally authorized the
reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation
of lands of public domain is reposed first in the
Philippine President.
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On operative fact doctrine:
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had
already been terminated by virtue of MOA between
RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question
after the passage of around 10 years from the start
of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed
or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor
General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had
ample opportunity to question the said project, but
did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to
the aforementioned general rule.
The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De
Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we
held: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception
to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law.
19.) Makati Stock Exchange v. SEC
This is an issue on resolution of the Securities and
Exchange Commission which would deny the Makati
Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a stock
exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its
board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock
Exchange.
Petitioner contended that the permission provided
by law amounted to prohibition, and that the
commission has no power to impose it.
Issue: Whether the SEC has the authority to
promulgate the rule in question.
Held: No. It is fundamental that an administrative
officer has only such powers as are expressly granted
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to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied
in the exercise thereof.
The commission cites no provision of law expressly
supporting its rule against double listing. The
commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule which result in discrimination
and violation of constitutional rights.
The test is not whether the act forbids the
commission from imposing a prohibition but
whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.
The Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule. The Administrative Officer has
such powers as are expressly granted to him and
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
20.) Taule v. Santos
Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
respondent Santos, the Secretary of Local
Government, protesting the election of the officers
of the FABC and seeking its nullification. Respondent
Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election
of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes ordering a
new one to be conducted as early as possible.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction to entertain an election protest.
Held: No. The Secretary of Local Government is not
vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that
unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the
statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer
it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to
give validity to their determinations.
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional
provision expressly or even by necessary implication
conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government
the power to assume jurisdiction over an election
protect involving officers of the FABC.
21.) Radio Communications of the Phils. v. National
Telecommunications Commission
Private respondent, on the account of the non-
delivery of the telegrams, filed a letter-complaint
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against the RCPI with the NTC. Commission finds
respondent administratively liable for deficient and
inadequate service and hereby imposes the penalty
of FINE. Thus, the issue on jurisdiction.
Held: No. NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine.
The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power
to impose administrative fines on public service
utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have
failed to render adequate service to consumers.
Neither has it expanded the coverage of the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.
There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate
the settled doctrine in administrative law that: Too
basic in administrative law is the rule that
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies,
like respondent Commission, are limited to those
expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body; and
any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective.
22.) Solid Homes v. Payawal
Issue: Whether the NHA had the jurisdiction over
cases involving claims, refund and any other claims
filed by the subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer.
Held: Yes. The applicable law is PD No. 957, as
amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of
Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under
Presidential Decree No. 957."
The language of this section 1 in PD 957, especially
the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the
petitioner and the private respondent is vested not
in the Regional Trial Court but in the National
Housing Authority.
23.) Antipolo Realty Corp. v. NHA
Antipolo Realty contended that the jurisdiction to
hear and decide Yuson's complaint was lodged in the
regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint
involved the interpretation and application of the
Contract to Sell.
Held: NHA has jurisdiction. It is by now
commonplace learning that many administrative
agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers
and functions, though to a limited extent only.
Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
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authority to administrative agencies is well
recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the
need for special competence and experience has
been recognized as essential in the resolution of
questions of complex or specialized character and
because of a companion recognition that the
dockets of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged.
Presidential Decree No. 1344 clarified and spelled
out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of
regulatory authority to the NHA in the following
quite specific terms: (see Solid Homes Case)
24.) Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite filed a complaint with
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage
dumpsite in Caloocan City due to its harmful effects.
LLDA issued a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala
Estate, Caloocan City.
Issue: Whether the LLDA have the power and
authority to issue a "cease and desist" order
Held: Yes. The cease and desist order issued by the
LLDA cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise
by the LLDA of injunctive powers.
By its express terms, RA 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and EO 927 authorizes the LLDA to "make,
alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." The law explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a
"cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to
the effect that the rule granting such authority need
not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers.
In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a
"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
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The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist
order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure
under the circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter
and its amendatory laws.
25.) Buenaseda v. Flavier
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the power to
suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials
and employees.
Held: Yes. (Preventive suspension) When the
constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power
"to recommend the suspension" of a public official
or employees, it referred to "suspension," as a
punitive measure.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative
charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal
statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after
compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as
an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official
the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials
or employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such actions,
the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In
turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation
in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need
to suspend the respondent.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. The Administrative Code of 1987 also
empowered the proper disciplining authority to
"preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an
investigation.
26.) Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan
Issue: Whether or not Azarcon can be considered a
public officer by reason of his designation by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of
distrained property.
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Held: No, petitioners designation by the BIR as a
custodian of distrained property does not qualify as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in
requiring Azarcon to sign a pro forma receipt for it,
effectively designated petitioner a depositary and,
hence, a public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework,
which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies exercise only
that power delegated to them as defined either in
the Constitution or in legislation or in both.
Although the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, the quantum of powers
possessed by an administrative agency will still be
limited to that conferred expressly or by necessary
or fair implication in its enabling act. Hence, an
administrative officer has only such powers as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.
Implied powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than
the power granted. It cannot extend to other
matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental
thereto. For to so extend the statutory grant of
power would be an encroachment on powers
expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.
The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to
act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include
the power to appoint him as a public officer. The
Court thus finds petitioners to be both private
individuals erroneously charged before and
convicted by Sandiganbayan which had no
jurisdiction over them. All the proceedings as well as
the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
27.) Masangcay v. COMELEC
Masangcay, with several others, was charged before
the COMELEC with contempt for having opened 3
boxes containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan.
It is contended that, even if petitioner can be held
guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is
null and void for lack of valid power on the part of
COMELEC to impose such disciplinary penalty under
the principle of separation of powers.
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Issue: Whether or not COMELEC lacks power to
charge petitioner with contempt.
Held: Yes. (Guevara v. COMELEC) The COMELEC has
only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to
the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections.
Thus, the Commission may exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision law come under its jurisdiction.
In the same case, we also expressed the view that
when the Commission exercises a ministerial
function, it cannot exercise the power to punish
contempt because such power is inherently judicial
in nature. The exercise of this power has always
been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute
of courts.
In the instant case, the resolutions merely call for
the exercise of an administrative or ministerial
function for they merely concern the procedure to
be followed in the distribution of ballots and other
election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for
contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
28.) Freeman, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission
Issue: Whether or not the SEC, being a coordinate
body with the Regional Trial Court, may interfere in
the proceedings held therein and review the issues
passed upon by the said court.
Held: No. Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals
should be understood in the light of 2 basic legal
principles.
First, that administrative agencies like the SEC are
tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such can
exercise only those powers which are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes.
The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its
minority stockholders is well within the jurisdiction
of the SEC to resolve in accordance with P.D. No.
902-A. However, the inclusion in the SEC case of
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT of which private
respondents are not stockholders is a matter outside
of the limited jurisdiction of the SEC.
The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-
interference which should be regarded as highly
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important in judicial stability and in the
administration of justice whereby the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,
modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction.
The SEC is at the very least co-equal with the
Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no
power to control the other.
29.) City of Baguio v. Nio
Held: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-
judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency.
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the
Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management
Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over
the Land Management Bureau) the authority to
issue an order of demolition which the Amended
Order of Execution, in substance, is.
While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is
confined to the determination of the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases
which involve the disposition of public lands, the
power to determine who has the actual, physical
possession or occupation or the better right of
possession over public lands remains with the
courts.
30.) Eslao v. Commission on Audit
Held: In Warren Manufacturing Workers Union
(WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court
held that "administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the
law have the force of law and are entitled to great
respect."
It is difficult for the Court to understand why, despite
these certifications, respondent COA took such a
rigid and uncompromising posture that CPG No. 80-4
was the applicable criterion for honoraria to be given
members of the reforestation evaluation project
team of the PSU.
Respondent COA's contention that the DBM
clarification is unconstitutional as that ruling does
not fulfill the requisites of a valid classification is, in
the Court's perception, imaginative but nonetheless
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an after-thought and a futile attempt to justify its
action. the constitutional arguments raised by
respondent COA here were never even mentioned
COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment
for any applicable law or administrative regulation
with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not
agree at least not before such law or regulation is set
aside by the authorized agency of government as
unconstitutional or illegal and void.
1.) Aratuc v. COMELEC
Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then
being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in
Cotabato City. The Regional Board of Canvassers
issued a resolution, over the objection of the KB
candidates, declaring all the eight KBL candidates
elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to
the Comelec.
Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring
seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as
having obtained the first eight places, and ordering
the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed
the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec has
committed grave abuse of discretion,amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Held: No. As the Superior administrative body
having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional
Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry
beyond the election records of the voting centers in
questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such
actuations does not spring from any appellant
jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law,
for there is none such provision anywhere in the
election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of
direct control and supervision endowed to it by the
provisions in Section 168.
In administrative law, a superior body or office
having supervision and control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to
have done.
2.) Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board
Caltex, Shell Petroleum, and Petron Corporation filed
with the Board for permission to increase the prices
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of petroleum products and for provisional authority
to increase temporarily such prices pending further
proceedings. The Board granted provisional relief
pursuant to Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172.
The petitioners submit that the Order had been
issued without proper notice and hearing.
Held: Provisional increase is valid. As the Order itself
indicates, the authority for provisional increase falls
within the above provision. What must be stressed is
that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing
is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did
here, subject to its final disposition of whether or
not: 1) to make it permanent; 2) to reduce or
increase it further; or 3) to deny the application.
In the light of Section 8, public respondent Board
need not even have conducted formal hearings in
these cases prior to issuance of its Order granting a
provisional increase of prices. The Board, upon its
own discretion and on the basis of documents and
evidence submitted by private respondents, could
have issued an order granting provisional relief
immediately upon filing by private respondents of
their respective applications.
3.) US v. Dorr
Issue: Whether or not the article be regarded as
embraced within the description of scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Held: No. The important question is to determine
what is meant in Section 8 of Act No. 292 by the
expression The Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands.
We understand, in modern political science, by the
term government, that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority
of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which
rule a society. Administration is the aggregate of
those persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being. Government
and administration and are not always used in their
strictness, and that government is often used for
administration.
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The article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the United States, and it is
quite apparent that it contains no attack upon the
governmental system by which the authority of the
United States is enforced in these Islands.
It is the character of the men who are entrusted with
the administration of the government that the writer
is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the
purity of their motives, their public integrity, and
their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy.
The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious
tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense
under Section 8 of Act No. 292
4.) Malaga v. Penachos
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) caused
the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a laboratory building but was denied.
Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the
project.
Defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order
on the ground that the Court was prohibited from
issuing restraining orders by PD No. 1818
(prohibiting courts from issuing restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure and natural resource development
projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government).
Issue: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a
government instrumentality such that it would fall
under the prohibition in PD 1818.
Held: Yes.
Definition of Instrumentality
- refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and GOCCs.
Definition of Chartered Institution
- refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
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It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD
1818.
HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present
controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts
of the administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters. What is involved here is non-
compliance with the procedural rules on bidding
which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not
intended to shield from judicial scrutiny the
irregularities committed by administrative agencies
such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence,
the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
5.) The United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc., v.
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP)
Issue: Whether or not COSLAP is empowered to hear
and try a petition for annulment of contracts with
prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and
conduct a hearing thereof.
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming
jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasi-
judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to
the actions and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis
for their official action, and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as
an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises
quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative
agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed
judicial tribunals.
The doctrine of separation of powers observed in
our system of government reposes the 3 great
powers into its 3 branches the legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary each department
being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its
own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by
its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own
agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered "to determine whether or not there has
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been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
6.) Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive
Secretary
Issue: Whether or not the reorganization of these
administrative agencies should be the subject of a
statute.
Held: No. The Constitution confers, by express
provision, the power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices in the President
alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative
power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them. The Constitution has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. Except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters
of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact
laws, the President executes the laws. The President
also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative
power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
The Constitutions express grant of the power of
control in the President justifies an executive action
to carry out reorganization measures under a broad
authority of law.
It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed
as agencies under the Office of the President. The
Agencies under the Office of the President refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control
of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those
attached to the Office for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law
or order creating them under any special
department.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer
any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in
the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against
these guidelines, the challenged executive orders
may not be said to have been issued with grave
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abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
The President saw it fit to streamline the agencies so
as not to hinder the delivery of crucial social
reforms. The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364
aims to attain the objectives of simplicity, economy
and efficiency as gathered from the provision
granting PCUP and NCIP access to the range of
services provided by the DARs technical offices and
support systems.
The characterization of the NCIP as an independent
agency under the Office of the President does not
remove said body from the Presidents control and
supervision with respect to its performance of
administrative functions. In transferring the NCIP to
the DAR as an attached agency, the President
effectively tempered the exercise of presidential
authority and considerably recognized that degree of
independence.
In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show
how the reorganization by executive fiat would
hamper the exercise of citizens rights and privileges.
It has not shown that by placing the NCIP as an
attached agency of the DAR, the President altered
the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all
claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples. Nor
has it been shown, nay alleged, that the
reorganization was made in bad faith. It rested on
the ambiguous conclusion that the reorganization
jeopardizes economic, social and cultural rights.
7.) Beja v. CA
Held: As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive
suspension" as a remedial measure with
"suspension" as a penalty for administrative
dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension
on a government employee charged with an
administrative offense is subject to the Civil Service
Law.
Although the foregoing section does not expressly
provide for a mechanism for an administrative
investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to
remove erring employees on the General Manager,
with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the
law impliedly grants said officials the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of
Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation,
the PPA General Manager may subject the employee
concerned to preventive suspension.
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The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.
Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA
General Manager impose the proper penalty in
accordance with law. It is the latter action which
requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the
complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB
was premature. The PPA General Manager should
have first conducted an investigation, made the
proper recommendation for the imposable penalty
and sought its approval by the PPA Board of
Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the
herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then
DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take
jurisdiction of the case.
8.) Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees
Held: In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), v. Romero, this
Court ruled that a voluntary arbitrator by the
nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a
panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial
agency but independent of, and apart from, the
NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the
latter.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or
the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be
considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a quasi-
judicial instrumentality.
An instrumentality is anything used as a means or
agency. Thus, the terms governmental agency or
instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that
either of them is a means by which a government
acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word instrumentality,
with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to
which the state delegates governmental power for
the performance of a state function.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state
function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions in the Labor
Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term instrumentality in Sec.
9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers
are provided for in the Labor Code does not place
him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a
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quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated
therein.
9.) Iron and Steel Authority v. CA
MCFCs contention: no valid judgment could be
rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a
juridical person.
Petitioners contention: despite the expiration of its
term, its juridical existence continued until the
winding up of its affairs could be completed. ISA
urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being the
real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be
substituted for petitioner ISA.
Issue: Whether or not the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISA's term
Held: Yes. It should also be noted that the enabling
statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into
certain kinds of contracts "for and in behalf of the
Government".
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributes normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D.
No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated
agency or instrumentality of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. We consider that the ISA
is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines.
When the statutory term of a non-
incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof.
ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its
capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under P.D. No. 272. The present
expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for
the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be
substituted in the expropriation proceedings as
party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
14

having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration
of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or
justify the dismissal of the eminent domain
proceedings.
While the power of eminent domain is, in principle,
vested primarily in the legislative department of the
government, we believe and so hold that no new
legislative act is necessary should the Republic
decide, upon being substituted for ISA, to continue
to prosecute the expropriation proceedings. The
legislative authority enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the President of the
Philippines to exercise, or cause the exercise of, the
power of eminent domain on behalf of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
10.) Leyson v. Office of the Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint based on the findings that the entities
involved are private corporations over which this
Office has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner contended that since it was declared that
coconut levy funds are public funds, then
conformably with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,
corporations formed and organized from those funds
or whose controlling stocks are from those funds
should be regarded as government owned and/or
controlled corporations.
Issue: Whether or not the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund companies are government
corporations.
Ruling: No. Government owned or controlled
corporation (GOCC) is any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock.
Requisites of GOCC:
a) Any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation;
b) Vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature;
c) Owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations,
to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent
of its capital stock.
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In the present case, all three (3) corporations
comprising the CIIF companies were organized as
stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of
the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED
COCONUT.
Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI
OIL removes this firm from the definition of a
government owned or controlled corporation.
Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT
and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second
requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that
petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions.
There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or
UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature. The Court thus concludes that
the CIIF companies are, as found by public
respondent, private corporations not within the
scope of its jurisdiction.
11.) Manila International Airport Authority v. City
of Pasay
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Property Tax
Delinquency from the City of Pasay. The City of
Pasay, through its City Treasurer, issued warrants of
levy for the NAIA Pasay properties.
Issue: Whether or not the NAIA Pasay properties of
MIAA are exempt from real property tax.
Ruling: Yes. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently
its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government
instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation.
Unless the government instrumentality is organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers.
Thus, MIAA is not a GOCC but a government
instrumentality which is exempt from any kind of tax
from the local governments. Indeed, the exercise of
the taxing power of local government units is subject
to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the
Local Government Code, which states that local
government units have no power to tax
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instrumentalities of the national government like the
MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property
tax for the NAIA Pasay properties.
Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings of
MIAA are properties of public dominion intended for
public use, and as such are exempt from real
property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code.
However, under the same provision, if MIAA leases
its real property to a taxable person, the specific
property leased becomes subject to real property
tax. In this case, only those portions of the NAIA
Pasay properties which are leased to taxable persons
like private parties are subject to real property tax by
the City of Pasay.
12.) University of the Philippines v. Dizon
UP entered into a General Construction Agreement
with respondent Stern Builders for the construction
of a building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3
progress billings, but UP failed to pay the 3rd billing,
prompting Stern Builders and Dela Cruz to sue the
UP to collect the unpaid billing and to recover
damages.
Issue: Whether or not UP funds can validly be
garnished
Ruling: No. UPs funds, being government funds, are
not subject to garnishment. UP is a government
instrumentality performing the States constitutional
mandate of promoting quality and accessible
education. As a government instrumentality, the UP
administers special funds sourced from the fees and
income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section
1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations.
All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a
"special trust fund", the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UPs mission and
purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by
the COA.
Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a "trust fund"
as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an
agency of the government or of a public officer as
trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received
for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund
may be utilized only for the "specific purpose for
which the trust was created or the funds received."
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The funds of the UP are government funds that are
public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the
UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of
this action could not be validly made the subject of
the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment.
Other Discussions: Suability of the State
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, and liability depends on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment
of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual
and moral damages (including attorneys fees) was
not validly made if there was no special
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required
before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for
moral and actual damages (including attorneys fees)
would be satisfied considering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the "appropriations
earmarked for the said project." The Constitution
strictly mandated that "(n)o money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
13.) Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency,
Inc., v. University of the Philippines
Several security guards assigned to UP filed separate
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of
underpaid wages. NLRC said that the satisfaction of
the judgment award in favor of Lockheed will be only
against the funds of UP which are not identified as
public funds. CA dismissed the petition in light of the
ruling in NEA v. Morales which mandates that all
money claims against the government must first be
filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Held: This Court finds that the CA correctly applied
the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government and has
the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA,
it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be
subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has
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primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all
debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCCs and their
subsidiaries.
We cannot subscribe to Lockheeds argument that
NEA is not similarly situated with UP because COAs
jurisdiction over the latter is only on post-audit basis.
A reading of the pertinent Commonwealth Act
provision clearly shows that it does not make any
distinction as to which of the government
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries whose debts
should be filed before the COA.
As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed,
contrary to its claim that there is nothing that can be
done since the funds of UP had already been
garnished, since the garnishment was erroneously
carried out and did not go through the proper
procedure (the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is
entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds.
14.) Liban v. Gordon
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Respondent insists that the PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Issue: Whether or not the PNRC is a GOCC
Ruling: No. The PNRC is not government-owned but
privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands
of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC
are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately
funded, and privately run charitable organization.
The PNRC is not a GOCC.
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Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of
Camporedondo v. NLRC, which ruled that the PNRC
is a GOCC. The simple test used was whether the
corporation was created by its own special charter
for the exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general corporation law.
Since the PNRC was created under a special charter,
the Court then ruled that it is a government
corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling
failed to consider the definition of a GOCC as
provided under the Administrative Code of 1987.
Hence, it is now deemed inapplicable.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was
created through a special charter. However, unlike
the Local Water Districts, the elements of
government ownership and control are clearly
lacking in the PNRC. Although the PNRC is created
by a special charter, it cannot be considered a GOCC
in the absence of the essential elements of
ownership and control by the government. (See
Leyson case)
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
15.) Republic of the Philippines v. City of Paranaque
PRA (was PEA before), a government corporation,
reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located
in Paraaque City. Warrants of Levy were issued on
PRAs reclaimed properties.
Issue: Whether or not PRA is a GOCC, a taxable
entity, and, therefore, not exempt from payment of
real property taxes
Ruling: No. PRA was not organized either as a stock
or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created
by Congress to operate commercially and compete
in the private market.
1.) PRA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing an essential public
service pursuant to the Administrative Code. Being
an incorporated government instrumentality, it is
exempt from payment of real property tax.
2.) Section 234 of the Local Government Code
provides that real property owned by the Republic
of the Philippines is exempt from real property tax
unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted
to a taxable person. In this case, there is no proof
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that PRA granted the beneficial use of the subject
reclaimed lands to a taxable entity.
The Administrative Code allows real property owned
by the Republic to be titled in the name of agencies
or instrumentalities of the national government.
Such real properties remain owned by the Republic
and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.
Indeed, the Republic grants the beneficial use of its
real property to an agency or instrumentality of the
national government. This happens when the title of
the real property is transferred to an agency or
instrumentality even as the Republic remains the
owner of the real property. Such arrangement does
not result in the loss of the tax exemption, unless
"the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."
3.) The Court agrees with PRA that the subject
reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain,
owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from
payment of real estate taxes. (Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution and Article 420 of the Civil
Code)
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands,
specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain
public lands and form part of the public domain.
16.) AGRA v. COA
A group of NEA employees who were hired after
October 31, 1989 claimed that they did not receive
meal, rice, and childrens allowances. RTC issued a
Notice of Garnishment against the funds of NEA with
DBP.
Issue: WON the immutability of final decision
doctrine must prevail over the exclusive jurisdiction
of the COA to audit and settle disbursements of
funds
Ruling: No. The immutability rule applies only when
the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for
mandamus is a money claim falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of this
Commission.
All money claims against the Government must be
filed with the Commission on Audit which shall act
upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the
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Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the
State thereby.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an
administrative body is clothed with original and
exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without
power and authority to exercise concurrently such
jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the
court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and
decisions reached thereby are null and void. Money
claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is
appealable only to the SC. The lower courts have
nothing to do with such transactions. (Case also
cited NEA v. Morales)
17.) Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-
Demigilio
TIDCORP, a government corporation, charged
Demigillo, then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP,
with grave misconduct. Pending the investigation,
TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive
suspension for 90 days. Demigillo assailed her
preventive suspension in the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC ruled that her
suspension was not proper.
Held: Preventive suspension was proper. Under
Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
imposition of preventive suspension by the proper
disciplining authority is authorized provided the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service.
Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a
preventive suspension may issue there must be
proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the
witnesses against him or may tamper the
documentary evidence on file in her office.
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that
preventive suspension pending investigation is a
measure intended to enable the disciplining
authority to investigate charges against respondent
by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any
way influencing witnesses against him. As such,
preventing the subordinate officer or employee from
intimidating the witnesses during investigation or
from tampering the documentary evidence in her
office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing
preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the
word intended.
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18.) Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC
Issues:
1. WON BSP is a government-owned or controlled
corporation; and
2. WON the BSP is embraced within the Civil Service
as that term is defined in Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the
1987 Constitution
Ruling: BSP may be regarded as both a "government
controlled corporation with an original charter" and
as an "instrumentality" of the Government within
the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the
Constitution.
Firstly, BSP's functions as set out in its statutory
charter do have a public aspect. BSP's functions do
relate to the fostering of the public virtues of
citizenship and patriotism and the general
improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of our
youth. At the same time, BSP's sanctions do not
relate to the governance of any part of territory of
the Philippines; BSP is not a public corporation in the
same sense that municipal corporations or local
governments are public corporations.
BSP's functions cannot also be described as
proprietary functions in the same sense that the
functions or activities of government-owned or
controlled corporations like the National
Development Company or the National Steel
Corporation can be described as proprietary or
"business-like" in character. Nevertheless, the public
character of BSP's functions and activities must be
conceded, for they pertain to the educational, civic
and social development of the youth which
constitutes a very substantial and important part of
the nation.
The second aspect that the Court must take into
account relates to the governance of the BSP. The
composition of the National Executive Board of the
BSP includes, as noted from Section 5 of its charter
quoted earlier, includes 7 Secretaries of Executive
Departments. The 7 Secretaries (now 6 in view of
the abolition of the Department of Youth and Sports
and merger thereof into the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports) by themselves do not
constitute a majority of the members of the National
Executive Board.
We must note at the same time that the
appointments of members of the National Executive
Board, except only the appointments of the Regional
Chairman and Scouts of Senior age from the various
Scout Regions, are subject to ratification and
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confirmation by the Chief Scout, who is the
President of the Philippines. Vacancies to the Board
are filled by a majority vote of the remaining
members thereof, but again subject to ratification
and confirmation by the Chief Scout. We must
assume that such confirmation or ratification
involves the exercise of choice or discretion on the
part of ratifying or confirming power.
It does appear therefore that there is substantial
governmental (i.e., Presidential) participation or
intervention in the choice of the majority of the
members of the National Executive Board of the BSP.
The third aspect relates to the character of the
assets and funds of the BSP. The original assets of
the BSP were acquired by purchase or gift or other
equitable arrangement with the Boy Scouts of
America, of which the BSP was part before the
establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
The BSP charter, however, does not indicate that
such assets were public or statal in character or had
originated from the Government or the State. We
note only that BSP funds have not apparently
heretofore been regarded as public funds by the
Commission on Audit, considering that such funds
have not been audited by the Commission.
While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of
entity, combining aspects of both public and private
entities, we believe that considering the character of
its purposes and its functions, the statutory
designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and
the substantial participation of the Government in
the selection of members of the National Executive
Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted
under its charter, is a government-controlled
corporation within the meaning of Article IX. (B) (2)
(1) of the Constitution.
We are fortified in this conclusion when we note
that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the
BSP as one of the attached agencies of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
("DECS").
An "agency of the Government" is defined as
referring to any of the various units of the
Government including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, government-owned or-controlled
corporation, or local government or distinct unit
therein.
Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in
the 1987 Administrative Code in the following
manner:
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Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually
through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
and government-owned or controlled corporations.
The same Code describes a "chartered institution"
in the following terms:
Chartered institution refers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the State.
We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded
as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987
Administrative Code. It thus appears that the BSP
may be regarded as both a "government controlled
corporation with an original charter" and as an
"instrumentality" of the Government within the
meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution.
It follows that the employees of petitioner BSP are
embraced within the Civil Service and are
accordingly governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that both the Labor
Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondents; neither labor agency had before it any
matter which could validly have been passed upon
by it in the exercise of original or appellate
jurisdiction.
19.) Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. General
Foods (Phils.), Inc.
Held: It has been a long standing policy and practice
of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-
judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a
highly specialized body specifically created for the
purpose of reviewing tax cases.
The CTA, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated
exclusively to the study and consideration of tax
problems. It has necessarily developed an expertise
on the subject. We extend due consideration to its
opinion unless there is an abuse or improvident
exercise of authority. Since there is none in the case
at bar, the Court adheres to the findings of the CTA.
Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals
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committed reversible error when it declared the
subject media advertising expense to be deductible
as an ordinary and necessary expense on the ground
that "it has not been established that the item being
claimed as deduction is excessive."
It is not incumbent upon the taxing authority to
prove that the amount of items being claimed is
unreasonable. The burden of proof to establish the
validity of claimed deductions is on the taxpayer. In
the present case, that burden was not discharged
satisfactorily.
20.) Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The
Philippine American Accident Insurance
Company, Inc.
Respondents are domestic corporations licensed
to transact insurance business in the country.
Respondents paid the Bureau of Internal Revenue
under protest the 3% tax imposed on lending
investors by Section 195-A of Commonwealth Act
No. 466 (CA 466), as amended by Republic Act No.
6110 (RA 6110) and other laws
Respondents sent a letter-claim to petitioner
seeking a refund of the taxes paid under protest
and filed a petition to the CTA. The CTA ruled that
respondents were entitled to their refund.
Issue: WON Insurance Companies should be taxed
(3% percentage tax) as lending investors
Ruling: No. Insurance companies cannot be
considered lending investors under CA 466, as
amended. Neither Section 182(A)(3)(dd) nor
Section 195-A mentions insurance companies.
Section 182(A)(3)(dd) provides for the taxation of
lending investors in different localities. Section
195-A refers to dealers in securities and lending
investors.
The burden is thus on petitioner to show that
insurance companies are lending investors for
purposes of taxation. In this case, petitioner does
not dispute that respondents are in the insurance
business. Petitioner merely alleges that the
definition of lending investors under CA 466 is
broad enough to encompass insurance companies.
NOTE: CTA Ruling
The CTA held that respondents are not taxable as
lending investors because the term lending
investors does not embrace insurance companies.
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The term money lenders were later changed to
lending investors but the definition of the term
remains the same. [Sec. 1464(x), Rev. Adm. Code,
as finally amended by Com. Act No. 215, and Sec.
1465(v) of the same Code, as finally amended by
Act No. 3963] The same law is embodied in the
present National Internal Revenue Code (Com. Act
No. 466) without change, except in the amount of
the tax.

It is a well-settled rule that an administrative

interpretation of a law which has been followed
and applied for a long time, and thereafter the law
is re-enacted without substantial change, such
administrative interpretation is deemed to have
received legislative approval. In short, the
administrative interpretation becomes part of the
law as it is presumed to carry out the legislative
purpose.

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