Cabili v.

Badelles Digest

Facts:

1. Elections of November 10, 1959, Respondent Badelles and Petitioner Cabili were rival candidates for the office
of city mayor of Iligan City. Cabili was proclaimed elected and thereafter assumed office, succeeding Badelles the
incumbent.

2. Thereafter, Badelles filed a case for quo warranto, questioning Cabili's right to hold the office on the ground that
the latter was not a resident of the City for at least one year prior to his election. The petition was filed by the law
firm of San Juan, Africa and Benedicto, as counsel for Badelles. Badelles was also represented by several other
lawyers but the senior counsel was Atty. Africa, who, in the initial hearing, explained that he is the one in charge of
the case, and therefore, requested that all pleadings, notices, orders and other papers be served at his office at
480 Padre Faura St., Manila. In order to avoid any confusion in the service of pleadings and orders, he made of
record that only service at the given address will be considered as service on petitioner Badelles and counsel. The
Court took note of said request of Attorney Africa.

3. The lower court dismissed the petition with copy of the decision sent to the office address of Atty. Africa and
was received the same day. It appears however, that, in the interim, i.e. on December 28, 1959, Badelles, who was
then in Iligan City, requested the judge for a copy of the decision. Badelles, was given a copy but refused to sign a
receipt therefor. The judge ordered his court interpreter to record the fact of said delivery of a copy to Badelles.
This order was complied with. The judge also telegraphed the law office of Atty. Africa in Manila that copy of the
decision was sent to them on December 1959 and that petitioner Badelles personally was furnished a copy also on
that same day. The telegram was received by Atty. Africa on December 29, 1959.

4. Upon receipt of the decision on January 4, 1960, the Africa Law Office, counsel for Badelles, sent a notified
appeal by registered mail on the same date. On January 5, 1960, Badelles filed his own notice of appeal to with a
corresponding cash appeal bond of sixty pesos. The Counsel for Cabili objected to the appeal on the ground that it
was filed beyond the period.

5. On February 15 and 19, 1960, respectively, the court dismissed the appeals filed by Badelles and his counsel on
the ground that the same were filed beyond the five-day statutory period for appeal, as provided in Section 178 of
the improvised Election Code. A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Badelles was denied for lack of
merit, so Badelles filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus in CA to annul said orders. CA granted.

Issue: Whether or not the service to the client was valid

NO.

1. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 27, Section 2, service of decisions should be made to the lawyers on
record and not to parties. In a long line of decisions, the Court have held that when a party appears by an attorney
who makes of record his appearance, service of pleadings is required to be made upon said attorney and not upon
the party

2. A notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law and that service upon a party who has
an attorney of record is not a compliance with Rule 27, Sec. 2, which makes service upon counsel mandatory; and
that personal information by a party of the rendition of a decision does not satisfy the right of counsel to receive a
copy of the decision rendered
Venturanza v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 77760 December 11, 1987

Ponente: Padilla, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and
Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with MTC for collection of sums of money for loans evidenced by promissory
notes and due to non-payment became demandable.

2. The summons was served on the petitioners through the father who refused to sign the receipt. Due to
petitioners failure to file an Answer, the court rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay. However, the said
decision could not be served to petitioners address since they were no longer residing there, hence it was served
in the Office of Violeta at ADB.

3. The petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of
Jurisdiction," alleging that there was no proper and valid service of summons upon them in accordance with either
Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and that the court a quonever acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioners, since the address where the summons was served is the residence of Violeta S.
Venturanza's father, and not on her address. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners
when the summons was served upon Augusto Soans address which is not the residence of petitioners

NO.

1. There is no question that the case at bar which is an action for collection of sum of money, an action in
personam thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants. It is only when a defendant can not
be personally served with summons within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of. For a
substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant's residence must be served at his residence at
the time of such service and not at his former place of residence.

2. It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the summons and
after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in
the proof of service. Upon examination of the sheriff 's Return in this case, no statement was made that an effort
or attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact,
said Return did not indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case
where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective. CA decision reversed and set aside.
 Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1. Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively,
of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the
deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners
Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
2. 2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a
complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a
period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
3. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as
he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the
trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program
and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.]
4. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default and ordered them to
present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel
of respondent filed a motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision
became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from
judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena
Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was
dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR,
hence this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

1. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be
promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.
2. The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof
of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to
the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted
service cannot be upheld.
3. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be
proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is
essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service
must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioners brother,
on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
petitioners residence.
 Valmonte v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996

Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are
husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the
Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila,
where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition
against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a
resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for
purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse
holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the
Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as the party to whom
all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes,
on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her
in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed
the private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in
default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.
NO.
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.
1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of
affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by
personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of
the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid
and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as
required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported
by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given
ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
Asiavest Limited v. CA Digest

Facts:

1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant
be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong
Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal
debtor.
2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this
jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in
attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed
the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA.
4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to
give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally
served on Heras in Hong Kong,
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction
due to improper notice to the party
YES.

1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that
Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over
his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and
the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong.

The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in
the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served with summons in the same
manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for
extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section
18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country,
because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong
Kong not only temporarily but for good.
Case Name: THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA
GR No. 442 SCRA 217
Date: November 11, 2004

By: Berna
Topic: SUMMONS

Facts

1. Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums at
RTC Davao against the petitioner Philamgen, a domestic corporation.

2. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes
through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

3. Thereafter, Summons was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its
Insurance Service Officer.

4. In December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its
person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section
11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be properly made.

5. The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could also be
served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any
of its officers authorized to receive summons.

RTC: denied the MD and directed the issuance of alias summons on its branch in Manila. the petitioner filed with
the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the Orders dated December 10, 1999 and January 14,
2000.

CA: On October 24, 2000 dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA held that the
service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its
principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision on April 25, 2001.

Issue/s Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person despite the service of the summons at
its regional office through an insurance service officer was improper

Ruling

YES. Where the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint
may be served upon him without need of another summons. Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly
served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him. It is not pertinent
whether the summons is designated as an original or an alias summons as long as it has adequately served its
purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has
been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint.
The complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss. The Rules provide that the amended
complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Contrary to the petitioners claim, the summons issued on the
amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been
served continues to have its legal effect.
BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene
Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans,
BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same
day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and
Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the
alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon
has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of
the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter.
Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of
5 Million but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the
company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was
served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the
complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized
by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The
summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation. Also alleged lack of
authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons.

4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI
alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the
RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI

YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the
issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person
not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons and complaint
were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial
compliance with the rule on service of summons.

2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the
attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue
prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive
pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be
subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu
peculiar to it.
3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons.
Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances
attendant to each.
Case Name: SAN PEDRO VS. WILLY ONG AND CABALLES
GR No. 177598
Date: OCTOBER 18, 2008

By: General

Topic:
SUMMONS

Facts

1. On 3 April 1996, San Pedro purchased from the spouses Guillermo Narciso and Brigida Santiago (spouses
Narciso) two parcels of land

2. San Pedro bought the subject properties for P35, 000.00, as evidenced by Deeds of Sale executed in his favor by
the spouses Narciso on 8 April 1996.

3. In order to transfer in his name the TCTs covering the subject properties, and upon the spouses Narcisos
recommendation, San Pedro hired the services of Adora Dela Pea (Dela Pea) who is known to be very familiar with
the intricacies of real property transfers.

4. After sometime, San Pedro inquired with the registry of deeds of bulacan the status of his application for
issuance in his name of new TCTs for the subject properties.

5. San pedro surprised to find out that the subject properties were still registered in the names of narciso spouses
and were mortgaged to Willy Ong.

6. Annotation stamped at the back of the TCTs reveals that on july 23 1998, spouses narciso executed SPAs
authorizing Dela Pea to mortgage the subject properties to Ong.

7. SPAs were procured by Dela Pea from the spouses narciso with the help of one Rufino Landayan, a tricycle
driver who accompanied Dela Pea to the spouses Narcisos residence.

8. San Pedro found out that it was Normita Caballes, Ongs agent, who caused the registration of the mortgages.

9. In order to free the subject properties from said encumbrances, San Pedro filed with the RTC on May 7, 1999 a
petition for nullification of mortgage with damages against the spouses narciso, Dela Pea, Landayan, Ong and
Caballes.

10. On May 14, 1991, the RTC issued summons to spouses Narciso, Dela Pea, Landayan, Ong and Caballes directing
them to file their answers to San Pedros petition and on same day, the sheriff served the summons on all
concerned.

11. The sheriffs return indicated that: a. Spouses Brigida Santiago & Guillermo Narciso thru their son Jaime
Narciso/Received & sign

b. Adora Dela Pea thru her sister-in- law/Received but refues to sign

c. Rufino Landayan thru his son Christoper Landayan/received & sign

d. Normita Caballes & Willy Ong thru Paul Caballes son of normita Caballes/received & sign

12. Spouses narciso, Landayan, Ong and Caballes voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of RTC while
Dela Pea was declared by the RTC in default.

13. Spouses narciso admitted selling the object properties to san pedro and denied authorizing the mortgage of
the same to ong. Their signitures on the spas were fraudulently secured by Dela Pea who mispresented to them
that such documents was necessary to facilitate the transfer of the TCTs to San Pedro. Caballes and Ong raised the
defense of mortgage in good faith.

14. A document examiner and hand writing expert from the NBI, confirmed that the signature of Guillermo Narciso
on one of the SPAs was forged, while the signitures of his wife Brigida Santiago on both SPAs were spurious.

15. Ong and Caballes filed a demurrer to evidence, questioning the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person
of Dela Pea. Since Dela Pea was an indispensable party in the case, they claimed that no final determination of the
same could be arrived at without the said court-acquiring jurisdiction over Dela Pea.

16. RTC rendered its judgment in favor of San Pedro.

17. Ong and Caballes appealed the RTCs decision assigning as error the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
person of Dela Pea that rendered all the proceedings held before said court fatally defective.

18. C.A. granted the appeal hence this appeal of the said decision.

Issue/s

Whether the improper service of summons on Dela Pea invalidates the entire proceedings before the court a quo.
-- - NO

Ruling

1. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is
the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the
absence of a valid waiver is null and void.

2. To provide perspective, it is crucial to determine first whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem
because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court apply according to the
nature of the action.

3. In the case at bar, Civil Case No. 515-M- 99, instituted by San Pedro, is anchored on his claim that he is the real
and rightful owner of the subject properties, thus, no one else has the right to mortgage them. The real estate
mortgages constituted on the subject properties in favor of Ong, annotated on their TCTs, are encumbrances on
said properties, which may be considered a cloud on San Pedros title thereto.

4. Significantly, suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically; they are neither in
rem nor in personam.

5. In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be
served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements.
6. Given that Civil Case No. 515-M- 99 is a an action for quieting of title, settled to be quasi in rem, the RTC was not
required to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, it being sufficient for the said court to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

7. The RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the subject properties the res. Therefore, the service of summons to
the defendants in said case, including Dela Pea, did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide Civil
Case No. 515-M- 99, and did not invalidate the proceedings held therein on the basis of jurisdiction.
Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation [G.R. No. 170943; September 23, 2008]
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Sunday, March 11, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro
Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car
loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.

Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last
known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed
service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the
affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail
to petitioners last known address.

Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence,
respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and
proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit
of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not
executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such
execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was
filed way beyond the reglementary period.

Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained the trial courts decision and
ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons.

(2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to
actions in rem, not actions in personam.
(3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of
court and not respondents messenger.

Held:

(1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where thedefendant is designated as an unknown owner or the
like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such
times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with
summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.

(2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of
action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule
expressly states that it applies in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the
petitioners contentionthat the complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for
recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.

(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to
defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a
copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant
by registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies
of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the
party who resorts to service by publication.
Kawasaki Port Service Corp v Amores and C.F. SHARP & CO., INC

Doctrine: As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial
service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.

Facts: Respondent, C.F. SHARP & CO., INC, filed a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against Japanese corporations as defendants.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
that there is another corporation organized under the law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha

That the plaintiff and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are separate and distinct from each other.

C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several creditors, that due to financial
difficulties, C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha failed and/or refused to pay its creditors and that in view of the failure to
pay its alleged obligations to defendants, the latter have been demanding from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., the payment
of the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha.

Since the defendants are non-residents, without business addresses in the Philippines but in Japan, the private
respondent prayed for leave of court to effect extraterritorial service of summons.

Acting on said motion, the judge issued an order granting the motion and authorizing extraterritorial service of
summons upon defendants to be effected by registered mail with return cards.

The petitioners, Kawasaki Port Service Corporation, Naikai Shipping Co., Ltd., Naikai Tug Boat Service Co., Ltd., The
Port Service Corporation and Licensed Land Sea Pilots Association filed their "Special Appearance to Question
Jurisdiction of This Honorable Court Over Persons of Defendants" contending that the lower court does not and
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants on the grounds that private respondent's action does
not refer to its personal status; that the action does not have for subject matter property contemplated in Section
17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be excluded from any interest or
property in the Philippines; that no property of the defendants has been attached; that the action is in personam;
and that the action does not fall within any of the four cases mentioned in Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: WON private respondent's complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief is within the purview of the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No. It is evident that monetary obligations do not refer to status, lights and obligations. Obligations are
more or less temporary, but status is relatively permanent. But more importantly, the prevailing rule is that "where
a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of
definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case is not one
for declaratory judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief
may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason to adhere to the
principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment would have to be made, only after a
judicial investigation of disputed issues.

Hence, as ruled by this Court, where the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any
property in the Philippines in which defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached, but
purely an action for injunction, it is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or
quasi in rem.
As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is
necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.

In an action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants
cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the
region over which they exercise their authority. Extra-territorial service of summons will not confer on the court
jurisdiction or Power to compel them to obey its orders

Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such times as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

Extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4) instances, namely: "

(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs:

(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;

(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; and

(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines
SANSIO PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES MOGOL

G.R. No. 177007

July 14, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent spouses Mogol before the MeTC
of Manila. At the request of herein petitioner, the process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and
the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were
in the said premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal cases filed by petitioner
against respondent Alicia for violations of BP 22. Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint,
respondent spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The
counsel of respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and read the
same. Thereafter, he pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be
served only at the address that was stated in both documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The
counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint to the
process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the same. As the process server could not
convince the respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the
premises of the courtroom.

The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons, declaring that:

RETURN ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS

This is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the undersigned tried to serve a copy of the Summons issued by the
Court .. together with a copy of Complaint upon defendant Leodegario .. and Alicia Mogol .. as requested by
plaintiff counsel, but failed for the reason that they refused to received (sic) with no valid reason at all.

The original and duplicate copies of the Summons are hereby respectfully returned, (sic) UNSERVED. xx

Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Petitioner averred that the summons and the copy
of the complaint were already validly served upon the respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC.
From the date of said service up to the time of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent spouses Mogol
had yet to file any responsive pleading.

Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent spouses Mogol filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Declare [Respondents] in Default. Respondent spouses Mogol averred the service should have been effected at the
respondent spouses residential address, as stated in the summons and the copy of the complaint.

The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not specify where service is to be effected..
Respondent spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file
any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, the Motion to Declare
[Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious. Respondent spouses Mogol filed an
MR on the above Order, but the same was denied by the MeTC of Manila,

Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC of Manila against
Judge de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of Manila, and herein petitioner. Respondent spouses insisted there was no valid
service of summons per return of the process server, which was binding on the MeTC judge, who did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of respondent spouses. They contended that the MeTC of Manila acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring them in default.

The RTC of Manila issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not
mandate that summons be served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said
provision states that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable. Therefore, it
did not matter much that the summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were served inside the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at Lucena City. The primordial consideration
was that the service of summons was made in the person of the respondent spouses Mogol.

Respondent spouses Mogol filed a Notice of Appeal on the above-mentioned Order of the RTC of Manila, which
was given due course. The CA rendered the assailed Decision, the relevant portions of which read: xx

We find the appeal meritorious.

After a careful perusal of the records, We hold that there was no valid service of summons upon the [respondent]
Mogol spouses Perforce, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over them. We explain. xx

Petitioner filed an MR thereon, but the same was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution

ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons to the respondent spouses

HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is GRANTED

YES; A summon is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil
action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants
voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction, or
when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the
Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided
for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the ROC, which read:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof
to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. The essence of personal service is the
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is,
wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.

In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent
spouses Mogol. The act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the
complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and
consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of handing a copy of the summons to respondent spouses
in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC
of Manila. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons
and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material.

Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be
effected only at the latters residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear
that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses
to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required

Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that respondent spouses Mogol
based their case on a wrong appreciation of the above-stated provisions of the ROC. Respondent spouses
principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7.
Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the ROC cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions
do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of
convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service.

As to the reliance of the CA on the second paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons stating that the original
and duplicate copies of the Summons were returned UNSERVED, the Court finds the same utterly misplaced. A
simple reading of the first paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, which contains the circumstances
surrounding the service of the summons on the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol, manifestly reveals that
the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served on the said respondents. They merely
refused to receive or obtain a copy of the same.

Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process server in the aforesaid
second paragraph an error that undoubtedly added to the confusion of the parties to this case the same was,
nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. Indeed, it
cannot be said that because of such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said return
informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus justifying their non-filing of any responsive pleading.

The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to
give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement
of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied and due process is served.

In fine, we rule that jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was validly acquired by the
MeTC in this case. For their failure to file any responsive pleading to the Complaint filed against them, in violation
of the order of the said court as stated in the summons, respondent spouses Mogol were correctly declared in
default.
GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (GUCCI) v. AIDA TORRES,
NONILO TORRES and SHERYL ANN TORRES-HOLGADO
GR No. 170926
Date: September 15, 2006

By: Jelica
Topic: Summons

Facts

-Holgado, who are members of Guiguinto

CreditCooperative, Inc. (GUCCI), availed of loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates
despite demands.

were served through a certain Benita S. Pagtalunan, secretary of the

respondents.

CI.

persons of

respondents since they were not validly served with summons and neither did they voluntarily appear in court.

Court

because there was no explanation why resort to substituted service of summons was made.

Issue/s

Whether summons was validly served on the respondents. NO.

Ruling

The CA correctly ruled that since substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service, there should be a
report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a relationship of trust and confidence that
would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified of the summons issued in their names. This is because
substituted service may only be availed of when the respondents could not be served personally within a
reasonable period of time, and such impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating that earnest efforts
have been made to find the respondents personally and that such efforts have failed. Such requirements under
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully in order not to deprive any person of his
property by violating his constitutional right to due process. The statutory requirements of substituted service
must be strictly construed since it is an extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of
summons, availed of only under certain conditions imposed by the Rules of Court. Any substituted service other
than that authorized under

Section 7 is deemed ineffective and contrary to law.

Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres, there is no showing that the former had indeed a
relationship of trust and confidence with the 3 respondents. It appears that the process server hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents.
Such service of summons is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and Sheryl Ann Torres whose relationship with
Pagtalunan was neither readily ascertained nor adequately explained in the Return of Summons. Also, no earnest
efforts were made to locate respondent Aida Torres who was allegedly working abroad at the time summons was
served on her person. No explanation why substituted service was resorted through Pagtalunan was stated in the
Return.

Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents never vested with the trial court since the manner of substituted
service by the process server is deemed invalid and ineffective. Clearly, there was a violation of due process
because of the defective service of summons. The judgment of the trial court should be annulled on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, since the respondents were not properly notified of the action filed against them, and denied
them the chance to answer the complaint before the court, thus depriving them of an opportunity to be heard.
Petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed.
Case Name: BENEDICTO POTENCIANO II vs GREGORY BARNES
GR No. 159421
Date: August 20, 2008

By: Joyce
Topic: Summons

Facts

as owned by respondent
Barnes.. Namely, Barnes Marketing Concept in Ortigas, London Underground Bar and Restaurant, and Executive
Dinner Club International.

tended for Barnes. He indicated that he is

a representative of Barnes counsel, E. Himan Law Office.

resented by Atty. Dave filed

it Comment/Manifestation, manifesting that the law office does not represent Barnes because the latter did not
engaged its services

to pay for damages.

xecution Pending Appeal

o Execution Pending Apppeal

but was denied by the RTC

otenciano filed an MR but he CA denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s

WON CA erred when it ruled that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Barnes, and rendered the RTCs
proceedings void

Ruling:

No.

Service of summons on the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant.
Summons serves as a notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against him, thereby giving him
the opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Sec 6, Rule 14 underscores the importance of actual
delivery or tender of the summons to the defendant himself. However, if for justifiable reasons the defendant
cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, substituted service of summons is proper as proved in Sec 7,
Rule 14.
In this case, there was no service of summons on Barnes himself. The handing of a copy to Mr. Herrera cannot
even qualify as substituted service. The requisites of substituted service of summons are: (1) the defendant cannot
be served personally within a reasonable time; and (2) the impossibility of prompt service should be shown by
stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed, and this statement
should be made in the proof of service. In this case, the deputy sheriff never made any effort to serve the
summons on Barnes himself. Neither was the copy of the summons served at Barnes residence nor at his office or
regular place of business. The deputy sheriff just handed a copy of the summons to a messenger of E. Himan Law
Office who came to the office of RTC claiming that E. Himan Law Office was the counsel of Barnes. Giving a copy of
the summons to a messenger of a law firm, which was not even the counsel of the defendant, cannot in any way
be construed as equivalent to service of summons on the defendant.

Since there was no service of summons on Barnes, RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Barnes and its order of
default and the judgment by default are void. Other than valid service of summons on the defendant, the trial
court can still acquire jurisdiction over the defendant by his voluntary appearance, in accordance with Sec 20, Rule
14. However, there is no evidence on record that Barnes authorized E. Himan Law Office to represent him in the
case. In fact, E. Himan Law Office filed a Comment to the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that
Barnes had not yet engaged the services of E. Himan Law Office, which could not therefore represent Barnes. Thus,
the receipt of the summons by E. Himan Law Office and its filing of a Comment to the Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default cannot be considered as voluntary appearance on the part of Barnes.

Thus, since RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Barnes, either by personal or substituted service of summons or
by Barnes voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority, the trial courts order of default and the
succeeding judgment are void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

WHEREFORE, petition is denied and affirmed the decision of the CA.