1. BASCO VS.

RAPATALO

Criminal Procedure; Bail; In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial.A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal
procedure entails appreciating its nature and purposes. Bail is the security required by the court
and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled
time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of
bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of
confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at
the trial. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory
that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied
in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also
been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or
whom the judges might not want to release.

Same; Same; Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.It is in view of the abovemen-
tioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

Same; Same; The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter
of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed
if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the
right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.

Same; Same; The discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: But discretion when
applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule,
not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.

Same; Same; In the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. A summary hearing
means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

Same; Same; The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the
court.

Same; Same; Even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for
bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only
the strength of the states evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.Corollarily,
another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the abovecited
case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if
the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the
court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the
states evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.

Same; Same; The courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution.After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate
his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the
guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the
existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an
intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the determination of whether
or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge
is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack
of it, against the accused."

Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from
the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.34 This Court, in a number of cases35
held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail
of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the states evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.

An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite
his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down
in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecutions declaration
not to oppose the petition. Respondents assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latters familiarity with the case due to his
having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding
to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
reposed upon the prosecutor.

The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It
is the courts determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the
basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation
made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutors recommendation. Moreover, there will
be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence is presented for or against the
accuseds provisional release will be determined at the hearing.

The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing
to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant
of bail to the accused.

This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force
the prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused
would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.42 It should
be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be
equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were
permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of
the proceedings, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare
for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this
Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. (1)Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. 2. (2)Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
3. 1. (3)Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
4. 4. (4)If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.

2. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO

Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Rebellion; Bail; Rebellion is a bailable offense under Section
13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot
be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion; When
a matter of right and a matter of discretion.Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter
of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other
hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The courts discretion is limited
to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended.The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by
explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial
of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right, such is required only where the grant of bail
is discretionary.Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the
denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant
of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for
in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of the
court; Guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond.We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error
for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing
the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We
stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: Certain guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to
refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of
the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is
under bond in other case. x x x.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent has unequivocably waived his right to bail.
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of waiver.
Waiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What rights and privileges may be waived.As to what rights
and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to
rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word waiver covers every conceivable right,
it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution,
provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at
large. x x x Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored,
and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal
liberty are subjects of waiver.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights to bail is another of the constitutional rights which
can be waived.We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which
can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.

The prosecutions fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and
rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted
authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit
that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail. Dura est
lex sed lex.

in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right
to bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody of his person in consideration of the recall of
the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: Bail, a matter of right:
exception.All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Therefore, before conviction bail is
either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the right is
absolute.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The courts
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.33 But once it
is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail.

He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying
for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.

Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private
respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail. But, is such waiver valid?
Waiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: x x x

the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word waiver
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs
to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large.

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver
will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy
or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all personal
rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the
state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the
second may be.

We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.

3. PEOPLE VS. FORTES

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail when a matter of right or when a matter of discretion;
As ruled in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, G.R. No. 92560, October 15, 1991, an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals to the Supreme Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.The clear
implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail
is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the
court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt
is strongwhich would have been sufficient to deny bail even before convictionit would
have likewise ruled that the accuseds guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail
must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment
of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez,
ruled that: Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as
a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Accused assails the trial courts refusal to grant his application for bail pending appeal on the
ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. He contends
that before his conviction by final judgment, he enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence,
and is therefore entitled to bail as a matter of right. There is no merit in the said petition.

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that:

x x x before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right

when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To
that extent the right is absolute. x x x

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The courts
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. x x x

The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty,
bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the
court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt
is strongwhich would have been sufficient to deny bail even before convictionit would
have likewise ruled that the accuseds guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail
must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment
of conviction.

Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court,
in the en bancResolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez,26 ruled that: Pursuant
to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of
the offense charged is strong.
In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and
subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly
denied his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.\

4. COMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

Constitution; Bail; Constitution grants the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is
applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.On August 22, 1990,
the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of
General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground
that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General
Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, interve-nors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General
Court-Martial No. 14.

Constitution; Bill of Rights; Bail; Equal Protection; That denial from the military of the right to
bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable.The argument that denial from
the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say
they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended
to civilians.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No. 14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No. 14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. On
July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken to this Court. After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order
for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc. Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio
Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc. Romelino Gojo and
Capt. Manuel Ison. On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a) Declaring,
that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the
defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to
military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby
set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General CourtMartial No. 14 is hereby directed
to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as
well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that
the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: The
unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary
use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing political system.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are
not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.

5. BAYLON VS. SISON

Criminal Law; Bail; The stratagem employed by the defense which virtually deprived the
prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter the representations in its petition is too
obvious to be ignored.Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the
petition for bail at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled hearing thereof. If bears emphasis that
the petition for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof served on the prosecution on December
21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on December 23, 1991, thereby giving the
prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its opposition thereto. The stratagem
employed by the defense which virtually deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately
counter the representations in its petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge
condoned the same and aggravated the situation by the unusual and precipitate haste with which
the petition was granted by respondent judge.

Same; Same; Bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with
an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.On top of that,
he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-observance of the
three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition
for bail is an urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which
espouses and reveals a distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to bail, does
violence to the well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing
where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Given this contingency, respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the
validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly considering
it outright as an urgent motion.

Same; Same; Bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion
of respondent judge.We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed
to the sound discretion of respondent judge. But his does not mean, however, a lubricious and
untrammeled exercise of such discretion. We have held that admission to bail as a matter of
discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles.

Same; Same; The discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in
appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused.
Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Same; Same; Prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court
resolves the motion for bail.The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a
serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, such as murder, bail may be
granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing
thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecutions evidence of guilt
is strong. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may wish to introduce
on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court resolves the motion for bail.

Same; Same; An order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence offered
by the prosecution.It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to
indicate the guilt of the accused. In fact, such a summary with his evaluation of the evidence may
be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.

Same; Same; Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions.The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein this Court has ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails
to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct
a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
Same; Same; The law and settled jurisprudence demands that a hearing be conducted before bail
can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused if bail is at all justified. InLibarios vs.
Dabalos, we emphasized that irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a hearing be
conducted before bail can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.

Same; Same; Error committed by respondent judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the
mere failure of the prosecution to file a motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his
order.Thus, in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., it was there held that even where
the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the Peoples
evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of bail. This was reiterated in the recent
case of Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc. where we said that the error committed by the therein
respondent judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution to file
a motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.

Same; Same; A hearing is also necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set
forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.Finally, in the
most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas it was categorically stressed that although the provincial
prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge
therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from
the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application. Additionally, it
must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary for the court to take into consideration
the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself that these requirements have been
met can he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged with the now familiar malfeasance of granting
bail in a non-bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is averred that
the prosecution was not given notice of at least three days before the scheduled hearing on the
petition for bail, in violation of the mandate under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and,
worse, with two non-working days between the filing and the hearing of the petition.

Bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense
which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.9 Given this contingency,
respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and the
veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly considering it outright as an urgent motion.

We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion
of respondent judge. But this does not mean, however, a lubricious and untrammeled exercise of
such discretion. We have held that admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the
exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles, to wit: x x
x The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion
is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.

Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter
of judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground.

Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with
reclusion perpetuato death, such as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose
has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or
not the prosecutions evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is
in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court
resolves the motion for bail.

It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused.16 In fact, such a summary with his evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense. The importance of a
hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.

Thus, in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc.,17 it was there held that even where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the Peoples
evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of bail.
In the case of Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte,etc.18 where we said that the error committed by the
therein respondent judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution
to file a motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.

In Libarios vs. Dabalos,19 we emphasized that irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that
a hearing be conducted before bail can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is
at all justified.

Where the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden of
proof, but the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutors attitude is not justified, as when he
is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, it has been ruled in the early case of
Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,et al.20 that, in the paramount interest of justice, the
court must inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not
it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore,
in recommending bail.

Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas21it was categorically stressed that although
the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the
respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail
application. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary for the court to
take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
fixing the amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met can he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

Note.Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. (People vs. Donato, 198
SCRA 130 [1991])

6. MANOTOC VS. CA

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bails; A court may prohibit an accused from leaving the
Philippines even if he was admitted to bail.A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Same; Same; Same; Same.The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Same; Same; Same; Same; An accused person desiring to leave the Philippines must show to the
courts satisfaction that the same is justified, including the conformity of his sureties.Petitioner
has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it.
Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the sure-ty because
in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees that it will not take
any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a
stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result
has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final
disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country. Thus, although
the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by
the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale
behind said order.

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing
a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to
relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial,
and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call
of the court and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.

As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). x x x the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes
of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction
of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who
have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely
as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority
over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state.14 If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then
has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent
right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at
total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave
the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.

he court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in
accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees that it will not take any
proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a
stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result
has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final
disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country.

7. GOVT OF HONG KONG VS. HON. OLALIA

International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this

jurisdiction.Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.At first glance, the
above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the
duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants
for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events
show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community; Fundamental among the rights enshrined in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized
as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951), this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held
that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land.In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined
therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States of America
v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan
is in order.The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in
Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition casesclearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.In
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, 90
Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges
have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should
see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him
in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Extradition
has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by
the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b)
the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law
obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process.But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law. This
is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of
justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of urgency to ask for
the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition; and that
release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings.Temporary detention may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of more than two
(2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditees fundamental right to liberty; While our
extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime.
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedingsin the latter, the standard of due process
is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former, the assumption is that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi
of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.The applicable standard
of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight
of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing
that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process; An extraditee should not be deprived
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil casesthe
potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing proof that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.An extradition proceeding being
sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent
the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence.

8. GOVT OF US VS. PARUNGANAN

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other.

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime. It is the only
regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to
try them in accordance with municipal and international law.

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking
refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State,
so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the
locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight
abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself.

In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government.
More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress
of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition
to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.

An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding
allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence
to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands
of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt
or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation
will serve the national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state.
On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country
before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under
the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled
to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving
the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2)
remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and
that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes
in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances
point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

THE RIGHT TO BAIL DOES NOT APPLY IN EXTRADITION CASES. We agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

EXCEPTIONS IN THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL ON

EXTRADITION CASES. The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and
tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property
of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances [71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police
assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it
also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights.69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the
life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.

Summation As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. 1.The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed
in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing
of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing
the accusedor the fugitive who has illegally escapedback to its territory, so that the
criminal process may proceed therein.

2. 2.By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner; as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal
case therein.

3. 3.By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima
faciepresumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.

4. 4.Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance,
whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie
case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and
summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

5.After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have
a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail
is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case.

6.Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is
sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and
the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with
the summary nature of extradition.

7.This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority
and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.

8.We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

9.On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and over-
due process every little step of the way, lest these summaryextradition proceedings become not
only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good
faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.

10.At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights,
to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.