Literal or

Grammatical Rule of
Interpretation & The
Golden Rule

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Ms. Anju Berwal Surya Sharma

B.A. LL.B (Hons.)
5th Semester
Group-1(Section-B)
Roll No.: 100/13
 TABLE OF CASES

Lord Wensleydale in Becke v Smith,1836

Grey v Pearson, 1857

Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675

Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 QB 442

M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034

Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi AIR

1986 SC 842

Dharamchand Khushalchand Mutha v. Anjana Medical Surgical Stores, through

Partners 1992 Bom CJ 453 (Bom).

Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44.

Manipal v. State of Karnataka AIR 1995 Kant 273

Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2524

PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363

B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, AIR 2011 SC 1925

Justice Chandrashekaraiah (retd.) v. Jenekere C. Krishna and others, AIR 2013 SC

726

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2014 SC 184
Literal or Grammatical Rule of Interpretation
If the words given in the statute are lucid and explicit, it is not for the judges to go beyond
that language or words to try and establish what the legislative might have meant by using
that word. It is also known as Grammatical Interpretation.1 The Courts have to follow
this principle even if it results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to the policy or
intention of legislature. It doesnt look beyond the litera legis which means letter of
legislation.2 It just looks at what law says. Words and phrases are to be construed by the
courts in their ordinary sense, and the ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation have to
be applied.

If, applying this rule, a clear meaning appears, then this must be applied, and the courts
will not inquire whether what the statute says represents the intention of the legislature. In
order to determine the literal meaning of a statute the courts have to ascertain the ordinary
meaning of a word in a statute by referring to a dictionary or scientific or any other
technical works where the words have been used. It is a rule of construction of statutes
that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the word is to be adhered to. 3 The words
of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. 4 If the words of the statute
are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural
meaning of the words used in provision.5

The sole purpose of interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. If the
words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound words in their natural and ordinary send because the words
themselves alone, in such cases, best declare the intention of the law-giver. Thus, where
the words used in the language and clear and precise and suffer with no ambiguity, the
legislative intent has to be gathered from the language itself.

Under the literal rule/grammatical rule, it is the task of the court to give a statutes words
their literal meaning regardless of whether the result is sensible or not.

1
Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675
2
AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON 1363 (2nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
3
Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi AIR 1986 SC 842
4
Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44.
5
Manipal v. State of Karnataka AIR 1995 Kant 273
In other words, a statute should be read as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.
This rule is the most widely used Rule of Interpretation for the statutes to ascertain the
legislative intention behind the framing of the enactment.

Where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that
construction ought to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the
contrary.6

The rule governs and regulates the meaning of the law in as much as the rule provides
that the meaning has to be ascertained from the text of the law itself. In M/s. Hiralal
Ratanlal v. STO7, this Court observed that:

In interpreting a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of interpretation is the
literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the
provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative
intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes.
The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not
clear.

Moreover, it is been regularly held by Honble Supreme Court of India that one of the
basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe the words according to their
plain, literal and grammatical meaning. If this principle is contrary to, or inconsistent
with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any
absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified,
extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus
of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who
alleges it.

The intention of the Legislature is to be found in the words used by the legislature which
is the primary rule of interpretation.8

Once the Court departs from the literal rule then any number of interpretations can be put
to a statutory provision, each judge having a free play to put his own interpretation as he

6
PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363
7
AIR 1973 SC 1034
8
Justice Chandrashekaraiah (retd.) v. Jenekere C. Krishna and others, AIR 2013 SC 726
likes. This would be destructive of judicial discipline and also the basic principle that it is
not for the Court to legislate. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or
inconvenience it has to be followed. Hence departure from the literal rule should only be
done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this
connection.9

It is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical meaning. The statutes should be
construed in such a manner as though there is no other meaning except the literal
meaning.

If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the court must give effect to it and it
has no right to extend its operation in order to carry out the real or supposed intention of
the legislature.10

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation is the rule and only if language of an
enactment is ambiguous recourse to other rule can be taken.11

The Courts cannot add words to a statute or read the words into which are not there. The
Courts should proceed on the assumption that the Legislature did not make a mistake and
that it intended to say what is said.12

9
B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, AIR 2011 SC 1925
10
MN RAO & AMITA DHANDA, N S BINDRAS INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 433(10th edn Lexis
Nexis Butterworths, 2007).
11
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2014 SC 184
12
Dharamchand Khushalchand Mutha v. Anjana Medical Surgical Stores, through Partners 1992 Bom CJ 453
(Bom).
Golden Rule of Interpretation

This rule is modified form of literal rule. It allows departure from strict literalness by
recourse to consequences of applying natural or the ordinary meaning.

According to the literal rule the grammatical or literal sense of words to be adhered to.
But if the literal interpretation leads to absurdity or some inconsistency with the rest of
the instrument, the literal interpretation may be dispensed with and grammatical and
ordinary meaning of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity. This is the
golden rule.

It says that ordinarily the Court must find out the intention of the legislature from the
words used in the statute by giving them their natural meaning but if this leads to
absurdity, repugnance, inconvenience, hardship, injustice or evasion, the Court must
modify the meaning to such an extent and no further as would prevent such a
consequence. On the face of it, this rule solves all the problems and is, therefore, known
as the golden rule.

According to this rule, the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning because when meaning of the word is plain, it is not the duty of the courts to
busy themselves with supposed intention. But when grammatical interpretation leads to
absurdity it is permissible to depart from and to interpret the provision of statutes in such
a manner so that absurdity is removed.

The court when faced with more than one possible interpretation of an enactment is
entitled to take into consideration the result of each interpretation in a bid to arrive at the
true intention of the legislature.

The golden rule comes into play where some doubt exists so as to the meaning of the
word. Where absurdity or inconsistency flows from literal construction and such
construction cannot be reasonably accepted to be the true one, the Golden Rule may be
invoked to remove such absurdity.

Like the literal interpretation rule, it gives the words of a statute their literal, ordinary
meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the
legislature's intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs,
where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred
meaning.

The Supreme Court in a case observed that to find the meaning of a word not defined in
an enactment the court apply the subject and object rule which means it is necessary to
ascertain carefully the subject of the enactment where the word occurs and have regard to
the object which the legislature has in view. In selecting one out of the various meanings
of a word regard must always be had to the context.13

The golden rule can be applied in two ways:

Narrow Approach- This approach is applied when the word or phrase is capable of more
than one literal meaning. This allows the judge to apply the meaning which avoids the
absurdity.

Broad Approach- This approach is applied when there is only one literal meaning. But
applying that one literal meaning would cause an absurdity. Under this approach the court
will modify the meaning to avoid the absurdity. The modification shall be made keeping
in mind the intention of the Parliament in making the law in question.

The golden rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a
word(s) if the overall content of the document demands it. It states that if the literal rule
produces an absurdity, then the court should look for another meaning of the words to
avoid that absurd result. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency
with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.14

In Lee v. Knapp,15 interpretation of the word stop was involved. Under section 77(1) of
the Road Traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall stop after the accident. In
this case a driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then went away.
The defence taken by the driver was that as per the literal meaning of the section, he
stopped after causing the accident and then went away. Applying the golden rule, the

13
Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2524
14
Lord Wensleydale in Becke v Smith,1836 and in Grey v Pearson, 1857
15
(1967) 2 QB 442
court held that requirement of the section had not been followed by the driver as he had
stopped for a reasonable period requiring interested persons to make necessary inquiries
from him about the accident.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute as it allows to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance
with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case it allows the language to be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience.
 Bibliography
Books
Langan P St. J, Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur; Twelfth edition (2010).
Bhattacharyya Prof T., The Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Agency,
2014
Sarkar S.C., Principles of Statutory Interpretation and Statutory Words and
Phrases, Dwivedi Law Agency, 2008.
Mathur DN, Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Publications, 2013.

Websites
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