Criminal Law Review (6th Assignment)
ARTICLES 89 - 113 informed of his death. Amistosos death on December 11,
98. People v. Bayot (2012)
Facts:
The accused Nelson Bayot was charged with rape, and
was convicted by the RTC and the CA. Pending appeal before
the CA, he died.
Issue: What is the effect of Bayots death during the
pendency of his appeal before the CA?
Held: Bayots death extinguished not only his criminal liability
but also his civil liability ex delicto. Cited in this case was
People v. Bayotas which laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based thereon.
2. The claim for civil liability survives despite the
accuseds death if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict, pursuant
to Art. 1157 of the Civil Code.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action which may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused.
4. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
99. People v. Amistoso (2013)
Facts:
The accused Anastacio Amistoso was charged with
statutory rape for raping his 12-year-old daughter. The RTC
convicted him of qualified rape and was required to pay the
victim P75,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling on Jan. 9, 2013,
but added P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. And on Jan. 9,
2013, the Supreme Court affirmed Amistosos conviction.
However, in a letter dated Feb. 7, 2013, an officer from
the Bureau of Corrections informed the court that Amistoso
had already died as early as Dec. 11, 2012. Nevertheless, the
PAO lawyer representing Amistoso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Jan. 9, 2013 decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may still entertain
the PAO lawyers motion for reconsideration.
Held: Yes. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11,
2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision
on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before
the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled
upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately
2012
renders the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013, even
though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and
ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final,
and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
Thus, the Court set aside its Jan. 9, 2013 decision and
dismissed the criminal case by reason of Amistosos death.
100. People v. Consorte (2014)
Facts:
The accused Benjie Consorte was charged with murder for
killing Elizabeth Palmar. He was convicted by the RTC, the CA
and the Supreme Court. During the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration, he died.
Issue: What is the effect of Consortes death?
Held: Criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto are
extinguished.
101. People v. Bautista (2007)
Facts:
The private complainant, Felipe Goyena, Jr., filed a
complaint for slight physical injuries against Clemente and
Leonida Bautista with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)
Manila on Aug. 16, 1999. The complaint alleged that the crime
was committed on June 12, 1999. However, it was only on
June 20, 2000 when the Information was filed with the MeTC.
Clemente moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the 60-day period of prescription from the date of
the commission of the crime had already elapsed. The MeTC
denied his motion. Clemente filed a petition for certiorari with
the RTC, which affirmed the MeTCs order. He filed another
petition for certiorari with the CA, which ruled that while the
60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended
party filed a complaint with the OCP, it began to run again
upon approval of the investigating prosecutors
recommendation for the filing of the Information.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct.
Held: No. The proceedings against respondent was not
terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information
be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled
from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted
or acquitted by the proper court.
102. Abellana v. People (2011)
Facts:
Felixberto Abellana extended a loan to Spouses Alonto
secured by a real estate mortgage over two lots in Cebu. In
1987, Abellana prepared a deed of sale conveying the lots to
him. The deed of sale was signed by the spouses in Manila,
but it was notarized in Cebu allegedly without the spouses
appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, Abellana
caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots
to third persons.
Abellana was charged with estafa through falsification of
public documents.
 Criminal Law Review (6th Assignment)
The RTC found that Abellana did not intend to defraud the
spouses as they actually did sign the deed of sale, hence, it
concluded that Abellana could only be held guilty of
Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual. The
RTC also directed him to pay the spouses the following:
P15,000 for nominal damages; P20,000 for attorneys fees;
P50,000 for litigation expenses; and P30,000 for exemplary
damages.
The CA acquitted Abellana, ruling that he could not also
be guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private
individual, because it was not alleged in the Information. The
CA, however, affirmed the trial courts finding with respect to
his civil liability.
Issue: Whether or not Abellana is civilly liable.
Held: No. Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by
reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner
to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the
acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based
on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly
committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to
spouses Alonto. First, the Information charged petitioner with
fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed
their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby
facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor.
However, after the presentation of the parties respective
evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without
basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and
that their signatures were genuine and not forged. Second,
even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally
appear before the notary public for the notarization of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or
render void ab initio the parties transaction. Moreover, we
cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the
petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the
properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other
kinds of damages.First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the
trial courts finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in
the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second,
[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing
in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the
alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing one
or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.
He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.
103. People v. Pangilinan (2012)
Facts:
Sometime in 1995, the accused Pangilinan issued nine
checks amounting to around P9.6 million which all bounced.
On Sept. 16, 1997, private complainant Virginia Malolos
filed a complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against
Pangilinan with the Quezon City Office of the Prosecutor.
Meanwhile, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and
effectivity of contract and specific performance against
Malolos, and on the basis of such civil action, Pangilinan asked
the prosecutor to suspend the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question.
The prosecutor suspended the criminal proceedings, but
this was reversed by the Secretary of Justice. On Feb. 3, 2000,
an Information was filed against Pangilinan for two counts of
violation of BP 22.
Pangilinan filed a motion to quash on the ground of
prescription, which was granted by the MeTC.
The RTC reversed the MeTCs order, considering that
proceedings had already commenced with the Office of the
Prosecutor in 1997.
The CA reversed the RTCs decision, invoking Zaldivia v.
Reyes which held that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court.
Arguing for the People, the OSG pointed out that the
Zaldivia doctrine had already been abandoned by subsequent
cases. On the other hand, Pangilinan contended that the
arguments advanced by the OSG are anchored on erroneous
premises, claiming that the cases relied upon by the OSG
involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
are therefore covered by Art. 91 of the RPC and Sec. 1, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. She pointed out that the crime
imputed against her is for violation of BP 22, a special law and
as such, is governed by Act 3326.
Issue: Whether or not prescription has set in.
Held: No. The current rule, per recent jurisprudence, is that
the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Pangilinans contention that a different rule should be applied
to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no
more distinction between cases under the RPC and those
covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the
period of prescription.
104. SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation (2008)
Facts:
On Aug. 6, 1994, IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB) wherein it
acquired shares over the Ganda Energy Holding Inc. (GEHI).
However, IRC has delayed its public disclosure which is a
violation of the Corporation Code.
Thus, on Aug. 16, 1994, SEC Chairman issued a directive
requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman
further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a
hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED)
of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the
information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material
Facts. Later on it issued an Order that IRC violated Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old
Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure
of its negotiations with GHB.
The officers questioned the SECs order with the CA which
sided with the officers and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative case against them.
When the case was already with the Supreme Court, IRC
contended that the case has already prescribed because
violation of Revised Securities Act shall have a prescription
period of 12 years. Since the offense was committed in 1994,
they reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and
 Criminal Law Review (6th Assignment)
rendered this case moot. However, it was contended that the
same has not yet prescribed considering that the same was
tolled by investigation made by the SEC.
Issue: Whether the investigation made by the SEC tolled the
running of the prescriptive period.
Held: Yes. A preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescription period. A preliminary investigation is essentially a
determination whether an offense has been committed, and
whether there is probable cause for the accused to have
committed an offense. Under Section 45 of the Revised
Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and
Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX."
After a finding that a person has violated the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution. While the SEC
investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially
similar duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In one case
decided by the Supreme Court, it enunciated that a criminal
complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the
existence of probable cause, before a preliminary investigation
can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the
complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the
ground that it should have been filed first with the SEC.
Similarly, the offense was a violation of the Securities
Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for criminal
prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the Revised
Securities Act. SC held that under the above provision, a
criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered
by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the SEC finds
that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to
the DOJ.
105. Lumantas v. Calapiz (2014)
Facts:
Spouses Calapiz brought their eight-year-old son, Hanz, to
a hospital for an emergency appendectomy. Dr. Encarnacion
Lumantas, who was attending to Hanz, suggested to the
parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost
to which they agreed. But after the operation, Hanz had
complications with his penis, and later on he was diagnosed to
have a damage urethra which, despite medical treatment,
could not be fully repaired and restructured.
Dr. Lumantas was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries.
The RTC acquitted Dr. Lumantas but ordered him to pay
Hanz P50,000 as moral damages. The CA affirmed the RTCs
ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the grant of moral damages was
proper.
Held: Yes. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
Thus, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a
judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil
aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and
adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of
based on mere preponderance of evidence. The petitioners
contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there
was no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration.
The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence
with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that
there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him
civilly liable.
106. Daluraya v. Oliva (2014)
Facts:
Marina Oliva was crossing the streat when a Nissan
Vanette, said to be driven by the accused Antonio Daluraya,
ran her over resulting in her death.
Daluraya was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed
to establish that he was the driver of the Nissan Vanette,
which was granted by the MeTC, which also ruled that no civil
liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for Olivas demise.
The RTC affirmed the MeTCs ruling.
However, the CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered
Daluraya to pay Olivas daughter P50,000 as indemnity and
P50,000 as moral damages. According to the CA, the MeTCs
order granting the demurrer was actually based on the fact
that the prosecution failed to prove Dalurayas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in awarding
damages.
Held: No. A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order,
which the RTC sustained, will show that Dalurayas acquittal
was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of
the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and
categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and
they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely
 Criminal Law Review (6th Assignment)
committed the crime charged against him." Furthermore, when
Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the
prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the
driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and
that "there is no competent evidence on hand which proves
that the accused was the person responsible for the death of
Marina Oliva."
107. Solidum v. People (2014)
Facts:
On June 2, 1992, Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born
with an imperforate anus. Hence, two days after his birth, he
underwent colostomy which enabled him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
Three years later or on May 17, 1995, he was admitted at
the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. The
surgical team consisted of Dr. Resurreccion, Dr. Luceo, Dr.
Valea, and Dr. Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Abella,
Dr. Razon and herein Petitioner Dr. Solidum. It was during the
said operation that Gerald experienced bradycardia or an
abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per minute.
He subsequently went into a coma which lasted for two weeks.
When he regained consciousness after a month, he could no
longer see, hear, or move. Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries against the attending physicians.
The prosecution, however, filed an Information solely
against Dr. Solidum.
The RTC convicted Dr. Solidum and order him to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila and
two other doctors who were with him, Luz P500,000 as moral
damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs. On motion for reconsideration, the RTC relieved the two
other doctors from liability. The CA affirmed the RTCs
decision.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Dr. Solidum is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries; and (2)
Whether or not Dr. Solidum is civilly liable.
Held:
(1) No. Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to
monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications."However, the
foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability
that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which
could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and
had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido
revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did
occur."
(2) No. We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum
would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we
cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present
the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no
firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had
been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of
the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of
the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by
Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable
would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not
allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation
but on competent evidence.
The Supreme Court also noted that the RTC erred in
holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally
with Dr. Solidum, considering that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not even been charged along with Dr.
Solidum.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have
been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Moreover,
Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when
subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary
liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied
with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
"engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means
any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged
in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public
hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly,
assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of
Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during
the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly,
assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum
as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution
against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.