Reply to Jacquette

John R. Searle

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, No. 4. (Jun., 1989), pp. 701-708.

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. X L I X , NO. 4 , June 1989

Reply to Jacquette
J O H N R. SEARLE
University of California, Berkeley

Jacquette makes numerous points about the Chinese Room Argument

and about the ~ r o b l e mof intentionality in general. I will not try to reply to
all of them, but I will confine myself to those that seem to me most impor-
tant.

I believe he has missed the point of the Chinese Room argument. Though
the point is really very simple, it does sometimes tend to get lost in all of
the interpretations, criticisms, and "intuitions" which are discussed in
these matters. Here it is: programs are purely syntactically defined. The
program consists of formal symbol manipulations. But these formal sym-
bol manipulations by themselves have no semantic content. Any semantic
interpretation has to be from outside the system of the symbol manipula-
tion. This is a strict logical consequence of the syntactical character of the
programs and the fact that syntax is not sufficient for semantics. But in
this respect programs differ from human minds, which have mental states
with intrinsic mental or semantic content.
That is the argument. It is that simple. In the abstract of the original
BBS article and in various other places, I set it out as a derivation from axi-
oms, but it can equally be understood discursively, as I stated it above.
The Chinese Room Argument reminds us of these facts by reminding us
that the man in the Chinese room can be the hardware implementing the
formal syntactical steps in any program at all, and yet the 'system' of hard-
ware and software still does not have the appropriate semantic content
which is supposed to be associated with those steps. This will be the case,
for example, when he is a native monolingual English speaker going
through the program for "understanding Chinese."
Using obvious abbreviations, Strong A1 says:
Necessarily (program implies mind).
My counter-argument says:
It is not the case that (necessarily (program implies mind)).
because
It is possible that (program and not mind).
Now, it seems to me that Jacquette misses the point of this argument. He
thinks it is only about "macrolevel" programs and would not apply to
"microlevel" programs. But the argument as stated applies to any pro-
grams at any level at all.
He also says that "the key assumption (of the Chinese Room Argument
is) that any adequate functionally isomorphic model of a native Chinese
speaker must have a central locus of program execution or control that
itself understands Chinese." But that is not a key assumption, indeed it is
not an assumption at all. I gave several examples in the original text of sys-
tems which were "functionally isomorphic models of a native Chinese
speaker" but which were made out of beer can systems or water pipes,
etc., and they certainly do not need to have a Chinese understanding
"central locus of program, execution or control." The only assumptions
that I make are the ones that I stated above, viz.: programs are syntactical,
syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and minds have semantics.
He says: ." . . if there is no single locus of control in the micro-func-
tionally isomorphic model of the native Chinese speaker, then it remains
at least possible that the program itself and no single identifiable part of it
would understand Chinese" (p. 609). But this, I believe, is just beside the
point. It is, of course, "possible" that every program carries with it a com-
plete understanding of Chinese. For example, for all I know, God might
decide to endow every single program ever created with a complete under-
standing of Chinese. In any case, if it is not possible, I certainly did not try
to demonstrate it. And you can have as many micro-functionally iso-
morphic models as you like, but as long as they are defined purely for-
mally, and as long as the formal syntax is just that, a formal syntax, the
program will not by itself be sufficient to guarantee the presence of the
semantics. Somehow or other, Jacquette seems to think that I am arguing
that no program system could ever have a semantics. But that is not my
argument, and it never was. That interpretation is based on misunder-
standing the scope of the modal operators. The argument, to repeat, is:
the presence of the appropriate program at any level which satisfies the
Turing test is not sufficient for nor constitutive of, it does not guarantee
the presence of intentional content. He thinks that I am claiming:
Program implies necessarily not mind.
Whereas what I am in fact claiming is:
It is not the case that (necessarily (program implies mind)).
As far as I can see, he has not answered this point, indeed, he has not even
addressed himself to it.
What is going on here? I am not sure how he could have come by this
misunderstanding, but my tentative diagnosis is this: in the original article
I imagined a single man going through all the steps of the "Chinese under-
standing" computer program. Jacquette thinks he can evade this thought
experiment simply by fiat.' He says we can simply imagine a microlevel
program which no single man could execute. Fine. Let us imagine such a
program. It still does not meet the point; the point is that the program is
purely formal or syntactical. And once again, you can see that by extend-
ing the thought experiment. If the system has a program which no single
man can execute, then let a whole bunch of monolingual English speaking
men execute it. You still do not get any Chinese semantics.
Just to summarize this point so that it is absolutely clear: He thinks that
the fundamental issue in the Chinese Room Argument is about the appro-
priate level of the program, and he thinks that there is nothing in the argu-
ment that precludes the possibility that there might be a program level
with no single locus of control. But that is not the issue. The issue is about
the distinction between formal symbols and semantics, between the
manipulation of syntactical elements and the meanings attaching to those
syntactical elements. And that distinction applies at every level of pro-
gram implementation.
I am happy to keep stating this argument over and over again, because
its points are brutally simple. As it does seem difficult to get across, I will
state it again:
I. Programs are syntactical.
2. Minds have semantics.

3. Syntax by itself is neither sufficient for nor constitutive of

semantics.
Therefore,
4. Programs by themselves are not minds.

' In this he apparently follows William G . Lycan, " T h e Functionalist Reply," The Behau-
ioral and Brazn Sciences j (1980):43 5 .
 At no point does Jacquette address this argument.

I now turn to Jacquette's discussion of the "causal powers of the mind"

and the problems of intentionality in general. It seems to me his main
interest is in the issues of the ontology of intentionality. The basic points
he makes here are as follows: first, he thinks my "arguments" for the
claim that intentionality is a biological phenomenon are "flawed"; and
second, he suggests in opposition to this that we should think of intention-
ality as an "abstract relation." The choice then that he presents us is
between the "naturalistic" biological conception of intentionality and an
"abstract'' conception of intentionality. Third, in opposition to my view,
he finds my analogies between the way intentionality relates to the brain
and the way that, e.g., liquidity and solidity relate to molecular substruc-
tures wanting. I will try to answer all of these points in the following dis-
cussion.
To begin, I believe there are some very deep misunderstandings, not
only of my own views, but of the nature of intentionality itself that moti-
vate much of his discussion. Since, he is not alone in having these misun-
derstandings, I think it is worth the effort to try to clarify the matter in
some detail. Let us consider the alleged opposition between the claims
that intentionality is a biological phenomenon and the claims that inten-
tionality involves abstract relations, and let us try to state each of these
views a little more precisely.
I. Intrinsic intentionality is a biological phenomenon, caused by
brain processes and realized in the structure of the brain.
2. Intentionality consists in a series of 'abstract relations' involv-
ing such abstract phenomena as propositional contents, refer-
ence, truth conditions, conditions of satisfaction generally, etc.
Mr. Jacquette objects to my holding the first of these, and urges that I
should instead adopt the second. But in fact, I hold both of these proposi-
tions, and I have spent a fair amount of my time over the past few years
attempting to explicate both. The crucial point to see is that they are not
competing answers to the same question, they are non-competing
answers to two quite different questions. The first is an answer to the
question "How does the existence of intentional phenomena such as
thirst, hunger, belief, desire, etc. relate to the rest of the world; i.e. how do
they fit into our overall ontology?" The second is an answer to the ques-
tion, "What is the logical structure of intentional representation; i.e. how
does it work logically speaking?" There is no inconsistency between these

704 J O H N R. SEARLE
two views, on the contrary, they are both part of one overall theory or
conception of intentionality.
Now, I believe that his deepest problem is that he, in common with
many other philosophers, cannot see how both of these can be true
together. Notice that on their face there is clearly no inconsistency
between I. and z. It is like saying that paintings have both physical real-
izations i.e. they are oil on canvas, and abstract relations, i.e they repre-
sent such and such scenes. But I think that Jacquette would reject this
analogy where "primitive" intentionality is concerned. After all, paint-
ings get their intentionality from humans, and it is for human intentional-
ity that he thinks we must choose between "abstract relations" and "natu-
ralism." So let us try to probe a little deeper.
Jacquette seems to think that I am attempting to produce some argu-
ments for the claim that intentionality is a biological phenomenon. And
he professes to find these arguments unconvincing. As far as I know, I
have never actually tried to produce any arguments that intentionality is a
biological phenomenon, I simply stated it as an obvious fact. I then tried
to show some of its instances, and I tried to explore the reasons why peo-
ple have denied this obvious fact. But I am not sure how one would go
about arguing for anything quite so obvious. So, let me once again call
attention to its obviousness. Consider some absolutely paradigm cases of
intentionality, not the usual philosopher's examples, but real ground
floor, real life cases of intentionality: having an intense thirst for a really
cold glass of beer, feeling a sudden desire to throw up, having a visual
experience of a man coming in the door on the opposite side of the room,
feeling too hot because the room is too hot, having a strong sexual desire,
feeling a surge of anger. Now, does anyone doubt that these are all biolog-
ical phenomena as much as digestion is a biological phenomenon? Of
course, we do not know the details of how they are caused by brain pro-
cesses, but there is no real doubt that they are caused by brain processes.
If we are talking about the ontology of intrinsic intentionality, then the
discussion starts with the fact they are biological phenomena. That is not
the conclusion of the argument, but the beginning. Why then is there so
much resistance? In Jacquette's case, why all the heavy going about the
Empress Josephine and the President of the United States? Why not just
grant that, e.g. when I am in a paradigm state of intentionality such as
thirst, my thirst is caused by neuron firings in the hypothalamus and is
realized right there - in the brain.
My own diagnosis of why people have failed to see this obvious fact is
fairly complex, and it has grown in complexity over the years. But the
basic component of the diagnosis is that many philosophers have still not
freed themselves from the clutches of Cartesian dualism. They still think
of the mind as something formal or abstract and not part of the real messy
world of biological phenomena going on in our brain. Now, once you get
over this Cartesianism, once you abandon dualism, and once you see the
biological character of intentionality, then there is no question of natural-
izing intentionality; it is already completely naturalized, it is as natural as
digestion. It is just something that happens to us in virtue of our biological
constitution.
The resistance to these obvious facts derives from the failure to see that
something can both have the irreducible logical properties of intentional
phenomena and still at the same time be a natural biological phenom-
enon. Many philosophers ranging from Descartes to his contemporary
heirs in Artificial Intelligence and functionalism generally think that the
mind, because of its "abstract" properties, could not be a natural biologi-
cal phenomenon. Jacquette is one of these heirs, and it is revealing that he
quotes the objections of Sir John Eccles against me (p. 11); because, of
course, Eccles is a convinced dualist. He believes that God attaches the
Soul to the fetus at the age of about three weeks.
T o repeat: I do not try to demonstrate that intentionality is a biological
phenomenon, I just assert it as an obvious fact which is based on every-
thing we know about how the world works; and anybody who fails to see
its obviousness, just has to go through the absolutely standard examples
of intentionality - feeling thirsty, seeing an object on the far side of the
room, feeling a strong emotion, wanting to throw up, etc. Mr. Jacquette
purports to find various "flaws" in my argument for the biological charac-
ter of intentionality, but since there is no such "argument" it is hard to
understand his characterization of the "flaws."
He does indeed have arguments against my various analogies as to how
mental phenomena could at the same time be both caused by brain phe-
nomena and realized in the structure of brains. He objects that mental
phenomena could not be analogous to solidity and liquidity, because, "if
intentional mental phenomena are irreducible then they cannot be caus-
ally naturalized by analogy with wetness, elasticity, solidity, or puncture
resistence, since these higher-level properties are arguably reducible to
and eliminable in favor of micro-structure physical state descriptions." In
this passage it seems to me he is confusing causal reduction with elimina-
tive reduction. Of course, in so far as mental phenomena are entirely caus-
ally explicable in terms of lower-level neuro-biological phenomena then
they are in that sense causally reducible to the lower-level phenomena.
The causes are sufficient to produce the effects. But there is no eliminative
or ontological reduction in this, because the higher-level phenomena still

706 J O H N R. S E A R L E
exist. Now, similarly with, for example, solidity. Solidity is entirely expli-
cable causally in terms of the vibratory movements of the molecules in lat-
tice structures. But the higher-level phenomena still exist. Thus, for exam-
ple, because the table in front of me is solid, it is able to support the books
on it. The table is not penetrated by the books. Solidity is a feature at the
level of the table, not at the level of individual molecules. He objects that
the only irreducible properties are "phenomenological"; but that, I
believe, involves a mistake about the nature of scientific reduction. Causal
reductions do not in general eliminate higher-level features. Even if we all
died and there were no more phenomenological properties in the world,
all the same books will not penetrate tables.
When Jacquette says that we ought to think of intentionality as an
"abstract relation," we need to be very careful to distinguish whether or
not his claim is about the ontological status of intentional phenomena or
whether or not it is about the logical properties of intentional phenomena.
If it is a question about the ontological status, then it seems to me, as a
matter of fact, it is just false. There is nothing "abstract" about my desire
to throw up. Of course, you cannot weigh it, or sit on it. It is not a physical
object, but all the same it is a pretty concrete empirical phenomenon in the
real world. He cites Brentano and Husserl as also holding the abstract
notion of intentionality. I have not read either of these authors on this
issue, and so I cannot comment on their conceptions, but if they deny that
intentionality is biological then, I believe, they must be mistaken.
The reason, however, that intentionality is so philosophically interest-
ing is that these biological phenomena have logical properties. They are
capable of representing objects and states of affairs in the world. It is here
that we can agree to his claim that intentionality is "abstract." But the
really deep mistake, and it is one of the most profound mistakes of the past
three hundred years in Western philosophy, is the assumption that any-
thing that has these abstract properties, that is capable of standing in rep-
resenting relations, cannot be part of the ordinary 'physical' world we all
live in. We know this assumption is mistaken, because we know that the
brain is part of the ordinary 'physical' world and we know that is does
stand in intentional relations. The assumption is one of the many forms
that dualism takes, and Mr. Jacquette has yet to free himself from it.
Jacquette says that I "need to preserve intentionality as an irreducible
distinguishing feature of the mental." But I have no such need and, indeed,
no such view. I do not think that intentionality is a "distinguishing feature
of the mental," because it seems to me quite possible that there may be
organisms that have mental phenomena in the form of conscious states,
but have no intentionality. I do not know whether this is the case, but I
certainly have no philosophical arguments against it. If we are talking
about the "distinguishing features of the mental," I would think con-
sciousness is a more plausible candidate than intentionality.