History and Technology

Vol. 26, No. 4, December 2010, 335357

Methanol as future fuel: efforts to develop alternative fuels in Sweden

after the Oil Crisis
Erland Mrald*

The 1973 Oil Crisis was a wake-up call for Sweden. Swedens high reliance on foreign
History
10.1080/07341512.2010.523175
GHAT_A_523175.sgm
0734-1512
Original
Taylor
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Erland.marald@idehist.umu.se
ErlandMarald
00000December
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and
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Article
Francis
(print)/1477-2620
Francis
Technology
2010 (online)

energy supply and the lack of domestic fossil energy sources hit private motoring hard.
In the aftermath of the crisis, methanol was seen as a promising alternative fuel. This
article analyzes how, who, and for what reasons methanol fuel was promoted in Sweden
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, the study places the efforts to establish
methanol as fuel in an international framework and in the broader context of the Energy
Program and the governments objective to plan for a new energy future for Sweden.
This article especially examines forecasting motor fuels and automobiles and how
foresight was used in relation to the methanol campaign. The article argues that in the
case of the Swedish methanol campaign the upcoming development in the energy sector
was mostly described as smooth and calculable. Both the state and the industry planned
for a post-petroleum era, in which methanol fuel played a vital role. However, they were
unwilling to take any decisive step until circumstances were right, but since
circumstances never seemed appropriate, methanol as a fuel was always deferred to a
distant future.
Keywords: methanol; alternative fuels; the Oil Crisis; foresight planning; energy;
automobile

The Oil Crisis in the autumn of 1973 was a wake-up call for the Western World. In Sweden,
with its high reliance on foreign energy supply, the emergency demonstrated Swedens inse-
cure position. There were no domestic sources of oil, coal, or natural gas available and
imported oil amounted to 73% of Swedens total energy use. In fact, Sweden was the most
oil consuming country in Europe per capita.1 Awareness of the nations vulnerability
intensified the already ongoing energy debate. The energy issue also stayed on top of the
Swedish political agenda during the rest of the 1970s, culminating in the referendum about
nuclear power in 1980.
The serious circumstances that the Oil Crisis revealed demanded actions from politi-
cians to meet and prevent similar situations in the future. As a consequence, early in 1974
the Swedish Government authorized the Energy Program Commission to investigate, from
a holistic approach, energy use and policy. In 1975, this investigation resulted in one of the
largest Swedish governmental investments in research and development ever, the Energy
Program. The task was to inventory and coordinate ongoing energy research, fund existing
and new research and development projects, and promote investments in new and alterna-
tive energy systems. The Energy Program involved universities, industry, and public
authorities. As a result, several new authorities were set up to organize the work. The long-
term aim was to reconstruct the entire energy system to break oil dependency, save energy,
and create a national independence.2 Seen from the present day horizon, these actions were

*Erland Mrald is Lecturer in the Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies,
Ume University. Email: Erland.marald@idehist.umu.se

ISSN 0734-1512 print/ISSN 1477-2620 online

2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/07341512.2010.523175
http://www.informaworld.com
336 E. Mrald

quite successful. To date, the dependency of oil has been reduced to 31% of the total energy
supply, and the import of crude oil and petroleum products has been reduced by over 40%.3
However, these impressive changes did not include fuels for motor vehicles. Since the
Oil Crisis, energy use for transportation has continually increased and oil products still
amount to 95% of this energy use.4 This gap is paradoxical since transportation and espe-
cially private motoring were hit hard by the Oil Crisis. When the access of oil was cut, there
were no substitutes for petrol and diesel. As a result, the Swedish government in January
1974 introduced petrol rationing for private motoring. The action lasted only a month, but
during this period there was an uncertainty how long the shortage of fuels would continue
or whether the situation would worsen. If the crisis became worse, the authorities planned
to prohibit private motoring at weekends. If the worst scenario materialized, a total prohibi-
tion of private motoring would have been enforced. In addition, the National Board of
Economic Defence had plans to start up mass production of wood gas aggregates, since
wood gas was the only possible domestic fuel substitute.5
Nevertheless, the issue about alternative motor fuels was not completely dismissed in
the aftermath of the Oil Crisis. Around the world, governments launched programs for oil
replacement, which included enhanced interests in electrical vehicles and in fuel alcohols,
synthetic petrol, and hydrogen fuel. The most well known among these campaigns is
Brazils National Alcohol Program to produce fuel ethanol from sugar cane, which started
in 1975 and later on became a significant industry.6 In Sweden, methanol was seen as the
most promising alternative fuel and efforts to develop methanol fuel started in the mid
1970s. Although the Swedish methanol campaign was a minor part of the Energy Program,
it was quite substantial and it lasted until the second half of the 1980s.
Often research about the Oil Crisis and the national energy programs in the 1970s only
briefly mention attempts to introduce alternative fuels.7 Presumably, this is because interest
in alternative fuels in the 1970s did not, except for Brazils ethanol investment, lead to
significant gains in oil savings. Instead, contemporary analyses and historical studies have
focused on international and national politics, mass media coverage, and concerning energy
issues, mainly oil savings programs and debates about nuclear energy, water power, wind
power, and solar energy.
Ethanol as an alternative to gasoline has a longer genealogy and has drawn historical
attention.8 Interest in ethanol as fuel started in the early twentieth century. To the contem-
porary eye, it points to the changing historical status of renewable and finite resources; to
the political economy of agriculture and forestry; and to issues of national independence in
fuel production. During the period 20002010, ethanol as a fuel has seen success and been
much debated. The history of methanol fuel, too, goes back to the first half of the twentieth
century. It was used in some European countries during the Second World War, and during
the 1970s and 1980s a number of countries started methanol fuel experimental programs,
yet the historical research on methanol is minimal.9 Thus, in the context of the Oil Crisis,
the role of alternative fuels has tended to be overlooked by scholars, as has methanols place
in the history of alternative fuels.
This article investigates how methanol fuel was promoted in Sweden: by whom, for
what reasons, and how these attempts fluctuated from the mid 1970s through the early
1980s. The problem of alternative motor fuels brought together a complex of issues and
politico-economic spheres: energy, the automotive industry, technological development,
welfare, national security, the environment, and the relationship between national policy
and international dependencies. The Oil Crisis accentuated and threw into higher relief the
interrelation among these issues and areas of activity, and the problem of understanding and
redefining these interrelations became an explicit concern of a range of historical actors.
 History and Technology 337

The study, too, emphasizes the efforts to establish methanol as fuel in an international
framework and in the broader context of the Energy Program and the governments objec-
tive to plan for a new energy future for Sweden. As expectations about societal changes and
predictions about oil supply, motor fuels, and automobiles were essential in the methanol
investment, this article will especially examine how such scenarios were used in connection
with the methanol development program and how this affected the work to introduce meth-
anol fuel in Sweden. The Oil Crisis gave a higher profile to the problem of planning for the
future for government and business and of developing the analytic tools that might
enhance confidence in such planning.

The Oil Crisis and the energy future

Although the Oil Crisis occurred suddenly, it was not without precedent in the Swedish
experience. The Second World War, the Suez Crisis in 1956, and energy rationing in the
winter of 1970 were still fresh national memories. In the Cold War, Sweden had declared
itself non-aligned and neutral. This position involved a very high defense budget that
included an elevated state of civil readiness for war or other crises. To prepare the country
for war or a possible sealed-off occurrence, large oil reserves were built up and the wood
gas technology continued to be maintained.10 From this readiness perspective, the National
Board of Economic Defense saw it as problematic that Swedish oil consumption had
increased by more than 10 times between 1950 and 1970. Moreover, the alarm was sounded
when the proportion of oil from the insecure Middle East region continually increased.11
The Oil Crisis did not, however, fit into the National Board of Economic Defenses estab-
lished scenarios of threatening situations. It was neither a war against the country nor
embargoing caused by war in surrounding areas as the situation had been during the Second
World War. Instead, the Oil Crisis was labeled a peace crisis, even if it was caused by a
war in a remote location.12 This concept focused on insecure global relationships of depen-
dency and the vulnerability of the energy system.
Furthermore, there were indications that such events could become more frequent or
even permanent in the future. The Club of Romes report The Limits to Growth (1972),
which predicted that economic growth could not continue indefinitely because of the limited
availability of natural resources, had a large impact on the Swedish debate.13 In Sweden,
Gsta Ehrensvrd, professor in biochemistry, a year earlier had presented a similar forecast
in his study Fre Efter: En diagnos [Before after: A diagnosis].14 Ehrensvrd predicted
that extraction of limited natural resources especially oil would soon come to an end
with major strain on society. The Oil era, according to Ehrensvrd, was a parenthesis in
history and cheap imported oil, which had been fundamental in the making of the Swedish
welfare state, belonged to the past. Whether we wanted it or not, wood and other renewable
fuels would eventually replace oil and petrol.15 Although Ehrensvrds arguments were
received as somewhat extreme, all evaluators agreed that oil was a finite resource. Even
representatives of the Swedish oil industry expected the oil price to continue to rise and the
world production of oil would come to a peak in a couple of decades and then decrease.16
In other words, the Oil Crisis turned the focus on the energy future.
In the 1960s and 1970s, system analysis, long-term national land-use planning, and
futurological studies in Sweden were advancing.17 This was an international trend, which
also reflected the development of the strong society with cadres of technological expertise
in expanding public authorities in Western countries.18 At the end of 1960s, a debate about
establishing futurological studies began in Sweden.19 There was awareness that decisions
about social reforms and technology had long-term effects. Furthermore, rapid societal
338 E. Mrald

changes quickly tended to make short-sighted decisions obsolete, or even worse, decreased
the space for transformative action. The most important motive for futurological studies,
according to the Official Governmental Report Att vlja framtid [Choosing the future] from
1972, was to make arrangements in time to take real decisions, i.e., to shape the future
instead of passively let it be shaped for us.20
One year later, the Oil Crisis became an apparent proof of what the lack of foresight
could mean. Moreover, emergencies tend to generate more planning and state interventions.
This was the case in Sweden. From 1975 to 1980, the amount earmarked for energy
research of the states total cost for research and development increased from 5% to 10%
because of the implementation of the Energy Program.21 In addition, between 1973 and
1980 almost 40 Official Governmental Reports about energy were published, many of them
related to the Energy Program.22 One important objective for the Energy Program was to
anticipate future changes in the energy sector and thereby secure Swedens space for
freedom of action.
Consequently, the Oil Crisis forced the fusion of future planning, energy issues, and
state interventions. Wittrock and Lindstrm have labeled the ambitions of Sweden to
combine scientific analyses with large-scale forward-looking action programs as the era of
large programs, using the Energy Program as their prime example. The policy behind these
programs was, according to Wittrock and Lindstrm, dictated by a radical rationalism.23
That phrase refers to the notion that it should be possible to cover a whole segment of soci-
ety by surveying problems and existing knowledge, and with the help of predictions and
scenario techniques analyze possible futures. Drawing on knowledge about upcoming
options, after democratic discussions, it would be possible to set up goals and implement
large-scale actions to reach the desired ends. From this perspective the future was seen as
calculable and upcoming changes possible to control and anticipate and thereby avoiding
drastic turns that could disturb the industry and the Swedish welfare state. In other words,
implementation of large programs was, on the one hand, a rationalistic mission and, on the
other, an optimistic belief that it was possible to shape the future.
Sweden was not unique in this sense. In the 1970s much of the international and national
futurological debates focused on different energy futures. Mason claims that discussing
energy in the singular was something innovative in the early 1970s.24 Previously, energy
supply had been understood as separate parts, such as nuclear energy, oil, coal, water, and
electricity. Now instead it was obvious that different energy supplies belonged to an inter-
connected system. This holistic view is, for example, evident in President Richard Nixons
televised address in November 1973, in which he declared that by 1980, under Project
Independence, we shall be able to meet Americas energy needs from Americas own energy
resources.25 The idea was to liberate the USA from foreign oil dependency by developing
diverse domestic energy assets. Thus, to rearrange the direction of the total national energy
system it would be possible to become self-sufficient and independent from external influence.
Vedung and Brandell have shown, in a similar way, that this semantic shift started in
Sweden some years before the Oil Crisis, with a reassessment of nuclear energy and water-
power. The earlier unambiguously optimistic view on nuclear power was replaced by a
debate about risks. Moreover, a strong political and public opinion for saving the last unex-
ploited rivers succeeded in stopping further utilization of them. Finally, the Oil Crisis put
focus on the oil dependency. The problem was that if the conditions were altered for one
energy supply, it had consequences for all the others. Moreover, it became apparent that the
energy use for transportation, heating, and production was interrelated.26 It was the entire
national energy system that the Energy Program was to examine from a holistic approach
and a long-term perspective to reduce the oil dependency.27
 History and Technology 339

Finally, it is important to remember that motor fuels are not only a matter of energy.
They are also a fundamental part of the modern mass-motoring society, with strong conno-
tations to welfare and freedom but also to threats against health and nature. Even before the
Oil Crisis, fuels and automobiles had attracted attention because of the rise of the environ-
mental question in the 1960s. Ralph Naders book Unsafe at any Speed (1965) was trans-
lated into Swedish in 1967 with a foreword by the Minister for Communication (later Prime
Minister) Olof Palme.28 In 1970, the USA ratified the Clean Air Act Amendments with
tough goals to limit automobile emissions by 1975/76; this legislation influenced the discus-
sion in Sweden and similar goals were approved in 1972.29 The US decision to phase out
leaded gasoline became a question in the Swedish debate during the 1970s and 1980s.
Another disputed subject was the negative impact of private motoring. Except for increasing
air pollution, traffic negatively affected urban areas, aggravated social interchange, and
increased accidental injuries and death.30
Issues about changes and the limitation of private motoring were delicate to handle. The
automotive industry was important to Sweden with Volvo, SAAB, and Scania as some of
the countrys largest companies and employers. There were also many subcontractors, and
the automotive sector altogether employed tens of thousands of people. These vital indus-
tries were backed by the political establishment, the trade unions, and influential interest
groups such as The Swedish Road Association. In Sweden, there were also three private
motoring popular movements with several hundred thousand members. Thus, every threat
against private motoring was seen as a threat against the Swedish society.31 For example, in
the middle of the Oil Crisis the influential Minister for Finance Gunnar Strng stated that
the automobile was vital for society in a foreseeable future: Man has still not invented any
better means [the automobile] to eliminate distance, to create individual freedom and
comfort of transportation.32

The establishment of methanol as alternative fuel number 1

In December 1973, two MIT researchers T.B. Reed and R.M. Lerner published the
article Methanol: A Versatile Fuel for Immediate Use in the prominent journal Science.
Reed and Lerner described the management of energy resources as the lifeblood of our
economy. Methanol, according to the authors, could be made of different supplies, be
easily stored in liquid form, fit existing equipment, and could be used in diverse industry
processes as well as in combustion engines as a motor fuel:

We believe that methanol is the most versatile synthetic fuel available and its use could stretch
or eventually substitute for the disappearing reserves of low-cost petroleum resources. 33

According to Brenton, Kovarik, and Sklar, this article made Reed into a celebrity overnight.34
MIT started up a methanol information centre to provide advice and dispense information.35
Methanol as a motor fuel also gained attention internationally in the mid 1970s, and the
automotive industry especially showed an interest in methanol.36
Methanol was not the only synthetic engine fuel that was under consideration in the
aftermath of the Oil Crisis. Hydrogen, butanol, methanol, ethanol, MTBE (methyl-tert-
butyl-ether), and synthetic petrol produced from coal were investigated in different devel-
opment programs in Brazil, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, USA, and West Germany. Among these countries, New Zealand and
West Germany had the most ambitious plans for developing methanol, but for West
Germany not as their only alternative and for New Zealand as a step towards synthetic
340 E. Mrald

petrol.37 The only country, because of an international boycott, that actually produced
synthetic fuels in a large scale was South Africa.
In other words, when the Energy Program Commission in early 1974 started mapping
alternative motor fuels, there were many possibilities and no international consensus. In their
report at the end of 1974, the Commission concluded that only the Swedish ready-made
system wood gas could produce fuel for a maximum of one million vehicles, which was
only one-third of the total Swedish fleet of motor vehicles. It was not a satisfactory solution.
Other possible alternatives were synthetic fuels that could reach a marked scale on the
international market within a decade. Such fuels could be made of methyl, ammonium, and
hydrazine. Several of these substances were considered too expensive to produce, too diffi-
cult to handle, or too poisonous. More plausible was ethanol and, in the long run, hydrogen.
However, the Commission claimed that methanol is probably closest at hand.38
Consequently, as early as this preliminary and investigative phase, the Commission
prioritized methanol. This priority probably is explained by the influence of one of
Swedens largest and most prestigious companies. In the summer of 1974, almost six
months before the Commission presented its first official report, the CEO of AB Volvo,
P.G. Gyllenhammar, presented an investment in methanol to the Minister for Industry. It
has not been possible to find any accessible documents that explain why Volvo took this
initiative, but Gyllenhammar personally most likely played a vital role. Gyllenhammar had
become CEO for Volvo in 1971 at only 36 years old. As a business leader, he had the ambi-
tion to be active in the public debate. Already in 1970, he had written a book about futur-
ological studies.39 Moreover, in connection with United Nations First Conference on the
Environment in Stockholm 1972 he took the initiative for an international symposium
about motoring in a global context, an event that finally took place in Paris in 1976.40 In
addition, in 1973 he published the book Jag tror p Sverige [I believe in Sweden], in which
he, among other things, discussed future problems of energy supply and transports.41
Gyllenhammar wrote:

The ceasing of oil resources is, of course, a threat against the industry as well as transport, if
no plausible alternatives are obtained. But alternatives probably exist. When the short-term
economic setback has been surmounted and the oil prices have increased drastically, other
energy supplies should become competitive.42

Early in 1974, Volvo engaged a working group to investigate alternative fuels, and during
the autumn of 1974 the Swedish State and Volvo negotiated to start up a joint venture to
develop methanol as a motor fuel. In March 1975, a company started up under the name The
Swedish Methanol Development Company [Svensk metanolutveckling AB] SMAB
with the state through the state-owned company Berol Kemi AB as part owner with 60%
and Volvo with 40%. The board of directors included representatives from Volvo, govern-
mental departments, public agencies, and other influential interest groups.43 One can,
however, note the lack of a representative from the Swedish Oil companies on the board of
directors. Initially, the staff at SMAB consisted of only three persons and most of the work
was done by consulting engineers or by Volvo.
During the first three years, the state paid (via the Energy Program) for 70% and Volvo
for 30% of SMABs development work, although the state only owned 60% of the company.
In the Energy Program, this was a relatively small project; however, in the area of alternative
engines and fuels, SMAB dominated. Actually, in the first governmental bill in the energy
area after the Oil Crisis in 1975 more than half of the governmental funding for research
and development of alternative fuels and motors went to SMAB.44 Moreover, SMAB soon
received some supplementary funding from the National Board of Energy Production
 History and Technology 341

Research, one of the special authorities that was created in the Energy Program. In addition,
SMAB had close connections to the National Board of Technical Development and the
National Board of Energy Production Research, both involved in the Energy Program. This
illustrates how intertwined different interests were in the Energy Program, with a blurred
border between the private and the governmental spheres. This circumstance also makes it
hard, in this study, to distinguish varying actors in the Swedish methanol campaign and to
connect certain opinions with different actors. For example, many statements reoccur both
in SMABs internal PMs and in different Official Governmental Reports.
One of SMABs goals was to build an international network. By March 1976, in coop-
eration with the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, SMAB arranged the
international conference in Stockholm Methanol as a Fuel.45 In addition to Swedish repre-
sentatives, there were representatives from West Germany, Japan, and the USA, including
the above-mentioned T.B. Reed. With the strong position within the Energy Program, the
connection to Volvo, and an international network, SMAB became, during the second half
of the 1970s and the early 1980s, a distinguished actor in the alternative fuel sphere.
SMABs position made methanol the number one alternative fuel in Sweden in the 1970s.

SMABs initial plans

The point of departure for SMABs work was explicitly the civil emergency perspective.
The main purpose, according to the governmental bill in 1975, was to make methanol an
alternative or complement to wood gas in case of war or a sealed-off situation.46 Thus, the
goal was not to replace petrol and diesel on the market but to create an improved substitute
in case of emergency. However, to make a quick reconversion to full scale war production,
it was necessary to establish a Swedish methanol production in peacetime. This presupposes
that a domestic methanol market must be created that could be obtained in two ways. One
was to create a separate system based on marketing pure methanol, M100, with special cars
and filling stations. To obtain an acceptable production, at least 250,000 cars had to be
rebuilt for methanol.
The other way was to blend 20% methanol into all petrol, M20, using the already exist-
ing technological system. M20 was possible to use in ordinary Otto internal combustion
engines with only small modifications. Methanol and diesel mixtures could be used in diesel
engines with an additive to ease the ignition. Furthermore, since methanol boosted the
octane rating, it was possible to reduce the additive of lead or even run on unleaded gaso-
line. In other words, it was described as an environmentally friendly solution. SMABs goal
was to investigate the establishment of M20 as a fuel in peacetime, but also accomplish
preparedness to switch to M100 in case of a crisis. According to the ambitious plan, all Otto
engines in Sweden should run on M20 by 1980.47
Methanol was chosen as the most promising alternative because, according to SMABs
own records, it could easily be produced from heavy residues of crude oil or from coal and
natural gas imported from neighboring countries.48 In addition, it was, as with petrol, a
liquid fuel, which could be stored and distributed within the existing system and could be
used in ordinary internal combustion engines with only small modifications. As a liquid
fuel, it could also be applied in the future to fuel cells. Thus, alternatives or substitutes
did not, at the time, primarily refer to non-petroleum fuels or environmentally friendly
substitutes. To reduce the dependency on petroleum products originating from the Middle
East, methanol was described as a way to spread the risk. Consequently, methanol as an
alternative continued to be linked to the internal combustion engine/oil trajectory within the
established socio-technical systems.
342 E. Mrald

However, a long-term advantage with methanol was, pursuant to SMAB, the possibility
of developing a production entirely based on domestic sources. To start, peat and shale oil
could be used, although the negative environmental impact of the extraction was well
known. Anything that contained organic substances such as sawdust, chips, stubs, manure,
straw, garbage, and cultivated energy forests could be a source for methanol production.49
The energy potential of domestic organic residues was estimated to correspond to about
20% of the total Swedish oil import.
The problem was that no domestic methanol production existed, neither based on fossil
nor renewable sources. Methanol for the trials and the early introduction had to be imported.
Instead of investigating how to overcome this fundamental difficulty, in the first phase
SMAB focused on examining how different blends of methanol functioned in combustion
engines and on how to introduce methanol to the market. With Volvo as a major owner, it
was from a motor vehicle construction perspective that methanol as a fuel was studied.
Parallel to this, SMAB started to investigate international techniques for production of
methanol. According to the plan, in the second phase, trials with domestic production tech-
niques were planned. However, no regular domestic production was planned to begin until
the mid 1980s, half a decade after M20 was supposed to be used in all cars.50

Lowered expectations and low external support

As we have seen SMAB and methanol fuel got strong support and a quick start in the after-
math of the Oil Crisis. However, the crisis was a result of a political situation and not of an
acute shortage of oil, at least not for a couple of decades. When the war in the Middle East
was over and OPEC dropped its embargo, the situation in the oil market calmed down. A
couple of years after the crisis, a governmental report ascertained that it had not affected
private motoring in Sweden negatively. Although both the price of petrol and cars had
increased, automobile sales continued to increase.51 After two years work, it seems like
SMABs hopes for a speedy introduction of methanol abated. In a report, SMAB stated the
following: However, in the present day situation the economic incitement is not strong
enough to motivate a development of an international methanol economy.52 Although
similar development programs for methanol were conducted in West Germany and Holland,
SMAB made this claim:

In a short time perspective, the 80s and the first half of the 90s, methanol will probably not
make any major impact internationally. An isolated Swedish campaign on methanol as fuel can
only be motivated from civil preparedness reasons during this period. 53

Thus, SMAB had no ambition to put Sweden on a separate fuel track. Their plan was to use
primarily imported methanol based on fossil resources, which required an expanding inter-
national methanol market. However, this plan was not implemented fully. Although the oil
companies played a key role in importing and distributing methanol, they did not push
methanol development. SMAB wrote: their attitudes are today rather uniform with a
sceptical wait-and-see approach to methanol.54
Moreover, after an initiative from Volvos representatives, SMABs board of directors
in January 1978 suddenly decided to stop the trials with M100 on Otto-engines. The reason
was that Volvo wanted to wait for results from an ongoing study on gasoline engines with
stratified charge.55 This was a clear departure from the instructions that had been renewed
only a year earlier. Another step away from the methanol campaign was that Volvo in 1978
started to negotiate with the Norwegian State about a fusion between Volvo and the
 History and Technology 343

Norwegian oil company Statoil. The idea was to secure petroleum resources for Volvo if the
Norwegian state became part owner in Volvo. The transaction was never completed, but
Volvo had obviously lost interest in methanol. In 1979, 80% of SMAB was sold to Studsvik,
a research and development company in the nuclear and energy sector. Volvo and the State
kept 10% each. Hereafter, Volvo more or less left the methanol campaign as a leader. Even
if the Swedish State also reduced its ownership, most funding to SMABs development
work continued to come from the Energy Program. As a result, SMAB and the efforts to
develop methanol fuel became even more closely connected with the Energy Program and
different agencies and governmental commissions in its protection.
At the same time, SMABs work after three years was evaluated in 1978. According to
the external evaluator Alf Peterson, there were great differences between the original goals
and the achieved results. For example, a planned field trial with 300 automobiles had only
included a maximum of 35 cars. The evaluator also had critical comments on the organization
and goals of SMAB. Its activity had until now the character of a state subsidized Volvo-
project. For a successful introduction, it would be better to involve other automotive manu-
facturers foremost SAAB and Scania and not just test methanol only on Volvo cars and
trucks. In addition, no oil companies had representatives on the board, although they
controlled all distribution channels for fuel. Furthermore, Peterson wanted to change the
name on the company to Swedish Fuel Development Company. This was a critique against
the strong focus on methanolpetrol blends. There were several arguments that it would be
better to go for M100 instead of M20. From a technical perspective, ethanol could be a better
substitute than methanol. Finally, the evaluator called attention to the fact that the campaign
on methanol did not reduce foreign energy dependency as long as the primary products did
not originate from domestic sources.56
As we have seen, SMAB had a strong network, but in practice few external actors were
involved in the methanol campaign. The state, through the Energy Program, was mainly the
driving force, but the states contribution was principally preparatory. An example of this
position is reflected in a representative from the National Board of Technical Development
who claimed the following about governmental support for developing electric vehicles:
not because we think that there will be any electric cars in an early future, but to be
prepared we want to learn the technique.57 Furthermore, the governmental funding was
only allocated to forward-looking, hazardous and innovative projects. The normal devel-
opment of products was the responsibility of commercial and industrial life.58 This division
of responsibilities was also applied in the methanol campaign, but, as we have seen, the
industry was hesitant about methanol. The motor vehicle industry showed some interest in
methanol. Nevertheless, Volvo withdrew from SMAB, and the Swedish oil industry was
pronouncedly sceptical about methanol.
Nor did the environmental movement show any interest in methanol as fuel, at least not
along SMABs plan with large-scale imports of fossil materials. Private motoring was
mainly interpreted as an environmental question concerning emissions, demolition of cities,
and superfluous energy consumption. In solidarity with the Third World, the futurists Gran
Bckstrand and Lars Ingelstam argued in their often debated article How Much is Enough?
Another Sweden, which was presented before the United Nations 7th Extraordinary
General Assembly in 1975, that the First World had to reduce their energy consumption. For
example, Bckstrand and Ingelstam wanted to transfer the possession of all private cars to
society, forbid passenger cars in cities, reducing automobiles in Sweden by 6070%.59 This
perspective recurred in Malte 1990 (1978), the alternative long-term energy plan from
several Swedish environmental movements.60 Instead of finding a substitute for petroleum
before it ran out, it would be better to build a new society based on renewable resources,
344 E. Mrald

self-sufficient communities, local democracy, collective possession, public transportation,

and small-scale technology.61 The possibility to produce organically and locally methanol
as motor fuel was mentioned, but in only a couple of lines.62 There was, moreover, incredu-
lity towards large-scale use of organic sources for fuel production, which the translation into
Swedish of Lester Browns book Food or Fuel? (1980) illustrates.63

Methanol and the second oil crisis

The evaluation and reorganization of SMAB took place at the same time as a new drastic
change occurred in the international oil market, which again put focus on foreign oil depen-
dency and the vulnerability of private motoring. The 19781979 Revolution in Iran resulted
in a new oil crisis with soaring gasoline prices. Once again governments around the world
intensified their work to develop alternative fuels. In the USA, President Jimmy Carter had
already started a program to reduce the foreign oil dependence and in 1979 this push for
alternative fuels stepped up. The program included tax breaks on ethanol gasoline blends,
gasohol, and a US$20 billion investment during a four-year period for developing tech-
niques to convert the abundant assets of domestic coal into gasoline under the guidance of
the SynFuel Corporation. There was also an increased interest in methanol from the oil
companies and the state of California started a methanol fuel program.64
Also the Swedish Government reacted quickly and in January 1979 they appointed a
governmental commission, the Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution. Its task was to
study technical, environmental, economic, and organizational solutions to increase the use
of sun energy and alternative fuels to replace oil.65 A special research and development
program on synthetic fuels was launched in which SMAB became very active. ke Brand-
berg from SMAB participated in the programs working group and Britt-Marie Bertilsson
became the groups secretariat. SMAB was responsible for conducting several subprojects
within the program.66 Closely connected to the program was a development program initiated
by the National Board of Energy Production Research a year earlier to establish a domestic
production of synthetic fuels in which SMAB took part.67 This development gave new impe-
tus to methanol as a fuel and to SMAB, but for the first time there was also interest directed
towards fuel ethanol and hereafter ethanol was often mentioned together with methanol.68
With focus on oil replacement, it became more urgent to establish domestic production
of alternative fuels. A research group in metallurgy at the Royal Technological Institute in
Stockholm suggested that by-products in the form of rich gases from a new process for steel
production could be used for methanol production. According to the research, this could
produce 250,000 tons methanol a year in Sweden.69 This method, however, was never
developed. Also other prefatorial studies on different techniques for gasification, pyrolysis,
fermentation, and liquidification of diverse domestic and imported substances were
started.70 The plan that was most developed and involved SMAB was an effort to establish
a gasification combo power plant for production of long-distance heating, fuel gas, and
methanol. The plant would be located next to a state-owned oil refinery in the harbor of
Nynshamn close to Stockholm. The idea was to use imported natural gas, coal, and heavy
oil residues from the refinery as sources for the production.71 This large investment was,
however, never implemented.
Although methanol was based on imported and fossil resources, it was now frequently
described as a first step to break the total dominance of oil in transportation without closing
the door for other future alternatives. The advantage of methanol was that it could be intro-
duced within existing technology in the present transport system with only small modifica-
tions. Later, the system would change, encouraging the development of domestically
 History and Technology 345

produced methanol, ethanol, and novel technologies such as fuel cells.72 The problem was
that methanol was more expensive than gasoline.73 The time aspect was, however, seen as
an advantage for methanol. Oil was a finite resource and according to SMAB in the begin-
ning methanol would be more expensive than gasoline and diesel, but within 1020 years
the shortage of oil and environmental demands would equalize the difference.74 Methanol
could even be the only fluid fuel available in the future.75
The Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution recommended the Swedish government
to be proactive and start a speedy introduction of methanolgasoline blends even though the
economic conditions were not the best. The conclusion was clear: An introduction of meth-
anol and ethanol as fuels will not come spontaneously. There are several reasons why this
will not happen without intervention from the state.76 Consequently, methanol would not
take off if the state did not change the competing conditions by reducing taxes on alcohols,
subsidizing the introduction, supporting the establishment of a distribution system, and
implementing other measurements. Not least the political contingency both in Sweden and
internationally about the future for methanol was a concern. To surmount this obstacle, the
Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution recommended the Parliament in 1980 the follow-
ing:

A decision should be reached as soon as possible on continuing work on methanol, with the
objective of introducing a blend fuel with a 15% methanol content in the autumn of 1984,
followed as soon as possible by a fuel consisting solely of methanol. This programme would
be based during the introductory stage on the importation of methanol from natural gas sources,
complemented by Swedish-produced ethanol to the extent available. 77

However, against the majority of the Commission, Tommy Nordin, an expert from the
Swedish Petroleum Institute, wrote a statement claiming that M15 blend only reduced the
petrol consumption marginally, that the supply of imported methanol was uncertain, and
that the optimistic time plan for the introduction fell on its own absurdity.78 This opinion
was supported by the expert Lars Nsman from the Swedish Association for Automobile
Industry and Wholesalers. In other words, the representatives from two of the most impor-
tant interest groups were sceptical about a fast introduction of methanol.

Step-by-step towards an awaiting future

Except for the oil crises of the 1970s, much of the momentum in the methanol investment
was propelled by expectations about the future of energy. One of the most influential futur-
ological studies in Sweden at the time was Solar versus Nuclear (1978). The study
compares two different energy futures, Sun-Sweden versus Nuclear-Sweden in 2015.
Especially in the Sun-Sweden scenario, but also to some extent in Nuclear-Sweden, metha-
nol fuel played a vital role to replace petrol in transport.79 In Sun-Sweden, methanol would
function as an energy carrier in fuel cells applied in electrical vehicles. Furthermore, on the
way towards this future, methanol had many benefits. It is based on known techniques, it is
a liquid, it is possible to store, and it is usable in existing vehicles. Methanol could also be
produced from varying sources, both fossil and organic. Consequently, the main advantage
with methanol fuel is that it could be introduced early and then successively change the fuel
supply in transport.80 However, Sweden would have to disconnect from the international
system, and that would both be difficult and take time.81
Another example of a futurological study concerning methanol was Bilen 1985, 2000
(1977) [The automobile 1985, 2000], which was organized by the Royal Swedish Academy
of Engineering Sciences. This study analyzed how issues about energy, safety, and the
346 E. Mrald

environment would affect the future of transport.82 Groups of experts extrapolated, by using
a special computer program for system analyses, different scenarios for private motoring,
lorry transport, and public transportation up to the year 2000. It was established that private
car ownership would not be replaced by public transport during the coming decades. At the
same time, all international serious investigations agreed on two things: there will not be
any scarcity in energy supply, but the oil will run out.83 With this prognosis, it became
obvious that until 2000 alternative fuels must be developed for large-scale production.
However, focusing on just one alternative was risky. Neither the state nor the industry
could venture to invest in only one possible development trajectory.84 In this context, the
introduction of methanol fuel was described as the first step towards more environmen-
tally friendly energy supplies for transport.85 It was also concluded that changes take time
and during this process the car industry and international developments in the automobile
sector required careful consideration.86
In his well-known study about the introduction of electrical vehicles in France in the
early 1970s, Callon describes how the engineer-sociologists within the project not only
worked with development of technology and economic calculations, but also tried to define
a future society.87 They put together a description of how society works and how their fresh
innovation fits into a post-industrial context with new social groups and consumer behav-
ior. The electric vehicle belonged to this new society, while the internal combustion engine
was doomed since it was part of the industrial society of the past. Thereby they gained cred-
ibility, erected a network, and enrolled allies by building a world in which everything had
its own place.88
Compared with the French engineer-sociologists revolutionary approach to societal
changes, the Swedish counterparts, as we have seen, presented an evolutionary perspective
on future transformations. This notion is especially evident in the methanol investment.
Frequently mentioned in SMABs timing plans and in governmental official reports about
methanol was the concept of lead time to explain how technological systems continue to
structure society into the future. Characteristic of the car industry was long lead times and
the lead times for changing the whole fuel and energy system were even longer. It was
expected that it would take at least 2030 years before any major impacts were noticed.89
Although methanol was closely connected to existing social-technical systems and easy to
include, many circumstances had to be observed before methanol could be introduced:

The introduction must, in normal circumstances, be gradual and at the pace that the new
production of automobiles permits, and begin a few years after application problems have been
securely identified. The transition period will have to be long, about 15 years; if not, encour-
agement/restraint actions will be implemented.90

Even if such measures were used, an extreme introduction would lie at least five years
ahead. The normal pace was, however, a calm and successive transformation over
decades. With forecasting, prefatory investigations, and successive developments, it would
be possible to adapt slowly to the new circumstances. This step-by-step proceeding reflects
much of Swedish politics and bureaucracy at the time, not least in the Energy Program. This
perspective also dominated industrial life. For example, a representative from Volvo
promptly declared in a debate about alternative engines and fuels in 1977 the following:
there will be no revolution, we dont like revolutions.91 Consequently, the normal devel-
opment not only meant, for many of the involved actors, the most likely future, but the most
preferable way towards the future.
This gradual strategy was also evident in SMABs reports and official reports in the rela-
tion to future availability of methanol cars. For a successful introduction of methanol on the
 History and Technology 347

market, everything had to be ready and prepared to the smallest detail before the consumers
were drawn in. For example, in an Official Governmental Report the following was claimed:
For methanol during normal circumstances to be used it needs to appear as attractive for
the consumer and consequently indirectly for the automobile manufacturer. Unchanged
driving economy, drivability, safety with good access of fuel have to be met during
increased environmental and efficiency demands.92 The development and introduction of
methanol worked according to a linear model. Several steps had to be completed before any
serious production: first, the evaluation of existing technologies and possibilities; then the
construction of a prototype and laboratory tests; then small-scale vehicle tests; and finally
the last normal step, large-scale fleet trials with concomitant infrastructure and demonstra-
tions.93 It was seen as a topdown process towards a future methanol introduction controlled
by experts. Thus, there was never a matter of any co-construction of the technology or any
alternative user scripts to challenge established political and engineering scripts.94

Up and down with methanol

Nevertheless, this gradual approach to the future was not totally unquestionable. The
Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution concluded after one years work that there were
two somewhat extreme scenarios concerning the development of the oil sector.95 The first
one predicted that the oil price would continuously increase without any major fluctuations
for the next couple of decades. As a consequence, this would make it possible to plan and
slowly implement new alternative energy supplies and at the same time consider social,
technical, economic, and environmental presumptions. The opposite scenario forecasted
unpredictable and significant disturbances in the oil market. This could happen in the near
future with effects such as both drastic increases in prices and temporary shut off of the oil
infusion. This scenario pointed to the need of immediate and major measures to reduce the
oil dependency to avoid strains on society. The Commission, however, established that the
former scenario had dominated the long-term energy estimations in Sweden. In addition, the
Commissions task had hitherto been based on an implicit hypothesis about a stable
increase in oil prices.96 The members of the Commission asked themselves whether it
would perhaps be better to be proactive to obtain substantial results before it was too late.
Moreover, the Commission questioned the argument that it would be impossible for
Sweden alone to start using methanol fuel before any other country in Western Europe took
the same decision:

At the same time, it is quite out of question to wait for developments abroad, while doing noth-
ing in Sweden. Sweden has a particularly high dependence upon oil, and there is therefore even
more incentive to undertake work aimed at replacing oil. A wait-and-see attitude would delay
the introduction of an alternative fuel for many years. 97

As we have seen, the Commission also recommended that Parliament act on the methanol
introduction. The Parliament did not, however, take any decision and two years later the
situation changed. The price of crude oil fell sharply in the early 1980s and new refinery
techniques made it possible to extract more petrol per barrel of crude oil. West Germany,
where Volkswagen and other car companies pursued research and large-scale trials on meth-
anol cars, did not choose to invest in methanol car production. Neither did any country or
industry begin large-scale production of methanol. From a Swedish perspective, the supply
of oil with a large part imported from the North Sea seemed more secure. Moreover, the
establishment of nuclear power in Sweden reduced the demand of heating oil, which both
decreased the total oil dependency and facilitated the use of more oil for transportation.98
348 E. Mrald

Seen from the perspective of a national energy system, the goal to decrease oil dependency
was being fulfilled. From this holistic perspective, the fact that public and commercial
transportation and private motoring still totally depended on imported oil was no longer
recognized as an important concern.
The Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution had to revise totally their goals stated in
1982.99 The Commission now believed alternative fuels could not compete with petrol and
diesel before the turn of the century. Moreover, a unilateral Swedish introduction of meth-
anol would be very hard to achieve, since Sweden both exported and imported a very large
quantity of vehicles. Therefore, Sweden was very dependent on international develop-
ment.100 The final recommendation was the following: the government should not at
present reach any long-term strategic decisions concerning the introduction of methanol as
a motor fuel.101 Consequently, the radical ambitions had diminished. According to a new
strategy, the work would instead continue to develop M100 within limited fleets of vehicles
and to gain more knowledge about alternative engine fuels for a pending political decision
at the end of the 1980s.
The work to develop methanol fuel also continued during the 1980s. In 1981, the
Swedish state took over 90% of SMAB and Volvo still owned 10%. At the same time,
SMAB changed its name to The Swedish Motor Fuel Technology Company (Svensk
drivmedelsteknik AB, later Ecotraffic ERD3 AB, which is still in existence today) because
they did not want to focus only on methanol.102 In a report from the company in 1986, it
appears nevertheless that methanol still was their main focus together with ethanol.103
During the 1980s, SMAB was very active in different vehicle trials. From 1980 to 1982,
SMAB took part in a large-scale trial on M15 with temporary filling stations in West
Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; 1000 test cars were used in Sweden and about
20 filling stations were opened throughout the country.104 Moreover, in the mid 1980s they
were planning a trial on M100 with 20 automobiles provided with the first generation of
methanol engines. At the peak of SMABs work on methanol fuel, they composed in 1986
the state-of-the-art report Alcohols and Alcohol Blends as Motor Fuels in three volumes in
cooperation with the International Energy Agency and the Swedish National Board for
Technical Development.105
However, these efforts with the methanol campaign slowly fizzled out. In the Swedish
Governmental Official Report Alcohols as Motor Fuel from 1986, it appears that SMAB
still worked with their vehicle trial with pure methanol, but it was delayed and not expected
to be finished until early 1987. The report also concluded that altogether the state so far had
invested SK250 million (Swedish Krona) in the development of methanol as a fuel (almost
half a billion Krona or US$60 million in present-day value).106 In addition, any new political
decision about alternative fuels was never adopted during the 1980s. The 1996 Official
Governmental Report about alternative fuels barely mentioned large investments in metha-
nol, describing methanol as only the third best option.107
However, internationally the 1970s interest in methanol fuel was not totally futile.
California, for example, during the 1980s continued a program on methanol fuel mainly as
a way to reduce ozone and photochemical smog.108 By the early 1980s vehicle trials
started with methanol vehicles and in 1990 efforts were made to commercialize methanol
with modified flexi-fuel cars and fillings stations with M85.109 Today, there are some new
efforts that focus on methanol as fuel. In Sweden, the well-known environmental activist
Bjrn Gillberg is working to establish a large-scale methanol production plant based on
forest resources.110 Internationally the Nobel Price winner George A. Olah argues that a
methanol economy is the most realistic and best alternative in the coming post-petroleum
era.111
 History and Technology 349

Concluding remarks
In an international context, the Swedish program for developing alternative motor fuels
stands out in two aspects. First, it was, relative to the size of the nation, a large and ambi-
tious project. Since Sweden had declared itself non-aligned and neutral in war and as the
country lacked domestic oil sources, it was seen as especially important to reduce the oil
dependency. Moreover, during the 1970s it was a recognized fact that the oil reserves in the
world would run out sooner or later. The objective of the Energy Program was to anticipate
this post-petroleum era and shape a new energy future for Sweden. The methanol fuel
campaign was only a minor part of this effort although quite large and directed towards one
particularly oil dependent sector, transportation. Second, it was, at least during the first five
years, totally focused on methanol fuel without any other alternatives considered. Seen from
national security and environmental perspectives, the alignment with methanol fuel was
somewhat surprising, because methanol initially would be imported and produced from
fossil sources. This strong focus on methanol was also contrary to the general idea behind
the Energy Program: an impartial survey of different problems and techniques before decid-
ing the best solution. This divergence can, presumably, be explained by the involvement of
Volvo. From an automotive producer viewpoint methanol was attractive. It fitted closely
into the existing petroleum and internal combustion engine trajectory. Methanol fuel also
gained a strong position within the Energy Program and it continued to be the number one
alternative fuel for some time, despite Volvo stepping back after some years.
When the methanol development work started in 1975, a civil emergency and national
security perspective dominated. Five years later the ambitions among some actors had
increased to change the whole fuel supply in transport. In this long-term process, methanol
fuel was described as the first step. Furthermore, during the whole methanol campaign it
is possible to see how the question recurred whether Sweden could create a nationally inde-
pendent methanol investment or if it should coordinate with an international effort. From
the beginning, a methanol introduction was only motivated from a civil emergency stand-
point, although this involved an objective to shape a domestic market. After the second oil
crisis in 1979, voices were raised encouraging Sweden to break free from the international
automobile and fuel market and quickly shape a separate fuel track before it was too late.
However, some years later, as we have seen, this ambition totally fizzled out. Instead it
seems that oil saving achievements in other sectors made it possible to define the high oil
dependence in transport as a problem of minimal significance.
It is interesting to compare the methanol campaign with other efforts within the Energy
Program. The Program successfully focused mainly on waterpower, nuclear power, long
distant heating, and different energy and oil saving actions. All of these technologies consist
of socio-technological systems, which primarily have been built up within a regional or
national framework. Both the automotive industry and petroleum fuel industry, however,
are international, a characteristic that makes it difficult to deal with in a solely domestic
context. Almost all alternative motor fuel programs in the 1970s, except Brazils, also more
or less failed. Nevertheless, these efforts produced knowledge that did not vanish. After the
1980s, the interest in alternative motor fuel slowly increased again but now with ethanol and
other alternative fuels as prime alternatives. However, many of the arguments, techniques,
and solutions that today, in the context of the global warming, have become a high priority
issue, can be tracked to the aftermath of the Oil Crisis in 1973.
Finally, this narrative looks at how scenarios of the future were used in connection with
the methanol campaign. The Oil Crisis had shown that there were severe flaws and
uncertainties in the energy system and that private motoring was particularly vulnerable to
350 E. Mrald

disruptions in the supply of imported oil. Yet key historical actors in this account saw this
challenge as manageable that the energy sector could meet national needs through well-
ordered planning. The best way to prepare for future changes was to use a long-term
perspective and step-by-step implementation of innovations. After the second oil crisis in
1979, the Swedish Commission for Oil Substitution, though, challenged this view. They saw
future oil supply as unpredictable and posing a threat to society, especially in its potential
affect on transportation. Consequently, they argued for a forced implementation of methanol
use. Despite this view, industrial and commercial actors around the methanol campaign took
a wait-and-see or even a pronounced sceptical attitude to methanol. The government, via the
Energy Program, allocated resources to methanol development, but they were unwillingly
to take any decisive step until circumstances were right, but because circumstances never
seemed appropriate, methanol as a fuel was always deferred to a distant future.
In an opening ceremony at a conference about alternative engines and fuels in 1977, the
director for the Swedish Association for Automobile Industry and Wholesalers Jonas
Gawell raised this question: Is it not a fact that we all the time defer the introduction ahead
of us? All the time, we have the same distance to its realization.112 Although this was
supposed to be a rhetorical musing, it was exactly what happened to the efforts to establish
methanol as a fuel. When SMAB started in 1975, the introduction of M20 lay, according to
their optimistic plans, five years ahead. Five years later, the introduction was still five years
ahead, and some years later the date for the introduction was not even specified.

Acknowledgements
The research for this article was supported by The Fuel of the Future? A Research Program on the
Science, Technology and Selling of Biofuels in Sweden, which is funded by Formas (The Swedish
Research Council Formas). I would like to thank my fellow scholars in the program for all their
encouragement. I also want to thank the editor of History and Technology and the two anonymous
referees for their valuable comments.

Notes
1. sterman, Wikman, and Bernow, Svenskarna och oljekrisen; Energiberedskap fr kristid;
Nydn, Kris i massupplaga?
2. Wittrock and Lindstrm, De stora programmens tid.
3. Energy in Sweden. 2007, 6, 1011.
4. Ibid., 79.
5. Gengasdrift av motorfordon.
6. Hammond, Alcohol: A Brazilian Answer; Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The Forbidden Fuel,
13960.
7. Hakes, A Declaration of Energy Independence; Wittrock and Lindstrm, De stora programmens
tid; Nydn, Kris i massupplaga?; Gorelick, Oil Panic and the Global Crisis; Issawi, The 1973
Oil Crisis and After; Radetzki, Tjugo r efter oljekrisen.
8. McCarthy, Auto Mania; Hrd, Automobile Engineering in a Dead End; Carolan, Ethanol versus
Gasoline; Sundin, From Waste to Opportunity; Kovarik, Henry Ford, Charles Kettering; Wik,
Henry Fords Science; Persson, Sulfitsprit; Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The Forbidden Fuel;
Pursell, The Farm Chemurgic Council; McCarthy, The Coming Wonder?
9. Mello and Freitas, Social Interests, Contextualizations; Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The
Forbidden Fuel; Sandn and Jonasson, Variety Creation, Growth and Selection Dynamics.
10. Sjsteen, Gengas om oljan skulle tryta; Sjsteen, Gengas en rddare i nden.
11. Stolpe, Vrldens olja och Sveriges; Danielsson, Vrt beroende av arabvrldens olja.
12. Danielsson, Oljekris fredskris.
13. Meadows, The Limits to Growth; Friman, No Limits, 13569.
14. Ehrensvrd, Fre efter.
15. Sjsteen, Gengas om oljan skulle tryta, 9.
 History and Technology 351

16. Andersson, Olja och politik; Stolpe, Hur ska energibristen vervinnas?; Vrt behov av olja,
1726; Motorer fr vgfordon, 1932.
17. Forsberg, En politisk ndvndighet; Lundblad, Fnster mot framtiden; Molander, Systemanalys
i Sverige.
18. Light, From Warfare to Welfare; Allison, Implementation analysis; Tarschys and Eduards,
Petita, 8791; Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn.
19. Lundblad, Kaijser, and Tiberg, From Operations Research to Future Studies.
20. Att vlja framtid, 12.
21. Wittrock and Lindstrm, De stora programmens tid, 155.
22. Ibid., 22.
23. Ibid.
24. Mason, Images of the Energy Future.
25. Hakes, A Declaration of Energy Independence, 26.
26. Ibid., 18495.
27. Governmental Bill, Regeringens proposition om energihushllning m.m., 1975: 30, bil. 1., 3304.
28. Nader and Bjrklund, Den livsfarliga bilen.
29. Framsteg inom forskning och teknik, 1973, 91111; McCarthy, Auto Mania, 15992.
30. Anell, Ska vi asfaltera Sverige?; Kjellstrm, Alternativ Bil.
31. Bjelving, Oljekrisens fljd: En krona om dagen dyrare bensin; Lysell, Oljekrisen; Lysell,
Skallet mot bilismen.
32. Motorfraren, Gunnar Strng: Bilen viktig fr samhllet fr verskdlig framtid.
33. Reed and Lerner, Methanol: A Versatile Fuel.
34. Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The Forbidden Fuel, 165.
35. Donnelly et al., Methanol as an Automotive Fuel.
36. Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The Forbidden Fuel, 165.
37. Introduktion av alternativa drivmedel, 3:24-3:33.
38. Energiforskning; Energiforskning.
39. Gyllenhammar, Mot sekelskiftet p mf.
40. Bjrklund, Svenskt initiativ bortfuskat av FN.
41. Gyllenhammar, Jag tror p Sverige.
42. Ibid., 127.
43. Peterson, Granskning av den svenska metanolsatsningen, bilaga 2.
44. Governmental Bill, Med frslag pa statsbudget 1976/77, 1975/76: 100, bil. 15, 23940;
Methanol as a Fuel.
45. Methanol as a Fuel.
46. Governmental Bill, Regeringens proposition on energihushllning m.m., 1975: 30, bil. 1,
21618.
47. Peterson, Granskning av den svenska metanolsatsningen.
48. SMAB styrelsesamantrde.
49. SMAB styrelsesamantrde; Brandberg, SMAB, Betr. svenska organiska rvaror.
50. Plan fr omrdet metanol, 1011; Peterson, Granskning av den svenska metanolsatsningen,
1922.
51. Energibesparingar inom transportsektorn, 32.
52. Svensk metanolutveckling AB, 11.
53. Ibid., 13.
54. Svensk metanolutveckling AB, 14; Energi program fr forskning, utveckling, demonstra-
tion, 93.
55. Peterson, Granskning av den svenska metanolsatsningen, 29.
56. Ibid., 4750.
57. Motorer fr vgfordon, 170.
58. Ibid., 1589.
59. Bckstrand and Ingelstam, How Much is Enough?
60. Malte 1990.
61. Olsson, Projektet byn; Olsson and Tengstrm, Vlsviken; Schumacher, Small is Beautiful.
62. Malte 1990, vol. 1, 144 and vol. 2, 378.
63. Brown, Livsmedel eller drivmedel? (Swedish translation, Jordens vnner, 1981).
64. Hakes, A Declaration of Energy Independence, 4169; Bernton, Kovarik, and Sklar, The
Forbidden Fuel, 7880; Fuel Alcohol.
65. Governmental Bill, Med frslag till statsbudget 1980/81, 1979/80: 100, bil. 17, 1359.
66. Minnesanteckningar Drivmedelsgruppens sammantrde nr 1.
67. Programplan syntetiska drivmedel, 67.
352 E. Mrald

68. Etanol ur jordbruksprodukter.

69. Swedish Television (TV1), Metanol Ett nytt bilbrnsle?
70. Nmnden fr energiproduktionsforskning, Demonstrationsanlggning fr metanolproduktion;
Ljung and Ryytty, Den framtida brnslemarknaden i Sverige; Lindstrm, Den grna energin.
71. Kignell, Energikombinat Stockholm Nynshamn.
72. PM 1980-02-08, 222.
73. Johansson, Metanol som drivmedel; Kignell, Energikombinat Stockholm Nynshamn.
74. Programplan syntetiska drivmedel, 6.
75. Swedish Television (TV1), Metanol Ett nytt bilbrnsle?
76. Drivmedelgruppens rapport, 14.
77. Introduction of Alternative Motor Fuels, 1.
78. Nordin, Srskilt yttrande, in Introduktion av alternativa drivmedel, bil. 3:2.
79. Lnnroth, Johansson, and Steen, Sol eller uran, 118, 12636, 1823.
80. Ibid., 126.
81. Ibid., 183.
82. Bilen 19802000.
83. Ibid., 7.
84. Ibid., 4.
85. Ibid., 47.
86. Ibid., 28.
87. Callon, Society in the Making, 83103.
88. Ibid., 86.
89. Energi program fr forskning, utveckling, demonstration.
90. Plan fr omrdet metanol, 9.
91. Motorer fr vgfordon, 165.
92. Energi program fr forskning, utveckling, demonstration, 673.
93. Bertilsson, Anvndning av alternativa drivmedel, 61.
94. Von Trischler and Steiner, Innovationsgeschichte als Gesellschaftsgeschichte; Gjoen and
Hard, Cultural Politics in Action.
95. PM 1979-12-07: Diskussionsunderlag rrande oljeersttning och OED:s roll.
96. Ibid., 3.
97. Introduction of Alternative Motor Fuels, 10.
98. Strategy for Alternative Fuels; Sandn and Jonasson, Variety Creation, Growth and Selection
Dynamics, 205.
99. Strategy for Alternative Fuels.
100. Ibid., xv.
101. Ibid., viii.
102. Governmental Bill, Om riktlinjer fr energipolitiken, 1978/79: 115, bil. 1, 1723; Nmnden
fr energiproduktionsforskning, Tillverkning, hantering och anvndning, 20.
103. Bertilsson, Anvndning av alternativa drivmedel.
104. Ibid., 415; Bengtsson, Spriten r dyr men den r bra.
105. Alcohols and Alcohol Blends as Motor Fuels, vol. 1, Executive Summary; Alcohols and Alcohol
Blends as Motor Fuels, vol. 2, State-of-the-Art Report, A, chaps 17; Alcohols and Alcohol
Blends as Motor Fuels, vol. 2, State-of-the-Art Report, B, chaps 814.
106. Alkoholer som motorbrnsle, 615.
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