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Documentality is the theory of documents that underlies the ontology of social reality put forward by the Italian philosopher
Maurizio Ferraris (see Ferraris 2007, 2008, 2009a and 2009b).[1] The theory gives to documents a central position within the sphere
of social objects, conceived as distinct from physical and ideal objects. Ferraris argues that social objects are "social acts that have
been inscribed on some kind of support", be it a paper document, a magnetic support, or even memory in people's heads (e.g. in the
case of the promises we make every day). Thus the constitutive rule of social objects is that Object = Inscribed Act. Therefore,
documents as inscriptions possessing social relevance and value embody the essential and prototypical features of any social object,
and it is on this basis that it is possible to develop an ontology capable of classifying documents and their selective storage, beginning
with the grand divide between strong documents (inscriptions of acts), which make up social objects in the full sense, and weak
documents (recordings of facts), which are secondary derivatives and of lesser importance. This theory is inspired, on the one hand,
by the reflection on the centrality of writing developed by Jacques Derrida (1967, 1972) and, on the other hand, by the theory of
social acts devised byAdolf Reinach (1913) and the theory of linguistic acts byJohn L. Austin (1962).
Contents
1 Searle: X counts as Y in C
2 The roots of Documentality
2.1 The Speech Acts Thesis
2.2 The "de Soto Thesis"
2.3 The "Derrida Thesis"
3 Context and Short History
4 Ferraris: Object = Inscribed Act
4.1 First step: the recognition of the sphere of social objects
4.2 Second step: the identification of the law of constitution of social objects
4.3 Third step: the individuation of the sphere of Documentality
5 Documentality in eleven theses
6 Documentality's as Applied to Other Disciplines
7 See also
8 Footnotes
9 Bibliography
10 External links
Searle: X counts as Y in C
In the contemporary debate, one of the main theories of social objects[2] has been proposed by the American philosopher John R.
Searle, in particular in his book The Construction of Social Reality (1995). Searle's ontology recognizes the sphere of social objects,
defining them as higher order objects with respect tophysical objects, in accordance with the rule
X counts as Y in C
meaning that the physical object X, for instance a colored piece of paper, counts as Y, a 10 euro banknote, in context C, the Europe of
the year 2010. According toSearle, from the iteration of this simple rule the whole complexity of social reality is derived.
Powerful it may be, the theory runs according to Ferraris into problems. Firstly, it is not at all obvious how, from the physical
object, we manage to get to the social object. If any physical object really can constitute the origin of a social object, then it is not
clear what would prevent every physical object to turn into a social object. But clearly it is not the case that, for instance, if you
decide to draw a banknote, you thereby produce a banknote.[3] The standard theory relies on key notion of "collective intentionality"
. However, such a notion as Ferraris argues is not at all as clear as it purports to be.[4]
to explain the transfiguration of X in Y
Secondly, how does the reversibility from the social to the physical sphere work? It is fairly intuitive to assert that a banknote is also a
piece of paper, or that a President is also a person. As much as it is true that when Searle is alone in a hotel room there is only one
physical object, but many social objects (a husband, an employee of the state of California, an American citizen, a driving license
holder etc.). In this case, the passage back from Y (the social) to X (the physical) goes smoothly. However, things change in different,
although not very peculiar, situations. How should we deal withvague or vast entities, such as a State, a battle, a university? And how
about negative entities, such as debts?[5]
What this means is that a social object is the result of a social act (one that involves at least two persons or a person and a deputed
machine), which is characterized by the fact of being registered on a piece of paper, a computer file or some other digital support, or
even, simply, in the heads of persons.
As Smith recognizes, if taken literally, the OBJECT=Inscribed Act formulation does not make sense. For instance, if taken literally,
this formulation implies that the US Constitution "is made of tiny oxidizing heaps of ink marks on parchment, and matters are helped
only slightly if we add together all the printed and digital copies of the US Constitution and assert that the US Constitution is the
[11]
mereological sum of all these multiple inscriptions."
2. There are three types of objects: natural (or physical), ideal, and social.
Objects come in three kinds: (1) physical objects (mountains, rivers, human bodies, and
animals) that exist in space and time and are independent from the subjects who know them,
even if they may have been built by them, as with artifacts (chairs, screwdrivers); (2) ideal
objects (numbers, theorems, relations) that exist outside of space and time and are
independent from the subjects who know them, but which, after having been discovered, can
be socialized (for instance, a theorem can be published: still, it is the publication, not the
theorem, that has a beginning in time); (3) social objects, that do not exist as such in space,
since their physical presence is limited to the inscription (money is such because of what is
written on the coin, on the banknote, on the memory of the credit card), but endure in time,
and whose existence depends on the subjects who know, or at least can use, them and who,
in certain cases, have constituted them. This latter circumstance displays how social objects,
for which construction is necessary, depend on social acts, whose inscription constitutes the
object.
See also
Speech act
Document
Social constructivism
Collective belief
Money
Deontological Ethics
Applied Ontology
Footnotes
1. For an extended debate on the theory, see Rescogitans (http://www.rescogitans.it/main.php?issueid=7§ionid=5&
chapterid=21) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120321204218/http://www .rescogitans.it/main.php?issueid=7
§ionid=5&chapterid=21)March 21, 2012, at theWayback Machine. and the symposium devoted to the theory in
Etica & Politica 11/2 (2010) (http://www2.units.it/etica/)
2. For the position of Documentality in the contemporary debate on social ontology
, See Torrengo 2009. For a critical
comparison between the social ontology put forward by Searle and Documentality , see Casetta 2010.
3. M. Ferraris, Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino, Milano, Bompiani, 2005: pp. 225-228 and M. Ferraris,
Documentalit. Perch necessario lasciar tracce , Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2009: pp. 170-173.
4. M. Ferraris, Dove sei?, cit.: pp. 214-225 and M. Ferraris,Documentalit, cit.: pp. 163-170.
5. M. Ferraris, Dove sei?, cit.: pp. 229-233 and M. Ferraris,Documentalit, cit.: pp. 173-176.
6. Cf. K. Mulligan (ed.), Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology
,
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
7. J. Derrida, De la grammatologie, Paris, Ed. de Minuit, 1967: pp. 219-220.
8. M. Ferraris, Dove sei?, cit.: pp. 202-204, 236-242 and M. Ferraris,Documentalit, cit.: pp. 176-177.
9. M. Ferraris, Documentalit, cit.: pp. 32-56.
10. M. Ferraris, Dove sei?, cit.: p. 174 and M. Ferraris,Documentalit, cit.: pp. 176-177.
11. Smith, Barry (2012). "How to Do Things with Documents"(http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/HowToDoThings
WithDocuments.pdf) (PDF). Rivista di Estetica.
12. M. Ferraris, Documentalit, cit.: pp. 299-300.
13. M. Ferraris, Documentalit, cit.: pp. 358-362.
14. E.H. Robinson (2014),"A Documentary Theory of States and Their Existence as Quasi-Abstract Entities,"
(https://dl.
dropboxusercontent.com/u/46395762/My%20Articles/Documentary%20Theory%20of%20States.pdf) Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20160303213829/https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/46395762/My%20Articles/Document
ary%20Theory%20of%20States.pdf)2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine. Geopolitics 00, pp. 1-29.
15. B. Smith, (2008) 'Searle and De Soto: The New Ontology of the Social W
orld". In The Mystery of Capital and the
Construction of Social Reality. Open Court.
16. E.H. Robinson (2014),"A Documentary Theory of States and Their Existence as Quasi-Abstract Entities,"
(https://dl.
dropboxusercontent.com/u/46395762/My%20Articles/Documentary%20Theory%20of%20States.pdf) Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20160303213829/https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/46395762/My%20Articles/Document
ary%20Theory%20of%20States.pdf)2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine. Geopolitics 00, pp. 1-29.
Bibliography
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"Biblioteca della libert", XLV (2010), settembre-dicembre, n. 199 online: 1-12.
de Soto, H. 2000, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism T riumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New
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Derrida, J. 1967, De la grammatologie, Paris, Ed. de Minuit.
Derrida, J. 1972, Signature, vnement, contexte, in Id., Marges de la philosophie, Paris, Ed. de Minuit.
Ferraris, M. 2005, Dove Sei? Ontologia del telefonino, Milano, Bompiani. (En: 2013,Where are you?, Fordham UP)
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Documentality, Fordham UP)
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"Philosophiques", 26/2: 315-47; eng. versionhttp://ontology.buffalo.edu/document_ontology/.
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External links
Laboratory for Ontology, LabOnt, Torino
Laboratory for Applied Ontology, LOA-CNR, Trento
Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science, IFOMIS
Center for Theoretical and Applied Ontology, CTAO
Journal of Applied Ontology
Rivista di Estetica