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 OUTLINES
OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.
 Eontiott : C. and SONS,
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OUTLINES
OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
COMPILED BY

EDWIN WALLACE, M.A.

LL.D. (ST. ANDREWS)
LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

Ae? yap i'crwj virorvrrCbcrai. irpwrov, eld' varepov avaypaxpai.

STEREOTYPED EDITION.

CAMBRIDGE:
AT THE UNIVERSITY 7
PRESS.
1898

[All Rights reserved]

 First Edition 1883.

Reprinted 1887, 1890, 1894, 1898.

HAROLD B. LEE LIBRARY

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
PROVO, UTAH
 PREFACE TO PREVIOUS EDITION.

The following pages are an expansion of a still

smaller work which I published with the same title

in 1875. My object in printing such a compendium

was at that time limited almost entirely to the
wants of my own pupils. But my brochure, I found,
circulated outside those for whom it was originally
intended, and the few copies which I could place
at the disposal of the booksellers were soon ex-
hausted. Since then I have been frequently asked
to republish, but have held back from a number of

considerations not least perhaps from a hope that
some day or other I might be able to fulfil the
suggestion of my motto and " write out " what had
been so far sketched. But I became more and
more diffident about undertaking such a task. Now
particularly when Prof. Zeller's excellent statement
of Aristotelianism is being translated into English
it would be difficult to find a reason for attempting
to do again work which has been already done so
well. There may however still be room left for a
smaller and less pretentious work which will string
together the more important passages in Aristotle's
VI PREFACE TO PREVIOUS EDITION.
writings and explain them by a brief English
commentary.
A book of selections can hardly fail to prove
unsatisfactory. There will always be passages
omitted which one reader would have inserted and
others inserted which he would have rejected.
Much also is lost by having to take sentences
out of their context and leave them without the
setting which half explains them. I hope at the

same time that I have managed to give in mode-

rate compass the cream of Aristotle's writings and
to make up in some way for the absence of context,
inseparable from such work, by the English ana-
lysis which precedes each paragraph of extracts.
Junior students can hardly be expected to thread
their way through the quarto volumes of the Berlin
Aristotle, and even those who are familiar with
these volumes and with Bonitz's admirable index
to them may be glad to have their favourite pas-
sages in a portable and concise form.

Oxford,
May, 1880.
 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

The success which has attended this little work

will probably be allowed to be sufficient excuse
for its republication. The present edition will be
found to contain as compared with its predecessor
a considerable amount of additional matter. For
the sake of beginners have added an introductory
I

chapter on the way in which Aristotle sought to

meet the difficulties of preceding thinkers and on
the general drift of his own philosophy. I have

considerably expanded the chapter on Aristotle's

Logic and, throughout, I have supplemented the
;

Greek extracts where it seemed to me that by

adding a few additional words Aristotle's meaning
was made more obvious. But I have also, I hope,
facilitated the study of the Greek by interpolating
occasionally short explanatory notes.
I have to thank several reviewers and others

for the kindly way in which they have spoken of

my work. Specially am I indebted to Professor
Susemihl for calling my attention (in Bursian's
Jahresbericht) to some gaps which I have tried in
this edition to fill up: and to Mr A. W. Benn for
Vlll PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.
several which appeared first in the
criticisms
Westminster Review and are now published in
his important work upon the Greek Philosophers.
Without admitting all Mr Benn's objections, I
have been led by his remarks to modify in one or
two passages my interpretation of Aristotle's views.
But a work like this leaves no room for contro-
versy: and as regards my exposition of Aristotle's
'creative reason' (56) I must content myself by
referring to the Introduction to my edition of
Aristotle's Psychology (pp. xcvii. where the
cxvi.),
grounds of my interpretation are much more fully
stated.

Oxford.
March, 1883.
 CONTENTS.

CHAP. I. GENERAL AIM OF ARISTOTLE'S

PHILOSOPHY p. i

CHAP. II. ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS p. 17

1. Biographical facts.

2. The transmission of Aristotle's writings.

3. Their genuineness.
4. The probable order of their composition.
5. Aristotle's successors and interpreters.
6. Width of Aristotle's Philosophy.
7. The Aristotelian Encyclopaedia.
8. The subdivisions of Philosophy.

CHAP. III. LOGIC p. 24

9. The Logical Treatises.

10. The ten Categories.
n. The elements of the proposition.
12. The proposition and its kinds.
13. The opposition and conversion of propositions.
14. The Predicables.
15. Definition and its Method.
16. Syllogism: its character and principle.
17. The Figures of Syllogism.
18. Reduction of Imperfect to Perfect Figures.
19. The Hypothetical Syllogism.
20. Induction.
21. Enthymeme and Example.
 CONTENTS.
22. The two orders of Knowledge.
23. Logical Proof and its relation to the Universal.

24. Scientific knowledge : its character and problems.

2 5. Definition as the end of Science.
26. The principles of Scientific Reasoning.
27. The origin of Knowledge.

CHAP. I\ . METAPHYSIC p. 60

28. The beginnings of Philosophy.

29. The Problems of Metaphysic.
30. The Law of contradiction and its value.

31. Plato's Explanation of the Real.

32. Defects of Plato's doctrine of Ideas.

33. Ideas not outside but in phenomena.
34- The concrete as the truly Real.
35. Matter and Form.
36. Potentiality and Actuality.
37- The four principles or Causes.

38. The eternal essence (ro ri r\v elvai).

39- God as the first of Substances.

CHAP. V PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE . . p. 75

40. The sphere and method of natural philosophy.

41. The different meaning of " Nature."
42. Movement and its different kinds.
43- Space as an attribute of existence.
44- Time and its relation to Number.
45. The Eternity of Movement and of the World.

46. The first cause of Movement.

47- Insufficiency of Materialism.

48. The continuity of Nature.

CHAP. V [. PSYCHOLOGY p. 85

49- Soul as the truth of Body.

50. The Psychic Faculties.
5i. Sense-Perception and the different " objects" of Sense.

5*. Common or Central sense.

53- Imagination and Illusion.

54. Memory and Association.
 CONTENTS. xi

55. Reason as thinking the rational.

56. Reason as creative.

CHAP. VII. MORAL PHILOSOPHY . . . p. 94

57. The chief good.

58. The psychological basis.

59. Virtue as a Habit and a Mean.
60. The Separate Virtues.
61. Justiceand Equity.
62. Moral Insight and the Unity of Virtue.
63. Moral Purpose as combining Reason and Desire.
64. Moral Weakness and its Explanation.
65. Pleasure and its relation to the Good.
66. The life of thought.
67. Friendship in relation to Morality.

CHAP. VIII. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY . . p m

68. Politics as related to Ethics.

69. The development of the State from the Family.

70. Slavery and Household Management.
71. Exchange and the origin of Money.
72. Plato's communistic schemes.

73. The different forms of Government.

74. The requirements of the ideal state.
75. The character of Law.
76. Education : its factors and its motives.

CHAP. IX. PHILOSOPHY OF ART . . . p. 124

77. Art as imitative but expressing the universal.

78. Comedy and Tragedy.

INDEX , ... p. 128

OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ARISTOTLE.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL AIM OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY.

The philosophical ideas of Aristotle were, like those

of every other philosopher, whether in ancient or in
modern an outgrowth from the systems which had
times,
preceded him. For philosophy, whatever may be said
to the contrary, is constantly progressing, and though
its problems may recur, the recurrence is not merely
iteration: the problem when it repeats itself is partly
rendered easier, made more difficult by the
partly
attempts which have been made to solve it. And so it
was that had tried to solve the difficulties
just as Socrates
of the pre-Socratic schools and Plato had sought to fill
up the defects in Socrates, Aristotle in turn came to
supplement the defects and meet the difficulties of
Platonism.
Greek Philosophy had started with a very simple
problem. It had asked what is the simplest explanation

we can give of all existing things what is the most uni-
versal, most comprehensive statement to which we can
reduce all the objects of our experience ? And the ques-
tion had met with varying answers. Thales had found
W. T
2 GENERAL AIM OF
the common element in water, of which every existing
object was some modification or other, while Anaximenes
regarded air as the universal explanation of phenomena.
Pythagoras struck out a new line among these early
thinkers.Abandoning their materialistic explanations,
he reduced all phenomena to number. Number, he
saw, was the universal attribute of all things : everything
of which existence could be predicated was in some
sense or other an expression of a numerical and quanti-
tative relationship. But the pre-Socratic philosophers
seldom indulged in such a supra-sensuous conception as
that of number. They were principally, as Aristotle
calls them, physical philosophers, students of nature; and
it was in material agencies that they found the secret of
the universe. Especially was this the case with Demo-
critus and the Atomic school. Matter they found was
ultimately reducible to indivisible particles, and it was
the different changes in the arrangement of such particles
which led to the actual form of outward things. Atoms
were thus the constituent parts of which all existing things
were merely particular manifestations.
Gradually, however, other problems were coming to
the front. Hitherto philosophy had dealt with things as
ready-made for experience, as directly known and un-
doubtedly knowable. But the nature of knowledge itself

soon came to be a question for philosophers. Democritus

had distinguished between a knowledge of the senses and
a knowledge of the intellect Empedocles had grasped
:

the real truth that we could know things only in so far

as some resemblance subsisted between the knowing
mind and the known thing and the Eleatic school of
:

Xenophanes and Parmenides had seen, however vaguely,

 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 3

that it was only in so far as we reduced our many sensa-

tions to unity and gave them a principle of reality that
they could exist as objects of rational cognition. And
still more strikingly Anaxagoras had hit the truth that

Nous or Reason was in a way the secret support and

organizer of outward things just as it was also the faculty
of inward knowledge.
Thus Greek Philosophy had gradually exchanged the
question of Ontology for the question of Epistemology
it had, that begun by asking what is Being, it had
is,

come to ask what is Knowing. And especially with the

Sophists and Socrates the problem of philosophy passed
from the study of the object to the study of the subject,
and speculation directed itself not so much to the ele-
mentary constituents of things as to the elementary con-
stituents of thought.
The Sophists had formulated the doctrine that know-
ledge was always relative to a subject, that nothing can
be known except by reference to the mind which knows
it. Man, said Protagoras, is the measure of all things
things, that is to say, contain within themselves no
standard by which they can be judged, and it is only
when man reads them and interprets them by reference
to ideas of his own that they come to have a meaning.
The doctrine was one which incautiously used could end
in strange results. It was an apparent corollary from
it was true or false in itself, but that this
that nothing
truth or falsity came only from the mind brought to
bear upon things. But to say this was to open the way
for an indifference of belief which held that one belief
was as good as another, that therefore contradiction
was impossible, and that the value of any opinion de-
4 GENERAL AIM OF
pended entirely on the person who entertained it. To
him it was true the fact that to other people it was not
:

true was of no force as against his own conviction

l
.

Against this absence of any general standard of belief

Socrates set himself to indicate the permanent elements
in knowledge. He shewed especially that ideas were
not such fluctuating phenomena as the Sophists repre-
sented them; that amid the different phases of any term
whatever, there was some general underlying concept
which remained the same throughout the many uses
to which the term could be put. He was continually,
as we learn at once from Xenophon and Plato, seeking
to find out what something or other is shewing men
that they were reasoning about words without attaching
any precise fixed meaning to the words, or that they
were confusing some concept or other with some par-
ticular form of its manifestation. His method in thus
finding out the common usage of a term was what may
be roughly called Induction : to discover
in order, that is,

what (say) beauty is, he took the cases of a beautiful n

"
woman, a "beautiful" landscape, a "beautiful" character,
and tried to ascertain the common characteristic which
entitled us to apply the one word beautiful in all

these cases. And thus, as Aristotle says, Socrates' con-

tributions to the history of philosophy are to be found
in his use of induction on the one hand his search
2
for universal definitions on the other .

Socrates had so far met the sceptical teaching of

the Sophists. But before his own life had closed, other
and more perplexing forms of the Sophistic problems
1
Plato Theaetetus 152 a, Euthydemus 286 B: and cf. 30.4
2
See the passage quoted 28. 5 below.
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 5

had and Nominalism and Individualism became

arisen,

the current theories of the day. The Cynic and Megaric

schools agreed in disbelieving in anything general or
universal was nothing but the individual an
: there
individual which stood alone and had no connexion with
other individuals. The doctrine was one which admitted
of both logical and practical application. Logically it
shewed itself as the restriction of judgment to identical
propositions. They were the only propositions possible:
we could not say "men are good," but only "men are
1
men," "good is good ." But this logical nominalism,
this metaphysical atomism, had also its ethical counter-
part. It became as selfish individualism the common
principle of the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. The one
regarded virtue, the other pleasure, as the end of life :

but the Cynic conception of self-sufficient, self-satisfied

virtue is only a particular phase of that general selfish-

ness which shewed another aspect of itself in the

Cyrenaic ideal of pleasure. To the one school as to the
other, self-satisfaction, self-gratification, is the aim of
life : neither gets beyond the individual neither sees
:

that the individual must, in order to become himself, go

beyond himself: neither had the metaphysical basis
by which to reconcile the individual with the universal 2 .

Such a metaphysical basis Plato attempted to supply.

He supplied it in his doctrine of Ideas as the only Real.
And such ideas were forced as it were upon him by the
L
Plato Soph. 251 c: Theaetet. 201 e: Simplic. ad Aris. Phys.
fol. 20 a (Ritter and Preller 238).
2
For the Cynic view see Aris. Eth. Nic. I. 8. S, 1099*1 Diog. :

L. VI.n (Ritter and Preller 219). For the Cyrenaic, Xenoph.

Memorabilia II. 1. 9, Arrian Var. Hist. xiv. 6 (Preller 207).
6 GENERAL AIM OF
necessities of life. In an interesting passage in
which Aristotle has explained to us the genesis of the
Platonic Ideal Theory we learn how the sensationalist 1
,

results of Heraclitus woke Plato to the need of a supra-

icus theory of knowledge much in the same way as
the empirical results of Hurne shewed Kant that in
order to explain experience we must find a basis in-
dependent of experience. For Plato, according to the
sketch which Aristotle us, began by accepting the

Heraditean flux of things, but drew the further conse-

quence that things as continually changing could never
jrne the objects of experience and be fixed for
thought. Put things, he argued further, are known : and
from this he drew the new conclusion that the the
of Heraclitus applied only to things as sensible, as
phenomena: and that to form an object of knowta
we must go b t m a world
of I and beyond a world of sensible
r

phenomena. Knowledge, that is to say, is only possible

he assumption that there is an order, a continuity, in

our sensations ; it was in fact Plato who first saw clearly

that a tent sensati m must be speech!
Mise the mere naming of a thing necessarily g
. the individual intimation of the senses, and
v
. into relation with a number of other like sensa-
tions and imp: . But this relationship again implies
that every object of existence and of knowledge is not
only its particular self but also something universal : the
particular individual man can be known and can e

only in so far as he is a man generally a particular

1 -
Ari t
-2<j (;><;. .

,)
: c Plato Cntjlai
439 c -
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY, 7

object can be known to be, for instance, beautiful only in

virtue of participation in an idea of beauty.
Somewhat in this fashion Plato solved what has been
well called the difficulty of Plato's age the correlation
of ideas. The proposition, it followed, was no longer the
impossibility which the Cynics and the Megarians had
made it. For everything, it now became evident, could
only be known could only exist in so far as it involved
relations with a larger whole outside itself: Socrates was
not merely Socrates, he was also a man, a virtuous man.
a philosopher, &c. ' And the object of philosophy was
just the study of the compatibility and incompatibility
of different ideas. Dialectic, as Plato entitled the pursuit
of the philosopher, was just a study of the agreements and
differences between things it was the combination of
synthesis and analysis of definition and division it in-
cluded the comprehension of the many into a one on the
one hand, the explication of a one into a many on the
other. The end therefore of philosophical study was
just to see the one in the many and the many in the one
by recognising the fact that the many of sense could only
be understood when interpreted by a unity of thought 2 .

So far then Plato had explained the relation of the par-

ticular to the universal. Above all he had emphasized the
ethical significance of his doctrine : no philosophy ever
attempted to be more practical (in the best sense of the

word) than Platonism. He had shewn that just as mere sub-

jectiveknowledge of sense-phenomena, or opinion, had to
be translated into true science or knowledge of the real, so
the customary virtue which was a merely selfish conformity
1
Sophist. 253 B 262 D.
:

2
Phaedrus 265 b Politicus 285
: B.
 3 GENERAL AIM OF
to outward rule had to be raised to real perception of the
'grounds of duty
1
. He had shewn again in the Republic
that it was only in connexion with his fellow-men in a
state or social organism, that man could be rightly under-
stood that is, not as a merely selfish individual but as
one with other selves. And he had given a particular
application of his ideal theory by shewing that every
good act and every blessing of life involved and depended
on an idea of Goodness, and that it was only in so far as
we had read this ideal into our daily conduct that it ac-
2
quired true moral worth .

While, however, Plato had in this way insisted on

the need of universals for knowledge and for existence,
he had taken but little pains to explain the relation
between the two, and shew how it was that the one
became the other. Rather, in fact, his language had
been such as to lead people to imagine that the two
worlds the world of thought and the world of sense
lay apart from one another : that the universal which
constituted things was something over and beyond the
particular things themselves.
It was this lacuna in the teaching of Plato which
Aristotle set himself to fill up. While Plato tried to
interpret the individual by the universal, Aristotle rather
sought to read the universal through the individual. He
had, in other words, a healthy distrust of everything
abstract, general, and transcendental: he was never
satisfied with a conception until he had given it a
really practical interpretation by facts. This love of the
concrete displays itself in almost every section of Aris-

2
1
Phaedo 69 A : 82 B. Republic 505 A.
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 9

totle's philosophy. Logically it appears as the syllogism,

which connects a notion of lower generality with a notion
of greater generality, by means of an intermediate con-
ception, and thus enables us to pass gradually from the
particular to the universal : it is equally prominent in
his view that no science can be successfully studied
except by reference to the peculiar principles which
1

characterize its special sphere . In metaphysic, again,

it appears as the doctrine that reality is to be found
not in the abstract universal, but in the merging of
indeterminate matter in definite form, or in the process
by which an undeveloped capacity attains to fully

realized activity. Psychologically again we find the

same result. Soul is not some harmony of parts or
some numerical abstraction it is the truth of body,
:

and therefore the constant correlative of body. And

similarly in Ethics the aim of life is neither to keep
our gaze directed on some abstract and absolute idea
of goodness, nor to sink into the selfish individualism
of the Cynic, but to realize our true human nature as
members of society in all the ways in which psychological
analysis shews it ought to be realized.
Logic is pre-eminently the creation of Aristotle. If
Socrates broke ground upon the subject of the concept,
and Plato laid the foundation of a theory of proposition,
Aristotle in turn completed the analysis of knowledge by
adding on his theory of syllogism. The characteristic
feature of syllogism lies in emphasizing the fact that we
discover the general characters of a notion by the help of
some conception which is wider than this notion itself

1
Cp. Eucken's Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, pp. 43 56.
io GENERAL AIM OF
while narrower than the general idea with which we are
seeking to connect it. And thus the aim of science
is just the discovery of these media or middle terms
by which our knowledge will be at once widened and
unified. But if we take a more comprehensive view,
we find that Aristotle's theory of syllogism is simply an
explicit statement of the fact that all thought rests on
universal truths that all knowledge whether "deductive "

or " inductive " is arrived at by the indispensable aid of

general propositions. on the contrary,
Stuart Mill,
maintained that reasoning is perpetually "from particular
to particular," and a " village matron " prescribing for
her neighbour's child on the strength of what happened
to her own Lucy, was introduced to illustrate the fact
that everyday reasoning takes place without any thought
of general propositions. We might almost as well be
told that oxygen and hydrogen do not enter into the com-
position of water, because our village matron perpetually
drinks it without passing through either element : and
the analysis of the chemist would be found to be as
great a fiction as the analysis of the logician. But
Aristotle has supplied the links which at once upset
all such superficial analysis. He has shewn that even
in Analogy or Example which apparently proceeds in

this way from one particular instance to another par-

ticular instance, we are only justified in so proceeding
in so far as we have transformed the particular instance
into a general proposition \ It is only in short, Aristotle

1
See 21 below. Mr Benn (Greek Philosophers, I. 389) is

mistaken in supposing that I objected to elucidating an argument by

" concrete examples " or thought that "Mill wrote exclusively for
College tutors." The truth is I had gained so much from Mill's
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 1

teaches, in so far as we universalize any fact that we are

warranted in going beyond it, and syllogism is merely an
elaborate analysis of the process.
Metaphysic applies to things the same conditions
as those which Logic ascertained to hold good of thought.
For the real, we find, is not the abstract universal : rather
we must between an unformed matter and
distinguish
a determinate form which go to make up the real, just
as the wide-spreading genus and the particular differentia
go to make up the existing species. And in place of the
dead and lifeless entities of the Platonic idealism, we
must recognise the life and change of nature and see in :

everything that really is, a constant progress from ca-

pacity to actuality, from potential to real, from implicit
to explicit, from not-being to being.
Psychology is little but a deduction from this meta-
physical foundation : Aristotle's doctrine of reality at
once determines his theory of soul. For body and soul
stand to one another, Aristotle holds, just as matter to
form, as what is potential to what is actual : and thus
soul is the entelechy or full realization of the body not
certainly as though it were the last result of bodily or-
ganization, but as the form which gives meaning and
truth to the bodily functions. And thus in discussing
psychological phenomena, Aristotle never loses sight of
their concomitant physiological conditions.
But while Aristotle does not overlook the close con-
nexion between psychology and physiology, he never,

works that I had supposed him to write for thinking Englishmen,

and so far am I from thinking Mill's illustration "deserving of
contempt " that I regard it as particularly valuable for bringing out,
when fully analysed, the essential character of inference.
12 GENERAL AIM OF
on the other hand, fails to distinguish between the phy-
sical conditions and the psychological character of a

mental fact, just as he distinguishes, besides, between

the psychological genesis and the metaphysical nature of
a conception. His recognition of two aspects of know-
ledge
the study of a thing as it is known to us, and the
study of it as it appears to the creative mind of God
is one which runs through all his philosophy : induc-
and correspond to these
tion and syllogism just represent
two ways of regarding any fact. What, then, is histori-
cally last may be metaphysically first the last stage in
the process of development may represent the original
a priori conditions of the development itself. And in
particular the faculty of thought or reason which seems
only the last result, almost the effect of the all different
powers of sense and memory and imagination turns
out to be the logically first the condition of the exercise
of any perception or reminiscence. To Aristotle, as to
a subtle Scotch theologian, " the real presupposition of

all knowledge or the thought which is the prius of all

things, is a thought or self-consciousness which is beyond

all individual selves, which is the unity of all thinkers
and all objects of thought 1 ."
What is thus metaphysically the presupposition of
the simplest understanding of the universe comes in

turn to be also the centre of morality : a life of thought

is found to be the highest life for man. Not that
Aristotle arrives immediately at this conclusion. He
begins by taking a midway course between the individual
selfishness of the Cynic and the impracticable univer-

1
Principal Caird's Philosophy of Religion, p. 158.
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 13

salism of Plato's theory. Man's happiness, he finds,

involves the perfect development of human nature as
a whole : and this nature is neither that of an exclusively
intellectual nor that of an exclusively emotional and appe-
titive being, but the two in combination with each other.
Virtue therefore is a mean
moderate
that is, consists in a
use of the different feelings and impulses of man's nature
a use which allows no one tendency to be developed
to excess, but prevents it becoming either too much or
too little. The result of course is that morality at times
appears little but respectability. But in Ethics, as in
other branches of philosophy, Aristotle ends with an
undercurrent of that Platonism which he criticized at
the beginning. And accordingly we find that man's true
duty is to live a life of thought, because it is just this
thought which constitutes the individual soul.
But this life of thought is not to be divorced from the
conditions of everyday humanity : the eternal life at which
we have to aim is not something beyond the present
(Eth. Nic. x. 7, H77 b 33) : rather the ideal must be found
within the real, and Politics itself is but the testing-stone
for Ethics. The two, in fact, are merely different
aspects of one great Science : the chief good must be

ras P2li "not only fo r the indi vidual but also for the
nation," ..andjthe ideal of the moralisfmust be alsoThe
ideal of the statesman. Not that Aristotle has always
taken pains to harmonize the results of one science with
the conclusions of the other. But no writer has em-
phasized more clearly than Aristotle has the moral pur-

pose of the State no one has combated more effectively
the view that states are merely artificial combinations for
the defence of life and property no one has brought
14 GENERAL AIM OF
out more clearly the real end of the social organism as
lying in the general moral welfare of its members. And
a state which takes so little real interest as ours in art,
and does so little for the elevation of the stage, might
" take a thought and mend" if its would lay to
citizens
heart some parts of Aristotle's remarks on music and the
moral influence exercised by tragedy.
It would take us far beyond the purpose of these
introductory remarks were we to go on and discuss the
objective value of Aristotle's doctrines. It may be
allowed at once that many of them are superseded by
modern philosophy. The student of Metaphysics will
seek in vain for any such insight into the conditions of
experience and the grounds of duty as distinguished
Kant's Critiques. In Ethics again Aristotle's analysis
of virtue is strikingly insufficient. In regarding virtue
as a middle state between extremes we find a contracted
stereotyped view of life which fails to realize the infinitude
of duty and indeed approves of the Pythagorean repre-
sentation of good as finite. And though the narrowness
of this ethical standard disappears in the (still selfishly

envisaged) conception of a life of thought as highest

good, we are far always from the words of the divine
command " Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father
in Heaven is perfect" words which supply an inexhaus-
tible and infinite ideal, which because infinite can never
be realized and before which not highmindedness but in-
1

becomes the characteristic of the soul

creasing humility .

Although however modern thought has passed be-

yond and absorbed many of the results of Aristotle, it
1
The relation of Aristotelian to Christian Ethics is thoroughly
discussed in Luthardt's Elhik des Aristoteles in ihrem Unterschied
 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY. 15

does not follow that his works are of no value to the

student. It may be so, so far as Aristotle's strictly scien-

tific theories are concerned. A treatise on Astronomy or

Chemistry becomes, whoever be its writer, rapidly super-
annuated, and it is practically useless when its theories
have been found out to be false. But the student of
morals must always go through the same work as his
precursors if he would understand the nature of the
problems of the human mind : he must live over again
the experiences of a Plato and an Aristotle if he would
reallyknow the meaning of reality and life.
The very fact again that these experiences are left us
in a language not our own brings with it a distinct advan-
tage. Philosophy indeed " perishes in the moment you
would teach it" : in a sense it cannot be taught at all.

The very value of metaphysical questions lies in the fact

that there is no one definite answer to them but that

von der Moral des Christentln tins (Leipzig 1869 1876). With most
of Luthardt's conclusions I fully agree. No one can read the Ethics
without feeling that Aristotle's ideal of perfection is selfish that
the virtuous man never really gets outside himself and that even in
discussing friendship, in which Aristotle more especially leaves his
egoistic standpoint, he fails to realize the common personality of
man, and attaches in consequence undue weight to social differences.
And so far Luthardt is right in saying that Aristotle remains unac-
quainted with the universal nature of man. But I cannot but think
that Luthardt insists too much on the absence in Aristotle's system
of inward motive and feeling {Gesinniing) as constituting morality.
No doubt Aristotle is not contented with a Kantian "good will"
and requires the outward deed to prove the reality of the virtuous
intention (Eth. Nic. x. 8. 4, ii78 a 3o). But it was after all a some-
what questionable moralist who held " The heart's aye the part
that maks us richt or wrang."
1 6 GENERAL AIM OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY.
we must each one decide them for ourselves : that while
the truths of physical science are the same for all in-
dividuals, the truths of ethics and metaphysics must be
made each one's own and must be made so by a perso-
nal effort of thought. But the training for discussing
questions of this kind will be found more easily in an
ancient than in a modern author. The effort of transla-

tion which such a study involves a translation not of

words but of ideas and their setting constitutes itself an
education which no modern manual can supply. And if
it be a real gain to approach a science by taking it in its
beginnings and letting its problems grow up in the natu-
ral order of their development, the writings of Aristotle
must always remain a real introduction to moral and
metaphysical philosophy. We are still anxious to know
whether our perception of a real world comes to us by an
exercise of thought or by a simple impression of sense
whether it is the universal that gives the individual
reality, or the individual that shapes itself by some pro-
cess not explained into a universal whether bodily
movements are the causal antecedents of mental func-
tions, or mind rather the reality which gives truth to body

whether the highest or contemplative

life is practical
whether advance involves also moral progress
intellectual
whether the State a mere combination preserving
is for

goods and property or a moral organism developing the

idea of or whether again
right a merely tem- art is

porary and accidental adjunct or a necessary element in

human life. And about these and such like questions

most of those who have studied Aristotle think that he

has given them many a valuable suggestion.
 CHAPTER II.

Aristotle's life and writings.

Aristotle was born at Stagira, a Chalcidian

i.

colony in Thrace, B.C. 384, and died in exile, voluntarily

adopted to avoid a prosecution for impiety, at Chalcis in

Euboea, B.C. 322. He studied at Athens, partly under

Plato, from 367 to 347 : stayed thereafter for some time
with his friend and fellow-student Hermias, despot of
Atarneus in Mysia, whose near relative Pythias he married:
acted as tutor to Alexander the Great from 343 to 340 B.C.;
and lectured at Athens in the Walk (TrcptVaros) of the

Lyceum from 335 and various anecdotes

to 323. His will

prove him a man of warm domestic sympathies and gene-

rous disposition.

The biography of Aristotle is treated most fully by

Adolf Stahr, Aristotelia (Halle, 1830), and Blakesley
(J. W.), Life of Aristotle (Cambridge, 1839). The chief
original authority is Diogenes Laertius (Book v.), who
himself builds upon a number of previous, no longer
extant, biographies.

2. The writings of Aristotle seem only to have been

first properly collected and edited by Andronicus of Rhodes
(b.c. 70) after being possessed successively by Theophras-
tus, Neleus (of Skepsis in the Troad) and his relatives,

w 2
1 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

Apellicon (b.c. ioo), Sulla (b.c. 86) and Tyrannion: but

there is no reason to believe Strabo's assertion that from
the time of Theophrastus to Apellicon the works of
Aristotle were in great measure unknown to students.

See Strabo, xm. p. 608, who describing Skepsis speaks

of Neleus as SiaScy/xcvos rrjv ^i/BXloOtJktjv tov <dto<f>pdo-Tov
iv y rjv koll y tov 'A/ho-totcAous o yap 'A/o icrrori Xrjs rrjv
*

kavrov co^pao-ra) 7rape8a)/cv, and concludes crvvifir) Sk :

rots K rtov HepnraTm', tols fxkv iraXat T019 fxerd o<pao-roi/,

oAcds ovk 'iypvcri rd /3tf3\ta, 7r\rjv oAiyooi/ /ecu fxaXicrra tuv
^a)TptK(5i/, fxrjSev ^X LV 4>i ^" 0<T0 4>^v ^pOLyfxaTLKWs, dWd
Secrets XtjkvOl&lv (amplify dogmas) and compare Plutarch,
:

Vita Sullae c. 26, and Athenaeus, JDeipnosoph. 1. c. 2.

The subject is fully discussed by Stahr (Aristotelia,
part and Blakesley {Life of Aristotle, p. 137). The
2),
probably right in holding the works bequeathed
latter is
to Theophrastus and Neleus to have been merely auto-
graphs of " rough draughts of future works."

3. The genuineness of Aristotle's writings is rendered

particularly open by the fact that the catalogue
to debate

of Aristotle's works given us by Diogenes Laertius corre-

sponds only to a slight extent with our extant collection;
but this difficulty is partly met by finding that Aristotle
himself refers to portions of his works under very different
names from those by which we know them notably for

instance the Physics are referred to as iv toZs irepl rds

a/o^ots
s
(274 21), iv toIs irepl klvtJ(Tu)s, &c. The compo-
sition of Aristotle's writings is a subject on which it is

impossible to dogmatize, but would seem not unlikely

it

that a great part of the works as we possess them are

little more than lecture-notes supplemented by pupil-

editors. Besides the works which we still possess, Aris-

totle would seem to have composed various more or less
 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS, 19

popularly constructed Dialogues \ but it seems unneces-

sary to identify these exclusively with i^iorepLKoL Xoyot, by
which latter phrase Aristotle would seem rather to under-
stand any results or opinions that have become part of
the common culture of the age.

It seems outside dispute that Aristotle compiled many

more works than those which have been handed down to
us :and Aristotle himself refers to works which do not
correspond with any of those in our collection. See
Heitz (E.), Die verlorenen Schriften des A ris to teles, 1865,
pp. 54 141, where Aristotle's references to works irepl
Tpocfrrjs, 7T/ot cj>VT<i)V, avarofxai, fxeOoSiKa, &C. are collected

and discussed. Some of these however perhaps exist in

our collection under different names, e.g. Aristotle's refer-
ence to a ircpl crroi;(tW and a 7repl rov iroiuv kcu Trdcrx^v
are probably to be found in the work we call de Genera-
tione et Corruptio?ie. Aristotle would seem also to have
composed a number of dialogues on questions of philo-
sophy, e.g. TpvWoS r) 7Tpl pr)T0pLK7Js, Ei)8r]fAOS 7] 7Tpl l/'VX'fc?
&c. (See Heitz, Ver. Sch., pp. 141
208.) Bernays (Die
Dialoge des Arisloteles, 1863) has further attempted to
identify these dialogues with certain i&repLKol Xoyot to
which Aristotle refers and to maintain that in Eth.
;

1. 13, no2 2 6 Aristotle is referring to his dialogue Eude-

a

mus, in vi. 4, ii4o a 2, to the Dialogue on Poets, in Meta-

a
physics^ xiii. 1, io76 28, to the Dialogue on Philosophy,
b
in Pol. in. 6, i278 3o, to the Dialogues 7repl ^acrtXeias,
vTrkp a7rotKO)v, and in Pol. vii. i, 1323 s 21, to the Dialogue
KopcvOtos. But it is to be noted that the psychological
analysis so accepted in Eth. i. 13 is sharply criticized
De An. 11. 9, and the phrase r^OpvXXyjrai in Meiaphys.
xiii. 1 seems to refer to something more current than
Aristotle's own opinions. In Pol. vn. 1, again, the refer-
ence would seem to be, as Zeller points out, to the popular
division of goods given in Eth. Nic. 1. 8, 1098 s 13. (Pol.
VII. I says vopLicravTas ovv t/cai/ws 7roXXd XiytcrOai kcu t&v
:

iv rots e^coTcptKois Xoyocs 7repl rrj s ap terras fw^s, koll vvv

20 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

Xprjcrriov avroLS' oJ? dXrjOoJS yap 7rpos ye /jllclv Statpecrtv

OuSeiS 0.fJL(f>LCrfSrjTlf](TLV Oiv 0)5 0V TpLWV 0V(T(Zv /ACpiStoV, TtOV T
/ctos /cat tc5i/ ev T(3 (KxijxaTi /cat twi/ 1/ ttJ xJ/vXVi "^dvra TavTa
virdp^eiv roi? /Aa/capiois Set. .Zi//^. I. 8 says : vci/c/x^/xevwv
St) twi/ aya#(m/ Tpi^rj, koX Ttov fxkv kto<; Xeyofxevuv Tc3y Se
7Tpt \pV)(f)V KCLl (TiOfXa, TOL TTtpl \j/V)(r}V KVpKSnCLTOL XtyOfJLtV KoL
fxaXiorra dyaOd.) It as if we should
would seem therefore
understand by i^mrepLKol Xoyot the current educated
opinion of the time, the main results of philosophical
analysis floating about in Greek society, results with
which the Dialogues of Aristotle may have been in many
cases identical, but which were by no means confined ex-
clusively to them. A similar explanation must be given
of rots v KOtvQ yiyvofxivois Xoyots (De An. I. 4, 407^9),
and ra iyKVKXia (Eth. Nic. i. 3, 1096 s 3).

4. The order of composition of Aristotle's writings

can scarcely be stated with any accuracy, as Aristotle
(i) would carry on some works simultaneously, (2 )
would frequently make later additions to works which
had been principally composed at an earlier date, and
probably (3 ) made references in one work to another
not so much from a chronological as from a logical order
in a preconceived system. It would seem however that

Aristotle began with rhetorical and logical writings, then

proceeded to moral and political, compiled in the third
place his physical treatises, and ended with the Meta-
physics though this last-named work was no doubt in
',

process of formation during the whole period of his life.

The
subject of the order of Aristotle's writings is
fully discussed in the learned but clumsily written work
of Rose (V.), De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine (1854),
with which compare the same writer's Aristoteles Pseud-
epigraphus (1863), and Titze (F. N.), De Aristotelis
Operum Serie (1826). Rose is probably right in holding
 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 21

that Aristotle commenced with the Topics, and that the

Ethics and Politics preceded the physical writings; but
Zeller would seem right in thinking that the Metaphysics
closed the list. Rose gives the following

List of Aristotle's Writings.

I. T07TLK0)V t, 9- 7Tpl <J)(X)V LCFTOpLaS I

,

2. dva\vTiKiov S', 10. 7Tp\ i/o^/s y,

3- 7Tpl pYJTOpLKYJs y\ irepl alcrOrj(7(i)S Kai jjLVTJfJLrjs

4- 7]0tK(Jt)V K ,
Kat v7rvov p
7T0\lTLK(j)V ,
7Tpl /JiaKpof3tOTr]TO<S a,
5- 7repl 7rotr]TiKrj<; a ,
7rept 0)779 kol Oavarov a',

6. fXTacf>V(TLKiOV K ,
II. 7repl aW fJLOpLutv S',

7- 7rpof3\.YjixaTiKa, 7Tpl 0)001/ 7ropetas a',

8. (pVCTLKOJV 7} ,
7rept wa>i/ ycvecreo)? e'.

7Tepl ovpavov fi',

7Tpl yevecrtiDS Kai cj>t lopois s;
jJLTWpoXoytKWV S',

The other works usually ascribed to Aristotle, Rose

regards as spurious ; but this result cannot be said to be
fully established as regards either the work on Categories
or that de Interpretatione.

5. Aristotelianism was after Aristotle's death con-

tinued and developed by Theophrastus (373 288), Eu-
demus of Rhodes, and Strato of Lampsacus, this last
particularly giving a materialistic rendering to Aristotle's
doctrines : and was more closely expounded and anno-
tatedby the exegete Alexander of Aphrodisias (a.d. 200),

Themistius (about 330 390), Philoponus and Simplicius.
After Justinian's suppression of philosophical studies at
Athens (a.d. 529), it was preserved by Syriac and Arabic
translations in the East, and was thence, through Latin
translations from the Arabian, communicated (about a.d.
22 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

1200) to Western Europe, where up to that time the

knowledge of Aristotle had been confined to his Logic as
expounded by Porphyry at Rome (a.d. 233 and
304),
translated by Boethius (a.d. 470 525). It thus became
the basis of Scholasticism, but was not studied with
reference to the Greek Originals till the beginning of the
fifteenth century. At the time of the Protestant Refor-
mation it was subjected to much violent depreciation, but
it still forms no inconsiderable element in modern phi-

losophy.

Cp. Article on Arabian Philosophy in Encyc. Brit.

ninth edit. ; Renan, De Philos. Peripatetica apud Syros :
Averroes et V Averroisme ; Stahr, Aristoteles bei den
Romern.

6. The various influences and valuable opportunities

which the circumstances of his life opened up to Aristotle

enabled him to grasp philosophy with almost equal vigour

in all its different divisions and thus frame an encyclo-
paedic philosophy.

7. This encyclopaedia since thought has three

objects includes
i, Speculative Philosophy, whose end is truth:
2 , Practical Philosophy,whose end is action
3 , Poetic Philosophy, whose end is an artistic pro-
duct.

7racra Siarota r) TrpaKTiKrj r) TrouqTiKrj rj coop 77T 1/07. Meta-

phys. E. 1, io25 b 25-
op0<os ^ eyei koX to KaXetcrOaL rrjv <<Aocro(/>iai/ kTnuTr)\xx)v
rrjs dXrjOcias. OewprjTiKrjs fxkv yap reAos dXijOeia, TrpaKTLKrjs
8' Metaph. A. b
epyov. 1, 993 2o.
rcXo9 8c rrjs p\v 7rotrjTLKrjs TTL(TT7]fxr]s to epyov. De
Caelo in. 7, 306*16.
 ARISTOTLE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 23

8. Speculative Philosophy subdivides into Prima

Philosophia (called also Theology), Mathematic and
1
Physic : Practical Philosophy into Ethic, Oeconomic,
2
and Politic . Poetic Philosophy considers Art and its
3
specific forms in Poetry and Rhetoric .

1
rpet? aV elev cf>t\ocro<f)Lai OeayprjTLKai, jj,a6r)(iaTiK7], <f>v-
<TLK7], OeoXoytKTJ . . .T) fJLV ydp cf>V(TlKrj 7Tpl i^piCTTa fAtv aW
ovk aKLvrjTa, rrjs Se ixaOvfxaTiKrjs cvta 7Tpt a/aV^ra /xcv ov
)(0)pLcrToi 8' uroos, a\A' o5s iv v\rj. 7] 8 7rpu)rrj /cat 7repl

XoypLo-rd kolI dvivrjTa. Metaph. E. 1, 1026 s For Aris-

18.
totle's conception of irpw-rrj cf>i\ocro<pia or Metaphysic see
29 ; and for that of Physic, 40. Speculative Philo-
sophy is divided in almost the same way in Metaph. K.
s
7, 1064 28 I0 ^4 b 3.
2
Eudemus (Et/i. I. 8, i2i8 b 13) distinguishes between
ttoXltlkt], olkovo/jllkt] and cfrpovrjcris as the three parts of a
philosophy of action ; but Aristotle himself nowhere puts
the matter so definitely. Cp. however Eth. Nic. vi. 8,
b
ii4i 3o, where a somewhat similar distinction is implied.
3
Aristotle himself however makes no systematic clas-
sification of 7roLr]TiKY/. A passage in the Rhetoric would
almost warrant us in regarding Painting, Sculpture and
Poetry as the three forms of artistic thought IttcI 8c to :

fxavOaveiv re tj8v kcu to Oav/Jid^etv, kcu tol roiaSe avdyKrj

tfSia eii/ai olov to tc fAe/JUfJLrjfjLivov, <x>cnrep ypacjuKrj kcu dv-
hpiavToiroda kcu Ravaisson
irourjTLKrj^
4. Rhet. I. it, 137 1

(Metaphysique d'Aristote, 1. 252) would subdivide Poetic

into Poetic strictly so called, Rhetoric and Dialectic
but for such a division there is no authority in Aristotle.
Logic does not fall within the sciences as classified, but
contains the general principles or rules of method on
which all thought is to be studied.
 CHAPTER III.

LOGIC.

9. The at an early
logical writings of Aristotle were
period collected together under the name of Organon by
some one or other Peripatetic who regarded Logic as an
instrument, or body of rules, by the aid of which any
l
science might be investigated By Aristotle himself how-
.

ever the term " Logic" is used as equivalent to mere verbal

reasoning the science which we call Logic he knows as
:

"Analytic 2 The treatises comprised in the Organon

.'
7

correspond in great part to the present sections of the

formal logic the Categories being a classification of
terms, the work de Interpretatione (so called because
language is regarded as the interpretation of thought)
an analysis of the proposition, the Analytics, Prior and
Posterior, an exhaustive treatment of Syllogism, the
Topics, a on Probable Reasoning, and the
discourse
3
Sophistical Refutations, a discourse on Fallacies .

1
The name may have been suggested by Topics vin.
14, i63 b n, where Aristotle says it is not a small aid (ov
fjiLKpdv opyavov) to science to be able to draw out the
consequences of conflicting hypotheses, and is in harmony
with Topics 1. 2, ioi a 29, and Metaphysics Y. 3, ioo5 b 4,
where he says an insufficient study of Metaphysic results
St' a7raiSei;crtav rwv avaXvTiKtjiv. The title however is not
used by the early commentators see St Hilaire, De la
 LOGIC. 2$

Logique d'Aristote (1838) but it was a common question

between the Stoics and Peripatetics whether Logic was a
part (pepos) or instrument (opyavov) of Philosophy. Cp.
s
Brandis, Scholia, 140 47, and see Prantl, Geschichte d.

Logik, 1. 89, 532.

2
is connected with SioAcktikoos and
Thus AoyiKok
Kvws, and
opposed as abstract a priori reasoning to
is

reasoning based on concrete facts (</>i;o-ik(3s). Cp. Anal.

a b
Post. 1. 32, 88 19. 30: Phys. ill. 5, 204 4 and Anal.
s
Post. 1. 22, 84 8, where Aoyi/oos is opposed to oa/oXvtik^.
3
The treatises are known by their Greek titles as
1 KaTrjyopiat 2 rrepl epfjbrjvtias
follows :
3 dvaXvTtKoi
: :

7rpoTpa: 4 avaXvTLKa vcrrepa 5 to T07riKa, of which :

the last book is entitled 6 o-o^kitikoI IXeyxoi.

10. The Categories of Aristotle are in the first in-

stance classifications of isolated words (to avev o-v/x7tXok^s

Aeyo/xcm) as opposed to propositions, and are most fully
enumerated as ten in number viz. Substance, Quantity,
Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Condition,
Action, Passion i. e. everything which exists may be
described as These
(1) a substance, (2) a quantity, &c l

ten Categories would seem to be arranged on little or no

principle: but we may regard them as corresponding to
the order of the questions we should put in gaining
knowledge of an object we ask, i.e., first what a thing is,

then how great it is, next of what kind it is and sub-

2
stance (ova-Ca) is always regarded as the most important .

Substances are further divided into first and second

first substances being individual objects, second sub-
stances the species in which first substances or individuals
3
inhere . Quantity is divided into continuous and dis-
crete : Relations are defined as terms whose being is

"of" others 4 : and among Qualities, "secondary" or pas-

sive qualities (iraO-qTiKoX ttoiot^tcs) have a distinct place 6 .
26 LOGIC.

twv \cyofjLV(ov rd fxkv Kara crvpLirXoKrjv Xcycrat, rd 8'

avv av/JLTrXoKrjs. ra pXv ovv Kara crvfjnrXoKrjv olov avOpoj-
7to? rp)(i, rd 8' dvv crvfJLirXoKfjs olov dvQpwiros, ports, Tpe^ct,
VLKa...T<j)V Kara fATjScfjLLav <TVfjL7r\oKr)v Xeyo/JLtvwv eKacrrov tjtoi
ovcriav crrj/JLaivei rj ttoctov rj ttolov rj 7rpo<s tl rj irov rj 7tot rj

KetcrOac rj fyeiv r} iroitlv rj Trdcr^iv, zcttl Sc ovcria (Js TV7ra>

tiTreLv olov aV#pa>7ro9, 'lttttos' 7too~6v 8c olov Swny^v, rplmfxy.
7roiov 8c olov Xzvkov, ypafJLfjLaTLKOv ' irpos tl Se olov St7rXa-
o"toi/ 7rov Sc otov cV dyopa ' irore Se otoi/ l\0^ KeicrOai

Sc otoi/ aVa/cctTat* c^ct^ ^* *0l/ ^TroScScTat 7rotctv Se oToi/

TflVL, KOLLL* 7Taa^LV Se OtOJ/ TfJLVTOLL, KaLT(lL. Cat 4,

b
l 25. Cp.io3 b 3o, where the ye'v^ twj/ Karrj-
Ttf/. I. 9,
yopLwv are treated as corresponding with the description
of an object: orav fxkv yap K/ct//,eVov dvOpdrrov (f>rj to
KKLfAVOV dv6p(D7TOV LVOLL rj ^WOV, Tt IcTTL XyL KOLL OVCTiav
O-rj/JLOLLVeL, OTCLV Sc ^pW/xar05 XcVKOl) KKLfJieVOV J>fj
TO KKl-
fxevov \vkov lvcll rj ^pw/xa, tl Icttl Xcyet /cat ttolov crrj-

fJLOLLVtl*
2
TOcravTax&s Sc Xeyo//,cVov tov ovtos cfxivepov otl tovtwv
TTpCOTOV OV TO TL ZCTTLV, 07Tp Crrj/XaLVtL TTJV OVCTiav. . .TCt 8'

aXXa XcycTat ovtol rep tov ovto)<s ovtos tcl pkv irocroTr]Tas
elvoLL, ret Sc 7rotOT^Ta9, ra Sc iraQr), ra Sc aXXo rt Tototrroi/...
a
7roXXaxa>9 /xei/ ovv XcycTat to 7rparrov o/zoos 8c iravTUiv r)

ovcria irpuTov koll Xdya> /cat yi/aKrct /cat xpovep... koll ctScVat
tot olo/xeda eKacTTOv /xaXtcrra, orav Tl ecrrty 6 avOputiros
yVO)fXV 7) TO 7TVp, fJL&WoV rj TO TTOLOV rj TO 7TOCr6v 7] TO 7T0V.
Meta. Z. i, 1028^3.
3
ovcria Se Iqttlv r] /cvptwrara re Kat TrpoJrws Kat /xaXicrra
XtyofAtvr), rj jmrjTe KaO* v7tokliulVOv tlvos XeycTat (/. ^. is not
predicated of any subject) /^V v vTroKeifievLp tlvl Icttlv, olov
o rig av0po)7ros rj o tIs Ittttos. 8cvTpat 8e ovaiaL Xcyoi/rai,
cy ots ct8ccrti/ at 7rpa)Ta>s ovataL Xcyo/xcvat UTrap^ovo'tv, otov
o Tt? av0pu)7ros v et8ct //,o/ virap^eL tw avOpajirip. ytvos 8e
ro{? ct8ovs (TTt to ^a>oi/ * SevTcpat ovv atTat Xcyoi/Tat ovcrtat,
otov o tc av8pi07ro<; Kat to ^(3ov...T(3]/ 8e StvTepwv ovctlwv
pidWov ovcria to t8o? tgi; yerou?* eyyiov yap Trjs 7rpajT?;s
ouo"tas CFTiv. iracra 8c ovcria 8o/cet toSc Tt o"r]fJiaivLV. Categ.
5, 2
a
n. But contrast with this J/^/tf. Z. 7, io32 b 2,
where cTSo? is regarded as primary substance et8os 8c
 LOGIC. 27

Aeyw to tl tjv circa kolo~tov koli rrjv 7rp(x>Trjv ovorcav, and

io54 b 1, where Xoyo? is said to be ttJ? 7rpwrr;s owtas.
4
ra to icu)t a AeyCTai ocra aura a7rcp cVtiv
irpos ti Se
irepayv civat AyTai...oIov to fxel^ov rovO oirep ecrnv irepov
Xeyerat. tlvos yap Aeycrai fiei^ov. Cat. 7, 6*36.
5
7ra6r]TiKcu Se 7roiOTr]T<; AcyovTai ou t<3 aura ra SeScy-
\xiva ra? TTOLOT-qTas ireirovOivai tl' ovt yap TO JJLcXl T(3

TTTrovOivaL tl Aeycrai yAv/<u. Ctf/. 8, 9*35-

11. Notions when isolated do not in themselves

express either truth or falsehood : it is only with the
combination of ideas in a proposition that truth and
falsity are possible
1
. The elements of such a proposition
are the ovofia or noun substantive on the one hand, the
2
prjfxa or verb on the other The noun or name is a .

sound conveying no idea of time and acquiring its mean-

3
ing only by convention (fcara o-vvOtJktjv) : the verb is

distinguished from by adding on the connotation of

it
4
time Beside the ordinary noun and verb, we must
.

recognise the nomen infinitum (ovofxa dopto-Tov) like not-

good which is infinite and indefinite as applying to every-
5
thing not covered by the positive conception .

1
7TCpt O-VvOeCTLV Kal SiaiptCTLV IcTTL TO \[/v86s T Kal TO
d\r]64s. Ta fxkv ovv oVo/xara avTa /cat ra p^/xara OLK t<3
dvev o"w#eo~a)s Kal Staipccrcw? voyjfjiaTi, olov to av0pu)7ro<s rj
to XevKOV, oTav fir) 7rpoorT0fj tl' ovt yap xj/tvSos ovt
dXrjOes 7ro)' cny/xcioi/ S' ecrri tovSc' Kal yap 6 TpayeXacfros
crrjfjiaivtL fxiv tl, ovttw 8c dXrjOes f) xf/evSos, eaV fxrj to tlvaL
rj fjLTj Kara yjpovov (i.e. unless it
Lvai 7rpocrTe8rj, rj a7rXws 77

is in addition asserted to be or not be, either generally

without any particular connotation of time or in a par-

ticular tense). De Interpret. 1, i6 a i2.
2
avdyKV Se irdvTa Xoyov diro(pavTLKov (i.e. proposition)
/c prjixaTos ctvat rj 7nraxrG)s pharos. De Inter. 5, 17
s
10.
3
ovofAa [jlIv ovv iaTL cfxDvr) cnjixavTiKT] Kara crvvOrfK-qv
28 LOGIC.

dvcv ypovov, rjs jxrjSev jxipoq IcttI o-rjfxavTLKov Kc^wptcr/xcVov*

iv yap t<3 KaXXi7T7ros to l7T7tos ovSlv avTO kolO* kavro crrj-
fiawci, wo~7rep iv to) Aoya> r<3 /caAos ^71-09... to 8c xara
o-vvOtJkyjv on <vcri twv ovofxaroiv ovSev (Ttlv (as Plato
had maintained in the Cratylus) aXX* oVav yivrjrai o-v/jl-
/3o\ov, 7Ti Sr)\ov<Jt ye TL KCU OL dypd/JLfxaTOL XJ/OCJiOL, olov
a
6rjpc(x)v, (Sv ovSeV eoTii/ oVo/xa. .Zte Inter. 2, i6 20.
4
p^/^a Se eWi to irpocro-r}ixaivov \povov, ou /xepos ovSey
CT7]fJLaiVl X W P^f KaL ^"rlV a * 1 T ^ V K(X @* TpOV XeyOfJLVO)V
O"r}jJLL0V, oloV TO)V KOL0 V7TOKLjxivOV 7] V VTrOKCljAtVU). De
b
Inte?\ 3, i6 6.
6
TO 8' OVK aV^pCD7TOS OUK OVO/lLOL. OV pLTjV OuSe KlTOLl

ovojxa otl Set KaAeu/ auTO* ovt yap \6yos ovt a7ro<f>acrLS
(negation) Icttlv. aSX eWco ovojxa dopio~Tov .to Se ov^ .

vyiaxvu Kal to ov Ka/xvet ov prjfia A.eya), aXX kcrTto aopicrTOv

prjfJia, otl d/Wa>s i<j> otovovv V7rdp)(i Kal ovtos Kal jxrj ovtos.

De Inter. 2, i6 a 3o.

1 2. The combination of words gives rise to rational

speech and thought (Adyos), which possesses a meaning
not only as a whole but also in its parts. Such Ao'yos may
take many forms, but Logic considers only the demon-
strative or indicative form as that which alone expresses
truth and falsehood A simple proposition then is a
1
.

significant sound which expresses the inherence or non-

2
inherence of something in something else for the truth :

or falsity of propositions is determined by their agreement

or disagreement with the facts they represent, a false pro-
position combining what is divided and dividing what is
3
really united . Thus propositions are either affirmative
4
(/cara^aTtKai) or negative (a7ro</>aTiKcu) , each of which
5
again may be either universal or particular or indesignate .

Propositions may further differ modally, i. e. as to the

degree of inherence between subject and predicate, and

6
so become necessary or problematic .
 LOGIC. 29
1
Aoyos 8c icrrt cj>u)vrj crrjfxavTLKyj, r)s r<2v fjuepow ti aryuLav-
TLKOV <TTL K)(ix)pL(TfJLVOV (OS cj>do~LS, dXX OV)( (OS KOLTdtfyaCTlS
rj dirocfrao-is (cp. Poet. C. 20, 1457* 23)... eo"T, 8c Aoyos a7ras
/aci/ (rrjfAavTLKos, ov^ (09 opyavov 8e, aAA (oo~7rep eip-qrai Kara
<jvv6rJKr)V dirocfaavTLKOS Sc ov 7ras, aAA cV a> to aXrjOevcw
77 i^u8co~#cu vrrdp^ei. ovk cV d-rracri Be virdpyti, olov rj ev^rj
Adyos /xcV, aAA' oirrc dXrjOrjs ovt xj/evftrjs. ol /xev ovv dXXoi
dcf>tcrO(x)(rav' prjToptKrjs yap rj iroirjTLKrjs oi/cciOTc'pa rj cr/cci/as'

o 8e dircxfxLVTiKos rrjs vvv Oeiapias. De Inter. 4, i6 b 2 6.

2
o*Tt Sc r] /xcv dirXrj airo^avats cj>ix>vrj crrjjjiavTtKrj wepl
TOV V7rdp^LV TL 7] fJLT] V7Tap^W (OS OL ^pOVOi Lr)prjVT(ll. De
s
Inter. 5, 17 23.
d/xouos 01 Adyoi dXrjOets wcrirep ra irpdypLara. De Inter.
s
9, 19 33. (oo"T dXridevti pXv 6 to Sirjprjfxivov oto/xci/os Strj-

pfjcrQai koll to avyKLfjLvov avyKL0-6aL, exj/evaraL 8c 6 ivav-

tl(ds cx^i/ ra 7rpay/xara.
77 Meta. . 10, io5l b 3.
4
0"Ti 8e cts 7rp(oTOs Adyos dirofyavTiKOs /cara^acris, ctra

drrotfxicr is* ol 8' dXXot 7ToVtcs o-vvSto-fJuo els. [Cp. ./fo/.

a b
c. 20, i457 28 and ^//#/. jPr. 86 33, where Aristotle
shews that affirmation is prior to negation just as being
to non-being] KaTd<j>ao~is Sc cVtiv diro^avoris twos Kara
twos. aVdc^ao-is 8c tto> dirocfxivcris twos aVd twos. De
s
Liter. 5, 6, 17 7.
5
TTpOTCLO-lS fJL*V OVV CCTTt AdyOS KCLTafyaTlKOS fj dlTOC^aTtKOS
twos /cara rtvos. outos 8e ?) Ka#dAov 97 cV pepec rj a8idoio"Tos.

Acy(o 8c KadoXov pXv to ttclvtI virdp^ew, ev jxepei

rj firjSevl
Se to twI rj jxrj twI rj
fjaij iravTi virdp^ew, dStoptorTOV 8c to
vwap^ew r) firj virapyew avev tov kolOoXov r) Kara /xepos,
OtOV TO TU)V ivaVTL(x)V WOLL Tf]V aVTt]VC7T IVTr) JJirjV rj TO TTJV

rjSovrjv dyaOov.
fxr) Anal. Prior. I. I, 24 s 16.
ctvat
6
7racra 7rpoTaats io~Tw rj tov v-rrdp^ew rj tov cf dvdyKrjs
vwdpxcw rj tov iv8i\cr0ai virdpytw. Anal. Prior. I. 2,
a
25 I.

13. Propositions are said to be opposed as Contra-

dictories (dvTi(aTiK(os dvTiKio-6at) when the one asserts
or denies of the whole what the other denies or asserts
of the part, and as contraries (cVavTtws dvTLKtLo-dai) when
30 LOGIC.

an universal affirmative stands against a universal nega-

tive. Contradictories accordingly entirely exclude one
another and one proposition must be false another true
contrary propositions may both be false
1
. Formally
(Kara ttjv \lv) four kinds of opposition have to be
distinguished, but really only three, since the opposition
of a particular affirmative to a particular negative is
2
merely verbal . Propositions admit of Conversion (dim-
<iTpo<f>rj) into equivalent propositions having the order of
the terms reversed, but while the universal negative
3
converts simply, the affirmative does so only partially .

1
SrjXov on 7rd(rYj /cara^acrct earti/ a7roc/>acrt9 avTiKtiLiivq
/cat irdcrrj aVd</>aorct Kardc/>ao-t9. Kat ora> avTicfaavis tovto,
KOLTdcjxnTLs Kol dirofyacris at avTiKecfxevau Xeyco Sc aVrtKet-
o-0at rrjv tov avTov Kara tov avrov lltj o/xcovu/xws Se, Kat
oo~a aXXa twv tolovtwv 7rpocr8topto/x#a 7rpos ras cro<t-
o-TLKas ivox^tjcreis [i.e. the subject of the opposed propo-
sitions and also the predicate must be really the same
thing, not a thing called ambiguously by the same name
(o/xojvv/i-ws) ] dvTLKucrOai jxkv ovv Kardipacrtv oVo^aorct
\4yio ai/Tt^artKw? ttjv to kol66X.ov crrjfxaivovo'av tw aurw
otl ov kolOoXov, olov Trds dv6p(D7ros Acvkos ov 7rds dvdpoiiros
Acvkos, ov8ets dvOpwos Acvko's corn rts dvOpwiros \cvk6s'
ivavrtws Se rrjv tov kol96\ov Karac/>ao"ti/ Kat tt)v tov kol66\ov
a7ro</)a(jti/, olov 7rds dv#pa)7ros StKatos ovScts avOpwiros
StKatos. ravVas /utev ov'x 0T0V T d/xa dXrjdeis ctrat,
Sto
rds 8e aVrtKct^eVas avrats cvSe^crat C7rt tov avrov, olov ov
Trds dv0pui)7ros Acvkos Kat ccrrt Tts dv6pu)7ro<s Acvkos [the
reference is to what we call sub-contrary opposition
a
i.e. between I and O], {Be Inter. 6, i7 3i). aVrt<acrts
Se avTiOecTLS rjs ovk cart /xto$v Ka#' avTijv (Ana/. Post.
a
I, 2,72 I2). a)(TT 7Tt [JLOVOJV TOVTQ)V iSiOV (XV L7J TO 0*t

Odrepov olvtiov dXrjOes fj xj/evSos eti/at, ocra cog KaTac/>acrts

kol dirocfyacTLS dvTLKLTat. Cat. IO, I3 b 32.
2
A.eya> S' dvTLKeijxevas etvat 7rpoTa'crts Kara /xei/ t^v
 LOGIC. 3 1

)*& TTTapa?, olov TO TTOLVtI T<2 OuSevt, /Cat TO 7TCLVTL TW 0L>

TravTi, /cat to rtvt tw ovSevt, /cat to tlvl r<p ov tw\ /car'

dXyjOecav Sk rpcts* to yap tlvl tw ov tlvl koto, ttjv X4lv

dvTLKLTOLL fJ.OVOV. Audi
Pr. II, 1 5, 6$ 2$.
3
7-771/ iv tw Ka^oAov aTtprjTiKijv \i.e. the uni-
i;7rapx tl/
versal negative, irpoTao-iv being supplied] dvdyKrj rots opens
dvTLO~Tp<f)Lv, olov ct jJLr)0fMia 77801/77 dyaOov, ov$ dyaOov
ovSkv corat 77801/77* ttjv 8e KaTTjyopiKrjv (affirmative) dvTi-
o-Tpe<j>iv fjiev dvayKcuov, ov
fxrjv kolOoXov aAA' iv /xepct, olov

ct 7rao"a 77S01/77 dyaOov, Kat ayaOov ti ctvat 77801/771/' tojv 8e

i/ /jtcpet 7-771/ /xcv KaTa^aTiKTjv avTLO~Tp<j)LV dvdyKrj Kara
/xcpos (ct yap 77801/77 Tt<? ayaOov, /cat aya#6V Tt ecrrat 7780 1/77)
7-771/ Sc OTcpr)TiKrjv ovk ai/ay/catoi/* ov yap ct dvOponros jxr)
Anal.
VTrdpxtt, tlvl (wo), /cat <oi/ 01;^ V7rap^ct rtvt aV#pa)7ra>.
Pr. 1. 2, 25 s 1. [Modern Logic applies "conversion by
negation " to such a proposition, ?". it first by permu-
tation changes the negative proposition into the corre-
sponding affirmative and then converts simply. Thus
(to take Aristotle's instance) "Some Animals are not
men " becomes " Some Animals are Not-men," a propo-
sition which converts into "Some Not-Men are Animals."]

14. The Predicables or possible relations in which

the predicate of a proposition may stand to its subject
1
are those of genus, (difference), property and accident .

This result may be reached either inductively (Sta 7-775

tTrayuiyrjs) i.e. by examining all kinds of actual pro-

positions, or deductively (8ta o-vXXoyLo-fjiov) by considering
the different ways in which from the nature of the case
the predicate must stand towards the subject. For the
predicate of a proposition either must convert with and
take the place of its subject or it is not thus convertible.
Now in the former case the predicate as convertible
with the subject is either a definition (opo<;) or a property
(t'Stoi/), in the latter case when not convertible it is either
a genus (ycVos) or a difference (8tac/>opa') or else an
32 LOGIC,

accident (<rv/x,/?/fy*rt>s)\ By a definition Aristotle under-

stands the statement of the essential character of a
subject : a property is a quality which without expressing
the real essence (to tl r)v elvat) an inseparable con-
is

comitant of a subject and is convertible with it a genus :

is a term which can be applied to a number of objects

specifically different : an accident is an attribute which
may or may not belong to some subject
3
.

irdcroL 8c Trporacrts kcu irdv irpofiXrjixa r) yeVos rj lSlov

rj avpLfiefi-qKOS SrjXol' /cat yap rrjv 8tac/>opaV 009 ovaav yevL-
Krjv ojjlov to) yeVet tclktzov /jlyjSzIs 8' rjfxds viroXdfir}
Ae'yetv ojs kol<jtov rovTiov Kaff' avro Xeyofxevov 7rporacrt5 rj
7rpo/3\r]iJLa i&TLV, aXX on /cat rd irpo/3XrjpLaTa
a7rd tovtcdv
Kal at 7rpoTao"tc yivovrai. Sta<epet 8e to 7rpo/3Xr]fjLa /cat rj
7rpoTaa"t5 tc3 TpoVa>. ovtcd fjikv yap prjOevTOs, dpd ye to
L^WOV 7TeoV SlTTOVV OpLO'fJLOS COTtV dv6pQJ7TOV 7TpOTaCTt5 ytW- ',

rat* eaV Se iroTtpov to wov 7redi/ hiirovv optcr/xo? o~tlv

b
dv0p{i)7rov rj ov irpofBX-qp.a ytverat.
; 77^>. I. 4, lOl 1 7.
OTt 8' /C T(01/ 7TpOTpOV lprjfJiVOJV ol XdyOL /Cat StCt
tovtcdi/ Kat 7rpo? tolvtol, fAia fjiev ttlcttls r] Sta T779 eVaytoyr;?
(induction)' et yap Tts hriVKOiroir) tKacrTrjv iw 7rpOTacr0)V
dv rj dwo tov opov y a7rd tov
/cat Tan/ 7rpoj3XrjfxaT(x)Vy c/hilvolt

tSt'ov rj aVo rov yeVovg r) dwo tov o~v jjl (3* fir] kotos yeyevrj/mevrj.

aXXr) 8c 7rtO"Tts rj Sta ayXXoytapLoV dvdyKrj yap irav to 7rept'

Ttvos KaTrjyopovfJLvov rjTOL dvTtKaTrjyopctaOat tov 7rpay/xaTOS
rj jxrj. /cat et piv dvTLKaTrjyopuTai, opos 7) t'Stov aV etrj' et

fxh' yap crrjjJLatvei to tl r)v etvat, opos, et Se pr; cr^/xatVet

tStov' tovto yap t/v tStov, to dvTLKaTTfyopovfxevov fxev, p-r)
o-q^OLLvov Se to tl r)v etVat. et Se p,?} dvTLKaTrjyopeLTOLL tov
Trpay/xaTOS, ?7TOt twi/ eV tw optcrp,a> tov v7roKLfxevov Xeyo/xei^ojv
eo-Tti/ 77 ov. Kat et p,ev twv ev t<3 opLO-fxu AeyopeVcoi/ yeVos 77
Stac/>opa av etri, eVetS?; d dpLCTfJLOS e/c yeVovs Kat 8tac/>opwv
icTTLV et Se p,?} twv eV tw dpta/xw Aeyottevwv eo~Tt, 817X01^ OTt
dv et?/.
crvfxfizftr)Ko<; 71?/. I. 8, i03 b io.
3
eo-Tt 8' opos /xev Xoyos d to Tt t;v etvat o-r;/xatVwv (for
explanation of the phrase to t. r;. e. see 38), t8tov 8' eo-Ttv 6
 LOGIC. 33

firjSrjXot fjccv to rirjv trai,/xoVa> 8' V7rdp\<a KaidvTLKaTYjyopeiTai

tov TrpdyfiaTos, olov lSlov dvOp^irov to ypajJLjuaTiKrjs elvai
Se/crt/coV. ycVos 8' ecrrt to /card irXeiovoiv /cat Siacj>povTd)v
TW t8ct V T(3 TL CTTt KOLTr)yopOV}A.VOV (i.e. what is Said Of
several subjects, specifically different, in stating what is
their nature, e.g. when asked 'what is' man, we say an
animal) o-u/x/^e/^/cos 8e Ivtiv o jjltjSIv p.ev tovtmv ecrrt, fX7]T

opos jlitJt lSlov pfrjTe yeVos, virap^et 8e T(3 irpayfiaTi kqX 6

eVSe^crat virdpyziv oTioovv evl /cat T(3 olvtq) /cat /XT; virdpytw,
olov to KaOrjcrOat ivSe^rat vwdpyew tlvI t<j> olvtq) /cat /^
V7rdpx^v. Top. I. 5, I02 i
a
I02 b
5.
be noticed, discusses the Pre-
Aristotle then, it should
dicates simply as expressing the relation of a predicate to
the subject; he does not objectify them like the school-
men. And the Categories do not get confused with the
predicates for the latter are contained within the former,
:

act yap to crv/x/^c/fy/cos /cat to yeVos /cat to IStov /cat o dptcr/xo?

iv pua TOVTmv Twv KaTrjyopLwv carat. Top. I. 9, 1 03^*23.

15. Definition (opos, opto-^05), as the statement of

the essential nature of an object, expresses itself in the
1
genus on the one hand, the differentia on the other .

To get then at a true definition we must find out those

qualities within the genus which taken separately are of
wider extent than the subject to be defined, but taken
altogether are precisely equal to it thus while *
prime
1
odd and number are each wider than
'
'
' triad, together
2
they are just equal to it . Division (Statpco-ts) must be
accordingly applied to enable us to find out the specific
kinds of a conception : it will especially secure our
leaving out no species of the notion which is to be
3
defined . The species thus determined, we must next
go on to find the points of similarity in the species
separately and then consider the common characteristics
of different species or should no such common point
:

w. 3
34 LOGIC.

be discovered we must allow a between

real difference
the different species thus in defining magnanimity if
we findsome magnanimous persons marked by inability
to brook insult and others marked by indifference to
fortune, but cannot reduce the two features to one
common characteristic, we must recognise two kinds of
4
magnanimity . Definition may be imperfect either from
being obscure or from being too wide or from not stating
the essential and fundamental attributes. Obscurity may
arise from the use of equivocal expressions, of meta-
5
phorical phrases, of eccentric words . The disregard of
essentialand primary attributes is shewn in (a) defining
opposite by opposite, (/3) using explicitly or implicitly
the very word to be defined, (y) explaining a higher
conception by a lower in which the higher is included 6 .

1
tov yeVovs /cat t<Sv Siac/>opan> optecr#ai tov
Set jxkv Sia
KaXw? Top. vi. 4, 14 b 29.
opitpfxevov.
raw $rj vTTap^ovrwv del Kao"ro) roiavra Xrjirriov . .

/xe^pt tovtov 0)5 Tocravra Xrjcj>6fj 7rpwroi/, aiv e/cacrToi/ pXv kiri
irXeiov vVap^et, caravra Se fxrj eVt 7rXeov' tolvtyjv yap dvayKrj
ovcriav etrat, tov itpay par os. olov rptaSt virdpyei irdcrrj
dpiOfJLOS, to 7repLTTov, to irpwTOV (prime) a/^orepa)?, /cat ws
fxrj fXTptcr8ai apt#/xa) Kal o5? jxrj avyKe2o~6ai e dpi6/AU)v.
TOVTO TOLVVV 7]Sr] o~tIv 7] T/0ta5, dpt9/JL0S 7TplTT0S 7Tpc3rOS Kal
wSl wpwTOs. TOVTOiV yap e/caaroi/, ra fxev /cat rot? 7reptTrots
7iao~iv virdpyei, to Se reAeirratoi/ Kal ttj SuaSt, irdvTa Se
ovhevi An. Post. II. 13, 96 a 32.
3
XPV ^ OTav bXov rt 7rpayfjLaTvrjTaL rts (discusses and
investigates) SteAeti/ to yeVos ets ret arop.a tw etSet ra 7rp(0Ta,
b
otoi> dpiOfxov els rptaSa /cat SvaSa. Ibid. 96 l5
QrjTeiv oe oet eiripKeirovTa e7rt ra ofjiota /cat aotacpopa
(like objects which present no differences), 7rparroi/ rt
a7ravra TavTOv eypvciv, etra 7raA.tr ec/> erepot?, a, eV ravra)
/xev yeVet e/cetVots, etcrt Se avrots /xei/ Tavrd to> etSet, eKeiviav
 LOGIC, 35

8' erepa. orav 8' 7rt tovtow Xr]cf>Orj tl irdvTa tolvtov, kcll enl
Tiov dXXoyv o/xotws, 7rl tcov elXrjpLp,evo)v iraXiv (tkottlv el
tovtov, etas dv eh eva eXOrj Xoyov' ovtos yap eo"Tai tou
irpdyixaros optcrfxos. edv 8e /mrj /3a8if?7 eh eva aAA* ets 8uo rj
7rXL(l), SfjXoV OTL OVK Siv 17? 1/ Tl CtVal TO ^rjTOV/XVOV dXXd
b
7rXt(o. ^4/z. Post. II. 13, 97 7-
5
core, 8e roO /xr AcaAw? (wptcrdai) p-epT? Svo 9 ev piev to
acra<ei tt} epfxrjveta Ke^pijaOatj Sevrepov 8' ct eVi 7rXctoi/
e'tprjKetov Xoyov tov 8eovTOS...eh pXv ovv tottos (source)
tov aVac/xSs el o/jlojvvjjlov karri tlvl to elprjpuevov (if the term
used is equivocal with some other word) olov on rj yeVco-is
dywyr} els ovo-tav kolI otl 77 vyUia o-fpp,Tpia OeppuZv /cat
ij/vxptov* ofJLtoWjJLOs yap 77 dyaiyrj /cat 77 o~vppieTpia.. aWos el

Kara fxeracfropdv et.prjK.ev, olov el rrjv eV lO-TrjjJLrjv ap,ra7rro)TOj/

i) rrjv yrjv TiOrjvrjv rj ttjv croi^pocrvvrjv o~vpL<f>u>viav...eTi el p.77

KecpLevois (established) ovofxacrL yjprJTai, olov HXaTWV 6<f>pv-

6o-klov tov ocfrQaXpLov. Top. VI. I, 2, 139^11.
6
tov 8e p,?7 K 7rpoTep(DV Tpels ctcrt Tpo7roi, irpioTOS fxev el
Std tov dvTLKetpievov to dvTiKeip^evov (Spiorat, otov Sia tov
KaKov to dyaOov' a/xa yap ra ai/TiKip.va...a\Aos
tjj <fivo~ei

el avTio Ke^prjTat tw XavOdvet 8 orav p.77 outo>

opifop,cVa).
tw rov opt^opevov ovopiaTL ^p^cr^Tat, otoi' ct tov 77A.101/
ao~Tpov r] p,epo craves wpuraTO* o yap rjpiepa ^po)p.evos T]Xi(x)
)(prJTai...7rdXiv el tw dvTiSiYjprjpievio to dvTtSLrjprjpevov d)pio~Tai,
0101/ TrepiTTOv to piovdSi piec^ov dpTLOV...6pLOL(x)S Se Kal el Sid
t<j)v to eVdVa) copio~Tai, olov apTiov dptdpiov tov St^a
viroKaTii)
otaipovpievov rj to dyaOov e^tv dpeTyjs' to Te yap 8t^a aVo t<Zv
ovo elXyjTTTai, dpTtuiv ovrcov, Kal 77 dperrj dyaOov tl ecmv, aio"6'
VTTOKaTO) TavTa eKeivuv ecrTLV. Top. VI. 4, 142 s 23.

16. Syllogism in the widest sense of the expression

is "a mental process in which certain facts being as-

sumed something else differing from these facts results

1
in virtue of them ." Such a process of inference and
discovery had been attempted by Plato in his account of
Definition by Division (Aiatpco-is). But Plato's method
of discovering the character of an object by continual

32
3^ LOGIC.

dichotomy what is to be proved it does

really assumes
not proceed gradually from the particular to the general
by a middle link or less general fxecrov rather it ar-
bitrarily takes one of two classes under which it seeks by

successive divisions to bring the particular conception 2 .

Syllogism is accordingly regarded by Aristotle himself as

3
being distinctively his own
Such syllogism
discovery .

rests upon the principle that whatever can be predicated

of the predicate of a proposition can be predicated also
4
of its subject .

1
crvWoyLcrfJLOS Se ecrrt Aoyos eV co reOevTuv TtvcoV Zrepov
tl rmv KifAvu)v ef dvdyKrjs crvfxfiaLvu tw ravra eli/at. Aeyco
Sc t<3 ravra civat to Sta raura o-u/x/fotVetv, to 8k Sta TavTa
crvfxf3aLVLVto fxrjSevos eu>6ev bpov 7rpocrSeu/ 7rpo? to yeviaOat
to dvayKouov. An. Pr. i. i, 24 b i8.
2
ort S' r} Sta tcoi/ yei/tov Statpecris paKpov ti fxopcov eari
t?Js tlprj/jiivrjs pieOoSov, paStov ISelv. corn yap rj Statpecris
otov do~0evr)<s crvAAoytcr/xdV o pXv yap Set 8etat atTeiTai, crv\-
A.oytcTat 8* du tl tcov dvoi9ev...V pikv ovv rats aTroSec^ecnv,
otov Birj ri o~vXXoyio~ao~6ai V7rdp^iV, Set to pbiaov, St ov
ytVcTat 6 o-vXXoyto-pLOS, Kal tjttov del eii/at /cat pjj KaOoXov
tov irpu>Tov t&v aKpo)v' r) Se Statpecrts rovvavTiov fiovXeTat'
to yap KaOoXov XapLftdvti piicrov. Thus, as Aristotle goes
on to illustrate, Plato's method with a view to discovering
the nature of 'man,' takes animal as the class under
which man falls, divides animal into mortal and immortal,
decides that man is a mortal animal, again subdivides
this into footless and footed, and so settles that man is
footed. But, as Aristotle says, it is a mere assumption
that man is mortal and is footed coo-re tov dvOpuirov r)
:

OvrjTOV fxev rj dOdvaTOV dvayKaiov eti/at, c3oj/ Ovyjtov Se ovk

dvayKaiov, aAA' atTCtraf tovto S' r)v 6 4'Set cri;AAoytcraGr#ai.
Anal Pr. 1. 31, 46*31, Cp. An. Post. 11. 5, 9i b 35-
3
Kat 7Tpl //,]/ rtoV prjTopiKwv virrjpxe iroXXa Kat 7raXaid
rd Xeyojxeva, 7rept Se tov avXXoyt^ecrOai 7ravTX<2s oxSev
 LOGIC. 37

L\OfJiV irporepov dXXo Xiyeiv, dXX t] Tpififj ^tjtovvtcs 7roXvv

s
XpOVOV i7TOVOV/JLV. SofiJl. JEl.
$$, 1 84 9.
4
orav Tpov KaO' irepov Karrjyoprjrai cos Ka6* VTroKei/Aevov,
ocra Kara tov Karrjyopovpiivov Xeyerai, iravra kclL Kara rod
v7roKtiJLvov prjOtjcTtTaL. [Thus taking the proposition
'Socrates is a man/ it follows that since 'Mortal' is a
predicate of man,' it can also be predicated of Socrates.
'

Cp. with Mill's Formula, whatever possesses any attribute

(here humanity) possesses that of which it is the attribute
(here mortality): and with the shorter formula Nota
notae est nota rei ipsius.'] Cat. 3, i b 1 1.

17. Every Syllogism consists of three terms (opoi),

a major (/acioi/ 0*001/), a minor (eXarrov), and a middle

1
(/xcVov) which enables us to compare the two . The
different relations of the middle term gives us the three
figures (crxv^ra) f syllogism. that in which The first is

the middle just between the two extremes, being less

lies

than the major or larger notion and greater than the

minor or smaller the second figure is that in which it
:

lies outside the extremes, being greater than either, and is

consequently predicate of both extremes : the third

figure is that in which while outside the extremes it is

less than either and is consequently subject of both 2 .

The second of these figures gives only negative conclu-

sions, the third only particular; the first alone gives
universal conclusions, and is therefore called the scientific
3
figure .

SrjXov Se kcu otl Tracra aVoSci^is ecrrat Sia toiwi/ opwv

kcu ov 7rXeLovo)v, lav p/rj 8l dXX<i)v kcu aXXwv to clvto crv/x-
7ripacr/xa ytv^Tcu, olov to E Sia T tcov AB koli Sid 7w TA rj

hid t<3i> AB kcu AY /cat Br* irXuu> yap /xecra rSv avrwv
OvSkv lWfc K(x)XvL. TOVT(x)V S' OVT(*)V OV)( 1? dXXd 9rAtOV$
cto-tv ol crvXXoytcrfxoL (An. Pr. I. 4I b
25, 36). opov Se /caAw
38 LOGIC.

els ov StaXverat r} 7rpoTacrt9, olov to re KaTrjyopovpLevov kclI to

kclQ' ov Karrjyo peir at. An. Pr. I. I, 24b 1 6.
2
First Figure, otojv ovv opot Tpets ovtcds e^wcrt 7rpos
ciXXtJXovs aio-T toV Idyarov (minor term) iv oXa> elvai to)
/xecra) /cat toi/ fxeo-ov iv oXa) tw 7rpcoTO) ?) etvat ^ /x/ty eivai,
dvdyKT] tQv OLKpm' elvaL o~i>XXoyicrp,oV TeXeioj/. KaXw Se /xecrov
/xei/ o /<at ai;TO cv aAAco koll aAAo ev touto) OT>, o k<ju tt;

0O~l yiVZTCLL fXeCTOV' OLKpa Se TO CLVTO T lv aXXo) OF KCU, iv (D

aXXo iartv. elyap to A Kara itclvtos tov B kcli to B kclto.

7ravT05 tov T, dvdyKT] to A Kara 7rai/TOS tov Y KaTYjyopeto'Oat.
kolXw Se to tolovtov cr^yjfjLa irpcoTov. An. Pr. I. 4, 25^*32.
Second Figure, otolv Se to co;to tw pXv ttcwtl tw Se
fir]Sevl V7rdp-^rj, rj l/ca/repo) 7rai/Ti -7
[JLrjSevi, to jJiev a^fjfjia to
tolovtov KaXw SevVepov, ]xeo~ov Se iv aurw Xeya) to KdTrjyopov-
fjitvov dpL^olv (the middle term is predicate of both pre-
misses). TtOeTat Se to jjlo~ov eo> fxev twv aKpcoj/, 7rpwTOV Se
Trj Oeorei. [The middle term stands first because it

occupies the highest place in extension among the three

terms employed in the syllogism, and similarly it is out- '

side' the extremes because it expresses a notion wider

than either the major or minor term. Thus in arguing
Modesty is a virtue Bashfulness-4S_nqt a virtue Bash-
: :

fulness is not Modesty it is evident that virtue is the

:

first and highest notion of the three and goes beyond

' '

both Modesty and Bashfulness.] An. Pr. 1. 5, 26 b 34.

Third Figure, idv Se tw auVw to ]xev ttovtI to Se jmySevl
vwdp^rj, rj a/zc/xo 7ravTt rj fxrjSevL, to jxev a^rjfia to tolovtov
/caXw TpLTOv, fxeaov S' iv avTU) Xeya) kclO ov a/xc/xo Ta kclty]-

yopovfxeva, aKpa Se to KaTrjyopov/Jieva, fiel^ov S' ditpov to

iroppwTepov tov fjbecrov, cXottov Se to iyyvTepov. TL0eTaL Se
to fieaov e(x) jjlIv twv aKpojv, eo~^aTOv Se Trj OecreL. [The
middle term is 'last' in position because it is the narrow-
est in extension of the three notions. Thus
in reasoning
Mercury is not solid, Mercury isa Metal Some :

metals are not Solids Mercury is evidently smaller than

6
Metals' and 'Solids/ and so last in position and outside
or after the extremes.]
More briefly Aristotle says : tjj tov fxecrov OeaeL yvupLov-
 LOGIC. 39

fjiV to cr^rj/ma... dv ay kyj yap to /xecroi/ iv afxcf>OTepats (ppo-

Tacrtcriv) virapyziv iv dnraai rots cr^fJiao'Lv. idv pXv ovv
KaTrjyopfj Kal KaTrjyoprJTai to jxiaov, rj avTo fiev KaTrjyopfj
a\\o S' Ikclvov aTrapvrjTai, to 7rpojTov ecrrat a^rj/xa. idv Sk
Kal KaTrjyopfj Kal a7rapvrJTaL diro twos, to pbicrov (i.e. 2nd
Figure)* idv 8' aAAa iKetvov KaTrjyoprjT at, rj to jxkv a7rapvrj-
Tai to he KaTrjyoprjT at, to eax^rov. An. Pr. I. 32, 47*39.
3
TO fXV OVV KaTa<f>aTLKOV TO Ka06XoV Sid TOV TTpWTOV
o~x7]fjLaTOs heiKWTai jaovov, koX hid tovtov /xova^cos. Anal.
Pr. I. 42 b 33.
26,
ov ycveTac Kara^artKO? crvWoyto-jJids Sid tovtov tov crffl-
/xaros (the second), aAAa 7toVtS o-TeprjTiKol, Kal ol KaOoXov
Kal ol Kara fiepos. An. Pr. I. 5, 28 a 8.
o~vXXoyio~acr6ai to KaOoXov Sid tovtov tov o-yrjjxaTO<; (i. e.
the third figure) ovk 'icrTat, ovt aTeprjTtKov oirre KaTa<fiaTiKOv.
a
An. Pr. 1. 6, 2 9 16.

18. The first figure as corresponding more than

other figures with the natural order of phenomena, be-
cause its middle term really lies between the two extremes,
is regarded by Aristotle as the typical form of syllogistic
reasoning, and as therefore preeminently cogent and
conclusive. It is therefore perfect (reAetos): the other
which the
figures give imperfect syllogisms (aVeXeis), in
conclusion does not follow thus necessarily from the
1
premisses . Hence Aristotle requires to prove the validity
of the reasoning in the second and third figures, and he
does so by shewing that tenable arguments in these
can be represented as reasonings in the first figure
figures
and so be proved conclusive (irepaivovTat, TeXetovvTat) 2 .

Reduction, by which syllogisms of the latter figures are

thus confirmed and shewn valid, may be effected in two
ways first, Ostensively (SeiKTiKm), i.e. by so applying
conversion as to bring a mood of a later figure into the
form of the first, or, per Impossible (Sid tov aSwarou), by
40 LOGIC.

assuming the falsity of the conclusion and finding that

the assumption leads to a result incompatible with the
8
premisses .

The chief rules of syllogism enunciated by Aristotle

are (i) one premiss must be affirmative, (2) one premiss
must be universal, (3) terms taken universally in the con-
clusion must have been previously distributed in the
4
premisses .

1
reXetoi/ filv ovv KaXuj o-uAAoytoyxoV tov fxrjSevos aiWov
7rpo(r$6fJLVov irapd rot elXrjpijxiva 7rpos to <fcavrjvaL to dvay-
kolov (which needs nothing beyond the facts stated in the
premisses to bring out the conclusiveness of the result),
dreXr} Se tov irpoo-heo^evov 7) eVos rj 7rA.toi/a)v, a cart fxkv
aVay/cata Sta tmv v7roKcifievo)v oputv, ov jjltjv elXyjirTai Sta
7rporao-0)v. An. Pr. I. I, 24 b 2 2.
2
SrjXov Se kolL 6tl 7rdvTes ol iv olvtco (the first figure),
cnAAoytcr/xot reAetot eto~f iravTts yap eVtTeAoiWat Sta twv
i dpxfjs Xr](f>6ivT(i)v {Anal. Pr. 1. 4, 26^30). reAetos ixkv ovv
ovk ecrrat avXXoyicrjJLOs ovSafjLws iv tovtu) tw axqfAOLTi (i.e.
s
the second). An. Pr. 1. 5, 27 1.
3
cjyavpov Se /cat otl TraVres ol aVeXets cnAXoytcr/xot
reXetowrat Sta tov irpMTOV cr^/mro?. rj yap SetKTt/coos r) Sta
tov dSvvaTOV 7TpaivovTai 7rdvTs' a/x^orepws Se ytvcTat to
7Tp(J)TOV CTxfjfJLa, Set/CTtKO)? jJLV TeXetOV/XeVa)!/, OTL Sta TYJS dvTL-
o~Tpo<f>rjs iirtpatvovTO 7rdVres, rj S' dvTLO-Tpocj>r) to irp&TOV
eVotet cr^/xa, Sta Se tov dSwdrov SetKW/xeVaw, otl TeOevTOS
tov ij/evSovs (after assuming the falsity of the original
conclusion and taking its contradictory as true to be the
premiss of a new syllogism) 6 orvXXoyLo-fxds ytVerat Sta tov
irpwTov cr^r)fjiaTO<;' olov iv rw reXevrata), et to A /cat to
B 7ravTt T<3 r wap^ct, otl to A rtvt r<3 B virdp^w et

yap fJLTjSevi, B iravTL t<3

to Se T, ouSei/t t<5 Y to A* dXX rjv

-rravTi' (i.e. in the original premisses), d/xotws Se Kat eVt

twv dXXuv. An. Pr. 1. 7, 29 s 30. The example is
All C is A
All C is B,
,\ Some B is A.
 LOGIC. 41

For if not, suppose it false ; then its contradictory must

be true, i.e.
No B is A But we had before
All C is B,
.". No C is A the contrary
of our original major.
7ravTS yap ol Sta rov dSwdrov
irepatvovTes to /jlzv
xf/evftos o-vXkoyitflvrai (reason out a conclusion which is

false) to 8' ef dpxV^ * virodiaews SetKvvovo-iv, otclv aSvva-

tov tl av/x/Baivrj ttJs dvTicfadaews TeOeicrjs, olov on acru/x-

jj.Tpos rj Sta/xerpos Sia to ycvecrOat tol irepiTTa tcra tol<s

a An. Pr.
dpTiois o-u/x/xerpou TeOeLo-rjs. 23, 4l 27. I.

8' CIS TO dSvVOLTOV CL7To8t^tS T^S StlKTLKrjS T(3

8ia<fiipU 7]

TiOivai o (3ov\Tai dvaip&v (i. e. the falsity of the conclu-

sion), dirdyovcra ets o/xoXoyovfji^vov i/'cvSos* r) 8e Scikti/o)
dp^Tai e ofJioXoyovfiivoyv 62^29.
6o-0)V. An. Pr. II. 14,
4
twv opwv
Iv diravTi (aiAAoytoyxa)) 8ei KaTYjyopLKov tlvol
ctvai kolI to KaOoXov virdpye.iv avev yap tov KaOoXov r) ovk
tcrTai o'vXXoyio'iJLOs f) ov 7rpos to Ket/xcvov, rj to i ap^s
aiTrjcrcTai. . . . lav pXv f)
to crv/X7Tpacr/xa KaOoXov, Kal tovs
opovs dvayKr) KaOoXov eivai, lav 8* ol opoi KaOoXov, ivSi\CTai
An. Pr, b
to cru/X7Tpao"/xa fJLr) etvat KaOoXov. I. 24, 4I 6.

19. Aristotle's Hypothetical Syllogism (o-iAXoy 107*05

c v7ro6io-U)i) is scarcely identical with the reasoning now
so called, but an argument in which something being
is

allowed to follow z/* something else is proved, a syllogism

isadduced to prove this condition and thereby by agree-
ment to establish the main position (to c apx^s) The 1
.

principle of hypothetical reasoning is distinctly enun-

ciated by Aristotle as follows : If two terms stand to one
another in such a relation that when the former is true
the latter necessarily is so, it follows that if the latter is

not, the former will not be either; but the existence of

the latter does not involve the existence of the former 2 .

<f>av.pov otl ol Sid rov dSvvaTOv a'vXXoyicrfJLol Std

tovtcdv 'iaovTai twv o-yrjfxaTwv. oxrairrcos Se Kal ol dXXot
 42 LOGIC.

wdvTes ot e v7ro6ecre(i)s. kv o,7racrt yap o fxev o~uXXoy 107x0$

yivTdL 7r/oo9 to /xeTaXa/x/Jaj/o'/xeyoi/ (the syllogism is framed
to prove the condition as a categorical statement) to 8'
e dpxfjs 7TpaivTai St o/xoXoytas 77 tivos dXXrjs v7to6ctcq)5.
6 8e tout' dXrjOes, iracrav a7ro8et^tv Kal 7rai/Ta o*uXXoyio7xoV
dvdyKYj yCveo-Oai Sia t/chwi/ too^ 7rpOLp rqfxv(x)v cr^/xaTa)i/.
tovtov Se Set^Oevros SrjXov w<$ a7ras T cnAXoyicr/xos 7rtT-
XeiTai Sia tov 7rpo')TOV o-^/xaTOS Kat dvdycTai (is reduced) ts
tous v TOVTco KadoXov avWoyLdfAOvs. An. Pr. I. 23, 41 a 36.
The hypothetical syllogism may best be understood
by taking a concrete illustration of it. A ofxoXoyia is
made that if man can be proved a spiritual being, it will
follow that the will is free. A syllogism is then framed
to prove the antecedent, and we get
Every being whose actions are inexplicable by merely
material agencies is spiritual.
Man is a being inexplicable by material agencies.
Therefore man is a spiritual being this conclusion :

being what Aristotle calls the /xeraXa/x/^aro/xeiw or cate-

gorical form of the assumption and in virtue of the agree- :

ment, it follows that the main question (to dp^yjs) viz.

The
2
will is free is established.
dXrjOwv pXv ovv ovk !o~ti xj/evSos crvWoyLo~ao~6ai, k
if/evSiov 8' o~tw dXrjOis, irXrjv ov Slotl aXX' oti [the conclu-
sion, true simply as matter of fact but not in virtue
i.e. 9 is
of the premisses] (An. Pr. 1. 2, 53 b 7) <f>avepov ovv otl &v
pXv rj to 0~vfJi7rpacrfJia \j/evSos, dvdyKrj, e wv 6 Xoyos ij/evSrj
t]/a6 rj TravTa rj evca, otclv o aArjues ovk avayKrj aArjues lvou

oi!t tI ovt irdvTa. aiTtov 8' oti otclv 8i;o c^tj oito> irpos
dXXrjXa wcttc OaTepov ovtos ef avayKrjs tivai OaTepov, tovtov
8' ovk dvayKY] eivau
fxrj ovtos pXv ovZ\ OaTepov ecrTat, oVtos

6aTpov. An. Pr. 11. 4, 57*36.

20. Syllogism is not only Deductive, reasoning

from whole to part; it is also Inductive, reasoning
from part to whole, and enabling us to detect the
I
universal and essential in the particular. Such Induction
(eVaywy^) is the method of proceeding from particular
 LOGIC, 43

instances to general uniformities, of finding the law amid

phenomena it is,
1
; when formally analyzed, the process
by which we prove the major or wider conception to be
a predicate of the middle or intermediate by means of
the minor term or particular instances. This minor
term itself must be conceived of as consisting of all the
instances
2
. No particular kinds of Induction are formu-
lated by Aristotle, but he has noticed incidentally the
principle of most of the " Experimental methods " and in
3
particular that of the method of concomitant variations .

1
kcu avWoyio-fios fiev ri icmv, eipYjTat irporepov ' eVa-
ycoyrj Se rj airo twv kolO kKaarov 7rt tol kclOoXov ec/>o8os, oilov

1 0"Tt KVJ3epV7]Tr]S O 7r6(7Ta/X^OS KpOLTLCTTOS KOU 7)VLO)(OS, KOll

oXtOS 1(Tt\v 6 7TtCTTa/XVOS 7T0t KOL(TTOV OLpLCTTOS (Top. I. 12,

I05 a I2). rj Se tov 6/jlolov Oecopca ^pTJaifJios 7roo5 re tovs
eVa/crt/covs Xoyovs . . StoVt rfj Koff e/cacrra eVt tcov ofjuotiov

7ray(x)yfjto kcl9o\ov atou/xei/ lirdyeiv' ov yap paStoV icrTtv

lirdymv pr) etSoVas rd o/jLoca. Top. I. 1 8, lo8 b 7.
lirayoyy-rj fxkv ovv ecrTi Kal 6 e eVayooy^s criAAoytoyxo?

to Sta tov eTtpov OcLTtpov OiKpov Tip /xeVa) o-vXXoyio~ao$'at,

olov et T&v AY ixicrov to B, Sta tov Y Setat to A tco
B virdp-^ov' ovT<x) yap TToiov^aOa ra? eVayooyas. olov eWco
to
to
A
kglQ'
fJLaKpopLov, to
tKacTTOv [AaKpo/Siov,
S' ec/>' w B to
olov
^0X771/ M
dv6p(t)7ros
*X 0V > *4? <? Se P
Kal i7T7ro5 /cat
t][Aiovo<s. to) Sr) V
A* (7raV yap to a^oXov
oXa) virdpyzi to
fxaKpo(3iov)' dXXd
B, to fxrj e^eu/ X^V V > ttclvtI
Kal to
virdpx^ t<5 r. et ov avTcaTpicket to T tw B /cat [xtj v-rrcp-

TtVt to lmctov, avdyKrj to A tw B V7rdp\LV. Se'Set/cTat -yap

irpoTepov oTt av ovo arTa tco avTip virap^rj /cat 7rpos uaTpov
aVT&V aVTLTTp4(f>r] TO OLKpOV, OTt TO) dvTLO-TpiifioVTL Kal 6aTpOV
virdpiat tcov KaTrjyopovfJLV(t)v. Set Se voeiv to V to i
a7ravTcov tcov KaO ocaoToi/ o~vyKtfJLVOv' tf ydp lirayoiyrj Sta
7ravTiov. Icttl $ 6 tolovtos oruXXoy 107x09 Trjs 7rpiOT7)s /cat
dfieo-ov 7rpoTacrca)s {i.e. induction rests upon some im-
mediate perception) 3>v ixkv yap Ivti fjuio-ov Sid tov /jlco-ov
o o-vXXoyto-fxos, (Sv Se fxy ecrTt, 8t' i7rayioyrjs. An. Pr. II. 23,
68b 15.
44 LOGIC.

Induction then proves the major of the middle by-

means of the minor: proves, e.g., that longevity (major
term) is an attribute of absence of gall (middle) by
means of particular gall-less animals which are long-lived.
Formally then Induction is a syllogism in the third
figure, according to which we argue
All C is A All C is B:
.-. All B is A.
: A syllogism
thus stated is of course logically invalid its cogency :

depends on the fact that not only all C is B but also all
B is C. Induction then is to Aristotle an application of
the Substitution of Similars, and depends on the converti-
bility of terms with one another. " For," he writes
above, " it has been shewn before, viz. in the preceding

chapter, that if two attributes (A and B) attach to the

same third term (C), and the minor (to aKpov) (C) is con-
vertible with one of them (B), it follows that the other
attribute (A) will also attach to the term thus conver-
tible (B)." Thus, to take again Aristotle's Illustration,
let A
= longevity, B = absence of gall, C = particular long-
lived animals. The reasoning we have seen is
All C is A (man, horse, mule, &c. are long-lived).
All C is B (man, horse, mule, &c. are gall-less).
Now here the two attributes A and B attach to the same
third term C. But further, the minor C is convertible
with one of these terms, viz. B, i.e. every gall-less animal
is also one or other of the long-lived animals it follows :

therefore that A
will be a predicate of B, i. e. every gall-
less animal will be also long-lived.
3
t \l\v yap olkoXovOcl rrj rov vTTOKeifxivov 7riSoo"t r) tov
<tv jul fie /3rj kotos 7u8oo-i5, 8rj\ov otl o-v/JbfiifirjKev (i.e. it is
evidently a causal consequence)* et Se urj aKoXovdti, ov
Top. II. IO, H5 3.
a
crvfxfiefirjKev.

21. Enthymeme and Example (irapa-

(ei/^u/x^a)
Sety/xa) are the rhetorical forms of syllogism and induc-
tion \ Enthymeme is a syllogism of which the premisses
are maxims generally true (eUoTa), or facts which indi-
cate the existence of some other fact (o^cta) : and which
 LOGIC. 45
2
as generally understood would be left unstated . Ex-
ample is the process in which " the major term is proved
to belong to the middle term by a term like the minor
term" it is in short, reasoning from "particular to par-
3
ticular " (ok /xe'pos tt/oos /xepos) , but Aristotle sees that
such reasoning is only possible in so far as we univer-
salize the peculiar instance, and he therefore treats it as
the appendage of a syllogism.

1
kolXq) 8' ivOvfJLrjfjLa /xev prjToptKOV o~vXXoytorfji6v 1 irapa-
Seiy/xa Sc Trayu>yrjv prjTopuKrjv. Rhet. I. 2, 1356^ 4.
2
ctKos Se koll (jrjjJLeiov ov tolvtov ecrrtv, aAAa to pXv
t/cos io~TL TrpoTacrts ev$oos. 6 yap 005 iwl to ttoXv lctolo-iv

ovto) ycvofievov rj ov rj fxrj ov, tovt laTtv et/co?, olov to fuaeiv

tovs <f)8ovovvTas rj to <iA.u/ tovs ipoifJievovs. arjixeiov Se
fiovXtTai eu/ai 7rporacrt5 air o$lktlkt} aVay/ccua f) v8oos* ov
yap ovtos Zcttlv r) ov yzvojxevov irpoTtpov r) vo-Ttpov yeyove
to 7r/oay/xa, tovto crty/xetoV ecrrt tov yeyovevau r) eti/at. ivOv-
jjLrjfjLa fjiev ovv icrrl en; AAoy 107x0s i lk6to)V r) o~r}fJLLU)V, Xafx-
/3dvTaL Se to o-rjjjLeiov rpt^c3?, oVa^co? kol to fjuiaov iv rots
cryr\\Jiao'iv . . .olov to piXv Sei^ai Kvovcrav Sia to ydXa ^x LV *K
tov irpojTov cr^Ty/xaTOs* fitcrov yap to yaAa ^X (ELV * AflClh Pt.
a
11. 27, 7o 2.
3
irapa&uyixa 8' Io~t\v OTav to) /xecro) to aKpov VTrdp^ov
SeixOrj Std tov ojjlolov t<3 t/oito). [To take Aristotle's in-
stance, we reason that because the war between Thebes
and Phocis was a war between neighbours and an evil,
therefore the war between Athens and Thebes, being
also a war between neighbours, will in all probability be
also an evil. Thus out of the one parallel case the
war between Thebes and Phocis we form the general
proposition
All wars between neighbours are evils to
this we add the minor
The war between Athens and
Thebes is a war between neighbours and thence arrive
at the conclusion that the war between Athens and Thebes
will be likewise an evil.] <f>avpov ovv otl to Ttapd^iy^d
icTTLV OVT (OS [JLtpOS TTpOS 0X0V (induction) OVT toS 0X0V 7TpOS
46 LOGIC.

fiepos (deduction) a\A' cJs /xep ? 7rpos p,epS, oral/ a/x<a> fxlv
rj V7TO TOLVTO, yVWpifJLOV & 6aTpOV. KCU LOL(f>pei TTJS 7Tay(D-

y^5, ort 77 fJLv e diravrdyv rwv ard/xwv to aKpov iSeuKvvev

virdp-^iv T(? fxeaco kcu 7rpos to aKpov ov crvvYJ7rT tov crvWo-
y 107x0V, to 8e /cat owdVrci [that is, out of the particular
instance it forms a general proposition to which as
major premiss it applies the new instance] koX ovk
d-nravToiv SetKvvo-Lv. Anal. Pr. n. 24,68^*38.

22. Syllogism and Induction correspond to the two

great aspects of existence or ways in which things are
known. Things may be looked at either in themselves
as they present themselves, so speak, to to the creative
mind or as they present themselves to us; thus in
mathematics it is the point which stands absolutely first

((pvo-et 7TpoTpov), the superficies or solid figure which is

first relatively to us (7rpos tJ/juxs irpoTtpov) \ Syllogism cor-

responds with the first of these aspects of the objects of
knowledge it starts with the law or cause, and reasons
forward to the application or effect : Induction begins
with facts of personal experience and reasons backward
2
to the cause or principle . But knowledge, properly so
called, lies in explaining things by reference to what is

absolutely prior, and in seeing that their causes lead

3
necessarily to particular effects .

1
irpoTtpa S' eoTt koX yi/oopi/Awrcpa Stews' oi> yap tolvtov
irpoTtpov ttJ cf>vo~et /cat 7rpos 77/Aas irpoTepov, ovoe yi/coptp-arrepoi/
Kai yvwp i/xarrcpov. Ae'ya) 8e 7rpos ?7/xas ptv npoTepa /cat
rjixiv

yv<i)pLfJuoTpa ra iyyvrepov ttJs aio^'crews, a7rXws Se 7rporpa

i<al yvu)pijJL(oTpa Ta 7roppwTpov. <xti 8e 7roppa>TaTa) fxkv rd

KaOoXov ftaXtcrra, iyyvTaTO) 8e ra kolO* CKaora. {Anal. Post.

b aVAws fxkv ovv yvtopifJuoTepov to TrpoTtpov
I. 2, 7l 33.)
rov vcrTtpov, olov crTtyjxrj ypa/xp^s koll ypafifirj iTriiriZov

...yjjuv S' aVaVaAii/ iviOTt cru/x/^aiVei* p,aA.iora yap to crTepeov

 LOGIC. 47

TO 8' .7T L7T .8oV fXOiXXoV T7j$ ypa/XfXrjs,

VTTO T7JV ataOrj(TLV 7Tt7TT6,
ypafjifjirj 8k arjueiov (jlolXXov. Top. VI. 4, I4I b 6.
2
Tpoirov TLvd dvTiKetTat y iTraywyr) t<3 crvXXoytcr/X(o. o
/Aei/ yap Sia rov pbiaov to aKpov tw rptra) Sciia/vcriv, 97 Se
SlCL TOl) TpLTOV TO CLKpOV T(p /X0"(i). cftVCTtL fXeV OLV 7TpOTpOS
kcu yi/oopi/xwTcpos d S(,a rov /xecrov o-vXXoyio-fxos, T^ytttv S'

evapyecrrepos d Sia t^s 7rayu)y^s. Anal. Pr. II. 23, 68 b 32.

a7rAa)S /x-ev ow fikXTiov to St a twv 7rpoTepa)i/ tci
3
WTcpa
Tretpao-Oai yvwpi^tw' iTriaTrjixoviKWTepov yap to toiovtov
icTTiv {Top. VI. 4, I41
b 7rio-Tacr#a6 8e oidp.#' eKacrroi'
15).
a7rA.uk, aAXa /xtJ toV aocjacrTtKOV Tpoirov tov kcltol o-iyx/^e/^Acdg,
oTav tt^v t* atTtav otw/xe^a yivwo~Kiv Si* 171/ to 7rpayp,a Icttlv,

otl iKewov oXt'mx Ictc, koX fxr) ivSi^ecrOat tovt aAAcos ^CtV.
^4^. /W. 1. 2, 7i 9-
b

23. Logical Proof, or aVo'Set^t?, is reached only when

things are regarded from the standpoint of what is thus
absolutely first for induction indicates a law but does
not prove it
1
and the distinction between Apodeictic
and Dialectic just lies in the fact that whereas Apodeictic
takes us back to what is primarily and necessarily true,
Dialectic merely lands us in probabilities and leaves us
2
to choose between possible alternatives . True logical
proof accordingly postulates the existence of universals. ,
Ideas in Plato's sense as supra-sensible entities may not
exist, but general predicables are necessary for demonstra-
tion : the individual in fact cannot as such be the subject
3
of demonstration . This universal or kol66Xov, however,
is not merely what is common or generally applicable
(kolvov or koto! ttolvtos) : it is also the essential attribute
which holds good of the most rudimentary form in which
the generic conception shews itself 4 So conceived the .

universal is equivalent to the cause, and this in turn

becomes the middle term of a syllogism. Genuine
logical proof then lies in tracing out by syllogistic reason-
4$ LOGIC.

ing the essential attributes attaching to some thing or

6
notion .

1
fxavddvojuiev r) 7raycoy^ 77 aVoSet^et. eart 8'
77 fxev
aTroSctfts K 7W kolOoXov, r] 8' eirayuiyr) Ik twv Kara fxipos.
aZvvaTov 8c rd kolOoXov 6eu>prjo~ai (xyj 8t' eVaytoyTys (An. Post.
a
I. 13, 8l 38) ouSe yap d eVaywi/ tcrtos a7ro8etKvvcru/, aXX'
o/Aws SrjXol n b
(.^72. ./W. II. 5, 9l 33). aVdSet^tv Se Xe'yco
(TvWoytcrfxov lincrTyjixoviKOv. el tolvvv ecrrt to e7rt'crTacr0at

olov eOc/jitv (i.e. if it involve a knowledge through causes

as necessarily producing certain effects) dvdyK-q ko1 rrjv
airoSeiKTLKrjv hricrTr]\xr)v e dXrjOcov r eti/at /cat 7rpwT0)v Kat
afAo~<i)v Kat yv(x)pLfJUx>Tp(i)v Kat 7rp0Tepwv Kat atTfW tov cny/,-

Trepdo-fiaTos. An. Post. I. 2, 7i b i8.

2
^PX 7? ?' ecTTtv aVoSet^etos rrpoTao-is djJLtcros, a/xecros 8c

77s /at; ccrTtr (XXX77 irporepa. 7rporacrts 8' cortr aVoc/)dVcrea)S

TO TpOV [JLOQIOV, V KdO* kvOS, SiaXKTtK77 /XCV 77 6fJLOL(l>S \afL-
/3avovora oiroTepovovv, diroheiKTtKr) Se 7; toptayxeVco? Odrepov,
OTL d\r]9is. CX7TOc/)aT/0"tS 8c aVTtcf)d(TWS 07rOTpOVOVV [JLOpLOV
(An. Post. 1. 2, 72 a 8). [Cp. ^.
TV. 1. 1, 24^32, where
the apodeictic proposition is said to be the definite
assertion of one side of a disjunctive proposition (X^i/as
Oaripov /uioptov ttjs ai/rtc/xxcrctos), whereas the dialectical is
the interrogation of a disjunctive proposition.] aVdSet^ts
puev ovv icrrlv otclv e aXr)6(ov Kat irpwrayv o cruXXoytcryxos
77, 77 ck TOtovrcav a Sta tlv<dv 7rpcorwv Kat dXrjOojv rrjq Trept
aiJra yvcocrea)? t?7V cLp^rjv ecXrjtfiev' StaXeKTtKos Se crvXXoytcr-
p,dg d e eVSda>i/ crvWoyL^o/JLCvos. Top. I. 1, loo a 2 7.
3
1877 /zev oiw etrat rj ev ri rrapd rd iroXXd ovk dvdyK-q,

el aVdSetfts carat, elvcu fxevTOL ev Kara 7roXX<oV dXrj6e<s ehrelv

dvdyKrj' ov yap carat to kolOoXov dv fir) tovto fj' edv Se to

KaOoXov puij rj, to jxeaov ovk carat, wcrr' ovS' aVdSetfts. An.
a
Post. i. 11, 77 5- Cp. Meta. Z, 15, 103^27, and B. 4,
a
999 26.
4
Ka^dXov Se Xcya) o aV Kara 7ra]/Tos tc virdpyrj Kat Ka0'
avTO Kat rj olvto. cfaav epov apa ort ocra kolOoXov, el; avay Kt]%

virdp^et rots 7rpayp,acrtv, to Ka^' avrd Se Kat 17 avTO ravrov*

otoi> kolO' avTrjv Trj ypapLfxrj virdp^et crTiyp^rj Kat to ev6v' Kat
 LOGIC. 49

yap rj ypafjLfjLij. to KaOoXov 8c virapx^L Tore, orav cVl tov

tvvovtos kcu irpwTov $LKvvr]TaL Thus, as Aristotle illus-
trates, the having of its angles equal to two right angles
is an universal attribute of the triangle, because it does
not apply to any figure before we come to the triangle
and so applies to it first (eVt irpdrov), and further it is an
attribute which holds good of any triangle whatever (cVi
tov rvxovros). Anal. Post. i. 4, 73 b 26.
5
77 apa KaOoXov, fxdXXov i7no-rrjTa r] f) Kara /xepo?. airo-
SetKrd apa fxaXXov rd KaOoXov fiakicrra Sc SrjXov otl rj
.

KaOoXov KVptO)Tpa, OTL TtoV 7TpOTaO~<j01/ T7JV fJLeV 7TpOTpaV

vcripav koI e^o/xcv Svvd[JLL...Kal
e^oi/Ts i'oyxcv 7ra)s /cat tt^v
-q fxkv KaOoXov votjtt], t] Se Kara fxipos ets alcrOrjcnv reXevra
(Anal. Post. I. 24, 86 a 7). to 8e KaOoXov tl/mov otl 877X01
to aiTiov (88 a 5). Tt t rj aVoSei^is fxiv Icttl o~vXXoyio"ixo$
Sct/CTtKOs atrtas /cat tov 8ta rt, to KaOoXov 8' aiTiarrepoj/* <5

yap KaQ* avTO virdp^ei tl, tovto avTO avVw oXtiov* to Sc KaOo-
Xov irp&TOV' oUtiov apa to KaOoXov. wottc Kal 77 a7roSciis
fieXTtitiv' fxaXXov yap tov aiTtov koX tov 8ia tl iaTtv (85^23).

77 fxkv yap aVo'Sci^is Icttl T(ov ocra virdpyei KaO* avra tols
Trpayfxaat (84 a Il).

24. Knowledge therefore to be truly scientific (cVt-

must involve an insight into the causes of pheno-
o-TTjfjirj)

mena and give, as distinguished from mere opinion,

:

1
absolutely certain and necessary results Scientific thus .

differs from empirical knowledge (epareipia) as a know-

ledge of things as universal and in relation to their causes

differs from a knowledge of particular and unexplained
2
facts .Science is thus opposed to sense-perception
for, although sense-perception generally (aio-Orjo-ts) deals
/
with an object as determined by qualities and so
universalized (toioVSc), it is in its actual exercise (atV-
OdvecrOat) limited to particular impressions which are
'now' and 'here' 3 . So far then as the cause is repre-
sented by the universalizing middle term, the questions of
w. A
50 LOGIC.

science resolve themselves into a search for middle terms.

Thus the question, Does a thing exist (el Io-tl) ? and the
question, Does a fact take place in such and such a
manner (to otl)? represent the inquiry, Is there oris there
not a middle term ? The question, What is the reason of
the fact (to Sio'ti) ? and the question, What is its essential
nature (tl Io-tlv)? constitute a search after the middle
4
term . Scientific Genius then just lies in a readiness at
finding out the middle term which will at once supply the
causal link and bring the fact to be explained into
5
connection with cognate phenomena . And for this pur-
pose the first figure of syllogism as developing at once
the ground and the essential character of a phenomenon
6
is preeminently useful .

to 8' tov Sofacrrov Kal

7ncrTrjT6v Kol Itt lcttj p,yi Stacj>epeL
So'ftys, otl 77 [lev i7ncrT7]fjir] dvayKOLLtoV, TO 8'
KaOoXov KOL Sl
dvay kcllov ovk evSe^eTaL aXXcos e^eLV (as the object of Soa
An. b
can). Post. 33, 88 3o.
1.
2
TO 8' OTL Sta<ppL KOL TO SlOTL e7TLCTTaO'6aL (All. Post. I.
a2 ol fxlv jap TO OTL fxkv SiOTL 8'
13, 78 2). fJL7TLpOL lOrOLCTL,

ovk LaacTLV (Meta. A. I. 981*29). otl fxev yap tol eXKrj to,
7repL(j>eprj j3paSvTepov i'yiaTcu, toi5 laTpov elSevaL, Slotl Se
tov An. Post. a
yd)fjiTpov. 1. 13, 79 i5.
tov o otto Tvyr\<$ ovk eo-TLV ZTTio-Trjixri ol a/7roo circus.
ovt yap cos avayKolov ovQ* cos e7rl to 7toXv to dwo tvv^s
io~TLV, dXXd to 7rapa TavTa yLVOfxevov ovSe St cucr&ycrecos
ecrTLV iTTLVTao-QaL. el yap
tov TOLOvSe Kal ecrTLV 7] alcrOrjo-LS
Kal ixrj TovSe twos, dXX' alo-Qdveo~6aL ye avayKolov ToSe tl
Kal 7rov Kal vvv. to Se KaOoXov Kal e7rt ttolo-lv aSvvaTov
b
alo-6dveo~6aL (An. Post. 1. 31, 87 i9). Itl Se tv alaOyj-
crew ovSefxiav yyovfxeOa eXvaL cro<pLav' KatTOL /cuoicotcxtcu
y elcrlv avTaL tcov Ka9* eKacrTa yi/cocreis* aXX' ov Xeyovo~L to
Sta tl irepl ouSei/os, oXov Sta tl Oep/mov to 7t9o, aXXa [xovov
otl Oep/xov (Meta. A. I, 98l b Io). Kal yap alcrOaveTai fxev to
KaQ' Kacr7W, 7]
8' ato-OrjcTLS tov KaOoXov eo~TLV, oXov av6pi07rov9
 LOGIC. 51

aXX' ov KaXXCov dv6pw7rov [cp. 27, 4]. An. Post. II. 19,
a
ioo i6.
4
ra icrrw tcra rov dpiO^ov barairep kiri-
fcrjTOVfievd
(TTajLLeOa. ^Tov/xev Se Tcrrapa, to otl, to Slotl, el Zcttl, tl
0"TLV. OTOLV [XeV ydp 7TOTpOV ToSe rj ToSe ^rjTCOjiLeV, 6S CLpl0-
fxov OivTes (reducing our results to numbers), olov iroTepov
/CACt7Tt O 7]AlOS 7] OV, TO OTL ^rjTOV/XeV . . , OTOLV 0 L0(i)[AV TO
OTL, TO SloTL t,7]TOVfJLV oloV ClSoTCS OTL IkXuITU KOLL OTL KLVL-
9

toll r] yrj, to Slotl k\L7Tl r) Slotl klvltoli ^rjTOVfxev. Tavra

fxev ovv ourcog, 4Via S' a\\ov Tpoirov rjTOVfxev, olov el ecrTLV rj
/x->7 ecrrt KevTavpos r) ueos. to o l zcttlv rj fJLrj a7rAa)s Acyco,
aAA' ouk ci Xeu/cos 77 fxrj. yvovTes Se otl eaTL, tl coti >tjtov-
fXeV, olov TL OVV icTTL OeOS 7] TL eCTTLV dv6pU)7TO<S.
^rjTOvfjiev Se, otolv p.ev qr<OfiV to otl to el eaTiv aVXcos,
r)

ap o~tl fxecrov clvtov r) ovk zcttlv otolv be yvovTes r) to otl r)

1 eaTLV 7] TO 7TL [AepOVS 7) TO a7rAa)S, TTClKlV TO Ota TL L,7]TU>-

fJLCV 7) TO TL IO'TL, TOT ,7]TOVfMV TL TO fJLeo-OV. [The question

of the otl because its inquiry is particular
is i-n-l fjiipovs
and definite, Is the moon being eclipsed ? the question
of the el o-tlv is aVAws because it asks simply generally,
Is there such and such a thing ?] crvpL^alveL dpa iv dird-
craL<$ tolls ^qTrjaeo'L t^Teiv r) el Io'tl fiecrov r) tl Zcttl to [lecrov.
to fiev yap oXtlov to fxeaov, iv diracrL Se tovto ^retrat. ap'
c/cXetVci ; ap' ecrTL tl oXtlov rj ov *
p-craravra yvovTS otl
eCTTL TL, TL OVV TOVT IcTTL fyjTOVfltV. TO ydp OLLTLOV TOV LVOLL
fJLrj toSI ^ toSI a\X' a7rXa)s tt)v ovo-lolv, i) to fir) aVXcios, aXXa
tl tcov /<a#' ai;TO Kara arvfJLfiefirjKOs, to /jlo~ov io~TLV. [That
rj

is, the fiicrov may as cause explain simply the existence of

an object, i. e. it may answer the question el Ivtl, or it

may express the cause why something or other is predi-
cated of an object either as an essential attribute or as a
resulting property.] Xeyw S\ to pkv aVXws to v-n-oKeLfjieuov
olov o-eXrjvrjv rj yrjv rj tjXlov rj Tpiycavov, to Se tl eKXcLif/Lv
laoTrjTa avto-OTrjTa, el iv fxeo-(o rj /mrj [/. e. aVXws refers to the
simple existence or non-existence of a subject (v7tokl-
fxevov), tl shews how the predicate e/cXct^ts attaches to
o-eXrjvrj or the predicate IcroTrjTa to Tptyuvov]. iv dirao-L ydp
tovtols (fravepov icrTLV otl to olvto i&TL TO TL icrTL kou Sta TL

42
52 LOGIC,

IcTTLV. TL IcTTlV kXcL\J/L<; J (TTp7](Ti? tjxtiTOS (X7T0 (TeXrjVrjS VTTO

yrjs ai/rt</>pa^0)?. Sia tl zcttlv e/cXcti^tg, rj 8ia ri IkXutt^l

7] creXyjvr] ; Std to aTroXt'nrtiv to <ojs dvTufipaTTovar]*; rrjs
yrjs. tl i<TTL o-vfjLcJHtiVLa ; Xoyos dpiQfxiov iv dfet r) /3apt.
Sia tl <JVfx<j>ovzL to 6v t<5 /3apei ; 8x to Aoyov e^ctv dpL0-
b
fiwv to ov /cat. to (3apv. An. Post. II. i, 8c) 23.
5 8'
?? dyyivoLa Zcttlv cv&toxlcl tis ev acrK7rTa) XP V(J? T v
fJLtaov, olov 6 Tts iScov OTt ?; aeXrjvr) to Xa^nrpov del e^ct 7rpos
toV tjXlov, Ta^i) ivevorjae Sia ti tovto, 6Vt Sta to Xd(JL7TLV oVo
b
ton ^Aiov. ^4/z. ./W. I. 34, 89 io.
6
T(3v 8 c crxqpLaToyv 7T60~t^/xov6kov fJidXicrTa to 7rp wtoV
o*Ttv. 77 yap oAcos 17 ols 7ri to woXv kcu iv tois 7rA.io~TOis
Sta TCUTOU TOV 0~XVlJLaT0 ^ O T V StOTt CTvXXoyLCTJLLO^ CITOL TTJV . . .

tov tl icrTLv i7no'Ti]fxr]v Sia fjiovov tovtov Orjpevcrai Svvoltov.

iv fxev yap to) /xecra) axVfJLaTL v ywerai KaT^yopiKos crvXXo-
yLCTfJLOS, 7] Sc TOU TL itfTLV i7rL0-T7]fJL7] KaTOLCJ)do-U)<S ' V Se TW
co-^aTa) (3rd figure) yu>Tcu //iv aAA.' ov kclOoXov, to Se ti
ecru twv Ka^oAov Icttlv. An. Post. i. 14, 79 ai 7

25. Defini tion (op torsos) may be said to be at once

the beginning and the end of syllogism and of sci entific

knowledge \ Such definition may be either real or nomi-

nal it may, that is, either state what a thing really is,

or merely explain its common acceptation

1
but it is

essentially a yywpto-/xos ovcrtas, an explanation of the

tl rjv uvaL of an object: and in describing what a thing
2
is it should also state why it is . Whereas then most
definitions are merely like syllogistic conclusions, without
any indication of the premisses on which they rest, the
true definition explains the process by which the result
has been obtained it defines for instance the squaring
of a figure not merely as the construction of an equi-
lateral rectangular figure equal to a figure of which the
sides are unequal, but as the finding of a mean propor-
3
tional (Euclid, 11. 14, and vi. 13 ). Nor should defi-
 LOGIC. 53

nitions content themselves with a mere abstract statement

of the substance : a knowledge of the properties (vvfifit-

(SrjKOTa) of bodies often throws important light upon the

4
substance .

<TTIV O OptO-flOS 7} apXV a7TOOfcg<l)S rj a7roOltS U <TL

Stacjiipovo-a (differing in the form of statement) 7) arojmi-
b
paa/Jid tl aVoSetJecos. (An. Post. I. 8, 75 3 T *) optcr//,os fxkv

yap tov tl ecrrt /cat ovcrtas* al 8' aVoSet^ets cfaaLVovTCu iracrai

vttot 16 [Xvai kolI Xafx^avovaaL to tl io~TLV, olov at fxaOrj/jLaTi-
KOLL TL fJLOVOLS KOLL TL TO 7TpLTTOV KOLL at oAA<U OjAOLWS. Atl.
b
Post. 11. 3, 90 3o.
2
SpLCfJios AeycTat etrat Aoyos tov tl io-Tt.
S' 7Ti8?7

<j>avp6v otl 6 /xeV tls carat Aoyos TOV tl o~7}fiawi to ovo/xa

7) Aoyos eVepos ovoixaTioSrjs, olov to tl arj/jLatveL tl Icttlv 77
TpLy(i)VOV. 07Tp )(OVTS OTL <XTl, ,7]T0VjJLCV Sta TL eOTtV...tS
fXv Sr) opos early opov o etp^/xeVos, aAAos ccttIv opos Aoyos
8y]\(qv Sta tl Icttlv. wcrre o fxkv 7rp6Vepos cr^/xatVet /xeV,
LKVVO~L O OV, O O VO~TpOS <paVp0V OTL COTat OLOV a7TOOttS
tov tl icTTLy ty} OiaeL Sta<epaH/ t?Js a7ro8et^0)9. Stac^epet yap
cl7TLV Sta Tt fipOVTa Kal TL 0~Tt fipOVTlj. ipL jdp OVTO) JULV

StoVt' a7rocr(3ivvvTaL to irvp iv vecfaeorL. tl 8' ecrrt fipovTrj ;

ij/ocfros airoo-jievvvixivov 7rvpos iv v <f>& lv. (Sore o avTOs

Aoyos aXXov Tpoirov AeycTat, Kal wSl p\v aVoSetfts crvvtyrjs,
(J8t Se OpLO-jJLOS. TL IvTLV OpOS fipOVTTJS l^O<oS iv v<t>0~l'
tovto 8 OTt t^s tov tl io~TLV aVoSeifecos crvfjiTrepacrfjLa. 6 Se
tojv a/xecro)!/ optoyxos #eo"ts eort tov tl o~tlv aVa7ro'SetKTOS.
b
An. Post. ii. 10, 93 29
OV TO OTL Set TOV SpLCTLKOV X6yOV SyjXovV, &0"JTp
fJLOVOV
01 rrXeLo-TOL twv wpuiv Xyovo~Lv, aXXa Kal ttjv airiav kvvirdp-
,
X^lv Kal ifxcfraLveo-OaL. vvv 8 wcnrep o^;/x7rpao/xa6 ol Xoyoc
twv opwi/ etcrtv* olov tl Icttl TCTpaywvtc/xos ; to laov kTepofxrj-
KL 6p6oyu>VLov LvaL lo~07rXvpov. 6 Se tolovtos opos Xoyo?
to{5 o-v/X7repacr/xaTOS. o Se A,eya)v otl ecrrtv o Terpaywi/tcr/xos
/xecr^s evpeo-ts, rou 7rpayp,aTOS Xeyet to atrtov. Xte ^4^. II.

2, 413*13-
ov fiovov to tl Icttl yvaWi xpyjo-Lfxov elvaL 7rpos
eoiKe 8'

to ^ecop^crat tcls amas twv o~vix^e(3rjKOT(ov Tats ovcrtaLS,

54 LOGIC.

wcnrcp Iv rot? fiaOy] fxacrt rt to ev6v koli KafJLTrvXov rj Tiypap. fir)

kolI c7rt7T8ov 7rpos to KaTtSctv 7rdcrats opOcus at tov Tptywvov

ycovtat urai, aXXa koli aVaVaAtv to) crvfJLf3cl3r]KOTa o-v/x/JaAXc-

rat fxiya jacpos 7rpos to ctSerat to tl Icttlv. 7TtSaV yap
^(OfXv aVoStSdvat Kara Trjv cfravTacriav irepl t&v avp,f3ef3rj-
KOTtoV 7] 7TOLVTtoV 7] TiOV 7rA.lOTtol/, TOT KOI 7Tpt TTJS OVO~L0L<5
$0fAV \iyew KaAAtcrra. De An. I. I, 402 b i6.

26. Scientific knowledge involves (i) a particular

ycVos v7TOKifjLvov or subject of invest igation ; (2) certain
-irdOr] or essential properties to be demonstrated; (3)
~
certain Koti/cTagtofytaTa or ge neral principles of all reaso n-
ing ?
1
Now true knowledge just lies in being able to
connect the essential properties of a conception with its

distinctive nature or peculiar principles : each sphere of

knowledge having principles peculiar to itself, so that we
cannot transfer the principles of one science to explain
the problems of another (ovk zo-tlv jitTafiavTa Sctat),

cannot e.g. reason about geometry on the data of arith-

metic, though the principles of geometry may be applied
2
to mechanics and those of arithmetic to harmonics .

Such particular principles cannot be proved any more

than can the general axiomatic truths on which all science
rests: the absence of logical training [oVatScwta] just
in fact lies in asking proof for what cannot be proved 3 .

Least of all can the peculiar principles of every science

be deduced from some great architectonic science as Plato
had imagined 4 . The question on the other hand about the
way in which the first principles of science are obtained
throws us back upon the question, How does knowledge
begin ? and so constitutes the Aristotelian Epistemology.
1
7Tt 8' c avdyKrjs xrrdp^u irepl Ikoo'tov yevos ocra kolO*
aura V7rap^t /cat r) kolo~tov, <pavepov otl ir ep\ t<2v kolO* olvtol
vTrapxovTWV at iirio'TrjfAOviKCu a7ro8cttslait c/c t(ov toiovtwv
 LOGIC. 55

L(rtv...ovK dpa t(TTLV e aWov

yevovs ^rajBavTa Setat, olov
to ycw/xcTptKOi/ dpiOiA-QTiKr}. rpia yap eo~TL tol ev rats aVo-
8eieo~Lv, ev fJLev to oltto^ikvv^vov to crvixTrepao-fJia, tovto S'
ecrrt to v7rdp^ov yevet tlvl K&ff avTo, ev Se rd aico/Aara,
diuSfjLOLTa 8' iarlv i d)V. rpirov to ycV os to vwoKeLfxevov, ov
rd rd Kaff avrd aVoSct^ts.
5i^\Te/<Nt,cw
OVV
irdO-q
Cl)V aTTO
fAeV
/cat

VO^Tat 7] 0ttS
crvfjLfSe/SrjKOTa SyjXol
\ > \ <*
TO. OLVTa LVOLL*
rj
? \
0)V 0 TO
\

yeVos Tpov wonrep dpiOfJLrjTLKrjs /cat yeoo/xcT/nas, ov/c OTt

T971/ dpcOfirjTLKyv aVoSetf tv ec/>ap/xocrat 7rt Ta Tots fteyeOeo'i

crvfjLJSejSrjKOTa, el ixrj Ta /JLeyeOrj aptfytot elo~L. An. Post.

i. 7, 75*28.
2
KacrTOV /cam o-iyx/Sc/^/cos, 6Vai/ /caT*
8' iTriVTrjfAtOa [xtj

c/cetvo ytvcocr/cco/xcv /ca# 6 virapyei, e/c twv apx&v tcov eKecvov rj

Klvo, olov to Svcrlv opOcus tcras ^cti/, a) V7rap^t kclO* avTO
to elprjfxevov, e/c twi/ dp^iov tojv tovtov. wctt ct /ca0 avTo
KOLKzivo virapyei w virap^et, avayKT) to piecrov ev Trj olvtyJ
uvyyeveia. elvai. t Se /x?7, aAA
Ta ap/xoi/t/ca St' apt#- (05

fjirjTiKrjs. i.e. we have essential and not merely empirical

knowledge of any truth when we know it of that to

which it belongs on the ground of the principles of this
thing as such e.g. true knowledge of the equality of the
:

angles of a triangle to two right angles is only reached

when we see that the equality follows from the principles
of the object (i.e. the triangle) to which the property in
question essentially belongs. An. Post. 1. 9, 76%
ecrri 8' (bv yp&VTai iv Tats aVoSet/cTt/cats 7rto-T?7/xats Ta

fxkv tSta eKao-T^s hr tcrTrJixrjs Ta Se ko ivd, KOivd Se kglt

ai/aAoytW, eVet -^prjo-ifjiov ye bcrov ev tw vtto ttjv emo-TtffJLrjv
yeVet. t'Sta [xev olov ypa/xp/>}i> etj/at TOtavSt /cat to evOv,
KOiva be olov to tcra airo torcov av acpeArj, otl to~a Ta Aot7ra.
An. Post. b
1. 10, 76 37.
3
e/c toutwv cfravepov otl ovk eaTtv aVoSet^at eKavTOv
a7rX<09, aXX rj Ik t<jjv dX\d tovtcdv at dp^ou
e/cacrTov dp^ojv.
e^ovo-t to kolvov. el Se cjyavepov tovto, (pavepov /cat OTt ovk
ecrTi Tas eKaaTOV tStas ap^as aTroSet^at. ecrovTai yap eKelvai
airavTiDV ap^at, Kat eirio-TTjiirj rj e/cetVooi/ /cvpta 7ravT<Dv. J 6*1$.
And speaking of the axiom of contradiction Aristotle
says it is through aVatSeWa that people attempt to
56 LOGIC.

prove it : ecru yap airai^evdia to fxrj jlvwctkuv tlvihv Set

tflTeiv a7ro8ct^tv kol twu>v ov Set. Meta. V 4, ioo6 a 5.

4
rjixw 8 c cf>afJLV ovre iracrav 7ncrTY][JLr]V a7roSetKTiKrjv
Lvai d\\d rrjv tc3v dfJLcro)v av<nr68eiKTov . . . Kal ov jxovov
kirto-rriii'qv aWd kgll dpfflv eTricrr^/x^s cTvai rivd <a/xcv, 77

tovs opovs yi/a)pto/>ii/ (72^17). apx7/ & tcrrtv aTroSet^coos

7rporacrf,s a/xecros, a/xecros 8c 77? p/ty ccrrtv C1AA77 7rporepa...
8'
dfJiio-ov dpxfjs crvWoyicrTiKfjs Oecriv (postulate) p,v Aeyoo
771/ /at} eon Seifai /X778' dvdyKYj t^eiv tov fJLa8r)o~OfJLvov tl* rjv
8' dvdyKrj ex* LV
v otlovv fjLa6r)o~d/JLCvov, ata)/*a* Oio-cws 8'
77 p,ei/ 07roTpovovv tQ>v p,opiW tt?s a7rocf>av crews Xafxfidvovcra,

0101/ Aeyco to euvau tl rj to /at? ctvat Tt, U7roc7cris, 97 avcu

a
tovtov opioyxos. ^4^. jR7j/. I. 2, 72 7.

27. Aristotle's theory of knowledge can hardly be

stated with any definiteness, because it would seem to
assign almost equal importance to sense and reason in
the building up of knowledge and there are many :

passages which might be adduced in support of the

sensationalist summary of Aristotle's Epistemology
"nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu."
The true Aristotelian theory, however, is probably more
completely expressed in the aphorism of Patricius
"Cognitio omnis a mente primam originem, a sensibus
exordium habet primum." For, as Aristotle sees, there
are almost equal difficulties in treating the principles of
knowledge as absolutely innate and as absolutely ac-
quired : since the former assumption implies that we,
without knowing it, possess a knowledge more absolutely
certain than demonstration, while the latter simply raises
afresh the difficulty it seeks to solve, and makes us ask
how in accordance with the principles of proof we can
know these principles unless some knowledge has itself
1
preceded . Aristotle accordingly treats knowledge as a
 LOGIC. 57
2
development from the impressions of sense , but recognises
that sense, as such, does not give us knowledge 3 and ,

thus while at one time regarding the formation of general

notions as proceeding from the less to the more extended,
he at another place conceives knowledge as proceeding
from the universal to the particular, the abstract to the
4
concrete and while again regarding eiray^yrj as the
:

means by which we acquire our earliest conceptions, he

does not fail upon the other hand to remind us that vovs,
or reason, is that of which eirayuyrj is merely the ex-
6
pression . The stages in Aristotle's conception of the
growth of knowledge are: i, Sense, 2, Memory, 3 ,

Experience, or "the formation of general conceptions in

6
the mind," 4 , Science, and 5 Art .

otl fxev ovv ovk evoe^erai eiricnacruai ol airooei^eoi^ fir)

ywixXTKOVTL ras 7rpa)Tas ap^ds Tas a/xecrous etpr)Tai rrporepov.

t<j)V 8 a/xecra)]/ rrjv yvciocrii/ ScaTroprjcreLev dv TLS...7roTepov ovk
evovcrai at el;ei<; eyyivovTai rj evovcrai \e\rj6acnv. el fxev Sr)

lypixev auras, droirov' auju^atvet yap aKpifiecrrepas e^ovras

yvojorcis aVoSet^ecos \av6dveiv. el 8e Xa/uij3dvofxev jmr) e^ovrcs
7TpOTpOV, 7TC0S OLV yVWpt^OLJJLCV KCU fJLav6dvOLfJLV K fJLrj
Trpov7rapxov(T7]s yvojcreuys ; dSvvarov yap, u>cnrep kol 7U rfjs
a7ro8ct^ca)9 eXeyofxev. cj>avepov roivvv otl ovt eyew olov re,
out dyvoovcri /cat /x^Se/xtW e^ovenv ew eyyivecrQai. An. Post.
II.
b 20.
19, 99
avdyKrj apa eyeiv /xev rtva Svvcljjlw, fifj TOiavrrjv 8' %X.UV
rj ecrrai rovroiv Tt/xiwrcpa Kar aKpifietav. (fxuverai Se tovto
ye iracruv virap^ov Tots a5oi9. e^ei yap Svyafuv crvjuLcfiVTOV
KpiriKrjv rjv KaXovcrtv atcrOrjcnv. evovcrrjs 8' alcrOr] crews rots
fxev tcov ^wwj/ iyytverai [xovrj rov alcrOrjjULaTOS, tois 8' ovk
eyyiveTai. ocroi% fxev ovv fxrj eyytverai, rj oXcos rj irepl a fxr)
eyyiverai, ovk ccrrt toutois yv&cris efco rou alcrOdvecrOaf ev
ots 8 ei/eo-riv alcrOavo/JLevois v TV faXQ' troWtov Se
%X LV * TL *-

TOiovTuv yivofjLevuv rjSrj 8ia<opa rts ytVcrai, ware rots fxev

5^ LOGIC.

ytvecrOai Xoyov Ik rfjs twv tolovtmv fxovfjs, rots Se pjq. c/c pXv
ovv cucr0?7crG)s ytVcrat ixvr]firj, wcnrep t7rop,v, K 8e /wqfirjs
ttoWolkls tov clvtov ytvo/xivr}s jJL7T Lp ta' at yap noXXal
/XvfjfAOLl T(3 apiOfJLip fX7TLpta fJLLGL icTTLV. K 8' ifJLTTUpLOLS f] K
7ravTOS tfpfi7J(ravTos tov kol66\ov iv ttj ij/vxyj, tov evos 7rapa
rd iroXXd, 6 av iv awacnv tv ivrj e/cctVots to olvto, Te\vrj<s dp^y
KCLL i7TlOrT7]fir)<S, 1<XV fJLV 7TpL yV<TLV, TC^V^S, idv TTtpl TO
OV 7Tt(TT7;/X979. Atl. Post.
1 9, II. ^$2.
<f>avcpov Se /cat otl, ct Tts alcrOyicri*; iKXeXoL7Tv, avayKrj
KOLL i7TLCTT7]fJL7]V Ttvd cVAcAotTTcVafc, 7]V dSvVOLTOV XafieW, L7Tp
fxav6avofiv rj eVaycoyfJ r) aVoSetf ct. cart 8' jjlcv aVoSctfts
7]

Ik t<2v kol66Xov 9 8' iiraycDyrj K t&v /caret fxepos' dSvvaTOv

7]

Se Ta KaOoXov Oeoyprjcrai jjaij St iiraywyrjs . . iiraxOfjvai Se fxrj

\ovTas alcrOrjcnv dSvvaTov' t<dv ydp kolO kclotov t] alcrOrjcris.

Anal Post. i. 13, 8i a 38.
ov0 ol atcru7]o-eo)<s ccttw 7rtoTacrc7at ov yap t)v tov . .

KaOoXov An. b 28.

ato-Orjo-Ls. Post. 1. 31, 87 Cp. 24, 3.
4
ovt Srj ivv7rdplover iv a^wpto-jaeVat at e^ets (our cogni-
tive powers are not ready-made innate faculties) ovt aV
aAAxoi/ e^cwv yivovTai yvo)CTTLKU)Tpu>v, aXX aVo alo-dyo-ews,
olov iv JAQ-xfj Tpoirfjs yevofAtvrjs ivos o*Tavros Tcpos ko~Trj 9 clO*
TpOS, (OS 7Tt dpyTjV TjXOtV. 7] Se ^V\7] VTTap^CL TOLOLVTY) OVCTa
o?a Swao-0at irdorxtiv tovto the work of the mind in
[i.e.

gathering together its knowledge is just like the action of

an army in gathering its routed soldiers. Just as in the
army one man has to stand and become a centre round
which others may group themselves and thus get order
and system (eVt dpxrjv rjXOev), so knowledge is a work
of concretion in which thought gradually widens itself
until it reach the highest universal], o-TavTos yap tw
aSta<opaH> eVos, 7rpCnov p\v iv ttj ^XV KadoXov (/cat yap
alcrOdveTai pXv to kolO' e/cacrTOV, t] 8' alcrOrjcris tov kolOoXov
icTTtv, olov dvOpwirov aAA' ov K.aXXcov dvOpwirov) 7rdXiv 8' iv
tovtols toraTat, eo)s av Ta afxeprj aTrj koI rot Ka6oXov, olov
tolovSI <oov, coo? ^wov* Kal iv touto) wcTavTCDs. [The mean-
ing would seem to be rightly given by Mr Shadworth
Hodgson (Philosophy of Reflection, n. 15): " Although it
is Callias an individual that is the object perceived, yet
 LOGIC. 59

what sense perceives is not Callias, but general quali-

ties."] ioo a i5.
5
com 8' tqplv irp&TOV SrjXa /cat cra<f>rj rd trvy/ce;(v/xeVa
fxaXXov' vcrrcpov 8' e/c tovtcov ytVeTat yvcopifxa rd arrotyjua
/cat atdpyai Statpoucrt ravra. Sto e/c tcoV kcl66\ov eVt rd
kcl6 to yap bXov /cam rrjv ataOrjcriv
CKacTTa Set irpoUvai.
yv(tipifjL(DTpov to Se kol66\ov oXov tl io-Ttv. And so, Aristotle
}

adds, children begin by calling all men "fathers" and all

women "mothers," and only at a later period differentiate
the terms. Phys. i. i, i84 a 2 2.
6
SfjXov Srj otl tffuv Ta irpona eVaytoy fj yvtoptfetv aVay-
kcuoV /cat yap /cat aurOrjO'is ovtm to KaOoXov e/X7rotet. eVet
Se...at ap^at T&v oTroSetfecov yvtopt/xarrepat, lirio'Trjixyj 8'
airaca fxeTa Xoyov etTTt, tcov ap^wv liriorTrifXT] /xev ovk av ir)'
C7Tt 8 ovSlv dXrjOeo'Tcpov eVSe^eTat eTvat eVtcrnf/^s rj vovv,
vovs av tr) Anal. Post. II. 19, ioo b io.
tq)v dpx&v.
Cp. Eth. Nic. VI. 3. 3, H39 b 30 (eiVtv apa dpxal i <Sv o
o-vXXoyco-fAos, <hv ovk cort tTuXXoytcr/xos. iirayoyyrj apa) with
VI. 6, 1 1 4 a 7 (XetVeTat vow etVat tcoV ap^oov). So again
in j5V/L iVfc. vi. 11. 5, ii43 b 5, Aristotle, speaking of the
formation of moral ideas, says we must proceed from
individual facts of experience to general truths, but adds
that the perception of these particulars implies the exercise
of reason (e/c tgov /ca0' e/cao-Ta to KaOoXov* tovtwv ovv e^eiv
Set ataOrjo-Lv, avTrj 8' eo-Tt vovs). And correspondingly the
first step in induction as the generalizing of a single
instance is designated as an act of reason (Set Se voetv to
Y to e airdvTMV tcov KaO e/cacrrov cruy/cet/xevov).
<f>varL jxev ovv ataOrjcnv e^ovTa ytyveTat Ta coa, e/c Se
8'
TTJs alo-67)o~u>s Tot? fJLtv avT&v ovk eyytyvcTat jJbVTjfxrj, to ts
eyytyveTat . . . ytyveTat Se e/c tt}s /JLvy/mrj^ e'ja7retpta Tots
av6p(ti7rois* yap 7roXXat /xv^/xat tov ovtov 7rpay/mT09 fiids
at
fJL7TLpLas Swa/uv a7roTeXovcTtv. /cat 80/cet cr^eSoV eViCT?;/^
/cat TtyyV fJLOiov etvat 77 e'jU,7retpta. a7ro/3atVet 8' eVtcrn;/^
Kat Tiyyt) Sta ttJ? e/XTretptas Tots aV0pGO7rot9...ytyi/eTat Se
T^v>7 oTav e/c 7roXXcov T179 e/x7Ttptas eVvo^/taVcov /Ma KaOoXov
yivrjTat 7rept t<3v o'/xotW VTroX-rjij/Ls. Metaphys. A. 1,980*28.
 CHAPTER IV.

METAPHYSIC.

28. Philosophy, properly so called, Aristotle views

as arising, after material wants had been supplied, out of
that feeling of curiosity and wonder to which the myth
gave a provisional satisfaction 1 . The earliest speculators
were philosophers of nature (c/>wtdAoyot 2 ), to whom suc-
ceeded the Pythagoreans with mathematical abstractions 3 .

The level of pure thought was reached partly in the

Eleaticsand Anaxagoras 4 but more completely, in the
work of Socrates, who habituated men's minds to the
expression of general conceptions in definitions arrived
at by induction and analogy 5 .

1
Sta yap to Oavfid^ccv ol dvOponroi /cat vvv /cat to irp&Tov
yjpiavTO <tA.ocroc/>tv Sto /cat o <f>tX6jJLv6o<; <t\dcroc/>ds 7rws
ccrTtV o yap fivOos cnry/ccirat e/c OavfMWitov. Meta, A. I,
b
982 i2. Cp. Plato, Thecetetus 155 d.
2
twv S77 irpQuov <pi\oGO(jyr](TdvT(jJV ol TrXctcrrot ras iv
vXrjs ct'Set /novas toyjOrjcro.v ap^as ti/at 7rdvT0)v. gS^ b 6.
3
iv rots aptOfJLo'is iSoKovv (i.e. UvOayopecoL) Ocuipew
ol
o/JLoidfiara TroXXd rots oScrt /cat ytyvofxevois, /naXXov rj iv 7rvpl
b
/cat yrj /cat vSari. 985 2 8.
4
vovv Sry tls ct7rcov eti/at, Kaddwep iv rots <*>ots, /cat iv
 METAPHYSIC. 6

TTJ <j)V(TL TO CLLTLOV TOV KOCTfJLOV Td 0>S TraCT^S, OLOV VTJcfiUiV

KOLL Trjs

i^dvrj 7rap' ei/a} Xiyovras tovs 7rpOTpov. Meta. A 4, 984 I5.

b
5
Svo yap icTTtv a tis av a7roSoLYj SwKparci SiKaca)?, tovs
t eVa/<TiKOi>s Aoyovs /cat to opc^ecrOai kcl86\ov. tolvtol yap

icrTLV a/xca) irepl dpyfjv iirLcrTtffJLrjs. aAA' o fxev Sw/cpar^s ra

7
KaOoXov ov ^wpicrra ZiroUi ovSe tovs optcrixovs' 61 S i)((x>pio~av

Kal to, TOtavTa twv ovtuv tSeas 7rpocr7jy6pVO'av (stil. the

b
Platonists). Metaph. M. 4, io78 28.

29. Metaphysics the name given by Aristotle's

editors to his works on prima philosophia, either because
they went beyond or followed after his physical investiga-
tions deals as a form of scientific knowledge with first

principles or ultimate conditions of all existence, and

more definitely considers being qua being and its essen-
tial attributes : just as mathematics, going so far beyond
physics, considers the characteristics which belong to
1
being not qua being, but qua line or angle . In its uni-
versal character Metaphysic resembles Dialectic and
Sophistic, but differs from the one method, from the
in
other in its moral purpose, Dialectic being tentative
(7reipacrTLK7]) where Philosophy is definitely conclusive
and Sophistic the pretence of knowledge without the
2
reality .

1
eo-TW liria-Trjix-q ri9 rj tfecopei to ov 77 ov Kal to. tovtid
virap\ovTa ko& avTO 810 koI tjimv tov ovtos rj ov ras
Trpcoras airtas \rj7TTeov. Meta. Y. I003 a 2l. (Cp.
I, I003 b
16.) KaOdirep 8' o /xaify/xari/cos irepl ra e ac^aipecreajs tt)v
OecDpcav 7rot6Tat (jrepLzXwv yap ivdvTa ra alaOrjToi 0a>pei,
OLOV fidpOS KOI KOV(f>OTrjTa TL Se KOI OepfJLOTTjTa Kal ij/vxpoTrjTa,
fxovov Se KaraXetVct to 7rocr6v koi crwe^e?, rcov pXv icfi eV
TiDV O TTL OVO TiiiV 7TL Tpta, Kai Ta TrOUt) Ta TOVTOiV f) 7TO<Xa
IcTTl KOI 0"VV)(fj, Kal OV Ka6' TpOV TL #a)pl) TOV OVTOV
hrj TpoTrov ^ct Kal 7repl to ov ra yap tovtco o-Vfx^ej3r]K6Ta
KaO' ocrov Io-tIv ov Kal ras eVai/Tiakra? avTov fj
ov ovk dkXrjs
62 METAPHYSIC.
e7nanjfjurjs rj <iXoo~oc/>ias Oeoyprjaat. rfj (pvcrtKyj jxev yap ov^
rj 6Wa, /xaAAoi/ y 8' Kwrjcrews /xcrc^ct, rr;v Oecoptav tis arrovel-
[xeiev aV. Metaphys. K. 3, io6i a 28.
2
Kat exm rov cf>i\ocrocf>ov 7repl navTayv Swao~0ai Oeuipelv.
el yap [xrj tov cfaiXocrocfaov, tl<$ ecrrat 6 hncKeij/ofjievos el ravro
ScoKpaT^s *<*}, Sco/cpaV^s KaOrjfjLtvos -q ei ev cvt i/aim'ov, 77 Tt
co-rt to ivavTtov, rj 7rocra\(j)s XeyeTat ; . . .(2cr7rp <TTt kcu api#-
/xou 77 dpiO/JLOs iSia 7ra^^ otoi/ irepiTTOTr)*; dpTioTrjs outcd
Kat TW oVt* 7) 01/ 6CTT6 TlVa I'Sia KOL TaVT* CCTTl 7Tpi <Sv TOV
cfuXoaocfyov C7no"Kt^ao"#(u TaXrjOes. (rrjfxeiov Sc* ot yap Sia-
XeKTLKoi Kal crotpiCTTal ravrov p.ev viro^vovrai cr^fia rw
cf>tXocr6<p(D 7rept fxev yap to avTO yevos aTpc^erat rj o"0(i-

otlktj koX rj ScaXeKTiKr) ttj <i\oa"o</>ia, aAAa Sta(j>epei ttJs ju-ei/

tw rpo7r<i> T779 Sfi/a/xea)?, t^s Se rov /3iou rrj 7rpoatp(7t.

ecrrt 8c 77 StaXeKTiKYJ ireipacrTiKr) irepl wv rj <t\ocro(ia yvcopi-
o-tiktj, rj he o~o<fciGTTiKr) (fraivofxevrj, ovora 8' ot!. Meta. T. 2,
b
ioo4 . Cp. aS^A. 2/. 165*9; Rhetor, 1. 1, I355 b i7.

30. The axioms of science fall under the consider-

ation of the metaphysician in so far as they are properties
of all existence. As against therefore the followers of
Heraclitus and Protagoras, Aristotle defends both the
2 1
axiom of contradiction and that of excluded middle , ,

by shewing that their denial, and the Protagorean doc-

3
trine of utter relativity, is suicidal . Carried out to its

logical consequences, the denial of these axioms would

lead to the sameness of and all facts and all assertions :

to an indifference in conduct, which is not accepted by

those who deny the axioms in question people do not :

think it the same thing to fall into a pit some morning

and to avoid doing so 4 .

1
to yap avTO a/xa virdpyeiv Te Kal fxr) virdpyew dSvvaTOV
tw avTQ) Kal KaTa to ax)TO avTrj 8r) irav&v IcftL f3ej3atOTaTr/
y

twv dp)((2v...d8vvaTov yap ovtlvovv tovtov VTroXafx^dveiv

elvaij Kal /xr) elvat, KaOdirep tlvIs olovTai Xeyew HpaKXeiTOV.
 METAPHYSIC. 63

ovk <jtl yap dvayKOLiov, a rts Xcyct, ravra Kat V7roXapLJ3dviv.

b
Meta. T. 3, ioos 2o.
2
aXXa /r/71/ ovSc fxera^v dvTicf>d(Tto<s cvSe^crat ctvai ov8iv,
aXX' dvdyKT] r) c/>aVat rj diro^dvai iv
cvos otlovv. Meta.kolO'

r. 7, IOTI b 23.
3
to yap /nr) %v tl o-rjfJLaLvciv ovOev crrfp-aivuv Icttlv, fir)
(TYjfxaivovToyv Se twv ovopLarwv dvrjprjTai to SiaXeyccrQou 7rpos
aXX^Xous, KaTa Se rrjv dXrjOetav kclI 7rpos olvtov ovOev yap
i/8ex Tat 7/0 ^T/ M
voovvra eV. [The axiom, that is, is really
the postulate that words shall have some one meaning
and not mean anything.] Meta. Y 4, ioo6 b 8.
(TV{JLJ3aLVL Srj Kal to OpvXXov/xevov irao-i rots tolovtols
Xdyots avrovs iavrovs dvaipeiv. 6 pXv yap rrdvra dXrjOrj
Xiyoiv Kal tov Ivavriov avrov Xoyov aXrjOrj 7rott, were tov
avrov ovk aXr)6r) (o yap ivavrios ov cf>rjo~iV avrov dXrjOrj), 6
Se irdvra vj/evSrj Kal avros avrov. Meta, V. 8, ioi2 b l4.
SXws S* dvaipovcriv ol tovto Xeyovrcs overlay koI to
tl rjv eti/at. irdvra yap dvdyKT] cru/x/?e/5^Kvat <j)do-Keiv av-
TOt?. I007 a 20.
4
en el aXrjOeiS at avTi(f>ao~Ls ajma KaTa tov avrov 7racrat,
SyXov cos diravra hrrax ev. ecrraL yap to avro Kal Tpirjprjs
Kal rot^os Kal aV0pa>7rog, el KaTa iravros tl rj KaTa<f>r)o~aL rj

a7ro(f)7Jcrai evSe^eraL, KaOdirep avdyKrj Tots tov Upayrayopou

Xeyoixrt Xoyov... ct Se firjOev viroXapifidveL aXX* ofiOLcos otCTat
/cat ouk otTat, Tt av Sia(f>ep6vro)s e\OL tcoi/ c/wtcov; 6#v Kat
fidXtcTTa cfravepov Ivtiv otl ovOels ovtco StaKCtTat oirre riov
aXXwv ovre t&v Xeyovroiv tov Xoyov tovtov. 8ta Tt yap
MeyapaSc aXX' ov^ -qcrvyd^u olofkevos /?aSttv ; ouS'
/^aSt^et
evOeus ewOev iropeveraL els c/>peap 97 ets c/>apayya, eav Ti^ry,
aXXa c^atVcTat evXafSovpievos, ws o^ o/xotcos olo/Jievos p-r) aya-
0oV et^at to e/x7reo-ti/ Kat dyaOov Meta. T. 4, Ioo8 b IO.
;

31. Metaphysic being the Science of Being ^#<2

Being, the leading question of Aristotle's First Philosophy
comes to be What
meant by the Real or by true
is

Substance ? This same question Plato had tried to solve

by positing an universal and invariable element of know-
ledge and existence, or an idea, as the only real and
64 METAPHYSIC.
permanent beside the changing phenomena of sense 1
.

For Plato, accepting the Heraclitean doctrine that sensible

things were in constant change, drew therefrom the con-
clusion that things qua sensible could not be known. But
things, he argued further, are known; and this knowledge
must be in virtue of that universal notion for which Socrates
2
sought .

1
GrVVJ3rj 8' 7] 7Tpl TCOV ClScoV Sod Tols LTTOV(TL StCt TO
7rei(r6fjvai irepX rrjs dkr)8etas rots Hpa/cXctretots Xoyois cos

7rdvT(i)V Tcor aKrOrjT&v del peovTOiV, clxtt' elirep cVictt^/x^ rivos

OTtu kcli erepas Seiv Ttvds 4>vcrets eTvai 7rapa ras
cf>p6vr}<JLS,

alcrOrjTas fxevovaas' ov yap etvai rtoV peovTiov eTno"rqixv)v.

Meta. M. 4, io78 b is.

2
ScoKparous 8c 7rept \Cev ra rjOiKa irpayfJLaTevofJLevov, Trepl
8e ttJs oAt^s <j>vcrea)s ovOev, ev {xevTOi toutois to kol6o\ov
trjTOVVTOS KOLL 7Tpl OptCT/XCOV 7TtCTT^(Ja^TOS TTpWTOV T7JV StdvOlOLV,
eKeivov d7ro8ed{JLevo<s Sid to tolovtov vireXafiev cos 7rept

CTpO)V TOVTO ytVO/XVOV KtU OV TCoV al(T0rjT(aV TtVOS* dSvVOLTOV

yap etvat tqv koivov opov 7W alcr6r)TiQV twos, act ye /xcra-
]3aXX6vTO)V. ovtos ju ]/ ow rot TOicurra rtoV ovtwv ISeas 7rpoo~r}-
yopev&e, ra 8' alo-QrjTa irapa TavTa Xeyeo-Qai iravTa. Meta.
b
A. 6, 987 i.

32. Plato's Ideal Theory is defective at once from

the standpoint of the Physicist, the Psychologist and the
1
Metaphysician .

1. Ideas are powerless to explain the unceasing life

and change of nature : they do not contribute to objects

2
of sensation any cause of movement and alteration .

2. They are equally incompetent to explain know-

ledge; for (a) knowledge is of the ovata, which is in

things, whereas ideas place them (/5) to sup-it outside ;

pose that we know things better by adding on their

general conceptions, is about as absurd as to imagine
3
that we can count numbers by multiplying them ;
better

(7) if they are assumed to explain what is permanent in

 METAPHYSIC. 65

knowledge, they must be extended to objects of art, of

4
which, however, the Platonists do not recognise ideas .

3. Ideas are equally incompetent to explain existence

(that). For (a) they do not exist in the objects which
partake in their nature, while the truth is, that substance
5
cannot be separated from that of which it is the substance ;

(b) the relation between ideas and things is left alto-

gether unexplained. To describe the ideas as patterns,

or archetypes of things, mere poetical metaphor, and
is

since what is a genus to one object, is a species to a

higher class, the same idea will have to be at once arche-
6
type and ectype Further, between the idea and the
.

individual object, we must imagine an intermediate link

and so on ad infinitum 1 : there must always be a third *

man' between the individual man and the idea of man.

TrdvTwv Se fMaXicrra SiOLTropyjcreLtv dv rts, ri ttotg. ctv/jl-

/JaXXeTat rd tSrj rj tois ai'Sioig rwv alo'OrjTcov rj rots yiyvo-

jllvol<; /cat (jyOeLpojULevoLS' ovre yap KLvrjcreuis ovre fJLTa/3o\.r}s
ouSe/xtas icFTtv atria avrots. aXXa /xr/v ovre 7rpds rrjv
7TL(TT7]/JLrjV OvOeV /3or)9eL TTjV TWV aXXtoJ/ (ovSe ydp OIXTLOL
e/cctva tovt(i)v' ev rovrocs yap dv rjv) OVT ets to tvat, fxrj

lvvTrdp\ovrd ye rots />ter trover iv ; Meta. A. 9, 99i a 8, or

in identical words M. 5, io79 b i2. Cp. Z. 1037^26.
iv Se tw
<PatSa)vt ovtids Xeyerat, cos /cat rov eii/at kcu
rov yiyveaOai airta ra elSrj icrriv. /catrot rtoV etScoV ovro)v
OyLtcos ov ytyi/erat ra /xere^ovra, dv fxrj rj ro Kivfjcrov,
/cat 7roAAa ytyi/eTat erepa, olov ot/cta /cat SaKTuXtos, tui/ ov

<j)OLfXV elSrj eii/at. 991^*4.

aXX' 6 jxkv Sto/cpar^s Ta kolOoXov ov ^topiard eVoiet* ol
e^ojptcrav, /cat ra rotavra r<2v ovtwv tSeas irpoo^qyopcvo-av.
W(JT crvvefiaivev clvtols tr;(eSoV tw olvtu) Xdya> irdvrwv ttSeas
etrat twv kol96\ov Xeyo/xeVan/, /cat 7rapa7r\y]cnov ojenrep dv ei
rts api6iArjo~ai /3ov\6fjLvos, iXarrd i/odv yotev ovruiv ototro /x?7

ovvrjo-ecrOai, 7rXetu) Se Troi-qcras dpiOfJLOtr]. I078 b 35.

W. C
66 METAPHYSIC.
KOLTOL T jap TOVS AoyOVS TOVS K T(JJV i7TL(TTr)fJL0JV <TTat
clSyj TravTiov ocnov Itt ictttj ^ai ctcrtv.
1079*9.
5
ert S6^iV av dSvvarov ctvat ^copis t^v oucriai/ /cat ov
?7 ovcria. cocttc 7rtt>s ai/ at iSeac ovcruat TtoV irpay/JLaTw ovcrat
Meta. A. b
^wpts ctei/; 9, 99i i.
6
to Se Aeyciv 7rapaSeiy/xaTa aura ti/at Kai /xcre^ctv
avTtoV TaXXa KCvoAoyeu/ ecrrt /cat fJLTa<f>opa<s Xiyetv iroir)-

Tt/<as...T6 ou fjiovov Ttov ala8rjTiov 7rapaSety/xaTa Ta 1877,

aXXa /cat avrcoV, cos yivos eiScoV cocrrc to avro ecrrai irapd-
Sciyjita /cat cikcoV. 99i a 20.
7
ert $ 01 aKpt/3eo'TaTOL twv Xoycov ot ju,ev TtoV 7rpos rt
7rotot)crti/ tSeas, <bv ov cfaacriv elvat kclO' olvto yivos, ol 8e rov
rpLTov dvOponrov Xiyovcnv. Meta. M. 5, 1079*13.

33. same question What

Aristotle's answer to this
is reality?
differs more in wording than in meaning

from that given by Plato. The main defect to Aristotle's

eyes in the ideal theory was that Plato considered ideas
as transcendant and separate from things of sense, and
failed to give through them any explanation of life and
1
change . Arist otle therefore concludes that si nce for

scientific as opposed to empirical knowledge, there mus t

be an universal element, since individuals are unlimited
2
and infinite, and as such unknowable the idea must be ,

not something outside the many, but rather in, and pre -
3
dicate of the manifold phen omena of sense
T
.

1
tovto 6p6ios ivorjcrev (o Sw/cparr/s) ov ^copt'cras...
kclL

avev p\v yap tov KaOoXov ovk k'o~Tiv iw L<TTJ]juLr)V \aj3etv, to 81

X<optetv ainov TtoV o~vfx/3aiv6vTOJV oVcr^eptoV 7repl rds tScas
i(TTiv. Meta. M. 9, io86 b 6.
2
elSrj fjiv ovv eti/at r) eV rt 7rapa Ta 7ro\Xa ovk avay/07,

el aVoSet^ts etTTat, etVat fievTOi tv Kara 7roAAcoV dXrjOls elweli/

dvdyKT}' ov yap etTTat to KaOoXov, av pirj tovto rj' idv 8e to
KaOoXov (ir) rj, to pAvou ovk etTTat, cuctt' ovS aVo'Set^ts. All.
Post. 1. 11, 77*5.
 METAPHYSIC. 6?

el jxlv ovv fxrjOev ecrn 7rapa ra kolO' c/cacrra, ovOkv av

tlrj votjtov aAAa irdvTa alcrOrjTd, /cat i7rtorTrjjJLr] ovOevos, t fxyj

Tt? ctvat Aeyet tt)v alcrOrjaiV l7rKJTrjfX7jv, Meta, B. 4,

bl
9993 ; N '
aAV 06 ra lSt7 XeyovTcs ty) jmev op6<2s \iyovori X^P 1 -
j^ovres avTa, ctTrep overeat elcrt, rrj 8' ovk dp#a>9, oti to tv
7Tt 7ToXXtol/ t8o? \yOV(TlV. OLITIOV K OTL OVK ^OVCTLV dwoSoV-
vai rtVcs at rotavTat ovcrtat at ac/>#aprot 7rapa ras /ca^
e/cacrra /cat alcrOrjTas. ttglovo~lv ovv ra? auras r<3 etSct
Tots c/>#aprots (Tavra? yap tcr/xci/), avToavOpomov /cat avro-
iTnrov, Trpoo-TiOivTZS rots alcrOrjTo'is to prjfxa to clvto. Meta. 7a.

16, I040 b 2 7.
7Tt 8e ouSe Trpayfxa ov8(v ecrrt 7rapa ra fjieyeOrj, a>s
So/cet, ra ato-OrjTa /ce^copi<x//,i/o]/, ei/ Tots et8ecrt rots alcrOrjTOLS
ra voT/ra eoTt. Z> ^4^. III. 8, 432*4.

34. Real Substance, or true Being (ovo-ta), is thu s

to Aristotle not the abstra ct universal, but rather th e
concrete individual thin g
1
.
|
The Aristotelian theory o f
Substance however altogether consistent with it -
is _not
self and while the teaching of the tract on Categorie s
:

inclines to Nominalism, the doctrine of the Metaphysic s

2
inclines frequently towards Realism or Idealism Parti- .

cularly we are struck by the apparent contradiction be-

tween the doctrine that Science and Definition deal on
the one hand with the universal, on the other hand with
3
Substance which is declared to be individual . The con-
tradiction is due to the desire, always operative with
Aristotle, to state his views in such a manner as will
bring them into more pronounced antagonism with the
theory of Plato, and may be partly solved by regarding
Substance as the concrete existence, in which a universal
is an individual universalized through
individualized, or
its particular relations. As such a concrete (avvoXov)
Substance is the merging of matter in form, of potenti -
S~2
68 METAPHYSIC.
ality in actuality. Just as knowledge proceeds from the
abstract universal to the concrete individua l {Phys. I. i),

so real existence is the gradual evolution and filling up of

4
an original abstract substratum .

1
yap dSvvarov etvat ovcriav cTfcu otlovv t&v kcl6o\ov
olk
\yofjLvu)v. Metaph. Z. 13, iO38' 9.
2
Thus in the Categories 7rparrai overeat are said to be
individual existences: in the Metaphysics (Z. 11, io37 b 2)
we read eVl twv Trpwrwv ovatiov, olov KafjLTrvXoTrjs. Cp.
I0 *
' 3
6 opicrfJios ovcrias tls yvayptcr^os. Ana/. Post. II. 3,
b i6. a
90 (Cp. Metaph. Z. 5, io3i i.) tov yap kclOoXov
Kal tov ctSovs 6 dpioyxo's. Mcta. Z. n, 1036^9.
7ras yap Xdyos Kal iracra 7tio~t?7/x77 tcoj/ KadoXov Kal ov
t<5i/ ccr^aTwv. Meta. K. 1, io59 b 2 5.
Sia tovto Se Kal t<qv ovctlwv tcov alordrjTcov twv Ka&*
Kao~ra ovu optcr/xos ovr airoot$ts zcttlv, otl e^ovcrtv vatjv rjs
rj <f>vcrts TOLavTT] uidT ivSi^ecrOat Kal elvat Kal jjltJ. Meta. Z.
15, io39 b 29.
7] ovata yap ecrTt to etdos to evov e ov Kai ttjs

vXrjs rj crvvoXos XeytTai ovcrta olov y KotXoTrjs' ck yap Taxi-

ttjs Kal ttjs ptvos crtp.rj pis Kal r) crLfjLOTYjs earl' Sis yap iv
tovtols V7rdp$i 77 pts. ev Se Trj avvoXu) ovata olov ptvl
crifAT) rj KaAAta, ei/ecrrtti Kal rj vXrj. Meta. Z. 1 1,

1037*29.
Xeyerat S' wcnrep to v7TokL[jlvov ovcrta tuvac Kai to tl
tjv clvat Kal to K tovtwv, Kal to KaOoXov. Meta. Z. 13,
b
i038 2.

35. Matter (vXrj) is used by Aristotle in four prin-

cipal senses, which however tend to glide into one an-

other. First, it is the substratum of varying determina-
1
tions, the subject of growth and of decay ; secondly\ it is

the potential which has implicitly the capacity to develop

2
into reality ; thirdly, it is the formless and so indetermi-
3
nate and contingent ; and thus fourthly, as that which is
 METAPHYSIC. 69

without any definite form (ao'pio-Toi/), it is almost synony-

4
mous with negation (o-reprjcns) . It is altogether a rela-
tive conception, and hence matter in its last phase is
5
identical with form .

1
<TTl Se v\r) fJCaXlCTTa }xv KCU KUptto? TO V7T0Kt/JLV0P
yei/ecrea)? Kal (fiOopas Scktlkov. (jDe Gen. et Cor. I. 4,
320 a 2.) Xeyoo yap vXrjv to TTpcoTov V7tokl/jlvov e/cacrro),
i ov ywTai tl twirdpyovTOS fxrj Kara 0"Vfxj3e/3rjK6<s, Phys.
i.
9, 192^1.
uA^i/ oe Aeyo) 77 //,77 to be tl ovcra evepyeta, ovvafxzi
Io-tI to$ ti. Meta. H. 1, io42 a 2 7 : cp. Meta. N. 4,
io92 a 3.
Xeyo) 8' vXrjv rj kclO' avTrjv jjltJtg tl fJLtJTe 7roo~oV fiyjTe
dXXo flTjOtV \iyTCLL Ot5 (jLpKTTCLl TO OV. Metd. Z. 3, I029 a
a
20. So in Phys. I. 7, i9i io Aristotle combines r] vXrj
Kal to dfiopcfyov and in Meta. A. 8, 9 89k 18, we have v\r)
described as to dopicrTOv irplv optcrOrjvai kcu /xeracr^eu/
el'Sous TtT/05.

7; vXrj ecrTat aiTia r) ivSe^Ofxivrj irapd to aSs eVl to

a
ttoXv aXXoos toij o-u/x/3e/?77KOTOS. Meta. E. 2, I027 l4.
Cp. De An. 11. 1, 4i2 a 7.
4
Thus in i7zyj\ 1. 7,i90 b 2 7, o-Teprjcns is said to be
a crvfjLpePrjKds of ij'Xt;. Cp. Meta. I. 8, 1 058^*23, 77 yap 1JX77
dirofydcrei SrjXovrai, to Se yeVos tjXt7 ov Xe'yeTat yeVos. And
in Phys. 1. 8, I9i b i3, A. writes: 17/ms Se kcu avroC </>a/xev
yiyvecrOai fxev ovSev aVXcos e/c tt>) oVro?, o/xwg fieVTOi yiyvccrQai
K firj ovtos, olov Kara
ck yap T779 o-rep^crea)?, o
cru/x/3e/377K6V
eo-rt Ka#' aiiro ovk IvvTrdpxovTOs yiyvzToi ti.
/xt/ 6V, But in
the next chapter, 19 2%
a distinction is drawn between
vXi] and cTTtprjo-is to the effect that VX77 is non-existent
only Kara cru/x/^e/fyKos, while o~Teprjo-i<s is SO Ka#' avTT/i/.
60-T6 Se T77S VX779 77 /xev vorjTr) 77 S' alcrOrjTrjy kcu act ro9
Xoyov to /xeV 7JX77 to S' ivepyeid Icttlv, olov 6 kvkXoz cr^tta
7rt7T001/. OTl QiQTTTep Lpr)TCU KCU Tf 0*^aT77 vXrj KCU 77*

fxopcfrr) rauro, to /xeV SiW/xei, to Se eVepyeta. Meta. H. 6,

i45 a 33-
70 METAPHYSIC.

36. The antithesis of Swa/xis and ivipyua is really

the same as that of 17X77 and elSos, except that whereas
the two last are conceived as fixed and stationary, the
two first-named are regarded as dynamical and progres-
sive, and ivipyeia is strictly only the process which attains

its termination in a final perfection or evrcXc^eta

1
. The
distinction cannot perhaps be logically defined but can
be made clear by observation of particular instances and
may be illustrated by the relation between the architect
and builder, the sleeping and the waking, &c. (Awajucis
may be either conscious or unconscious, the former
admitting of alternative courses of action, the latter, or
2
the capacities of nature, of one only .) The theory of a
continuous development from the possible to the actual,
from that which is not yet, but has the power of being, to
that which really is, is one of the most important aspects
of the philosophy of Aristotle. It was intended by its

author to solve the difficulties had

which earlier thinkers
raised with reference to the beginnings of existence and
the relations of the one and many difficulties which
in the last-named connection had led to a denial of all
3
predication But while Aristotle thus recognises the
.

genesis of things by evolution and development, he does

not fail to distinguish between the study of an object from
the standpoint of history, and the standpoint of its con-
stitutive nature, and to emphasize the fact that while in

the order of time a capacity or imperfect form precedes

a realized activity or perfect condition, in the order of
thought and of real existence, the perfect precedes the
4
imperfect, the whole the part, the realized the possible .

1
OTl 8' T] ivpyLOL TO V7TOLp)(LV TO TTpayjULOL, /XT] OVT(x)<5

<jjo-7Tp \4yojxev Swa/xci (Xiyofxev Sc SvvafAtL otov v r<3 vAa>

 METAPHYSIC. 7 1

'Epfjirjv kcu iv rrj oXrj rrjv ?;/xtoretav...). to 8' evepyeta, SrjXov

eVt t&v kolO* CKacrra (observation) o /3ovA.o'/xe#a
rfj eVaycDyirJ
Aeyetv, koI ov Set 7ravTos opov fcfjretv aXXd Kat to ai/aAoyoi/
avvopav, otl <Js to oikoSo/xovv 7rpos to oiKoSofJUKov, kolL to
iyprjyopos 7rpo<s to kclOzvSov, koll to opwv irpos to fxvov fxev
oif/tv Se e
X ov. Meta. . 6, io48 a 3o.
Towo/xa ivipyeia Ae'yeTat Kara to epyov, /cat owTct'vet
7rpos tt]v ei/TeXe^etav. Meta* . 8, I050 a 23.
2
Kat at /xev /xera Adyov 7rao"at twi/ eVavTtW at olvtcll, at
8' aXoyoi
fiLa evds, olov to Oeppcov tov 0epp,atVetv fxovov, rj Se
laTpiKrj voo~ov Kat vytetas. Meta. . 2, I046 b 5
3
/mova^s o{/T(t> Averat Kat 7; twj/ ap^atW aVopt'a, viz.
that things could originate neither from the existent nor
from the non-existent... ck yap T/79 a-Tcp^a-ecus, o eort Ka#'
avra p-77 ov, ovk hruirapyovTos ytyverat Tt. Phys. I. 8,
i9 ia 23-
to~t Se Ttves ot <f>acnv, otov ot MeyaptKOt, orav ivepyrj
/movov $vvao~6aL, otov Se p/>7 ivepyrj ov SvvaaOou, olov tov fxrj
oIkoSo/jlovvtcl ov Svvao~6ai otKoSop.etv, aAAd tov otKoSo/xouvra
orav oIkoSo/jlyj' o'/xotcos Se Kat eVt twv aAAwv* ots to, ctv/jl-
/3aLvovTa aT07ra ov ^aXe7rov t8etv...cocrT ovtol 61 Xoyoi
iiatpovcrt Kat Kivrjcnv Kat yeVeo-tV act yap to tc ecrTrjKos
eVr/^erat Kat to KaOrjfjLzvov Ka#eSetrat. Meta.. 3, I047 a i4.
4
Set Se /xt} XeX-qQevai iroTepov 7rpoarjKet Aeyetv 7ra>5
tKacTTOv ycveaOat irecfrvKe fjiaXXov rj 7TW9 eo~Ttv. 77 yap yeVecrts
eVeKa ttJs overtax ecrTtV, a'AA' ovk 77 ovo'ta evcKa Trjs yevecrews*
yevva yap o* av6pa)7ros av6po)7rov. De Part. An. 640 a i8,
b
cp. Zte 6V/z. ^?z. v. 1, 778 5-
to aVeAes p.eye6os yei/eVet /xev irpoTepov Icttl, ttj ovcrta S'
vorepov, otov onj/v^ov ifxxj/v^ov. Meta. M. 3, io77 a i9.

37. The Aristotelian analysis of existence into Su-

ra/xts and evepyeta, or {SXt; and etSo?, is expressed with
more detail in the doctrine of the four ap^at or amat
that is, which enter into the existence or
principles
1
origination or cognition of any object These four .

a'px<xt are 1st, the material cause, or elements out of

72 METAPHYSIC.
which an object is created : 2ndly, the efficient, or means
by which it is created : 3rdly, the formal, or expres-
sion of what it is : and 4thly, the final, or end for which
2
it is The final, however, tends to
. be one with the
formal, and both may be identical with the efficient.
Of th e four it is the formal and final which is the most
,
*-
important, and which most truly gives the explanation of
an object . The teleology of Aristotle regards the end of
a thing as realized not in its relation to us, but in the full
perfection of itself : final cause with Aristotle is internal
3
and objective, not external and subjective .

1
7racrc3v pkv ovv kolvov tcov apywv to irpwTOv et^at oOev
rj 0~tlv rj ylyvercu rj yiyi/axr/cTai. Meta. A. 1, ioi3 a i8.
2
eVa fxkv ovv rpoirov clltlov Xeyerat to ef ov yiverai tl
ivv7rdp^ovTOs, olov 6 ^cxXkos tov av8pidvTos...oiXXov 8e to
etSos Kcd to 7raoaSc6y/>ta...Tt oOev r] apXV r V^ fteTa/SoXrjs r}

7rp(jjT7j rj rrjs rjpejjLrjaews, olov 6 j3ovXevaas oiltlos kclI 6 7rdTrjp

TOV TKVOV...TL TOVTO 8' 0"TI TO OV eVeKa, olov
OJS TO TeXoS '

tov 7repL7raTLV r) vyUia. Phys. II. 3, 1 94^24, and in

almost identical words Meta, A. 2, 1013*24, Phys. 11. 7,
I98 a 24.
3
eVet ttXclovs opw/JLev cuTias 7Tpl tt)v yveo~iv tt)v <fivo-L-

Kr)v...8iopLcrTOV tovtmv iroia irp^TYj koX Sevrepa

/cat Trepl
TricfyvKtv. cf>aivTou Se irpwTq rjv Xiyo/xev eVc/ca twos' Aoyos

yap ovtos, dp)(rj ^ ^-VS Ofioitas eV te toIs Kara Tkyyr\v kcu

Iv toIs cf)vo~ei crvvecrTrjKoo'tv. rj yap Trj Siai/oia rj Tjj aladrjcrtL

opto-dfievos o fxcv laTpos Trjv vyUiav, 6 8' oikoSo/xos Trjv

OLKiav, a7roSt8oao"t tot)s Xoyovs koi tcis amas ov ttolovo'lv
ckciotoi;, koX Slotl 7tol7]Tov ovtws. De Part. Anim, 1.
639^1.

38. The concrete reality which constitutes substance

gains special expression in the phrase to tl rjv elvat. The
phrase would seem to have originated in a combination
of to thai and tl Ictti, but the conception was taken
 METAPHYS1C, 73

outside the limits of present time by the substitution of

the past for the present ; it is as the " being of what
a thing was," not only its actual present condition but
its eternal and essential constitution. Thus to tI rjv dvai
means the manifestation of the general notion and it is :

therefore most explicitly described as ova la aVcv vXrjs

i.e., Substance free from all indeterminateness and con-
1
tingency . It is therefore preeminently the subject of
definition.

1
Kal 7Tp<j)TOV LTTQ)flV eVlO, 7Tpl aVTOV AoytKO)?, OTL (TTt
to tI rjv elvat e/cacrro) o Xiyerai kolO avTO. ov yap ecrrt to
crot elvat to jxovatKio ctvat* ov yap KaTa aavrov el /jlovo'ikos*
b
Meta. Z. 4, io2c> i4. Thus chapter
out that 6 points
in essential conceptions the to tI of the concep- rjv etvat
tion is identical with the conception itself, but this is not
the case with those which are accidental. dvdyKrj Spa eV
ctvat to dyadov Kal dyaOco elvai Kal KaXdv /cat KaXco eu/at, oaa
fxr) KaT dXXo XeyeTat, dXXd /ca#' avTa Kal 7rpcoTa. I031 b 12.
Xeyo) Se ova lav avev vXrjs to Tt rjv eti/at. Afeta. Z. 7,
io32 b i4. So also De An. 11. 1, 4i2 b tyvyrj is said to n
be the t. rj. e, of the body, and in T043 b i we have to yap
Tt rjv etj/at to) eiSet /cat Trj ivepyela virdp^t. ^XV h* v 7^P
/cat ^vyrj eTvat Tavrov,

39. God to Aristotle is the first of all substances,

the necessary first source of movement who is himself
unmoved: a being with everlasting life, and perfect
blessedness, engaged in never-ending self-contemplation
acting on the world as the primary object of love in
which desire and reason fall into unity
1
. The moral
virtues are too dependent on material, bodily and ter-
restrial conditions to be ascribed to God but the perfect :

simplicity and immutability of his nature brings him the

2
purest and serenest pleasure .
74 METAPHYSIC.
7Tl 8c Set KLVY)(TIV del LVOLL KOLL fXTj StaAet7TtV, dvdyKT)
LVai 71 6 7TpU)T0V KtVL, 6T V CtT 7rAl'(0, /Cat TO 7rpCDTOV
b
/avow aKtvrjTov. Phys. viii. 6, 2 58 io.
0"Tt Tt o ov /ctj/ov/xevov /ctvet, dtStov /cat ovcrta /cat evepyeta
ovcra *
Kti/6 Se wSe to o'pe/cToV, /cat to vorjrov klvzl ov klvov-
fxevov. Tovroiv ra 7rpdora rd avra /ctvet 8c wg ipwfjievov,
KLvov/xevov 8e TaAAa /civet. ..e/c roiavr-qs apa dp-^fj^ yjprrjrai 6
ovpavos koll 7] coverts. Stayo^yrj 8' icrrlv ota tj dptarrj fJUKpov
Xpovov ?7/xaH'...<a/x,j/ 8c rov Otov etvat a>ov ollSlov aptarov,
ware t^rj /cat annv crvvc\rj^ /cat dtStos virdpyei t<3 #<3. rovro
yap 6 0eo<;...OTL pXv ovv iorrlv over [a ns atStos /cat a/ctvTiTOS
KCU K)(0)pLa-fx4vrj rwv alaOrjriov, cfaavepov e/c rwv elp-qixivoiv.
{Meta. A. 7, io72 a 25.) airroV apa voet, clVep eo-Tt to Kpdricr-
tov, /cat Io~tiv rj votjctls vorjo-eojs vorjo-ts. Meta. A. 9, I074 b

2
toi>? 0Oi;s yap juaXto"Ta v7ret\rj<pafJLv /xa/captous Kai
evSat/xovas eti/af 7rpacts Se 7rotas aVovet/mt xpeu>v avTOts;...
8tftoi)cri 7ravTa (paivotr av rd
irepl Tas 7rpa^ts tu/cpa /cat
aVata rov izparreiv acfaaipovfAtvov, en 8c
0(jjv....t<p Srj <jovti,

imdXXov rov 7rott]/, Tt Xct7TTat ttXtjv Oewpta ; coo"tc 7; tou

#eo9 ivepyeia, /xa/captOT?7Ti 8iac/>epoi>cra, OewprjTLKrj av elrj.
Eth. Nic. x. 8, ii78 b 9.
i tov 77 </>wts dir\r) irj 9 act 77 avr/7 7rpats 7781cm? co-rat.

Sto 0cos act /xtav /cat airXrjv ^atpet 77801/771/* ov yap fxovov
klv7]CTU)s Icttlv evepyeta, aAAa /cat aKwrjG'Las, Kai 77801/77 p.aX-
Aov i/ yjpefxia iarlv rj kv KLnjaei. Eth. Nic. VII. 14, H54 b
25.
 CHAPTER V.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

40. Aristotle's Philosophy of Nature (foo-LKtj) con-

siders existence not in itself, but in so far as it partici-
1
pates in movement . Its province is the actual sensible
reality in which Xoyos thought and idea is wrapped up
in v\rj, matter: but the student of nature should possess
a knowledge not only of the matter, but also and to a
greater degree of the idea which regulates this matter 2 .

The cf)vcru<6s in fact will embrace in his explanation of an

object all its four causes, and thus grasp it in its compre-
3
hensive concreteness . To study a phenomenon <vo-ikws
is thus with Aristotle to study it in the concrete, just
as to do so AoyiKcos is to study it in the abstract and
4
without reference to facts . And he notes accordingly
that while those who have been more occupied with natural
phenomena are better able to frame comprehensive
principles which will give a wide-spread unity to nature,
merely logical or verbal reasoners, neglecting the facts
and attending only to some few points, find it easier to
enunciate a theory.

rrj cf>V(itKrj fxv yap ov^ fj

ovra, fxaWov 8 77 Kivrjcreais
fXT^L, T7JV #G)plW TtS <X7rOVLjJiLV OLV. Metd. K. 3,I06l b 6.
76 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
rj cfavcrLKr} OctoprjTiKij Tts av e'trj, dXXd 6eu)pr]TiKiq 7rept rot-
OVTOV OV 6 eCTTL SwdTOV KLVLCr6cU KCU 7Tpt OV&LOLV TTjV KCLTO.
TOV \6yOV (0? 7Tt TO 7ToXv 0V ^CDp LO'TrjV fJLOVOV L 8r) TTOLVTCL

rd (pvo-tKa o/xotoos T(3 o-t/x<3 Xeyovrai, olov pes, oc#a\/A05, irpocr-

u)7rov, crapf, octtovv, oXw? <j)ov...(ov6cv6s ydp dvtv

)
KLV7Jo~e<o<;

o Aoyos auTcoj/ aAA act ^t uA^i/) orjAov 7rw? oet 1/ rotg

<j>VCTLKo2s TO TL IcTTL tflTSXV KoCl Opt^CCT^at, KCU StOTt KCU TTp\
ij/vxfjs ivias decoprjcrai rov (pvcrtKOv, ocrrj firj dvev rrjs vXrjs

io-Ttv. Meta. E. i, io25 b 26.

2
ov ydp fJidvov 7TpL rrjs vXrjs Set yvtapi^eiv rov cfrvcrLKov,
dXXd kcu ttJs Kara rov Xoyov kcu fxdXXov. Meta. Z. II,
io37 a i6.
3
eVet 8' at atrtat TcVrapcg, 7rept 7raow rov <j>vctlkov
etSeVat kcu ets 7rao~as aVayooi/ to Sta tl a7roSa)o~et cfavcrLKUJs,

t^v vXrjy, to etSos, to KLvfjcrav, to ov ej/e/ca. Phys. II. 7,

198^3.
4
Sto oo"ot Iv^KrjKacri jjlcLXXov eV Tots <i;o"t/<otg, /maXXov
SvvavTcu VTTOTiOecrOai tolclvtcls dp^as at eVt 77-0X1) SwavTat
crvvLpLv (i.e. principles which can to a great degree con-
nect phenomena): ot 8' Ik tcov iroXX&v Xoyu>v dOeojprjrot
T&v v7rapxovTO)v ovTes (who as a result of many theories
fail to observe the actual facts), 7rpos oAtya /3Xe\j/avTcs, aVo-
cjyatvovTat pdov' tSot 8 av Tt? kcu Ik tovtwv bcrov hiacfrepovcriv
ot cbvcrLK&s kcu AoytKcas crK07rowTs. De Gen. et Cor. I. 2,
3i6 a io.

41. Nature (vmi) to Aristotle is what is at once

intrinsically spontaneous, self-determined and uniform in

its mode of action. opposed therefore to accidental

It is

spontaneity (to avTopaTov) and chance (rvxv)' spontaneity

referring to eccentric uncaused results in things as such,

chance referring to unexpected issues in things in regard

to man. Nature as the self-producing and the self-
determined is thus opposed to art in that while art is an
originating principle in something outside itself, nature
1
is so within itself As such, it is at once the original
.
 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. 77

primary substratum, and the formed and perfect state of

2
development It is in this second sense that the State
.

3
is a natural institution .

ra jxkv <pv(rei ovra wdvTa <cuvtcu c^oi/ra v iavroU

1

dpXqv klv7]<t(o<; kcll crraa-ca)?, ra fiev Kara tottov, to, Sc kclt

b
aifrqcrw kcll cj>6lo~lv, rd 8e kclt aAAoiWu/. Phys, II. I, I92
14-
r) \x\v ovv Tiyyt] dpxv *v aAAa>, r] 8e cfyvcns clp\V *v a ^ T^
dvOpco-iros yelp dvOpcoirov yevva. Meta. A. 3, io7o a 6.
cjivcrei yap ocra dird tlvos ev olvtols clpxV^ o^vue^s klvov-
/uLva d<f>LKvei.Tai el's tl tcXos yap rj tv^t) tw Kara o-vfxfit-
/3r)Kos clIticov' aAA.' otclv tovto del r) cos inl to 7ro\v yiyi/^rtu,
ov crvfAfiefirjKos ovS* diro Tires' eV Se rots c^vctlkoIs act ovrtos,
av fxrj ti /X7roSt(Ji7.../xaXt(TTa 8e SrjXov otclv tis laTpevrj clvtos
iavTOv* tovtlo yap 4'oikci/ rj cfrvens. Phys. II. 8, 199^5. Cp.
De CaeL 111. 2, 3oi b i7.
2
Va fJLV OVV TpOTTOV OVTLOS Tj c/>UO~tS A.yTCU, Tj TTptOT'Q

KaCTTLO V7TOKLIJlvr) vXrj TLOV l\OVT(JiV V aVTOLS CLpyTJV KLV71-

trecos /cat iATa/3o\rjs y dXXov Se Tpoirov rj fxop^yr) ko\ to i8os
to KCiTa tov X6yov...TO yap Swa/xei o~ap rj octtovv ovt e^ei
7rco ttjv iavTov <f>vcriv irplv av Xdj3rj to eiSos to Kara tov
Xoyov. Phys. 11. i, i93 a 28.
</>i>trls 8e rj tc 7rptoT7] vXrj...Kal to cTSos Kal rj ovcria' tovto
8e icrTl to WAos Trjs yeve'trecos. Meta. A. 4, Ioi5 a 7.
3
Slo iraua 7rdA.is cf^vo'ec o-tlv, tnrep Kai at irpcoTat kolvco-
viai' T/Vos yap avrrj klvlov, rj 8c </>vo~is TeAos cttlv. olov
yap eKacTov etrri r^s yeveaecos reXecr^etcrr/?, Tavrrjv </>a/xev

tt)v cf>vo-LV elvai eKaaroi;, coenrep dvOpcoirov, 'nrirov, 01/aas.

Polit. 1. 1, i252 b 3o.

42. Movement (/aV^tns) is the mode in which poten-

tial being is continually actualizing itself in the world
1
of nature . Of movement, Aristotle recognises three
kinds, quantitative (increase and decrease), qualitative
(alteration) and spatial (locomotion)
2
all of which, how-
ever, reduce to that last-mentioned, since even yeVecns
7^ PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
and cj)6opd, as forms of avyKpLo-us and StaK/oto-t9, necessarily
3
involve space .

1
SiyprjiJLevov Sc KaS* CKaoroi/ ycVos tov pXv evrcXc^cta,
tov Se 8vvdfJLi 9 y tov SiW/xet ovtos evTcXe^eia, 77 Totoirroi/,
KivrjcTLS icrTiV) olov tov /xcv aXXotwTOv, rj aXXoLWTOv, aXXotwcrts.
./%)V. III. I, 20I a IO.
2
ct ow at KaT7)yopiai SirjprjvTai ovcria ko! iroioTrjTi /cat

TW 7TOU Kat TW 7TOTC Kat T<3 7T0OS TL Kat T(3 7TO<ja) Kat TO)
7tollv 7) irao-yew, dvdyKTj rpcts ctvat Ktv^crets, tt/v tc tov
Kat T^V TOV TTOCTOV KCU T7JV KOLTa TOTTOV.
7TOto{> (P/l)>S. V. I,
22 5^9)"-V ^
V 0VV KaT ^ T07roi/ c/>ooa, 77 8e KaTa to 7rotoV
aXXotajo~t9, 7] 8e Kara to 7rooov av^rjo'LS Kat (pOtats. Phys,
a 8.
VII. 2, 243
3 8' ouow KLVTjcreoiv, Trjs T Kara fxeyeOos Kat t^s
TpiQtv
KaTa 7rd0os Kat t^s KaTa T07roi/, ?)V KaXovjxev (popdv, TavTTjv
dvayKcuov elvat TrpwTrjv. dSvvaTOv yap av^rjcnv etVat aXXotai-
aea>s /x?} 7rpov7rap^ovo~rj<;. aXXa ju/^v ct ye dXXoto{>rat, Set
Tt ctrat to aXXotouV Kat ttolovv Ik tov SwafJiec Oepfxov to
ivepyeta Oepfxov. SrjXov ovv otl to kivovv ov^ d/xota>s ex t >

aXX' 6t. fiev iyyvTepov 6t 8e 7roppcoTepov tov dXXoLovjmevov

io~Ttv. TavTa 8' dvev cfropds ovk eVSe^erat virdpyetv, (Phys.
VIII. 7, 2 6o a 2 8.) Kat T779 Ktv^crecos rj koivt) pdXiaTa Kat
Kvp toiTaTTj Kara to7tov io-TLv, rjv KaXov/xev <fiopdv. Phys, IV.
1, 2o8 a 3i.

43. Space (tokos) is a necessary concomitant of

1
sensible existence ; and is therefore not to be resolved
2
into body, either as matter or as form , because space
remains after the body is destroyed; and two bodies,
3
were space body, would be in the same place . Nor
again can it be identified with the interval between the
extremities of body, for this changes with the bodies:
whereas space continues the same whatever may go on
within it. It is therefore the first and unmoved limit of
4
the enclosing as against the enclosed .
 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. 79
1
TL 61 TO KVOV cj>a(TKOVTS elvCU TOTTOV \4y0VCTW TO
yap Ktvov tottos dv eirj icrTeprjfjiivos crw/xaro?. ore /xev ovv
Ivti tl 6 T07ros 7rapa Ta o-co/xaTa, Kcu wo.v aS/xa alcr6r)TOV iv
T07TO), Slol TOVTdiV dv TIS VTToXd/SoL. PkyS. IV. I, 2o8 b 2 5.
2
to fJiev yap cTSos /cat 77 vXyj ov ^wpt^erat tov 7rpayp.aT09,
toV 8c Toirov ivSi^eTat' eV <S yap ai;p rjv, iv tovtq) irdXiv
u8a)p, o5s e<pa/JLev, ytveTat.. ./cat yap So/cet Totoirro rt ctrafc o
T07ros otoi/ to ayyetoi/* eo~Ti yap to ayyetov T07ros /xcTa-
(j>opr}To<i' to 8' ayyetoi/ ovSev tov 7rpay/xaT09 ecrTtv. 209^*23.
3
ov yap aVoAAi>Tat o'toVos tow eV avT(3 (pOetpojjievoiv.
dSvvaTOv 8e crwfjLa etVat tov tottov* iv tclvtcq yap av etrj Svo
o-co/xaTa. 209 a 2.
4
0~Tt 8' ojo-Trep to dyyecov T07ros fXTacf>oprjTO<;, ovto) Kal
6 tottos dyyecov djJLeTaKivrjTOV ..u>ctt to tov Trepii^pvTO^ iripas
.

aKLVTJTOV 7Tp<JJTOV, TOVT tCTTLV O T07TOS. PkyS. IV. 4, 2I2 a I5.

44. Time is referred by Aristotle to our conscious-

ness of a succession in our thoughts, and a sense of
difference between the events of our experience it is

not observed when we are conscious of no change and

is described as a numeration of movement as to its
1
priority and posteriority . Like space it is a universal
concomitant of real existence. Being what is numbered,
it necessarily involves a numberer, that is, a conscious
mind2 .

OTav yap (xrjSev avTol //,Ta/3aAXa)/xci/ Trjv Stduocav rj

XaOwfAtv fxeTa/SdWovTes, ov 8o/cet rjplv yeyoveVat ^poi/05,
KaOdirep ovSe Tots iv SapSot fJivOoXoyov/jiivoLS KaOevSetv
vrapa Tots rjpmo'iv^ OTav iypOwcriv...l 8?; to fxrj olecrOai
etVat xpovov tot crup,/3atVet qfiiv, OTav fxrj o'pt^w/xcv //,778c-
/juav fJLTaj3o\.r]v, aXX iv ivl Kal aStatpeVa) <f>acvr}TaL rj xj/vyrj

p-eVeti/, OTav 8' alcrOwjjLtOa Kal optcrco/xev, tot c/>a/xej/ yeyovivat

Xpovov, (pavepov otl ovk eaTiv avev Kcvijcrecos Kal /JLTa/3oXrj<;

XPovos (jP/iys. IV. II, 2l8 b 2 2). /cat tot <pafjiv yeyovevai
Xpovov, OTav tov irpoTepov Kal vcrTepov iv Tjj Kivrjcrei ataOrjcrtv
80 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
\d/3a)/JLv...TOVTo yap lariv 6 )(P0 V0<> dpi6/JL0<$ KLvrjcrews kolto
TO 7Tf)OTpOV KCU VCTTepOV. 2IC) b I.
2
el Se jJLrjSev d'AAo Tre<fivKev dptOfxeiw rj if/v^rj kcu IJ/VXV^
vovs, dSvvcLTOV elvat xpovoi/ xj/v^rjs fir) ovcrrjs, Phys. IV. 1 4,

223 a 2S.
el ovv dSvvarov Zctti kcu elvat kcu voTjcrai xpovov dvev tov
vvv, to Se vvv icrTi fJLtcroTrjs Tt9, kcu dpyrjv kcu reXevTrjv fyov
a/xa, dpxyv tov icrofxevov xpovov, TeXevTrjv Se tov TrapeX-
/xev
Oovtos, dvajKr) ael elVcu \povov' to yap ecr^arov tov TeXev-
Taiov \r}<f)6ivT0S yp vov * v TLVl
b
v v ^ v tcrrat. Phys, VIII. I,
2Sl 20.

45. Time, Aristotle sees, is necessarily eternal, since

without it the conception of before and after would be

impossible. But if time be eternal, movement is neces-
sarily so also
1
. And this same result is evident for other
reasons. One such reason is that every movement really

presupposes ad infinitum the existence of a prior move-

ment 2 A more detailed proof shews that if movement
.

had once begun, a moving factor and a moved must

either have or have not existed before this beginning :

and hence deduces the need of perpetually assuming

movement 3 . Movement is therefore without beginning
and without end and the world itself it follows is
: eter-
4
nal, neither coming into nor passing out of being .

1
TTpOS Se TOVTOLS TO TTpOTepOV KCU VCTTCpOV 7TW? eCTTat

Xpovov /jli] ovtos rj 6 xpovos fxrj ovarjs

; Ktvrjcreu>s ; el Srj Icttiv

6 xpovos Ktvijcreuis dptO/JLOS rj klvtjctls Tt?, elirep aet xpovos

Icttiv, dvdyKY) kcu Ktvrjcrtv dtStov elvat. Phys. VIII. I, 25 b
IO.
2
(3(7T dvdyKYj fieTafSaXXetv /cat to
to fxeTa/Se/BXr/Kos
fxeTafidWov tov fiev fxeTa/3dXXeiv
(xeTa/3ef3XrjKevai, /cat ecrTt

to /JteTafiefiXrjKevat -rrpoTepov, tov Se iieTafiefiX-qKevat to /xtu-

fidWeiv Kal ovSeiroTe XrjcfrOrjcreTat to TvpCnov. Phys, VI. 6,
b
237 3-
 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. 8

3
t fXV TOIVVV lyivTO (began tO exist) TW1/ KLVTJTiOV
eKacrTOv, dvayKouov irpOTepov rfjs XrjifiOeLo-rjs dXXrjv yevecrOat
jjLTa/3o\rjv koll Swoltov KtvrjOr/vat
Kivqcriv kolB' jjv iyivero to
rj KLvrjorou. ovra irpovirrjp^v del (existed from the be-
el 8'

ginning) klv7]o-U)s [AY) ovcrrjs, aXoyov p\v <atVcrat Kat avToOev

7rL(TTrjo"a(TLV, ov fxrjv aAAa fiaXXov en. irpoiovo~i tovto ctvjx-

fSatveiv dvayKcaov, el yap rwv p.ev Kivr)T<x>v 6vtu)v tujv Se

KivrjTiKwv ore fxev ear at rt irpcorov klvovv to Se Kivovpievov, ore
8' ovOev, dAA' ypefxe'iy dvayKouov tovto fxeTafidWeiv irpoTepov 9

tjv yap ti oXtlov ttjs ^pe/xtas* r) yap rjpefJLYjcrts aTeprjcris Trjs

Kwrfo-ews. <Zo~Te irpo ttjs 7rpu)Trjs fxeTa/3oXr]s carat fxeTajSoXr)
irpoTepa. Phys. VIII. I, 25l a l7.
4
otl fxev ovv ovtc yeyovev 6 7rds ovpavos ovTe evSe^eTat
<f)6apfjvai, KaOdrrep rives <ao"tv avTov, dAA' ecrTiv els Kat
dt8tos, dpyjjv fxev koX TeXevTrjvovk e)(wv tov iravTOS alwvos,
e'^wv Se Kat irepieyuiv ev aurco tov direipov xpovoi/, Ik ran/
elprjpLevwv efecrrt Xafielv tt)v tticttlv. De Caelo II. I, 2S^ h 26.

46. Movement however, while thus from one aspect

unending, is found on the other hand to presuppose an
original principle of movement which remains essentially
unmoved a causal actuality which is as eternal as move-
1
ment itself . For causation, whether efficient or final,

involves ultimately a cause which is neither a secondary

end nor a derivative agent 2 Such a first principle of .

movement must be absolutely

as essentially pure activity
3
immaterial and invariable Thought therefore is the .

presupposition of the world and nature is an organic :

whole in which everything attests an order and a reign of

law (rafts) an order however which is neither absolutely
immanent, nor altogether imposed from without, but the
two in combination, as in the orderly arrangement of an
army 4 .

el Srj dvdyKT) irav to Kwovfievov vtto rtvos re KivelaOat

Kat r) v7ro KLvovfxevov vir aAAou rj fir], Kat t fxev V7T aWov
VV. 6
82 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
Kivovfxivov avay/07 tl elvaL klvovv o ov% vtt dXXov 7rpa>T0i/, el
8e tolovto to 7rp(j)T0v, ovk aVay/07 Odrepov (dSvvarov yap els
aireipov levaL to klvovv /cat KLvovfxevov V7r dXXov olvto' tu>v
yap dirtLptov ovk ecrTLv ovSev 7rp6)Tov) el ovv dirav p,ev to
KLVOVfJieVOV V7T0 TWOS KtVCtTat, TO &. 7TpU)T0V KLVOVV KLVe7.TaL
fiev, ovx vtt aXXov Se, avay/c?? ai)TO i5c/>' avTov KLvelcrOaL.
Pkys.vm. 5,256*13.
aAAa fJirjv otl y iarlv dpxrf tls koll ovk direLpa ret atria
tw ovtwv SrjXov, ovTe yap ws e vXrjs to& e/c TovSe SvvaTOV
levaL els aTreipov...ovTe oOev 77 dp\7] Trjs KLvyjcre^s d/Wa)s Se
ovSe to ov eveKa els aVetpoi/ olov re levaL, j3d8LaLv fxev vytetag
eveKev, TavTrjv 8' evSaL/movLas, ttjv 8' evhaLfioviav dXXov, /cat
ovt(x)s del aXXo dXXov eveKev elvaL. Meta. A. 2, 994*1.
3
el yap jxrj evepyqo-eL (i. e. ovcria at'Stos) ovk eo-Tat klvtjctls.
Itl ovS el evepyrjcreL, 77
8' over la avTrjs Swa/us* ov yap 4'oTat
KLvrjCLs aiStos* evhe^eTaL yap to Swd/xeL ov /jlt] elvaL, Set
apa eLvaL apyrjv TOLavTrjv rjs r\ oucrta evepyeLa. ctl tolvvv
TavTas Sei tgls over (as elvaL avev vXrjs. atStous yap 8t, elirep

ye Ka\ aXXo tl atStoi/. evepyeia apa, Meta. A. 6. I07i b i7.

4
hrLVKeirTeov Se/cat irorepuys e^eL r\ tov oXov <f>vcrLs to

aya$ov to apio~TW, iroTepov Ke^pLcrfxevov tl /cat avTo KaO*

/cal

auro, rj Tiijv Ta^LV ; 77 afXc/>OTepo)s loo-irep crTpaTevfxa. ko! yap

ev Trj Ta^eL to ev /cat, o o-TpaTTjyos, /cat jmaXXov ovtos' ov yap
ovtos Std rqv Ta^Lv dXX' eKeivq 8ta tovtov o~tlv. Meta* A.
10, io75 a n.

47. Against the mechanical philosophy of Demo-

critus, which explained origination by the combination
or dissolution of infinitely numerous homogeneous atoms,
Aristotle maintains the existence of qualitative distinc-
tions among the elements themselves, and the possibility
of qualitative alteration (aAAotWts), as opposed to mere
composition and decomposition of existing particles
1
.

He insists on the teleological study of nature as that

2
which alone gives a true insight into things and requires ,

that the standpoint of the physicist be supplemented by

 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. S$

that of the metaphysician, who sees that what is last in

the order of production, stands first in the light of the
3
phenomenon's fixed nature . Nature (and God) are
always, he conceives, working towards an end, and striv-
4
ing after what is perfect But sometimes the idea is
.

defeated in its aim : matter (v\rj) gets the upper hand

5
and monsters and misgrowths are the result .

1
Arj/JLVKpLTOS 8e /cat AevKL7nros TToirjcravTts tol cr^/xaTa
T7JV dWoLUXTW /Cat Trjv yv(TW K TOVTOiV TTOIOVCTI, Sta/CptCTt
fxev /cat crvyKpio-ct yivccrtv /cat <f>8opdv, Tafct Se /cat 6<jc.i

dXXoLWCTLV. 7Tt $ So/Ct (T^SoV TTOLdiV TpOV tVat yCl'CO't? KOI

dWoLoxTLS /cat yivecrOai /xeu /cat c/>#tpcr#at crvyKpivo/JLtva /cat
SiOLKpLvo/JLeva aXXoiovaOac 8e pLTa/3aXX6vT(x)V tcov 7ra0rjfJidT(i)v,
Kept tovtojv i7n(TT7]<ja(Ti (with attention) OzioprjTiov. aVoptas
yap e^ct tclvtol /cat 7roAAas /cat evXoyovs. {JDe Gen. I. 2,
3l5 b 9.) aVatpct yap oirros 6 Aoyos aXXoLwenv, opMfJLtv 8e to
avTo crwfxa awe^es ov ore p\v vypov ore 8e 7re7rrjy6<s 9 ov
8tatp0~et /cat orvuOecret tOvto iraOov, ov& Tpoirrj /cat StaOtyrj,
KaOdirep Aeyet A^/xo'/cptTos. De Gen. I. 9, 327*16.
2
ov yap LKavov to e/c tlvcdv eortV, olov 7rvpos r) yrjs...
ovto)s yap Kal oi <wtoAoyot ras atrta? tovra<> yeviaeus /cat

cr^/xaros Xyovo-iv...7ravTaypv 8e Xeyo/mev toSc rovSe cVc/ca,

o7rov av (patvrjTat t\os tl 7rpos o y /ctV^crt? 7TpatvL fxrjSevos
e/x7ToSt^ovro5. Part. An. I. 1, 64o b 2 2.
3
See the passages quoted in 36, 4.
o #09 /cat rj cavorts ovSev fxdrrjv ttolovctiv. (Z)e Cael. I. 4,
271*33.) y] c/>ixrts act 7rott t6)v ivSe^ojxivoJV to fieXTto-TOv.
Id. II. 5, 288*2.
ecru yap to Tepas Ttov irapd <f>vcnv tl, irapd <f>v(Tiv 8' ov
iracrav aXXa ttjv ws kiri to ttoXv . .
.
, OTav fxrj KpaTijarj ttjv /caTa
Trjv vXrjv 77 /caTa to ct8os c^vctls. Gen. An. IV. 4, 77o b i6.
Cp. Phys. 11. 9, 200*14.

48. The continuity of nature exhibits a gradual

1
transition from plants to animals . Plants possess no
life beyond that of growth and nutrition, but admit of
62
84 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.
2
variation under domestication . Animals as possessing
3
sense-perception, possess already the germs of knowledge ,

and shew traces of those mental and moral characteristics

which appear in more developed forms in man 4 . The
study of soul (i/svx*]) should therefore be conducted not
with exclusive reference to that of man, but should be
5
extended so as to include its forms in other animals .

1
rjyap cf>vat<; fjLTa/3aiveL o~vve)((i>s aVo t<Zv d\jrv)((DV eU rd
a>a Sid tQv aWcoi/ jacV, ovk ovtmv 8e wa>v, ourtog dxjre
SoKeiv 7rdfi7rav fjuKpov Stac/>cpti/ Oaripov Odrepov to) awcyyus
dXX^Xots. 6 pXv ovv <X7rdyyos, a)<77rcp ctp^rat, /cat r<3 tfiv
7rpO(T7TCJiVK(j)<; fJLOVOV, a7roXv0tls Sc fJirj ZflV, 6fJLCLQ)S C^Ct TOtS
<I>vtoi<; 7rai/TcXc59. De Part. An. iv. 5, 68i a i2.
cVta yap t(ov Iv rrj OaXarrrj S taw oprjcretev av rtg worepov
b
<3dv io-Tiv rj cjyvrov. Hist. An. viii. 1, 588 io.
2
7raXtv T(i)V cfiVTiov rcvd /xcraXXaTTOvrat, ws cf>a<TLV, cts

aXXo ctSos, (J? orav yrjpdcrr)...Ka\ to Tpdyiov 8e

rj Kapva,
TfxrjOkv /cat cfrvrevOev wapd rrjv OdXao-aav rv)(ov carat (TiorvfJL-
fipiov. De Plantis (Arist.?) 1. 7, 82i a 3o.
3
rov 8 c wov ov fjiovov ro yevvrjaat epyov, aXXa *cat
i

yi/axrccos T6vos wdvra jXT)^ovat...a io-6r}0'LV yap e^ovcnVy rj 8

aicrOrjo-is yv worts Tts. Zte GV/z. 23, 731*32.
^?7Z. I.
4
TOVTCOV 8' t\V7y fXeV TiOV 7]6(OV Z&TLV V WaO~LV WS Ct7TCtl/,

/xaXXov 8c <ai/cparrcpa cV rots c^ov(tl fxaXXov ^^os Kat

fxaXtcrra iv dvOpwwtp' tovto yap c^ct tt/v <fivo~LV a7TOTCTcXecr-
b
fxivqv. Histor. Animal, ix. 1, 6o8 4.
6
crK7TTOv Sc Kat worepov d/xoctS^s awao~a
. . . if/vx?) T) ov'

ct 8c //.^ d/xoctSifs, TTOTtpov ct'Sct Stac^cpovcrti/ rj ycVct. vvv

fiev yap ol Xcyovrcs Kat ^t/tovi/tcs 7rcpt xj/v^rjs wept ttjs

dv6pM7rivr]<z p.6vr)<i ioiKacrtv iwiorKOwelv. Z? ^??z. I. I, 402 b 4-

 CHAPTER VI.

PSYCHOLOGY.

49. Soul (t/^x7?) *s defined by Aristotle as the perfect

expression or realization of a natural body a realiza-
tion, further, which is in its first stage, and which is
1
therefore implicit rather than explicit . It follows that

there is the closest connexion between psychical states

and physiological processes we need no more ask
whether the soul and body are one, than whether the wax
2
and the impression stamped upon it are so : the very
error of the pre- Aristotelian psychologists lay in discussing
the soul and metaphysically without any
abstractedly
3
regard to the bodily environment At the same time, .

Aristotle regards soul or mind not as the product of the

physiological conditions, but as the truth of body, the
oi'o-ta, which only do the bodily conditions gain
in their
real meaning 4 .

Sid xf/v)(i] (ttlv IvreXi^eia tj it purr) crco/xaros <J)VO-lkov

Swdfxei 00771/ )(ovto<;. De An.
4i2 a 28. First en-11. i,
telechy, it is explained, stands to second as eTrto-r^/x^,
knowledge possessed, stands to Oeupclv, knowledge ap-
plied, and since sleep no less than waking involves soul,
it must be entelechy of the first or implicit kind. It is
called simply an ivtpyeia croj/xaros in Meta. H. 3, 1043*3 5.
86 PSYCHOLOGY.
8
8lo kol ov Sec tprjTtiv el iv 77 il/vxV Ka ^ T crw/xa, wcnrep
OvSk TOV KTJpOV Kdl TO O^T^ta. 4-I2 b 8.
eou< Se kclI ra rrjs xj/vxys 7raOrj iravra eii/cu /xera (TaJ/xaros
...l O OVTW? ^(t, OrjAOV OTL T(X 7TaU7] AoyOL CVVAOL LO~LV. . . KOLl

Sia TavTa 77877 ^>vclkov to 6ewprjaai irtpX if/vx^s, V Trdcrrjs 77

a
T-fjs ToiavT-qs. De An. 1. 1, 403 i6.
OV TO O'to/Xa 0~TLV ivT\X LCL ^XV^i a^ A avT7J O~0)]ULaT0S
rti/05. Kal Sia tovto kcxAws V7roXap.(5avovcriv ots Sokci fxrjT
avev adfxaTOS ctvat ^tc crw/xa ti 7; if/vyr]. -^^ -^#- n. 2,
a
4i4 i8.
3
ol Se jnovov iTrix^tpovat Xiyetv ttoIov tl rj
^J/vxVj KCpl Se
tov Se^o/zeVov crw/xaros otj#> krt TrpooSiopi^ovcrLv, wcnrep
ZrSexofAtvov Kara tovs Hv0ayopiKovs pivOovs ty)v tvxovctolv
tvxov ivSvea6ai arQfxa.
xf/vx^v cts to De An. I. 3, 407 b 20.
4
KaOoXov p\v ovv elprjTaL tl Iutiv r] \\fvxj] ovcria yap 77 %

Kara tov Xoyov. tovto 8c to T6 tjv efi/at tw toiwSi crco/xari,

KaOairep ci ti twv opydvw cf>vcriKov rjv o-w/xa, otoi/ 7TXckvs'

7)1/ xuv yap av to 7reXK6 ova col avTOV, Kal 77 ij/vxveii/at 77

tovto' X'^pLG'Q^aTjs yap TavTrjs ovk av Ztl 7reXKVS rjv, aXX 77

ofxwvfjLus. De An. 11. 1, 4i2 b io.

50. The soul manifests its activity in certain "facul-

ties" or "parts" which correspond with the stages of
biological development, and are the faculties of nutrition

(peculiar to plants), that of sense perception (peculiar to

animals), that of movement, and that of reason (peculiar
1
to man) These faculties resemble mathematical figures
.

in which the higher includes the lower, and must be

understood not as like actual physical parts, but like such
aspects asconvex and concave which we distinguish in
2
the same line The mind remains throughout a unity
. :

and it is absurd to speak of it, as Plato did, as desiring

3
with one part and feeling anger with another .

1
corn/ 7] if/vxv twv elprjfxevtov tovtmv (nutrition, sense,
etc.) dpxrj, xal tovtols copio-Tai, 0p7TT6Ka>, alo~6r)TLK(o, Sta-
 PSYCHOLOGY. Sj

VOrjTLKto, KLV7](Tl. 7TOTpOV & TOVTWV KCLCTTOV icTTL if/VXV V

flOpLOV lf/V)(fj<S, KCLl Ct LLOplOV, 7TOTpOV OVTiOS W(TT LVOLL ^JJplCTTOV
XoyO) jXOVOV 7) KCLl T07TW, TTCpl p\v TlViOV TOVTO)V OV ^aA.7TOI/
b
iSeiv, cVia Se diropiav e^et. De An. II. 2, 4i3 l2.
SlW/*lS 8' l7TOp.l> 6pe7TTLKOV, CLLCrOrjTLKOV, OpCKTIKOV,
KtvrjTiKov Kara toVoj/, Siclvotjtikov* virdpyei Se tols p^iv

<f>VTols TO 0p7TTtKOV LIOVOV. De Afl. II. 3, 414*31.

2
7rapa7r\r]crL(i)<; 8' e^ei t<3 7Tpl rwv cr^Lidrayv kcll rd
Kara ypvyrjv' act yap iv T(3 icfaetjrjs virdp^et Svvdpiei to
7TpOTpOV 7Tl T TWV CT)(r)LlCLT<x)V KCU C7TI TCOl/ ifJOJ/V^OiV, OlOV Iv
TTpay(DV(o pev Tptyu)vov 9 iv alcrOrjTLKio Se to OpeirTiKov.
b
De An. n. 3, 4i4 28.
KaOdirep iv rrj 7repi<epeia to KvpToV kcll to koIXov* Eth.
Nic. 1. 13, no2 a
28. Cp. Eth. Eud. 11. 1, I2i9 b 32.
3
XcyOVOTt 8>7 TtVS LLCpLCTT^V aVTTJV, KCLl CtAAo) /Al> l/OCtV

aXX<o 8' iTTiOvLLtiv *

Tt o5i> 877 7tot crvve)(L rrjv il/ vXV v> c*

pepiarrj 7ricj>VKV ; ov yap 8?) to ye ow/xa. .Zte ^4/z. I.

5,
4n b 5-
to Se Xeyeiv opyifccr#ai rrjv if/v^rjv oliolov kclv cl tis
Xeyoc rrjv \pv)(rjv vcfyaiveiv rj oIkoSollciv. (SeXriov yap Icroys lltj

Xe'ye> rrjv il/v^rjv eXeelv f) Liav6dviv r) SiavoeicrOai, aXXa tov

dv6pcx)7rov rrj ij/v)(rj. De An. I. 4, 4o8 b n.

51. Sense perception is a faculty of receiving the

forms of outward objects independently of the matter of
which they are composed, just as the wax takes on the
figure of the seal without the gold or other metal of which
1
it is composed As the subject of impression it involves
.

a movement and a kind of qualitative change; but it is not

merely a passive or receptive affection 2 : it in turn acts,
and, distznguzs/imgbetweQYi the qualities of outward things,
becomes " a movement of the soul through the medium
of the body 3." It involves accordingly between the object
and the organ a ratio or correspondence (/xecroT^s) of
which the destruction by excessive colour or sound etc.
makes perception impossible 4 The object of sense may .
88 PSYCHOLOGY.

be either i, Special; thus colour is the special object of

sight, sound of hearing ; 2 , Common, or apprehended by
several senses in combination, e.g. motion or figure :

or 3 , Incidental or Inferential (Kara o-vfjLf3e/3rjKos) as

when from the immediate sensation of white we come to
know a person or object which is white 5 The special .

senses are five in number, of which touch is the most

common and rudimentary, hearing the most instructive,
and sight the most ennobling 6 . The organ in these senses
never acts directly, but is affected by some medium such
as air : even touch, which seems to act by actual contact,
probably involving some such vehicle of communication 7 .

1
rj jjiev aia6r)(TLS Icrrt to ScktikoV twv alcrdrjTcov el8<2v
avtv rrjs vXrjs, otoi/ 6 Krjpos tov SolktvXlov avev tov atSrjpov
Several to arjjjbiov. De An. II. 12, 4 24
s
1 8.
2
r] 8' ato-drjats Iv ra> Kiv&oOai tc kcu 7rao"^cti/ o~Vf fiaivei'
b
Sokcl yap aXXotwcrts tls elvai. De An. II. 5? 4!6 33. But
in in. 4, 42(^29, we hear of r] aVa^eta tov alo-6-qTiKov :

and in Anal. Post. 11. 19 alo-drjo-is is described as aSiW/us

KpLTlKY],
3
rj Se Xeyofxevrj alcrOrjo-LS, o5s ivipyeta, KcvrjcrLS tls Sta
tov o~a)/xaros Trjs xj/v^rjs eo~n. De Somno 2, 454*7*
4
toot/ alo-QrjTwv ai vwepfSoXal c^Oeipovai ra alcrOiiTrjpia'
lav yap rj io-yvpoTtpa tov ato~8rjrrjpLOV r) Kivr)0~LS, XveTat o
Xoyos, tovto 8' rjv r) aXcrOrjcns. De Alt. II. 12, 424*30.
Sid tov 6fjLo(<x)<$ Oep/jLOv Kal \pv)(pov ovk alaOavo/jieOa, aAAa
Ttov virepfioXGv, cos rrjs alaOrjaeoiS olov fxecroTrjTOS twos
ovarjs Trjs iv rois aloOrjTols tvavTicocrcais' Kal Sid tovto
Kpivei ra alaOrjTa' to yap fxiaov KpiTiKov. De An. II. II,
4*4*5-
6 , v A
Xcyerat Se to alcrOrjTOV Tptx&S" Aeya) 8' tSiov /u,V 6 //,?)
ci/Se^crai erepa aladrjcrei alcrOdveaOai, Kal ircpl o fxrj ivSe^rj-
Tai d7raT7]6rjvaL olov oiJ/ls ^pw/xaros...KOiva 8c Kivricris,
rjpe/JLLa, dpiO/mos, 0-^17/xa, fxeyeOos* tol yap TOiavra ouSe/uas

icTiv i'Sia dWd KOivd 7rdcraLS' Kal yap arfyfj Kivrjcris tls icrTiv
 PSYCHOLOGY. 89

alcr6r]Trj /cat oxf/W Kara ctu/a/Jc/^kos 8c Xiycrai aurBrjrov,

oXov el to XevKov eirjAtapous vlos Kara <7VfJLJ3f3rjKd<s yap
*

tovtov alo-Odverai, otl tw Acvko) crvfji(3if3rjK tovto ov aiaOa-

vtoll. De An. 11. 6, 4i8 a io.
6
rd Se ^wa irdvT e^ovcrt /xtW yc rwv atcr^crcwv, T771/
e
a c/>^i/. Zte ^#. II. 3, 4i4 b 3-
Trpos /xei/ rd aVayKata KpctTTO)!/ 77 oi/as /cat /ca#* olvttjv, 7rpos
8e vow Kat /cara <jVfx/3/3rjK6<; y aKorj. Stac/>opas yu,ei/ yap
7roXXa? etcrayyeXXet Kat 7rai/ro8a7ras ??'
t?Js oi^eoos Swa/xt?...?;
8' a/co?) ra<; rov xj/otpov Stac/>opas fxovov. De Sensu I, 437
a
5*
7
eav Tts ^77 to e^oi/ xpw/m C7r' avr^v TTyv 01/av, ov/c o\J/TaL'
aXXa to /xev ^pco/xa Ktvet to 8tacav9, otoi/ toi/ aepa, vVo
toutou 8e o^we^oi;? oVtos KtvctTat to alo'9rjT7]pLOv...o 8' avVos
A.oyos /cat 7rept xj/ocfrov /cat ocrfJLrjs Icttlv' ov6\v yap aurwv
a7rTO/xi/ov tot; ala6rjT7]pLOV 7rotet t?)i/ ataOrjatv, dXX vwo p.ev
007x17s Kat xj/6<pov to /xeTafi) KtvetTat, tj-tto 8e tovtov tcuv ato - -

6r]T7]pL<j)V KCtTp01/. /? ^4/Z. II. 7, 41^ 12.

52. Aristotle's Common or Central Sense, besides

recognising the common qualities which are involved in
1
all particular objects of Sensations , is thus firsts the
sense which brings us a consciousness of Sensation ; and,
secondly, that which by thus holding up in one act before
the mind the objects of our knowledge, enables us to
2
distinguish between the reports of different senses . It

finds accordingly its analogue in the heart as the organ

which occupies a corresponding central position in the
body 3 .

1
De An. 425*14, where the KOLvd are described
in. i,
as 0)1/ Kara av/mfSe^rjKO^ /. e.
eKao-T7j alaOtfaei alcrOavofxeOa
qualities which we perceive by each sense incidentally.
2
IcJTt Se Tt? Kat Koivrj 8iVa/xts aKoXov6ovo~a 7raaat9, y

Kat OTt o'pa Kat aKovet alcrddveTai' ov yap 877 rrj ye o\J/cl dpa
otl Spa. Kat KptVet 8*7 Kat SvVaTat Kptveiv on erepa rd
yXvKea rwv Xcvkcov, ovt yevaeL ovre ox]/l ovt attc/>oti/, aXXd
TLVL KOtVW fJLOptCO T<2v alo~9Y)T7]pL<X>V aVaVTO)!/. De SoPinO 2,
90 PSYCHOLOGY.

455**5- Cp. De An. in. 2, 426*12; De Sensu 7,

449 &
a

3
oXkd fxrjv to ye Kvptov rwv alcrOijcretov iv ravrrj {rfj
KdpSia) rots ivaifjLois iraaiv' iv tovtio yap dvayKcuov eTvat to
7rdvTa>v tQv aicrOrjTrjpLtov kolvov alo-0r]T7]pLov. De Juv. 3,
469*10.

53. Imagination (^avTaaia) Aristotle defines as "the

movement which upon an actual sensation :" it
results
1

is, in other words, the process by which an impression of

sense is pictured and retained before the mind, and is

accordingly the basis of Memory. The representative
2
pictures which it provides form the materials of reason .

Illusions and Dreams are both alike due to an excite-

ment in the organ of sense similar to that which would
be caused by the actual presence of the sensible pheno-
menon 3 .

1
y <f>avTacria av etrj klvtjctis v7ro rfjs alcrOrjcrews rfjs kolt
ivepyeiav yiyvofxevrj. De An. III. 3, 429
s
!. So in the
Rhetoric 1. 11, 1370*28, it is briefly described as alo-Orjo-cs
dvOevrjs
2
decaying sense.
rrj Se StavorjTLKrj ij/ vXV T(* ^avTao-/xara olov alaOyj fxara
v-rdpyei. De An. III. 7, 43i a i4. voeiv ovk exmv dvev
(pavTacTjixaTos. De Memor. 449*31.
3
rov 8c Siexj/evcrOat alrtov on ov fxovov rov alcrdrjrov
klvov[jlvov cjiatverat dhr]7roTe, aAAa kolL rfjs alaOyjaeios klvov-
/JLvr}S olvttJs, idv ojcraurws klvtJtcll ojcnrep kcu VTro tov alaOr)-
tov* Xeyco 8' otov rj Sokci tois irXeovui KivelcrOai klvov-
yyj
fjLtvrjs t?Js 6\peo)s vtt oXkov. De Insom. 46o b 2 5.

54. Memory (/xv?^) is defined by Aristotle as the

permanent possession of a sensuous picture as a copy
1
which represents the object of which it is a picture .

Recollection, or the calling back to mind the residua of

memory, depends upon the laws which regulate the
 PSYCHOLOGY. 91

association of our ideas, and " we seek to reach the asso-

ciated impression by starting in our thought from an
object present to us, or something else, whether it be
2 ."
similar, contrary or contiguous

1
(ttl /jLvrJiJirj...<j>avTdcrfJiaTO<s <os clkovos ov cfyavracrfxa
eis. De Mem. 1, 4Si
a
i5.
2
orav ovv dvafJUfJLvyjcrKMfjLeOa, KtvovfX0a twv irporipoiv
TLVOL KLV7](T0iV, WS SiV KLVrjO&fJLeV //,#' TjV KLVYJ (the impreS-
sion of which we are in search) duOzv. Sio kcu to i<j>er)<;
OrjptvofJLtv vorjcravTts airo rov vvv rj aXXov twos, koll a<fi

ofxoiov rj IvavTiov rj tov o-vveyyvs. De Mem. 2, 45l b l6.

55. Reason (vovs) is to Aristotle the source of the

first principles of knowledge, and thus opposed to sense,

in that while sense is restricted and individual, thought
is and universal ; and that while sense deals with the
free
concrete and material aspect of phenomena, reason deals
1
with the abstract and ideal But while reason is thus .

in itself the source of general ideas, it is so only poten-

tially it arrives, that is, at them only by a process of
development in which it gradually clothes sense in
2
thought, and unifies and interprets sense-presentations .

1
Xeyio Se vovv <S Siavoei/rcH Kal v7roXafJi/3dvt rj ^v\rj.
De An. III. 4, 429*23. A.i7TTai vovv clvou twv apywv.
Eth. Nic. vi. 6, 1141*7.
7W KO.& (ZKCLCTTOV 7] KCLT ZvipyCLOLV CUO'OrjO'LS, 7]
8' 7T LCTI] fJLT)

t<ov kcl66\ov TavTa 8'

^XV' ^ l vo ^~
iv avTjj 7rws Ictti ttj
aai pXv hr olvtiq ottotolv /3ovXrjTat, alaOdveaOai 8' ovk sir
OLVT&' dvayKcuov yap virdpytw to alcrOrjTov. De An. II.
54i7 b 22.
h
dXXo cori to fxeyeOos Kal to fJLtyeOet ctvcu (t. e. we
7rct 8'

may distinguish between the actual physical magnitude

and the abstract conception of it)...ro> pkv ovv alo-6rjTu2
to Oepfjiov Kal to xj/vxpov KpLvec ..aXXio Se tjtol ^captcrrw, rj
92 PSYCHOLOGY.
tog 7] KK\o.(rjJLvr) e\ei 7rpog avrrjv orav eKTaQr}, to crap/d
cTvat [The meaning would seem to be that sense
Kptvei.
and reason stand to one another in cognition, as two
processes of which the one like a straight line goes
directly at its object, whereas the other like the bent line
returns upon itself.] De An. in. 4, 42^1 o.
2
kcu ev Srj 61 keyovres rrjv \j/v^rjv elvtu tottov ctScoV,
ttayjv on ovrc oatj aAA rj vorjTLKT], ovt evreAe^eta aAA.a
Swd/jLti ra eiSrj. De An. III. 4, 429*27.
Swdfiei 7T(3s co~tl ra vorjToi 6 voug, aAA' IvrcXe^eia ovh\v
irpiv av vorj. Set 8' ovrcos coo"7rp j/ ypa/jL/xareta) <o fxrjOev
vwap^a ivreXe^eta ycy pap.fxivov' OTrep av/JLJ3aiVL IttX tov
vov. De An. in. 4, 43o a i.
ovre Sr} ivvTrdp^ovcFiV dcfuDptcrjuivat ai e^et?, our a7r
aXXcoi/ c^ccov yivonai yvoiOTLKoyripiDV, dW air alo~6r] crews.

[ch. 27.) /to/. An. 11. 19, ioo a io.

56. The work of reason in thinking things suggests

the question, How can immaterial thought come to re-
1
ceive material things ? Only it is obvious in virtue of
some community between thought and Over and things.

above therefore passive reason, which receives, com-

bines and compares the various objects of thought,
Aristotle recognises a creative reason which makes objects
of thought, which renders the world intelligible, and
bestows on the materials of knowledge those ideas or
categories which make them accessible to thought, just
as the sun communicates to material objects that light,
without which colour would be invisible, and sight would
have no object 2 Hence reason is as it were the constant
.

support of an intelligible world, and Aristotle accord-

ingly, while assigning reason to the soul of man, describes

it as coming from without, and would seem almost to

identify it with God as the eternal and omnipresent

3
thinker Even in man, in short, reason realizes some-
.
 PSYCHOLOGY. 93

thing of the essential characteristic of absolute thought

the 4
unity of thought as subject with thought as
object .

1
airoprjaeic 8' dv Tts ct 6 vovs dirXovv Icttl kcu a/7ra0S
koll jjlyjOzvl [JLrjOev ^t kolvov, wcnrep cfrrjcrlv Avafayopas, ttcos

vorjcrtL, el to voeiv iracrytLV tl Zcttlv* 77 yap tl kolvov

a/x<ou/ virapyti, to fiev 7tolLV SoKet to Se 7rda)^LV. De
An. III. 4, 429 b 22.
2
eVet 8' ojcnrep iv OL7rdcrr) rfj (frvcru Icttl tl to /xev v\rj
c/cao"TO) yeVct (tovto Se o 7rdvTa Svvafxet eKetva), tTtpov Se to
gutioi> Kat TroirjTLKOv, TO> 7roteu/ 7ravTa, otov 7; Te^yrj 7rpos T771/

{jA.771/ 7re7rov6ev, dvdyKrj kcu iv Trj if/v^rj wap\iv tolvtols Tag

Stac^opas. Kat ccttcv o' fiev tolovtos vovs tw TTai/Ta ytVe-
crOai, 6 Se irdvTa iroiew, ws efts Tts, otov to <d>s* Tpd-
t<5
7toi/ yap Ttva Kat to <(3s 7rotet tcl Swa/xet 6VTa ^pco/xara
eVepyeta xpcopxrra* Kat ovtos o vovs ^a)pto*Tos Kat airaOrjs
Kat dfjuyrjs Trj ovcrta wi/ eVepyeta. De An. III. 5, 430 a IO.
3
AetVeTat Se toV vovV jjlovov OvpdOzv hreio'iivo.i Kat
ctVat fjLovov. Gen. An. b 28.
tfetoi'
e
11. 3, 736
auToV KaTa
Se voet o vovs jJLTa\r)\J/LV tov voyjtov.
voyjtos yap yiyverai Oiyydvmv Kat vod)v tocrre TavTOv vovs
Kat voyjtov. to yap Sektlkov tov voyjtov Kat Trjs ouVtas vovs.
-M/tf. A. 7, I072 b 20.
a^ToV apa voct, (i.e. the divine substance) et7rep eo-Tt to
KpaTLCTOV, Kat tcTTLV 77* VOT^CTtS V07yO"G)S VO^O"tS. <^>at]/Tat, S'
act aAAov 77 i7ncrTrjfxrj Kat 77 alcrOrjcrLs Kat 77* Sda Kat 77

StaVota, avTT^s 8' eV 7rapepya>. 77 eV' evtW 77 7TLcrTrjiJLrj to

7rpayfxa m
eVt fxkv twv ttolyjtlkwv avev v\rjs 77 ovcrta Kat to tl
r)v etvat, eVt Se to>v OewprjTLKwv d Adyos to 7rpayp,a Kat 77

vdrjo-Ls [i.e. in speculative sciences the thought is also the

object (7rpdy/xa)]. otj;( erepou ovv 6Vtos tov vov/jlvov Kat tou
vov, ocra e^et, to avTO ccrTat, Kat 77 vorjaLS tS voov-
^,7; t1Xt7i/

/xcVw (Meta. A. 9, io74 b 33-)

jjllcu 7rt pkv yap twv dvcv

vXrjs to avTo ecrTt to voovv Kat to voovfxwov. De An. 43Q a 2.

 CHAPTER VII.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

57. Ethics, as viewed by Aristotle, is an attempt to

find out what, is man's chief end or highest good an
end which he maintains is really final (tcA.os tcAcioi/)
because though many ends of life are only means to
further ends, our aspirations and desires must have at
1
lastsome absolute object of pursuit in which to rest .

Such a chief end is universally called happiness (cvStu-

Ijlovlcl), but people mean such different things by the

expression that he finds it necessary to discuss the nature
2
of it for himself . It must be, to begin with, based on
3
human nature . Morality in short must rest upon the
conditions of human life, and its method must be that of
4
starting from the facts of personal experience . Thus
happiness cannot be found in any abstract transcendental
notion like a Platonic self-existing good must be : it
5
something practical and human . must then be found
It

in the work and life peculiar to man. But this is neither

the vegetative life we share with plants nor the sensitive
existence which we share with animals 6 . It follows
therefore that true happiness lies in the active life of a
rational being or in a perfect realization and outworking
of the true soul and self (Ivipyua if/vxys kolt dptnyv
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 95

dpio-rrjv) continued besides throughout a lifetime (iv fiiy

7
TcXetco) .

1
iraaa tx v71 koX iracra //,#oSo?, o/xotcos 8c 7rpat's T /cat
7rpoatpecrts dyaOov twos i<f>UcrOai 8o/ct* Sto /caXcos aVe-
cfayvavTO t dyaOov, ov irdvr c/>tTat...t 877 rt tcXos iorrl

t<j)v 7rpaKTiov o Si clvto fiovXofxeOa, rdXXa Se Sid tovto, kcu

fxrj irdvTa Si ercpov alpovfJieQa (jrpoucn yap ovrtt) y cts
OLTTCLpOV <JJ(TT LVCLL KVTjV KCU pLaTaCaV T7JV Op^iv), SrjXov COS

tovt dv Lrj rdyaOov /ecu to dpio~Tov. Eth. ./Vic. I. I,

109^1.
2
Xeywfxzv SI ri Icttlv ov Xtyofxev rrjv iroXiTiKrjv icj>UcrOai
/cat ri to irdvTwv aKporarov tcoV wpaKTcov dyaOiov. ovo/nan
pXv ovv cryzSov vtto tcoV 7rXetoTO)i/ d/xoXoyctTat. ...7Tpl 8c
rrjs tvSaifJLOvias, ri icmv, dfjLcj>icrl3r]TOvcri, Kal ov)( o'ttotcos

ol 7roXXol rots* croc/>ots a7ro8t8o'acrti>. Eth. Nic. I. 4, I095 a

I5 -

3 m
rrjs 7toXltlk7]<; ovk ecrriv oIkclos aKpoarrjs o vo<z aVct-
pos* yap tujv Kara rov /3lov 7rpaecoi/, ol Xoyot 8 c/c tovtwv /cat

7Tpl TOVTUiV. EtJl. NlC. I. 3. 5, I095 a 2.

4
fxkv ovv aVo tcoV yvcopt/xcoi/, ravra Sc StTTcoV
dpKrkov
Ta yap rjplv rd 8' aVXcoV ttrcos ovv rffuv yc ap/creov
/xei/

aVo tcoV 77/w yviiiptpaov. 8to Set rots edeo-iv rj^Oat /caXcos
toi/ 7rept /caXtoV /cat Siko.lwv kcu 6'Xcos* tcoV 7roXtrt/ccoV a/cov-
o-ofievov t/cavcos. apx^7 yap to oti. Eth. Nic. I. 4. 5.
fi
ct yap Kal Zcttlv ev n to kowyj Karr]yopovjULVOv dyaOov
r) ^(xiptarov tl avTO KaO* avTO, SrjXov cos ovk av elrj 7rpa/c-
TOV 0\)Sk KT7JTOV dv0pOJ7TU)' VVV 8e TOLOVTOV Ti ^TJTtiTai. Eth.
b
Nic. 1. 6. 13, io98 32.
5
aXX' 6crcos Trjv fiv evSatfioviav to dpLcrTov Xcyctv OfXO-
Xoyovp.cv6v Ti c^atVerat, 7ro0eiTai 8 ivapyecrTCpov Ti o~Tiv
Irt Xe-^OrjvaL ra^a 877 ykvoiT dv tovt, el Xy]<j>6t7j to epyov
rov dvOp(X)Trov...Ti ovv Srj tovt dv etrj ttotc. ; to /jlV yap
tf/v KOivov cu/at cf>aivTai Kal tois <fcvTo2s, ^retrat Se to
t8toi/. d<popiaTov apa tt}i/ 0p7TTiKrjv Kal avr)TiKrjv <dtJv.
irrofjievr) 8c aicrOrjTiKTJ tis aV ctTy c^atVcrat 8c /cat aur^ /cotn;
/cat r7T7ra) /cat iravTi ^ww, ^^. iV/^r. I. 7. 10, I097 b 2 2.
'
XctVerat 877 7rpaKTLK7] rts (Cw>}) ro ^ Xoyoi/ e^oi/ros*.
:- MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
&TTbs (Le. in the two senses of c&s and eVepyeia) oc kcli

Kar crepyeiav Oereov' Kvpuartpov yap

Tcuriift Xeyofianqs, rrjv
avtrf 8okl Acyecr&u. et b cotif epyov ayOpt&rov
hipyeia Kara Aoyov rj pur} avev Aoyov, to 8* a i it
epyor cTkcu to ycVct Tovoe icat roroc (TTOvSataii wnrep k .

purmv u cnroT&uav KiBapurrov (this explains why the life

a~f ::s iee' lorrer.: r:v.;s: ';e riker: in :hei: _es: anc
perfect State Or opcnj), to avOpwrartnr aya&ov ^nrjcrj 5
yeia yivcrai tear apenfr, et 8e vAeious at apercu ma I

apurrqr jcat TeAetOTariTK. en o ev pt) reAeuE>. /na yap

^cAiOQH' eap or rwei oroe pa rjuepa' ovra> oe ovoe /za/ca
paw jcat evSat/tora iua 17/iepa orS* oAtyos xpcVos. ./&. J
L 7. 14

5$. I
expands and interprets this biological conception of
happiness. Happiness, we have just seen, is an out-
working of man's true soul ; and the moralist must the: e
fore have some knowledge of it .
1
Now this soul, whi
is on the one hand purely vegetative and animal (to
_.-.-, . presents :n :he ::':.-: h:.ni :
"
; ;_.;.:; .isper.s

:":: the ._.:.-: :he :"::-.:.-: :.~i iesire r.enii'.e

:: rrnsir. :':<-. o; -*,-- -cVn:: . ~r.i .: the reason

and the intellectual powers (to Aoyov e^ov mpu^ . It

:':".*.:
~.-s :;::.: :he ;:er:e:: levei: -in.er.: :: :;:::;: nan-ire

will include ^Jirr/ a perfect development and true regula-

:i;n ::" :he feelinzs ar.f iesires in n: ::;.". ex: eii-n: e dze--
i)6unj) or virtue, and secondly a perfect development
of the intellectual faculties in an dpcrrj SuMvaqruaj or
:::er.;^i yi.vnt '.

ei 8e tow^ ovrtts ego, JtyAor ort Set toV xoAtTi/cov

ctSeVat ins to xept 7^x 7 r 1 ^nrP Ka* T K 6<f>6a\pxns Oepa-
veoaorra jcat xaV o~5/ta... AeycTtu Se WEfM avrrjs /cal ev rots

c^Wrepucots Aoyot? apjeovVrus eVta #cat xpnqan bottoSi

 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 97
*

oTov to jueV dXoyov avrrjs etVat, to Se Xoyov (.\ ov ' T0V

dXoyov Se to fxkv eot/ce kolvco kolI (J)vtlk<2, Xeyoo Se to oItlov
tov Tpcj>ecr6at KOLi auf ecrOat . . aXXd to OpeirTiKov lariov
eVeiS^ ttJs dvOptoirLKrjs dperrjq dfxoipov etfivKev. eot/ce Se

/cat dXXrj Tts <ucrts Trjs iK'X^s aXoyos etrat /xeTexoucra \x.ivTOi

ttt) tov yap iyKpaTOvs /cat a/cpaTOu? tov Xoyov Kal

Xoyov.
Trjst/^Y^ T ^y ov *X 0V ^Tratrov/xcv* opOcos yap /cat eVt Ta
/3eXTLCTTa 7rapa/caXet' </>atVeTat S' eV avTOts /cat aXXo tl napd
tov Xoyov 7recf)VK6s o jxaxtTai T /cat arrtTetvet tw Xoya>...
Xoyov Se /cat tovto c/>atWrat /xcTe^etv, coo-7rep etTro/zev*
7
7ret#ap^et yovV to) Xo'ya) to tov ey/cpaTou?. .Zs//?. JV /?. I. 1 3. 9.
2
</>atverat Srj Kal to aXoyov Slttov. to /jlev yap <Pvtlkov
ovSa/xak KOlVfDvei Xoyov, to S' eVt^vp.^Tt/coY Kal oXco? dpe/cTt-
KOV /XT6^t 7TC05, t} KaTTjKOOV CCTTLV CLVTOV Kal TTeiOap^LKOV . . .

et Se ^p?} /cat tovto cravat Xo'yov e>(etv, 8(,ttov ecrrat [Kal] to

Xoyov e^ov, to /xev /cvptujs Kal eV avra), to S' wo-rrep tov 7raTpo$
aKOvcrTiKov tl. StopteTat Se /cat 77 apery) Kara ttjv Stac^opaV
TavTrjv. Xeyo/Jiev yap avrcuv Tas fxev Stavo^Tt/cas, Tas Se
rjOiKas, crocf>[av fxlv Kal avvecnv Kal fypovrjcnv Staj/OTyrt/cas,

iXevOepLOTrjTa Se /cat o-u><$>poo-vvqv r)6iKas. Eth. Nic. I. 1 3.

18, no2 b 3o. The

following diagram may assist in com-
prehending the subject*.

*hoci

d\oyoj> Xoyo^ ex 0J/

(pvnKQv emdv/j.rjTLKOi' \6yov ^rex.ov XoyiKOi'

dptKTLKOV

dperrj tjOlkt)
(a'perTj au/jLaTiKr))
1 __ T . .
dperi) 5lclvot]ti.K7i
j
'<pvx?js ivepyeia^ evdaL/aouia.

59. Moral Virtue, while distinguished from all natural

* The diagram I fear necessarily seems to draw divisions where

aspects only are 10 be distinguished. I quite agree at least with Prof.
Susemihl in holding that Aristotle's meaning is "not that the
rational soul is two-fold but that if we reckon the appetitive soul
:

as rational, then the last mentioned will be two-fold." Whether

Kal after 5trToz> 2<ttcu is or is not omitted seems to me immaterial.

W. 7
98 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
phenomena by man's power of modifying and improving
its materials, is an evolution from those natural impulses
which exist even in the brute, and which may be de-
1
scribed as natural virtue (<t*v(riKrj dperrj) . These im-
pulses, by association of repeated acts which are not in
themselves virtuous, consolidate themselves into a fixed
tendency, or c^ts, and so gain those characteristics of
permanence and purity of purpose, which are involved
2
in formed virtue Further, happiness being a perfect
.

development of our nature, virtue as opposed to vice

observes a mean or ixtcroTrjs between excess and defect
that is, it does not indulge any tendency of our nature at
the expense of another, but it seeks by proper regulation
to develope all. The Cynics, it follows, are mistaken in
regarding the entire suppression of the feelings rather
3
than their regulation as the object of morality . But it is

only when we try to define virtue and take it in the form

of its ordinary existence in the world (owta), that virtue
appears as moderation : as the best thing possible it is

essentially an extreme. This mean, however, as subjective

and relative, requires to be regulated by an opOos Aoyos or
4
an Ideal of Reason .

1
8rj\ov otl ovSe/xta Tiov i/9lk<j)v aperwi/ <f>vcri rj/xtv iyyt-
vcrac ovOev yap rwv (jyvaet 6vto)V aAAws kOit^rai. ovtc apa
cfrvcrei ovre irapd cf>v<jtv lyyivovrai at apeTCu, aAAa 7T6c/>u/co(xt

fxkv Tjfjuv 8ea<j6ai auras, TcAeiov/xei/ois Se Sta rod e#oug.

Eth. Nic. II. I. 3, I103 a 2 5. iraai yap So/cct I/cacrra rwy
yjOcov v7rdp)(LV cf^vcret 7ro)s* /cat yap St/catot Kal crdxppovtKol /cat
aVSpetot /cat raXXa 'i^ofxev evOvs Ik yevtTrjs. VI. 13. 1,
b
H44 4. wriv dperal Kal <jyucrei ev e/cao"TOts eyytvo/^crat,
olov dpfjcau rives iv Ka<TTa> avtv Xoyov 7rpos ra aVSpeta Kal
to. 8tKata...ecrTt 8>) /cat e#et /cat irpoaipivei. Afag, Mor.
i. 35, ii98 a i.
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 99
2
ras apeTas Xafx^dvofxev eVepy>?crai>Tes irpoTCpov wcnrep
/cat eVt twv d'AAtoi/ re^vcav a yap Set fxaOovTas 7roteti/, ravra

7roto{;vTS p.av6dvo/xv} olov OLKoSofJLOvvres oIkoSo/jlol yiVOVTCU

koI KiOapt^ovres KiOaptcrrai' outgo Se /cat Ta /xei/ St/cata irpdrr-
tovtcs St/catot ywo/JLeOa. /cat eVt 877 Adya) c/c twv ojlloiwv
eVepyetcoV at efets yivovrai. Eth. JSfic. II. I, 1103*31.
d7rop7](TL S' ay Tts 7rc3? Aeyottei/ OTt Set Ta /xei/ StKata
7rpaTTO]/ras StKatoug ytVeo-#at, rd Se orccKppova (rwcfrpovas' et
yap TTpdrrovcrL rd StKata Kat Ta o~coc/>pova, 77877 eto~t StKatot
/cat (ruxfipovts, wcr7rep et Ta ypafx/maTLKa /cat Ta /xov<Tt/ca,

ypa/x/xaTt/cot Kat /xoucrt/cot. 77 ovS' eVt tgov Te^cCi/ outcos

9(et ; eVSe^eTat yap ypa/x//,aTtKoV ti Trotrjo-ai /cat aVd TV^rjq
Kat dXXov viroBepiivov [even in art, *.&, the mere external
result is not enough]. eVt ou'S' ofioiov icmv eVt tgoV tc^i/coV
/cat Tcav apeTcoi/* because, Aristotle goes on to explain, in
art we consider merely the morals the character
result, in
of the agent, whom we require to act ist with knowledge,
2ndly with disinterested purpose, 3rdly with permanent
disposition, ravra Se Trpos fjikv to Ta? aAAas re^vas ^X LV
ov o-wapt#/xetTat, irXrjv avro to etSeVat* 7rpo? Scto Tas apeTas
to pXv etSeVat /xtKpoV 77 ovSev tcr^uet, rd 8' aAAa (purity and
constancy of purpose) ov fxiKpov aAAa to irdv Svvcltcu, aVep
K tov 7roAA.a/ct9 7rpaTTLv to, StKata Kat o~oj(f>pova 7reptytVeTat.
Eth. Nic. ii. 4. 3, no5 b 3.
Sto Kat opitpvTai tols apeTas a7ra#etas Ttvas Kat T^pe/xta?*
ouk ev Se, OTt aVAak Ae'youo-ti/, aAA' ou^ w? Set Kat 009 ov Set
Kat oVe Kat oVa aAAa 7rpoo-Tt#Tat. .//#. iV7<r. II. 3, b
24. U04
eo-Tti/ apa 77 apCTrj et? irpoaipeTLKrj eV fJLtcroTrjTi ovcra ttj
7rpo9 77/xas (x)ptcr/LLvr} Aoya) Kat ws av d c/)poVt/xo9 o'pto-etev.
/aecroV^s Se Suo KaKtcoV, t^s /xey Ka^' vTrepfioXrjv ttjs Se KaT'
eAAett/av...Sto Kara /xev tt)]/ ouo~tav Kat toi/ Adyov toV Tt 771/

etvat Aeyorra /xecroTTys eoTti/ 77 dpeTT], KaTa Se to dptaTOV Kat

to e3 aKpoTrjs. II. 6. 15, iio6 b 36.

60. Aristotle illustrates his theory of virtue as a mean

by a classification oi which he
the several virtues, in
apparently begins with the simpler self-regarding, and
passes on to the more social other-regarding aspects of
72
TOO MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
character
1
. His list may be represented by the following
table

Defect Mean Excess

Cowardice Courage Rashness
Insensibility Temperance Intemperance
Illiberality Liberality Prodigality
Pettiness Munificence Vulgarity
Humble-mind ed- High-mindedness Vaingloriousness
ness
Want of Ambition Right Ambition Over-ambition
Spiritlessness Good Temper Irascibility
Surliness Friendly Civility Obsequiousness
Ironical Deprecia- Sincerity Boastfulness
tion
Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery
Shamelessness Modesty Bashfulness
Callousness Just Resentment Spitefulness.

The prominent virtue of this list is high-mindedness,

or fxtyaXoij/vxta, which, as being a kind of ideal self-respect,
is regarded as the crown of all the other virtues, depending
on them for its existence, and itself in turn tending to
2
intensify their force . The list seems to be more a
deduction from the formula than a statement of the
facts on which the formula itself depends, and Aristotle
accordingly finds language frequently e.g. in dealing with
the virtue of ambition inadequate to express the states of
3
excess or defect which his theory involves . Throughout
the list he insists on the " autonomy of will" as indis-
pensable to virtue : courage for instance is only really
worthy of the name when done from a love of honour
and duty (8ta to kol\6v) : munificence again becomes
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ioi

vulgarity when exercised not from love of what is right

4
and beautiful, but for displaying wealth .

1
Set Se tovto ixrj /jlovov kolOoXov Xiyeo'Oat aAAa Kat rots
Ka6' Ka<jTa ec/>ap/A6rrety lv yap rots 7rept ra? 7rpaets \oyots
01 fXV K0l86\0V KV(DTpOL elo~LV, Oi 8' 7Tt fJiipOVS aXrjOlVi&TCpOl'
7Tpl yap ra Ka6
y
e/cacrra at 7rpatg, Seov 8' e7rt tovtuv (tv/jl-

cj>ojyciv. XrjwTeov ovv ravra Ik rrjs Staypac/^s. .Z?//^. Nic.

ii. 7. i, no7 a 28.
2
eotK /xev ovv 7; fieyaXoxj/v^ta olov Koa/xos rts etvat r<3v
aperw* fxei^ovs yap avrds 7rotet Kat ov ytverat avev CKeti/ooi/.

Sta rovro ^aX7rov ttJ aXrjOeia fXtyaXoipvypv ctvaf ov yap

otov re avev KaXoKayaOias. Eth. Nic. IV. 3. 16, II24 a I.
3
ecrrt />ter ovv /cat tovto)v ra 7rXctw ai/awv/xa, 7retpareov
8' (2o-7rep Kat e?Tt rwv dXXcoy avrovs oVo/xaro7roteti/ crac/^yvctas
I/KV Kat rOV V7TapaKoXov67]TOV. II. 7. II. Cp. IV. 7* *>
7Tpt ra avra 8c o-;(eS6V eo-rt Kat 77 tt/9 aAaoi/tas yaeo-o'rtys*

aVcovv/xos 8e Kat avTyj* ov yupov Se Kat ras rotavras

7rfXdLV.
4
reXos Se 7rdcrrj<; eVepyetas icrrl to Kara rrjv eftv. Kat
ra) aVSpeta) 8e 7; aVSpeta KaXov. tolovtov 877 Kat to reAos.
koAov S77 eVeKa o aVSpetos vVo/xei/et Kat 7rparret ra Kara r>yv
av op ctav...Ot 6 ov ot avay ktjv avopuov etvat aAA ort KaAoi'.
-Z/& iVzV. III. 7. 6. Kat iravra ra roiavra iroirjcet (i. e. o
fidvavvoi) ov rov KaXov evKa dXXd rov ttXovtov c?rt8etKi/v/A-
i/os Kat Sta ravra oto'/xevos #av/xaeo-#at. IV. 2. 20, 1 1 23^5.

61. Justice (StKatoo-vV/i) is used at once in a general

and in a special sense. In its general significance it

is equivalent to the observance of law, and is as such

coextensive with virtue, differing only in that while virtue
exercises the disposition simply in the abstract, justice
1
applies it in dealings with another . Particular Justice
displays itself in the two forms of Distributive Justice
(StKcuoi/ ev rats Stavo/^at?) which awards honours and
rewards according to the merits of the recipients, and
Corrective Justice (StKatov StopflcortKoV) which takes no
 102 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
account of the position of the parties concerned but
simply seeks to secure equality between the two by taking
away from the advantage of the one and adding it to the
2
disadvantage of the other . Simple Retaliation and
Reciprocity (to dvTnreirovOds) therefore is not a sufficient
account of either distributive or corrective Justice, but it
is an adequate formula for civil communion, which just

rests upon such a relation between producer and con-

3
sumer as is measured by a currency Justice however is .

unequal to the complexity of life, and has therefore to be

supplemented by Equity (eTneiKeia) which corrects and
modifies law where it falls short owing to its universal
4
character . Evidently therefore morality requires a
standard which shall not only regulate the inadequacies
of absolute justice but be also an ideal of moral progress.

eoLKe Se 7r\ova)(u)<i XeyecrOat rj SiKaioorvvr) /cat rj aSt/cta.

So/CC Sc O T 7rapdvO/JLOS aSlKOS CtVat Kol 6 TzXeOVeKTrfS KCU 6
olvktos, wore SrjXov on /cat 6 8t/catos earat o re vofjujuLOS /cat o
L<TOs...avTr) jJLtv ovv r] ov fxepos aperrjs a'XX' oXr]
SiKatoo-vvrj
apeTrj Icttiv, ov$* r] evavria aSt/cta /xepos /caKtas aXX' oXrj
/ca/cta. tl Se Stac/)ept r] dpzrrj /cat rj hiKatoo-vvrj avrrj SfjXov k
ran/ elprjfjLevMV. ecrTi fxev yap y avTrj, to 8 eTvat ov to clvto
(i.e. while fundamentally the same their mode of existence
IS different), a'XX'
y fxev 7rpos erepov SiKaioovvrj, fj
Se toi aSe
ets a7rXa)9, apeTrj. Eth. Nic. V. I, H29 a 26.
Trjs Se Kara fiepos St/catocnV^s /cat tov /car' avrrjv
OLKOLLOV V fxiv icTTLV CtSoS TO V TatS SiCLVOfJiOLlS TL/Xrjs *}

yprjpLaTtov rj tu)V aXXco^ ocra /x,ept<xra Tots KOivoivovcrt ty/%

7roXiTtas, eV Se to ev Tots crvvaXXay/xacrt StopOiDTiKOV. . .to
yap Stavc/mrtTtKov SUatov t<x>v
fJLV kolvcov del /cara ttjv aVa-
XoytW...ro 8' eV rots (rwaXXay/xacrt Slkollov ecrrt fxev laov Tt
aXX ov /cara ttjv dvaXoytav eKeivqv a'XXa /cam ttjv aptO/Jirj-
TLKTfv. ovSev yap Stac/>e'pet et eVtet/c^s cfravXov airecTeprjO'ev
t) cf>avXos e7neiKr], a'XXa 7rpo? tov /3Xd/3ovs tyjv Stac^opaV fxovov
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 103

j3\i7TL 6 V0JU-05...WCTTC TO ilTOLVOpQutTLKOV SlKCLlOV aV L7] TO

fxicrov &]fJLias /cat /ce'oSovs. Eth. JVic. V. 2, H30 b 30.
3
So/cet Se T60"t /cat to avTiirzirovOos etvat oV/Vus St/catov,
wcnrtp ol UvOayopeiOt ec/>ao"ai/. to 8' avTLTrewovOos ovk
i(^apjJLOTTL OVT 7Tl TO StavejJLrjTiKOV SiKOLLOV OVT 7Tt TO
SiopOcoTLKov.. a A A.' i/ Tats Koiviov lolls Tats aAAa/cTt/cats
(TDV^ft TO TOtOUTOV SlKCLLOV TO dvTL7r7T0v66s, KOLT dvaXoyiOLV
/cat ^77 /caT Lo~oTr)Ta' tw avTL7T0Llv yap avaXoyov o~vfx/xVL

7] 7r6Xt5. j^M. Nic. v. 5, ii32 b 2i.

4
/cat eo~TLv amrj 77 coverts t] tov 7rtt/coi>s 7ravop^w/xa
vo/jlov, rj cAA.t7Ti Sta to /ca#oAot;. Eth. JVic. v. 10. 6,
ii37 b 26.

62. This Ideal of Morality is given by the faculty of

moral insight (cfrpovrjo-Ls), which is at once the cause and
good man is at the
the effect of virtue, so that the truly
same time the man of and the man of perfect insight,
1
true insight is also perfectly good Thus the moral .

dpxv the conception of the ultimate end of moral
action is the growth of habitual experience (efltcr/xos),

and gradually frames itself out of particular perceptions :

but the apprehension of these particulars is implicitly

2
an exercise of reason . The relation of intellect to
morality is not therefore so close as it was represented
by Socrates : rather the intellectual element in virtue is

a mere faculty of cleverness (StLvoTrjs), which may de-

velope into either moral wisdom or deep-seated villainy.

At the same time so Aristotle modifies the Socratic

standpoint virtue is only true and established virtue,
when, instead of resting on merely irrational impulses, it

involves this moral insight : and such an understanding

of the principles of conduct necessarily gives an unity to
conduct, so that the man who possesses one virtue, in
3
the true sense of the word, ipso facto possesses all .
104 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
1
eVet Se TVyydvofxtv irpoTtpov elprjKOTes on Set to fxicrov
alpeiaOai, to Se /xeaov iarlv ws o Xdyos d dp#ds Xeyet tovto
SteXco/xei/ (Eth. NlC. VI. I. i). /cat vvv 7raVTes orav dpt^covTat
rrjv dperrjv, 7rpocrTt#eacri tt/v cn/, elirovTes /cat 7rpos a eo"Tt,

rrjv Kara tov 6p66v XoyoV opOos S' d Kara tt}v cfypovrjcrtv.
Eth. Nic. VI. 13. 4. crwe^ev/cTat Se /cat 7; (ppovrjcns rrj rov
r)6ovs apery /cat avrrj rrj <f>povr)o~CL, et7rep at pXv rrjs </>pov>/creoj?
dp-^ai Kara ras rjOiKas eto"tv apeTas, to S opOov rwv tj6li2v
Kara rrjv ^povqo-iv. Eth. Nic. X. 8. 3, II78 a l6.
2
77 yap dperrj /cat rj pL0\6r)pta rrjv dpyrjv rj pXv <#etpet,

rj Se o"coet, eV Se rats 7rpaecrt to ov eVe/ca dpyrj, a>cr7rep eV

tois fjLaOrjjjLciLTLKo'LS at vVo^co-ets* oi!re S77 e/cet d Xdyos StSao- -
/caXt/cd? T(2v dpy&v ovtc ZvravOa, aXX aperrj rj cfavcrLKr) rj

iOiCTTr) TTpl TTJV dp)0V.

TOV OpOoSo^tlv Eth. NlC. VII. 8. 4,
H5l a l5. yap ap^al rwv 7rpaKTwv to ov ei/e/ca ra
o.l fxlv
irpaKra' tw Se Stec/>#app<eVa> St' 77801/771/ 77 Xv^i/ eu#vs ov
<f>aiv.rai 77 dp)(7J...o~TL yap rj /ca/cta cj>9apTiKrj dpxrjs* war

dvdyKrj rrjv cfrpovrjo'iv eti/ eti/at p,Ta Xdyou aXrjOrj 7rept Ta

b
dv6p(07Tiva dya6d irpaKTiKrjv. VI. 5. 6, H40 l6. ck twi/
/ca0' I/caora yap to /ca#dXou. tovtcjoi/ 0J1/ e^etv Set alaOrjo'Lv,

avrrj S' eWt i/oik. VI. II. 5, H43 b 4.

8
/cat Soo/cpaT^s rrj fxev opdws i^rjret, tt) S' r]pidpravV* otl
fxkv yap <f>povrjo'L<z wero eti/at 7rao"as ra? aperas, 77/xaprai/ei/,

on S* ou/c avev cfrpovrjaetos, /caXws eXeyei/... 877X01/ oui/ e/c twv

elprj/Jiii'oiv on ov^ otdv tc dyaOov eti/at /cvptcos ai/eu cfrpovr) crews

ouSe cfrpovi/JLOv dvev 7779 rjQiKrjs aper^s. aXXa Kat o Xoyos

TavTrj Xvoir dv, io ScaXe^Oetr] rt? ai/ OTt ^wpt^ovrat aXX77Xo)v
at apeTat. tovto yap /caTa /xei/ Ta? cfrvaLKas apeTas eVSe^eTat,
/cat? as oe aTTAcos AeyeTat ayavos ovk ei/oe^eTat. ap-a yap T77

cfapovrjoreL pud ovarj Tracrai virdp^ovvw. Eth. NlC. VI. 13. 6,

H44b i9.
63. Moral Action is accordingly never the result of
a mere act of understanding, nor is it on the other hand,
in man, the result of simple appetite which knows objects
1
simply as producing pain or pleasure : a conception of
what is advantageous precedes the desire, but this con-
ception is in itself powerless without the natural impulse
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 105

2
which will give it strength . The will or purpose which
morality implies, is thus either reason stimulated into
action by desire, or desire (not purely animal) guided and
3
controlled by understanding . The freedom of the will
must be allowed (or disallowed) equally in vice and virtue :

and actions are to be called involuntary only when due

to actual compulsion at the hands of others, or to ignor-
ance of particular details in action : voluntary action being
that of which the dpyr\^ or originating cause, lies in the
4
agent .

oiavota avrrj ovvev Ktvei, aAA rj ei/c/ca tov /cat

TTpaKTLKTJ. Etk. JVtC. VI. 2. 5, I I $<f $ 6. /Cat 7] fJLV 7Tt-

Ov/JLLCL?JSc09 /Cat l'7Tt\vTTOV ) 7] 7rpOCLLp(TlS S OVT \v7T7ipOV OvQ

b
tjSeos. III. 2. 5, i7. nii
2
/xaWovrj So/cct Stort dpyo/X0a.
SpeyofJieOa Se Stort So/cet
dpXV ydp V Meta. A. 7, 1072 s 29.
vorjcris.

ev\6yo)<S ravra Svo c/>atVcrat ra kivovvtcl, dpcts /cat

StdVota TTpaKTLKTJ' TO OptKTOV ydp KtVCt, /Cat StCt TOVTO 7]
StaVota /ctvct, ort dp^rj avTrjs ecrrt to o'pe/croV. /cat rj c^avracrta
Se otolv Kivrj, ov klvzl dvev dpc^ccos. De An, III. io,
a
433 20.
3
StO r\ OpZKTlKo\ VOVS 7] TTpOaipZCTlS 7] OpC^tS SlCLVOTJTLKt}, )

/cat rj TOiavTTi dp\rj aV#pa)7ro?. Eth. Nic. VI. 2. 5, 1 1 39*^4.

4
So/cct Se a/cowta ctvat ra /3ta r) St' dyvoiav yiyvo^va.
(Slouov Se ov r] ap^rj e^ioOev, tololvtt) ovcra iv r) /LLrjSkv avfJL-

fiaWeTaL 6 7rparrooi/ r) 6 irdo-yoiv, otov ct 7TVv/JLa /co/xtVat

7rot. ovtos 8' aKovatov tov /3ca /cat St* dyvotav, to Zkovctlov

oetei/ ay ctvat ov rj apxr) ev avTio ctoort ra /cap e/cacrra ey

ol? 7; 7rpa^t?. III. I. 3, ino a I. cc/>' 17/uv Se /cat 77 dpTrj,
d/xotcos Se /cat 7; /ca/cta. III. 5. 2.

Moral Weakness (a'/cpao-ta), which results in a

64.
man's doing the wrong although knowing what is right,
and following appetite against reason, is not, as Socrates
supposed, a myth
1
. Moral action may be represented as
106 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
a syllogism in which a general principle of morality forms
the major premiss, while the particular application is the
minor: but the conclusion which is arrived at specu-
2
latively is not always that which is executed practically .

The question in fact must be studied not logically but

psychologicallyand physiologically (</>i>o-ikojs) and when :

we regard the problem in this manner, we find that

appetite can lead to a minor premiss being applied to
one rather than another of two major premisses existing
1
in the mind Animals, on the other hand, cannot be
.

called weak or incontinent just because such a conflict

4
of principles is with them impossible .

1
pXv yap o\a>s e/xa^cro 7rpos tov Xoyov oU ovk
Sw/cpttTT^s
ovcrrjs aKpacrcoLS' ovOeva yap viroXapifidvovja TrpaTTUV irapa
to /SeXTiaTov dXXd 8l dyvoiav' ovtos jjlIv ovv 6 Adyos
dfufiLO-flrjTei rots <j>CUVO[JLVOLS ivapyws. Elk. Nic. VII. 2. 2,
H45 b2 5-
2
ot yap <ruAAoy 107x01 Ttov irpaKTLov ap^rfv e\oj/TS lo~lv,
iirtiSr) toioV8c to TeAos Kal to dpicrTOV. VI. 12. IO, 1144*31.
8
T6 Kal (S8e <f>VO~lK(jJS dv TtS 7Tt/3Al//l T7}V CUTiaj/. T)

fjitv yap KaOoXov 8da, r] 8' kripa irepl tujv KaO enacTTa icrTiv,

<Sv ataOrjcrLS ffirj Kvpia' OTav 8e fxia yevrjTat i avTtov,

dvdyKY) to o-vfjarepavOev IvOa (i.e. in the intellectual sphere)
p\v <f>dvai TTjv ij/vx^v, iv Sc rats 7roLY)TiKals irpaTTetv tvOvs,
olov, el 7ravTOS yAv/ceos yevecrOai Set, tovtI Se yXvKV cos ev tl
twv KaO* KacrT0i/, dvdyKTj tov SvvdfJievov Kal p/q KtoXvoptvov
ajota tovto Kal irpaTTeiv' OTav ovv 7/ pXv KaOoXov ivf) KtoXvovcra
yeveo-Oaij r] 8e on 7rdv to yXvKV rjSv, tovtI Se yXvKV (avTYj Se
ivtpyei), TVXV & hnJBv/lla ivovaa, rj pXv Ae'yei cfrevytiv tovto,
r] 8* ayef Kiveuv yap Kao~Tov SvvaTat tidv /xopiwv'
iiriOvfiia
waTe vno Xoyov 7rws Kal Sotry? aKpaTeveaOaij ovk
o-v/x/Wi/ci
ivavTias 8e KaO* avTrjv, dXXd Kara GvpLpefSrjKos. Etll. NlC.

VII. 3. 9, ii47 a2 4-
* Kal Sia tovto Ta Oiqpla ovk ciKparry, on ovk ^ci TG)V

KaOoXov v7r6Xr){j/LV y dXXd tgoV KaO' eKaora cfjavTaacav Kal

 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 107

-
fiwqfurpr, 1 147^ 4. wa n
aKoXaaTa Xeyojacr, iXk, if Kara ^t-^o.v.v m yap *\t.

rpoaipccriy ouSc A,- iXX! 3cimfiec - \- ob ore 5 [are in

their actions the result of nature] a>o-:rep 01 ,ua.ioaeioi -wr
artyiMrwr. ZVv. iY/c*. vn. 6, 1140^31.

65, Pleasure is not to be identified with Gooc

though many of the arguments advanced against the
identification 01 the two are n r less falla

The F. argument, : :. which treats it as a

process g -a progress cons

towards a natural ycrans as 0mra> alcr^ijn])
and maintains that il QS< [liei

real or final takes . : of little but ijoy-

ment : pleasure is rather found in the cons -ness of

spontaneous I i
-^ -oStoros) it is a

complel Le experience lik<

present wh< -
acts upon a perfect ol

Pleasures I fifer in kind: with

the different value 0:" the fun, tionsof
expression, and mined ultimately bj nent of
s
"\'.\
I man" (own is! s .

1
rots >;8oi">; Et :\T
i

vn. 1;. 1152 9. own rtryaPov >; >/8on; i

~
t* .-... x. ; . 1 ;. 1
.

\ \c. ro
t witrt j ea . c*itu
n)y -

:\\;i \t\: t
"

; : .- - \ s .-.
-

n/v arcfuro&aror. Et:

VII. 1 r. ;. , \ ;
.-.
V;o\\
TO ii \ ;* liri wKa m xpovo* ytropu s n \cM*0i/<rTcu
ro ctSos, \ ... : Mtra -' ymf -. ^ru* t/8oi->/\

o/noius 5t v mi QctopLaw i}Si<m] 0* >; TcXcioranf,

io8 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
TeXciOTOLTr) 8' r] tov ev c^ovtos 7rpds to cr7rov8atoTaTOT/ tgjv </>'

avrrjv. TeXtLOi 8e tt)v evepyeiav rj r)Sovr/. X. 4. 5, H74b 20.

3
o#i/ So/coo-t /cat T(3 et'Sct 8tac/>ptv* rd yap crepa tw
et'Sct uc/>' crepwv olo/JieOa TtXeiovcrOai. X. 5. I, H75 a 2I.
8o/cct 8' ev aVacrt Tots toiovtols cu/ai to <paiv6fJivov T<3
o-7rovSoua>. 1 1 76 s 1 5.

66. Man's chief end being the perfect development

of his true nature (evepyeta i/or^?), it must be particu-
larly found in the realization of his highest faculty or
1
reason It is this in fact which constitutes our per-
.

sonality,and man would be pursuing not his own life,

but the life of some lower being, if he followed any other
aim. Self-love accordingly may be said to be the highest
law of morals, because while such self-love may be under-
stood as the selfishness which gratifies a man's lower
nature, it may also be, and is rightly, the love of that
higher and rational nature which constitutes each man's
2
true self . Such a life of thought (/2tos OtayprjTiKos) is

further recommended as that which

most pleasant, is

most self-sufficient, most continuous, and most consonant

with axoXy. It is also that which is most akin to the life

of God : for God cannot be conceived as practising the

ordinary moral virtues and must therefore find his happi-
3
ness in contemplation .

1
t 8' (ttlv rj evSaLjJLovia kolt dptrrjv evepyeta, evXoyov
Kara tt)v KpaTicrrrjv' avrrj 8' dv elrj rov dpivTOV . . .ort 8 cart
OtuiprjTiKYj, eipYjTOLL. . . KpaTLcrTr) tc yap avTTj icrrlv rj evepycta
/cat yap 6 vovs tu>v Iv r]plv (i.e. /cpaVto-Tos), /cat twi/ yva) ot<3i/,
7rcpt a 6 vovs. Eth. Nic. X. 7. I, H77 a i2.
2
8det 8' dv 6 TotouTOS fxdXXov etvat (fitXavTOS. diro-
yovv eaDTco ra /caAAtcrra /cat /mAtcrr dyadd, /cat ^aptf cTat
ve'/xet

iavrov Tcp /cuptcDTCtTw /cat 7ravra tovtqo TTeiOerat' wcnrep Se

/cat 7rdAts to KvpLWTarov fxaXiar ctvat 8oKet /cat irav aXXo
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 109

crvcrTrjfAa, ovto) kolL av6p(x)7ros' Kctl <fci\avTOs Srj fxaXtcra 6

TOVTO dyCLTT&V KOLL TOVTID ^api^O/JitVOS. EtJl. NlC. IX. 8. 6,
b
n68 28.
3
o 8e tolovtos av etr] ficos Kpecrruiv fj kolt avOpioirov.
ov yap rj avOpwtTos Io~tlv ovtoj /3ioj(TT<h, aAA' y 0l6v
Tt a/ avT<2 u7rap^et...8ofei 8' av kou etvau eKCwrros touto,
L7Tp TO KVpLOV KCU a/JLLVOV' aTOTTOV OXJV JLVOLT OLV 1 /AT?

tov ovtov /3tov alpoiTO dXXd rtvos dXXov. Eth. NlC. X.

b
7. 8, ii77 26.
7; 8e rcActa evSaifJLOVLa otl OeoiprjTLKij ris Icttlv evepyeia,
Kai ivTtvOev av <f>aveir]. rovs Oeovs yap p,aAio~ra vireikrj^api^v
fxaKapiovs elvau Trpd^tLS 8e iroias aVovei/xcu xpewv auTocs;...
to) 8e aWt tou TTpaTTi.LV d<j>aLpovfjiivov, TL Sc jxaXXov TOV
ttollv, tl XeL7TTaL irXrjv OewpLa; Eth, NlC. X. 8, H78 b 7.

67. Friendship is an indispensable aid in framing

for ourselves the higher moral life if not itself a virtue,
;

it is at least a concomitant of virtue, and it proves itself

1
of service in almost all conditions of our existence .

Such results, however, are to be derived not from the

worldly friendships of utility or pleasure, but only from
2
those which are founded on virtue . The true friend
is in fact a second self, and the true moral value of
friendship lies in the fact that the friend presents to us
a mirror of good actions, and so intensifies our con-
3
sciousness and our appreciation of life ,

1
ecm yap dpcTnj tls t) julct apcr*;?, en 8' avayKaioTaTOv
ts tov /3lov dvev yap cf>tXd)v ou'Seis eXolt av JCfiv. Eth.
NlC. VIII. I. cltottov 8 tcro)? /cat to pLovu>Tr)v ttolelv tov
fxaKapLOV' ovOeis yap ZXolt av KaO* avTOV ra iravT .\.iv

dyaOd' ttoXltlkov yap 6 avOpwTros /cat av^rjv 7T</>l>kos

Eth. Nic. ix. 9. 3, n69 b i6.

2 8'
Sokci ov ttqlv c/>iA.icr#ai, aXXa to c/uAtttov, tovto
elvaL dyaOov 77 t]8v rj yjpr)o-Lfxov...Tpia 8r) ra 7-779 c/>tA.tas eiS??,

io'dpLOfxa rots cf>LXrjTols."Ol p\v ovv 81a to yprjo-Lfxov c/uAowres

no MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
aAA^Aot?, ov kol6 olvtovs cf)i\ovo~iv 9 aX\ rj yiyi/crai rt avrot?
trap dWrjXutv dyaOdv. reActa 8 Io~t\v r] twv dyaOwv cjitXia
kcu kolt dperrjv dfxoioiv. VIII. 4. I, 1156*^7.
8
o /x,a/capto? 817 (fiukiov tolovtcov SeyjcreTou, etTrep Oewptiv
7rpoaipeiTai 7rpdeis e7rtt/cts kcu oiKctas* TOiavTai 8' at tou
aya#oi) <fii\ov 6t/tos...cos Se 7rpos eauroi/ e^ci o (77roi;8atos,
kou 7rpog tov cjyiXov' crepos yap avros d <J>l\o$ kariv. KaQdirtp
ovv to avTov eu/ai alptTOV eornv Kao"Ta>, ovtuj Kal to tov
(piXoVj rj TrapaTrXrjaLWS. Eth. Nic. IX. 9, IO ; II70 a 2.
 CHAPTER VIII.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

68. Politics Aristotle regards not as a Science

separate from Ethics: but as the completion and (almost)
verification of it in a true philosophy of humanity (rj

7Tpl rd dvOpw-mva (^tXocro^ta) : the moral ideal in political

administration being only a different aspect of that
which also applies itself to individual happiness
1
. Man
is by nature a social being, and the possession of rational
speech (Xoyos) in itself leads him to the social union 2 .

1
1 yap KOLL TCLVTOV i<JTLV 1/1 KOU 7ToAl, fJLl6v
J KOLL

TeXtLOTCpOV TO TtJs 7ToA.OJS cfraLVeTCLL KOLL Xa/3elv KOLL (TW^LV...

Tj fXV OVV (JiiOoSoS TOVTOiV </)lTai, 7ToXlTLK7] TLS OVO~a. EtJl.
Nic. I. 2, io94 b 8.
(TKOirelv 6Y) rd irpoetp-qpiiva y^prj 7rt ra epya koX tov
/3lov iiTL(f>ipovTas, kcu avvahovToyv fxkv tois epyois aVoSeKTeoi/,
8ta<po)vovvro)v 8e \6yovs V7roXrj7TTov. Eth. JVic. X. 8. 12,
n79 a 2o.
kdTL 8e ko1 y ttoXltlkyj koI rj (ppovrjcrLS r) avrrj /jlIv ^t?,

to fxivTOL uvai ov tolvtov olvtcus. Eth. JSfic. VI. 8. I,

H4i b 24.
dv6pu)7ros cj^vaet ttoXltlkov wov koX 6 aVoAts Sia (frvaiv
Kdl ov Sea rv\r)v tjtol cfaavXos lariv rj KpeiTrwv y avQpu)-
7ros...8tOTt Se 7toXltlk6v 6 dvOpouro^ u)ov...8fjXov. .
ovOlv
yap, ojs </>a/xeV, fxaTrjv r] covens 7tolu' Xoyov Sk fxovov av-
IT2 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Opo)7ro<; ^t tujv aJO)i/' yj pXv ovv <j>a)vr) tov \v7rrjpov kou

t/Scos icTTt o-rjjjiLov'...6 8e Xoyos C7rt t<o S^Xovi/ eort to
crv^ipov koI to J3\app6v. Pol. I. 2. 9, I253 a 2.

69. The State is a development from the family

through the village community, an offshoot of the family.
Formed originally for the satisfaction o f natural wants ,

it exists afterwards for moral ends and for the promotion

of the higher life
1
. The
no mere local State in fact is

union for the prevention of wrong-doing, and the con-

venience of exchange no mere material or utilitarian:

institution for the protection of goods and property;

it is a real moral organization for advancing the de-
velopment of man 2 .

1
77 pkv ovv ts irao'av rjfjbipav avveorTrjKvla KOLVOiVta Kara
OtKOS lo-TLV...TJ 8' K irXtLOVOiV OLKLCOV KOLVQ)VLOL TTpOJTY]
cfavCTLV

VKV /XT/ i<p7]fJLpOV KOJfJLr) 8' K Tc\eiOVU)V KiDjJLtOV

Xp7^O"0)S . . .7]

Kowoivia reXeios, 7to\l<;, tf

Srj 7rdo"r)s e^ovaa Trepa? rrjs

airrapKeias ws cVos ci7reu/* jLyvo/xevr] fxkv ovv tov Qfjv eveKev,

ovcra 8c rov v tfiv. Pol. I. I, I252 b i2.

2
</>ai on rj 7ro'Xis ovk ecrrt kolvmvlol tottov
epov roivvv
KOU TOV d$LKUV 0"<a9 aVTOVS KOLL TTjS /i,Ta8oO"0)5 ^OLpLV'
fJLTJ

aXXa ravra pXv avayKolov virdp^ELv, etVcp Icrrai ttoXls, ov

fxrjv ovS' virap^ovTOiv tovtwv a7rdvT0)v tJSyj 7roXi9, aXX tf

TOV V Z$)V KOIVCDVLOL KOLL TOLLS Ol/a'(US KCU, TOt? yvVL (*)rjs

reXeias \dpLV koX avToipKOvs. Pol. III. 9, i28o b 30.

70. The family, which is chronologically prior to the

State, involves a consideration of the relations subsisting
between husband and wife, parent and child, master and
slave
1
. The slave Aristotle regards as a piece of live pro-
perty having no existence save in relation to his master.

Slavery is a natural institution because there is a ruling

and a subject-class amongst men related to each other as
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 113

soul to body, although from those who are slaves by

nature we must distinguish those who have become slaves
2
merely by war and conquest . Household management
involves the acquisition of riches, but must be distinguished
from money-making for its own sake. Wealth is every-
thing whose value can be measured by money ; but it is

the use rather than the possession of commodities which

3
constitutes riches .

1
7rpwra Se /cat, kXdyio~Ta p-iprj oik(as Seo-nroTrjs kolL Sov-
Xos, Kal 7rocrts koI aXo^o?, koX iraTTjp koX tzkvol. Pol. I. 3.
2
t<3v 8' opydvwv ra fxkv aiia^a, ra 8* /jaf/v)(a...Kal o
SovXos KTrjfxd tl efxipv^ov, Kal ojcnrep opyavov Trpo opydymv
7ras 6 v7rrjpeTrj<;...6 yap pii) avrov cf>vo~L aAA' dXXov dv0pi*)7ro<s }

8c, OVTOS <f>V(TL SovX6<S icTTL. . . fiovXtTat fXV OVV 7] (f)VO~L<; Kal
rd aw/mara Statfcipovra 7rotetv ra tqjv iXevOepwv Kal Ttov
SovXwv, ra fxev tcr^vpd 7rpos rrjv dvayKecav xpfjcnv, ra 8 opOd
Kal dxprjcrTa 7rp6s ras roLavras Ipyaaias, aXXd ypr)<jifxa irpos
15
ttoXltlkov /3lov. Pol. I. 3, 1253 28.
3
xprjpLaTa 8e Xiyofitv iravra ocrwv t] aLa vo/jLicrpiaTL

jx^TpeiTat. (Eth. Nic. IV. I. 2, ni9 b 26.) o/Ws 8e to 7tXov-

relv io-Tiv iv rw ypfjcrOai fiaXXov rj iv T(2 KtKTrjcrOaL. Rhet. I. 5.

71. Exchange was by barter in kind,

at first effected
but, with the difficulties of transmission between countries
widely separated from one another, money as a currency
arose. At first merely so much definitely weighed or
measured metal, it afterwards received a stamp to mark
the amount 1
. Demand is the real standard of value:
and currency is therefore a merely conventional repre-
sentative of demand acting as a mean between the pro-
2
ducer and the recipient and so securing reciprocity .

3
Usury is an unnatural and reprehensible use of money .

ecm yap 77 fjLTa/3Xr)TiKrj 7rdvT(x)v, ap^apiivr) to p*\v

irpioTov Ik tov Kara <fivo-iv, ra> ra /xcv 7rXeL0) rot 8e eAarrw
W. 8
114 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

tojv LKav<2v ^X LV T vs dv6p(x)7rovs...rj pXv ovv Toiavrrj /xera-

(3\rjTLKrj ovre 7rapd cfrvcnv ovtz )(py]fJLaTi(TTLK'rjs iariv eTSos
ov$v...ii< jjlzvtol TavTrjs iyiver eKecvrj Kara Xoyov* eviK(x)-
repas yap ycvofxevrj^ rrjs fiorjOetas 7(2 elcrdyecrOaL wv ci/Sccts
koll iK7Tfji7riv (Sv kirXeova^ov, the mutual assistance
[as
through import and export spread wider] i dvdyKrjs 77
TOV VOfJLLO-fJLOLTOS 7TOpiO~#?7 \prJ0~i%' OV yap VJ3a(TTaKTOV KOL(TTOV
Ttov Kara <j>vcnv dvayKaioiv. Sid 7rpds ras aAAayas tolovtov
tl (rvveOevTO 7rpos cnfcas avTOvs SiSovai kolI A.a/x/3avciv, 6 tcov
XprjcrifJLOJv avro ov, ei^e rrjv ^petav c^cra^etptcrTOV 7rpos to

tfiv, olov CTL$r)po<; kcu dpyvpos, kolv el tl tolovtov erepoi/, to

/JLCV 7rp<jJTOV a7rAak opiaOev jmeyiOet kcu o~Ta#/xa), to 8c TeXtv-

Tcdov kolI xapaKTrjpa eirif^aXkovTOiV, Iva airoXvo-rj ttjs fxeTpyj-

crecos avTOvs. Pol. I. 9, I257 a i4.
2
olovvirdXXayfia Trjs XP tas T vopaafxa yiyove KaTa
8'

avv6rjK7]v. Eth. Nic. V. 5. II, 1133*29.

3
/ATa/3oA?79 yap eycVeTO ydpiv (to vop-tcr/xa), d Se tokos
avTo iroiei irXiov. I258 b 5. Cp. Eth. I. 5. 8.

72. Communism and property as sketched

in wives

by Plato in the Republic rests upon a false conception of

political society, since the state is not the homogeneous

unity to which Plato would reduce it, but rather a product

1
of ^heterogeneous elem ents His scheme further involves
.

2
a fallacy of language in its use of "all :" forgets that
3
what is everybody's business will be nobody's : leaves no
4
room for the practice of liberality and chastity : destroys
and beyond
friendship, the basis of the political organism,
all attempts to secure, by positive enactments, ends which
5
are better attained by general institutions and culture .

Socialism in general forgets that the regulation of desires

and the limiting of population is better and more neces-
6
sary than the equalization of property .

1
to Xiav ivovv ^rjTeiv ttjv 7rdA.11/ ovk cot 11/ d/neivov...
TrXrjBos yap tl ttjv (fivaiv zcttIv rj ttoXls, yiyvofievrj tc paa
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 115

julolXXov oiKia fxkv i 7rdA.a)S, av^pco7ros 8' c olklols ecrrat.

/W. II. I, I26l a l8.
2
on yutci/ tolvvv 7rapa\oyiarjJi6s tls Zcttl to Xiyciv TrdvTas,
cj>avpov. I26l b 2 7.
3
tJkhttol eVi/xcAeias Tvy^avct to 7rXeto"Ta)v koivov. I26l b

4
ai/oupovcrii/epya Svow aperatv <pavp<2s, (roxfipocrvvrjs
fxkv 7repl rds yvvcuKas, ZXevOepLOTrjTOs Sc 7repl ras Knjcrets.
b
I263 io.
5
(XTOTTOV TOLS TOLOVTOIS oUdOai SiOpOoVV, dXXd fJLTJ TOtS
b
eOecrt koll rfj <iAo<ro(ta koI tois vo/ulois. I2 63 40.
6
Set Se fxrjSe tovto XavOdvetv tovs ovtw vofAoOerovvTas, o
Xav9dvL vvv, ore to Trjs ovo-cas TaTTOi/ras irXrjOos 7rpoo~7]KL
KOLL TO)]/ TKVO)V TO TrXfjOoS TOLTTLV. Pol. II. 4, I266 b 8.
ert S' 6 tis /<ai r^v fJLTpLdv Ta^eiev ovaiav Trdcriv, ovSev
6<e/Vo<r /xdXXov ydp Set ras 7ri#u/Atas dfJLaXi&iv tj Tas
ovcrtas, tovto 8' ov/c Ioti fny 7rat8euo/jteVots iKayws U7ro tc3i/
b
vo/xojj/. I2 66 28.

73. The Classification of Constitutions is based

upon the fact that government may be exercised either
for the good of the governed or of the governing, and
may be either concentrated in one man or shared by a
few or by the many 1
There are thus three true forms of
.

government (opOal TroXiTeiat) onarchy, aristocracy and

c onstitutional r ppnhliV -
the perverted forms of these
(7rapK(3do-us) are tyranny, o ligarchy and democracy the ,

differencebetween the two last being not that democracy

is a government of the many, oligarchy of the few, but

that democracy is the state of the poor, oligarchy of the

2
rich . Considered in the abstract, these six states stand
in the following order of merit : i Monarchy, 2 Aristo-
cracy, 3 Democracy, 5 Oli-
Constitutional Republic, 4
3
garchy, 6 Tyranny But though with a perfect man
.

Monarchy would be the highest form of government, the

82
Il6 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

absence of such men puts it practically out of considera-

4
tion . Similarly, true aristocracy, in which dptTrj is the

qualification of government, is hardly ever found in its

uncorrupted form : it would be however preeminently

the constitution in which the good man and the good
citizen would coincide 5 Practically therefore, apart from .

the question of an ideal State the constitutional republic ^

may be regarded as the best attainable form of govern-

ment, especially as it secures that predominance of a
large middle-class which is the chief basis of permanence
6
in any State . Democracy however is not unlikely with
the spread of population to become the general form of
government : and, in defence of it, the claim might be
advanced, thinks Aristotle, that the collective voice of a
people is as likely to be sound in State administration as
7
in criticisms on art .

1
7rt Se 7roXiTta fjitv kclI 7roXtTevjj.a (Trjfiatvei tclvtov,
7roA.tTV/Xa 8' (JTL TO KVpLOV TUJV 7r6X(J0V, dvdytO) 8' LVOU
Kvpcov rj eva rj oXtyovs rj tovs 7roAAovs, otclv julzv o ts rj ol

dXtyot rj oc 7roXXol 7rpos to kolvov cn;/x</>epov ap^wcrt, tolvtols

jjlIv SpOds dvayKcuov ras 7roAiTtas, Tas 8e 7rpds to l&lov

elvai
rj tov evos -7 tcov oXiyoiV r) tov ttXtJOovs, 7rapeK/3ao~is. The
three dpOai are then enumerated as fiao-ikzia, dpio-TOKpaTia
and iroXiTtia. 7rapK/3acris Se twv etprjjJieviDV, Tvpavvls jjlIv

oXtyap^ta 8e aptcrroKpaTtas, 877/zoKpaTia Se ttoXl-

/3ao~iA.ta5,

Ttias. Pol in. 7, 1279*25. Cp. Eth. Nic. vm. 10,

n6o a 32, where for iroXiTeia is substituted rt/^oKparta as a
government aVo rt/xr//xaTa)i/.
2
SrjXov otl to fxev oXiyovs rj noXXovs eivat Kvpiovs cru/x-
/^c/^kos cart, to pxv Tats o'Xtyap^tats to Se Tats 8^/xoKpaTtats,
oXtyovs, 7roXXovs 8' tovs
8ta to tovs p\v evTropovs eti/at

aVopovs 7ravTa^ov. 816 kou ov cru/x/^aiVct Tas prjOeiaa^ atrial

yireo-8oLL Sia<opas (i.e. numbers do not constitute the dif-

ference) (S Se hiafyepovviv rj T BrjfxoKpaTta koll r] oXtyap^ta

 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 117

dXXyjXuv, irevia /cat ttXovtos coti. Pol. III. 7, I2 79 b 35-

b
Cp. iv. 4, i29o 1.

a'ptcrro/cpaTtas p,e> yap opos apery, o'Xtyap^tas 8c 7rXo{rros,

877/xov 8' tXevOepia. IV. 8, l294 a IO.
3
Totrrcov Sc (tcGV opOwv 7roXtTctcoV) ^eXricrrrj fxev rj /?acrt-
Xeta, ^eLptarrj 8' 77 Tt/JLOKparta. .kolklcttov 8c to ivavriov tw .

/^eATto-ro) (/.*. Tupavi/ts). j57/j. iVS& VIII. 12, n6o a 35.

4
^PX^ ^ *" T15 S r}T7J(TU><; CLVT7], 7TOTpOV (TV/JLcfreptL

fxaXXov v7ro tov dpto-Tov aVSpos apyzaOai 7) V7r6 twv dpi(TT<t)v

vofuov BoKOvcn Srj Tots vofxi^ovcrt cnjp,c/>pcti/ ^aaiXeveaOai to
KaOoXov fxovov ol vo/jLOL Xeyctv, aXX ov 7rpos ra wpo<nrnrrovTa
kiriTaTTZlV. PoL III. 1*5, I286 a 8. O /XCl/ o!v TOV VOfJLOV
/ccXcucov ap^ctv So/cct KtXevecv ap^ctv- toV #coV, d 8' dvOpunrov
KeXevwv, 7rpo(TTi6r)crL /cat Orjpiov. III. 1 6, I287 a 29.
ct 877 t??V p,e> tcoV 7rXct6Vcoi' dpyrjv dya6o)v 8' avSpcoV
irdvTwv dpiCTTOKpaTLav deTeov, Trjv 8e tou cVos /2acrtXctav,
atpcTcoTcpoi/ aV ct?7 Tats 7rdXccrti/ apttTTO/cpaTta /3acrtXetas.
b
i^/. in. 15, i286 3.
ou yiyvovrai 8' Tt /3acriXetat vvv...Sta to tt)]/ /3acrtXetar
eKOVcrtoi/ p,cv dpyrjv cti/at, Kvpiav 8e p,ctdVcoi/, 7roXXoi)s 8' ctvat
toi>s dfJLOiovs, /cat a Stac/>epovTa tocto{;tov COCTTC dirapr i&w
par] 8 el

7rpos to p,eye#os /cat to a^iiofxa ttjs a PXV^' Pol- V. io, I3l3 a 5-

TTjv yap c/c TtoV dptcrTO)i/ aVXtos /CaT' dpT7]V 7ro\tTLav y

/cat p,?? 7rpds viroOeo-iv Tiva dyaOwv aVSpcoV, /movr/v St/catoi/

7rpoo-ayopvetv aptcrTOKpaTtav' iv jmovrj yap a7rXo3s o avTOS
avrjp /cat ttoXltyjs dyaOos Ictlv. Pol. IV. 7, I 293*^3.
/cat yap as /caXovcrti/ apto-TO/cpaTtas . Ta. . p-ev c^toTcpco
izltttovo'i Tats 7rXcto"Tats twv 7rdXea)i/, Ta 8e yctTi/ttoo~t ttJ
KaXovfxivrj TroXiTeta' 8td 7rept d/mcfiolv cos p,tds Xc/cTOi/. jR?/.
iv. 11, 1295*31^
ct yap /caXojs eV Tots yjOlkoI^; etprjTai to tov cvSatpova
yStoy eti/at tot/ KaT dpeTYjv dvefjaroStcrTov, /necroTYjTa Sc ttjv
dpeTyjv, tov fxeo-ov aVay/catov /3tov ctrat ^cXtio-toi/ . . . SrjXov
apa otl /cat 77 Kotvwvca rj iroXiTiKrj dpio~Trj yj 8ta tgoV fxicruiv . .

oVoU 8c TO TtoV p-eVtOV V7TpTLVL 7rXfj6oS 7] CTWap,c/>OTCptOJ/

Tcot/ a/cpcov >) Kat OaTepov fiovov,
ivTavO* i/8c^cTat 7roXtTta^
ctvat ixovifiov.
7
Pol. iv. 11, i295 a 35 i296 b 38.
6Vt 8e 8ci Kvpiov ctrat /maXXov to 7rXij0os 17 totjs apto-TOvs
1 18 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

julIv oAtyovs Se,dv koll tiv ^\ LV diropiav, ra^a Se

Sofctci/
kolv aXrjOeiav. yap ttoWovs wv e/cacrros ecrrt ov cnrov-
tov<z
Scuos dvrjp, o/xcos eVSe^crat crweA^ovras etyat /^cArtous e/cct-
vcoi/, ov^ cos eVacrTOV dAA cos cn;/A7rai/Tas, otov ra arv/JLcjyoprjTa

SttTTva tcoV e/c /a tag 8(nrdvr)s ypprjyq9vTu>v . . . Sto /cat Kpivov-

criv a/xetvov ot 7roXXol /cat ra tt\% fJLOvaLKrjs epya /cat ra tcoV
7ron7TcoV dAAot yap dXXo rt /xdptov, 7ravTS 8e iravra . . . ct

/x,ev ow 7rept iravra Stj/jlov /cat 7rept irav irXrjOos evSe^rat

ravTTjv ctvat rrjv 8tac/>opdv tcoV ttoAAcoV 7rpos toijs oAtyovs
crTrovSatoi;?, d'S^Aoi/' tcrcos Se 1/77 Ata S77A0V on 7rcpt ivluiv
dSvvarov. 6 yap avros kolv iirl tcoV Orjptoyv dpfx6cret Xoyos.
Pol. III. II, I28l b I.
/cat 8ta tout' tor cos e/3acrt Ac vovro 7rpoTepov, ort (nraviov
rjv evpecv aVSpas, 7toAt) Stac/>epovTas /car' aperijv, dAAcos t
/cat rore fiiKpds olkovvtos 7roAet9.. .e7ret Se /cat ju,tovs ctvat
<rviuL/3/3r)K ras 7roAts, tcrcog ouSe paStov ert yiyvecrOai 7roAt-

retW irepav irapd S^/xo/cpartW. jP<?/. III. 1 5, I286 b 20.

o^Sei/ yap /ccoAuet 7tot to ttXtjOos etrat fUkriov tcoV
oXtywv Kal 7rXovo-LQ)Tpov, ovx ws Ka# ckcwttov dAA cos

dOpoovs. Pol. III. 13, 1 283^3.

74. Which is the best State is a question scarcely

admitting of an unqualified answer, for different races are
suited for different forms of government, and the question
which meets the politician is not so much what is ab-
stractly the best State as which is the best State under
existing circumstances (e wo/cct/xeVcov) or to meet certain
l
given data ( i;7ro^ecrecos) . Generally, however, the best
State will be such an organization as will enable any one
to act in the best and live in the happiest manner that
is, aid him in leading a life of action, a /?to? 7rpa/crt/cos
2
understood in a liberal sense . To serve this end the
ideal State should be neither too great nor too small, but
3
simply self-sufficient ; it should occupy a favourable posi-
tion towards land and sea 4 and consist of citizens gifted
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 119

at once with the spirit of the northern and the intelli-

5
gence of the Asiatic nations . It should further take
particular care to exclude from government all those
engaged and in tradebest State will commerce "the
6
not make the working-man a citizen " should provide
'
'
:

endowment for religious worship 7 and should secure the ,

moral ends which it proposes by the educational in-

8
fluences of law and early training .

1
7roXXots rrjs dptcrrrjf; (TroXtretas) rvyuv tcraj? dSvvarov.
ojcrre rrjv KpaTto-rrjv re a7rX<J3s /cat ttjv e VTroKL/JLVQ)V dpiarrjv
ov Set XeXrjOivai rov vo/JLoOerrjv . . . ert Se rpirrjv rrjv i viro-
^ecrecos . . . ov yap jjlovov rr/v dpicrTrjv Set OewptLv, aXXa /cat

ttjv Svvaryjv. Pol. IV. I, I2 88 b 25.

ecrrt yap tl <pvo~L $(T7ro(TTOv Kal dXXo fiaaiXevTOV /cat

aXXo ttoXitlkov Kal SiKatov /cat avfxcfaepov' rvpavviKov S' ovk

eo-Ti Kara cj>vo~lv. III. 17, 1 287^ 7.
otl fjiev ovv avayKaiov etvat 7roXtTetai/ aptcrTrjv Tavrrjv
Ka6 7/v ra^iv /caV ocrrcaovv aptcrra 7rparTOt /cat t^t) /xa/captcos,

cfravepov icFTtv. aXXa rov 7rpa/cTt/coV {fiiov) ovk avayKaiov

. . .

etrat wpos irepovs ouSe ras Stavotas et^at jjiovas ravras 7rpa/c-
Tt/cas Tas twv d7ro/3aLvovT(jL>v
X^P LV ywofievas Ik tov Trpdrreiv.
Pol. VII. 2, 1324*23.
otovrat /jlv ovv ol 7rXeto-TOt Trpoo-rjKtiv fJLeydXrjv eu/at rrjv
evSalfjiova iroXiv . . . Set Se fxdXXov fxrj ets to irXrjOos et? Se
SvvafjLtv aVo/^XeVeti/ . . . o/xotoos Se /cat 7roXts 77 pXv ef dXiywv
Xcav ovk avrapKrjs* rj Se e/c 7toXXojv dyav eV /xev rot? aVay-
/catots avrapKrjs, coo-n-ep eOvos, aXX' ot> 7rdXts* 7roXtretav yap
ov paStov \nrdpx<Eiv' rts yap o-Tparrjyos ecrrat tot) Xtai/ V7rep-
/?aXXoi/TO? 7rXy]8ov<;, y rt? Krjpv jxrj crrei/ropeto? ./W. VII. ;

4, 1326*9.^
oure yap e/c Se/ca dvOpajTrcov ykvoir dv 7roXt5, out' e/c Se'/ca

fJLVptdSwV TL WXtS eO"TtV. /^. iV7<f. IX. IO. 3, Il70 b 3I.

tt^s Se 7roXeca5 rrjv Oicrtv et 7rotetv /car' ^v^ijv, 7rpo9
^p 7?
re t?;v #aXacro"ai/ 7rpoo~rjKi /cetor#at /caXaS? 7rpos re T>p ^ojpav.
Pol. vii. 5, 1327^.
120 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
3
<^avepov tolvvv otl Set Slclvoyjtlkovs re elvaL Kat 0upoet-
Sets rrjv cj>vcnv tovs peXXoi/Ta? evaywyovs ecrecr6aL tw vopo-
#0-77 7rpos T77V dpeTrjv . . .to Se t<oi/ EXX?7i/a>i/ yeVos, cocr7rep

fJL(TVL Kara toi)s T07roi>9, ovtcos apc/>ou/ peTe^et *

Kat yap
v6vfJiov /cat ScavorjTLKov eaTLv. Pol. VII. 7, I327 b 36.
6
iv Trj KctXXtcrTa TroXLTevofxevrj 7rdXet Kat ttJ KeKT7}fJLevrj
StKatovs aVSpas aVXak, aXXa p?) 7rpog tt;v V7rd#eo-u/, ovre
/3dvavo~ov J3lov ovt dyopalov Set 77 v rot;? 7roXtras' ay evvrjs
yap 6 tolovtos (3ios Kat 7rpds dpeTrjv V7revavTLOS. Pol. VIL
9, 1328*39.
77 Se /SeXriarrrj ttoXls ov 7roLrjcreL fSdvavcrov TToXiTrjv . . . ov
yap olov T eVtTriSewat rd Trjs dpeTrjs ajvTa /3lov fidvavcrov
r) 6t)tik6v. Pol. Ill, 5, 1 278 s 8.
7
ert Se rd 7rpos toijs Oeovs Sairavrj/maTa ko tva TTacrrfs tt/?

7roAaos ecrrtv* aVayKatW tolvvv ets Suo pep>7 SiyprjaOac rrjv

Xtopav, Kat T771/ pey etvat kolvtjv rrjv Se tw tStcorcor. Kat
rovrcoi/ Karipav $L7)prjo~6ai St^a 7rd\tv, to fxev
rrjs jxev kolvtjs

Tpov fxepos ets t<x Trpos tovs Oeovs XetTOvpytag, to Se erepov

ets tt/v twi/ o-vcro-LTLWV Sa7rdvyjv' rrjs Se tcoi/ tStwrcav to eTepov
fJ.epo<$ to 7rpo? ret? ecr^arta?, eTepov Se to 7rpos tt]v 7toXlv,
Iva Svo k\t]p<i)v eKao~Ta) vepLrjOevTuiv afji<poTep(x)v twj/ toVcot/
s
7ravres /xeTe^coo-t. jP<?/. VII. 10, 1 330 8.
8
to Se o"7rovSatav etrat tt^v 7roXtv ovk4tl tv^tjs epyov aXX
iTTLO-TrjjJLrjs Kat 7rpoatpeo"ew?. apa o-KeiTTeov, 7tojs avrjp
tout
ytVeTat o~7roi;Satos . . . aXXa p?yi/ dyaOoi ye Kat o"7rot;Satot
yivovTai Sta Tptcoi/. ra Tpta Se TavTa ecrrt, c/wcrts, e#09,
Xo'yos . . . TT/i/ pei/ tolvvv <pvo-LV olovs etVai Set tot)s /meXXovTas
e{n(tpaJT0vs ecrecrOaL T(3 vo/xoOeTrj Stcoptcr/xe^a irpoTtpov . . . to
Se Xot7rov epyov rjSrj yap iOL^o/mtvoL fxav-
7ratSetas* Ta p,ei/

Odvovo-L, Ta S* aVoi;oj/T9. J^/. VII. 13, I332 a 3l.

et S' ouv, KaOdirep elprjTai, tov icro/mevov ayaOov Tpa<j>r)vai

KaXco? Set Kat iOLcrOrjvaL, et^' ovtcos eV iTrLTTjSevfJLaaLV e7rtetKeo~t

^77^Kat P^t' aKOVTa fxrjO ettovTa ivpaTT^LV Ta c/>ai)Xa, Ta^Ta
Se yiyvoLT av ^tovpevot? KaTa Ttva vow Kat Ta^Lv opOrjv
e^ovcrav lo~)(yv. rj jxkv ovv iraTpLKr) 7rpoo"Taft? ovk tyei to
laxvpov ouSe to dvayKOLoV 6 Se vofxos avay KacrTLKrjv e^et
Svi/aptv, Xo'yos oiv aVo tivos <$>povr) crews Kat vov. Eth. Nic.
x. 9, n8o a i4.
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 12 1

75. Law to Aristotle is the outward expression of

the moral ideal without the bias of human feeling
1
. It is

therefore no mere agreement or convention as Lykophron

2
regarded it, but a moral force coextensive with all virtue .

Being necessarily universal in its character, it requires to

be modified and adapted to particular circumstances by
the action of equity (liriuKuaf.

1
avev opc^C05 vovs 6 v6fxo<; Icttlv. Pol. III. 1 6, I287 a
32. Cp. Eth. Nic. n8o a 2
2, Adyos airo cf>pov7]creo)s kcu vov.
2
(pavepov otl Set 7rept dptTrjs 7ri/xeA.S elvcu rrj y w? aXrj-

0ws oVo/xao/xeV?7 7rdAei fir} Xoyov ^dpiv' yiverai yap rj kol-

vwvia <rv/jLfjLaxLa (that is, otherwise the political community
becomes a mere alliance for self-defence) . . . kcu 6 v6p.os
crvvOrjKr/, KCU Ka0d7Tp <j>r) AvKO<ppU)V O CTO^tCTTTyS, iyyvr/rr/s
dXXrjXois 7W SiKatW dX)C ov)( olos7tollv dyaOovs kolI

Si/caiou? tovs ttoXltols. Pol. III. 8, l28o b 8.

ol Se vojjlol dyopevovcTL 7repi aTrdvroJV, crro^afdjUCT/ot rj rov
Kotvfj o-v/uufiepovTOS irdcriv rj rots apccrTOis rj rots Kvpuois.
Etli Nic. V. 1. 13.
3
KCU CCTTLV aVTTj Tj (f>V(TLS Tj TOV 67T161KOVS, i7Tav6p0o)fXa
vojubov rj eAAetVcc Sid to kolOoXov. Eth. Nic. V. IO. 6,
ii37 b 26.

76. Education should be so guided by legislation as

to make it correspond with the results of psychological
analysis,and follow the gradual development of the
1
bodily and mental faculties Children should during .

their earliest years be carefully protected from all inju-

rious associations,and be introduced to such amusements
2
as will prepare them for the serious duties of life Their .

literary education should commence with their 7th and

be continued to their 21st year, this period being divided

into two courses of training, the one from the 7th year
to puberty, the other from puberty to 21. Such educa-
122 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

tion should not be left to private enterprize, but should

be undertaken by the State, to which indeed the citizen
3
belongs There are four main branches of education
.

reading and writing (ypa/x/xara), gymnastic, music and

painting and with respect to all it must be remembered
:

that they should be studied not from any exclusive or

utilitarian ends but in the liberal spirit which will create
4
true freemen . Thus for example gymnastic should not
be pursued by itself exclusively, or it will issue in a harsh
savage type of character : painting must be studied not
merely to prevent people being cheated in pictures but
to make them attend to physical beauty: and music
must be studied not merely foramusement but on ac-
count of the moral influence which it exerts upon the
5
feelings . Indeed all true education is, as Plato saw, a
training of our sympathies so that we may love and hate
6
in a right manner .

1
7rpOS TTaVTCL fXtV TOLVVV TO) TToXlTLKip fiXeTTOVTl VOfJLO-

8ctyjtOV kcu Kara ret pipr] T7/s \pv)(fj<s koX Kara rds 7rpaeis
avT<2v, jmdXXov Se 7rpos ra /3eArta) Kat ra TeXrj. rov avrov
Se Tpoirov Kal 7Tpl tovs fiiovs Kal ras Tiov 7rpay/mra)v Statpe-
(rets* Set [lev yap dcr)(oXuv SyvaaOaL Kal 7roAc//,tv, fxaX-
Xov 8' Lpt]V7]v dyuv Kal crypXd&w. Pol. VII. 14, I333 a 37
Sto 7rp<jjTov fJikv tov crw/xaros Trjv tTrLfxiXuav dvay-
kolov ctvat irporipav y rrjv i/^^s, irLra
rrjs rrjv rrj<s

ope^ew eveKa fxivroi tov vov rrjv t^s opefea)?, rrjv 8e

tov o-w/xarog rrjs t/ar^g. Pol. VII. 1 5, I334 b 2 5.
Set Se ttj Statpecret rfjs cjyucrews liraKoXovO eiv' irdo~a yap
T)(yrj Kal iraiheia to irpocrXeiTrov fiovXtTai Trjs (pvaeojs ava-
a
irX-qpovv. Pol. VII. 17, I337 l.
2
Sto rots 7rcuSias ctVat Set ra? 7roAAas /xtju/^crets twv
vaTepov r7rovSa^ojJi4v(jov...x,Xoyov ovv aTrtXavvew airo tcov
a/<ovcr/xaTa)]/ Kat tojv opajmaTo^v twv aveXtvOepixiV Kat tyjXlkov-
tovs ovTas. 1336*33.
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 123

3 8'
7Tt iv to reXos rrj 7r6\ci Trdcrrj, <f>avzpov otl kcu
ty)v ircuheiav [llclv kcu rrjv olvttjv dvayKcuov elvat irctv-

TU)V' KCU TOLVTrjS TTjV 7rtjU<Atai/ LVCLL KOIV7JV KCtl JJL7) KOLT

tStOV, OV TpOTTOV VVV Ka(JTOS TT L/JLeXeiTCLL TWV CLVTOV TKVO)V,

tSta tc koll fxaOrjcrtv t8tav, rjv dv $6r], StSao-Kooj/. Set Se twv
kolvojv Koivrjv 7roiLO~6ai kcu rrjv dcTKrjcnv. a/xa Se ovSe XPV
vo/jii^etv avrov avrov tlvol eti/at rcZv ttoXliiov, aAAa 7rairas
ttjs 7rdXews. /V. viii. i, 1337*21. Cp. Eth, Nic. X. 9,
n8o a 29.
4
ccrrt Se rerrapa cr^cSov a TratScueti/ elwOacri, ypapifiara
kcu yvjxvacrTiKrjv kcu jjlovctlkyjv kcu reraprov eviOL ypcufriKrjv.
PolYULL 2, 1337*23. ^

in Se kol twi/ ^prja'L/jnov Set rtva 7ratSeueo~#at tovs 7ratSas

ou /jlovov Sid to xpTjcrijjiov, olov TTjV tu)v ypa/x/xaTtoi/ fJLaOrjCTLV,

aAAa kcu hid to 7roXXa? iv84)(<r0cu yivecrOcu $1 clvtujv fiaO/j-

cret? erepas. o/xotoos Sc /cat tt/i/ ypcufyiKyv, ov% Lva iv rot?
totots wi/tots /x?} Sia/xapTaVa>crti/, aAA' wcrti/ avea7raTr]T0i
7rp6s rrjv twv ctkcvcov wvrjv re /cat irpdcriv, rj fx&Wov otl
7TOtt OeCDpTJTtKOV TOV 7Tpt TO, CTto/XaTa KGlAAoV?. TO Se t,r]TLV

7ravTaypv to xpycnjJLOv rjKicrTa apttdrret rots fxeyaXoxj/v^ocs

kcu rots iXevOepots. Pol. viii. 3, 1338*37.
6
7Tpt 8e jJLOVO-LKTJS...OVT TIVCL ^t Svva/JLLV paStOV 7Tpt
avTrjs SteAeu/, ovre rtVos Set ydpiv ^tere^et^ avTrjs, iroTtpov
7rat8ta? eVe/<a kolI aVa7rai;crtoS, KaOdirep v7rvov kcu fJLtOrjs...

rj jjidWov olrjTeov 7rpos dptTrjv tl retVetv r^v jhovctlktJv, ojs

SvvafJLevrjv, KaOdirep r) yvfxvacrTiKrj to croo/xa 7tolov tl irapa-
0-KVa,L, KCU TTjV fJLOVCTLKrjV TO TjQoS 7TOLOV TL 7TOttl/, IOl^OVCTCIV
SvvacrOaL ^aipuv opOws.Pol. VIII. 5, I339 a ll. ecrrt 8c
0/xotoj/x.ara pudXicrTa irapa tcis d\r]6ivds <fcvcrLS iv rot? pvOfAols
kcu Tots fxeXecrLV opyfjs kcu 7rpaoTr]Tos, tl 8' aV8ptas /cat
s
cra)<fipocrvvr]<;. 3 40 18. 1
6
8to 8et rjxpai 7rw5 evOvs Ik vewv, aS? d nXarwi/ <prjcrLV 9
(ocrre ^atpctv re kou Xi)7TtO"^at otg 8et* 17 yap op#?7 7rat8eta

a{;r77 eo-rtV. ii/^. iV/<f. II. 3. 2, 1 104*1 1.

 CHAPTER IX.

PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

77. Art is defined by Aristotle as the realization in

external form of a true idea, and is traced back to that
natural love of imitation which characterizes man, and to
1
the pleasure which we feel in recognising likenesses . Art
however is not limited to mere copying; it idealizes

nature and completes its deficiencies : it seeks to grasp

the universal type in the individual phenomenon 2 . The
distinction therefore between poetic art and history is not

that the one uses metre, and the other not, but that
while history is limited to what has actually happened,
poetry depicts things in their universal character. And
therefore "poetry is more philosophical and more
3
elevated than history".

1
7rct 8' rj oLKO$o/JUKrj riyyt] rig icmv kcu 07Tp ei? rt?
fxerd Xoyov 7roLr)Tu<r} koli ovSc/jlicl ovre rt^vq icrriv ^rts
OV fJLCTOL X6yOV 7T0Lr)TLKYJ C^IS CTTtJ/, OVT TOtaVTT] TJ OV T)(Vr},
TOLVTOV aV LT] TX V V K0LL **$ |U,Ta \6jOV OlXt]6oVS 7TOi7JTlK7],
Eth. Nic. vi. 4, H4o io.
a

loiKacri Se ytvvrjcrai p\v oAtos rrjv 77-0177x1/071/ alrtai Svo

Tivls /cat avrat (f>vcrtKaL to t yap fxtfieicrOat crvjULcfavTOV rols
dvOpUHTOLS K 7TOLl$(DV icTTL (kOlI TOVTO) $L0L<f)epOVCn TWV dXXtoV
cOO)|/ OTL fJUfJLrjTLKlDTOLTOV CO~Tl KCtl TCt? fXaOrjaetS 7TOttTat Sid

jJLLIA7JO"(i)<S TaS TTptoTaS), KCU TO )(CUpLV TOtS flfJLr}jJLaO~L 7rdvT0LS.

 PHILOSOPHY OF ART. 125

olltiov Se Kcd tovtov otl jmavOdvetv ov jjlovov tols <t\ocroc/>ot9

7)$l<ttov, dX\d Kal rots aAAots o/xotcos, aAA iirt /3pa\v kolvo)-
vovctlv avrov' Sta yap tovto yaipovo~i ras etxoras opwi/Tes
OTt 0-V/x/3aLVL OeiDpOVVTOLS fJLav6(XVLV KCU Ov\\oyL^O~0aL TL
b
tKao-Tov, olov on ovros e/ceti/05. Poet. I. 4, I448 4.
2
oAcos re rj Tyyrj rd pXv eVtTeAet a rj 4>vctls aSwarei
a7repyacracr#at, rd Se p,t//,etTai. Phys. II. 8, 199*15.
yiVeTat Se Tkyyr\ otclv Ik TroWutv rrjs e/i/7retptas ivvorj/jLaTQiv
jxia kolOoXov yvr]T(U 7rept twv 6fJLOto)V VTroXrjxj/tSy Meta. A.
a
i, 98i 5. But it is to be noted that here t4x vV ls use d
not as equivalent to creative art, but rather to such "arts"
b
as medicine, &c. Cp. Rhet. 1. 2, i356 29j ovStfxia Se
tiyvr) <tko7tc2 to /ca#' Kao~Tov,
7Tt Se fJLLfJLTJCTlS io"TLV rj TpaytoSta (3e\TLOV(j)V, rj/xas Set
tovs dyaOovs iKOvoypd<j>ovs' Kal yap e/cetvot
juufAeLo-Oai
aVoStSovTe? ttjv IScav /uLop<j>rjv, 6/jlolovs irouovvTes, KaWtovs
ypacj>ovortv. ovtq) /cat tov ttoiiitiiv juujJLOvfJLevov Kai opytkovs
Kal paOvfjiovs Kai TaXXa ra rotavra e^ovras eVt tiov rjOwv,
eVtefKetas 7roteti> 7rapaSety/xa rj cr/cX^por^ro? Set, olov tov
f
'A^tXXea 'Aya^wi/ Kat '0/x77po9. ./W. 15, I454 b 8.
3
<f>avep6v Se e/c rwv elprifxevojv Kal otl ov to Ta yevo/uieva
Xeyetv tovto ttoltitov epyov Icttlv, aXX ota ai/ ykvoiTO Kal tol
SwctTa Kara to et/<os 77 to aVay/catoV 6 yap lo~ToptKOS Kal 6
7roLr)T7]<; ov tw rj e/x/xeTpa Xeyety 7) a/xeTpa Sia<pepovortv (et'77

yap ai/ t<x 'HpoSoVou ets /xeVpa TeOrjvat Kal ovSev tjttov dv etrj

tcrTopta Tts /xeTa fjLtTpov avev fxeTpoiv) aXXa tovto) Sta-

fj *

/xey Ta yevo/meva Xeyeti/, toV Se ota av yeVotTO

'
c/>epet, tc3 toi/
Sto Kal c/uXoo-oc^arrepoj/ /cat o-7rouSatOTepoi/ Trotriais taropt'as
eo~TtV* 77 /xei/ yap iroirjo-is fxdXXov Ta Ka66\ov, r] S' tcrTopta
Ta /ca^' eKacrTO]/ Xe'yet. /^/. 9, I45l a 36.

78. Such imitation may represent men either as

better or as worse than men usually are, or it may nei-
1
ther go beyond nor below the average standard
fall .

Comedy is the imitation of the worse specimens of

humanity, understood however not in the sense of abso-
lute badness, but only in so far as what is low and ignoble
126 PHILOSOPHY OF ART.
2
enters into what is Tragedy upon
laughable and comic .

the other hand is the representation of a serious or mean-

ing-full, rounded or finished, and more or less extended

or far-reaching, action
a representation which is effected
by action and not mere narration and which is fitted by :

pourtraying events which excite fear and pity in the

mind of the beholder to purify these feelings and extend
and regulate their sympathy 3 Such a Kadapo-is ira6r)ixd-
.

7w is well termed by Zeller " a homoeopathic curing of

the passions," and we may further accept his theory that
art being as we have seen a universalizing of particular
events, it follows that tragedy in depicting passionate and
critical situations takes them outside the selfish and the

individual standpoint, and views them in connexion

with the general lot of human beings. In a partly simi-
lar sense Aristotle explains the use of the orgiastic music

of the worship of Bacchus and other deities as affording

an outlet for religious fervour and so steadying our reli-
4
gious sentiments .

1
C7Tt Se fJU/AOVVTOLL 01 pit fXOVlXeVO I TTpOLTTOVTOLS, avaytO)
tovtovs rj (nrovoaiovs rj <pavXovs elvat...rjTot fieXTcovas rj
kolL tolovtovs, wcnrep ol
kclO* 77/xas rj -^ecpovas rj
ypanels'
ILoXvyvoiTOS fxev yap KpetTTOvs, Ilavcrwv Se ^etpovs, Atovv-
crtos Se OfxoLOvs etKa^ev, SrjXov Srj otl kcu tcov Xe\0eio~Qv
eKao-Trj iJLifX7]o~e(i)v eet ravras rds Sioufiopds kou Icrrai erepa
rc3 erepa papLe'ivOai tovtov tov rpoirov. ev rrj avrrj Se
Sta<j>opa Kal rj Tpaya>8ta 7rpos rrjv KWfjupStav SieaTTjKev ' rj jmev

yap xetpovs rj Se fieXrlovs fxtpLelaOai /BovXerat twv vvv. Poet.

s
2, 1448 I.
2
r] Se KUijJUpSia earn/, o'jcnrep elirofiev, [XLfxrjcns c^avXore-
pu)V fxevj ov fxevTQi Kara iraaav KaKtav, aXX r) tov alo~\pov
ecrTL to yeXotov piopiov. Poet. 5, I449 a 32.
3
ecTiv ovv TpaywSta fjLtfxrjcns 7rpdl;eu)S arrovSatas koX
 PHILOSOPHY OF ART. 127

TeXetas, fieyeOos i^ovcrrjs, ^Svcrfxiva) Aoyw, ^wptg eKacrTOV r<Zv

elScov iv tois fJLOpcoLS, $p(DVTU)v /cat ov St' aVayyeXtas, St'
i\tov /cat <}>of3ov 7TpaLVOvcra rrjv tiov tolovtcov TraOrjfjLOLTwv
KaOapaiv. Xeyoo Se yj^va/Jiivov fxkv Xoyov tov e^ovra pvO/jiov
/cat dp/jLOvcav /cat /xcXos, to Se ^copts Tots et'Secrt to Sta jLcerpwi/

eVta fxovov 7repatVe<7#at /cat, 7raXtv erepa Sta (xeXovs. Poet. 6,

1449^4.
4
(pavepov on ^p-qcrriov fxkv 77-acrats rat? dp/jiov cats. .0 . yap
7rept eVtas crvp/3atvL iraOos i/ar^a? tcr^yp^, tovto iv 7rdVats
V7rap^et, rw 8c tjttov Stac/>epet /cat t(3 fxaWov, olov eXeos /cat
c/)o/?o?, ert 8' i/^ovo"tao-/xo5. /cat yap v7ro ravr^? T179 /air-
crews KaTa/cw^t/xot rtves etcrti/* e/c Se rc3i/ tepwi/ /xeXwi/ 6p<s>fXv
tqvtovs, brav ^pyjcrwvraL rots i^opytat,ovo~i rrjv xf/v^rjv /x,eXe<xt,
KaOiorraiJLevovs c3<j7ip tarpetas ri^oi/ras Kai /ca^dpcreu)?. ./W.
s
VIII. 7, 1342 !
 INDEX.

The numbers refer to the paragraphs in which the subject is discussed.

'Ayadov, 57 yvupipLurepov rjpuit, 22, 57

atdiov, 45
afodrjcr is, 24, 27, 51, 52, 55 Aetvorrfs, 62
afoGijTOP, rpix&s Xeyerac, 51 5r)/ULOKpaTia, 73
atrial., ArijbLOKpLTOS, 47
37
aK0v<TL0i>, 63 dtaypa(p7] r<2v dperuv, 60
d/cpa, 17 Laip(Tis, 15. 16
d/cpacri'a, 64 BcaXeKTiKos, -cjs, 9, 29
dXrjdes, 11 dtd*>ota, 63
dXXotaxns, 42, 47, 51 Stdvoicu rpels, 9
dvaXvTLKa, dvaXvriKLos, 9 dtacpopd, 14
ava/JLV7)<ns i 54 diKaioavvrj, 61
dvTLKelcrOaL, 13 Siort, 24,25
dvTL7T67rOvd6s, 6l So^CUJTOZ',24
dvriaTpocpr), 13 SoOXos, 70
dvTL<pa(TiS) 13, 30 dvvafus, 36, 50
d^ub/Aara, 26, 30
dTrcuSeua-ta, 9, 26 "E#io>ios, 62
d7ro5etts, 23 et<5?7 (nxdrupos), 23, 31, 32, 55
diro^avTLKOs X070S, 12 eI5os, 37
ci7ro0acris, 12 et'/cos, 21

aper?} ^0tKiJ, 58, ea>at, 38, Dl

59
dpLGTOKparia, 73 enovGiov, 63
dpxcu ttJs yeveaeus, 37 t/nreipia, 24,
27
dpx a ^ twp e-marrj/JLOou, 26 evavTi&s dvTLKeiadai, 13
dpx^-l tCjv irpaKTwv, 62 evkpyzia, 36
avro/JLarop, 41 21
vdv/UL7]/ULa,

evreXexeta, 49
Baj>au<70S, 60, 74 f, 59
/3acri\aa, 73 kt,U)TplKOi \6yOL, 3
/3iOS deuprjTLKos, 66 eiraywyrj, 20, 22
TTLLKLa, 6l
Tevecns, 42 iirLdv/nia, 58, 64
7e^os, 14 7ri<jTriiuL7), 24
 INDEX. 129

evdaLfjLOpia, 57 op|, 58, 63

opos, opio-fxos, 14, 15, 25
Ziwov, 48, 51 6Vi, 24
Ve ca 37, 47 57
V^ ',,
!
'

*H.8our}, 65 ovpavos ai5(.os, 45

'Hpa/cXetros, 30 ouo-ta, 10, 34, 59

GaO^a, 28 IlcuSeta, 76
0eds, 39, 46 TrapoLbeiyixa, 21
fleams, 26 7rapeK(3a<JLS,
73
dewprjTiKOS, 7, 66 nXarco^, 16, 26, 31, 32, 50, 57,
SpeiTTLKou, 50
TroirjTiKr}, 7,^8, 77
'ISecu (IlXarco^os), 28, 32 7ron;ri/cos j>ous, 56
ifoo*', 1 7TOi6t7)TS, IO
7TO\tS, 69
Katfaoo-ts, 78 TroXireia, 73
KadoXov, 23, 32 ttoXltlkti, 8, 68
/caXoV, 60 ?rpats, irpaKTLKrj, 7, 8, 57, 63
KCLTCLCpaO-LS, 12 -rrpoaipecris, 63
KCLTrjyopLcu, 10 7T/)OS rt, 10
KLvrjais, 39, 42 irpOTOLCTLS, 12, 14
Kot^d alcrdrjrd, 51, 52 irporepov (pvaei, 22, 36
kolvcl ai-ubfiara, 26, 30 npajrayopas, 30
K&tArj, 69
Kw/JLCpdLa, 78 'P^aa, 11

Aoyt/cws, 9, 40 'ErjfjLe'ioi', 21
X070S, 12, 37, 59, 68 (TCXpLCTTlKOS, 29
Xoyov x ov 58 i (TTeprjvis, 35
(TuXXoyca-jULo diarov fiecrov, 16 18
MadTjfxarLKTjf 8, 29 (TuXX. e e7raywy?Js, 20
/bLeya\o\{/vx<>ci>, 60 crvXX. e virodecreajs, 19
Meya/n/cot, 36 avXX. t<2v irpaKTioi', 64
/*e<rw, 16, 17, 24, 51, 59 <TVfJL(3(37]K6s, I4, 20
/xerd rd (pvcrtKa, 29 avvexeta, 48
jULeTaj3\7)TLKr}, 71 0X7,tia ((TuXXoywytoO), 17
{xifx<qGis, 78 2uKpdrr)s, 28, 32, 33, 62, 64
fivfori,27, 54 o-cu^a, 43, 49
fJL0V<TLK7), 76, 78

TAos, 37, 47, 57

No^io^a, 71 reoas, 47
"o/*os, 75 tcx*"7 27, 41, 77
"ous, 27, 55, 56, 66 Tl/ULOKpCLTta, 73
to Ti 9?? elf at, 38
'OXiyapxla, 73 TOKOS, 71
OVOfJLa, IT T07TOS, 43
opyavov, 9 Tpayq)8La, 78

W.
i3 INDEX.
tvpawls, 73 (pVCTLKOS, CpvatKLuS, 4O
(pvcTLoXoyoi, 28
0i5<rts, 22, 41, 59
"*A* 35 (pVTOV, 48
(p(jOl>7}, 68
Qavrao-La, 53
(pikia, 67 Xpr/^ara, 70
<pi\6/u.vdos, 28 XPows, 44
0iXocro0ta, 7, 8, 28
0o/3a, 42 ^eOSos, 1
(ppovrjais, 62, 68 ^X% 49> 5> 5S

CAMBRIDGE I PRINTED BY J. & C. F. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

 BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
Demy Octavo, Cloth. Price \%s.

API2T0TEAH2 TTEPI YYXHS

ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY
IN GREEK AND ENGLISH,
WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

ILontJOtt: C. J. CLAY AND SONS,

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u Mr Wallace's Introduction is a clear, concise, forcible and

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. .

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endeavour to arrive at his real meaning." Mind.
 " This Edition of Aristotle's Psychology will largely help to take
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. . .

come up to the ideal standard of what such a translation ought to

be, but compared with what has been attained in similar efforts it

stands in the front rank, and is of quite conspicuous excellence. . . .

The Introduction is a piece of work thoroughly well done."

Spectator*

" Wallace's Bearbeitung der Aristotelischen Psychologie ist das

Werk eines denkenden und in alien Schriften des Aristoteles und
grosstenteils auch
neueren Litteratur zu denselben belesenen
in der
Mannes. . . . Der schwachste
Teil der Arbeit ist der kritische. . . .

Aber in alien diesen Dingen liegt auch nach der Absicht des
Verfassers nicht der Schwerpunkt seiner Arbeit, sondern in der
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stet. . Und so sei schliesslich noch einmal das Ganze von
. .

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mittel fiir das Studium der bearbeiteten Schrift auf das warmste

empfohlen." Prof. Susemihl in Philologische Wochenschrift.

" Griindlichkeit der Forschung, Umsicht der Behandlung, Beson-

nenheit des Urtheils, praktische Anordnung des Ganzen lassen das

Werk als ein tiichtiges und nutzliches erscheinen." Prof. Eucken
in Philosophise he Mo?iatshefte.

" In an elaborate introduction Mr Wallace collects and correlates

all the passages from the various works of Aristotle bearing on these
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acumen that is far from common .... The chapter of the intro-
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theory of thought is a singularly interesting and fresh attempt to
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. . .

is altogether a valuable addition to our philosophical library."

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lently wrought out, the translation is good, the notes are thoughtful,
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which is useful both to those who study it as scholars, and to those
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Author Work Editor Price

Mayor A Sketch of Ancient Philoso-
phy from Thales to Cicero 3/6
More History of King Richard III Lumby 3/6

Utopia 3/6
Milton Arcades and Comus Verity 3/"
ii
Ode on the Nativity, L'Alle-)
gro, 11 Penseroso & Lycidas\ 2/6

Samson Agonistes 2/6

i Sonnets ,/6
> Paradise Lost, six parts / each
Pope Essay on Criticism West */-
Scott Marmion Masterman a/6
i>
Lady of the Lake 2/6
ii
Lay of the last Minstrel Flather */-
ii
Legend of Montrose Simpson 2/6
>i
Old Mortality Nicklin 2/6
Shakespeare A Midsummer-Night's Dream Verity x/6
Twelfth Night i/6
Julius Caesar ii i/6
The Tempest >i i/6
King Lear ii i/6
Merchant of Venice i/6
King Richard II > i/6
As you Like it i/6
King Henry V > i/6
Macbeth ,, Nearly ready
Shakespeare & Fletcher Two Noble Kinsmen Skeat 3/6
Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie Shuckburgh 3/"
Wallace Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle 4 /6

West Elements of English Grammar 2/6

English Grammar for Beginners '/-

i> Key to English Grammars 3/6 net

Carlos Short History of British India </-
Mill Elementary Commercial Geography r/6
Bartholomew Atlas of Commercial Geography 3/-

Eohlnson Church Catechism Explained 2/-

Jackson The Prayer Book explained. Part I 2/6
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6. EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE.
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Colbeck Lectures on the Teaching of Modern
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Comenius Life and Educational Works Laurie 3/6
Three Lectures on the Practice of
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Sidgwick II. On
Stimulus I
Vol.
i */-
Abbott III. On
the teaching of Lai in
j
Verse Composition
Farrar General Aims ot the Teacher)
Vol. 1/6
Poole Form Management (

Locke Thoughts on Education Quick 3/6

Milton Tractate on Education Browning 2/-
Sidgwick On Stimulus /-
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7. MATHEMATICS.
Ball Elementary Algebra 4/6
Euclid Books I vi, xi, xn Taylor 5/-
,, Books l vi >> 4/"
Books I IV 3/-
Also separately
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,
Solutions to Exercises in Taylor's
Euclid W. W. Taylor io/6
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,, Solutions to Bks l IV 6/-
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IIobson& Jessop Elementary Plane Trigonometry 4 /6
Loney Elements of Statics and Dynamics 7/6
Part I. Elements of Statics 4/6
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Elements of Hydrostatics 4/6
Solutions of Examples, Statics and Dynamics 7/6
Mechanics and Hydrostatics 4/6
Smith, C. Arithmetic for Schools, with or without answers 3/6
Part I. Chapters I
vm. Elementary, with
or without answers */
Part II.
Chapters IX XX, with or without
answers */
Hale, G. Key to Smith's Arithmetic 7/6

London: C. J. CLAY and SONS,

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8
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