B.

Executive Department
(1) The President
a. Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath
Art. VII, Sec. 2 and 4
*Pormento vs. Estrada, GR No. 191988, Aug 31, 2010
*Quizon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177927, Feb 15, 2008
*Salonga vs. Cruz Pao, GR No. L-59524, Feb 18, 1985
*Loida Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, GR No. 162759, August 4, 2006
* Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait vs. Reyes, GR No. 180771,
Apr 21, 2015
*Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, Mar 2, 2001, Apr 3, 2001
Regular Election and Term
Art. XVIII, Sec. 5
In re: Saturnino Bermudez, GR No. 76180, Oct 24, 1986
Special Election and Term
Art. VII, Sec. 10
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-72915, Dec 19, 1985
Canvassing of Election Returns
Canvass of Votes
Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
Brillantes vs. COMELEC, GR No. 163193, June 15, 2004
Pimentel vs. Congress, GR No. 163783, June 22, 2004

Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress Sen. Pimentel seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee (canvassing, determining authenticity and due execution of
CoCs for Pres. and VP) after Congress adjourned sine die. He claims that the terms of the members of
Congress expired on June 11, 2004, when the body adjourned. The petition lacks merit. The Senate
Rules specifically provide that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or
compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VP. Moreover, the precdents set by the 1992
and 1998 do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing. The legislative functions of Congress
may have ended upon its adjournment, but this does not affect its nonlegislative functions, such as that
of being the NBOC. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes. Finally, since the Constitution provides that the terms of the members of
Congress shall commence at noon of June 30th, the terms of the incumbent legislators likewise expire
on the same day.

Electoral Tribunal for the Election of the President and Vice-President

Election Contest
Tecson vs. COMELEC, GR No. 161434, Mar 3, 2004
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, GR 221697, March 8, 2016
Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001, Feb 13, 1996
Legarda vs. De Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, Mar 31, 2005, Jan 18, 2008
Oath of Office
Art. VII, Sec. 5
b. Privilege and Salary
1
 Art. VII, Sec. 6
National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 156982, Sept 8, 2004
c. Prohibitions
Art. VII, Sec. 13
Cabinet Members
*Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, Feb 22, 1991

*Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

President Aquino issued an EO stating that members of the Cabinet could not hold more than two
additional positions in government or GOCCs (with compensation). The theory was that Sec. 7, Art. IX-
B allowed this, Sec. 13, Art. VII notwithstanding. The latter provides that the President and the members
of his official family (up to Assistant Secretaries) shall not, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN
THE CONSTITUTION, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. The former, on the
other hand, says that unless otherwise allowed by law no appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in Government. The theory was that the exception provided in Sec. 7, Art. IX-B fell
within the proviso in Sec. 13, Art. VIIand that the Executive Order issued by President Aquino was the
necessary step to allow appointive officials in her Cabinet to hold other offices.

The SC decided against the Executive Secretary.

Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution does not refer to broad exceptionsrather, it refers to
specific offices delegated to particular officials: the VP serving as a member of the Cabinet (without
having to be confirmed by the Legislature), the VP as Acting President in case the President was not
chosen or failed to qualify, the Secretary of Justice serving as an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council. The Court held that members of the Official Family may only take on other offices in an ex-
officio capacity (the official is not appointed, rather the additional office is attached to his primary
position), as may be provided by law, provided that no additional compensation will be given.

EO 284 of 25 July 1987, Authorizing the Holding of Other Govt Offices or Positions
Dela Cruz vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 138489, Nov 29, 2001
PIC vs. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006 and Mar 5, 2007

Public Interest Center v. Elma Magdangal

Elma was appointed PCGG Chairman. A few months later, he was appointed Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC), but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as PCLC. Petitioners seek to
declare the concurrent appointments void, citing Civil Liberties. The issue in this case is whether the
PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC. The Court held that he cannot. The Court
has previously held that There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government
offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The test for
incompatibility is whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right
to interfere with the other (People v. Green). In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions
of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to
review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.

Art. IX-B, Sec. 7

2
 Funa vs. Agra, GR No. 191644, Feb 19, 2013

Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra
was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then
relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations were merely
in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an
Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the
Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid

No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General
violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet
Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent
the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Funa vs. Ermita, GR No. 184740, February 11, 2010

Espiritu vs. del Rosario, GR No. 204964, October 15, 2014

FACTS : Respondent Lutgarda Torres del Rosario sought to exempt her lots, numbered 854
and 855, -both located in Angeles City, Pampanga- from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Exemption was granted by the
then secretary of Agrarian Reform. However, the farmers in the said lots led by
Remigio Espirito opposed, saying that under the Housing and Land Regulatory
Board Resolution, and Angeles City Council Resolution, the lots were classified as
agricultural, meaning they are well under the coverage of the CARP. Espiritus
motion was considered by a new secretary agrarian reform, so del Rosario appealed
to the Office of the President. But, her appeal was dissmissed by the Deputy
Executive Secretary of Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite.
Now, respondent del Rosario assails the decision of Gaite, saying the same was void
because the latter was already appointed to the Securities and Exchange
Commission two months before the decision was rendered.

ISSUE: a. WON Gaite, in violation of Art. VII section 13, is not considered as a valid
executive department officer
b. WON Gaites decision is valid.

3
HELD: a. No. Gaite is rather a de facto officer of the President after his appointment to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is
presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.

b. Yes. Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was
rendered beyond the power of authority. There is a presumption of regularity of
official acts, unless rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity. Del Rosario
failed to rebut the presumption

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 85468, Sep 7, 1989

Compare Prohibitions against other Officials
Art. VI, Sec. 13
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7
Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Exceptions to Prohibitions
Art. VII, Sec. 13
Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, GR No. L-46570, Apr 21, 1939
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 96409, Feb 14, 1992
Art. XII, Sec. 9
Art. VII, Sec. 3
Art. VIII, Sec. 8 (1)
Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2
d. Succession and Removal
(1) At the Beginning of Term
Art. VII, Sec. 7
A. Temporary or Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency before the Term
Art. VII, Sec. 7, Par. 2-6
Art. VII, Sec. 10
(2) During Term
Art. VII, Sec. 8
B. Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency during the Term
(3) In case of Temporary Disability
Art. VII, Sec. 11
C. Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency during the Term
Art. VII, Sec. 12
Removal
Art. XI, Sec. 2 & 3
Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, Mar 2, 2001, Apr 3, 2001
e. Powers and Functions of the President
(1) Executive Power
Art. VII, Sec. 1 & 17
4
 Natl Electrification Administration vs. COA, GR No. 143481, Feb 15, 2002

Pursuant to the Salary Standardization Law II, Pres. Ramos issued EO 389 mandating that the salary
increase be implemented in two trenches. NEA implemented it in one lump sum. CoA issued a notice of
disallowance. NEAs appeal was denied. The Court upheld CoAs disallowance. NEAs implementation
of the salary increase was not in accordance with the law and the pertinent EO. Accelerated
implementation may only be allowed subject to the approval of the DBM. As per EO 292 and the
Constitution, the President has the power of control over all executive departments. His or her authority
to issue executive orders springs from this power. [Yu note: The Executive has power to plan how the
funds appropriated by Congress to an executive agency will be used.]

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, Sept 15, 1989, Oct 27, 1989 --- Residual Powers
Art. VII, Sec. 14-23
Myers vs. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, Oct 25, 1926

Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senates permission to remove the
postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed with the Senates advice and
consent. The President asked for the individuals resignation without consulting the Senate first, and
the Senate refused the President permission to do so.

Issue. [W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive
officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.

Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded
opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative history of executive appointments, including
Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to
prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect
was equally so. Dissent. Justice McReynolds found that it is impossible for me to accept the view
that the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed
with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy
review of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was May the President, having acted
under the statute in so far as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the
Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take
place? Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was created by Congress.

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, Aug 19, 1994
*The Province of North Cotabato vs. The Govt of the Rep of the Phil Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
GR No. 183591, Oct 14, 2008

Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Angeles, GR No. 108461, October 21, 1996

The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government owned and controlled corporation
issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which application to the PITC
for importation from the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed Export Program of the Philippine Products to China carried out by the importer himself or
5
through a tie-up with a legitimate importer from PROC in an amount equivalent to the value
of importation from PRC being applied for, or simply at one-to one ratio.

Two domestic corporations, Remington and Firestone, both applied for authority to import from
PROC, which were granted, but later on were withheld for failure to comply with the require one to
one ratio of import and export.

They filed a complaint asserting that the administrative order is unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that
the order was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. PITC elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:

The order was not valid.

The PITC is a line agency of the Department of Trade and Industry which was the primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the countrys trade.
The PITC as an integral part of the DTI was given the task of the implementing the departments
program. It has the authority to issue the questioned order and may legally exercise that authority
under the supervision of the DTI. The grant t quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies are not
unconstitutional. It has become necessary to create more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its activities. Because hey specializes in the field assigned to them, they can deal and
dispatch problems with more expertise than the legislature or the courts of justice.

In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue the Administrative Orders as a valid exercise of a
power ancillary to legislation; however, it does not imply that the order was valid. First, it was
never published, thus it is not effective. Second, the same is inconsistent with the declared policy of
the government to then effect that it will develop and strengthen trade relations with the PROC. Since
the order was a unnecessary barrier to trade, the same is not a valid exercise of its authority.

Ople vs. Torres, GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion.

HELD: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought.

*Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., GR No. 212426, Jan 12, 2016, July 26, 2016
(2) Control of Executive Departments
6
 Art. VII, Sec. 17
Webb vs. De Leon, GR No. 121234, Aug 23, 1995
Mondano vs. Silvosa, GR No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
Planas vs. Gil, GR No. L-46440, Jan 18, 1939
*Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, GR No. L-46570, Apr 21, 1939
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., vs. Pano, GR No. L-27811, Nov 17, 1967
Teotico vs. Agda, Sr., GR No. 87437, May 29, 1991
Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez, GR No. 85439, Jan 13, 1992
Angeles vs. Gaite, GR 165276, November 25, 2009
Nestle Philippines Inc., vs. Uniwide Sales Inc., GR No. 174674, October 20, 2010
Samar II Electric Cooperative Inc. (SAMELCO II) vs. Seludo, Jr., GR No. 173840, April 25, 2012

MEWAP vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007

Pres. Estrada directed the reorganization of the DOH through EOs 102 and 1165. Petitioners were
adversely affected by the restructuring. They challenged his authority to order the reorganization and
streamlining of the DOH. The Court upheld the validity of the assailed EOs. It was within Estradas
power to order the restructuring, as the President exercises the power of control over executive
departments according to the Constitution. Reorganization may involve the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof. There was no showing that the issuance of the assailed EO
was tainted with bad faith. [Yu note: The President cannot abolish offices. That is a function of
Congress. But the President may inactivate offices and order their reorganization.]
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, GR No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001

On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another memo
providing that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations
in all land areas and inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs. On January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO 191 entitled Deactivation of the EIIB. The order
of deactivation was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223
providing for the separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of
positions.

ISSUES:

Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department?How shall the
reorganization be carried out?

RULING:

YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or
offices in the executive department are under the Presidents power of control. Hence he is justified in
deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law
grants him such power.

Banda vs. Ermita, GR No. 166620, April 20, 2010

7
 In the present case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices,the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out,
according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but
accept.
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012

Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor, GR No. L-58184, Oct 30, 1981
Blaquera vs. Alcala, GR No. 109406, Sept 11, 1998
Hutchison Ports Phil, Ltd vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, GR No. 131367, Aug 31, 2000
*Cruz vs. Sec of Environment & Nat Resources, GR No. 135385, Dec 6, 2000
*Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express Inc., GR No. 154377, Dec 8, 2003

*Chavez vs. Romulo, GR No. 157036, June 9, 2004

Frank Chavez questions the authority of PNP Chief Ebdane to issue guidelines pertaining to the
nationwide gun ban announced by then Pres. GMA. The Court upheld his authority. PD 1866 (the law on
firearms) specifically empowers the PNP Chief to promulgate rules and regulations. When Pres. Arroyo
directed Ebdane to issue the assailed guidelines, she was merely exercising her power of control over all
executive departments.
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General, NEDA, GR No. 167798, Apr 19, 2006
Petitioners assail EO 420 insofar as it usurps the authority of Congress. They claim that the creation of a
unified ID system requires legislation and an appropriation therefor. The Court upheld the validity of the
Order. EO 420 does not create a national ID system, it merely directs all departments to streamline the
data required to appear therein. However, the order cannot be applied to Congress, the Judiciary, or the
Constitutional Commissions because they are not under the control of the President. In issuing EO 420
the President did not make, repeal, or alter any law but merely implemented and executed existing ones.

DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug 19, 2003
Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, GR No. L-17169, November 30, 1963

President does not have the power to remove officers in the Classified Civil Service (Ang-Angco was
Collector of Customs)
-contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative case of an employee under classified civil
service EVEN WITH AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT without first submitting the case to the
Commissioner of Customs
*Constantino vs. Cuisia, GR No. 106064, Oct 13, 2005
PASEI vs. Torres, GR No. 98472, August 19, 1993
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the
department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based
workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

HELD:
the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated
by the growing complexities of the modern society.
Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, GR No. L-61388, Apr 20, 1983, July 19, 1985
8
Applications for writs of habeas corpus were filed in behalf of 14 detainees who were arrested while having a
conference in the dining room of Dr. Parongs residence. Prior thereto, all the fourteen detainees were under
surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging
in subversive activities.

The SC held that the detention of the petitioners was validated by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) issued on July 12, 1982. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention
of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. It renders
the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for
continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or
quelled and the need therefor in the interest of public safety continues. The significance of the conferment of
this power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not
subject to judicial inquiry. Under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the
executive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the Courts, under the
doctrine of political question.

Tondo Medical Center vs. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
Sec. 31, Book III, Chapter 10, Administrative Code of 1987
Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, Feb 6, 2003
*Anak Mindanao vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 166052, Aug 29, 2007
Biraogo vs. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, GR Nos. 192935, 193036, Dec 7, 2010
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. (because the ad hoc committee only for PGMAs administration)

PEZA vs. COA, GR No. 210903, Oct 11, 2016

*Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, Nov 8, 2016
*Zamboanga City Water District vs. COA, GR No. 213472, Jan 26, 2016
(3) General Supervision of Local Governments & Autonomous Regions
Art. X, Sec. 4 & 16
*Ganzon vs. CA, GR No. 93252, Aug 5, 1991, Nov 8, 1991
*League of Provinces vs. DENR, GR No. 175368, Apr 11, 2013
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following: ( 1)
declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over
provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:
9
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for
providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits
amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued
by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the
implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the
duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural
resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court has
clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not
make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization
of the country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it
bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be
valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A.
No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary,
declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and
canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale
Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which
involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with
respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution
of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act
of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the
law.

(4) Power of Appointment

Manalang vs. Quitoriano, GR No. L-6898, Apr 30, 1954
Flores vs. Drilon, GR No. 104732, June 22, 1993
10
 *Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, GR No. L-17169, November 30, 1963
Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, GR No. L-22754, Dec 31, 1965
*Concepcion vs. Paredes, GR No. 17539, Dec 23, 1921
*Sarmiento III vs. Mison, GR No. 79974, Dec 17, 1987
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of
Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting
his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and
to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the
CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Art. X, Sec. 18
Bautista vs. Salonga, GR No. 86439, Apr 13, 1989
FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the
Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the
authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without
confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments,
cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

11
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 86439

Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commissions, GR No. 83216, Sept 4, 1989

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for
women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently
scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition
against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the
concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not
require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups,
to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group
abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. All
other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard
is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:

Art. VII, Sec. 16

Calderon vs. Carale, GR No. 91636, Apr 23, 1992
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman
and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the
CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the
confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715
should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation
12
by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for
the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first
group). With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase
and other officers required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has
significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed
in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides
in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Tarrosa vs. Singson, GR No. 111243, May 25, 1994

Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in
1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as
required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the
Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management was
impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

13
Issue:

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.

Held:

No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the
appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

*
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, GR No. L-6355-56, Aug 31, 1953
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias
and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which
provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation
this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal
Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent
and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their
salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This
is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation

14
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by
the highest court of the land.

Art. IX, B, Sec. 1 (2)

Art. IX, C, Sec. 1 (2)
Art. IX, D, Sec. 1 (2)
Art. VIII, Sec. 8 (2)
Art. XVIII, Sec. 7
Art. X, Sec. 18
i. Non-Delegability
Binamira vs. Garrucho, Jr., GR No. 92008, July 30, 1990
ii. Necessity of Discretion
Flores vs. Drilon, GR No. 104732, June 22, 1993
Bermudez vs. Torres, GR No. 131429, Aug 4, 1999

Pobre vs. Mendieta, GR No. 106677, July 23, 1993

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional
Regulation Commission by the President is lawful.
RULING: THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE
POINT THAT THE OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds
unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior"
Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that
would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners
iii. Prohibition during Election Period
In re: Appointments of Mateo Valenzuela, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
Valenzuela and Vallarta were appointed by Pres. Ramos as RTC judges within the two-month period
provided in Sec. 15, Art. VII. Were their appointments valid? NO. The Court held that Sec. 4 (1) and
Sec. 9, Art. VIII, requiring the filling-up of a vacancy in 90 days is the general rule, while the two-
month ban is the exception which applies once every six years. In other words, the President is
mandated to fill a vacancy in the judiciary within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy except
when the vacancy occurs during the two-month period. [Yu note: Overturned by De Castro v. JBC.]
*Aytona vs. Castillo, GR No. L-19313, Jan 19, 1962
Pres. Carlos P. Garcia made 351 appointments the day before Pres.-elect Macapagal was to assume
office. Two hours before Macapagals inauguration, the midnight-appointees were inducted. Pres.
Macapagal then issued AO 2 recalling all the 351 appointments. Castillo replaced Aytona as Governor of
the Central Bank. HELD: AO 2 is valid. The en masse ad interim appointments were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Such appointments were made without regard for the appointees fitness for their
respective positions. The new administration was deprived of an opportunity to make its own
appointments. [Yu note: SC did not declare midnight appointments illegal per se, it was just obvious that
Garcia used his power to appoint to ensure continued influence in the new administration.]
Jorge vs. Mayor, GR No. L-21776, Feb 28, 1964
Quimsing vs. Tajanglangit, GR No. L-19981, Feb 29, 1964
Garcia extended an ad interim appointment to Quimsing as Chief of Police, Iloilo. His appointment was
confirmed by the CA. Later, an MR was filed but there was a motion to lay all the pending motions on
the table. Believing that Quimsings appointment was one of those nullified by AO 2, Macapagal
15
 appointed Tajanglangit to the same post. Does Quimsing have a better right to the post? YES. His
appointment was made in good faith. He was already acting Police Chief prior to the ad interim
appointment. The confirmation of his appointment stands, as the MR was not granted, it was merely laid
on the table. Tajanglangit could not be appointed to the same position because there was no vacancy to
be filled.

De Rama vs. CA, GR No. 131136, February 28, 2001

De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010 and April 20, 2010
CJ Puno was set to retire on May 17, 2010. The national elections would be held on May 10. JBC
commenced the acceptance of nominations to the post of CJ. Petitioners seek to enjoin the JBC from
continuing with the screening of nominees for CJ. Is the position of Chief Justice covered by the
Constitutional ban on midnight appointments? NO. The use of the word shall in Section Ish Guidote |
Pola Lamarca | Dodot Ramos Constitutional Law 1 Exam #3 Reviewer | Page 21 of 64 4(1), Art. VIII
imposes a duty on the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days. The Court here relied on the opinion
of former Justice and Commissioner Regalado that Section 15, Art. VII applies only to appointments in
the Executive Department. Justice Carpio-Morales dissented saying that the position of a provision in a
law is a weak device for statutory construction. She likewise claims that it was hasty for the SC to
overrule Valenzuela solely on the basis of the opinion of J. Regalado, when the Valenzuela case was
unanimously decided. There is no imperative need to fill the vacancy because the SC is a collegiate
court which can function temporarily even without a CJ. [Yu note: This is good law as of today.]
Velicaria-Garafil vs. OP, GR No. 203372, June 16, 2015

GMA appointed 800 appointees on March 8&9, cutoff was March 10. PNOY issued EO2, recalling
appointments

SC: for valid appointments to concur:

1. Authority to appoint
2. Transmittal of appointment paper
3. Vacant position
4. Receipt of appointment

-petitioners failed to prove that their appointments were transmitted before the ban took effect
-EO2 valid

CJ Coronas Appointment as CJ of the Supreme Court

iv. Confirmation by Commission on Appointments
a. Temporary Appointments
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, GR No. 164978, Oct 13, 2005
While Congress was in session, PGMA issued appointments to acting capacities to various departments. She
issued ad interim respondent to same persons after congress adjourned.

SC: Pres can appoint in acting capacity w/o consent of CA when Congress is in session. Appointment in acting
capacities is temporary (cant exceed one year), ad interim appointments are permanent and need CA
confirmation. Congress cant impose on the Pres to make Usec as Sec.

Acting Capacity Ad interim

16
-temporary -permanent
-made any time there is vacancy -while congress is not in session
-does not require CA confirmation -requires CA confirmation

b. Appointments Not Subject to Confirmation

*Sarmiento III vs. Mison, GR No. 79974, Dec 17, 1987
Soriano III vs. Lista, GR No. 153881, Mar 24, 2003

GMA appointed officers to PH coast guard. Challenged because not appointed by CA.
SC: Appointments dont require confirmation. PCG is not part of AFP, its under DOTC

Manalo vs. Sistoza, GR No. 107639, Aug 11, 1999

c. Legislative Expansion of List of Appointments Subject to Confirmation
Calderon vs. Carale, GR No. 91636, Apr 23, 1992
v. Appointment of Subordinate Officers
Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006
Upon JBCs Recommendation
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1), 9
Art. XI, Sec. 9
Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012, Apr 16 2013
2012 decision:
Pet was nominated Chief Justice. Senate & HoR sent one representative each for JBC.
Pet: composition of JBC unconstitutional, there should be only one member from congress.
Res: JBC was designated for unicameral legislature but not charged when commission adopted
bicameral

SC: JBC consti unconstitutional, however, doctrine of operative fact applies.

After the casecongress filed MR, in the meantime their reps decided to boycott JBC. The court
allowed them to sit & vote
--questioned in Umali vs JBC

2013 decision:
The use of a representative of Congres not an oversight. JBC was created to support executive power
to appoint. Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned to contribute a non-legislative function.

SC: Commission really intended 7 members in JBC

>4 regular members + 3 representing each branch of government (to assign same weight of
considerations)

Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, GR No. 224302, Nov 29, 2016, Feb 21, 2017, Aug 8, 2017

Appointment of VP as Member of the Cabinet

Art. VII, Sec. 3
Appointments solely by the President
Art. VII, Sec. 16
17
 Art. VII, Sec. 3 (2)
Limitations on Appointing Power of the President
Art. VII, Sec. 13
Art. VII, Sec. 15
Art. VI, Sec. 19
Art. VII, Sec. 16
Valencia vs. Peralta, Jr., GR No. L-20864, Aug 23, 1963
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. IAC, GR No. L-65439, Nov 13, 1985, July 31, 1986
Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
-Respondents were appointed by GMA as COMELEC Chairman & Commissioner
- The CA did not act on their appointments, so she reappointed them.
Petitioners assail respondents right to remain in their appointive offices in view of prohibition of
temporary in COMELEC

SC: ad interim = permanent in nature. They remain valid until rejected or not acted upon. If CA does not
act upon an appointment is not considered disapproval. The appointee can be appointed anew
Brillantes vs. Yorac, GR No. 93867, Dec 18, 1990
Davide vacated COMELEC chairmanship to join a fact finding commission. Yorac was appointed by
Cory as a temporary substitute in an acting capacity
Pet: violative of Consti 10-C

SC: Unconstitutional. Although constitutional commissions are exec in nature, they are not under
control of pres in the discharge of their functions. Only members of COMELEC can elect their acting
chairman pursuant to constitutional commissions being independent bodies.

Lacson vs. Romero, GR No. L-3081, Oct 14, 1949

Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Sec 17
Limitations on the Appointing Power of the Acting President
Art. VII, Sec. 14, 15, 16
General vs. Urro, GR No. 191560, Mar 29, 2011
Sana vs. Career Exec. Service Board, GR No. 192926, Nov 15, 2011
Abas Kida vs. Senate, GR No. 196271, Oct 18, 2011 and Feb. 28, 2012
In the constitution elections should be synchronized. ARMM should be in sync with national elections

g. Executive Clemencies
Art. VII, Sec. 19
Art. IX, C, Sec. 5
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., GR No. 78239, Feb 9, 1989
Garcia vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. L-75025, Sept 14, 1993
Vidal and Lim vs. COMELEC and Estrada, GR No. 206666, Jan 21, 2015
Tiu vs. Dizon, GR No. 211269, June 15, 2016
It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power.51 Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not
delegate the authority to pardon prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which "essentially
postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the

18
 actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless
the President himself should disapprove such acts."52
chanrob leslaw

Idanan vs. People, GR No. 193313, Mar 16, 2016

Basta the court recommended clemency.
considering the facts about petitioners' participation in the crime, and guided by
jurisprudence on instances when the facts of the crime elicited the Court's
compassion for the accused, we recommend executive clemency
San Diego vs. People, GR No. 176114, Apr 8, 2015
Verily, the proper penalty imposable is, thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was incorrect for the R
TC to sentence the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty ( 40) years without pardon because
that would be a limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of the pardoning
power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court,
save only when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.
(a) Pardon distinguished from Probation
*People vs. Vera, GR No. L-45685, Nov 16, 1937, Dec 22, 1937
the case of People vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng (defendant), Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted to an
indeterminate penalty. He applied for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 or the Probation
Act.

HELD: Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and
different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in
pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire
punishment whichthe law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationers case is not terminated by
the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in
legal custody-- subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon
the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to
serve the sentence originally imposed upon him.

(b) Pardon distinguished from Parole

Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, GR No. L-46437, May 23, 1939
Torres vs. Gonzales, GR No. 76872, July 23, 1987
RPC, Art. 159
(c) Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
*Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, Mar 23, 1896
Knote vs. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, 1877
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, GR No. L-1278, Jan 21, 1949
Petitioners were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before perfecting appeal, Jimenez as well as Barrioquinto applied for amnesty under
Proclamation 8 which granted amnesty in favor of all those charged under the RPC in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in war efforts of the enemy. The Guerilla Amnesty
Commission did not decide on their applications on the ground that petitioners did not admit having
committed the offence they were charged with. HELD: in order to entitle a person to the benefits of
amnesty, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent, admit having committed the
criminal act with which he is charged. It is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or
accused shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of the proclamation.

Pardon v. Amnesty: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
is by proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
19
 which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence (Art 36 RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

(d) Effects of Pardon

Cristobal vs. Labrador, GR No. L-47941, Dec 7, 1940

Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor. Upon appeal, his
conviction was affirmed. He was thereafter confined in jail from. Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos
continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal and was municipal president. from 1934 to 1937.
Subsequently, The Election Code was approved. Sec. 94, par. (b) of said law disqualifies the respondent
from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Because of
this provision, Santos petitioned the Chief Executive for absolute pardon which was granted. He was
restored to his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be appointed for appointments only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility. Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of
Santos name in from the list of voters in Malabon on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par.
(b), Sec. 94 of CA 357. The lower court denied Cristobals petition holding that Santos pardon had the
effect of excluding him from the disqualification created by par. (b) of Sec. 94.

HELD: There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the President to
grant pardon: (1) that the power be exercised after conviction; (2) that such power does not extend to
cases of impeachment. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes
all disabilities resulting from conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction
withoutwhichthere would be no basis for the disqualification from voting. Aside from imprisonment,
there are accessory and resultant disabilities and the pardoning power likewise extends to such
disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that
is left of the consequences of conviction. To argue that the disqualification imposed in par. (b) of Sec.94
is beyond the purview of the pardoning power of the chief executive is tantamount to an impairment of
his pardoning power, not contemplated by the Constitution.

Pelobello vs. Palatino, GR No. L-48100, June 20, 1941

Pelobello alleges that Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon. It appears that Palatino
was convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to
imprisonment. He was later elected mayor of Torrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is admitted that Palatino
was granted by the Governor Gen. a conditional pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on Dec. 25, 1940,
the President granted him absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights.

20
 ISSUE: WON the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under the then Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before
the date fixed by law for assuming office.

HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislation; an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or
impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at
liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned
from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. Under the circumstances of the case,
it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position
in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended after the election but before the date
fixed by the Election Code for assuming office.

Lacuna vs. Abes, GR No. L-28613, Aug 27, 1968

Mayor-elect Abes was convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants. After partially serving
his sentence, he was released on conditional pardon. Abes applied for registration as a voter but this was denied.
Despite such denial, he filed his COC for office of mayor, and subsequently won. His opponent challenged his
election. After elections but before assumption of office, Abes was granted absolute and unconditional pardon.
Petitioner contends that Abes was ineligible for the position as mayor since he was not a qualified voted at the
time of the elections.

HELD: The election into office of Abes is sustained. While the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to exercise the right of suffrage attached to the penalty imposed on Abes and is supposed to
continue even after he has served such sentence, the absolute unconditional pardon granted to Abes had the
effect of blotting out the crime committed AND removing all disabilities resulting from conviction.
Furthermore, when it is granted after the term of imprisonment as expired (as in the case at bar), absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.

(e) Sanctions for Violations of Conditional Pardon

Civil Liability
People vs. Nacional, GR No. 111294-95, September 7, 1995
(f) Pardoning Powers Application to Administrative Cases
Llamas vs. Executive Secretary Orbos, GR No. 99031, Oct 15, 1991
Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Sec 53, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I
(g) Who May Avail of Amnesty
Tolentino vs. Catoy, GR No. L-2503, Dec 10, 1948
Macaga-an vs. People, GR Nos. 77317-50, July 29, 1987
Pending Criminal Cases
People vs. Patriarca, Jr., GR No. 135457, Sept 29, 2000
Denial of Commission of Offenses
Vera vs. People, GR No. L-18184, Jan 31, 1963

21
 Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. They invoked the Amnesty
Proclamation of 1946. Their case was tried by the Guerilla Amnesty Commission, but they denied
participation in the crime. The case was remanded to the court of origin.

ISSUE: WoN persons invoking the benefit of amnesty must first admit to their complicity in the crimes
charged.

RULING: YES. The ruling in Barrioquinto is overturned. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a
crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for
amnesty. An invocation of amnesty is akin to a plea of confession and avoidance. Here, petitioners
cannot avail of the amnesty because the crime was committed not in furtherance of the Resistance, but
due to a guerilla rivalry

*People vs. Llaneta, GR No. L-2082, Apr 26, 1950

Tax Cases
Republic vs. IAC, GR No. 69344, April 26, 1991
BIR assessed taxes against Sps. Pastor. They availed of the tax amnesty under PDs 23, 213, and 370. In
1980, the Government filed a complaint for non-payment of the tax assessed in 1950. The Court held
that the State is estopped from demanding payment. The nature of a tax amnesty is that of a general
pardon or an intentional overlooking. It partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver of its right to
collect what would otherwise be due it.

(h) Requirement of Finality of Conviction

People vs. Salle, Jr., GR No. 103567, Dec 4, 1995
*People vs. Bacang, GR No. 116512, July 30, 1996,
(i) Commutation
Drilon vs. Courts of Appeals, GR No. 91626, Oct 3, 1991
(j) Amnesty
People vs. Casido, GR No. 116512, March 7, 1997
People vs. Salig, GR No. L-53568, Oct 31, 1984
In this case, the SC upheld the Amnesty Commissions denial of Saligs application for amnesty, having
been filed while his trial for robbery with homicide was pending in the lower court.

h. Powers as Commander-in-Chief
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. III, Sec. 13
Art. VIII, Sec. 1
1. Power to Call out the Armed Forces and Declaration of State of Rebellion/National Emergency
IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, Aug 15, 2000
Sanlakas vs. Executivje Secretary, GR No. 159085, Feb 3, 2004
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011
2. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus/State of Rebellion
Art. III, Sec. 2
RPC, Art. 124
RPC, Art. 125, as amended by EO 272

22
 Morales, Jr., vs. Ponce Enrile, GR No. L-61016, April 26, 1983
Petitioners were arrested and have been detained for the crime of rebellion. They petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that they were arrested without a warrant, that their constitutional rights to
counsel, to remain silent, speedy and public trial and bail were violated.

HELD: First, the SC held that under its power of judicial review, in all petitions for habeas corpus, it
must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioners detention to satisfy itself that due process has
been complied with. In the case at bar, the SC finds no merit in the petitions and dismissed them. While
Proc.2045 lifted martial law, it also provided that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus shall
continue with respect to persons presently detained or for those who may be hereafter detained for the
crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, or conspiracy or proposal to commit such crime or in
furtherance of the same. The finding of the City Fiscal affirmed the existence of a prima facie case of
rebellion against the petitioners. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of HC is to enable the State
to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those people who endanger the
States very existence. For this measure to be effective, the SC held that the right to bail must also be
deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. The SC also upheld the warrantless arrests since at the
time of the arrests, the petitioners were actually committing the offense of rebellion, thus are lawful
pursuant to Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The allegations of torture were not passed upon by the Court
as it is not a trier of facts.

Aberca vs. Ver, GR No. L-69866, Apr 15, 1988

Aberca vs. Ver, GR No. 166216, March 14, 2012
Lacson vs. Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Navales vs. Gen. Abaya, GR No. 162318, October 25, 2004

3. Proclamation of Martial Law

Aquino, Jr., vs. Military Commission No. 2, GR No. L-37364, May 9, 1975
SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military
personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the
open court theory.

HELD: Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil
jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by
military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The
immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial
law.

*Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, GR No. L-54558, May 22, 1987
Aquino, Jr., vs. Ponce Enrile, GR No. L-35546, Sept 17, 1974
These are 9 consolidated petitions praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, or the removal
of restrictions to movement and speech of those released from detention. Via Proclamation 1081on
September 21, 1972, with a backdrop of national emergency manifested by the growing communist
insurgency nationally, fueled by the 70s roaring student activism, then President Marcos found it
imperative to declare Martial Law. Thru General Order No. 2 Marcos had several people detained for
being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state
23
 power in the country and take government by force. Petitions can be classified into three categories: 1.
Aquinos prayer for habeas corpus 2. Dioknos writ for habeas corpus, 3. Rodrigo, et al.s prayer to lift
restrictions on movement and speech as part of their conditional release from detention.

HELD: Of the three, the Court held that only the first is justiciable. The second is moot as Diokno
already withdrew his petition because of his lack of confidence in the SC and because of the fact that a
few days before the issuance of the Decision, Diokno after more than a year in prison, was already
released, and the 3rd category is also moot for they have already been released from detention and the
restrictions imposed (movement only in Greater Manila Area, limit on what they can write) are proper,
because of the situation at the time.

ISSUES and RULING:

1. WON the proclamation of 1081 is a justiciable issue. YES. By a vote of 6-5, Court ruled that it is a
justiciable issue. Makalintal concurs with Barredo, Castro, Fernando, Teenhakee and Munoz-Palma.
Castro: In the 1934 Constitutional Convention delegate Araneta suggested that the power to declare
Martial Law should be vested in the National Assembly, however, the majority found more wisdom in a
string Executive. There are limitations, however. The situation must be proven to be that stipulated in
Art VII Sec 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution. The prerogative to decide whether such situations exist is
vested on the Executive, although the Court can decide if such decision was made arbitrarily. Fernando:
There is paramount public interest and private rights of liberty are involved, making it justiciable. The
assessment of the president regarding the national situation is not impressed with finality.

2. WON Martial Law is permanent. NO. Barredo, Munoz Palma, Makalintal cite the 1973 provision
stating that all decrees, laws, provisions, etc. shall be valid even AFTER Martial Law. This expressly
provides that under the 1973 Constitution, Martial Law is NOT permanent. Fernando: Martial Law
ceases when the emergency that necessitated its declaration ceases. Castro: cited a long list of historical
sources citing the need and nature of Martial Law, all of them only during the time of emergency and
temporary

3. WON detention of petitioners is unconstitutional. NO. Barredo, Castro, Fernandez: The suspension of
writ of habeas corpus is subsumed in the declaration of Martial Law, lest the latter be a mere ruse or a
parade. Fernando: There is still a need to prove that the petitioners were involved in the things charged
against them. All petitions are DISMISSED.

Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 in relation to Lansang vs. Garcia, GR No. L-33964, Dec 11, 1971
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people,
Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to
curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for
interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC
declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were
conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the
24
end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow
the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, GR No. L-61388, Apr 20, 1983, July 19, 1985
Barcelon vs. Baker, Jr., GR No. 2808, September 30, 1905
Montenegro vs. Castaeda, GR No. L-4221, August 30, 1952
An application for a writ of HC was filed in behalf of Maximino Montenegros who was arrested by the
military for complicity with a communist organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrection or sedition. While the respondents admit having custody of Montenegro, they invoke
Proclamation 210 which suspends the writ of HC in light of overt acts of sedition, insurrection and
rebellion which seek to overthrow duly constituted authorities and create a state of lawlessness and
disorder. The Proclamation is assailed for being an ex post facto law and for lack of factual basis of a
state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof to warrant its issuance.

HELD: The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to statutes and legislative acts. The
proclamation suspending the writ of HC is in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the
President by the Constitution. The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring the
suspension of the writ belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts
and all other persons.

Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 190293, Mar 20, 2012

Court made a noble pronouncement: validity of proclamation of Martial Law & suspends WOHC the
court CANNOT inquire it is a question in the hands of CONGRESS FIRST BEFORE THE COURTS
can step in
(not prevailing jurisprudence, overturned by Lagman vs Medildea, where SC was asserting its power
again. However, they said that to determine facts, they will base it on WHAT EXECUTIVE TELLS
THEM) (Yu: WHAT THE FUCK BRO? FUCKEN DUMBASS CUNT SC?!?!)
i. Emergency Powers
Art. VI, Sec. 23
Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the 1973 Constitution
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, GR No. L-2044, Aug 26, 1949
Rodriguez vs. Gella, GR No. L-6266, Feb 2, 1953
Art. XII, Sec. 17
*Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Petitioner-officers were en route to the Senate to participate in an investigation of alleged cheating in the
2004 elections in Lanao. President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered that no military personnel should appear
before any House or Senate hearing without her approval. Petitioners nonetheless testified. Consequently,
they were relieved of their duties and subjected to court-martial proceedings. The petitioners questioned
the validity of PGMAs directive.

The SC decided against the petitioners.

The power behind the directive was not Executive Privilege, but the Presidents Commander-in-Chief
(CIC) powers. Under the CIC powers, the President has full control over the military and its personnel.
25
 Aguilar vs. DOJ, GR No. 197522, Sep 11, 2013
Aguilar (policeman) admits killing someone but he invokes a justifying circumstance. By doing so, the
presumption of innocence is waived

Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. L-57664, Feb 8, 1989

j. Contracting & Guaranteeing Foreign Loans
Art. VII, Sec. 20
Art. XII, Sec. 21
*Constantino vs. Cuisia, GR No. 106064, Oct 13, 2005
Art. VI, Sec. 24
R.A. 4860
k. Power over Foreign Affairs
a. Treating-Making Powers
Art. VII, Sec. 21
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
Bayan vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, Oct 10, 2000
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25
Nicolas vs. Romulo, GR No. 175888, Feb 11, 2009
Whether or not the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program is beyond Presidents power
granted under Art. VII, Sec. 20, stating that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the
Republic. It is claimed that the buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither loans nor
guarantees, and hence beyond the power of the President to execute.

HELD: The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power subject to such
limitations as may be provided under law. Presidential prerogative may be exercised by the Presidents alter ego, who
in this case is the Secretary of Finance. Courts cannot ascribe meanings to the Constitution which would unduly burden
powers of the President. Full exercise must be allowed. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. Sovereign
bonds may be issued not only to supplement government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase,
redemption, or refunding of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine Government. Congress has
promulgated a law ordaining automatic appropriations for debt servicing by virtue of which the President is empowered
to execute debt payments without need for further appropriations. Debt service is not included in the GAA, since
authorization already exists through law. The decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest,
but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary
incident, but from the established functions of governance.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, Apr 11, 2002

*Medellin vs. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, No. 06-984, Mar 25, 2008

Brief Fact Summary. Jose Medellin (D) appealed after Texas (P) convicted him of rape and murder
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to inform him of his right to have consular personnel notified of
his detention by the state as it was required under the Vienna Convention. During his appeal at the
Supreme Court, Medellin (D) argued that a case decided by the international Court of Justice
suggested that his conviction must be reconsidered to comply with the Vienna Convention.
26
Synopsis of Rule of Law. (1). States courts are not required under the U.S. Constitution to honor a treaty
obligation of the United States by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice.
(2) State courts are not required by the U.S. Constitution to provide review and reconsideration of a conviction
without regard to state procedural default rules as required by a Memorandum by the President.

AKBAYAN vs. Aquino, GR No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Petitioner seeks to compel the government to disclose the full text of the JPEPA as well as the offers made by the RP and
Japan during the negotiations. With respect to the documents during the negotiations, respondents invoke executive
privilege on the ground that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.

HELD: The petition is moot with respect to the full text as this has been made available to the public. SC upheld the
privileged nature of the negotiations. While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since
there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved - the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. The petitioners have also failed to show sufficient public interest to overcome the
privilege.

*PMPF vs. Manglapus, GR No. 84642, Sept 13, 1988

*Chavez vs. PEA, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002, May 6, 2003, Nov 11, 2003
*Chavez vs. PCGG, GR No. 130716, Dec 9, 1998 and May 19, 1999
Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010, Aug 12, 2014
- Treaties
Pimentel, Jr., vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, GR No. 158088, July 6, 2005
Air Canada vs. CIR, GR No. 169507, Jan 11, 2016
- Executive Agreements
Abaya vs. Ebdane, GR No. 167919, Feb 14, 2007
CIR vs. Gotamco & Sons, Inc., GR No. L-31092, Feb 27, 1987
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, GR No. L-14279, Oct 31, 1961
USAFFE Veterans Assn Inc., vs. Treasurer, GR No. L-10500, June 30, 1959
*Altman & Co., vs. US, 224 U.S. 583, May 13, 1912
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, GR No. L-21897, Oct 22, 1963
President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the
importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales
averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits
the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: WON RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws. The rule that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
27
 statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar since
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an
executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not
be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ
of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo and Ople, GR No. 159618, Feb 1, 2011
IPAP vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204605, July 19, 2016
The registration of trademarks and copyrights have been the subject of executive agreements entered
into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some executive agreements have been concluded in
comformity w/ the policies declared in the acts of congress with respect to the general subject matter.

b. Deportation of Undesirable Aliens

*Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, GR No. L-10280, Sept 30, 1963
Go Tek vs. Deportation Board, GR No. L-23846, Sept 9, 1977
l. Power over Legislation
Art. VII, Sec. 22, 23
Art. VI, Sec. 23, 27 & 28
*Tolentino vs. Sec of Finance, GR No. 115455, Aug 25, 1994, Oct 30, 1995
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the
3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.

m. Other Powers

28
 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, GR No. 161796, Feb 8, 2012
Art. XVII, Sec. 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution
n. Immunity from Suit
*In re: Saturnino Bermudez, GR No. 76180, Oct 24, 1986
Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 183871, February 18, 2010
Gloria vs. CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000
*Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, June 24, 1982
*Harlow vs. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, June 24, 1982
Soliven vs. Makasiar, GR No. 82585, Nov 14, 1988
Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 and Apr 3, 2001
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152259, July 29, 2004
Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, Nov 15, 2011 and April 16, 2013
Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 183533, Sept 25, 2012
Clinton vs. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, May 27, 1997
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint
containing four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton (Petitioner), alleging the
Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of
Arkansas.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not
automatically grant the President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon
his private conduct unrelated to his official duties as President.

KMU vs. Aquino, GR No. 210761, June 28, 2016

At the outset, we stress the settled principle that a sitting head of state enjoys immunity from suit during
his actual tenure.43 The events that gave rise to the present action and the filing of the case occurred
during the incumbency of President Aquino. Moreover, the petition contains no allegations as to any
specific presidential act or omission that amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, it is only
proper to drop the President as a party-respondent.

Under the NHIA, all citizens of the Philippines are required to enroll in the Program; membership is
mandatory. 44 In other words, the NHIP covers all Filipinos in accordance with the principles of
universality and compulsory coverage. 45 Ultimately, every Filipino is affected by an increase in the
premium rates. Thus, the petitioners have sufficient legal standing to file the present suit.

o. Executive Privilege
U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, July 24, 1974 Watergate Scandal
Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, Apr 20, 2006, July 14, 2006
Neri vs. Senate, GR No. 180643, Mar 25, 2008 and Sept 4, 2008
*AKBAYAN vs. Aquino, GR No. 170516, July 16, 2008
(2) The Vice President
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Art. VII, Sec. 3, 4, and 5
b. Privilege and Salary
Art. VII, Sec. 6
c. Prohibition

29
 Art. VII, Sec. 13 and 3
d. Succession
Art. VII, Sec. 9
e. Removal
Art. XI, Sec. 2 and 3
f. Functions
(i) Right of Succession
Art. VII, Sec. 8 and 11
(ii) Membership in Cabinet
Art. VII, Sec. 3
*Legarda vs. De Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, Mar 31, 2005, Jan 18, 2008
(3) Prohibited Offices
Boy Scout of the Philippines vs. COA, GR No. 177131, June 7, 2011
Doctrine of Operative Fact: Executive Acts
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. PARC, GR No. 171101, July 5, 2011, Nov 22, 2011, Apr 24, 2012

operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to
the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is
on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were
also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

Lagman vs. Medialdea

DU30s Martial law in Mindanao.

SC was asserting its power again by overturning Fortun vs Macapagal Arroyo.. However, they said that
to determine facts, they will base it on WHAT EXECUTIVE TELLS THEM) (Yu: WHAT THE FUCK
BRO? FUCKEN DUMBASS CUNT SC?!?!)

Umali vs. JBC

In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress should only have one representative in the JBC as
it rejected the argument that a single representation runs contrary to the bicameral nature of the
legislative department.
But Umali, in his petition, maintained that such a set-up runs contrary to the bicameral structure of
the legislature.
A single representation not only violates the intent of the frames of the Constitution but defies
reason and practicability in the process, Umali, chairman of the House committee on justice, said.
Under the present arrangement, Umali sits in the JBC from January to June while Senator Richard
Gordon, chairman of the Senate committee on justice, sits from July to December.

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SC firm on ruling only 1 from Congress can vote in JBC

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