1

POLITICAL LAW

Part I

I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: Effectivity, definition, nature and concepts

De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)

De Leon, whose term as Barangay Captain was to expire on June 7, 1988, was replaced
as Captain by Governor Esguerra under the Freedom Constitution, which granted the Governor
the power to appoint successors to local government posts until Feb. 25, 1987. However, the
Supreme Court held that the power no longer existed upon effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
In turn, the 1987 Constitution became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the plebiscite was held,
and not when the results were announced.

1. Interpretation of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)

Francisco challenged the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint within the same
year against SC Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was barred by Art. XI, Section 3
(5) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, and gave the following rules
for the interpretation of the Constitution:

1) Verba legiswhenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
2) Ratio legis et animathe words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of the framers.
3) Ut magis valeat quam pereatthe Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.

1. Definition of State (to be related with PIL discussion)

CIR v. Campos Rueda (1971)

Campos Rueda died in Tangier, Morocco, an international zone in North Africa. The CIR
assessed her estate for deficiency taxes. Ruedas defense was a tax treaty between Tangiers
and the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that Tangier was a state, defining such as a
politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties
of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning
under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
 2

territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.

B. Parts
C. Amendments and revisions

In General (Art. XVII):

By Congress as Constituent Assembly

Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law
that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be
held. Gonzales challenged the propriety of the act.

The SC upheld RA 4913. Congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but
the power to amend the Constitution is not included. The power to amend is within the
constituent power of the people. The Congress possesses constituent power as it is a delegation
of the people of their constituent power.

By Constitutional Convention

Imbong v. Comelec (1970)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act was enacted by Congress acting as a legislative
body. Imbong challenged its constitutionality. The SC upheld the act. The power to enact the
implementing details of the Constitutional Convention -- as opposed to the exclusive authority
of Congress as a Constituent Assembly to call for the ConCon -- is within the competency of
Congress exercising its comprehensive legislative power, as long as the statutory details do not
clash with any specific provision in the Constitution. Congress continued to exercise its
legislative powers even if it was already the Constituent Assembly and it did not abandon its
legislative duties.

By Peoples Initiative

Santiago v. Comelec (1997)

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local
legislation and national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the
Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the
SC held that the constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution
(Article XVII 2) required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the
 3

implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack could not be cured by Comelec
providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority to Comelec, so
Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so
under law.

Completeness on its face

Lambino v. Comelec (2006)

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples initiative.
However, his petition did not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled
that the initiative did not meet the requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be
deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there should be both
direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to the petition.

Submission of Proposed Amendments must be made as a whole. No piecemeal submission

allowed.

Tolentino v. Comelec (1971)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention ordered the holding of a plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposed amendment to lower the voting age without submitting the other
amendments to the Constitution for ratification. The SC held this to be unconstitutional.. The
language of the 1973 Constitutions provision on amendments is clear on the matter of how
many elections may be held to ratify any amendments proposed by a constituent assembly or
constitutional convention: one. It is important that the parts of the Constitution must have
harmony as an integrated whole. In order for a plebiscite for the ratification of amendments to
be validly held, it must provide voters not only sufficient time but means for said voter to
intelligently appraise the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to other parts
of the Constitution with which it forms a whole.

D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

1. Self-Executing
2. Non-Self-executing

E. General provisions

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
 4

B. State immunity

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical

personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent
power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot
prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. The immunity has
been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to
such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in
pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.

The TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially
government or public functions. As such, they were invested with the inherent power of
sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government,
they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting as the agent of the TRB
in respect of the matter concerned.

Nonetheless, the Hermano Oil properly argued that the PNCC, being a private
business entity, was not immune from suit. The PNCC was incorporated in 1966 under
its original name of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for
a term of fifty years pursuant to the Corporation Code. Hence, the Government owned
90.3% of the equity of the PNCC, and only 9.70% of the PNCCs voting equity remained
under private ownership. Although the majority or controlling shares of the PNCC
belonged to the Government, the PNCC was essentially a private corporation due to its
having been created in accordance with the Corporation Code, the general corporation
statute. More specifically, the PNCC was an acquired asset corporation under
Administrative Order No. 59, and was subject to the regulation and jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
had no application to the PNCC. HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR
CORPORATION vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) AND DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014, J.
Bersamin

C. General principles and state policies

2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism
3. Adherence to International Law
4. Supremacy of Civilian Authority
5. Government as protector of People & People as Defenders of the State
6. Separation of Church and State
7. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines
8. A just and dynamic social order
9. Social justice
 5

Calalang v. Williams (1940)

An ordinance was passed preventing animal-drawn vehicles from passing through

certain thoroughfares. Calalang challenged the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that it was a
valid exercise of police power, in the interests of social justice.

Defining Social Justice, it is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. It is the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
government of measure calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the member of the community, constitutionally, through adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments. It is founded upon the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest
number.

Labor, agrarian and natural resources reform Urban land reform and housing
Healt

Oposa v. Factoran (1993)

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The
Supreme Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their
standing, held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II
16 of the Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation and is
assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing.
Women

Peoples organizations
Respect for human dignity and human rights Education Language
Science and technology Arts and culture
The family

D. Separation of powers

If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
 6

interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it
stated that savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative,
instead of judicial determination. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015, J. Bersamin

E. Checks and balances

Under this carefully laid-out constitutional system, the DAP violates the principles of
sepa-ration of powers and checks and balances on two (2) counts: first, by pooling funds that
cannot at all be classified as savings; and second, by using these funds to finance projects
outside the Executive or for projects with no appropriation cover.

These violations in direct violation of the no transfer proviso of *Sec. 25(5)+ of Article
VI of the Constitution had the effect of allowing the Executive to encroach on the domain of
Congress in the budgetary process. By facilitating the use of funds not classified as savings to
finance items other than for which they have been appropriated, the DAP in effect allowed the
President to circumvent the constitutional budgetary process and to veto items of the GAA
without subjecting them to the 2/3 overriding veto that Congress is empowered to exercise.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et
al.,G.R. No. 209287 (Consolidated), July 01, 2014, Separate Opinion, J. Brion

F. Delegation of powers
G. Forms of government
1. De jure v. De Facto
2. Presidential v. Parliamentary
3. Unitary v. Federal

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Who may exercise legislative powers Congress

Delegation

To local governments
To the People through initiative and referendum
To the President under martial law rule or in a revolutionary government.

Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)

President Marcos, in exercise of his emergency powers, proposed amendments to the

Constitution and proposals to set up the machinery and procedures required for the ratification
of his proposals by the people. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad challenged the validity of the
 7

amendments, as the power to amend is legislative. The SC upheld the amendments, because
the governmental powers in a crisis government are more or less concentrated in the President.
The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is a valid act. This is not to
say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly normally constituted
by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the
Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it
imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
constitutional amendments.

Although the President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of

amendments to the constitution, it is permissible to grant more powers to the President in
times of emergency in the interest of restoring normalcy.

Congress
The Senate

Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office

Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of
ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue
as Representative, was not able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him
to take office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may
serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official actually serves. The
Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo
shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented
from re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended
or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may be
affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.

The House of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)

Agapito Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
2nd district of Makati. However, it was shown that he had been a resident of Concepcion,
Tarlac, for the previous 52 years. Ruling that Aquino was not a resident of Makati for the 1 year
period required in the Constitution, The Supreme Court held that the residence requirement in
Constitution connotes domicile. Domicile is the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
intends to return and remain. A person may have several residences but just one domicile. An
intention to return is established by determining (1) whether there was abandonment of
 8

domicile of origin, and (2) whether there was establishment of permanent residence in the
district

District Representatives and questions on Apportionment and

Reapportionment

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC APPORTIONMENT-REAPPORTIONMENT case

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro
was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment
legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held
that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority
granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).

Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT CREATION, DIVISION,

MERGER, ABOLITION,
ALTERATION OF
BOUNDARY OF LGUs
Constitutional Provision Article VI, Sec. 5 Article X, Sec. 10
Meaning Determination of the number of Concerned
representatives which a state, with
country or other subdivision may commencement, termination,
send to a legislative body
and modification
of an LGUs
corporate existence
and territorial coverage
Requirement Legislation providing for criteria established in
apportionment Local Government Code
Each city with a Approval by a majority
population of at least 250, of the votes cast in a
000 shall have one plebiscite in the political
representative. units affected

Result LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT LOCAL GOVT UNIT

No legal personality Political subdivision
Purpose: representation Can discharge govt
functions
Has political and economic
effects on inhabitants
Has own IRA; can generate
own revenue
 9

The Party List System

BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a

party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation of party-list representatives released by the
COMELEC, as well as the formula being used. BANATs claims were that the 2% threshold is
invalid, and that the 20% allotment to party-list representatives is a mandatory requirement,
not merely a ceiling.

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.

The Supreme Court, granting the positions, laid down the following guidelines: The
Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters:

1. The 20% allocation---the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party-list.
2. The 2% threshold---only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.
3. The three-seat limit--- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
4. Proportional representation---the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:

1. Find total number of Party List Representatives

Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list is in
reference to the seats for representatives of legislative districts. The combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article
VI, Sec. 5(2).

2nd level of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives

The allocation of party list seats was left to the wisdom of Legislature. Congress enacted
RA 7941 (Party List System Act).
 10

Sec. 11, RA 7941:

1. Parties should be ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of votes
garnered.
2. Parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall be entitled to one seat.

3rd level of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats

The Court departs from the Veterans procedure in allocating additional seats. 2%
threshold in 2nd round of allocation is declared unconstitutional. The 2% threshold set by
Veterans in the 2nd round of allocation of seats prevents filling of the seats allocated for party
list. The number of additional seats to be allocated is
[Maximum number of seats for party list] -[guaranteed seats].

In allocating additional seats, even the parties who did not garner 2% could be entitled
to additional seats.

Procedure in second round of seat allocation:

1. Correct formula in determining the number of additional seats:

[Number of votes received/total number of votes] x Remaining available seats
2. Seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.
3. 3-seat cap is applied to determine to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.

Participation of major political parties in Party list elections

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. But, by a vote of 8-7, Court decides to continue with the ruling in
Veterans, disallowing major political parties from participating in the party list election.

NOTE: But in Atong Paglaum the Court laid down new guidelines on the participation of major
political parties as follows:

ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a) national parties or
organizations, (b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party
 11

that field candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent.
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Salaries Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)

Philconsa challenged the appropriation of salaries of the members of Congress set out in
the GAA for 1965-1966, which had been increased the year before (1964). The controversy
came because the Senators who took part in the approval of the law would be in office until
1969. The SC agreed with Philconsa. The term mentioned in the provision refers to the term
of the Congress as a whole. Members of Congress who approved the increase will not have the
salary increase.

Freedom from Arrest Article VI, Sec. 11

While Congress is in session (Art. VI, Sec. 15)

Martinez v. Morfe (1972)

An information was filed against Martinez for falsification of public documents, and 2
informations Bautista for violations of the Revised Election Code. As members of the
Constitutional Convention, they invoked the protection of the Constitution against search and
arrest against members of Congress.

However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the privilege.
Parliamentary immunity granted to the members of the legislature and the Constitutional
Convention was never meant to shield them from criminal liability, only to protect them from
possible harassment. Any privileges extended to the legislature should not harm the State.
Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace.
Here, petitioners are charged with felonies; hence, the immunity does not apply to them.

Speech and Debate

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

 12

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its

Committee on National Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines, alleging that there were plans to hold a coup dtat. Jimenez then filed a case
against Cabangbang for damages due to the Cabangbangs libellous statements. In response,
Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from suit.

The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression "speeches or
debates herein" in Art. VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship,
interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary session), statements
and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress. It also
includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of Congressional premises while in
the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not
connected with the discharge of their office.

Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions

a. From holding any other office or employment in Government during term without
forfeiting seat
b. From appointment to any office which may have been created or its emoluments
increased during his term
c. From personally appearing as counsel
d. From financial interest in any contract with, or in any franchise granted by the government
during his term
e. From intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office

Duties

f. Duty to Disclose
g. Full disclosure of financial and business interests
h. Notify the House of potential conflict of interest from proposed legislation of which they
are authors

Flores v. Drilon (1993)

The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the Mayor of
Olongapo City to be appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was
challenged on the ground that it violated the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.

The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B 7 of the
Constitution expresses the policy against concentrating several public positions in one person,
so that a public official may serve full-time with dedication and efficiency. While the provision
allows appointive officials to hold multiple offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is
 13

more stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the Constitution itself says so. While the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains throughout his tenure/incumbency,
the official may resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualifications. The respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective office when he is
appointed to another position.

Quorum and Voting Majorities

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino. However, Avelino and his camp employed dilatory and
delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Avelinos camp then moved to
adjourn the session due to the disorder.

Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers.

The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by
the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful
Senate President.

On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators considered to be in
session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of
the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of
all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one
(23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt about Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained

Discipline of Members

Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Congressman Osmea Jr made a privilege speech entitled, A Message to Garcia, in

which he accused Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee was formed through House
 14

Resolution 59, to investigate and discipline Osmea. Osmea asked for the annulment of the
resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition
for declaratory relief.

The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Arroyo et al., all members of the HOR, claimed that
there was a violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They claimed
that the passage of the bill was railroaded.

The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that Congress
failed to comply with its own rules while enacting a law when no constitutional provision or
rights of private individuals were violated. Within the limits of constitutional restraints,
fundamental rights and a reasonable relation between the means of proceeding and the
intended results, all matters of methods for internal procedures are open to the determination
of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There was no grave abuse of discretion,
only a matter of internal procedure.

Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)

A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the Hello Garci tapes in relation to
election fraud. The propriety of the legislative inquiry was challenged based on the non-
publication of the Senate rules of procedure in accordance with Art. VI 21.

The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It would be an
injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists
of publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication.
Publication via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state that the rules
must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA 8792, an electronic document
serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it
does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.

The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12
Senators as it is a continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state
that they expire after every Senate.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

 15

Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in accordance with

RA 3019. She assailed the SBs authority to do so, claiming contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)
which provides for suspension only for 60 days max.

The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension in Art VI, Sec.
16(3) is different from preventive suspension under RA 3019, Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is
not a penalty and thus is not a suspension under the purview of the Constitution.

De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)

De Venecia, as House Speaker, was cited in contempt of court for not implementing the
preventive suspension by Sandiganbayan against one of the House Members. While the
Supreme Court held the case moot and academic, since the term of the member expired while
the case was pending, further differences between Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and RA 3019, Sec. 13 were
discussed, to wit:

Art. VI, Sec. 16(3):

House-imposed sanction
Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order
in proceedings or vindicate honor and integrity

RA 3019, Sec. 13:

Prevent accused from influencing witnesses
Prevent tampering with documentary evidence
Prevent committing further crimes while in office Sessions
Regular Sessions Special Session Restrictions
Adjournment for more than 3 days As to venue
Emergency Sessions
Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office
Ability of President to discharge powers and duties of office Presidential proclamation of
martial law or suspension of habeas corpus

Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments Powers of Congress

White Light v. City of Manila (2009)

The City of Manila issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of motels as well as
offering quick-time rates. White Light as well as various other motels challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being unconstitutional.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
 16

room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.

Agustin v. Edu (1979)

LOI 229 was issued by Pres. Marcos, recommending the enactment of local legislation
for the installation of road safety signs and devices. Upon constitutional challenge, the SC held
there was no unlawful delegation of police power.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of police power, there must be a standard
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down the fundamental policy. The standard lays down the legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out boundaries, and specifies the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the
executive or administrative agency designated to carry out the legislative policy may
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

General Plenary Powers Legislative Power

Substantive Limitations
Express Substantive Limitations Bill of Rights Appropriations
Taxation (infra)
Public Money in a Special fund
Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence
Granting title of royalty or nobility Implied Substantive Limitations
Delegation of legislative powers Criterion of valid delegation

Abakada Guro v. Exec. Sec. (2005)

The grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT under certain
circumstances was challenged for being undue delegation of legislative power, as VAT was not
mentioned in Art VI, Sec 28. The SC held that there was no undue delegation.

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only
the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law.
The criteria for valid delegation are that:

Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be

executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions

Undue delegation of legislative power

 17

Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)

By virtue of several PDs, 33 municipalities were created. Pelaez challenged the

constitutionality of their creation. The SC agreed with him, ruling that while the power to fix
common boundaries of adjoining municipalities to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction may
be administrative in nature, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature.

The questioned statutes did not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power
to fix details in enforcing a law. They neither enunciated a policy to be implemented by
the President nor gave a sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase as
the public welfare may require is so overbroad that it rests in the President a virtually
unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a delegation of legislative power. For the President
to create municipalities will be for him to exercise the power of control over local government
units denied to him by the Constitution.
Proper delegation by express authority of the constitution Delegation to the president to fix
tariffs, rates, etc.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992)

EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5%
according to their value, except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a
9% additional duty) and E.O. 478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude oil and oil
products) were constitutionally challenged.

The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI 24 of the Constitution, the
enactment of appropriation revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the legislative and
not the executive branch. Art. VI 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within
specific limits, among others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit constitutional
permission to allow the E.O.s to be issued. The Tariff and Customs Code also laid down
sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid delegation of legislative power.

Delegation to the President in times of war or national emergency Delegation to Local

government

Delegation of power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards

Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)

RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board and
providing for a special assessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be
fixed by the Board) was constitutionally challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative
power.
 18

The SC upheld the law. Article XVI 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under which the special
assessment may be imposed. The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and
conferring of authority as to the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as
to what the law shall be, while in the latter, the authority as to its execution has to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.

Osmea v. Orbos (1993)

PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase
of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue
to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground of
undue delegation of legislative powers to the ERB.

The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to impose
additional amounts on petrol products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority
must be exercised. The standard to which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform
may be implied from the policy and purpose of the act, not only spelled out specifically. The
challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that governs the exercise of power granted
to the ERB.

Promulgation of Internal Rules and Regulations Prohibition Against Passage of Irrepealable

Laws

Procedural Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail) Oversight
1. Congressional Scrutiny
2. Congressional Investigation
3. Legislative Supervision

Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22) Legislative Investigations

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates was undertaken. During the Senate investigation, one witness, Arnault,
refused to reveal the identity of the representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money,
at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate
adopted a resolution holding Arnault in contempt and ordered him imprisoned in the custody
of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
 19

The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not necessary for the legislative to show
that every question addressed to a witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is
required that each question be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of
investigation before the Committee is within legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony of the witness relates to the subject, obedience to the process may be enforced by
the Committee by imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of Congress in contempt is
a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without obstruction. Therefore,
the Court finds no sound reason to limit such power which has already been recognized as an
appropriate auxiliary power of Congress.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991)

A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Investigation was commenced regarding Kokoy

Romualdez participation in various corporations put up by the Marcoses. The investigation was
started based on a privileged speech delivered by Sen. Enrile. Bengzon, called as a witness,
challenged the propriety of the investigation.

The SC ruled that the investigation did not have a valid legislative purpose.
Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure
and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator
Enriles privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the
legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.

Senate v. Executive Secretary (2006)

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well
as the Garci tapes surfaced, prompting the Senate to conduct public hearings to investigate the
said anomalies. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Subsequently,
GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 prohibited Department heads,
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege. EO 464 was challenged for contravening the power of
inquiry vested in Congress.

The SC held that it did. Executive privilege is based on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is one of the exemptions to the power of legislative inquiry. It
exempts the executive from disclosing information to the public, Congress and the courts. To
determine the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only if the
 20

requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also if that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting. Presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

(Question hour vs. legislative inquiry)

On the validity of 1 of E.O. 464 (which applies specifically to heads of executive

departments): the required prior consent is grounded on Art. VI 22 or what is known as
question hour. ConCom records show that it was considered distinct from inquiries in aid of
legislation. In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation,
attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a greater
imperative to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department heads can only
exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on
whom the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial
power is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the
requirement for Presidential consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the
question hour but not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by
the President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege,

there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from
attending inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the
claim of executive privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.

Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Call special
election for President and Vice-President
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial
law

Approve presidential amnesties Confirm certain appointments

Cf. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18) Concur in treaties (Senate)

Bayan v. Zamora (2000)

The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII 25 on military bases in the Philippines.

The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is allowed
under Art. XVIII 25 for 2 reasons:

1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by
the U.S. since it was attested and duly certified by a U.S. government representative. That it
was not submitted for advice and consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status
 21

as a binding international agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter of

internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to its Senate policymaking agreements for advice or
consent, while those that further implement these policymaking agreements are merely
submitted to Congress within 60 days of ratification.

2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier R.P.-U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified with both countries senates
concurring; the VFA is simply an implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty,
so it was not necessary to submit it to the
U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is why the U.S. certified it as a binding international
agreement (treaty) that substantially complies with Art. XVIII 25.

Declaration of war and declaration of emergency powers Be judge of presidents physical

fitness
(16) Power of impeachment
(17) Amendment or revision of the Constitution (supra)

6. The legislative process

Requirement as to bills as to title

Embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Lidasan v. Comelec (1967)

RA 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur)
was challenged for falling short of the constitutional requirement that bills shall embrace 1
subject that must be expressed in the title.

The SC ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Constitution has 2 limitations for
bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The
title of the bill must be couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the
import of the single title. Complying with the second directive is imperative since the
Constitution does not require Congress to read a bills entire text during deliberations. For H.B.
1247/R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House.

The test of the sufficiency of a title a bill is whether or not it is misleading. If the
language is so uncertain that an average person reading it is not informed of its purpose, or if it
is misleading by referring to one subject when another is embraced in the act or by omitting
any indication of its real subject/scope, it is misleading. It is not required that the title use
language of such precision that it fully catalogues all its contents and minute details, but that it
serves its constitutional purpose of informing all interested persons of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws

 22

Lutz v. Araneta (1955)

Commonwealth Act 567 Section provided for an increase of the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, while section 3 levied on owners or persons in
control of lands devoted to cultivating sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration a tax
equivalent to the difference between the value of the consideration collected and the amount
representing 12% of the assessed value of the land. The Act was challenged on constitutional
grounds.

The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise of taxing
power but was an exercise of the police power, since tax was levied with a regulatory purpose,
to provide means for rehabilitating and stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational
that the tax be taken from those who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to
tax that a state is free to choose who to tax.

Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation

Scheme) amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent
pursuant to RA 7496.

The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the constitutional
requirement that taxation be uniform and equitable ignores that such a system of income
taxation where single proprietorship and professionals be taxed differently from corporations
and partnership had long been the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that
all subjects of objects of taxation similarly situated were to be treated alike both in privileges
and liabilities and did not discount classification as long as:
the standards are substantial making real differences;
the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose;
the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions; and
the classification applies equally to the same class.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (infra, under Judiciary)

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)

The Omnibus Investments Code gave the SC appellate jurisdiction over BOI decisions.
The SC issued a circular giving the CA that jurisdiction, on the ground that its appellate
jurisdiction could not be increased without its concurrence.

After the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress was now barred from increasing
Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction without its concurrence. This was done in order to give
the Court a measure of control over the cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. The
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the Courts appellate jurisdiction could
 23

unnecessarily burden the Court and undermine its essential function of expounding the law in
profound national aspect.

D. Legislative veto

Limitation on Legislative power

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39. Authority
to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as otherwise provided in the
General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General
Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with
the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be
allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law:
Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or
project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts
appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing
the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings
in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations.
As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department
out of the savings in other items of his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section
39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with. MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN et al., vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al., G.R.
No. 209287, February 3, 2015, J. Bersamin

IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications

Presidential Immunity
 24

In Re: Bermudez (1986)

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief on whether the provisions of the
Freedom Constitution referred to the incumbent President or the previously-elected president.

The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding first that it referred to the incumbent
president, and secondly that a suit cannot be brought against the incumbent President. The
petition for declaratory relief was essentially a suit against President Aquino, and Bermudez
had no standing to file it.

Soliven v. Makasiar (1988)

Soliven was sued by Pres. Aquino for libel. Soliven alleged that because the President is
immune from suit, neither can she file a suit.

The SC disagreed. The immunity may be invoked ONLY by the holder of the office.
Nothing prevents the President (and only the President) from waiving the privilege and
submitting to court's jurisdiction.

Clinton v. Jones (1997)

Pres. Clinton was charged with sexual harassment by Paula Jones for acts done while he
was Governor of Arkansas. The SC held that the sitting president can be involved in a lawsuit
during his tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President, and before his term
commenced.

Presidential Privileges

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (2008)

Neri, along with other officers, was invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee regarding the NBN-ZTE project. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate v. Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.

The SC upheld the invocation of privilege. The oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
 25

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos Cabinet. And,

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Aside from these, other executive privileges include:

1. Deliberative process privilege

2. Military or State Secrets
3. Identity of government informers in some circumstances
4. Information related to pending investigations
5. Foreign relations

AKBAYAN v. Aquino (2008)

AKBAYAN and the other petitioners filed a petition asking for the government to release
the records of the negotiations leading up to the JPEPA.

The SC denied the petition. While there was indeed a right to information on matters of
public concern, this was only on a case by case basis. The validity of executive privilege depends
on ground invoked to justify it and context in which it is made. The privileged status of a
privileged document rests not on the need to protect national security but on the obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if people will find out
what they talk about anyway. Here, the negotiations of the JPEPA falls under the diplomatic
negotiations privilege.

Prohibition from holding other appointments

Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office CLU v. Executive Secretary, supra.
(1991)

Dela Cruz v. COA (2001)

 26

The payment of salaries to ex-officio members of the NHA Board who were in the
Cabinet, or their alternates, was denied by the COA. The propriety of that COA decision was
challenged.

The SC upheld the decision. However, while it was correct to rule that the payment of
compensation was not allowed, the prohibition against multiple offices was not interpreted to
apply to posts of executive officials in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law as required by
the primary function of their office and without additional compensation. The term ex-officio
referred to authority derived from official character, not merely conferred upon the individual
character but rather annexed to the official position. However, since the position is an actual
and legal part of the principal office, it followed that the official concerned had no right to
receive additional compensation for services in the same position since the services were
already paid for by the compensation attached to the principal office.

Powers and Functions of the President Executive Power

Power to execute laws

Ople v. Torres (1998)

AO 308 was issued, adopting a national computerized identification system. Ople

challenged the AOs constitutionality.

The SC struck down the AO. Executive power to enforce and administer the laws into
practical separation is vested in the President. As Chief Executive, the President is also granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper constitutional organs. However, the administrative
order should be issued in relation to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the
government. It should not impair citizens rights and privileges or impose a duty on them, and
must not substitute for general policy-making that Congress enact as laws.

Power of Appointment

In general

Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as
the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.
 27

The SC upheld the appointment. Positions to be filled by the President by appointment are
divided into 4 groups:

1) heads of executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution,
2) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law,
3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, &
4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone. Only the first group is appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The Customs commissioner was not one of those
within the first group.

Manalo v. Sistoza (1999)

Sistoza questioned the constitutionality and legality of the appointments by former

Pres. Corazon Aquino of senior officers of the PNP, who were promoted to the rank of Chief
Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.

The SC upheld the appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the CA and require confirmation of appointments to other positions not within
the Constitution. The PNP is separate from the AFP. It is different from and independent of the
AFP. Its military ranks are not similar to the AFP, thus directors and chief superintendents of the
PNP do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring CA confirmation

b. Commission on Appointments confirmation

c. Midnight Appointments
d. Power of removal

Power of Control and Supervision

a. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

b. Control over Executive departments and offices

Lacson-Magallanes Co. v. Pao (1967)

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao; he later
ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao asserted his claim over the same piece
of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise
denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary
Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC challenged the decision of the Executive Secretary as an undue
delegation of power.
 28

The SC did not agree. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of
his confidence. Implicit is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken
by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule
on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated
that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution
does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.

Buklod ng Manggagawang EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2000)

President Corazon Aquino created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB.
He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter,
he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to
be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB,
invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB
employees maintained that the President has no power to abolish a public office, as that is a
power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right
to security of tenure.

The SC upheld the reorganization. As a general rule, the power to abolish an office is
lodged with the legislative. However, the Presidents power of control may justify his
deactivating the functions of a particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad
continuing authority to carry out reorganization measures for reasons of economy and
productivity.

c. Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions

Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)

President Ramos issued AO 372 The Adoption of Economy Measures in Government

for FY 1998, which required LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized
regular appropriations of non- personal services. Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment
(IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. The constitutionality of the directive to withhold 10% of
 29

this IRA is challenged for being in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code
and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the automatic release of its share in the
national income revenue.

The SC upheld Section 1, which directed the LGUs to reduce expenditures, as being part
of the Presidents supervision over local government. Supervision is meant to oversee, while
control meant to power to alter what a subordinate has done and substitute ones judgment.
The Chief Executive wields no more authority than that of checking whether local government
were performing their duties as provided by Constitution and statutes. But LGUs continue to be
agents of the national government. However, Section 4, which withheld 5% of the IRA from
LGUs was struck down for being unconstitutional. It is a basic feature of local government
autonomy that their share of the IRA should be automatically released.

Military Powers

IBP v. Zamora (2000)

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period
only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in law enforcement.

The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out armed forces is discretionary
power solely vested in the Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to
see whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion

Here, the deployment of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot
be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Article XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution.

Lansang v. Garcia (1971)

Two hand grenades were thrown at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971, killing 8. Pres.
Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al.
were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al.
 30

questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ averring that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites

The SC found that there was valid basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The requirements for such a suspension are:

1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof

2. Public safety requires the suspension.

Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how
small it is.

The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (2004)

On July 27, 2003, the Oakwood mutiny took place. Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to suppress the
rebellion. By that evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru
Proclamation No. 435.

The SC upheld the declaration of a state of rebellion. Actual invasion/rebellion and

requirement of public safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing
prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not the same as a
declaration of martial law.

Gudani v. Senga (2006)

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al. from appearing before the Senate Committee
without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact
that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments
for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected to Court Martial proceedings for willfully
violating an order of a superior officer.

The SC upheld EO 464. The President as Commander-in-Chief has absolute authority

over persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Significant concessions to
 31

personal freedoms are expected in the military. Preventing military officers from testifying
before Congress springs from Commander-in- Chief powers, not executive privilege.

David v. Arroyo (2006)

As a result of the events of EDSA II, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of
national emergency, invoking Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she
also issued General Order No. 5 directing the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Article II, Sec. 4 of
the same, citing elements of the extreme left and right being in alliance to bring down the
President. A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.

Randy David and the petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987
Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

In relation to the validity of the declaration of a state of national emergency, the SC

ruled that as there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under
General Order No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism,
without restrictions. Thus, the due process clause has been violated and that portion of General
Order No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Pardoning Power

When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first
sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., *w+hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,
neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A preamble is
really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over
its text. Hence if the pardon was intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
 32

extended. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro

a. Nature and limitations

b. Forms of Executive Clemency

Diplomatic Powers

a. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

b. Deportation of undesirable aliens

Powers relative to appropriation measures

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy
through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being
a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage
under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress
did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but
would have nothing more to do during the Budge Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was
the act by which Congress designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the
public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of
governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. As pointed out in
Gonzales vs. Raquiza, *i+n a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or
assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the
State to its creditors.

On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws,
had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in
the countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could
pool the savings and identify the [Programs, Activities and Projects or PAPs] to be funded under
the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had
been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions,
the Executive did not usurp the power vested in the Congress under Sec. 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, et al., vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 209287 (Consolidated), July 01, 2014, J. Bersamin

The Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a

Program, Activity or Project (PAP) by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the
Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by
so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both
 33

appropriations will thereby be violated. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON,

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 209287 (Consolidated), July 01, 2014, J.
Bersamin

Residual Powers

Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres.
Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an
exercise of the Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for
protecting people's general welfare, preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the
peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging
the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power. Residual powers are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Powers relating to appropriation Measures Delegated powers
Veto power

C. Rules on Succession

a. Constructive Resignation

b. The Vice President

c. Right of Succession and Membership in Cabinet

Estrada v. Desierto (2001)

After the events of EDSA II, whereby President Estrada left Malacaang and Gloria
Arroyo was sworn in as President, Estrada filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the
Ombudsman from proceeding with any cases against him and to declare him to still be the
incumbent president.

The SC denied the petition, holding that Estrada had constructively resigned, because both
elements of resignation were present, namely:

1. Intent
2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate,
listening to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer
 34

of power, declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency,
etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to

prosecution. Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a
bar to a criminal prosecution, then he would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has
already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed
by the Court.

V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Concepts

Judicial Power.

Ynot v. IAC (1987)

EO 626-A banned the killing and intra-province transport of carabao and carabeef.
Ynot was caught in violation of EO 626-A as he was transporting 6 carabaos. He went to trial
court seeking to declare EO 626-A unconstitutional. The Trial Court ruled that they cannot
answer questions of constitutionality.

However, the SC ruled that it could. All courts in the hierarchy can exercise both
judicial power and judicial review, subject to later review by the SC (Sec. 5 (2) (a))

Judicial Review
a. Definition, nature, principles

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

As outgoing President, John Adams, appointed judges, including Marbury, to positions

as justices of the peace, in Marburys case in the District of Columbia,, with the concurrence of
the Senate. However, the commissions were never served upon the offices, so Marbury was
never able to carry out his duties. He appealed to the SC for a writ of mandamus to compel
State Secretary James Madison to appoint him as a judge.

1. Marbury has a right to the commission. Presidential commission has three stages ---
nomination, appointment, and commission. When the President signs the commission, it
creates a vested right.

2. Marbury has a relief for his right. Because withholding the commission would be violative
of the vested right, there must be a remedy.
 35

3. The most appropriate relief in this case is a writ of mandamus. According to the
Constitution, the SC can only have appellate jurisdiction over writs of mandamus.
However, the law that Adams signed gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction.
Therefore, there was a dispute over which one should be followed. The Constitution is the
paramount law, and it is the judiciary that decides questions of constitutionality. It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what is law. Using
this reasoning, the court held that it was the Constitution that must prevail, and so they
could not award the writ of mandamus.

1. Requisites of judicial review

a. Actual case or controversy

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.

o An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, and opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest"; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief.
o A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
o Ripeness entails that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture. The questioned acts should
have already been carried out
o Exception to the mootness rule: Court will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Operative fact
doctrine

The Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Hence, there is deemed an actual case of controversy when petitioners have shown that the
case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
 36

benefits. For this reason, Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
JAMES M. IMBONG, et al., vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. et al., G.R. No. 204819 , April 8,
2014, J. Mendoza

Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked
their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and implementation of the DAP
and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in
preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo)
and G.R. No. 29442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and
observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government.

On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal
standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues. Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites
his additional as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by its avowed
duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not
to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the
constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party
raising the constitutional question (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case. The Supreme Court has carefully read the petitions and we conclude that
they fail to compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of Section 28(a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., et al., vs. JESSIE ROBREDO, in his capacity as
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, et al., G.R. No. 200903, July 22,
2014, J. Brion

The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be overemphasized. At

the time of filing of the instant petition, Robredo had already implemented the assailed MCs. In
fact, Villafuerte received Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10,
2011 from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on
the observation of the audit team,

The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication that the assailed
issuances of Robredo are already in the full course of implementation. The AOM specifically
mentioned of Villafuertes alleged non-compliance and *t+he fact that Villafuerte is being
required to comment on the contents of thereof signifies that the process of investigation for
his alleged violation has already begun. Ultimately, the investigation is expected to end in a
resolution on whether a violation has indeed been committed, together with the appropriate
sanctions that come with it. Clearly, Villafuertes apprehension is real and well-founded as he
stands to be sanctioned for non-compliance with the issuances. GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F.
 37

VILLAFUERTE, JR. AND THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, G.R.
No. 195390, December 10, 2014, J. Reyes

There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill.

The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Mijares wants the court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development
Fund. The court, however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. The
court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. IN THE MATTER OF:
SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMEN vs.
ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY., UDK-15143, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen

Operative Fact Doctrine

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior
to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act,
but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extra-
ordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application.

The Court finds the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and
implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no
longer be undone. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 209287 (Consolidated), July 01, 2014, J. Bersamin

Moot Questions

Gonzales v. Narvasa (2000)

Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of
the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres.
Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

The SC held that the petition was moot and academic. As the questioned commission
had been dissolved, it was impossible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. The Court
 38

could no longer enjoin a body that no longer existed from acting. Any ruling regarding the
matter would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion and definitely beyond the
permissible scope of judicial power.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a moot question can no longer be
enforced. RTC's rendition of the Decision by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases
were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening events which have rendered the
essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents should have
been allowed by the RTC to intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the
forfeited assets. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL, vs. RAFAEL A. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-YAP,
G.R. No. 192302, June 4, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe

Political Question Doctrine

Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, under Internal Government of Congress: Quorum

The court did not have jurisdiction over the petition. Due to the separation of powers,
the political nature of the controversy and the Constitution giving the Senate the power to elect
its own President, the judiciary cannot interfere with or take over the matter. The remedy lies
with the Senate and not with the Court.

Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)

RA 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an

independent component city. RA 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
In 1998, RA 8528 amended RA No. 7720 to the effect that the City of Santiago was downgraded
from an independent component city to a component city. Miranda, et al., assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of
the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
On the threshold issue of whether or not the case involved a political question, the Court
upheld its jurisdiction. Questions of whether laws passed by Congress complied with the
requirements of the constitution posed a question only the Court could decide.

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which
under the constitution were:

1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or

 39

2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the

legislative/executive branch of government.

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a
particular measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or
constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right and a remedy granted
and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.

When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral
which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the
COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation
which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELECs breach of the
petitioners fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election. The concept of a
political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ
infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen

Safeguards of Judicial Independence

a. Fiscal autonomy Art. VIII, Sec. 3

i. appropriations shall not be reduced below the amount appropriated for

the previous year
ii. Appropriations will be automatically and regularly released.

b. Report on the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 16

c. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 3

Judicial Restraint

Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. While the prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman, may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them
by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The requirement for judicial intrusion is
still for the petitioner Agdeppa to demonstrate clearly that the Office of the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a
clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of non-
interference. The Court adheres to a policy of non-interference with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, other than his own
allegations, suspicions, and surmises, Agdeppa did not submit independent or corroborating
 40

evidence in support of the purported conspiracy. Taking away Agdeppas conspiracy theory, the
grounds for his Petition no longer have a leg to stand on. RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA vs.
HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014, J.
Leonardo-De Castro

Appointments to the Judiciary Supreme Court

En banc and division cases Procedural Rule-making
Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts

Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)

Bonifacio Maceda falsified his certificate of service saying he had submitted the
decisions for all his civil and criminal cases, when he had not submitted anything. His clerk
reported him to the Ombudsman.

The Court ruled that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the matter. Judges are
liable under the Supreme Court, not the Ombudsman. Only the SC can oversee judges
compliance with the law and take proper administrative action.

In re Demetria (2001)

Judge Demetria had been trying to intercede on behalf of drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. The
Supreme Court ruled that the evidence against Demetria proved her guilty. However, it is up to
the SC to implement the proper administrative actions.

Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions

Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003)

The constitutionality of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) was
challenged. The controversial provisions were:

o Sec 5: allowed immigrants to register by executing affidavit expressing intent to

return
Constitutional. Does not violate Art. V, Sec. 1 (Residency Rule). Rather, it
enfranchises Filipinos abroad domiciled in the Philippines.
o Sec 18.5: empowered COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates
Unconstitutional. Violates Art. VII, Sec. 4; winning candidates for
President and VP are to be proclaimed by Congress.
 41

o Sec 25: allowed Congress, through oversight committee, to review, revise,

amend and approve IRR of COMELEC.
Unconstitutional. Violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, on COMELEC independence.
Congress may not intrude into the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers.

Brillantes v. Yorac (1990)

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of

the COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec.
1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on
Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for
the independence of ConCom from the executive department.

Powers and Functions of Each Commission

Since the Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) of Government-Owned and

Controlled Corporations (GOCCs), Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) and their
subsidiaries, are, pursuant to law, allocated by their own internal governing boards, as opposed
to the EME of National Government Agencies (NGAs) which are appropriated in the annual
General Appropriations Act (GAA) duly enacted by Congress, there is a perceivable rational
impetus for the Commission on Audit (CoA) to impose nuanced control measures to check if the
EME disbursements of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries constitute irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable government expenditures. ARNALDO M. ESPINAS,
LILLIAN N. ASPRER, and ELEANORA R. DE JESUS, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 198271,
April 1, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe

To fill the gap created by the amendment of COA Circular No. 86-255, respondents
correctly held that the officials of CDC who violated the provisions of Circular No. 98-002 and
Circular No. 9 should be personally liable to pay the legal fees of Laguesma, as previously
provided for in Circular No. 86-255.

This finds support in Sec. 103 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, which
states that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of
law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefore.

This court has also previously held in Gumaru vs. Quirino State College that the fee of
the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the
personal liability of the government official who hired his services without the prior written
conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be. THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA
MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND/OR REYNALDO
 42

A. VILLAR AND JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND

COMMISSIONER, RESPECTIVELY, G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015, J. Leonen

Prohibited Offices and Interests

Flores v. Drilon, supra.

i. Standardization of pay and ban on double compensation
ii. Ban on partisan political activities
iii. Removal or suspension only for a cause
iv. Right to self-organization
v. Right to strike: Government employees, including members of the CSC,
do not have the right to strike.

Jurisdiction of each Constitutional Commission

Tan v. COMELEC (2003)

Tan was designated by COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in

Davao for the May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with provisions
of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Manuel Garcia was proclaimed Congressman of 2nd Dist. Davao.

Alterado filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation, including
an administrative charge against the Board of Canvassers and Tan for Misconduct, Neglect of
Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service, before the COMELEC.

On petition for review, the SC upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over the administrative case.
COMELECs authority under Article IX, Sec. 2(6-8) of 1987 Constitution is all-encompassing
when it comes to election matters. The administrative case is related to the performance of his
duties as Election canvasser, not as a City Prosecutor. COMELECs mandate includes the
authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national and local law enforcement agency
and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections.

Daza v. Singson (1989)

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political

realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new
LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned
such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization was not permanent and stable.
 43

The SC disagreed. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members
include the Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political
organization in a democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional
election was never laid down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the
House to change its representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes
and not merely temporary alliances or factional divisions without severance of loyalties/formal
disaffiliation that may transpire in the political alignments of its members.

Guingona v. Gonzales (1992)

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS- NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To fulfil the requirement that
each party must have a representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The
result of the computation under that formula was that 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for
NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP- PDP-LABAN would be part of the
COA. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party; he rounded
7.5 up to 8; and decided that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party in
the CoA. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that
the compromise is against proportional representation.

The SC agreed that the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The proposed
scheme does not comply with the requirement that 12 senators be elected on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties in the Senate; to disturb the resulting
fractional membership of political parties in the CoA by adding together 2 halves to make a
whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation since it gave the LDP an added
member by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, which is deprived
of representation.

Instead, the correct rule is that in Coseteng v. Mitraa political party must have at least
2 senators in the Senate to have a CoA representative.

The case tackles the decision of COA for denying allegation of BCDA that COA gravely
abused its discretion when it when it declared that disbursement made covering the
remuneration pursuant to the extension of CMS is without legal basis. The court ruled in favor
of COA.It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that
this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BCDA), vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA
 44

M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA AND COMMISSIONER ROWENA V.

GUANZON, THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 209219, December 02,
2014, J. Reyes

Funa filed the instant petition questioning the designation of Duque as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being violative of Sections 1
and 2 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the Chairmen and Members of
the Constitutional Commissions from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure. Ruling in favor of Funa the SC ruled that Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans membership in a governing body is dependent on the
condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member
must affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees.

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions
associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the
concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are
not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are
carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the
CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC
Chairman. Such being the case, the designation of Duque was unconstitutional. DENNIS A. B.
FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November
25, 2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin

Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions

2. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
3. In the exercise of administrative functions

c. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

National Patrimony

Regalian Doctrine

La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association v. Ramos (2004)

The La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association challenged the issuance of mining permits and
other measures allowing for the exploration, development of natural resources. The Court held
that the mining permits should no longer be issued, applying the the Regalian Doctrine.
 45

The Regalian Doctrine, which declares all natural resources of the Philippines, including
mineral lands and minerals, to be property belonging to the State, extends not only to land but
also to "all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth." Spain, in particular,
recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an
abundant source of revenue to finance its wars against other nations.

Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions EDU of Natural Resources

Franchises, Authority, and Certificates of Public Utilities Acquisition Ownership and Transfer
of Public and Private Lands Practice of Professions
Organization and Regulation of Corporations, Private and Public Monopolies, Restraint of
Trade and Unfair Competition

National Economy and Patrimony

Tanada v. Angara (1997)

Senate Resolution No. 97, which ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement, was
challenged, on the ground that it violates Article II, Section 19 and Article XII, Sections 10 and
12 of the 1987 Constitution (embodying the Filipino First policy).

The SC upheld the WTO agreement. While the Constitution has a bias towards Filipino
goods, services, labor, and enterprises, there is also a need for some degree of equality and
reciprocity in the countrys business dealings with the rest of the world. The framers did not
intend to adopt an isolationist policy. A self-reliant and independent national economy
cannot be interpreted to mean a bar on foreign investments, goods, and services. It is not
economic seclusion, nor is it mendicancy in the international community. What the
Constitution shall do is protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition.

Natural Resources

La Bugal Blaan Tribal Assn v. Ramos (2004), supra.

Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance in Art. XII, Section 2(4) of the Constitution?

Held: The exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources may be
undertaken in the following ways: 1) the State by itself directly and solely, 2) by co-production,
joint venture or production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations, 3) small-
scale utilization allowed by law in favor of Filipino citizens, and, 5) large-scale EDU of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils via agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law.
 46

Contending that the 50,000-MTs production limit does not apply to small-scale miners
under RA 7076, the DENR then erred in declaring that they have exceeded the allowed annual
extraction of mineral ore. The SC however ruled that the DENR, being the agency mandated to
protect the environment and the countrys natural resources, it has the power to promulgate
the necessary IRRs to give effect to mining laws. Such being the case its interpretation as to the
50,000-MT limit provided under RA 7076 is authoritative. SR METALS, INC., SAN R MINING AND
CONSTRUCTION CORP. AND GALEO EQUIPMENT AND MINING COMP ANY, INC. vs. THE
HONORABLE ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), G.R. No. 179669, June 4, 2014, J. Del
Castillo

Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
existing prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be impaired. Mining rights
acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
were vested rights that could not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the mining
patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest
had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be
impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and
annual work obligations. YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015, J. Bersamin

The use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or
technical assistance. Service contracts were not banned under the 1987 Constitution.

Agrarian Reform
Urban Land Reform and Housing
Organization and Regulation of Private Corporations Operation of Public Utilities
On Mass Media and Advertising Industry Practice of Professions

State Operation of Private Enterprises

Agan v. Piatco (2004)

The consortium that eventually became PIATCO was awarded the NAIA III terminal
project. As a consequence, it entered into a Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The
Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the
concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the
rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that
the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date,
and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five
 47

(25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility
to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which was charged with the maintenance and operation of the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services. This led the employees of the service providers to file a
petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of the various agreements.

On the issue of whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected
with public interest, the SC held in this case that it could not. PIATCO could not, by mere
contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government
takeover and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal
and/or Terminal Complex.

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The national emergency
contemplated in that provision was defined to include threat from external aggression,
calamities or national disasters, but not strikes unless it is of such proportion that it would
paralyze government service. The duration of the emergency is the determining factor as to
how long the temporary takeover of the government will last.

PNCC in a series of agreements transferred authority to perform the operations and

maintenance of the South Metro Manila Skyway to SOMCO. Legislators and the Union of PNCC
oppose the said transfer. They argue that the TOC issued by the TRB to SOMCO is highly
irregular and that the transfer of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the government. To
resolve this issue, the Court has ruled that first, it is thus clear that Congress does not have the
sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Considering the foregoing,
the Court finds that the petition raises no issue of constitutional import. More particularly, no
legislative prerogative, power, or privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no
standing to file the instant petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress. In this case,
the Court finds that the allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations,
apprehensions, and suppositions. It is quite understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a
proven track record in toll operations, considering that it was only the ASTOA and the MOA that
gave birth to it. ANA THERESIA RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL et al. vs. TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015, C.J. Sereno

Monopolies, Combinations, and Unfair Competition

NEA v. Mendoza (1985)

 48

The IBP Oriental Mindoro Chapter opposed the increased electric rates being charged by
ORMECO in accordance with the NEAs approved increase in rates, on the ground that it did so
without a public hearing. The CFI issued a restraining order that prevented ORMECO from
charging the rates.

The Supreme Court held that the CFI gravely abused its discretion and set the order
aside.because the consumers are members of the cooperative ORMECO, which is a non-profit
organization. The consumers are already represented by the Board of Directors whom they had
elected. The necessity of a public hearing is lost.

Money, Banking, and Credit Cooperatives

Communication and Information in Nation-Building Autonomy of Local Governments
Recognition of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities Honest Public Service and Full
Public Disclosure

Valmonte v. Belmonte (1989)

Valmonte wanted Belmonte to give him a list of names of the opposition members of
the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a P2 million loan on guaranty of Imelda
Marcos from the GSIS. GSIS refused on the ground of confidentiality. Valmonte, et al., filed a
petition for mandamus.

The SC held that the right to access the records does not include the right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. The GSIS is a
trustee of contributions from the government and the administrator of insurance programs for
the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume a public character. Considering the nature of its
funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with law. The public nature of the funds and the public office of the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (2002)

PEA is the central implementing agency for reclamation projects in the country. It took
over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR as far as reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to reclaim portions
of Manila Bay. Despite a Senate investigation report, the Legal Task Force appointed by the
President upheld the JVA. Chavez filed a petition for mandamus and asked that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. The SC held that the right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.

d. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

 49

e. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS