INTESTATE SUCCESSION CASES
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000.]
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. PASTORA
PIEDAD, respondent.
Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Office for
petitioner.
P.C. Jose & Associates for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a
collateral relative within the fifth civil degree of the decedent.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the maternal aunt of the
decedent, a collateral relative within the third civil degree of the
decedent. The issue here is the applicability of the rule on
proximity among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is: Can
petitioner inherit alongside respondent?
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives
nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant
ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive
with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not
apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to
which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule on
proximity, respondent relative within the third civil degree
excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree from
succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION; APPRECIATION OF THE LAW.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession
embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or
by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and
obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed
incongruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by
the Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RULE ON
PROXIMITY; APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION. The rule on proximity is a concept that
favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent
that the right of representation can apply. . . . By right of
representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of
relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the
person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from
the person to whose estate the person represented would have
succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of representation is proper
only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when
such children survive with their uncles or aunts. SacTCA
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER
COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN THE FIFTH CIVIL
DEGREE." The right of representation does not apply to "other
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In
determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives
to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth
degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the
decedent.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu
moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto
H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of
the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to
respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings
were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete
publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the
heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise
her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the
dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up
on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in
that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing
Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else
but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45
thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the
distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question
of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances,
and their relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation." 1
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court,
ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a
prima facie interest over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over
the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the
deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the
proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues
which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal
within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their
resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the
facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the
fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the
first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-
appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad;
that the notice of hearing was published for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no
order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the
intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an
order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H.
Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the
truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether
intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil
degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would
justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication
of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would
amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and
the question as to whether the proceedings has already been
terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer
of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite
the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call
for the application and interpretation of the proper law. There is
doubt as to what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state
of facts. aHCSTD
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review
of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor
the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even
without going to examination of facts on record." 2
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the
appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate
court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and
take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner,
a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate
succession find application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the
daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth degree
relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody
an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by
operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and
obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed
in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by
the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives
nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant
ones, except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code
provides:
"ARTICLE 26. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation
when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives
of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and
degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the
same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes
of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter,
but from the person to whose estate the person represented
would have succeeded.
"ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and
the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights
which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited."
"ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by
the law and not by the person represented. The representative
does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line,
the right of representation may only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children
survive with their uncles or aunts.
"ARTICLE 972. The right of representation takes place in the
direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sister, whether they be of the full or half blood."
"ARTICLE 974. Whenever there is succession by representation,
the division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such
manner that the representative or representatives shall not
inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if
he were living or could inherit."
"ARTICLE 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters
of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute
rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral
relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
"ARTICLE 966. . . .
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother
of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." SCHATc
Accordingly
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth
degree, from succeeding ab intestato the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"ARTICLE 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend
beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line."
invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law
means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in
the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be
observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine,
a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first
cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of
the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree
relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have
priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. ISADET
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, [December 8, 2000], 400
PHIL 1380-1388)
ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992.]
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S.
PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF
ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA must be determined from the language employed and the statute
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to
Manila, respondents. the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolito for petitioners. (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for private respondents. not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
SYLLABUS who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORDER OF INTESTATE (Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting
SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; NO RIGHT TO that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule,
INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so
AND RELATIVES OF THEIR PARENTS; DIAZ V. IAC (150 far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
SCRA 645) CITED. The issue in the case at bar, had already resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA 645) where this Court exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute,
ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children DECISION
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They PARAS, J p:
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse
for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al.",
the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. cdphil
blemish broken in life the law does no more than recognize this The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment." Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
PARENTS IN THE INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE PARENT. latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of children and was survived by the following:
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse:
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named of the deceased, to wit:
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants Manuel C. Pascual
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate Jose C. Pascual
grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to Erlinda C. Pascual
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
provides that 'the grandchildren and other descendants shall (c) Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood of the
inherit by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is deceased, to wit:
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate Avelino Pascual
child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation Isoceles Pascual
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article Loida Pascual-Martinez
982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 Virginia Pascual-Ner
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the Nona Pascual-Fernando
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the Octavio Pascual
father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid down (d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of
in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
inherit by right of representation' and in Article 902 that the rights Olivia S. Pascual
of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their Hermes S. Pascual
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the (e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate the deceased and represented by the following:
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate Dominga M. Pascual
children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae's Mamerta P. Fugoso
Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431- Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
432; [1990]). Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHEN THE WORDS AND Dominga P. San Diego
PHRASES OF THE STATUTE ARE CLEAR AND Nelia P. Marquez
UNEQUIVOCAL; RULE. Verily, the interpretation of the law Silvestre M. Pascual
desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don
Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case
No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late
husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a
Supplemental Petition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual
and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual
executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge,
Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late
husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by
the oppositors, that they are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into
a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections
of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S.
Pascual, although Paragraph V of such compromise agreement
provides, to wit: LibLex
"This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual."
(Rollo, p. 108).
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite
the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp.
111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113114) and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-
130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over
by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and such motion was
denied.
Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).
On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioners.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision
and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due
course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or
not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the
purview of Article 992 and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC
(150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural
children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior
marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p.
418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as
provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to
spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein
petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to
them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:
"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child."
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz
v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment."
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC
did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the
light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia
and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate
of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this
Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate
children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that `the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate
child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article
982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation' and in Article
902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C.
Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA
427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may
be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
[1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA
233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno,
et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus,
where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v.
C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). llcd
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate
children are generally placed under one category, which
undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged
natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law
(DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, [March 25,
1992])
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117246. August 21, 1995.]
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO
MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA
MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
Eufrocino L. Bermudez for petitioners.
Marcelo C. Espinoza for Modesta Baltazar.
Nolan R. Evangelista for Estanislaoa Manuel.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; ART. 992, CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; "BARRIER" BETWEEN
MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE
FAMILY; CONSTRUED. Article 992 of the Civil Code, a basic
postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The
doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral
line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally
disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier"
between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in
intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. (Desiderio Jurado,
Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession, 8th ed., 1991, pp.
423-424.) His thesis: "What is meant by the law when it speaks
of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate
heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992
of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate
family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by
virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers
and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate
child. Consequently, when the law speaks of 'brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate
child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters." The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron
curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie(40 O.G. [First
S] No. 3, p. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110) and, then, in the relatively
recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA
645) and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. (181 SCRA 861)
In Diaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . .
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment." The rule in Article 992 has
consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases.
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-
brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
former's inheritance; (Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567) that the
legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from
her illegitimate child; (Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693) that a
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; (Llorente
v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909) that
the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father;
(Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29) and that an illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father. (Leonardo v. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 890) Indeed, the law on succession is
animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be
rendered inoperative (Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042) by, but
must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole. (Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil
688; Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709)
2. ID.; ID.; ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE
IN INTESTACY; GRAPHIC PRESENTATION. We might, in
easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and
concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article
1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children
and Descendants and Descendants,
Illegitimate Children
and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents
and Ascendants and Ascendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children (c) Illegitimate Children
and Descendants (in the and Descendants and
absence of ICDs and LPAs, Surviving Spouse
the illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse
and Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nieces Nephews and Nieces
and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN A WARD IS NEITHER A COMPULSORY
HEIR NOR A LEGAL HEIR. A ward (ampon), without the
benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor
a legal heir. (Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
69679, 18 October 1988)
4. ID.; DAMAGES; WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED; CASE AT BAR.
An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy
is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of
damages against the actor. (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 488, Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 51)
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the
inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without
any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel
and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several
years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his
mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06
August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza
Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square
meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-
20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana
Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and
Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought
by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed
with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar
into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter."
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year
period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land
covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21
February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992,
Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza,
Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT
P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan
Manuel). Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three
titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the
name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No.
184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in
the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992,
Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by
TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel
under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of
Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of
the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was
submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994
decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not
being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel,
were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily)
pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of
P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation
expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for
moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00
for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
"1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY
VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992
OF THE SAME CODE.
"2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS
OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY,
RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED
UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE
OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED
SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY
CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
"3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED
IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG." 1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of
Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to
Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last
paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
"ARTICLE 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate
child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who
shall be entitled to the entire estate.
"If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the
estate, and the latter the other half ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in
conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child." (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand,
and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule
is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and
illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted
civilist. 2 His thesis:
"What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate
child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is
a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from
members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this
barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right.
cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption,
law speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners
sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters." (Emphasis supplied) by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the
Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
said: The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it
to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private
legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the Feliciano, Acting C.J., Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the ||| (Manuel v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246, [August 21, 1995], 317
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further PHIL 568-578)
grounds of resentment."
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court SECOND DIVISION
in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the [G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997.]
illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R.
had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his Benjamin P. Quitoriano for petitioners.
natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate Ramoso Law Office for private respondent.
grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the SYLLABUS
estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her 1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FILIATION; LEGITIMACY;
natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to GENERAL PRESUMPTION THAT CHILDREN BORN IN
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE; ISSUE THEREOF CANNOT BE
his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. There is no presumption of the
uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12 in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue
order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for
Code; viz: re-conveyance. This is aside from the further consideration that
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the
(a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children and legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently
and Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is
Children and Descendants, rebutted.
and Surviving Spouse 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of
(b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents and proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the
and Ascendants Ascendants, Illegitimate presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is
Children and Descendants, disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong
and Surviving Spouse that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children the party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the
Descendants (in the and Descendants and presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce
absence of ICDs and Surviving Spouse substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is
LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents) an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may
Illegitimate Parents stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision.
(e) Brothers and (e) Brothers and Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted.
Sisters/Nephews and Sisters/Nephews and This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima
Nieces Nieces and Surviving facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
Spouse established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone disproved, it must stand as proved. Indubitably, when private
(within the fifth civil degree) respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to
(g) State (g) Alone overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of
such fact.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; EXCEPTION
TO THE HEARSAY RULE; DECLARATION ABOUT
PEDIGREE; CONDITIONS. The primary proof to be
considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the
effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY DISCUSSED.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as
to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant,
and when men It must be supported by evidence aliunde. The
general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but
not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the
relationship of the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement
that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as
to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member
of the family.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES NO FURTHER EVIDENCE
IN CASE AT BAR. The present case is one instance where
the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece,
is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary
evidence thereof, the reason being that such declarant is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is
in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute
that declaration made by the decedent. Where the subject of the
declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person.
it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of
the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary.
6. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE; INSUFFICIENCY ADMITTED WHEN NOT TIMELY
OBJECTED. While the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure
to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were
being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waived. The proper time is when from the question
addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or
may be inferred. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence
because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness
must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to
the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken
after the testimony has been given, is too late. Thus, for instance,
failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the
party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections
thereto.
7. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE. Private respondent may no longer be allowed to
present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section I of
revised Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed
he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence."
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the
judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30,
1995 1 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting
herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed
in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for
reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054,
over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located
at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and
Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the
deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September
15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating
unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a
consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074
was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988,
Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012
was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2,
1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation. cdtai
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented
by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the
nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of
representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must
reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate
of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the
defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral
and exemplary, plus attorney' s fees for the willful and malicious
refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in
the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing
fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said
deceased; and

(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be
considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary
evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and
their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller;
death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin
Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested
their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which
a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further
averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison
regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-
serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short
of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family
Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the
records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by
Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of
birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being
hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-
examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals
declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and
joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to
evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the
quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for
consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's
legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation
with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by
petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other,
are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree.
It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower
courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous
assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be
validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the
second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to
prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree
on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court
have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void.' This principle applies under our
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity
of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory." 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate
children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly
controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is
aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to
operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this
case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who
have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should
have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to
evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as
well as the time and effort necessitated thereby. cdtai
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in
whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce
evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that
fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of
proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the
burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in
order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it
operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the
contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that
a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a
finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed
if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and
unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal
presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely
filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly
admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or
disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial
notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting
evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby
considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding
petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose
estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more
intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and
marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil
registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by
third persons all of which she identified and explained in the
course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement
is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible,
as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is,
whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as
to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant,
and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is
stated thus:
"One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a
claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the
admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he
may not do so by declarant's own statements as to declarant' s
relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's
declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature.
Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources
that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the
particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that
declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not
met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship
in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's
estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose
estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who
claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of
relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then
disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such
declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in
determining the class to which the declarations belong. The
distinction we have noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one case
the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent
from reasons of necessity." 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming
seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's
estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative
may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought
to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some
other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case
is one instance where the general requirement on
evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right
to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient
proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was
no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More
importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all
and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent. cdtai
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded,
on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need
for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and
nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's
own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require,
as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the
very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless
produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on
their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that
the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's
failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they
were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection
shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely
a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made
at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been
waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to
the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation
of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be
inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the
time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of
evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the
testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance,
failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the
party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections
thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private
respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone
witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no
time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the
possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private
respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the
circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents:
The observations later made by private respondent in her
comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds
therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were
being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised
therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences
which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being
hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is
indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo
Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism
of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller
(Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as
Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes
Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the
Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his
daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners
are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller these can be
deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between
the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with
the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only
slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not
be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence
the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the
subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the
manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in
this case, to wit:
"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
"Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001."
"Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half."
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving
spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the
remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own
right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively. cdrep
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the
demurrer to plaintiffs' evidence should have been, as it is hereby,
denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be
allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate
under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein
petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the
subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-
fourth (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, [July 31, 1997],
342 PHIL 550-567)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998.]
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN
URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and
FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA
ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO,
represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and
LUPECINO ARNALDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.
Amado A. Caballero for petitioners.
Antonia C. Buenaflor for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent brought in the Regional Trial Court an action
for partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering who died
intestate and without issue, claiming to be the sole surviving heir
of decedent. Private respondent contended that petitioners could
claim only one-half of the land which the decedent had inherited
from her parents. However, the petitioners claimed that the land
was originally owned by their great granduncle, Ambrocio
Arnaldo, who allegedly bequeathed the land to his nephews
Domingo Arnaldo, uncle of the decedent, and Juan Arnaldo,
father of the decedent. Petitioners contended that private
respondent did not have any right to the property because he
was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo. The trial court sustained
petitioners' contention. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that
private respondent is the nephew of the decedent, being the son
of Agatonica Arreza, half-sister of the decedent, and is therefore
a third degree relative of the decedent. On the other hand, the
petitioners are the sons and daughters of decedent's cousins and
are therefore fifth degree relatives of the decedent. Applying
Article 962 of the Civil Code which provides that the nearest
excludes the farthest, the Court of Appeals held that the private
respondent is the lawful heir of the decedent. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners are questioning private respondent's filiation
contending that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of the decedent.
Petitioners also make much of the fact that private respondent is
not an Arnaldo, and is therefore not qualified to share in the
estate of the decedent.
The Supreme Court found that petition to be without merit. It is
well-settled that questions not taken up during the trial of a case
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason
should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first
time on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court also held that
petitioners misappreciate the relationship between the decedent
and private respondent. A nephew is considered a collateral
relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood
relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from
being his aunt's heir. The determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half-blood is important only to
determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; ISSUES NOT
RAISED DURING THE TRIAL CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. It is well-settled, however, that
questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should
such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on
appeal to this Court.
2. CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; A NEPHEW IS A
COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY INHERIT IF NO
DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT, OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE
DECEDENT. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship
between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private
respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is
therefore Justa's nephews. A nephew is considered a collateral
relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BEING A HALF-BLOOD RELATIVE, NOT A
DISQUALIFICATION FROM BEING HIS AUNT'S HEIR. That
private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This
alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of
whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important
only to determine the extent of the share of the
survivors." EDHCSI
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the
appellate court's resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare
piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa
Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989. cdasia
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as
follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica
Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil.
Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by
whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. 2 Private
respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her
half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio
Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte.
Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado
Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of
Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and
Justa's father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers. 3 Petitioners are
thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo
Uriarte. cdtai
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of
her brother Gregorio. 4 The children of Primitiva by Conrado
Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio,
Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of
Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are
Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other
petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio
Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa
Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been
acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her
parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by
purchase. 5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving
heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He
complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the
land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent)
his share of the harvest. 6 He contended that Pascasio had no
right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of
the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents
Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. 7
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by his heirs. 8 In their answer, the heirs denied they
were mere tenants of Justa 9 but the latter's heirs entitled to her
entire land. cdt
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was
originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their great granduncle.
It was alleged bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo,
Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio
in 1908. 11 Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and
Juan, one-third. 12 The heirs claimed that the land had always
been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never
asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her
share of the harvest from it. 13 They alleged that private
respondent did not have any right to the property because he
was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, 14 the original owner of the
property.
The trial court sustained petitioner's contention. In its decision
rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to
his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481
hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters
to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The
area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because
the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa
Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latter's death.
The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the
name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate
and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the children
of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed
on after her death by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other
relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil
Code). 15
Accordingly, the court ordered: aisadc
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against
the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and
the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo
Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax
Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in
the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial
court's finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares
had been acquired by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula
Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-
sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to
share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its
decision the appellate court ordered: cdta
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and another is hereby entered
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second
amended complaint in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff. cdasia
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed
with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 17
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of
Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners
allege: cdtai
I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF
SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;
II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED
TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO
ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS
MERITORIOUS; cdt
IV AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 18
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without
merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7
hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals
found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares,
was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents.
Accordingly, the division of Justa's property should be as follows
as private respondent contends:
A The first hectare should be divided into two parts, the share
of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the second
half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private
respondent. aisadc
B As to the second portion of the area of the land in question
which as already stated was consolidated with the hectare
originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo
and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent,
who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three
degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the
children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five
degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. 19
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the
private respondent is entitled to Justa's estate as her nearest
relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private
respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-
sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only
now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up
during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question be
disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this
Court. 20
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of
Appeals, 21 petitioners admitted that private respondent is
Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister.
Apparently they are now questioning private respondent's filiation
because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private
respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the
only one entitled to her estate. cdasia
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justa's parents, Justa
was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her
father's (Juan Arnaldo's) share in the conjugal property, while
petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition,
Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of
0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her
own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the
2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private
respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justa's nearest surviving
relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance,
the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives
of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between paternal and maternal lines. cdtai
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are
provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number
of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral. aisadc
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but
who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. cdt
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. aisadc
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus
the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the
grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent is made to the person with whom the computation
is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four
from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of
Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. cdta
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and
daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives
of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then
plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only
a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 22
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private
respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter
not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this
being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and
thus not qualified to share in her estate. cdasia
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and
private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the
son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may
inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. 23 The private respondent is only a half-blood relative
is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his
aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half-
blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the
survivors." 24
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and
fourth grounds of the petition for renew must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Uriarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116775,
[January 22, 1998], 348 PHIL 549-559)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998.]
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD,
MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; WHEN A CHILD
SHALL BE PRESUMED LEGITIMATE, ALTHOUGH THE
MOTHER MAY HAVE DECLARED AGAINST ITS LEGITIMACY;
CASE AT BAR. It is undisputed that prior to her relationship
with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose
Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita,
Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian.
But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in
1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971. The
date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive
in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria
Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 256. The child shall be
presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. cdasia
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL RELATIVES; WHEN
PRECLUDED FROM INHERITING FROM THE DECEDENT;
CASE AT BAR. With the finding that private respondents are
the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The
applicable provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there
are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. As to
petitioners' claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad
actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court
and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by
private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to
Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial
court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence,
as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this
conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the
subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by
Lucila de Mesa.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE ON
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATIENT; CASE AT BAR. As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the
same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. The rule on confidential communications between
physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the
advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a
civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between
the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and
the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any
information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four
requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo
Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased.
Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility"
arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society
holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We
thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same
remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of
Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court: In the case
of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it
was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished
or terminated because of death as stated in established
precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law
would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted
thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy,
from the communications and disclosures which a patient should
make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living
are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by
dragging to light communications and disclosures made under
the seal of the statute."
4. ID.; APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT; RULINGS THEREOF,
BINDING UPON AND MAY NOT BE REVERSED BY A LOWER
COURT. In its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975
denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This
affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had
already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled
is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding
upon and may not be reversed by a lower court. CTIEac
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994, finding private
respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as
annulling petitioners' extrajudicial partition of the decedent's
estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores
de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In
their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging
that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and
64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually
only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late
mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court
appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. LLphil
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa,
copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the
Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483
in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No 108484 in
the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly
executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor
of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado,
Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a
motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition
in Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged
that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from
1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had
produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian
Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by
Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law
awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion
of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners
with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children
in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo
Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw
their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed
administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied
private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as
administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to
establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had
managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through
the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate
Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a
motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484,
the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by
the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered
the following judgment: prLL
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S.
Abad acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo M.
Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely:
Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad the
only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and
as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased,
subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner
of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired
thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they
lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives,
namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M.
Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from
participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of
Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this
intestacy with a bond of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new
administratrix all property or properties, monies and such papers
that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as
administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with
respect to the latter's motion for annulment of certain documents.
On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment: LLpr
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for
Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious and
accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos.
13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in the name of Ricardo
Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de
Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432
Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the
properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc.
No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial
book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530,
53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos.
108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No.
108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-
Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the
corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three
(3) real estate mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by
(a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145,
Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales,
identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of
1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor
of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of
Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the
back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and
wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the new administratrix,
Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484
within five (5) days from receipt hereof cdll
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973
decision was denied by the trial court. Their notice of appeal was
likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out
of time. Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and
mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed
there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the
appellate court granted petitioners' petition and ordered the lower
court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The trial court,
however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that
their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of
appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of the trial court. On
March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground
that it had been filed out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again
instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals,
prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9,
1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to
petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring
private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the
order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents
pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to
the appellate court. On October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal
is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP
No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that
Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all surnamed Abad as the
acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad; dctai
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that
the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671
and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de
Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the
beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null
and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or
issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of
Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de
Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for
being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against petitioner-appellants.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS
CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF
THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE
WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE DECEASED
RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE
MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's
filiation, submit the startling theory that the husband of Honoria
Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and
Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad,
Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union
having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina,
prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private
respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still
alive in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria
Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides: cdasia
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the
application for enrollment at Mapua Institute of Technology of
Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name : Jose Libunao
Occupation : engineer (mining)
Mother's Name : Honoria Empaynado 5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrollment at the
Mapua Institute of Technology, which states:
Father's Name : Jose Libunao
Occupation : none
Mother's Name : Honoria Empaynado 6
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the
time when said applications were accomplished, the enrollment
forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the
case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive
in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan
Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating that to their
knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow,
Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at
the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro
Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he
had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with
gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and
Marian Abad are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but
rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and
Honoria Empaynado. cdll
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the
veracity of the trial court's finding of facts. It is a fundamental and
settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners, however, argue
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on
this Court when there appears in the record of the case some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted,
that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to
the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose
Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive.
Failure to indicate on an enrollment form that one's parent is
"deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still
living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro
Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not
competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being
merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death
certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the
latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to
present the same, although there is no showing that said death
certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as
proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling, while the records of
Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose BautistaLibunao
was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be
different from Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the latter's
name being Jose SantosLibunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes
while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private
respondents as being privileged communication under Section
24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a)
the action in which the advice or treatment given or any
information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person claiming the
privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired
by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the
information was necessary for the performance of his
professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would
tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. 12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four
requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo
Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased.
Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility"
arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society
holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We
thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same
remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of
Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99
N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not
abolished or terminated because of death as stated in
established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose
of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal
of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a
patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his
grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and
disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and
disclosures made under the seal of the statute. cdphil
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners
have failed to establish their claim by the quantum of evidence
required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by
private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We quote with
approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar
years 1958 and 1970, and in all his individual income tax returns
for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has
declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and
as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in
Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February
26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxx xxx xxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia,
then eleven (11) years old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a]
twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to
C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund
account of P100,000.00 with the People's Bank and Trust
Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either
of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5,
1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the
same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On
January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had
(sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the
9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid
monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings
Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia
Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for
Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp.
21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte
de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348
which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972.
(Exh. 60-B). . .
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from
inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions
are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Emphasis supplied)
As to petitioners' claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo
Abad actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the
trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence
presented by private respondents proved that said properties in
truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not
be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine
the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem
to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are
entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by
Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19,
1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dated
March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad
and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was
filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985,
this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of
time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme
Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower
court. cdphil
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March
21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, [October 30,
1998], 358 PHIL 806-821)
COMMON PROVISIONS
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998.]
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO
CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S.
REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES,
BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO,
REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO,
ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO
C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C.
SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO,
CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A.
SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of
NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
Concepcion B. Buencamino and Antonio P. Pacheo for
petitioners.
Roman R. Mendioro for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the March
30, 1994 decision and December 21, 1994 resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private
respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition of
a property under Article 494 of the Civil Code. Records show that
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners of the
property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the
corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City. After
Lourdes Sampayo died, private respondents filed an action for
partition and damages before the RTC of Lucena City against
Ignacio Conti. After trial on the merits, the court a quo declared
herein respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and
ordered both parties to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot for confirmation by the trial court. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision
ruling that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship
was not necessary and that private respondents became co-
owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the
name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently,
entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other
incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law including the
right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code. Hence,
the instant petition. SIDEaA
The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court
ruled that a prior settlement of the estate is not essential before
the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the
deceased. Under Articles 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the
death of Lourdes Sampayo her right as the co-owner of the
questioned property, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were
transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition, private
respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to
the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Likewise, the Court
found that herein respondents, by preponderance of evidence,
have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of
succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo. In
view thereof, the Court denied the instant petition.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON. A prior settlement of
the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any
action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained
in Quison v. Salud (12 Phil. 109, 113-114 [1908]) Claro
Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present
plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants
that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is
no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for
the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without
such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is
nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of
Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who
dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and
the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of
paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate,
from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial
administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the
estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this
action is established. IECAaD
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PARTITION; PUBLICATION,
NOT REQUIRED. Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of
publication would have been correct had the action been for the
partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing
with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value. But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes'
one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate
succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between
co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court. A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows
that publication is not required as erroneously maintained by
petitioners.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO SIMULTANEOUS ISSUES IN AN ACTION
THEREFOR. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an
action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-
owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if
answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the
property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. Thus, in
this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by
preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they
are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late
Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew
or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the
trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.
4. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
WHEN IT TAKES PLACE. Succession is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. Legal or intestate succession takes place if a
person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.
5. ID.; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
HOW FILIATION THEREOF PROVED. Under Art. 172 of the
Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such
legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by
the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized
in the instant case. SaHIEA
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE;
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS;
DEFINED. Public documents are the written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country. The baptismal certificates
presented in evidence by private respondents are public
documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of
the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the
form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS;
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES, ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.
Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official
recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, (G.R. No. 88582, 5
March 1991, 194 SCRA 690, 705) citing U.S. v. de Vera, (28 Phil.
105 [1914]), thus . . . the entries made in the Registry Book
may be considered as entries made in the course of the business
under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one
of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in the book of the church during the course of its
business.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30
March 1994 Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private
respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code. LexLib
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario,
were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a
539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa
Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with a house
erected thereon. 1 On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died
intestate without issue. 2 Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private
respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia
S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico
A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna
C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia
A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A.
Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting
also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A.
Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages
before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City. 3
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the
partition on the ground that private respondents failed to produce
any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo. 4 On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and
was substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion,
Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all
surnamed Conti. 5
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes
and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral
heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled
to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the
original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father
was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina
Sampayo, 6 Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of
the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina
Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified
that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo
who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis
J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove
that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of
Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of
the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence.
These documents showed that their father and mother, like
Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of
Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero
who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance
with the church records, hence, the lower left portion of the
documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to
where the documents were logged in particular. 7 The baptismal
certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates because
the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two separate
occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil
registration records were totally burned. 8 On the other hand, a
photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25 October 1919
(Exh. "I") 9 showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her
husband Manuel was the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and
with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living
sibling of Lourdes was Josefina. 10
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over
the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa
Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that
the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her
husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family
(Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since
1937. 11 In fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti
paid for the real estate taxes 12 and spent for the necessary
repairs and improvements thereon 13 because by agreement
Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them. 14
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either
testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim. 15 Rosario also disclosed that when
Lourdes died her remains were taken by her relatives from their
house. 16 When cross examined on who those relatives were,
she replied that the only one she remembered was Josefina
since there were many relatives who came. When asked who
Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise,
when asked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied
having ever known them. 17
Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she
used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share would go
to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since both
of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and
Anastacia Allarey Cord, 18 although she admitted that she did
not know whether Lourdes had other relatives. 19
According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures
of the tombs bearing the tombstones of Gabriel Cord and
Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of
Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred
beside her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario
during her direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred
there because her relatives took her remains. 20
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as
the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot for confirmation by the court. 21
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending
that the trial court erred in finding that private respondents were
the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the
partition of the lot and the improvements thereon. 22
On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed
RTC decision and held 23
In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able
to prove and establish by preponderance of evidence that they
are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs
[now private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to
submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot
owned in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court . . .
Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in
declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of
deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit her property,
the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs
[now private respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of
merit (insertions in [] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez
v. Padua 24 and Marabilles v. Quito, 25 that a prior and separate
judicial declaration of heirship was notnecessary 26 and that
private respondents became co-owners of the portion of the
property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo
upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate
possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as
provided for by law including the right to demand partition
under Art. 777 of the Civil Code, 27 and Ilustre v. Alaras
Frondosa 28 holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death. LLjur
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for
reconsideration upheld the probative value of the documentary
and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted
petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed
that she was a vital witness in the case. 29 Hence, petitioners
pursued this case arguing that a complaint for petition to claim a
supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper
without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with
all legal requirements, especially publication, and private
respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their
relationship with the deceased. 30
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate
is not essential before the heirs can commence any action
originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison
v. Salud 31
Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the
present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the
appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action
because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been
taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison,
and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this
action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as
by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title of the property owned by
a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such
transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of
administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for
the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not
prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the
intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a
judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle
the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain
this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with
Arts. 777 and 494 32 of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes
Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right
to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership,
where transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition
private respondents merely exercised the right originally
pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as the requirement of publication would have
been correct had the action been for the partition of the estate of
Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary
settlement of estates of small value. 33 But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes'
one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate
succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between
co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court
Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as in this rule prescribed, settling forth in his complain the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is
not required as erroneously maintained by petitioners. There are
two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought
to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the
manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should
go to which co-owner. 34 Thus, in this case, we must determine
whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence,
have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of
succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as
they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These,
private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well
as before respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation
because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove
filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do
not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation
of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the
testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina
Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina
and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on
events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified
on matter merely narrated to her. 35
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and
testimonial evidence submitted are competent and adequate
proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of
one-half () pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of
legal or instate succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of
law. 36 Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies
without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently
lost its validity. 37 If there are not descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 38 It was
established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and
without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and
nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, 39 the filiation of legitimate
children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of
birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a public
or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof
of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 40 By analogy,
this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant
case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country. 41 The baptismal certificates presented in
evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish
priests continue to be the legal custodian of the parish records
and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates,
of the entries contained therein. 42
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.
Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official
recorder, was settled in People vs. Ritter, citing U .S. v. de
Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914), 43 thus
. . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as
entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of
Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions
in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book
of the church during the course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of
the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were
four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together,
uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had
the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by
the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the
demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister
Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes,
such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to
prove filiation.
Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the court a quo and
respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule
130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself except when the original has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the
original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly
established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was
completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30
August 1983, respectively, and as consequence thereof, all civil
registration records were totally burned. Cdpr
Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners'
contention that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove
filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no
declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that
the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the
controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to
dispute her testimony in open court when she was mentioning
who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly
observed by the trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary and
testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants" (now
petitioners). 44 Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the
witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the
identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs
counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she
professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio
Conti, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However,
in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken
together, clearly, preponderate to the right of private respondents
to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. cdphil
||| (Heirs of Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464,
[December 21, 1998], 360 PHIL 536-551)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114151. September 17, 1998.]
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9,
CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
Sitoy Go Associates for petitioner.
Reuben B. Baldoza for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left to
their six children, namely, Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia,
Laurencia and Abundio a 219 square meter lot in Mambaling,
Cebu City, wherein each of them is entitled to a share of 36.50
square meters. Licerio Nique purchased portions of the said
property with a total area of 121.67 square meters thru one of the
heirs, Laurencia, representing her share, the shares of Gregorio,
Marcelino at 36.50 square meters each and 12.17 square meters
from the share of Abundio. But later on, Laurencia questioned
the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages she filed
against Nique. The lower court in its decision declared Nique as
owner in fee simple of the 146-square meters of the said lot
representing the shares of Laurencia, Marcelino, Gregorio and
Abundio. Laurencia, not contented with the said decision,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but withdrew it. cdasia
Subsequently, Nique filed a Motion for the segregation of the 146
square meter portion of the property that had been awarded to
him by the trial court. The said motion was granted by the court
in its order dated May 6, 1993 and on the ground that the decision
had long become final.
Mauricia questioned the order of the Court before the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court upheld the validity of the said
order. Hence, this petition, for review on certiorari raising the
same issue.
The Court ruled that the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia
and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of
them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it
was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The
fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its
effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document. The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order
for the segregation of the property. AICDSa
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; RIGHTS OF HEIRS; TO USE
AND ENJOY THE UNDIVIDED ESTATE BEFORE PARTITION.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment
of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is
that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot
be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the right
of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such
inchoate right.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TO SELL THE PRO INDIVISO SHARE OF THE
INHERITED PROPERTY BEFORE PARTITION; CASE AT BAR.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of
inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is
specifically governed by Article 1088. In the instant case,
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro
indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property
had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of
Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as
yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting
Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-
owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. ESTcIA
3. ID.; ID.; PARTITION; WAYS IT COULD BE EFFECTED.
Under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be
effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the
court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4)
by the third person designated by the testator.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COULD NOT BE EFFECTED IN AN ACTION
FOR QUIETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTION. The trial court may
not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting
of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the
property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by
the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate.
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was
offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the order
for segregation of the property sold to private respondent.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE EVIDENCED BY THE OVERT ACT OF
A CO-OWNER. It appears that when a co-owner sells his
inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to
"put an end to indivision among (his) co heirs." Partition among
co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner
of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it
takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate
the co-ownership by selling her share to private respondent.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEED NOT BE EMBODIED IN A PUBLIC
DOCUMENT. Moreover, the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the intention of
both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the
property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers
and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle
the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no
hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document. DCcIaE
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER OF THE COURT FOR THE
SEGREGATION OF THE PROPERTY IS A MERE
REITERATION OF DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in issuing the order for the segregation of
the property. In so doing, it was merely reiterating the partition of
the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that
was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate.
The order may likewise be deemed as a clarification of its
decision that had become final and executory. Such clarification
was needed lest proper execution of the decision be rendered
futile.
8. ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 (FORUM
SHOPPING); TO EXIST ELEMENTS OF EITHER LITIS
PENDENTIA OR RES JUDICATA MUST BE PRESENT; NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The Court finds no merit in
the issue of forum shopping raised by private respondent. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. Because the judgment in Civil Case No.
CEB-7028 is already final and executory, the existence of res
judicata is determinative of whether or not petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the
following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4)
the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and
causes of action. The fourth element is not present in this case.
The parties are not identical because petitioner was not
impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the subject matter
may be the same property of the Alejandrino spouses, the
causes of action are different. Civil Case No. 7028 is an action
for quieting of title and damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673
is for redemption and recovery of properties. HIAEcT
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which ruled that the trial court,
in an action for quieting of title, did not act in excess of jurisdiction
when it issued an order for the segregation of property, after the
finality of its decision. LibLex
The facts show that the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and
Enrica Labunos left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio,
Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot
in Mambaling, Cebu City identified as Lot No. 2798 and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658. Upon the demise of the
Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been divided
among their children with each child having a share of 36.50
square meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was not settled in accordance with the procedure outlined in the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased
12.17 square meters of Gregorio's share, 36.50 square meters
of Ciriaco's share and 12.17 square meters of Abundio's share
thereby giving her a total area of 97.43 square meters, including
her own share of 36.50 square meters. It turned out, however,
that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private respondent in
this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50
square meters from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from
Gregorio "through Laurencia," 12.17 square meters from
Abundio also "through Laurencia" and 36.50 square meters from
Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square meters of the
Alejandrino property. 2
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67
square meters of the property) later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages against private
respondent Nique. It was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-7038
in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9, presided by
Judge Benigno G. Gaviola. In due course, the lower court
rendered a decision on November 27, 1990 disposing of the case
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff, dismissing the complaint filed by
plaintiff against defendant, and on the Counterclaim and prayer
of defendant in its Answer, the Court hereby declares defendant
as the owner in fee simple of the share of plaintiff Laurencia
Alejandrino and the shares of Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio,
all surnamed Alejandrino, of the parcel of land known as Lot No.
2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658
which 4 shares totals an area of 146 square meters more or less;
and the Court further Orders plaintiff to:
1. Vacate the premises subject of the complaint and surrender
the property to defendant to the extent of the 4 shares
aforementioned;
2. Pay the defendant the amount of P15,000.00 as litigation and
necessary expenses; the sum of P10,000.00 as reimbursement
for attorney's fees; the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Plus costs.
SO ORDERED." 3
Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under
CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 but later withdrew the same. 4 On April
13, 1992, the Court of Appeals considered the appeal withdrawn
in accordance with Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 5
Meanwhile, herein petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino filed on May 5,
1992 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VII, a
complaint for redemption and recovery of properties with
damages against private respondent Nique that was docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-11673. Adelino B. Sitoy, Laurencia's counsel
in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, filed Civil Case No. CEB-11673 for
petitioner Mauricia.
The amended complaint in the latter case dated May 17, 1992
alleged that private respondent Nique never notified petitioner
Mauricia of the purchase of 121.67 square meters of
the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did he give petitioner Mauricia the
preemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the same lot.
As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia manifested her willingness
to deposit with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the
acquisition cost of the portion purchased by private respondent
Nique. Petitioner Mauricia also alleged that she demanded from
private respondent the area of around 24.34 square meters that
the latter had "unduly, baselessly and maliciously claimed as his
own but which, as part of Lot No. 2798, actually belongs to her."
The amended complaint prayed that petitioner Mauricia be
allowed to redeem the area of 121.67 square meters under the
redemption price of P29,777.78 and that private respondent
Nique be ordered to execute the necessary documents for the
redemption and the eventual transfer of certificate of title to her.
The amended complaint further prayed for the return to petitioner
Mauricia of the 24.34-square-meter portion of the lot and for
damages amounting to P115,000 and attorney's fees of P30,000.
On August 2, 1993, the lower court granted the motion to admit
the amended complaint and forthwith ordered the defendant
therein to file an amended answer.
In Civil Case No. CEB-7038 in the meantime, private respondent
filed a motion for the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion
of the property that had been declared by the trial court as his
own by virtue of purchase. On May 6, 1993, the trial court issued
an order the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"ORDER
For resolution is a 'Motion to Order Segregation of 146 Square
Meters In Lot No. 2798' dated January 15, 1993 filed by
defendant and the 'Opposition' thereto dated February 2, 1992
by plaintiff. Movant-defendant also filed a rejoinder dated
February 15, 1993 to the Opposition.
After going over the allegations in the motion, the opposition
thereto and the rejoinder as well as the records of the case,
particularly the decision rendered by this Court and the Order
dated October 28, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by plaintiffs and allowing the issuance of a writ of execution,
the Court is inclined to Grant the instant motion.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition thereto, the Court makes the following observation:
1. Plaintiff (oppositor) has a total share of 146 square meters.
This is admitted by her in her complaint (par. 4 thereof). In the
decision rendered by this Court, this share now belongs to
defendant movant by way of sale. The decision of this Court has
long become final.
2. The total area of the land is 219 sq. meters (par. 2 of
complaint), thus, the share of Mauricia Alejandrino is only 73
square meters.
3. As early as June 10, 1983, Mauricia Alejandrino and Laurencia
Alejandrino had entered into an 'Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate' whereby they agreed to divide the land subject of this
case with Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in
the frontage and Mauricia Alejandrino owning 75 square meters
in the back portion (Exh. '16', Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
par. 1) (emphasis supplied), and that the parties assure each
other and their successor in interest that a right of way of two
meters is granted to each party by the other permanently (Exh.
'16', par. 2). This partition is signed by the parties and their
witnesses. Although not notarized, it is certainly valid as between
the parties, Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino, being an immediate party,
may not renege on this.
4. Since the share of defendant Licerio P. Nique is specifically
known to be 146 square meters, and that its location shall be on
the 'frontage' of the property while the 73 square meters of
Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino shall be at the back portion, then, the
Court cannot see its way clear, why the 146 sq. meters share of
defendant may not be segregated.
5. The contention by oppositor that the 'segregation of
defendant's share of 146 sq. meters from Lot No. 2798 was not
decreed in the judgment' is a rather narrow way of looking at the
judgment. Paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the judgment
by this Court, Orders plaintiff to 'vacate the premises subject of
the complaint and surrender the property to defendant to the
extent of the 4 shares aforementioned.' The 4 shares of
Laurencia Alejandrino of 146 sq. meters can be segregated
because Laurencia and Maurecia had already executed an
extrajudicial partition indicating where their respective shares
shall be located (Exh. '16'). To deny the segregation is to make
the decision of this Court just about valueless is not altogether
useless. The matter of allowing the segregation should be read
into the decision.
The bottomline is still that plaintiff Laurencia, despite the fact that
the decision of this Court had long become final; and despite the
fact that she even withdraw (sic) her appeal, she still is enjoying
the fruits of the property to the exclusion of the rightful
owner. cdphil
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the motion. The
defendant Licerio Nique may proceed to segregate his 2146 (sic)
sq. meters from Lot No. 2798 covered by TCT No. 19658, by
having the same surveyed by a competent Geodetic Engineer, at
the expense of movant-defendant.
SO ORDERED." 6
Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction filed before the Court of
Appeals. In due course, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition in a Decision promulgated on August 25, 1993.
The Court of Appeals stated that, in issuing the questioned order
of May 6, 1993, the respondent court was merely performing its
job of seeing to it that "execution of a final judgment must
conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision." It
ratiocinated thus:
". . . In ordering the segregation of the 146 square meters,
respondent Judge correctly referred to the text of the decision to
ascertain which portion of the land covered by TCT No. 19658
was actually sold by Laurencia Alejandrino (sister of herein
petitioner Mauricia) to private respondent Nique. The respondent
Judge did not err in relying upon Exhibit '16', the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, dated June 10, 1983, mentioned in
page 3 of the Decision. Pertinent portion of Exhibit '16' reads:
'NOW, THEREFORE, the above-named parties-heirs hereby
stipulates (sic), declare and agree as follows:
'1. That the parties have agreed to divide the parcel of land with
Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the
frontage and Mauricia Alejandrino 73 square meters in the back
portions;
'2. That the parties mutually and reciprocally assure each other
and their successor of interest (sic) that a right of way of two
meters is granted to each party to the other permanently.'
(emphasis supplied, Annex '1', Comment, p. 65, Rollo)
duly signed by herein petitioner and witnessed by private
respondent Nique. It readily reveals that when Laurencia
subsequently sold her shares to herein private respondent, per
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1986 (Exhs. 'B' and
'10'), the parties must have referred to the 146 square meters in
the frontage described in said document, Exhibit '16'. Laurencia
had no authority to sell more, or, less, than that agreed upon in
the extrajudicial settlement between her and herein petitioner
Mauricia. Insofar as the latter is concerned, she is estopped from
claiming that said extrajudicial settlement was a fatally defective
instrument because it was not notarized nor published. What is
important is that private respondent personally knew about
Laurencia and Mauricia's agreement because he was a witness
to said agreement and he relied upon it when he purchased the
146 square meters from Laurencia.
It cannot be validly claimed by petitioner that she was deprived
of her property without due process of law considering that
private respondent is merely segregating the portion of the land
actually sold to him by Laurencia Alejandrino and it does not
affect the 73 square meters that properly pertain to petitioner.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that where there is
ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion of a decision the court may clarify such ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment had become final, and for
this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the
court's finding of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the
body of the decision (Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., et
al., versus Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 309).
The assailed order, in effect, clarifies the exact location of the
146 square meters pursuant to Exhibit '16'. Respondent court did
not act in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence, writs of certiorari and
prohibition do not lie in this case." 7
Petitioner Mauricia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals' decision. However, on February 15, 1994, the
Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit "there being
no new ground or compelling reason that justifies a
reconsideration" of its Decision. 8
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails
the decision of the Court of Appeals, contending that the lower
court acted beyond its jurisdiction in ordering the segregation of
the property bought by private respondent as the same was not
decreed in its judgment, which had long become final and
executory. Petitioner argues that partition of the property cannot
be effected because private respondent is also a defendant in
Civil Case No. CEB-11673. She asserts that Exhibit 16, the
extrajudicial settlement of estate referred to in the questioned
order of the lower court, was not discussed in the decision of the
lower court and even if it were, she could not be bound thereby
considering that she was not a party litigant in Civil Case No.
CEB-7038. She questions the validity of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement because it was not notarized or published.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent alleges that
although petitioner was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-
7038, she is estopped from questioning the decision in that case
and filing the instant petition because she had "knowledge of the
existence of said case" where res judicata had set in. He adds
that the instant petition was filed in violation of Circular No. 28-
91 on forum shopping "in that the Petitioner in the instant petition
whose counsel is also the counsel of plaintiff-appellant Laurencia
Alejandrino in CA-G.R. CV No. . . ., had filed a civil action Civil
Case No. CEB-11673 . . . for "REDEMPTION & RECOVERY OF
PROPERTIES WITH DAMAGES", which is presently pending
before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City." He
asserts that the lower court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or
commit grave abuse of discretion in granting his motion for
segregation of the 146 square meters of the land involved that
rightfully belonged to him in accordance with the decision of the
lower court. He charges counsel for petitioner with exhibiting
"unethical conduct and practice" in appearing as counsel for
petitioner in Civil Case No. CEB-11673 after he had appeared for
complainant Laurencia in CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 or Civil Case
No. CEB-7038.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that
needs determination is whether or not as an heir of the
Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions
thereof to a third party.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment
of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. 9Each co-owner of property which is held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is
that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot
be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. 10
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned, 11 the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:
"ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership."
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of
inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is
specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:
"ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to
a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor."
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in
selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because
the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the
Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus,
interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an
alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership," the Court said:
". . . (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate
his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the
consent of the other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part
owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The
prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that 'no one can
give what he does not have' (Nemo dat quod non habet). Thus,
we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 78178,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 745), viz:
'. . . since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property.
'The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of
the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it.' " 12
The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of
the Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038.
The decision in that case had become final and executory with
Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal. When private respondent
filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property
that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect
calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law,
partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1)
the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third
person designated by the testator. 13
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in
an action for quieting of title. As there is no pending
administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino
spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an
extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court
and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the
property sold to private respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not
deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on
account of the absence of notarization of the document and the
non-publication thereof. LLjur
On extrajudicial settlement of estate, Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court provides:
"If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition.
..
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof."
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect
of making it a public document 14 that can bind third parties.
However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded by
the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
"ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to
be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his
inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to
"put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among
co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner
of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it
takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate
the co-ownership by selling her share to private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
the estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner
Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had
acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the
two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the
document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as
regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need
not be embodied in a public document. In this regard, Tolentino
subscribes to that opinion when he states as follows:
" . . . We believe, however, that the public instrument is not
essential to the validity of the partition. This is not one of those
contracts in which form is of the essence. The public instrument
is necessary only for the registration of the contract, but not for
its validity. The validity of an oral contract among the heirs,
terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized by the
Supreme Court in a decision . . . (where) that tribunal said: 'An
agreement among the heirs that a certain lot should be sold and
its proceeds paid to one of them is a valid oral contract, and the
same has the force of law between the parties from and after the
original assent thereto, and no one of them may withdraw or
oppose its execution without the consent of all.'
In a still later case, the Supreme Court held that 'partition among
heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance.' Hence, the court concluded, 'it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an oral agreement for distribution
of the estate among themselves.' " 15
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and
Laurencia evidence their intention to partition the property. It
delineates what portion of the property belongs to each other.
That it was not notarized is immaterial in view of Mauricia's
admission that she did execute the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only mentioned
the existence of such document in its decision in Civil Case No.
CEB-7028. That document was formally offered in evidence and
the court is deemed to have duly considered 16 it in deciding the
case. The court has in its favor the presumption of regularity of
the performance of its task that has not been rebutted by
petitioner Mauricia. Neither may the fact that the other heirs of
the Alejandrino spouses, named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco
and Abundio did not participate in the extrajudicial settlement of
estate affect its validity. In her amended complaint in Civil Case
No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia herself admitted having
acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her brothers.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted
her rights over portions she had acquired from her brothers to
private respondent Nique. The sale was made after the execution
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate that private
respondent himself witnessed. The extrajudicial settlement of
estate having constituted a partition of the property, Laurencia
validly transferred ownership over the specific front portion of the
property with an area of 146 square meters.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing
the order for the segregation of the property. In so doing, it was
merely reiterating the partition of the property by petitioner
Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that was embodied in the deed
of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The order may likewise be
deemed as a clarification of its decision that had become final
and executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper
execution of the decision be rendered futile.
The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by
private respondent. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. 17 Because the
judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is already final and
executory, the existence of res judicata is determinative of
whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the
principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present:
(1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions
involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of
action. 18 The fourth element is not present in this case. The
parties are not identical because petitioner was not impleaded in
Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the
same property of the Alejandrino spouses, the causes of action
are different. Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is an action for quieting
of title and damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for
redemption and recovery of properties.
It appears moreover, that private respondent's argument on
forum shopping is anchored on the fact that counsel for both
plaintiffs in those two cases is one and the same, thereby
implying that the same counsel merely wanted to prevail in the
second case after having failed to do so in the first. The records
show, however, that Laurencia executed an
affidavit 19 consenting to the appearance of her counsel in any
case that petitioner Mauricia might file against private
respondent. She affirmed in that affidavit that she could be
included even as a defendant in any case that petitioner Mauricia
would file because she "fully agree(d)" with whatever cause of
action Mauricia would have against private respondent. Such a
statement can hardly constitute a proper basis for a finding of
forum shopping, much less evidence of misconduct on the part
of counsel. As noted earlier, the two cases have different causes
of action and the two plaintiffs who would have conflicting claims
under the facts of the case actually presented a united stand
against private respondent. If there is any charge that could be
leveled against counsel, it is his lack of thoroughness in pursuing
the action for quieting of title. As counsel for plaintiff therein, he
could have impleaded petitioner Mauricia knowing fully well her
interest in the property involved in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits. However, such an omission is not a sufficient ground for
administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. cdll
||| (Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114151,
[September 17, 1998], 356 PHIL 851-869)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127827. March 5, 2003.]
ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO,
EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO, LORENZO, DOMINGO,
AMADO, and VICTORIA, all surnamed LOPEZ, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and spouses
MARCELINO and CRISTINA S. LOPEZ, FELISA LOPEZ and
RAMON CORTEZ, ZOILO LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ and
LEONILA LOPEZ and spouses ROGELIO M. AMURAO and
NOAMI T. AMURAO, respondents.
Salonga Hernandez and Mendoza for petitioners.
Angeles & Associates for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On May 31, 1985, petitioners, heirs of Nazario and Juan Lopez,
instituted an action against the respondents, heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez, praying that they be declared co-owners of
a parcel of land situated in Makatubong, Barrio De la Paz,
Antipolo, Rizal, and that respondents be ordered to reconvey to
them 3/5 thereof as its co-owners, or in the alternative, to pay its
value. Respondents opposed the complaint alleging that they are
the absolute owners of the contested land on the basis of the
homestead grant to their predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes
Lopez. On March 30, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal ruled for the respondents, dismissed the complaint and
declared Hermogenes Lopez as the exclusive owner of the
property in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the decision of the trial court. Hence, petitioners
elevated the matter before the Supreme Court.
Finding no cogent reason to reverse the impugned Decision of
the Court of Appeals, the Court denied the petition for lack of
merit. It held that Act No. 2874 requires that for an application for
a homestead to be valid, it must be approved by the Director of
Lands. The Director of Lands is tasked to satisfy himself that,
among others, the application papers meet the requirements of
the law, the land is a disposable public land, and the land is not
subject of a previous valid application. Only when he finds the
application sufficient in form and substance should he favorably
act on it. Otherwise, he should deny it. In this case, the
application of Fermin Lopez unfortunately remained unacted
upon up to the time of his death. It was neither approved nor
denied by the Director of Lands, as the Bureau failed to process
it. Hence, a valid application is sadly lacking in his case. This
circumstance, therefore, prevented him from acquiring any
vested right over the land and fully owning it at the time of his
death. Conformably, his heirs did not inherit any property right
from him. Consequently, at the time Hermogenes Lopez applied
for a homestead grant over the disputed property, it was still part
of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his
application inures to his sole benefit. After complying with the
cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee of
a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and
exclusive owner. TADaES
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; USED ONLY
TO HELP SECURE AND NOT OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. We find that respondents were
deprived of their right to a hearing due to accident. In the October
17, 1986 hearing, their counsel was absent due to asthma, which
disabled him and made it difficult for him to talk. Similarly, when
petitioners presented their evidence ex parte on December 5,
1986, the counsel for the respondents again failed to appear as
he experienced another severe asthma attack. On both
occasions, his absence is clearly excusable. Nor is there any
doubt that respondents were able to show that they have a good
and substantial defense. They attached to their affidavit of merit
the following documents: the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 5957 entitled "Hermogenes
Lopez v. Fernando Gorospe, et al."; the decision also of the
Pasig CFI, in Civil Case No. 24873, entitled "Ambrocio Aguilar
v. Fernando Gorospe"; the decisions of the lower and appellate
courts in the case of Marcelino Lopez, et al. v. Ambrocio Aguilar";
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo in the case
of "Ambrocio Aguilar v. Santos"; and the Deed of Sale executed
by and between Hermogenes and his brothers petitioner
Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan. The ruling in the foregoing cases
recognized the absolute ownership and possession of
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes Lopez. The
deed showed that petitioner Eleuterio, Juan and Nazario sold
their rights and interests in the contested lot to their brother
Hermogenes. Time and again, we have stressed that the rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very strict and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure and
not override substantial justice. If a stringent application of the
rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. cHSIAC
2. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; ACT NO. 2874;
APPLICATION FOR A HOMESTEAD PATENT; HOMESTEAD
SETTLEMENT; PURPOSE. Homestead settlement is one of
the modes by which public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes are disposed of. Its object is to provide a home for each
citizen of the state, where his family may shelter and live beyond
the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals
those feelings of independence which are essential to the
maintenance of free institutions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CULTIVATION AND RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS. A person who is legally qualified has to file
his application for a homestead patent with the Bureau of Lands.
If in order, the application shall be approved by the Director. The
applicant will be authorized to enter the land upon payment of an
entry fee of five pesos. Within six months after approval of the
application, the applicant has to improve and cultivate the land.
He must cultivate at least one-fifth of the land for a period of not
less than two years nor more than five years from the date of
approval of the application. He must also continuously reside in
the same municipality where the homestead is located, or in an
adjacent municipality, for at least one year. He must finally
present his final proof to the Bureau of Lands that he has
complied with the cultivation and residency requirements.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS TO BE VALID; A HOMESTEAD APPLICANT COULD
NOT ACQUIRE ANY VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE PROPERTY
WHERE HIS APPLICATION WAS NEVER ACTED UPON BY
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; CASE AT BAR. It bears
emphasis that Act No. 2874 requires that for an application to be
valid, it must be approved by the Director of Lands. This is
expressly mandated by Section 13 of the law, viz: . . . This
provision gives the Director of Lands discretion to approve or
deny an application. He is not a mere automaton who must
perfunctorily approve an application upon its filing. He is tasked
to satisfy himself that, among others, the application papers meet
the requirements of the law, the land is a disposable public land,
and the land is not subject of a previous valid application. Only
when he finds the application sufficient in form and substance
should he favorably act on it. Otherwise, he should deny it. The
application of Fermin unfortunately remained unacted upon up to
the time of his death. It was neither approved nor denied by the
Director, as the Bureau failed to process it. Hence, he could not
have acquired any vested rights as a homestead applicant over
the property because his application was never acted upon.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEIRS OF HOMESTEAD APPLICANT
DO NOT INHERIT ANY RIGHTS FROM HIM WITH RESPECT
TO THE LAND APPLIED FOR WHERE BUREAU OF LANDS ,
FAILED TO ACT ON HIS APPLICATION UP TO THE TIME OF
HIS DEATH; CASE AT BAR. Reliance on the cases of Davao
Grains, Inc. v. IAC and Balboa v. Farrales by the petitioners is
misplaced. Those two had different factual backdrops. In
both Davao Grains, Inc. and Balboa, the disputed lots were
subject of valid applications for public land grants. The valid
applications became our bases for ruling that once an applicant
has complied with the cultivation, residency and other
requirements of Act No. 2874, which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of land, "he is deemed to have already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
government for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts
an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act No. 2874." A valid application is sadly lacking
in the case of Fermin. This circumstance prevented him from
acquiring any vested right over the land and fully owning it at the
time of his death. Conformably, his heirs did not inherit any
property right from him. Had the application of Fermin been duly
approved, his heirs would have succeeded him in his rights and
obligations with respect to the land he has applied for. Sec. 103
of Act No. 2874 covers such a contingency, thus: . . .. The failure
of the Bureau of Lands to act on the application of Fermin up to
the time of his death, however, prevented his heirs to be
subrogated in all his rights and obligations with respect to the
land applied for. Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a
homestead grant over the disputed property, it was still part of
alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his
application inures to his sole benefit. After complying with the
cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee of
a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and
exclusive owner.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT MUST PERSONALLY COMPLY
WITH THE RESIDENCY AND CULTIVATION
REQUIREMENTS. The claim of the petitioners that
Hermogenes filed the application in behalf of all the heirs of
Fermin pursuant to a previous agreement does not hold water.
There is paucity of evidence in support of this allegation. Aside
from the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Eleuterio,
petitioners were not able to present other proof of the agreement.
Besides, we cannot easily give credence to such a claim
considering that under Act No. 2874, an applicant must
personally comply with the legal requirements for a homestead
grant. He must possess the necessary qualifications. He must
cultivate the land and reside on it himself. It would be a
circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply
"in behalf of another," as the latter may be disqualified or might
not comply with the residency and cultivation requirements.
7. ID.; ESTOPPEL BY DEED; EXPLAINED. Estoppel by deed
is a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the
other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the
deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted in
it. The principle is that when a man has entered into a solemn
engagement by deed, he shall not be permitted to deny any
matter which he has asserted therein, for a deed is a solemn act
to any part of which the law gives effect as the deliberate
admission of the maker. It promotes the judicious policy of
making certain formal documents final and conclusive of their
contents.
8. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT OPERATE TO CONFER PROPERTY
RIGHTS WHERE THERE ARE NONE; A VOID DEED MAY NOT
BE THE BASIS OF AN ESTOPPEL; CASE AT BAR. A void
deed, however, will not work, and may not be the basis of, an
estoppel. Covenants do not work an estoppel unless the deed in
which they are contained is itself a valid instrument. In the case
at bar, the deed and instruments at issue were void. The extra-
judicial partition and the special power of attorney to sell did not
have an object certain, which is the subject matter of the deed.
The disputed land cannot be their object because petitioners do
not have any right or interest over it. They are not its co-owners
as it is owned absolutely by Hermogenes. Well to note, the two
instruments were executed on the mistaken assumption that
Hermogenes and his brothers inherited the property from Fermin.
Moreover, at the time the documents were made, Hermogenes
was unaware that he was granted a homestead patent. As
correctly ruled by the appellate court, estoppel does not operate
to confer property rights where there are none. Apropos the letter
dated January 16, 1984, suffice it to state that we agree with the
trial court's pronouncement that respondent Marcelino Lopez
signed it merely "to gain the favors of his uncle Eleuterio Lopez
and in no way does it constitute an admission that the plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) are co-owners of the property." Under these
circumstances, respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel by
deed.
9. ID.; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP; A PARTY WHO IS NOT
A CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTY CANNOT DEMAND ITS
PARTITION; CASE AT BAR. In respect of the fourth assigned
error, we find that petitioners' attack on the authenticity and
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 12, 1958,
where petitioner Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario allegedly sold their
share in the disputed property to Hermogenes, bereft of merit. It
did not change the fact that no co-ownership existed among
Hermogenes and his brothers. Hermogenes is the absolute
owner of the disputed property just as his brothers do not own
any share in it. Hence, they cannot validly sell anything to
Hermogenes by virtue of the deed. Prescinding from the lack of
co-ownership, petitioners' argument that they are entitled to have
the land partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is
to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole
estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy
his estate without supervision or interference from the other. Not
being co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand
its partition. They do not have any interest or share in the
property upon which they can base their demand to have it
divided.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; LACHES; EXPLAINED; NO DELAY IN
ASSERTING A RIGHT WHERE THE RIGHT DOES NOT EXIST.
Petitioners' last argument that they are not guilty of laches in
enforcing their rights to the property is irrelevant. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere
lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. Petitioners'
insistence that they are not negligent in asserting their right over
the property proceeds from the wrong premise that they have a
right to enforce over the disputed property as co-owners. There
can be no delay in asserting a right where the right does not
exist.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision 1 dated September 30, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 43837, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated March 30, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 677-A.
The evidence shows that in 1920, Fermin Lopez occupied,
possessed, and declared for taxation purposes a parcel of public
land containing an area of 19 hectares,
48 ares, 88 centares, more or less, situated in Makatubong,
Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal. He filed a homestead
application over the land, but his application was not acted upon
until his death in 1934. When he died, he was survived by the
following: (1) Hermogenes Lopez, now deceased, leaving his
children, respondents Marcelino, Felisa, Zoilo, and Leonardo, all
surnamed Lopez, as his heirs; (2) petitioner Eleuterio Lopez; (3)
Juan Lopez, now deceased, leaving his children, Guillermo,
Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and Victoria, all surnamed Lopez, as
his heirs; 2 and (4) Nazario, now deceased, leaving his wife,
petitioner Anatalia, and children, petitioners Joselito, Rogelio,
Evangeline and Noel, all surnamed Lopez, as his heirs.
Following Fermin's death, Hermogenes, being the eldest child,
worked and introduced additional improvements on the land. In
1936, he inquired from the Bureau of Lands the status of his late
father's application for a homestead grant. An official 3 of the
bureau informed him that the application remained unacted upon
and suggested that he file a new application. Following the
suggestion, Hermogenes filed a homestead application in his
own name, which was docketed as No. 138612. After
ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private
person, the Bureau approved his application. In 1939,
Hermogenes submitted his final proof of compliance with the
residency and cultivation requirements of the law. The land was
surveyed and a resulting plan, H-138612, was approved by the
Director of Lands, who thereafter ordered the issuance of the
homestead patent. The patent was later transmitted to the
Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title in his name.
Unaware that he has been awarded a homestead patent,
Hermogenes executed on February 11, 1956 an Extra-judicial
Partition of the disputed land with his brothers petitioner
Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario. On September 12, 1958, however,
the three executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share in the
land in favor of Hermogenes. The succeeding year, Hermogenes
applied with the Land Registration Commission for the
registration of the property in his name. This was docketed as
LRC Case No. 2531. To his surprise, he found that the land has
been registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de
Tagle, Rosario de Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo
Santos, who collectively opposed his application.
In December 1959, Hermogenes filed a complaint for the
annulment of the free patent and title against these persons
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 4 docketed as Civil
Case No. 5957. Some of the defendants moved for its dismissal
alleging that Hermogenes was not a real party in interest since
he previously sold his right to the land to one Ambrocio Aguilar
on July 31, 1959.
The case was dismissed.
Aguilar instituted on November 18, 1976 a new civil action before
the CFI of Rizal, 5 docketed as Civil Case No. 24873. It was
similar to Civil Case No. 5957 except for the change in plaintiff
and the addition of the Bureau of Lands as co-defendant. On
April 15, 1982, the lower court declared Aguilar as the absolute
owner of the land and OCT No. 537 and all subsequent
certificates of title emanating therefrom as void ab initio. This
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In G.R. No.
90380, we affirmed the decision of the appellate court in a
decision promulgated on September 13, 1990. 6
After the April 15, 1982 decision of the CFI, and while the case
was on appeal, respondent Lopezes, as heirs of Hermogenes
(who died on August 20, 1982), filed a complaint against Aguilar
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The July 14, 1984 complaint
was for the cancellation of the deed of sale executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar dated July 31, 1959 and/or
reconveyance. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A. On
February 5, 1985, the lower court declared the deed of absolute
sale null and void ab initio and the respondents as the true and
absolute owner of the disputed land. Aguilar sought relief with the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC
in a Decision promulgated on August 18, 1987. 7 In G.R. No.
81092, we denied Aguilar's petition for review in a resolution
dated April 6, 1998 for having been filed late.
On April 25, 1985, after the RTC of Antipolo rendered its
February 5, 1987 decision in Civil Case No. 463-A and pending
its appeal, respondent Lopezes sold a large portion of the
disputed property to respondent spouses Amurao.
On May 31, 1985, petitioners Eleuterio, Anatalia, Joselito,
Rogelio, Evangeline and Noel, all heirs of Nazario Lopez, along
with Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and Victoria, all heirs
of Juan Lopez, instituted the present action against the
respondents before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,
docketed as Civil Case No. 677-A. They prayed, among others,
that they be declared co-owners of the property subject matter
hereof and that private respondents be ordered to reconvey to
them 3/5 thereof as its co-owners, or in the alternative, to pay its
value. On June 26, 1985, respondents filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim alleging that they are the absolute
owners of the contested land on the basis of the homestead grant
to their predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes.
After the pre-trial on November 27, 1987, trial ensued. In the
August 28, 1986 hearing petitioners' counsel failed to appear,
causing the case to be dismissed. The dismissal, however, was
reconsidered upon motion of petitioners' counsel, and the case
was again set for hearing. In the scheduled hearing of October
17, 1986, counsel for respondent was absent. Upon proper
motion, petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex-
parte on December 5, 1986. Following the presentation of ex-
parte evidence, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On June 25, 1987, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioners ordering the division of the disputed lot in equal
portions among the four children of Fermin or their heirs.
Respondents failed to appeal the decision but on September 10,
1987, they filed a petition for relief from judgment, alleging that
accident/excusable negligence prevented them from attending
the trial and that they have a good, substantial and meritorious
defense. On December 28, 1989, the court a quo set aside its
decision dated June 25, 1987 and ordered a pre-trial conference.
On January 30, 1990, respondents filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Answer alleging for the first time that petitioners have
already sold to Hermogenes their shares in the contested
property: Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the
amendments constituted substantial alteration of the theory of
the defense. On February 13, 1990, the court a quo allowed
respondents to amend the answer. When their motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioners elevated the issue
directly to this court via a Petition for Certiorari. On April 25,
1990, we denied the petition for failure to comply with the
requirements of Circular 1-88, with a further pronouncement that,
"besides, even if the petition were admitted, the same would still
be dismissed as the Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by public respondent." Trial on the merits once
more proceeded in the court a quo.
While the case was on trial, complainants therein Guillermo,
Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado and Victoria, all children of Juan
Lopez, entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondent Lopezes, heirs of Hermogenes, recognizing the
latter's ownership and possession of the property subject of the
case. They confirmed the sale made by their father Juan to
Hermogenes. On July 20, 1992, the court a quo rendered a
partial decision approving the compromise agreement. 8
On March 30, 1993, the court a quo rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the case;
2. Declaring Hermogenes Lopez as the exclusive owner of the
property in question;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4. Ordering plaintiffs to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED." 9
Feeling aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the above Decision, thus:
"Finally, We have to delete and disallow the award of attorney's
fees for want of factual and legal premise in the text of the
appealed Decision.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED with a modification that the award of attorney's
fees is deleted. Costs against the appellants." 10
Hence, the present course of action where petitioners contend:
"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals in ruling that the propriety of
the grant of respondents' petition for relief from judgment has
been rendered moot is not in accord with the decisions of this
Honorable Supreme Court.
II. The Court of Appeals' ruling that Fermin Lopez, the common
predecessor-in-interest, was not entitled to the grant of the
homestead patent, hence petitioners are not co-owners of the
disputed property is not in accord with the evidence and the
decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
III. The Court of Appeals' ruling that the statement or declarations
in the extra-judicial partition (Exh. N); the special power of
attorney (Exh. O); and the letter dated January 11, 1984 (Exh. Q)
were based on a wrong assumption that the property is owned
by their common predecessor-in-interest is not in accord with
the evidence and decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
IV. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that
the forged absolute deed of sale dated September 12, 1958 has
no bearing on the respondents' claim over the disputed property.
V. The Court of Appeals in not ruling that the remedy of partition
is available to the petitioners is not in accord with law.
VI. The Court of Appeals' ruling that laches applies to the herein
(sic) who are close relatives is not in accord with the decisions of
this Honorable Supreme Court." 11
First, the procedural issue. Petitioners contend that the grant of
relief from judgment is erroneous as the respondents did not
substantiate their allegation of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence which unjustly deprived them of a hearing.
They add that while respondents had ample opportunity to avail
of other remedies, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal, from the time they received a copy of the decision on July
10, 1987, yet they did not do so.
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the petition
for relief from judgment. Sections 2 and 3 of the Rules provide:
"Section 2. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other
proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside." 12
"Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding
to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered or such proceeding was
taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon,
and the facts constituting the petitioners' good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be." 13
We find that respondents were deprived of their right to a hearing
due to accident. In the October 17, 1986 hearing, their counsel
was absent due to asthma, which disabled him and made it
difficult for him to talk. Similarly, when petitioners presented their
evidence ex-parte on December 5, 1986, the counsel for the
respondents again failed to appear as he experienced another
severe asthma attack. On both occasions, his absence is clearly
excusable.
Nor is there any doubt that respondents were able to show that
they have a good and substantial defense. They attached to their
affidavit of merit the following documents: 14 the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 5957 entitled
"Hermogenes Lopez v. Fernando Gorospe, et al."; the decision
also of the Pasig CFI, in Civil Case No. 24873, entitled "Ambrocio
Aguilar v. Fernando Gorospe"; the decisions of the lower and
appellate courts in the case of Marcelino Lopez, et al. v.
Ambrocio Aguilar"; the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo in the case of "Ambrocio Aguilar v. Santos"; and the
Deed of Sale executed by and between Hermogenes and his
brothers petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan. The ruling in
the foregoing cases recognized the absolute ownership and
possession of respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Hermogenes Lopez. The deed showed that petitioner Eleuterio,
Juan and Nazario sold their rights and interests in the contested
lot to their brother Hermogenes.
Time and again, we have stressed that the rules of procedure are
not to be applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules
of procedure are used only to help secure and not override
substantial justice. 15 If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the
former must yield to the latter. 16
We now address the substantive issues. The most pivotal is the
petitioners' contention that the appellate court erred in holding
that they are not co-owners of the disputed property. They argue
that Fermin, their predecessor-in-interest, has complied with all
the requirements of the Public Land Act pertaining to a
homestead grant, and is therefore entitled to a patent as a matter
of right. They claim that Fermin filed a homestead application
over the land, cultivated at least one-fifth of it, and resided on it
for at least one year. Upon his death, they argue that they
became its co-owners through succession.
We do not agree. Homestead settlement is one of the modes by
which public lands suitable for agricultural purposes are disposed
of. 17 Its object is to provide a home for each citizen of the state,
where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of
financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings
of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free
institutions. 18
The record is bereft of any evidence as to when Fermin exactly
filed his homestead application over the lot in controversy, but it
must have been filed after 1920, the year he first occupied and
possessed the land, and before 1934, the year he died. During
this period, Act No. 2874 was the governing law. 19 Section 12
thereof provides:
"Sec. 12. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands or of the United
States, over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family,
who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in said
Islands or has not had any benefit of any gratuitous allotment of
more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of
the Philippine Islands by the United States, may enter a
homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural
land of the public domain." 20
A person who is legally qualified has to file his application for a
homestead patent with the Bureau of Lands. If in order, the
application shall be approved by the Director. The applicant will
be authorized to enter the land upon payment of an entry fee of
five pesos. 21 Within six months after approval of the application,
the applicant has to improve and cultivate the land. 22 He must
cultivate at least one-fifth of the land for a period of not less than
two years nor more than five years from the date of approval of
the application. 23 He must also continuously reside in the same
municipality where the homestead is located, or in an adjacent
municipality, for at least one year. 24 He must finally present his
final proof to the Bureau of Lands that he has complied with the
cultivation and residency requirements. 25
It bears emphasis that Act No. 2874 requires that for an
application to be valid, it must be approved by the Director of
Lands. This is expressly mandated by Section 13 of the law, viz:
"Sec. 13. Upon filing of an application for a homestead, the
Director of Lands, if he finds that the application should be
approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take
possession of the land upon the payment of ten pesos, Philippine
currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the date
of the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to
work the homestead, otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the
land." 26 (italics supplied)
This provision gives the Director of Lands discretion to approve
or deny an application. He is not a mere automaton who must
perfunctorily approve an application upon its filing. He is tasked
to satisfy himself that, among others, the application papers meet
the requirements of the law, the land is a disposable public land,
and the land is not subject of a previous valid application. 27 Only
when he finds the application sufficient in form and substance
should he favorably act on it. Otherwise, he should deny it.
The application of Fermin unfortunately remained unacted upon
up to the time of his death. It was neither approved nor denied by
the Director, as the Bureau failed to process it. Hence, he could
not have acquired any vested rights as a homestead applicant
over the property because his application was never acted upon.
Reliance on the cases of Davao Grains, Inc. v.
IAC 28 and Balboa v. Farrales 29 by the petitioners is misplaced.
Those two had different factual backdrops. In both Davao Grains,
Inc. and Balboa, the disputed lots were subject of valid
applications for public land grants. The valid applications became
our bases for ruling that once an applicant has complied with the
cultivation, residency and other requirements of Act No. 2874,
which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of land, "he is
deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the government for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts an application therefor
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No.
2874." 30
A valid application is sadly lacking in the case of Fermin. This
circumstance prevented him from acquiring any vested right over
the land and fully owning it at the time of his death. Conformably,
his heirs did not inherit any property right from him. 31
Had the application of Fermin been duly approved, his heirs
would have succeeded him in his rights and obligations with
respect to the land he has applied for. Sec. 103 of Act No. 2874
covers such a contingency, thus:
"Sec. 103. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before
the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during
the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has
obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with
this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with
respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this Act
by his widow, who shall be entitled to have issued to her the
patent or final concession if she shows that she has complied
with the requirement therefore, or in case he has left no widow or
the widow refuses the succession, he shall be succeeded by the
person or persons who are his heirs by law and who shall be
subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of
this Act." 32
The failure of the Bureau of Lands to act on the application of
Fermin up to the time of his death, however, prevented his heirs
to be subrogated in all his rights and obligations with respect to
the land applied for.
Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant
over the disputed property, it was still part of alienable public
land. As he applied for it in his own name, his application inures
to his sole benefit. After complying with the cultivation and
residency requirements, he became a grantee of a homestead
patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and exclusive
owner. 33
Petitioners, however, claim that Hermogenes and his heirs,
respondent Lopezes, recognized their rights as co-owners of the
disputed property, as shown by the following documents: an
Extra-judicial Partition of the real property executed by
Hermogenes and his brothers petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario,
and Juan; 34a Special Power of Attorney to sell the lot in
question executed by petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan in
favor of Hermogenes; 35 and a letter dated January 16, 1984,
which contains the statement that petitioners are co-heirs of the
property, and which respondent Marcelino Lopez
signed. 36 Petitioners argue that respondents are precluded
from denying the contents of these documents based on the
principle of estoppel by deed. They add that while only
Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant, nonetheless, there
was an agreement among the brothers that his application was
for and in behalf of all them.
These arguments fail to impress. Estoppel by deed is a bar which
precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and
his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from
denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it. 37 The
principle is that when a man has entered into a solemn
engagement by deed, he shall not be permitted to deny any
matter which he has asserted therein, for a deed is a solemn act
to any part of which the law gives effect as the deliberate
admission of the maker. 38 It promotes the judicious policy of
making certain formal documents final and conclusive of their
contents. 39
A void deed, however, will not work, and may not be the basis of,
an estoppel. 40 Covenants do not work an estoppel unless the
deed in which they are contained is itself a valid instrument. 41 In
the case at bar, the deed and instruments at issue were void. The
extra-judicial partition and the special power of attorney to sell
did not have an object certain, which is the subject matter of the
deed. The disputed land cannot be their object because
petitioners do not have any right or interest over it. They are not
its co-owners as it is owned absolutely by Hermogenes. Well to
note, the two instruments were executed on the mistaken
assumption that Hermogenes and his brothers inherited the
property from Fermin. Moreover, at the time the documents were
made, Hermogenes was unaware that he was granted a
homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the appellate court,
estoppel does not operate to confer property rights where there
are none. 42
Apropos the letter dated January 16, 1984, 43 suffice it to state
that we agree with the trial court's pronouncement that
respondent Marcelino Lopez signed it merely "to gain the favors
of his uncle Eleuterio Lopez and in no way does it constitute an
admission that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are co-owners of
the property." 44 Under these circumstances, respondents
cannot be held guilty of estoppel by deed.
The claim of the petitioners that Hermogenes filed the application
in behalf of all the heirs of Fermin pursuant to a previous
agreement does not hold water. There is paucity of evidence in
support of this allegation. Aside from the uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Eleuterio, petitioners were not able to
present other proof of the agreement. Besides, we cannot easily
give credence to such a claim considering that under Act No.
2874, an applicant must personally comply with the legal
requirements for a homestead grant. He must possess the
necessary qualifications. He must cultivate the land and reside
on it himself. It would be a circumvention of the law if an individual
were permitted to apply "in behalf of another," as the latter may
be disqualified or might not comply with the residency and
cultivation requirements.
In respect of the fourth assigned error, we find that petitioners'
attack on the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated September 12, 1958, where petitioner Eleuterio,
Juan, and Nazario allegedly sold their share in the disputed
property to Hermogenes, bereft of merit. It did not change the
fact that no co-ownership existed among Hermogenes and his
brothers. Hermogenes is the absolute owner of the disputed
property just as his brothers do not own any share in it. Hence,
they cannot validly sell anything to Hermogenes by virtue of the
deed.
Prescinding from the lack of co-ownership, petitioners' argument
that they are entitled to have the land partition must be
rejected. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong. 45 The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership. 46 It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property
and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other. 47 Not being co-
owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its
partition. They do not have any interest or share in the property
upon which they can base their demand to have it divided.
Petitioners' last argument that they are not guilty of laches in
enforcing their rights to the property is irrelevant. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 48 It does not involve mere
lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. 49 Petitioners'
insistence that they are not negligent in asserting their right over
the property proceeds from the wrong premise that they have a
right to enforce over the disputed property as co-owners. There
can be no delay in asserting a right where the right does not exist.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to reverse the
impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. CaEIST
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127827, [March 5, 2003],
446 PHIL 722-744)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005.]
LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P.
BRAVO, 1 ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVO-
QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR namely:
GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD
B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY
ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-
GUERRERO as their attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD
P. BRAVO, represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C.
BRAVO, respondent,
- and -
DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., intervenor-respondent.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioners.
Isabelo A. Cendana for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS;
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
CONJUGAL PROPERTY; ALIENATION OF REAL PROPERTY
WITHOUT THE WIFE'S CONSENT IS VOIDABLE; CLARIFIED.
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by
the conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the Civil Code of
the Philippines ("Civil Code"). The Civil Code came into force on
30 August 1950. Although there is no dispute that the Properties
were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do
not show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the Properties
were acquired. Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil
Code,the husband could alienate conjugal partnership property
for valuable consideration without the wife's consent. Even under
the present Civil Code,however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It
is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property
without the wife's consent are merely voidable under the Civil
Code that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a
competent court and not void ab initio. Article 166 must be
read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code ("Article
173"). The latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of
conjugal property can be annulled for lack of the wife's consent,
as follows: Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail
to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband. Under the Civil Code,only the wife can
ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property
without her consent. The wife must file the action for annulment
during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies available if the
wife fails to exercise this right within the specified period. In such
case, the wife or her heirs can only demand the value of the
property provided they prove that the husband fraudulently
alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
2.ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; AGENCY; THE SPECIAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY REQUIRED TO TRANSFER
OWNERSHIP OF AN IMMOVABLE REFERS TO THE NATURE
OF AUTHORIZATION; JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. True,
Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to
execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable.
However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the
nature of the authorization, not to its form. Even if a document is
titled as a general power of attorney, the requirement of a special
power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the
principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act.
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that a general
power of attorney could contain a special power to sell that
satisfies the requirement of Article 1878, thus: In this case,
Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to "sell, assign
and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or
mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any
interest therein. . . ." as well as to "act as my general
representative and agent, with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate
and contract for me and in my behalf." Taken together, these
provisions constitute a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to
sell the Properties. Even if it is called a "general power of
attorney," the specific provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the
purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise
indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the Properties.
3.ID.; SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION TO A
DESCENDANT OR COMPULSORY HEIR IS NOT A BAR ON
THE LAW ON LEGITIME. We point out that the law on legitime
does not bar the disposition of property for valuable consideration
to descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent
value replaces the property taken from the estate. There is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values.
Donations and other dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other
hand, must be included in the computation of legitimes.
4.ID.; CONTRACTS; EFFECT OF SIMULATION OF
CONTRACT AND GROSS INADEQUACY OF
CONSIDERATION, DISTINGUISHED. Simulation of contract
and gross inadequacy of price are distinct legal concepts, with
different effects. When the parties to an alleged contract do not
really intend to be bound by it, the contract is simulated and void.
A simulated or fictitious contract has no legal effect whatsoever
because there is no real agreement between the parties. In
contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may
nevertheless embody a true agreement between the parties. A
contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid
and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price
and the object of the sale. The concept of a simulated sale is thus
incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties agree
on a price as the actual consideration, the sale is not simulated
despite the inadequacy of the price. Gross inadequacy of price
by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of
price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless
it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually
intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause
will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake
or undue influence. In this case, respondents have not proved
any of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
5.ID.; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP; ANY CO-OWNER MAY
DEMAND AT ANY TIME PARTITION OF COMMON
PROPERTY; EXCEPTION. Any co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has
repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not
prescribe and is not subject to laches.
6.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;
PREVAILS OVER ALLEGATIONS, TESTIMONY AND BARE
DENIALS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. Respondents'
allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot prevail over the
documentary evidence presented by petitioners. These
documents the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are both
notarized, the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax
declarations over the Properties support petitioners' account
of the sale. As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed
of Sale and alleging its simulation, respondents had the burden
of proving these charges. Respondents failed to discharge this
burden. Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 2 assailing the
Decision 3 of 21 December 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67794. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision 4 of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-1379 denying respondents'
prayer to partition the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and Simona 5 Andaya
Bravo ("Simona") owned two parcels of land ("Properties")
measuring 287 and 291 square meters and located along
Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. The Properties are
registered under TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on 23 May 1958. The Properties
contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and other
improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children Roland, Cesar and
Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo
married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. ("David
Jr."). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-
Guerrero ("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), Roland Bravo,
Jr. ("Roland Jr."), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and
their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo ("Ofelia").
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA") on 17
June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the
GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to "mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and
wheresoever situated, or any interest therein . . . ." 6 Mauricio
subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for
P10,000 and P5,000, respectively. 7
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage ("Deed of Sale") conveying
the Properties to "Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth
Bravo" 8 ("vendees"). The sale was conditioned on the payment
of P1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and
DBP mortgages over the Properties. CAaDTH
As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q.
Guzman on 28 October 1970 and entered in his Notarial
Register. 9 However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on
TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB
and DBP. The mortage loans and the receipts for loan payments
issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricio's name even
after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima
Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of the Properties.
Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio
and Simona are co-owners of the Properties by succession.
Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession
and rental income of the Properties. Edward later amended his
complaint to include a prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which
he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice the other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was
subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene in the case.
David Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention impugning the validity
of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties
among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court
allowed the intervention in its Order dated 5 May 1999. 10
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court upheld Mauricio's sale of the Properties to the
vendees. The trial court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the
compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable
consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed of Sale
was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without
question about its validity.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision of 11 May
2000 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DENIES
the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
58999 and 59000 registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED. 11
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. ("respondents") filed a joint
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code ("Article 166"), the Court of
Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simona's
consent. The appellate court held that the GPA executed by
Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell
the Properties because Article 1878 of the Civil Code ("Article
1878") requires a special power of attorney for such transactions.
The appellate court reasoned that the GPA was executed merely
to enable Mauricio to mortgage the Properties, not to sell them.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was insufficient proof
that the vendees made the mortgage payments on the
Properties, since the PNB and DBP receipts were issued in
Mauricio's name. The appellate court opined that the rental
income of the Properties, which the vendees never shared with
respondents, was sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to
PNB and DBP.
The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and ordered
the partition of the Properties in its Decision of 21 December
2001 ("CA Decision"), as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Metro-Manila, Branch 13[9] dated 11 May 2000[,] review of
which is sought in these proceedings[,] is REVERSED.
1.The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage
(Exh. 4) dated 28 October 1970 is hereby declared null and void;
2.Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is hereby
GRANTED in the following manner:
A.In representation of his deceased mother, LILY BRAVO-DIAZ,
intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., is entitled to one-half (1/2) interest
of the subject properties;
B.Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of the five
siblings, namely: LILY ELIZABETH, EDWARD, ROLAND, JR.,
SENIA, BENJAMIN and OFELIA are entitled to one-sixth (1/6)
representing the other half portion of the subject properties;
C.Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR.,
SENIA and BENJAMIN shall reimburse the defendant-appellees
LILY ELIZABETH, OFELIA and ROLAND the sum of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) PESOS representing the consideration
paid on the questioned deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
with interest of six (6) percent per annum effective 28 October
1970 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, raising these issues:
1.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.
2.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION. 13
At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is valid as to
Mauricio's share in the Properties.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are co-owners
of the Properties by succession. Respondents argue that the sale
of the conjugal Properties is void because: (1) Mauricio executed
the Deed of Sale without Simona's consent; and (2) the sale was
merely simulated, as shown by the grossly inadequate
consideration Mauricio received for the Properties.
While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong
("Leonida"), David Jr.'s aunt, and Atty. Cendaa, respondents'
counsel, informed the Court that David Jr. died on 14 September
2004. Afterwards, Leonida and Elizabeth wrote separate letters
asking for the resolution of this case. Atty. Cendaa later filed an
urgent motion to annotate attorney's lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and
59000. In its Resolution dated 10 November 2004, 14 the Court
noted the notice of David Jr.'s death, the letters written by
Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the motion to annotate
attorney's lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. SAHIDc
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed of Sale
and whether the subject sale was simulated are factual in nature.
The rule is factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. However, there are exceptions, such as when the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory, or when the evidence on record does not support
the factual findings. 15 Because these exceptions obtain in the
present case, the Court will consider these issues.
On the Requirement of the Wife's Consent
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the
Deed of Sale void based on Article 166, which states:
Art. 166.Unless the wife has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined
in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnerships before the effective date of this Code.
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the
conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines ("Civil Code"). The Civil Code came into force on 30
August 1950. 16 Although there is no dispute that the Properties
were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do
not show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the Properties
were acquired. 17 Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil
Code,the husband could alienate conjugal partnership property
for valuable consideration without the wife's consent. 18
Even under the present Civil Code,however, the Deed of Sale is
not void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real
property without the wife's consent are merely voidable under
the Civil Code that is, binding on the parties unless annulled
by a competent court and not void ab initio. 19
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of
the Civil Code ("Article 173"). The latter prescribes certain
conditions before a sale of conjugal property can be annulled for
lack of the wife's consent, as follows:
Art. 173.The wife may, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code,only the wife can ask to annul a contract
that disposes of conjugal real property without her consent. The
wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and
within ten years from the questioned transaction. Article 173 is
explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to exercise this
right within the specified period. In such case, the wife or her
heirs can only demand the value of the property provided they
prove that the husband fraudulently alienated the property. Fraud
is never presumed, but must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. 20
Respondents' action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article
166 must fail for having been filed out of time. The marriage of
Mauricio and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in 1973.
More than ten years have passed since the execution of the
Deed of Sale. IcSADC
Further, respondents, who are Simona's heirs, are not the parties
who can invoke Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to
the wife alone. Only Simona had the right to have the sale of the
Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the
Properties without her consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her
marriage or even after Mauricio's death. The records are bereft
of any indication that Simona questioned the sale of the
Properties at any time. Simona did not even attempt to take
possession of or reside on the Properties after Mauricio's death.
David Jr., who was raised by Simona, testified that he and
Simona continued to live in Pasay City after Mauricio's death,
while her children and other grandchildren resided on the
Properties. 21
We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized
Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she executed the
GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for
an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an
immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878
refers to the nature of the authorization, not to its form. 22 Even
if a document is titled as a general power of attorney, the
requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a
clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the
performance of the act. 23
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court explained that a
general power of attorney could contain a special power to sell
that satisfies the requirement of Article 1878, thus:
An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of
attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and
as such, it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. While it is true that it was
denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof
revealed that it stated an authority to sell, to wit:
"2.To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate lands, tenements and hereditaments or other forms
of real property, more specifically TCT No. 49138, upon such
terms and conditions and under such covenants as my said
attorney shall deem fit and proper."
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special
power of attorney since the general power of attorney had
expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to
sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be
included in the general power when it is specified therein the
act or transaction for which the special power is
required. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to
"sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real,
personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever
situated, or any interest therein . . ." as well as to "act as my
general representative and agent, with full authority to
buy, sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my
behalf." 25 Taken together, these provisions constitute a clear
and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it
is called a "general power of attorney," the specific provisions in
the GPA are sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These
provisions in the GPA likewise indicate that Simona consented to
the sale of the Properties.
Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated
or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition
of property for valuable consideration to descendants or
compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the
property taken from the estate. 26 There is no diminution of the
estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other
dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be
included in the computation of legitimes. 27
Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the Properties
was merely simulated. As proof, respondents point to the
consideration of P1,000 in the Deed of Sale, which respondents
claim is grossly inadequate compared to the actual value of the
Properties. cDSaEH
Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct
legal concepts, with different effects. When the parties to an
alleged contract do not really intend to be bound by it, the
contract is simulated and void. 28 A simulated or fictitious
contract has no legal effect whatsoever 29 because there is no
real agreement between the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may
nevertheless embody a true agreement between the parties. A
contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid
and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price
and the object of the sale. 30 The concept of a simulated sale is
thus incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties
agree on a price as the actual consideration, the sale is not
simulated despite the inadequacy of the price. 31
Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void
contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the
validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the
consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or some
other contract. 32 Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a
contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue
influence. 33 In this case, respondents have not proved any of
the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Respondents even failed to establish that the consideration paid
by the vendees for the Properties was grossly inadequate. As the
trial court pointed out, the Deed of Sale stipulates that, in addition
to the payment of P1,000, the vendees should assume the
mortgage loans from PNB and DBP. The consideration for the
sale of the Properties was thus P1,000 in cash and the
assumption of the P15,000 mortgage.
Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the actual value
of the Properties. To bolster their claim, respondents presented
the following: (1) Tax Declarations No. A-001-00905 34 and A-
001-00906 35 for the year 1979, which placed the assessed
value of the Properties at P70,020 and their approximate market
value at P244,290; and (2) a certified copy of the Department of
Finance's Department Order No. 62-97 36 dated 6 June 1997
and attached guidelines 37which established the zonal value of
the properties along Evangelista Street at P15,000 per square
meter.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The
valuation of the Properties in 1979 or 1997 is of little relevance
to the issue of whether P16,000 was a grossly inadequate price
to pay for the Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is nothing
surprising in the sharp increase in the value of the Properties nine
or twenty-seven years after the sale, particularly when we
consider that the Properties are located in the City of Makati.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812 38 and No.
15813, 39 both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These
tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at
P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be
considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the
conscience 40 as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of
Sale. CTaSEI
Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make the
mortgage payments on the Properties. Respondents allege that
the rents paid by the tenants leasing portions of the Properties
were sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to DBP and PNB.
Again, this argument does not help respondents' cause.
Assuming that the vendees failed to pay the full price stated in
the Deed of Sale, such partial failure would not render the sale
void. In Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court held:
. . . If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of
payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. . . .
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of
a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with
the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the
performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right
to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under
an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence
of a valid contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were sufficient
to cover the mortgage payments. The parties to this case
stipulated to only one tenant, a certain Federico M. Puno, who
supposedly leased a room on the Properties for P300 per month
from 1992 to 1994. 42 This is hardly significant, when we
consider that the mortgage was fully paid by 1974. Indeed, the
fact that the Properties were mortgaged to DBP and PNB
indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least Mauricio, was
short of funds.
Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and had the
financial capacity to buy the Properties in 1970. Respondents did
not refute this. Petitioners presented 72 receipts 43 showing the
mortgage payments made to PNB and DBP, and the Release of
the Real Estate Mortgage 44 ("Mortgage Release") dated 5 April
1974. True, these documents all bear Mauricio's name. However,
this tends to support, rather than detract from, petitioner-
vendees' explanation that they initially gave the mortgage
payments directly to Mauricio, and then later directly to the
banks, without formally advising the bank of the sale. The last 3
mortgage receipts and the Mortgage Release were all issued in
Mauricio's name even after his death in 1970. Obviously,
Mauricio could not have secured the Mortgage Release and
made these last payments. TCDHaE
Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof
The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, entered in the notarial books submitted to
that court. As a document acknowledged before a notary public,
the Deed of Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity 45 and due
execution. 46 Absent evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld. 47
Respondents' evidence in this case is not even preponderant.
Respondents' allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot
prevail over the documentary evidence presented by petitioners.
These documents the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are
both notarized, the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967
tax declarations over the Properties support petitioners'
account of the sale.
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and
alleging its simulation, respondents had the burden of proving
these charges. 48 Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.
On the Partition of the Property
Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of
the Properties, subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of
the vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and
Ofelia both testified that the "Roland A. Bravo" in the Deed of
Sale is their father, 49 although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr.,
made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners' counsel, Atty.
Paggao, made the same clarification before the trial court. 50
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward
Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and
entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his
father's portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners
are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the
Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the
co-ownership. 51 This action for partition does not prescribe and
is not subject to laches. 52
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21 December
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. We
REINSTATE the Decision of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-137,
declaring VALID the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
dated 28 October 1970, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the
following manner:
a.Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to
one-third (1/3) of the Properties;
b.Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third
(1/3) of the Properties; and
c.The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should
be divided equally between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.
2.The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse ROLAND
BRAVO, JR. for whatever expenses the latter incurred in paying
for and securing the release of the mortgage on the Properties.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152658, [July 29, 2005],
503 PHIL 220-240)