1. Belgica vs.

Executive Secretary Ochoa, November 11, 2013

(Note: This case is about the pork barrel, Malampaya Funds, and Janet
Napoles. Consolidated cases ni siya to abolish pork barrel. This digest will
focus on the delegation of powers. If you are interested to read the history,
please do so)
FACTS:
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage
may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a
multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast
to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in
trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of
refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents.6
In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money
to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8

HISTORY
In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature (Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the Executive. The Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from
Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects
during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the
Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal
Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to
6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For
this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list,
standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships,
identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative
district shall have the written concurrence of the member of the House of
Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
3. Legislators Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators
shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million
Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of
which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and
projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project
menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions
on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts
may be released in the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be
released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once.
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government,
Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment
from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the
same implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii)
allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work;
and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must
be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval
thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the
same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1
hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and
revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify
that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to
the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the
case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the
conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special
Provision No. 3.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89
owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel"
in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were SOP (standard operating procedure)
among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost
of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few
days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted
pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including 3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked
public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF
as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of
"any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya
Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special
fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand
Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to
the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital
to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title
IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF
as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of
"any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some
10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles)
had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no
fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly
the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some
of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.

ISSUE: WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on non-delegability of legislative power("to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient
standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power).

HELD:
YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability of powers.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same.
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that
only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.
This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the
only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the
President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to

delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of
either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making
were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated
to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law
of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially,
under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to
(b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain
the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

2. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance

of Court Officials and Employees, Feb. 14, 2012

3. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Reyes, 621 SCRA 511

Facts:

Rene De Guzman, the docket clerk of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch
31, was in charge of the preparation and transmission of the records on appeal.
Judge Sta. Romana would often remind him about his duties but De Guzman still
continued to neglect them. After sometime, the attitude of De guzman seem to
worsen which prompted Judge Sta. Romana to have de guzman undergo a drug test.
The result yielded positive of marijuana and shabu.

In a resolution, the Court required De Guzman to submit his comment on the

charge of misconduct relative to alleged use of prohibited drugs within 10days from
notice. De guzman failed to comment thereon. Thus, on January 23, 2008, the Court
redirected De Guzman to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for
failure to comply with the resolution. De Guzman complied with the order only on
March 2008 which is way beyond the 10 day period. He said that he failed to comply
because he lost his copy of the resolution. The Court forwarded De Guzman's letter
to OCA. The OCA in turn submitted its report and recommendation that De Guzman
be dismissed from service. The Court adopted the OCA's recommendation and
ordered that De Guzman be dismissed.

Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They opine that the Courts
action in this case contravenes an express public policy embodied in RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992) which calls for the rehabilitation of
drug users. The legislative policy in RA 9165 in deterring dangerous drugs use by
resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in
light of the Court's constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and
court personnel.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court is bound to observe the policy set forth by the
legislature in RA 9165.

Ruling:

No. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is
subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in
the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it
cannot limit the Courts power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices,
judges and court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Courts
power to preserve and maintain the Judiciarys honor, dignity and integrity and
public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of
decency and propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court
employees.

Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

Facts: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive

Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005.
Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President
Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford
said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues
so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.
Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which,
among others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of
the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to
attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the
lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials
invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue:

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Ruling:

To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two
different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section
22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of

Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:

The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized

in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall
be respected.

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A

legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
executive privilege. This is the power of the government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the
President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section
2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official
invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly
invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege
to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter
assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the
executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare
that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise
and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own

judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a
claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then
opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are
declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.

Baker v. Carr

Appellants are persons allegedly qualified to vote for members of the General
Assembly of Tennessee representing the counties in which they reside. They brought
suit in a Federal District Court in Tennessee on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, to redress the alleged deprivation of their federal constitutional
rights by legislation classifying voters with respect to representation in the General
Assembly. They alleged that, by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee arbitrarily
and capriciously apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the State's
95 counties, and a failure to reapportion them subsequently notwithstanding
substantial growth and redistribution of the State's population, they suffer a
"debasement of their votes," and were thereby denied the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought, inter alia, a
declaratory judgment that the 1901 statute is unconstitutional and an injunction
restraining certain state officers from conducting any further elections under it. The
District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction of
the subject matter and that no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted.

Issue:

Whether or not a case of legislative apportionment presents a political question or a

justiciable one?

Held:

JUSTICIABILITY

We conclude that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a

justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial
and a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

"In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action
of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination are dominant considerations."

It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings
in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one
or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be
no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence....

Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative
cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political
question doctrine.
 "When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is
insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when
state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."

A natural beginning is to note whether any of the common characteristics which we

have been able to identify and label descriptively are present. We find none: the
question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution. We
have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government
coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our government abroad, or
grave disturbance at home if we take issue with Tennessee as to the constitutionality
of her action here challenged. Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this
action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially
manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if, on the particular facts,
they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action.

Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642

Facts:

Yu was proclaimed in 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the

local elections over his only rival, Casibang, who filed a protest against the election
of the former with the CFI of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified
electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or
balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971
Election Code.

On September 21, 1972, then Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing
the entire country under Martial Law, and two months thereafter, the 1971
Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935
Constitution, and the same was ratified people. The Supreme Court declared that
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.

On October 10, 1973, at which time Casibang had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same
stating that a political question has intervened in the case. Yu contended that the
provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere
to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under
its Article XI. He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors)
have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article
XVII.

According to Yu, the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof,
protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and
effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of
office as extended now depends on the pleasure of the incumbent President or the
Legislative Department, and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the
National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the
enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review.

Issue:

Whether or not the case involves a political question which is beyond judicial
ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and
academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to
continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took
effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who
at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under
protest or contest, and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in
Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have
been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt
aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-
frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed
mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-
elects right to the contested office.

The right to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9
of Article XVII of the New Constitution, but principally from having been proclaimed
elected as a result of the 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, one was not
duly elected to his respective position and consequently, has no right to hold the
same, perform this functions, enjoy his privileges and emoluments, then certainly,
one should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to him by said
constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of Yu to

continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by
Casibang. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, Yu
would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his
tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the term of office and the right to hold an office. A
term of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to
hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A right to
hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. In other words, the term refers to the period, duration
of length of time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein
whether such period be definite or indefinite.

Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term
indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge in an election protest, of the right of the
one to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by
said constitutional provision is the term to the office, although the right of the
incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the term
thereof.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance
to hear, try and decide election protests: Section 7 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National
Assembly. And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220
of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an
election contest against those proclaimed elected, and according to Section 8,
Article XVII of the New Constitution all courts existing at the time of the ratification
of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise
provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said
courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.
Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges
should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election
protests filed by herein petitioners.
 While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2,
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral
contests concerning municipal elective positions.

The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No
political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the
incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or
interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term
political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.

Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496

FACTS:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments
among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas
ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Daza was among those
chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1

In 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, resulting in a

political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the
Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling
its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members.

House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on

Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to
the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting
of the original members except the petitioner and including respondent Singson as
the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner then challenge in court his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent alleging that he
cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.

Respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and
so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been
improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives
which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed
the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that
the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments.

Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of

the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.

ISSUES:

WON it is a political issue and that Court has no jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

No, the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. What is before
us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the
issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the
legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if
the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As
for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside,
conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue
raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the
authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that
such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances
or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to
be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on
Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been
invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively.
In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or
substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn
responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not
evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC,73 SCRA 333

Facts: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers.

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another
related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential
Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential
Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve
the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second
question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

(*Note: There are nine amendments. Please refer to the full text for the
enumeration which detailed the amendments.)

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD,

father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution,
as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no
grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners
have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite
is a step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary

Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII
of the Constitution.
 Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on
October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under
Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in
such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift
Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum and allowing
15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and
above.

Issue: The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary
injunction relates to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to
propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim
National Assembly which has not been convened.

Ruling: The court ruled that, as held in Aquino v. COMELEC, it is already settled that
the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country.

In a strict sense, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals
of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking.
It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines,
that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National
Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for
the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science, a distinction is made between
constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character'. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of
the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the
President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation.
The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution.

In general, the governmental powers in crisis government are more or less

concentrated in the President. According to Rossiter, "the concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the
crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free
states, it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive,
legislature and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any
one branch should exercise any two or more types of power and certainly a total
disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47,
'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a
distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in
abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency
action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the
life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose
and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative and
judicial power in the hands of one man.

The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded;
it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations.
The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of
the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may
be ended and normal times restored.

The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now

concededly valid. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3
(pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions.

The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution

presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in
executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude
and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino
people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession,
recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while
conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our
political, social and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting
the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency
measures.

The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National

Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that
Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President.
And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that
body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of
transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory
Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided
not to call the interim National Assembly.

The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to

exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed
 amendments proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the
collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the
authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein,
the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a
referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves
implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that
the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same
and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.

COCOFED vs. Republic, Jan. 24, 2012

Topic: Separation and Delegation of Power

Case Background:
The case is related to the various petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan with regards to the Coco levy and ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.

Facts:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The
source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kilo of copra. The Philippine Coconut
Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed
at the disposition of the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. (COCOFED), the
recognized national association of coconut producers declared by Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA). Coco fund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.

During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decrees
purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry.

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the
proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-
based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.

PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation
of a hybrid coconut seed farm.

In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth
and development of the coconut and palm oil industry.

The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 section 2, which permitted the use of the
Fund by PCA for the acquisition of commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut
farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it acquired free to the
coconut farmers.

o P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of
coconut/palm oil industries.
 o The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D. No. 1468
(Revised Coconut Industry Code), read:

ARTICLE III
Levies

Section 1. Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy. The

[PCA] is hereby empowered to impose and collect the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy.

Section 5. Exemption. The [CCSF] and

the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as herein authorized,
shall not be construed as special and/or fiduciary funds, or
as part of the general funds of the national government within
the contemplation of PD 711; the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their private capacities.

Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB). Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from
Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was
also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 %
of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his
exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.

The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity.
It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund. The rest of the fund was deposited to the
UCPB interest free.

Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given corresponding
UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a
large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private
individuals.

Parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted
into different assets or investments through the years.

After EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 which created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG aimed to assist the
President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies.
PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sadiganbayan.

Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name
of over a million coconut farmers held trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the
sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima
facie public funds and that Section 2 of PD No. 755 was unconstitutional.

The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via Petition for review under
Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration
amounted to the taking of private property without just compensation and impairment of vested
right of ownership.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private
capacities?

No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic, the Coconut Levy was imposed in
the exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds
partake the nature of Taxes. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments
by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose. Hence, they cannot be used to
purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is
allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or
for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public,
with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private
enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In this case, the
coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and
582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. To hold therefore,
even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely
for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their
benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.

The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect if not exactly direct conversion
of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which
in turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong
to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with
special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The fact that the coconut levy funds
were collected from persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and
cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more bluntly, owners thereof
in their private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so
purchased using the said special funds of the government.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the coconut levy funds can only be used for special purpose and the
balance thereof should revert to the general fund?

YES. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by

private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are
unconstitutional.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation,
enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it
was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government,

As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF to advance the governments avowed
policy of protecting the coconut industry. The CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to
support consumer purchases of coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry
and the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. P.D. No.
276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but for the
entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the
benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755,
961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: [the coconut levy] fund and the
disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be
owned by them in their private capacities; or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any
law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the
national government later on; or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be
distributed to the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for which the CCSF
was established.

Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution
of the shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the public purpose
declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut
industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut levy fund as private fund to be
disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary
to the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound the situation, the offending
provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which
normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public
funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly
therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for
violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the
UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of the government
to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.

Issue 3:

Whether or not Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power?

YES. P.D No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund by PCA for the acquisition of
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares
of the stock of the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers, involves invalid
delegation of legislative power. It is fundamental that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power, what cannot be delegated is the authority to make laws and to alter and
repeal them.

The test is the completeness of the statute in all term and provisions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of the legislative power,
the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what the scope of his authority is. There must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
A standard thus defines the legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which the legislative purpose maybe carried out.

To determine the validity of the delegated power, two test must be complied, (1) completeness
test A law is complete when it set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. And (2) the sufficient standard test when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy to identify the conditions under which it is
to be implemented.

In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes
PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the
CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as
coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a
coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be
given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a
farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot
be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.

Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition
of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of
the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut
farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development. The said
law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively
into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national
policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were
transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of their
acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by
which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same
will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry pursuant to
its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to
distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full
disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or
restrictions that would advance the laws national policy or public purpose, present a case of
undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue 4:

Whether or not Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5
of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution?

YES. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds
from the coffer of the public funds. It privatized revenues derived from the
coco levy. The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the
 Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the Commission on Audit
shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.

The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the

responsibility for state audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its
audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article
IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. Following the mandate of the COA and the
parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has
jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds.
Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds.
However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds,
ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the
public funds of the government, and consequently renders them
impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions
of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated
function and undermine its constitutional independence.

The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy
funds is an example of an investment of public funds. The conversion of
these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals
to own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively
deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle
such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special
public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will
completely take away the said funds from the boundaries with which the
COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over
the receipt or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III,
Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

Carbonilla vs. Board of Airline Representatives, 657 SCRA 775

FACTS:
The Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-
2005 (CAO 1-2005) amending CAO 7-92 and was duly approved by the
Department of Finance. CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 were promulgated
 pursuant to Section 3506 in relation to Section 608 of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
Section 3506. Assignment of Customs Employees to Overtime Work. -
Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime work at
rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to
be paid by the importers, shippers or other persons served. The rates to be
fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of
private enterprise.

A review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino

International Airport (NAIA) was conducted and adjustment was proposed
from the exchange rate of 25 to US$1 to the then exchange rate of 55 to
US$1.
BAR wrote a letter addressed to BOC-NAIA informing its objection to the
proposed increase in the overtime rates.
BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on reiterating its concerns against the
issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter the Acting District Collector of BOC
informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CAO 1-2005. In
a letter, Undersecretary Mendoza, Jr., Department of Finance informed BAR,
through its Chairman Cruz, that they "find no valid ground to disturb the
validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to suspend its implementation or
effectivity.
In separate letters, Cruz requested the Office of the President and the Office
of the Executive Secretary to review the decision of Usec. Mendoza.
The Office of the President denied the appeal of BAR and affirmed the
Decision of the Department of Finance. The Office of the President ruled that
since CAO 1-2005 was issued in the exercise of BOCs rule-making or quasi-
legislative power, its validity and constitutionality may only be assailed
through a direct action before the regular courts.
BAR filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP are
constitutional.

RULING:

YES. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or

invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that
the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial
review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should not
be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately
after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of
constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper
party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the
completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling
of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements.
The law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives
authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the
Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be
made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the
standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates
shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise.

Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359

Facts:

Petitioner in 1949 is the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year.
By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19
of that year, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month
effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the
Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was on August 3,
1949, disapproved by the said Committee on strength of the recommendation of the
NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance
constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which
fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a
year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not
warrant the granting of such allowance.

Republic Act No. 51 authorized the President of the Philippines, among

other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned
and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operation. Pursuant thereto, the President
promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises
Council. The Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to
approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors
granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance
necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget.

The petitioner challenged the action of the Government Enterprises Council in

disallowing the allowance. It is argued that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void,
not only because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation
of legislature power to the executive.

Issue:
 WON the EO 93 is void because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an
illegal delegation of legislature power to the executive.

Ruling:

No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard
is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957).
Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to
make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a
standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon
the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set
and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by
promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited,
does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the
granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the
provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is also
to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per annum. But regardless of whether
quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the
board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given
effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers
granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's contention that
quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on which American authorities
appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees working for the
Government of the Philippines and its Instrumentalities, including, naturally,
government-controlled corporations.

US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil.1

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated.
Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent
maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature
and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors
of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
orders because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios
composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the
provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less
than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective,
barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition
of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

PRIMARY ISSUE:WON Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
RULING: YES
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel.
Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the
exercise oflegislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-
349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations
are purely the creatures of statutes."

TESTS for valid delegation of legislative power:

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself (Completeness Test) it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b)
fix a standard (Sufficient Standard Test) the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it,
by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
WON the phrase as the public welfare may require constitutes a sufficient
standard-NO
under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted,
but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
Even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said
Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof, it is still not sufficient.It is true that
in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this
Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. Both cases
involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is
"purely a legislative question " or a political question. The question as to
whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is
emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" .

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a

discretion that is "virtually unfettered."(cited from a US case: Schechter Poultry
Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570)) and, consequently, tantamount to a
delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which
has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result.
Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in
favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic
system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of
this Court to uphold. (chos)
Other reasons to invalidate the executive orders and Sec. 68:
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued
after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this
case had failed to pass Congress. (abi wa kapasar sa Congress, nag EO na
lang sila)
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible
and inconsistent with said statutory enactment Section 10 (1) of
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides that while the President may
have the power of control over all departments, bureaus, and offices,This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law
permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said
local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Only the power of supervision is exercised over
these municipal corporations.
Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it),
without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.
Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal
corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.

As to other claims of the respondents: pede ra ni di basahon swear haha

(a) that "not all the proper parties" referring to the officers of the newly created
municipalities "have been impleaded in this case," -Solicitor General represents
the entire Philippines government. Local officials, if any, are mere agents or
representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has,
accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
 (b) that "the present petition is premature."-(ana man an Auditor General na excited
ra daw an case kay wa pa gani mi nag appropriate ng public funds, sa new
municipalities, kiha man dayon mu)- There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
the Auditor General would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities
involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has
been made by him. (kay dugay na diay na sige himo an President ng municipalities
nya karon ra gireklamo bah. Nya sauna kai ginagaan jd sila ng budget sa Auditor
General. Unsa man kunoi nakalahi sa karon. Haha)

ANNEX: hahahaha pede ra di basahon as in.. for reference only :)

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the
disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province
into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of
the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any
administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President
of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the
territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new
districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of
the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pp vs. Judge Dacuycuy, May 5, 1989

Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an

the petition at bar seeks to set aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September 8,1976, penned by herein respondent judge
and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as
well as his resolution of October 19, 1976 denying the motions for reconsideration
filed by the parties therein.

Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the
constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.

1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or
coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in
any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more
than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine
ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law
has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a
minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be
qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.

Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended

to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the
absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty
into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said
Section 32 is unconstitutional.

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the
Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from
proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of
said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to
reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion
of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.

Issues: Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

Held: Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.

The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure
is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the
constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of
the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule
that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment. 15

We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision
in question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as
if the lattter were the legislative department of the government."

Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts
to determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and
not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition
 against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of
power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic
Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment,
but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.

Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to
the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing
persons convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the
courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but
is an instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing laws to
the facts of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously overlooked is his
own reference to penalties "between designated limits."

In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:

.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle
that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of
powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they
can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due
process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private
persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest
delegari." 20

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative

authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts.
It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be
a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law
and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21

So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of
sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons
convicted of a crime. 22

In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since
the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is
endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot
agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where
no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a
term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as
an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.