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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Actual case requirement: Proposed bills do not present a justiciable
controversy: One of the requirements for judicial review is the existence of an
actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. A proposed bill does not present an actual justiciable controversy.
The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject
to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not
pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and
Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)
1 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of
Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland,
2014); Litigation Lawyer & Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Professor of Constitutional Law,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila,
College of Law; former professor of Constitutional Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review
Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila; Partner, Libra Law (Libarios & Partners)
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facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases. The most distinctive feature of the
overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute
is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts
carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling," deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Supreme Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid: The transfer of funds
under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is invalid for lack of a
valid law authorizing the transfer. The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 authorized
the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that the
2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the
GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive,
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contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
necessarily savings. Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist. Funds described as unreleased or unalloted are not
necessarily savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing
item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation
to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The
power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the
transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-
border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
JBC can set standards for choosing nominees to the judiciary: JBCs
policy of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they
can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has
the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
NATIONAL ECONOMY
POLICE POWER
Police power and taking of property: The State may not, under the
guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The requirement under the ordinance for owners of educational
institutions to build their fences six meters back for beautification purposes is
invalid for being unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
(Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
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best to protect their property. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment
of just compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for
determining just compensation is still the value of the property at the time of
taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment
but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears
outdated. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v.
Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Counsels mistake and due process: The general rule is that a client is
bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique, unless the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the
client is deprived of his day in court. To properly claim gross negligence on the
part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of
nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause. (Uyboco v. People,
G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE SPEECH
Honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are
insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press
prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison d' tre for
the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments
would lead to self-censorship. A "public figure" as defined in Ayers Production
Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong refers to celebrity. It includes, in short, anyone who has
arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a
person. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)
The actual malice rule applies even if the person subject of criticism
is not a public figure, for as long as he is involved in a public issue: But
even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position
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he occupied would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow
that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not
a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to
become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of
the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. (Borjal v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999)
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environment is reduced. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a
large extent limited by the companys work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881,
October 18, 2011)
No expectation of privacy for a government employee in his
government-issued computer if the employee is so notified based on office
policy: A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy
in his government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the
government office implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that
they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881,
October 18, 2011)
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of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City
Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the
writ of habeas data to be granted. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012)
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seizures, and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. However, a drug test result is immaterial
evidence in prosecuting non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused for all persons arrested regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest was made is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. We cannot condone drug testing
of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is
being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
RIGHT TO BAIL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Access to information on the winning bidder for a government
project: The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the
governments constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. The people have the right to access the papers and
documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning
bidder for a government project. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment
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Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
When evictions and demolitions without any court order are valid:
The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons occupy areas
where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a
just and humane manner, RA 7279 commands requires compliance with a
prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, including
prior 30-day notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and demolitions
without any court order under RA 7279 are valid. (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang
Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
WRIT OF AMPARO
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have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should
be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii)
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although
there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions. (Rodriguez
v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to
be or had been committed; and
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Supreme Court has laid down the test for determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions:
adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an
investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of
judicial discretion and judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang,
G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)
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the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted
a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal
charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner. The
proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the
existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an
administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutors
preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has
been committed.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one-year period. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
Condonation doctrine has no legal basis: The doctrine of condonation
is bereft of legal bases. The concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President. When a doctrine of
the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
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had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. (Carpio-Morales v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
The Arias Doctrine applies only to heads of offices, not to public officials
whose duty is to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to
sign it. (Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013) The
Arias Doctrine applies only where the head of an office is being held to answer
for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. It is not applicable when
the head of an office is being held liable for relying on other independent
offices. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)
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Next-in-Rank Rule: The next in rank has no vested right to be
appointed to the position next higher: The next-in-rank rule is a rule of
preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees
next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that
position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the
appointing authority. Who to appoint is "a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." As
long as the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by law
or regulations, there is no question that his appointment must be respected by
the Civil Service Commission even if it be proved that there are others with
superior credentials. (Abad v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
De facto Officers: Acts are valid and binding: One who is in possession
of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, meaning an
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, is a de
facto officer. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
The actions of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of
a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons are concerned: A
de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
ELECTION LAW
Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of
the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate: Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against
the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with
the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has
risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise
of the right of suffrage. They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric
validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise
of the right of suffrage through deactivation. Further, they advance the
argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated as a
valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution. The
contestation is untenable.
Registration is a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the
right of suffrage: Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right: Registration is a mere
procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage." The requirement of biometrics validation for voters is not
a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable
element in the election process. The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
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inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election. (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December
16, 2015)
The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
The fact that a candidate has no registered property under his name
does not belie his actual residence because property ownership is not among
the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he
should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No.
209286, September 23, 2014)
Subjective non-legal standards (such as, a man of stature does not live
in a dilapidated house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence.
(Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The Mayor has the power to demolish illegal constructions after due
process: Under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, insofar as
illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. This
power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate
nuisances per se. (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356,
September 29, 2014)
INTERNATIONAL LAW
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that
their principles are not binding. Their principles are binding as generally
accepted principles of international law. "Generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. (Poe-Llamanzares v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
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Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. (Poe-Llamanzares v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
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