Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October
27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners election and
proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be
elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen
was not impressed with voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a
sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated
himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the
Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of
automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a
sufficient act of repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged

LABO VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his
marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen.
Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization
made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign
country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
Torayno v. COMELEC
FACTS:

This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he
was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran
for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive
terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement.

HELD:

Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a
mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided
there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

COQUILLA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, September 17, 2002, 385 SCRA 607

Facts:

Coquilla was born on 1938 ofFilipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and
resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after
joining the US Navy.

In1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001.

On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquillas
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in
Oras was a material representation as he only resided therein for6 months after his oath as
a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was
proclaimed the winner.

On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his
motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding

the proclamation of petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year
before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy
3. Whether the petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not
suspend the running of the period for filing this petition for certiorari because the motion
was pro forma.

Held:

1. Yes. R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
suchcandidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election
shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against
whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and
proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends
their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their
certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of
candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been
begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of
the winners.

2. No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines;

a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when
he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue
of a greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that
country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then
does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.

3. It is contended that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc
did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro
forma.

The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties
and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants
remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy.

In the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was
so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[or (2) it did not comply with
the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to
law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or
(4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5)
the adverse party was not given noticethereof.

The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers
from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that
petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein
are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise new matters. Hence, the filing
of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case,
which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.

Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC [381 SCRA 133]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials, Residence)

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur,
namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and
Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a resident of
Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from
Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in
Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later
withdraw.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a resolution,
on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years
prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must be a
resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day
of the election

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative of
such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

Case Digest: Matugas v. COMELEC

ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERT
LYNDON S. BARBERS, respondents.

G.R. No. 151944. January 20, 2004

TINGA, J.:

On 28 February 28 2001, Private Respondent Robert Lyndon Barbers filed his certificate of
candidacy as governor of Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas, who
is also a candidate for governor, filed with COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify Barbers as candidate.

His main contention is that Barbers is not a Filipino citizen. To support his claim, Matugas presented
the following documents:

1. Photocopy of a letter-request of a certain Jesus Agana, a confidential agent of the

Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly
of the United States Embassy regarding the US citizenship of Barbers;
2. A notation on the letter request allegedly made by George Clarke, stating that
Barbers was naturalized on 11 October 1991;
3. Photocopy of a Certification from the BID containing Barbers' travel records and
indicating in some documents that he is American;
4. Certification from the Office of the Solicitor General's Special Committee on
Naturalization stating that there is no pending petition by, or grant of repatriation to, Barbers.
Meanwhile, Barbers won the gubernatorial race on 17 May 2001. Matugas then filed a Motion for
Suspension/Annulment of Proclamation of Barbers. However, Barbers was proclaimed the duly
elected governor of Surigao del Norte on 28 May 2001.

COMELEC then dismissed the Petition to Disqualify. It found little or no probative value in the
notation of George Clarke to Aganas letter-request.While noting that the BID certification involving
the travel records of Barbers stated that he was an American, it held that there is no other
independent evidence to justify Matugas's claim that Barbers has renounced his allegiance to the
Philippines.

Matugas filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court, and presented the following additional documents:
1. Photocopy of a document purportedly coming from the US Dirstrict Court of
California showing the Naturalization of Barbers signed by its Deputy Clerk;
2. Photocopy of a purported Authentication attached to the previous document coming
from the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California stating the following: "The annexed
document is an Information of Naturalization Re: Robert Lyndon Barbers executed by United
States District Court, Central District of California."
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original Documents,
appending the originals of the above documents.

Issue: W/N Barbers should have been disqualified.

Ruling: No.

One who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Matugas did not overcome his burden of
presenting substantial evidence with the documents he presented.

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public
documents include the written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be accompanied by a certificate
that such officer has custody thereof. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States. The
document containing the record of this act is a public document, so this document can only be
evidenced by its official publication or a copy duly attested by the officer having legal custody
thereof.

The George Clarke's notation in the letter-request of Jesus Agana is neither an official publication of
the document that contains the record of private respondents naturalization, nor a copy attested by
the officer who has legal custody of the record. Matugas also did not show if Clarke is the officer
charged with the custody of such record.

Furthermore, Matugas only presented photocopies of the letter-request and notation, as well as the
BID certification, in contravention of the above-cited rule.

In any case, the BID certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the nationality of Barbers.
While some entries indicate that he is American, other entries state that he is Filipino.

The new documents presented in the Petition for Certiorari cannot also be admitted in evidence. In
this case, the Authentication executed the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles does not state that the
Deputy Clerk who signed the document has the custody of the document being authenticated.

Lastly, the Petitioner's calls to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the COMELEC is
clearly beyond the the Supreme Courts certiorari powers. Doing so would be tantamount to holding
a new investigation.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it cannot be asked to substitute its own judgment and
discretion for that of the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on
appeal,and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered
in disposing of the issues of an action. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord
with orderly justice.

The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. It would be absurd to hold
COMELEC guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before it.
The patent unfairness of Matugass plea militates against the admission and consideration of the
subject documents.
EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157527. April 28, 2004]

SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes is

disqualified after the election is held, a permanent vacancy is created, and the
vice mayor succeeds to the position.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the March 19, 2003 En Banc
Resolution issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPA No. 01-
272. The Comelec resolved therein to disqualify Salvador K. Moll from the
mayoralty of Malinao, Albay, and to proclaim Avelino Ceriola as the mayor-
elect of the said municipality. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. It is

affirmed that private respondent Salvador K. Moll is DISQUALIFIED from holding
the office of the Mayor of Malinao, Albay.His proclamation as the winning candidate
for such office is declared VOID AB INITIO. Consequently, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Albay is directed to immediately convene the municipal board of
canvassers of Malinao, Albay and PROCLAIM petitioner Avelino Ceriola as the
Mayor-Elect of the municipality.[1]

In GR No. 157526, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare seeks the nullification of

the March 19, 2003 Resolution insofar as it authorized the proclamation of
Ceriola as the mayor-elect of Malinao. In GR No. 157527, Petitioner Moll
prays for the annulment of the entire Resolution.
 The Facts

Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for mayor
of the Municipality of Malinao, Albay, during the elections of May 14, 2001.
Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while
Ceriola came in second, with a total of nine hundred eighty-seven (987) votes
separating the two. Kare was elected vice mayor in the same election.
On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the Disqualification
and/or Ineligibility of Dindo K. Moll to Run for Any Elective Position. The
Petition alleged that the latter had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9)
months of prision correccional, for the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its May 28, 2001 Resolution,[2] the Comelec First Division dismissed the
Petition. Ceriola filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec en
banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside the said Resolution. It thereafter
directed the clerk of the Comelec to remand the Petition to the provincial
election supervisor of Albay for hearing and reception of evidence.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

On March 19, 2003, after the provincial election supervisor of Albay

submitted the report and recommendation, the Comelec en banc issued the
questioned Resolution affirming Molls disqualification and proclaiming Ceriola
as the mayor-elect of the municipality.
As earlier adverted to, the Comelec ruled that Moll had indeed been
disqualified from being a mayoral candidate in the May 14, 2001 local
election, and that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was void ab
initio. Consequently, he was disqualified from holding that office.
The Comelec further ruled that the trial courts final judgment of conviction
of Moll disqualified him from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued to
disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were
stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the candidate who had obtained the
second highest number of votes -- was adjudged the winner.Thus, the
Comelec ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as the
mayor-elect of the municipality.
 Before Ceriolas actual proclamation, Kare filed a Petition before this Court
with a prayer for a Status Quo Order, which was granted on April 1, 2003.[3] In
this Order, the Comelec, the provincial election supervisor of Albay, and the
municipal canvassers of Malinao (Albay) were required to observe the status
quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition.
The other Petition was filed by Moll.[4]

The Issues

After going through the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court
has determined that the following are the two issues that have to be resolved:

1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?

2.) If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor --
Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition in GR No. 157526 is partly meritorious, but the Petition in GR

No. 157527 has no merit.
First Issue:
Disqualification
Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since
his judgement of conviction[5] -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly
not yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment promulgated
on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the
ordinary course of the proceedings, he still filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary period.[6] Thus, according to him,
the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.
We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads thus:

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of

the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (Italics supplied)

In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed
from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run. (Italics supplied)

It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a
motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear
that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the running of
the period for filing an appeal. What he did file, however, was a Motion to
Quash the Information; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial.
The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being
appealed.
Neither Molls Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for
Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both
attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the
period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.
Moll himself admitted that no regular appeal was filed because he was still
questioning the propriety of the denial of his Motion to Quash the Information
and the propriety of the conduct of the promulgation of his sentence despite
his absence x x x.[7] Aside from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the
motion to quash was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the
accused at any time before entering a plea[8] and certainly not on the day of
the promulgation, as Moll did.
As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid
because it was done in his absence, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General, which argues as follows:

It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his
counsel was present on the day of the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence,
because of Molls unexplained absence, the promulgation of the judgment could be
validly made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof to his last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of
Court).[9]

Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by

Moll, the judgment against him has become final.[10] Thus, the Comelec en
banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor, under
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:

Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;

x x x x x x x x x.

Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty
that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position.
Second Issue:
The Lawful Mayor

In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be

proclaimed mayor-elect after the disqualification of Moll, the Comelec applied
Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which provides:

Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good
reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the
following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the
expression of the voters will:

xxxxxxxxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment
shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the
ballot.
 The poll body interpreted the phrase disqualified by final judgment to
mean disqualification by a final judgment of conviction, which was the ground
upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:

In this case, the disqualification is based specifically on the final judgment of

conviction by a court against private respondent. This final judgment disqualified
private respondent from filing his certificate of candidacy in the first instance, and
continues to disqualify private respondent from holding office. Accordingly, the votes
cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes and the general rule in the Sunga Case
does not apply. Consequently, petitioner, having obtained the highest number of valid
votes, is entitled to be proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate.[11]

Further, it said:

x x x As such, this instance constitutes an exception to the general rule enunciated in

the Sunga Case. In the language of the said case, the foregoing provision of law is a
statute which clearly asserts a legislative policy contrary to the rule that the candidate
with the second highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner, given that the
votes for the disqualified candidate, though of highest number, are deemed stray and
invalid. Consequently, the so-called second placer shall be declared the winner
because he or she in fact obtained the highest number of valid votes.[12]

Such arguments do not persuade.

In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration,
and their expressed will must at all times be given effect.[13] When the majority
speaks by giving a candidate the highest number of votes in the election for
an office, no one else can be declared elected in place of the former.[14] In a
long line of cases, this Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot
proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.[15]
The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception
declared by the Court in Sunga v. Comelec,[16] from which we quote:

x x x The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner
into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts
a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void
or meaningless.[17]
 According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear
legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be
declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelecs Decision to declare
the second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation
with other provisions of the OEC.Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646,
provides as follows:

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the
end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election
in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office." (Italics supplied)

When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any
vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been
declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered
stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to
disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a
final judgment; the law lists other grounds for disqualification.[18] It escapes us
why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those
convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent
with the other provisions of the election code.
More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the
Comelec en banc issued Resolution No. SPA No. 01-272. The Resolution
adopted the recommendation of the provincial election supervisor of Albay to
disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate in Malinao, Albay. Thus,
on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were
under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they
agreed to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of
his disqualification.
 A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was
ineligible cannot retroact to the date of the election and thereby invalidate the
votes cast for him.[19]
Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an ineligible
candidate. As discussed above, the Resolution declaring him as such was
rendered long after the election. Thus, on the part of those who voted for him,
their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere belief that he was a
qualified candidate, and without any intention to misapply their
franchise. Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.[20]
The Comelecs interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant an
accepted doctrine laid down by this Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,[21] we said:

x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer
is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results
under such circumstances.[22]

To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty
despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no
fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of
democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.[23]
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a
case, it would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the
voters choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes received by
the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In such
situations, if the equation changes because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, voters preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and
unpredictable that the results for qualified candidates would not be self-
evident.[24] The absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the
choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second
placer.[25] Where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or a
plurality of the votes, by no mathematical formulation can the runnerup in the
election be construed to have obtained the majority or the plurality of votes
cast.[26]
We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose upon
and compel the people of Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as their
mayor.[27] The law on succession under Section 44 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. This
provision relevantly states:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,

Mayor, and Vice Mayor.

(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor,
vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein.

x x x x x x x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it admits
no room for interpretation, but merely for application.[28] Accordingly, when
Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created for
failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the office.[29] In such eventuality, the
duly elected vice mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[30]
For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY GRANTED, and
the assailed Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner Salvador K. Moll
is DECLARED ineligible for the position of municipal mayor of Malinao,
Albay. In view of the vacancy created in that office, Petitioner Emiliana Toral
Kare, the duly elected vice mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule
on succession. The status quo order of this Court dated April 1, 2003, is made
permanent. Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers
of the mayor of Malinao, Albay. The Petition in GR 157527 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.

DELA TORRE V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592; July 5, 1996)

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was
convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the
execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

ISSUE:

WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office.

HELD:

Sec.40 of LGC provides:

Disqualifications.

The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their
very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking public office.

With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence.

Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a
judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it
is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.
VIRGINIA MALINAO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUISITO REYES, in his
capacity as Governor of the Province of Marinduque,
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF MARINDUQUE and
WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as Mayor of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the decision

dated October 21, 1994 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque,
dismissing the administrative case filed by petitioner against respondent
Mayor Wilfredo Red of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The ground for the present
petition is that the same body already found respondent Mayor guilty of abuse
of authority in removing petitioner from her post as Human Resource Manager
without due process in another decision which is now final and executory.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case against her in the Office of the
Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While
the case was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner.
On February 24, 1994 petitioner filed an administrative case, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 93-03, against respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial
of due process.
On August 12, 1994, the case was taken up in executive session of the
Sanggunian. The transcript of stenographic notes of the session shows that
[1]

the Sanggunian, by the vote of 5to 3 of its members, found respondent Mayor
guilty of the charge and imposed on him the penalty of one-month
suspension,
The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a Decision
dated September 5, 1994, signed by only one member of the Sanggunian,
[2]

Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,

Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Copies of the Decision were served on
respondent Mayor Red as well as on respondent Governor Luisito Reyes
on September 12, 1994.
On September 14, 1994, respondent Mayor filed a manifestation before
[3]

the Sanggunian, questioning the Decision on the ground that it was signed by
Sotto alone, apparently acting in his capacity and designated as Presiding
Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan. He
contended that because of this the decision could only be considered as a
recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee and he was not bound
thereby.
On September 13, 1994, respondent Mayor sought the opinion of the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government regarding
the validity of the Decision.
In his letter dated September 14, 1994, DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan
[4]

III opined that the decision alluded to does not appear to be in accordance
with Section 66 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and settled
jurisprudence since

in the instant case, the purported decision of the Blue Ribbon Committee should have
been submitted to, approved and/or adopted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as a
collegial body inasmuch as the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has the administrative
jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof in conformity with Section 61 and Section 66
of the Code. It is not for the said committee to decide on the merits thereof, more so to
impose the suspension, as its duty and function is purely recommendatory. If it were
at all the intention of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to adopt entirely the
recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee, it should have so stated and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, who may have affirmatively voted
thereon or participated in its deliberations, should have affixed their respective
signatures on whatever decision that could have been arrived at. . . .

On the other hand petitioner sent a letter on October 14, 1994 to

[5]

respondent Governor Reyes, demanding that the Decision suspending

respondent Mayor from office be implemented without further delay.
In his letter dated October 20, 1994, respondent Governor informed the
[6]

Sanggunian that he agreed with the opinion of the DILG for which reason he
could not implement the Decision in question.
On October 21, 1994, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted
[7]

respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was embodied in a
Decision of the same date, which was signed by all members who had thus
voted.[8]

Hence this petition.

I. Petitioners basic contention is that inasmuch as the Decision
of September 5, 1994 had become final and executory, for failure of
respondent Mayor to appeal, it was beyond the power of the Sanggunian to
render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect reversed the first
decision.
These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be
the September 5, 1994 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the
signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the Decision as
Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Petitioner claims that at its session on August 12, 1994, the Sanggunian by
the vote of five members against three found respondent Mayor guilty of
having removed petitioner as Human Resources Officer III without due
process and that this fact is shown in the minutes of the session of the
Sanggunian. The minutes referred to read in pertinent part as follows:
KGD. SOTTO - No if he [respondent Mayor] is acquitted, then lets acquit it. Whatever
is the decision everybody goes to the majority.
(There was nominal voting from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member. For NOT
GUILTY OR GUILTY)
KGD. ZOLETA - I vote not guilty.
KGD. MUHI - Guilty.
KGD. LIM - Not guilty.
KGD. RAZA - First I would like to say that I will decide on the merit of the case. The
fact that the Civil Service ordered the reinstatement wherein Virginia Molinao is
included, only means that the Supreme Court duly constituted has found the merit
of the decision of the Civil Service.
I vote that the Mayor is guilty.
KGD. PINAROC - Guilty.
KGD. DE LUNA - Guilty, there is no due process and to protect the integrity of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
KGD. LAGRAN - Guilty.
KGD. ZOLETA - My reason for voting not guilty is that the mayor acted in good faith,
he just followed the order of the reorganization recommended by the Placement
Committee.
KGD. REJANO - The order of the reorganization was given by the Civil Service
Commission and based on the contention made by Kgd. Palamos that since there
should be reorganization to be conducted by the Civil Service Commission the
mayor was supposed to go on with that reorganization and based on the
reorganization there should be a screening committee to check whether the
employees are really working efficiently. Based on the case that has been given to
Mrs. Malinao, based on the witnesses, Ligeralde, Monterozo and Pastrana and
then decided that Mayor Red has done in good faith.
So I vote Not Guilty.
Five (5) voted GUILTY:

Kgd. Muhi

Kgd. Raza

Kgd. Pinaroc

Kgd. Lagran

Kgd. De Luna

Three (3) voted NOT GUILTY:

Kgd. Rejano

Kgd. Zoleta

Kgd. Lim

KGD. SOTTO - Punishment...

Censure? Reprimand? Suspension?
KGD. LAGRAN - I suggest that only those who voted guilty should vote as to what
punishment should be given.
KGD. LIM - All the members should be given the right to vote.
(THE VOTING PROCEEDED.)
Kgd. Muhi - Suspension
Kgd. Raza - Suspension
Kgd. Pinaroc - Suspension
Kgd. Lagran - Suspension
Kgd. de Luna - Suspension
KGD. ZOLETA - Since we voted not guilty therefore no punishment.
KGD. REJANO - No punishment.
KGD. LIM - No punishment.
KGD. SOTTO - How many months?
KGD. MUHI - One month.
KGD. RAZA - One month.
KGD. PINAROC - One month.
 KGD. LAGRAN - One month.
KGD. DE LUNA - One month.
KGD SOTTO - Be it on record that on August 12, 1994 during the Executive Session of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan en banc the respondent is hereby found guilty.

Effective upon receipt of the Decision, copy furnished: the counsel for Respondent,
the Counsel for Complainant, the Municipal Treasurer, Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, the
Provincial Auditor, the Civil Service Commission, Boac, Marinduque, the DILG,
Boac, Marinduque, the Provincial Governor.

Contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is that on August
12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the administrative case of respondent
Mayor and not that it then rendered a decision as required by 66(a) of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) which provides as follows:

66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (a) The investigation of the case shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after
the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned
shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished the
respondent and all interested parties.

In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local

officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. What the
Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was not to render a decision.
Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the
Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. Like the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting following the deliberation of the
members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their decision
unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one of them and
concurred in by the others, in the same way that the voting following the
deliberation on a case in the Supreme Court becomes its decision only after
the opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others composing the
majority. Until they have signed the opinion and the decision is promulgated,
the Justices are free to change their votes. [9]

Indeed, in his comment in this case, Member Sotto admits that the draft
[10]

decision he prepared had only his signature due to the reluctance of some
Kagawads to affix their signatures. Consequently the draft never became a
decision. It is noteworthy that the draft was signed by Member Sotto in his
capacity as Presiding Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and that it did not provide spaces for the
signatures of other members of the Sanggunian had it been intended that it be
signed by them. This fact led the DILG to conclude that the draft was simply
the report and recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee to the
Sanggunian.
Now, as already stated, the Sanggunian, at its session on October 21,
1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided to dismiss the case against
respondent Mayor. This time its decision was made in writing, stating the facts
and the law on which it was based, and it was signed by the members taking
part in the decision. This, and not the so-called decision
of September 5, 1994, is the decision of the Sanggunian.
Petitioner complains that no notice of the session by the Sanggunian
on October 21, 1994 was given to her. None was really required to be given to
her. The deliberation of the Sanggunian was an internal matter.
II. Petitioner brought this case by way of Petition for certiorari and
mandamus. A prime specification of the writ of certiorari, however, is that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to petitioner. But, in the case at bar, petitioner could
have appealed the decision of the Sanggunian to the Office of the President
as provided in 67(b) of the Local Government Code.
III. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
expiration of respondents term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent Mayor are
barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed
the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative disciplinary
proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected,
because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he
might have committed during his previous term. [11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., on leave.
Lingating vs Comelec
Post under Disqualification from office , Political Law Case Digests

Facts

During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrativecomplaint was filed against him and
several other individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of
Public Funds and violation RA No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal shortly thereafter.
The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.

Pending appeal, then ViceMayor Vicente Imbing took his oath and assumed the office of
Mayor of Lapuyan on March 3, 1992 pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Gov't Code
which allows for the execution pending appeal ofadministrative decisions. From February
1992 to August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-91 nor
has the Sanggunian resolved Sulongs MR/Appeal.

In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position of Mayor of
Lapuyan. On May 3, 2001, Lingating file a petition for disqualification of Sulong on the
ground that the latter is disqualified from running for any elective local position
having been removed from office during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of
an administrative case (AC No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local Government
Code. Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final
and executory since up to the filing of the disqualification case, no comment has been filed
nor has the appeal been resolved. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment before
the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Lapuyan.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong
disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Respondent Sulong
filed an MR arguing that the decision in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and executory;
that at no time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision, and that the issue
was moot and academic having been "overtaken by the local elections of May 11, 1992."

Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that Sulong was succeeded
by Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91 had indeed become final. Lingating also
prayed that he be installed as Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.

The COMELEC First Division denied Lingatings motion on the ground that the
disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Lingating then filed a motion
for reconsideration of this order.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing Aguinaldov.
COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic. It also ruled
that respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated.

Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling inAguinaldo vs.
COMELEC. Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable case is Reyes v. COMELEC where
the court held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration
of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local
elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election

Held:

The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak
of. Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the
office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final
because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government
Code, which makes decisions inadministrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that
removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no
longer be removed if he is thereafter re-elected for another term. However, Aguinaldo is
not applicable as at the time the case was decided, there was no provision similar to 40(b)
of the LGC and hence, cannot be given retroactive effect. Neither is Reyes vs.
COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to this day, not final. (G.R. No. 153475,
November 13, 2002)

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26,

1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Post under Disqualification from office , Election law , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon
Province. Rodriguez won. Marquezchallenged Rodriguez victory via a Quo Warranto on the
ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held that:
Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction
toavoid punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from
justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on
the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felonycomplaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoidprosecution. This
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a
particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be
established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez.
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the
felony complaintin the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of
the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to
have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as
there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet
at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996)

Nolasco v COMELEC

Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts
which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy,
and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor,
urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed
to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that
the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not
met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be
strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v
COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes
otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won
the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have
substantially changed.

Borja v COMELEC
Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco
was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On
March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that Capco would have
already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he
would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec
declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of

law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in
that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the
next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the
full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office
should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to

prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of
choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the
drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned
were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term
in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to
falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom
they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Socrates v COMELEC

FACTS:

Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three
consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the
three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the
2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventuallywon. However, midway into his term,
Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the
formers unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under the
three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is
that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intentis that involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth
term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the same
office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall
election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizenuntil the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest
opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not
because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legalprohibition. (Socrates vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

Lonzanida v COMELEC
Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his
proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually
declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure
of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of
execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the
remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His
opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that
Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May
13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining

that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his
assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose
of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not
the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued
that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy
is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995
should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties
of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before
the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from

May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of
applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this
court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and
while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation
of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term
as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was
not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The
respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one
full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term
has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application
of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The
second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear
intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-
term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office
for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The
Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the
May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the
assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is
pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered.
The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but
which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ
delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been
proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent

the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned
and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Adormeo v COMELEC

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However,
before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May
2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June
2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the
ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in
violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for
mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga
was then elected Mayor.
Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served
two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
wasdisrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term
and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not
the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R.
No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

MONROY VS CA FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas Rizal when he filed
his certificate of candidacy as representative of the First District of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections. Three days later, petitioner withdrew his candidacy, which the COMELEC approved.
However, Del Rosario, vice mayor of Navotas, took his oath as a Municipal Mayor on the theory
that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon filing his certificate of candidacy. CFI: Petitioner
was deemed resigned upon filing his COC and ordered to reimburse salaries received in favor
of Del Rosario. CA: Affirmed in toto. ISSUE: WON Petitioner is deemed a de facto officer from
the moment he assumed Del Rosario s entitlement to the office of Municipal Mayor, and thus,
not required to reimburse salaries to the latter. HELD: Yes and it is the general rule that the
rightful incumbent of a specific lawful office may recover from an officer de facto the salary
received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure though he entered into the office
with goodfaith and under color of title, which applies to this case. A de facto officer, not having a
good title, takes the salaries at risk and must account to the de jure officer for whatever amount
of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office. LASTIMOSA
CASE FACTS: Gloria Lastimosa is the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. On 1993,
she and the Provincial Prosecutor were ordered by the Ombudsman to prosecute an attempted
rape case against Mayor Illustrisimo. However, the two failed to do so. Hence, an administrative
complaint was filed against them. In the meanwhile, they were both placed under preventive
suspension. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution for attempted rape against the person of the Mayor. 2.
Whether Ombudsman has the power to punish them for contempt. 3. Whether the Ombudsman
has power to discipline petitioners through preventive suspension. HELD: 1. Yes, the
Ombudsman has the power. It has been Petioners contention that the Ombudsman lacks
jurisdiction of the case since the offense committed was not in relation to public office. This
contention is without merit. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers, is without regard as whether the acts or omission complained of
were related to the performance of his duty. It is enough that the act was committed by a public
officer, for the Ombudsman to have jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Under the Ombudsman Act, Office of the Ombudsman has the power to punish for
contempt. Consequently, her refusal to file an information for attempted rape constitutes
defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process or command of the Ombudsman; thus
making her liable for indirect contempt. 3. Yes. Neither there is any doubt as to the power of the
Ombudsman to discipline petitioners should day be found guilty of grave misconduct,
insubordination or neglect of duty, nor the Ombudsman power to place them under preventive
suspension. As provided for by Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary powers over all appointive and elective officials of the government except
those who may only be removed by impeachment. Moreover, it can preventively suspend any
official if in his discretion, the guilt is strong, and the charges include dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or the charge would warrant removal from office, or the respondent s
continued stay in office may any way prejudice the case filed against him. Such preventive
suspension is not constituted as penalty but as a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. Thus, notice and hearing is not required. Further, such suspension can last long
up to 6 months.

Aguinaldo v COMELEC

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December
1989 coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to
GovernorAguinaldo requiring him toshow cause why he should not be suspended or
removed from office for disloyalty to theRepublic. A sworn complaint was also filed by
Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the
coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the
outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding
petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas
was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local
Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend
or remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power
to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as
Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by
 proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is
an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against
him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision
of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court.
As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for
his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter
ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from
office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of
Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor.The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed
during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both
the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislativebranch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of
general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of
the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected
by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the
present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the
power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of
removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et
al., this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the
effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government
Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective
government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum
of proof required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115,
August 21, 1992)

Montesclaros vs COMELEC GR N
152295 09 July 2002

11 WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to
Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths at least 15 but no more than
21 years of age. On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from
COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman
Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February
2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed
support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral
Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to
15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of
age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13
March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners
filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of
postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual
justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional. Petitioners perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At
the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its
passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be
unconstitutional.