Message in A Bottle Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies

Contemporary Security Policy
ISSN: 1352-3260 (Print) 1743-8764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20
Message in a bottle'? Theory and praxis in critical

security studies
Richard Wyn Jones
To cite this article: Richard Wyn Jones (1995) Message in a bottle'? Theory and praxis in critical
security studies, Contemporary Security Policy, 16:3, 299-319, DOI: 10.1080/13523269508404119
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'Message in a Bottle'? Theory and Praxis in
Critical Security Studies
RICHARD WYN JONES
Strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen

one's own side in the contention of nations.
Downloaded by [University of Glasgow] at 09:49 25 October 2017
Edward N. Luttwak1
I cast about, sometime here, sometime there, for traces of a reason that
unites without effacing separation, that binds without unnaming
difference, that points out the common and the shared among
strangers, without depriving the other of otherness.
Jiirgen Habermas2
Introduction
For Critical Theorists, the question of the relationship between theory and
praxis is of primary concern. One of the central claims of Critical Theory in
all its many guises is that, in Robert Cox's neat summary, 'all theory is for
someone and for some purpose'.3 Critical Theory's claim to superiority over
what Horkheimer described as 'traditional theory', and Cox himself
describes as 'problem solving theory', is that Critical Theory is aware of the
intimate connections between the supposedly abstract realm of the theory
and the social world.4 Furthermore, Critical Theory is committed to
developing an understanding of the world that promotes emancipatory
socio-cultural, economic and political change. But whilst all Critical
Theorists take seriously Marx's injunction in his Thesis on Feuerbach that
'Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is
to change it',5 it hardly need be underscored how difficult it is to translate
this deceptively simple formulation into practice. However, one important
implication of this orientation towards praxis is that, in the words of Nancy
Fraser, 'it is in the crucible of political practice that critical theories meet the
ultimate test of vitality'.6 This article will attempt to explore the vexed issue
of the relationship between Critical Theory and emancipatory political
praxis in more depth, paying particular attention to the role of intellectuals
Richard Wyn Jones is a member of the Department of International Politics, University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, Wales SY23 3DA.
Contemporary Security Policy Vol.16, No.3 (December 1995), pp.299-319
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS. LONDON
300 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
in general, and academics in particular.

Such a discussion has obvious relevance to the whole project of Critical
International Theory. However, the following discussion of theory and
praxis will concentrate on the relationship between Critical Theory-inspired
attempts to focus on issues of security (that is 'Critical Security Studies')
and the practices of global security. There are two reasons for this. First the
relationship between the meta-theory of Critical International Theory and
any form of global politics is so mediated as to make any attempt to trace
the relationship in anything but the most general terms very difficult.
Therefore, by concentrating on a sub-field of Critical International Theory
such as Critical Security Studies (which will be delineated and discussed

later), our analysis will be more concrete and thus more amenable to critical
engagement.
The second, and main, reason relates to the general perception that the
provision of security is still the primary raison d'etre of the sovereign state
and, as such, it remains its most jealously guarded preserve. As a result, any
attempt to create an alternative discourse in the field of security, and in
particular, any attempt to problematize the role of the state as the provider
of security, is likely to be strongly resisted. This was clearly seen in Britain
in the early 1980s when the state made determined efforts to combat the
peace movement and marginalize those who were perceived as its
supporters in academia: witness, for example, the Thatcher-inspired
demonization of Peace Studies.7 Another problem for those attempting to
develop Critical Security Studies arises from the fact that, as Simon Dalby
points out, security as it is traditionally conceived 'is inherently politically
conservative precisely because it emphasises permanence, control, and
predictability'.8 The political sensitivity of the security issue, as well as the
innately conservative nature of the prevailing security discourse, means that
the issue of the relationship between Critical Theory and emancipatory
praxis is raised in a particularly acute way for proponents of Critical
Security Studies.
Critical Theory and Emancipatory Politics

Merely to pose the issue of the relationship between Critical Theory and
emancipatory political praxis is immediately to raise a whole host of other
extremely problematic, even perhaps insoluble questions and puzzles. For
example, one is forced to address the question of the social role of
intellectuals and intellectual activity, and the role that they play in
supporting, and/or promoting social change. This in turn raises the thorny
issue of the audience to which Critical Theorists are addressing their ideas.
Ultimately, of course, these questions lead us inexorably to one of the
THEORY AND PRAXIS IN CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES 301
central issues of all social theory, that of the relationship between agents and
structures: the agent-structure debate.
Whilst recent discussions of this debate in International Relations have
tended to concentrate on the perhaps rarefied issues of levels of analysis and
ontology,1* any discussion of the social role of Critical Theory also has to
consider the problematic relationship between agents and structure at the
micro-level of academic life. Quite simply, how are Critical Theorists to
pursue what must inevitably be their twin goals of academic respectability
and political relevance? How much autonomy does the agent, in this case
the Critical Theorist, enjoy within the largely hostile structures of Western
academe? Can one successfully bridge the chasm between, on the one hand,
the ghettoizing nature of academic language itself as well as the
professional constraints created by tenure requirements, research selectivity
exercises and the like, and on the other, the desire to disseminate and make
accessible one's Critical theorizing? Jiirgen Habermas frames these issues
well when he wonders, rather ruefully one feels, 'how theories that have
wrapped themselves up in their own problems, and have retreated so far into
the scientific system under the pull of the social division of labor - how
such autistic undertakings are at all able to place themselves in relation to
praxis and to develop a force for the direction of action'.10
Given the centrality of emancipatory political praxis to the claims of
Critical Theory it is hardly surprising that Habermas is not the first thinker
from this tradition to reflect upon the nature of the relationship between
theory and practice. Rather, successive generations of Critical Theorists
have agonized and argued over the question of whether their ideas can
indeed 'develop a force for the direction of action', and if so, how to set
about attaining this objective?" However, whilst proponents of Critical
Theory in general have discussed the theory-practice nexus at some length,
it has certainly not been dealt with in any systematic way in the work of
those scholars attempting to develop Critical International Theory. Robert
Cox, for example, has described the task,of Critical Theorists as providing
'a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order'.12 Whilst
he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined
the nature and structure of some feasible 'alternative orders', he has not
explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of Critical Theory
(i.e. who is being 'guided'), and thus, how the theory can hope to become a
part of the political process." Similarly Andrew Linklater has argued that 'a
critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of
extending community beyond the nation-state as its most important
problem'.14 However, he has little to say about the relationship between
theory and praxis of this 'practical project'. Indeed his main point is to
suggest that the role of Critical Theory 'is not to offer instructions on how
to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities'.15 But the

question still remains: 'reveal' to whom? Is the audience enlightened
statesmen and women; particular social classes; particular social
movements; or particular (and presumably particularized) communities?
Given Linklater's primary concern with emancipation, we might expect
more guidance as to who is to be emancipated, whom he expects might do
the emancipating, and how Critical Theory can impinge upon the
emancipatory process. There is, similarly, little help in Mark Hoffman's
important contribution. He argues that Critical International Theory:
seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to

understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and
constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a
social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the
historical situation, but also a force for change within those
conditions.16
However, once again, we are given no suggestion as to how this 'force for
change' is to be operationalized and what role Critical Theory will play in
changing society.
The Relationship between International Relations Theory and Global

Politics
From our discussion thus far, it seems clear that proponents of Critical
International Theory have, so far at least, been remarkably unreflective as
to the relationship between their theories and emancipatory political praxis.
This lack of reflectiveness as to the nature of the relationship between
International Theory and international political practice is shared with other
approaches to international relations. Indeed the issue provides a striking
omission from the vast literature on international relations." However, any
cursory survey will find that very different attitudes to the theory-practice
nexus have been adopted by the differing approaches to academic study of
international relations
During the pioneer years of the 1920s and 1930s the fledgling discipline
reflected its origins in Welsh liberal internationalism and peace activism by
concerning itself explicitly with political practice.18 Indeed it is clear that
David Davies, who endowed the first chair, hoped that the discipline would
become the academic arm of the League of Nations, providing the world
body with both intellectual support and practical advice: in effect, he
regarded theory and praxis as inextricably linked, with the whole point of
the former being to inform and improve the latter.19
However, after the Second World War, the ruling Realist orthodoxy in
international relations adopted an explicitly positivist approach to the

subject which has attempted to disentangle theory from praxis by claiming
to distinguish sharply between questions of 'fact' and 'value'. Questions of
'fact' have been seen as those pertaining to the nature of political reality,
and regarded as the only valid subject for scientific inquiry. Furthermore,
the knowledge accrued through such study has been claimed to be value-
neutral; that is containing no implicit world-view, or indeed, policy
prescriptions. Policy prescription has always been relegated to the realm of
'value' and thus seen as falling beyond the purview of objective social
theory. While theorists may well have their own views as to correct or
desirable political practice, the dominant forms of Realism - currently, of

course, Neorealism - have tended to disregard these views as mere
reflections of subjective personal opinion which, whilst they may well be
theoretically informed, are seen as extrinsic to the theoretical activity itself.
Of course, this form of positivist international relations theory has
almost always proven willing to supplicate itself before the great god of
'policy relevance' as well as pursue research agendas which reflect the
preoccupation's of policy-makers.20 However, the point is that this concern
with policy - with political practice - was seen by post-war Realists as an
'optional extra'. Furthermore, if scholars did attempt to feed their ideas into
the political process, then they almost exclusively limited themselves to
addressing policy-makers and elite 'opinion formers'. The aim was - and
indeed is - to gain the ear of the powerful rather than engage with those who
are presently powerless. As is well known, this quest has met with varying
degrees of success. In the United States, for example, there has been a close,
symbiotic relationship between academia and government, whilst in Britain,
it is usually argued that relations have remained more distant. However, at
this point it is as well to remind ourselves that appearances, in the British
case at least, may be deceptive. Commenting on the apparent lack of contact
between academics and what he terms 'practitioners', A.J.R. Groom claims
that: 'little communication between them was necessary since their
paradigmatic unity [by which he means, allegiance to the Realist model of
power politics] was so strong that they could go their separate ways safe in
the knowledge that their work was compatible' .2I
From which we can infer that, in the main, British International
Relations specialists - by effect, if not, perhaps, by intention - have
provided academic justification for the main thrust of British foreign policy.
Here Groom's argument resonates with Critical Theory critiques of
Positivist international relations theory which charge that the distinction
between 'fact' and 'value', between 'is' and 'ought', is spurious: 'all theory
is for someone and for some purpose'. Far from providing an objective view
of political reality, Realist international relations theory has helped produce,
reproduce and legitimate global realpolitik.

Thus whilst on its own terms the relationship between theory and
practice is unproblematic for Positivist International Theory, Critical
Theory argues that this 'peace of mind' is a product of, at best, a certain
naivete as to the social role of theory. In contrast, Critical Theory claims that
all theory is intimately and inescapably linked with political praxis and
dedicates itself to furthering emancipation. But whilst these criticisms of
Realism are well-taken, as we have already seen, Critical International
Theory has thus-far failed to provide a convincing account of its own
relationship to this emancipatory praxis. Given the centrality of praxis to
Critical Theory it is arguable that without some plausible account of the

mechanisms by which it hopes to aid in the achievement of its emancipatory
goals, Critical International Theory will hardly be in a position to justify
Mark Hoffman's bold claim that 'it represents the next stage in the
development of International Relations theory'.22 Indeed, without an
understanding of the theory-practice nexus, Critical International Theory
will remain an atrophied and autistic enterprise.
Having delineated the nature of the problem, we will now try to outline
possible approaches to the relationship between theory and praxis which are
consistent with Critical International Theory. This will be attempted via an
exposition of the differing, and indeed, contradictory approaches to this
issue that have been adopted by the various Critical theorists who have
inspired writers like Cox, Linklater and Hoffman. This will lead us to a
discussion of a possible model for social change based on Gramsci's
revolutionary strategy of a 'war of position'. It will be argued that Gramsci's
discussion of a 'war of position' provides important insights into the role of
theory in supporting progressive social change. However, Gramsci's faith in
the revolutionary potential of the working class and the guiding role of the
'modern prince' - the Communist Party - will be rejected as not only
anachronistic but fundamentally misplaced. Rather it will be argued that the
experience of the (so-called) new social movements suggests possible
agents for change and addressees for theory.
Critical Theory on the Role of Intellectuals

Critical International Theory has drawn on two main intellectual strands in
its development, which can be summarized under the headings of the
'Italian School' and the 'Frankfurt School'.23 Writers like Cox and Gill have
drawn heavily on the work of Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of the
Italian Communist Party, in their attempt to develop critical approaches to
international political economy. Other theorists, most notably Linklater and
Hoffman, have drawn on the Critical Theory of the so-called Frankfurt
School. Although there are many broad similarities between Gramsci and
the Frankfurt School, there are also important differences.24 One difference
relates to the role of intellectuals.
Of all the thinkers in the Western Marxist tradition, it is perhaps Gramsci
who devoted most thought to the role of the intellectuals, and indeed of
ideas in general, in society. This is hardly surprising given his consistent
stress on eschewing the abstract in order to concentrate on the concrete: on
theorizing with a practical, and revolutionary, intent. In his Prison
Notebooks he referred to his reading of Marxism as 'the philosophy of
praxis'. It is usually claimed that this was done in order to confuse the
prison censors. However, as Cox points out, if this is true, then the censors
'must have been particularly slow-witted'.25 A more plausible explanation is
provided by the English translators of the Notebooks who suggest that:
'"philosophy of praxis" is both a euphemism for Marxism and an
autonomous term used by Gramsci to define what he saw to be the central
characteristic of the philosophy of Marxism, the inescapable link it
establishes between theory and practice, thought and action'.26
It is this light that Gramsci developed his theory of the intellectual.27
Gramsci's first move is to broaden the concept of intellectuals by arguing
that 'All men are intellectuals...but not all men have in society the function
of intellectuals.'28 He then argues that those with the social function of
intellectuals fall into two groups. On the one hand he refers to 'traditional
intellectuals'. This concept represents the way in which most intellectuals
view their own role in society. Traditional intellectuals, according to their
self-image, have a relatively autonomous social role which lifts them above
the class cleavages of society to the Mannheimian realm of universal, 'free-
floating' thinkers. For Gramsci, this independence is a chimera. Rather, he
ultimately regards 'traditional intellectuals' as playing a vital, if
subconscious role, in producing and reproducing the hegemony which
provides a indispensable buttress to the prevailing patterns of domination
within society. These 'traditional intellectuals' are contrasted with 'organic
intellectuals'.
'Organic intellectuals' play a crucial, and far more self-conscious role in
articulating and organizing the interests and aspirations of a particular social
class. Each class has its own 'organic intellectuals' - although, as we have
seen, the intellectuals of the ruling strata can often see themselves in a
different, 'traditional' light. However, due to its social position (rather than
some mental deficiency a la the conservative American Charles Murray), it
is the working class that has least intellectual resources at its disposal.
Gramsci therefore stresses the need for that class to develop its own
'organic intellectuals' and argues that they have a crucial role to play in
advancing proletarian, and thus human, emancipation. Discussing their role
Gramsci argues: 'The mode of being of the new intellectuals can no longer
consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings
and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor,
organiser, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator.'29
Their central political task is to aid in the construction of a counter-
hegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and
interaction which make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is
accomplished through educational activity, for, as Gramsci argues, 'every
relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily a pedagogic relationship'.30
Discussing the relationship of the 'philosophy of praxis' to the political
practice, Gramsci claims that:

The philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave the 'simple' in their
primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a
higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between
intellectuals and 'simple' it is not in order to restrict scientific activity
and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order
to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically
possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small
intellectual groups."
This attempt to construct an alternative 'intellectual-moral bloc' will take
place, according to Gramsci, under the auspices of the Communist Party,
which he described as the 'modern prince'. Just as Machiavelli hoped to see
a Prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign 'barbarians', and create a
virtii-ous state; Gramsci believed that the 'modern prince' could lead the
working class on its journey towards its revolutionary destiny of an
emancipated society."
Gramsci's relative optimism about the possibility of progressive
theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice is
predicated on his belief in the existence of a "universal class' with
revolutionary potential. As is well known, it was a gradual loss of faith in
this axiom that led the founders of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory
to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of
progressive social change.'1 This in turn led them to a very different model
of the role of the critical intellectual within society. For Theodor Adorno, in
particular, the all-pervasiveness of structures of domination within society
meant that the only role the critical intellectual could adopt was that of the
metaphorical exile.34 Given his belief that 'Nothing complicitous with this
world can have any truth',35 the only legitimate stance for the intellectual
was one of unrelenting negativity. Any attempt by the intellectual to suggest
alternatives, or to engage in the pseudo-politics of the 'totally administered
society', would immediately be reified and form yet another layer in the
already over-determined structures of domination. The only honourable role

for the intellectual was to remain an outsider, to observe, as it were, from
the sidelines, and to refuse as far as humanly possible the blandishments of
comforting conformity. In a contemporary world caught up in a dialectic
between stultifying mundanity and inhuman cruelty, the duty of the
intellectual was to provide a note of dissonance and dissent.
For Theodor Adorno there was no hope or expectation of influencing
political practice: in effect, in the modern world he believed that the
relationship between theory and practice, or at least between Critical Theory
and progressive praxis, had been severed. Rather, he regarded his
philosophy in terms of a 'message in a bottle' to be cast on the waters of

history with perhaps the hope, certainly not expectation, that it might be
picked up at some point in the future by persons unknown. Even should this
happen, Adorno did not expect his theory to influence praxis; rather his
hope was, in the words of Edward Said, 'not that he will have an effect on
the world, but that someday, somewhere, someone will read what he wrote
exactly as he wrote it'.36
Thus we find in the Critical Theory tradition two very different models
of the role of intellectuals. Gramsci, as we have seen, posits the possibility
of politically engaged intellectuals playing a vital role in the struggle for
emancipation. However Adorno regards this model as a chimera. Indeed
even attempting to pursue this strategy will be worse than futile: it will
probably be counter-productive. Adorno realizes that his understanding of
society led him to an extraordinarily uncomfortable, even fatalistic position.
Engagement is not an option, however he is aware that his preferred strategy
of disengagement 'leads to destruction' and 'a loveless disregard for things
which necessarily turns against people too'." The ultimate dilemma for
Adorno is that, 'Wrong life cannot be lived rightly'.3*
In a world characterized by warfare, extreme yet seemingly casual
cruelty, obscene disparities of wealth, prejudice, famine and all kinds of
unnecessary suffering, Adorno's position is an understandable one. In the
world of Rwanda, Angola, Bosnia, Hiroshima, Auschwitz, Bhopal,
deforestation, Saddam Hussein, Pol Pot, and Marlboro, one can easily
succumb to despair or nihilistic rage. One can certainly understand why
Adorno himself adopted a position of unrelenting negativity given his own
life experience as a left-wing German Jew in the 1920s and 1930s:
significantly, his masterpiece Minima Moralia is subtitled Reflections from
damaged life. However, I regard his pessimism as ultimately unwarranted.
In Raymond Williams' phrase, there are 'resources of hope' within all
societies.39 Progressive change is not only possible but it actually occurs.
Even in the particularly intractable realm of security, change is occurring
even if only very slowly. For example, interstate war is gradually being
delegitimated.40 Of course, this change is occurring due to many factors.

Many cite the growing destructiveness of modern weapons and others may
cite changes in the global mode of production: internationalization of
production and so on. Whilst there may be an element of truth in both
suggestions, change is not simply determined by material factors; rather it
is a product of the (dialectical) interaction between material reality and
ideas.
One clear, security-related example of the role of critical thinking and
thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change can be seen in the
experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. Then, the ideas of dissident
defence intellectuals encouraged, as well as drew strength from peace

activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but, far
more importantly in the long run, on the dominant discourses of strategy
and security. Witness, for example, the fate of 'common security'. In the
early 1980s, mainstream defence intellectuals dismissed the concept as
idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hard-headed and
'realist' view of the world. Since then the concept has gone on something
of a rollercoaster ride. Initially taken up by Gorbachev, the concept has
gradually become part of the adopted 'common sense' [sic] of Western
security discourse.41 Although a concept like 'common security', like
'collective security' before it, does tend to become debased in the usage of
governments and military services, enough of the residual meaning survives
to shift the parameters of the discourse in a potentially progressive
direction. Its adoption by official circles most certainly provides critics with
a useful tool for critiquing aspects of security policy.
This example is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical
intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role, however small, in
making the world a better and certainly safer place. Second, it points to
potential future addressees for Critical Theory in general, and Critical
Security Studies in particular. Third, it also hints at the role of ideas in the
evolution of society.
Critical Security Studies and the Theory-Practice Nexus

Whilst proponents of Critical International Theory will certainly wish to
reject aspects of Gramsci's theory of 'organic intellectuals', in particular his
exclusive concentration on class and his stress on the guiding role of the
party, the desire for engagement and relevance remains at the heart of their
project. The example of the peace movement suggests that Critical
Theorists can still play the role of 'organic intellectuals' and that this
organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class but, rather, can
involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements which
campaign on an issue, or series of issues, pertinent to the struggle for

emancipation. Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that
critical intellectuals 'are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part
of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the
voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless'.42 In the specific case of Critical
Security Studies this means placing the experience of those men and women
and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity
rather than security, at the centre of our agenda. Such an approach, placing
common humanity rather than raison d'etat at the centre of our normative
concerns, has given rise to an attempt by some Critical Theorists to rethink
fundamentally the shibboleths of Strategic Studies.43

Critical Security Studies has begun to challenge the hegemonic security
discourse and the prevailing practices of global (in)security by asking a
series of fundamental questions. Despite their apparent simplicity, these
questions are deeply subversive of the ruling orthodoxy on questions of
strategy and security. They are, first, what is security? Second, who is being
secured by the prevailing order, and who or what are they being secured
against? Third, and directly connected to this, we have the fundamental
issue of whose security we should be concerning ourselves, and by which
agents and through which strategies should this security be attained?44
In recent years, calls to broaden our conception of 'what is security'
have become almost commonplace.45 Traditionally, security was conceived
in very narrow, almost exclusively military terms. The threat or reality of
interstate war was regarded as the primary cause of insecurity and, certainly,
the only one worthy of serious consideration by strategists. However, since
the mid-1980s, perhaps even since the oil-shocks of the 1970s, this limited,
traditional conception of security has become increasingly untenable. Other
issues, for example economic, environmental, human rights, have forced
their way on to the security agenda.46 However, whilst erstwhile strategists
may appear to have acknowledged these wider concerns by adopting the
moniker 'security studies' to replace 'strategic studies', this re-baptism
seems to have been a typically 1990s piece of repackaging. The name may
have changed, but the substance remains the same.47 But if security studies
is content to pay lip-service to broader conceptions of security even while
carrying on with 'business as usual' by concentrating on the new 'threats'
that have (so conveniently) arisen to take the place of the vanquished
communist menace, Critical Security Studies insists on taking the broader
security agenda seriously. This does not entail any attempt to deny or ignore
the continuing salience or importance of military security. It does mean,
however, that proponents of Critical Security Studies, by placing 'the poor,
the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless' at the
centre of its agenda, recognize that for most of the world's population,
apparently 'marginal' or 'esoteric' concerns - such as environmental

security, food security and economic security - are far more real and
immediate threats to security than interstate war. Indeed in very many cases,
and not only in the disadvantaged South, the arms purchased and the powers
accrued by governments under the guise of protecting their citizens from
interstate war are far more potent threats to the security of those citizens
than any putative foreign enemy. Eschewing the statism of mainstream
security discourse, proponents of Critical Security Studies recognize that,
globally, the sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity: it is part
of the problem rather than the solution.
This leads us to consideration of who is being secured by the currently

hegemonic discourses and practices of security. The 'referent' of the
orthodox discourse on security was, and remains, the state.48 That is, the
sovereign state, conceived of as a distinct territory and a particular form of
government, is regarded as the entity which is to be 'secured'. The
perceived threat to its security was, of course, other states who were
regarded, in Hobbesian fashion, as eyeing their neighbours rapaciously,
ready to pounce at any sign of weakness. The normative justification for
privileging the state in this way is that states are, allegedly, the agents which
provide their citizens with security at the domestic level. Thus by ensuring
a stable international order, the ultimate result is prosperity for the state's
citizens.4'' Critical Security Studies fundamentally challenges this dominant
account. As we have seen, it argues, on empirical grounds, that any
normative claims for privileging the state are untenable. The overwhelming
majority of states create insecurity rather than foster an atmosphere within
which stability can be attained, and prosperity created. Those relatively few
states which can afford their citizens circumstances enabling them to enjoy
a deal of security do so because of their position within a global economy
which reinforces grotesque disparities of wealth, environmental
degradation, and class and gender inequalities. Their citizens' security is
brought at the price of insecurity for the vast majority of the inhabitants of
those chronically insecure states. Furthermore, rather than viewing the
orthodox discourses and practices of security as aimed at securing states
from potential challenges from other states, a Critical approach suggests
that those discourses and practices are primarily aimed at those within the
states who deign to challenge the status quo. In the states which form the
core of the global economy, these practices and discourses are also aimed at
those in the periphery foolish enough to attempt to refuse their allotted role
in the global division of labour.
Rejecting the traditional fetishization of the state, Critical Security
Studies proposes other referents for security discourse. Security should
focus variously, or indeed interchangeably, on the individual, on society, on
civil society, on community, on the continuing integrity of ethnic or cultural

groups, on global society.5" Furthermore, not only should the referent be
different but so should the aim of the security. According to Ken Booth, the
discourses and practices of security should be concerned with the struggle
for human emancipation.51 Here the project stands full-square with the
tradition of Critical Theory. If 'all theory is for someone and for some
purpose', then Critical Security Studies is for those who are, in Said's
words, '...the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless', and its purpose
is their emancipation. This orientation is in stark contrast to traditional
theories of security, which, Critical Theorists would argue, are for soldiers
and statesmen [sic] and whose purpose is to maintain and strengthen these
groups' already dominant position.
In line with this rejection of the sovereign state as the referent for
security and as the agent through which security is ultimately provided,
Critical Security Studies stresses other agents which can effect
emancipatory change. Eschewing the traditional stress on diplomacy and
the military, it aligns itself with critical or 'new' social movements such as
those engaged in peace activism, those engaged in the struggle for human
rights and the survival of minority cultures, and so on.52 It is through these
movements that Critical Security Studies can hope to become 'a force for
the direction of action'.
At this point we return to the role of theory in effecting social change
which, once again, leads us back to Gramsci. In the Prison Notebooks
Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play
a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders:5' in
Gramsci's terminology, particular historic blocs. Gramsci adotted
Machiavelli's view of power ;is a centaur, that is half man, half beast: a
mixture of consent and coercion.54 Consent is produced and reproduced by
a ruling hegemony which holds sway through civil society and through
which ruling or dominant ideas become widely dispersed.55 In particular,
Gramsci describes how ideology becomes sedimented in society and takes
on the status of 'common sense', that is it becomes unconsciously accepted
and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is
nothing immutable about the values which permeate society; they can and
do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions which were once seen
as natural and beyond question (i.e. commonsensical) in the west, such as
feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust and
unacceptable. In Marx's phrase, 'all that is solid melts into the air'.
Gramsci's intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure
that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a
strategy of a 'war of position'.56 In states with developed civil societies, such
as those of the developed countries, Gramsci argued that any successful
attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even

molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct
an alternative counter-hegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals
have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the
'naturalness', the 'common sense', internalized nature of the status quo.
This in turn helps to create political space within which alternative
conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I
would contend that Gramsci's strategy of a 'war of position' suggests an
appropriate model for proponents of Critical Security Studies to adopt in
relating their theorizing to praxis.
The Tasks of Critical Security Studies

When the project of Critical Security Studies is conceived in terms of a 'war
of position' then we can see that the main task of those intellectuals who
align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the
prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by
utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent
critique of the prevailing security regimes: that is, comparing the
justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. As we have already
seen, when this is attempted in relation to the security field then the
prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own
terms. Additionally, such an approach also involves challenging the
pronouncements of those intellectuals, be they traditional or organic, whose
views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order."
This entails teasing out the often unconscious, and certainly unexamined,
assumptions which underlie their arguments,5* whilst also drawing attention
to the normative viewpoints which are smuggled into mainstream thinking
about security behind its positivist facade. In this sense, if no other,
proponents of Critical Security Studies approximate to Foucault's notion of
'specific intellectuals' who use their expert knowledge to challenge the
prevailing 'regime of truth'.59 However, Critical Theorists might wish to
reformulate this sentiment along more 'modernist' lines of 'speaking truth
to power'.60 Of course, mainstream strategists like Colin S. Gray can, and
indeed do aspire to a similar role.61 The difference between Gray and
proponents of Critical Security Studies is that, while the former seeks to
influence policy-makers in particular directions without questioning the
basis or effects of their power, the latter aim at a thorough-going critique of
all that mainstream strategic studies has taken for granted. Furthermore,
Critical Theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated
by Adorno, that 'The need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of
all truth'."2
The purpose of Critical Theorists' attempts to undermine the prevailing

orthodoxy is ultimately educational, bearing in mind that, as we have seen,
'every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily a pedagogic
relationship'." Thus by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing
alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of
human potentialities, one is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the
legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc, and contributing to the development
of a counter-hegemonic position. There are, of course, a number of avenues
open to the Critical Security specialist in pursuing this educational strategy.
As teachers we can try to foster and encourage scepticism towards 'accepted
wisdom' and open minds towards other possibilities. We can also take
advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant
punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. These points are
summarized by Nancy Fraser who argues that, 'As teachers, we try to foster
an emergent pedagogical counterculture...as critical public intellectuals we
try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public
spheres we have access to.'64 Perhaps significantly, we can find support for
this type of emancipatory strategy even in the work of the ultra-pessimistic
Adorno who argues that: 'In the history of civilization there have been not
a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda,
but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive work
habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion.'65
However, this 'unobtrusive yet insistent work' does not of itself create
the social change to which Adorno alludes. We must be wary of the
conceptual as well as the practical dangers of collapsing praxis into theory.
Rather, through their educational activities, proponents of Critical Theory
must aim to provide support for those social movements who promote
emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order
and legitimating alternative views, Critical Theorists can perform a valuable
role in opening political space for social movements. That said, it should be
stressed that the role of theorists is not to 'direct' and 'instruct' those
movements with which they are aligned. Rather, the relationship is
reciprocal. Indeed, the experience of the European, North American and
Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social
movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual
and educational activity of critical thinkers.66 In Europe, North America and
the Antipodes, the peace movements and the dissident defence intellectuals
drew strength and succour from each other's efforts.
If, however, such critical social movements do not exist then this creates
obvious difficulties for the Critical Theorist. But even under these
circumstances the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual
orientation towards praxis. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s
provides the evidence. Then, the movement benefited from the intellectual
work undertaken in the lean years (in peace movement terms) of the 1970s.
Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as 'common
security' and 'non-offensive defence', were even taken up by the Kremlin
and played a crucial role in defusing the Second Cold War. In this case,
those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in terms of a 'message in a
bottle', but this time, contra Adorno, they were picked up and used to
support a programme of emancipatory political praxis."
Obviously one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those
attempting to develop alternative, critical approaches within academia.

Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the
structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many
problems are caused by what he describes as the growing
'professionalization' of academic life.*8 Academics are now so constrained
by the requirements of job security and marketability as to make most
extremely risk-averse. It pays (in all senses) to stick with the crowd and
avoid the 'exposed limb' by following the prevalent disciplinary
preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals and so on. The result
is, of course, the profoundly autistic and deeply tedious navel-gazing so
prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of
security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the
Cold War.
These difficulties are arguably compounded for critical voices
attempting to intervene in, and challenge the prevailing security discourse.
As we have already argued, sensitivity here is heightened by the states' very
real interest in marginalizing dissent. 'Gate-keeping' appears particularly
strong -journals avoiding articles which are 'too heavily theoretical', i.e.
those which attempt to challenge the prevailing 'common sense'
assumptions. In addition the material lures which reward conformity are
also very substantial. Defence consultancy on the part of academics
involves large amounts of money, and governments and commercial
concerns alike often wish to add a layer of academic respectability and
legitimacy to their enterprises.
Conclusion
Nevertheless, whilst not wishing to underestimate the practical difficulties
engendered by these obstacles, Critical Security Studies is an idea whose
time has come. The contemporary world 'order' exhibits all the morbid
symptoms of the interregnum period foreseen by Gramsci 'when the old is
dying and the new cannot be born'.6'' The 'old' is certainly withering: not
only have we seen the Warsaw Pact disintegrate following the collapse of
the Soviet empire, and the NATO alliance paralysed by the Bosnian tragedy,
but, far more fundamentally, the Westphalian system itself is losing its
legitimacy. The main reason for this 'legitimation crisis'71 is that those
political structures whose justification rests on their ability to provide
security - namely sovereign states and the states system which they form -
are patently failing in their task. When 'security' is considered in its widest,
comprehensive sense, incorporating ecological concerns, economic
questions, human rights - both individual and communal - as well as
military issues, those proffering traditional solutions to contemporary
problems are engaging in a Canute-like attempt to ignore the rising tide of
change.
The nature of the 'new' is still, however, undecided. Barbarism is a
strong possibility. Barbarism will become more of a probability if the
mindset exhibited in the quotation by Edward N. Luttwak at the start of this
article continues to be widely adopted by those engaged in the study of
security. However, there is also the possibility of the development of a
peaceful and rational world order: what Adorno foresaw as a 'landscape of
benignly interacting particularities'.72 Such a development will undoubtedly
be aided if those intellectuals concerned with issues of security attempt to
emulate Habermas in seeking out 'traces of reason that unites without
effacing separation, that binds without unnaming difference, that points out
the common and the shared among strangers, without depriving the other of
otherness'.73 Ultimately, however, only political practice can bring about the
development of a peaceful, secure and just world order. Whilst Critical
Security Studies can assist those political practices which aim at providing
real security through emancipation, it cannot be a substitute for them.
Unfortunately Critical Theorists cannot hope to emulate those Australian
aboriginal people so memorably portrayed by Bruce Chatwin in his book
The Songlines, who, during their 'dream-time', sang their world into
existence.74 However, Critical Security Studies can become an important
voice informing and legitimating those political practices that could turn the
dream of 'a world of benignly interacting particularities' into a reality.
NOTES
I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance and support of Ken Booth, Susie
Carruthers, Steve Smith and Nicholas Wheeler. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented to the
Cambrian Discussion Group in Aberystwyth, and to the Critical Security Studies panels at the
1994 annual conference of the British International Studies Association and the 1995 annual
conference of the International Studies Association. A number of those who attended these
sessions also contributed useful comments and suggestions for which I am most grateful.
1. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy and History: Collected Essays, Volume Two (New Brunswick
and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985), p.xiii.
2. Jrgen Habermas interviewed by Michael Haller, The Past as Future, trans. Max Pensky
(Cambridge: Polity, 1994), pp.119-20.
3. Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.10 (Summer 1981), p.128
[emphasis in original].
4. Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional or Critical Theory', trans. Matthew J. O'Connell, in Max
Horkheimer, Critical Theory; Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 1992), pp.188-243,
and Robert Cox, op. cit., pp. 128-9.
5. Karl Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach' in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol.
5 (1845-47) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p. 5.
6. Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), p.2.
7. The persecution of the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford was dicussed in a lecture by
the former head of department, James O'Connoll. See The Guardian, 16 October 1993, and
The Times, 25 October 1993.
8. Simon Dalby, 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security
Discourse', Alternatives, Vol.17 (Winter 1992), p.98.
9. See, for example, the exchanges between Alexander Wendt and Martin Hollis and Steve
Smith in Review of International Studies, Vol.17 (October 1991), pp.383-410 and 18 (April
1992), pp. 181-8 , and also Walter Carlsneas, 'The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign
Policy Analysis', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.36 (April 1992), pp.245-70, and
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Two stories about structure and agency', Review of
International Studies, Vol.20 (July 1994), pp.241-51.
10. Jrgen Habermas, p.116.
11. For an extended discussion of the relationship between theory and praxis in the work of the
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory see Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in the
Development of Critical Theory, trans Benjamin Gregg (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1985).
12. Cox, p. 130.
13. See ibid., passim, and Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An
Essay in Method', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.12 (Summer 1983),
pp. 162-75.
14. Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.171.
15. Ibid., p. 172.
16. Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Vol.16 (Summer 1987), p. 233 [emphasis in original].
17. The literature on the relationship between the theory and practice of international relations is
sparse. The main studies, in chronological order, are: R.Tanter and R.H.Ullman (eds.),
Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972);
Coral Bell (ed.), Academic Studies and International Politics (Canberra: Department of
International Relations, ANU, 1982); A.J.R. Groom, 'Practitioners and Academics: Towards
a Happier Relationship?', in Michael Banks (ed.), Conflict in World Society: A new
perspective on international relations (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984); Christopher Hill
and Pamela Beshoff (eds.), Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners
and the Trade in Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994).
18. Goronwy J. Jones, Wales and the Quest for Peace (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1969)
gives a flavour of the of activism of which the foundation of the world's first chair in
International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1919, formed only a part.
19. See Brian Porter, 'David Davies: a hunter after peace'. Review of International Studies,
Vol.15 (January 1989), pp.27-36.
20. See Stanley Hoffman, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', Daedalus,
Vol.106, No.3 (1977), pp.41-60, and Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American
Approaches in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.16
(Summer, 1987), pp.207-14. See also Christopher Hill, 'Academic International Relations:
The siren song of policy relevance', in C. Hill and P. Beshoff (eds.), in note 17, pp. 16-19.
21. A.J.R. Groom, p.194.
22. M. Hoffman, p.244.

23. See Stephen Gill, 'Epistemology, ontology, and the "Italian school'", in Stephen Gill (ed.),
Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), pp.21-48.
24. For a discussion of some broad themes see Renate Holub, Antonio Gramsci: Beyond
Marxism and Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.3-30.
25. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...', p.175ff.
26. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p.xiii.
27. As is almost invariably the case with Gramsci, his theory of intellectuals and the role of
intellectual activity is presented in a series of fragmentary notes scattered throughout the
Notebooks. Obviously, Gramsci can hardly be blamed for this given the conditions he was
forced to endure during their writing. It does however mean that his theory has to be
reconstructed from these fragments and it is not without its contradictions. The main
fragments in the Notebooks dealing with intellectuals are 'The Intellectuals', pp.5-23, and
'The Study of Philosophy', pp.323-77.
28. Ibid., p.9.
29. Ibid., p.10.
30. Ibid., p.350.
31. Ibid., pp.332-3.
32. See ibid., pp. 125-205.
33. On the Frankfurt School see, for example, Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its
History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity,
1994) and Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and
the Institute for Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).
34. Adorno's bleak assessment of the pathologies of contemporary society can be found in
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming
(London: Verso, 1989). Adorno's conception of the role of the intellectual are discussed
concisely in Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectual (London: Vintage, 1994),
pp.40-4.
35. Cited in Frederic Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic
(London: Verso, 1992), pp.177-8.
36. Edward Said, p. 42.
37. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from damaged life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London:
Verso, 1991), p.39.
38. Ibid.
39. Raymond Williams, Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism (London: Verso,
1989).
40. See, for example, John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolesence of Major War
(New York: Basic Books, 1990).
41. The term 'commom security' originated in the German security debate but was popularized
by the Palme Commission report, see Independent Commission on Disarmament and
Security Issues, Common Security. A programme for disarmament (London: Pan, 1982). On
the adoption of 'common security', as well the concept of 'non-offensive defence', by
Gorbachev and some of his advisors see, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas do not
float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war',
International Organisation, Vol.48 (Spring 1994), pp.185-214.
42. Said, p. 84.
43. For a classic summary of the fundamental assumptions of Strategic Studies see John Garnett,
'Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions', in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil
Williams (eds), Contemporary Strategy Vol. 1: Theories and Concepts (2nd edition)
(London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.3-29.
44. A more detailed series of such questions can be found in Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in
Southern Africa: Theoretical Consideration', South African Perspectives, No.30 (February
1994) (Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape), pp.26-7. An
attempt to answer those questions in the Southern African context is made in Ken Booth and
Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The case of Southern Africa',
in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
45. For a more extended commentary on contemporary discussions regarding the concept of
security see Richard Wyn Jones, '"Travel without maps": Thinking about Security after the
Cold War', in Jane Davis (ed.), Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Aldershot:
Edward Elgar, forthcoming), pp.232-55.
46. Perhaps the most influential statement of the case for expanding the concept of security is
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the
post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
47. For an extended discussion see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'From Strategy to
Security. Foundations of Critical Security Studies', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams
(eds.), Critical Security Studies.

48. This is also ultimately the case for Barry Buzan despite his broader conception of security.
For a discussion see Richard Wyn Jones, '"Travel without Maps'".
49. On this point see Christian Reus-Smit, 'Realist and Resistance Utopias: Community,
Security and Political Action in the New Europe', Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, Vol.21, No.1 (1992), pp.14-18.
50. Ken Booth argues that the individual should be a central referent in any attempt to rethink
security. See Ken Booth, 'Strategy and emancipation', Review of International Studies, Vol.
17 (October 1991), pp.319-21. Martin Shaw argues that society should be the primary
referent of security in 'There is no such thing as society: beyond individualism and statism
in international security studies', Review of International Studies, Vol.19 (April 1993),
pp. 159-75. Ole Wver discusses the concept of societal security in a book which stresses the
importance of ethno-national identity as the focus of the European security agenda in the
post-Cold War era. See Ole Wasver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre,
Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), esp.
pp. 17-40. Linklater's stress on the importance of community would seem to suggest another
canditate for a successor to the state as the primary referent of the theory and practice of
security. See Andrew Linklater, 'Community', in, Alex Danchev (ed.), The Meaning of the
Twentieth Century (London: Tauris Academic Press, 1995), and 'The Achievements of
Critical Theory', in Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International
Theory: Positivism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming
1995) Ken Booth and Peter Vale suggest that it is appropriate for any Critical Security
Studies approach to focus on different referents, at different times, in different locations. See
Booth and Vale, op. cit. For a critical discussion of these various positions see Richard Wyn
Jones, op. cit.
51. See Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', passim.
52. For a discussion of social movements from a Critical Theory perspective see Larry J. Ray,
Rethinking Critical Theory: Emancipation in the age of Global Social Movements (London:
Sage, 1993), esp. pp.57-77.
53. See, in particular, Gramsci, op. cit., pp.323-77.
54. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...', op. cit., p.164.
55. For an attempt to apply some of Gramsci's concepts to the study of foreign policy see Enrico
Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World (London:
Pinter, 1988).
56. Gramsci, op. cit., pp.229-39.
57. It could be argued that many strategists, for example Colin S. Gray and Edward N. Luttwak,
are organic intellectuals in that they explicitly orientate their ideas towards the interests of a
specific strata within society, in their case the ruling elites. See, for example, Gray, Strategic
Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1982), pp. 185-95.
58. For an attempt to interrogate the assumptions about the role of technology which underlie
much nuclear strategy see Richard Wyn Jones, 'The Nuclear Revolution', in Alex Danchev
(ed.), op. cit.
59. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977,
edited by Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper
(Brighton: Harvester, 1980), p. 132.
60. This approach has recently been eloquently rearticulated by Edward W. Said, op. cit.,
pp.63-75.
61. Gray, op. cit., p.193.
62. Cited in Frederic Jameson, op. cit., p. 66.
63. See note 31.
64. Nancy Fraser, op. cit., p. 11.
65. Theodor W. Adorno, cited in Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, CO. and
Oxford: Westview, 1992), p.vii.
66. See, for example, the discussion of the 'Nuclear Freeze Movement in the United States' in
David Cortright, Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War (Boulder, CO and
Oxford: Westview, 1993), pp.5-13. Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of
such figures as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the political climate in New
Zealand and aiding the growth of the country's anti-nuclear movement. Michael C. Pugh,
The ANZUS crisis, nuclear visiting and deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), p.108.
67. See note 41.
68. Said, op. cit., pp.49-62.
69. This is cited by one of the pioneers of Critical Security Studies, Ken Booth, following its use
by the South African novelist Nadine Gordimer. See Ken Booth, introduction The
interregnum: world politics in transition' in Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy
and International Security (London: HarperCollins, 1991), p.1. The original source of this
quotation is Gramsci, op. cit., p.276.
70. See, for example, James R. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and
Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
71. Jrgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976).
72. Martin Jay, Adorno (London: Fontana, 1984), p.20.
73. See note 2.
74. Bruce Chatwin, The Songlines (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987).

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Message in a bottle'? Theory and praxis in critical

Richard Wyn Jones

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Strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen

in general, and academics in particular.

such as Critical Security Studies (which will be delineated and discussed

Critical Theory and Emancipatory Politics

to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities'.15 But the

seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to

The Relationship between International Relations Theory and Global

international relations adopted an explicitly positivist approach to the

desirable political practice, the dominant forms of Realism - currently, of

reproduce and legitimate global realpolitik.

Critical Theory it is arguable that without some plausible account of the

Critical Theory on the Role of Intellectuals

practice, Gramsci claims that:

already over-determined structures of domination. The only honourable role

philosophy in terms of a 'message in a bottle' to be cast on the waters of

delegitimated.40 Of course, this change is occurring due to many factors.

defence intellectuals encouraged, as well as drew strength from peace

Critical Security Studies and the Theory-Practice Nexus

campaign on an issue, or series of issues, pertinent to the struggle for

fundamentally the shibboleths of Strategic Studies.43

apparently 'marginal' or 'esoteric' concerns - such as environmental

This leads us to consideration of who is being secured by the currently

civil society, on community, on the continuing integrity of ethnic or cultural

attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even

The Tasks of Critical Security Studies

The purpose of Critical Theorists' attempts to undermine the prevailing

attempting to develop alternative, critical approaches within academia.

22. M. Hoffman, p.244.

(eds.), Critical Security Studies.

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