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113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Supreme Court of the United States
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE,
INC. and Ernesto Pichardo, Petitioners,
v.
CITY OF HIALEAH.
No. 91-948.
Argued Nov. 4, 1992.
Decided June 11, 1993.
Church brought action challenging city ordinances
dealing with ritual slaughter of animals. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied relief, 723 F.Supp. 1467, and church
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, 936 F.2d 586. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that: (1) or-
dinances were not neutral; (2) ordinances were not
of general applicability; and (3) governmental in-
terest assertedly advanced by the ordinances did not
justify the targeting of religious activity.
Reversed.
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined.
Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment.
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in which Justice O'Connor joined.
West Headnotes
[1] Constitutional Law 92 1291
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1291 k. Neutrality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
Law that is neutral and of general applicability need
not be justified by compelling government interest
even if law has incidental effect of burdening par-
ticular religious practice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1
.
[2] Constitutional Law 92 1291
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1291 k. Neutrality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Law which is not neutral and of general applicabil-
ity must be justified by compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance
that interest if it burdens religious practice.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[3] Constitutional Law 92 1303
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1302 Free Exercise of Religion
92k1303 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Protections of free exercise clause pertain if law at
issue discriminates against some or all religious be-
liefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[4] Constitutional Law 92 1291
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1291 k. Neutrality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
If object of law is to infringe upon or restrict prac-
tices because of their religious motivation, law is
not neutral and is invalid unless justified by com-
pelling interest and narrowly tailored to advance
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
that interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[5] Constitutional Law 92 1291
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1291 k. Neutrality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
To determine object of law which burdens religion,
court must begin with its text, for minimum re-
quirement of neutrality is that law not discriminate
on its face; law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to
religious practice without secular meaning discern-
ible from the language or context. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[6] Constitutional Law 92 1307
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1302 Free Exercise of Religion
92k1307 k. Neutrality; General Ap-
plicability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Facial neutrality is not determinative of whether
law violates free exercise clause, as that clause ex-
tends beyond facial discrimination and forbids
subtle departures from neutrality and covert sup-
pression of particular religious beliefs. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[7] Constitutional Law 92 1307
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1302 Free Exercise of Religion
92k1307 k. Neutrality; General Ap-
plicability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Official action that targets religious conduct for dis-
tinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere com-
pliance with requirement of facial neutrality, as free
exercise clause protects against governmental hos-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
tility which is masked as well as overt. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[8] Constitutional Law 92 1328
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1327 Religious Organizations in Gen-
eral
92k1328 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k84.5(1))
Ordinances regulating ritual animal sacrifice were
not religiously neutral as they used the words
“sacrifice” and “ritual,” resolutions recited that res-
idents and citizens of the city had expressed their
concern that certain religions might propose to en-
gage in practices which were inconsistent with pub-
lic morals and reiterated the city's commitment to
prohibit any and all such acts of any and all reli-
gious groups, ordinances defined “sacrifice” so as
to exclude almost all killings of animals except for
religious sacrifice, ordinances reached few if any
killings other than those performed as religious sac-
rifice by particular church, and ordinances did not
deal with hunting, slaughter of animals for foods,
eradication of insects and pests, or euthanasia.
[9] Constitutional Law 92 1290
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1290 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Adverse impact will not always lead to finding of
impermissible targeting of religion, as social harm
may have been legitimate concern of government
for reasons quite apart from discrimination.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[10] Constitutional Law 92 1150
92 Constitutional Law
92X First Amendment in General
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
92X(A) In General
92k1150 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k82(3))
Neutrality of law is suspect if First Amendment
freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated collateral
harms not themselves prohibited by direct regula-
tion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[11] Animals 28 15
28 Animals
28k15 k. Regulation of Slaughtering. Most Cited
Cases
Constitutional Law 92 1328
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1327 Religious Organizations in Gen-
eral
92k1328 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k84.5(1))
Although city ordinance governing slaughterhouses
appeared to apply to substantial nonreligious con-
duct and not be overbroad, it was invalid on First
Amendment grounds where it was part of a group
of four ordinances which were passed for the pur-
pose of suppressing animal sacrifices performed by
church. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[12] Constitutional Law 92 1290
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1290 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
All laws are selective to some extent, but categories
of selection are of paramount concern when law has
incidental effect of burdening religious practices,
and inequality results when legislature decides that
government interests it seeks to advance are worthy
of being pursued only against conduct with a reli-
gious motivation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 3
[13] Constitutional Law 92 1306
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1302 Free Exercise of Religion
92k1306 k. Burden on Religion. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate
interests, cannot in a selective manner impose bur-
dens only on conduct motivated by religious belief
is essential to protection of rights guaranteed by
free exercise clause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[14] Animals 28 15
28 Animals
28k15 k. Regulation of Slaughtering. Most Cited
Cases
Constitutional Law 92 1310
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1310 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.5(1))
Ordinances dealing with ritual slaughter of animals
were not of general applicability despite claim that
they prevented cruelty to animals where they were
underinclusive for those ends and failed to prohibit
nonreligious conduct endangering the interests in a
similar or greater degree than did religious ritual
sacrifice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[15] Animals 28 15
28 Animals
28k15 k. Regulation of Slaughtering. Most Cited
Cases
Constitutional Law 92 1310
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(B) Particular Issues and Applications
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
92k1310 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.5(17))
Ordinances intended to prohibit ritual slaughter of
animals were not of general applicability despite
claim that they were related to city's interest in pub-
lic health which was threatened by disposal of an-
imal carcasses in open public places and the con-
sumption of uninspected meat, where they were un-
derinclusive with respect to that interest as they did
not deal with consumption of meat or disposal of
carcasses by hunters and fishers. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[16] Constitutional Law 92 1291
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1291 k. Neutrality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Law burdening religious practice, not neutral or of
general application, must undergo the most rigorous
of scrutiny. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[17] Constitutional Law 92 1290
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
92XIII(A) In General
92k1290 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.1, 92k84(1))
Law that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment or advances legitimate governmental in-
terest only against conduct with religious motiva-
tion survives strict scrutiny only in rare cases.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[18] Animals 28 15
28 Animals
28k15 k. Regulation of Slaughtering. Most Cited
Cases
Constitutional Law 92 1310
92 Constitutional Law
92XIII Freedom of Religion and Conscience
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 4
92XIII(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1310 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k84.5(1))
Ordinances dealing with ritual slaughter of animals
did not have compelling governmental interest
which would justify their targeting of religious
activity despite claims that they dealt with the city's
interest in public health and the protection of
cruelty to animals. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
FN*
**2219 Syllabus
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the con-
venience of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26
S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
Petitioner church and its congregants practice the
Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifice
as one of its principal forms of devotion. The anim-
als are killed by cutting their carotid arteries and
are cooked and eaten following all Santeria rituals
except**2220 healing and death rites. After the
church leased land in respondent city and an-
nounced plans to establish a house of worship and
other facilities there, the city council held an emer-
gency public session and passed, among other en-
actments, Resolution 87-66, which noted city resid-
ents' “concern” over religious practices inconsistent
with public morals, peace, or safety, and declared
the city's “commitment” to prohibiting such prac-
tices; Ordinance 87-40, which incorporates the
Florida animal cruelty laws and broadly punishes
“[w]hoever ... unnecessarily or cruelly ... kills any
animal,” and has been interpreted to reach killings
for religious reasons; Ordinance 87-52, which
defines “sacrifice” as “to unnecessarily kill ... an
animal in a ... ritual ... not for the primary purpose
of food consumption,” and prohibits the
“possess[ion], sacrifice, or slaughter” of an animal
if it is killed in “any type of ritual” and there is an
intent to use it for food, but exempts “any licensed
[food] establishment” if the killing is otherwise per-
mitted by law; Ordinance 87-71, which prohibits
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
the sacrifice of animals, and defines “sacrifice” in
the same manner as Ordinance 87-52; and Ordin-
ance 87-72, which defines “slaughter” as “the
killing of animals for food” and prohibits slaughter
outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses, but in-
cludes an exemption for “small numbers of hogs
and/or cattle” when exempted by state law. Peti-
tioners filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-
leging violations of their rights under, inter alia,
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Although acknowledging that the foregoing ordin-
ances are not religiously neutral, the District Court
ruled for the city, concluding, among other things,
that compelling governmental interests in prevent-
ing public health risks and cruelty to animals fully
justified the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice
accomplished by the ordinances, and that an excep-
tion to that prohibition for religious conduct would
unduly interfere with fulfillment of the govern-
mental interest because any more narrow restric-
tions would*521 be unenforceable as a result of the
Santeria religion's secret nature. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed.
936 F.2d 586, (CA 11 1991) reversed.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II-A-1, II-A-3, II-B,
III, and IV, concluding that the laws in question
were enacted contrary to free exercise principles,
and they are void. Pp. 2225-30, 2231-34.
(a) Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that bur-
dens religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and
of general applicability. Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876. However, where
such a law is not neutral or not of general applica-
tion, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny:
It must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance
that interest. Neutrality and general applicability
are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one require-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5
ment is a likely indication that the other has not
been satisfied. Pp. 2225-26.
(b) The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate
that they are not neutral, but have as their object the
suppression of Santeria's central element, animal
sacrifice. That this religious exercise has been tar-
geted is evidenced by Resolution 87-66's statements
of “concern” and “commitment,” and by the use of
the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” in Ordinances
87-40, 87-52, and 87-71. Moreover, the latter ordin-
ances' various prohibitions, definitions, and exemp-
tions demonstrate that they were “gerrymandered”
with care to proscribe religious killings of animals
by Santeria church members but to exclude almost
all other animal killings. They also suppress much
more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve
their stated ends. The legitimate governmental in-
terests in protecting the public health and prevent-
ing cruelty to animals could be addressed by re-
strictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of
all Santeria sacrificial practice, such as **2221 gen-
eral regulations on the disposal of organic garbage,
on the care of animals regardless of why they are
kept, or on methods of slaughter. Although Ordin-
ance 87-72 appears to apply to substantial nonreli-
gious conduct and not to be overbroad, it must also
be invalidated because it functions in tandem with
the other ordinances to suppress Santeria religious
worship. Pp. 2227-30.
(c) Each of the ordinances pursues the city's gov-
ernmental interests only against conduct motivated
by religious belief and thereby violates the require-
ment that laws burdening religious practice must be
of general applicability. Ordinances 87-40, 87-52,
and 87-71 are substantially underinclusive with re-
gard to the city's interest in preventing crueltyto
*522 animals, since they are drafted with care to
forbid few animal killings but those occasioned by
religious sacrifice, while many types of animal
deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are either
not prohibited or approved by express provision.
The city's assertions that it is “self-evident” that
killing for food is “important,” that the eradication
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
of insects and pests is “obviously justified,” and
that euthanasia of excess animals “makes sense” do
not explain why religion alone must bear the bur-
den of the ordinances. These ordinances are also
substantially underinclusive with regard to the
city's public health interests in preventing the dis-
posal of animal carcasses in open public places and
the consumption of uninspected meat, since neither
interest is pursued by respondent with regard to
conduct that is not motivated by religious convic-
tion. Ordinance 87-72 is underinclusive on its face,
since it does not regulate nonreligious slaughter for
food in like manner, and respondent has not ex-
plained why the commercial slaughter of “small
numbers” of cattle and hogs does not implicate its
professed desire to prevent cruelty to animals and
preserve the public health. Pp. 2231-33.
(d) The ordinances cannot withstand the strict scru-
tiny that is required upon their failure to meet the
Smith standard. They are not narrowly tailored to
accomplish the asserted governmental interests. All
four are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial
respects because the proffered objectives are not
pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious
conduct and those interests could be achieved by
narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far
lesser degree. Moreover, where, as here, govern-
ment restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to
restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or
alleged harm of the same sort, the governmental in-
terests given in justification of the restriction can-
not be regarded as compelling. Pp. 2233-34.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS,
SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, the
opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS,
SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, the opinion of
the Court with respect to Parts II-A-1 and II-A-3, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS,
SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and an opin-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 6
ion with respect to Part II-A-2, in which STEVENS
, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., joined, post, p. ----. SOUTER,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment, post, p. ----. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. ----.
*523 Douglas Laycock, Austin, TX, for petitioners.
Richard G. Garrett, Miami, FL, for respondent.
**2222 Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of
FN*
the Court, except as to Part II-A-2.
FN* THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice
SCALIA, and Justice THOMAS join all
but Part II-A-2 of this opinion. Justice
WHITE joins all but Part II-A of this opin-
ion. Justice SOUTER joins only Parts I,
III, and IV of this opinion.
The principle that government may not enact laws
that suppress religious belief or practice is so well
understood that few violations are recorded in our
opinions. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98
S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978); Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed.
828 (1953). Concerned that this fundamental non-
persecution principle of the First Amendment was
implicated here, however, we granted certiorari.
503 U.S. 935, 112 S.Ct. 1472, 117 L.Ed.2d 616
(1992).
*524 Our review confirms that the laws in question
were enacted by officials who did not understand,
failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that
their official actions violated the Nation's essential
commitment to religious freedom. The challenged
laws had an impermissible object; and in all events
the principle of general applicability was violated
because the secular ends asserted in defense of the
laws were pursued only with respect to conduct mo-
tivated by religious beliefs. We invalidate the chal-
lenged enactments and reverse the judgment of the
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Court of Appeals.
I
A ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles. The
This case involves practices of the Santeria reli-
gion, which originated in the 19th century. When
hundreds of thousands of members of the Yoruba
people were brought as slaves from western Africa
to Cuba, their traditional African religion absorbed
significant elements of Roman Catholicism. The
resulting syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, “the way
of the saints.” The Cuban Yoruba express their de-
votion to spirits, called orishas, through the icono-
graphy of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are of-
ten present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees
attend the Catholic sacraments. 723 F.Supp. 1467,
1469-1470 (SD Fla.1989); 13 Encyclopedia of Reli-
gion 66 (M. Eliade ed. 1987); 1 Encyclopedia of the
American Religious Experience 183 (C. Lippy & P.
Williams eds. 1988).
The Santeria faith teaches that every individual has
a destiny from God, a destiny fulfilled with the aid
and energy of the orishas. The basis of the Santeria
religion is the nurture of a personal relation with
the orishas, and one of the principal forms of devo-
tion is an animal sacrifice. 13 Encyclopedia of Reli-
gion, supra, at 66. The sacrifice of animals as part
of religious rituals has ancient roots. See generally
12 id., at 554-556. Animal sacrifice is mentioned
throughout the Old Testament, see 14 Encyclopae-
dia Judaica 600, 600-605*525 (1971), and it played
an important role in the practice of Judaism before
destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem, see
id., at 605-612. In modern Islam, there is an annual
sacrifice commemorating Abraham's sacrifice of a
ram in the stead of his son. See C. Glassé, Concise
Encyclopedia of Islam 178 (1989); 7 Encyclopedia
of Religion, supra, at 456.
According to Santeria teaching, the orishas are
powerful but not immortal. They depend for surviv-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 7
al on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth,
marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick,
for the initiation of new members and priests, and
during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in
Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves,
animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid ar-
teries in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked
and eaten, except after healing and death rituals.
See 723 F.Supp., at 1471-1472; 13 Encyclopedia of
Religion, supra, at 66; M. Gonzálex-Wippler, The
Santeria Experience 105 (1982).
Santeria adherents faced widespread persecution in
Cuba, so the religion and its **2223 rituals were
practiced in secret. The open practice of Santeria
and its rites remains infrequent. See 723 F.Supp., at
1470; 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 67;
M. González-Wippler, Santería: The Religion 3-4
(1989). The religion was brought to this Nation
most often by exiles from the Cuban revolution.
The District Court estimated that there are at least
50,000 practitioners in South Florida today. See
723 F.Supp., at 1470.
B
Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
(Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized
under Florida law in 1973. The Church and its con-
gregants practice the Santeria religion. The presid-
ent of the Church is petitioner Ernesto Pichardo,
who is also the Church's priest and holds the reli-
gious title of Italero, the second highest in the San-
teria faith. In April 1987, the Church leased land in
*526 the City of Hialeah, Florida, and announced
plans to establish a house of worship as well as a
school, cultural center, and museum. Pichardo in-
dicated that the Church's goal was to bring the prac-
tice of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of an-
imal sacrifice, into the open. The Church began the
process of obtaining utility service and receiving
the necessary licensing, inspection, and zoning ap-
provals. Although the Church's efforts at obtaining
the necessary licenses and permits were far from
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
smooth, see 723 F.Supp., at 1477-1478, it appears
that it received all needed approvals by early Au-
gust 1987.
The prospect of a Santeria church in their midst was
distressing to many members of the Hialeah com-
munity, and the announcement of the plans to open
a Santeria church in Hialeah prompted the city
council to hold an emergency public session on
June 9, 1987. The resolutions and ordinances
passed at that and later meetings are set forth in the
Appendix following this opinion.
A summary suffices here, beginning with the enact-
ments passed at the June 9 meeting. First, the city
council adopted Resolution 87-66, which noted the
“concern” expressed by residents of the city “that
certain religions may propose to engage in practices
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety,” and declared that “[t]he City reiterates its
commitment to a prohibition against any and all
acts of any and all religious groups which are in-
consistent with public morals, peace or safety.”
Next, the council approved an emergency ordin-
ance, Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated in full,
except as to penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws.
Fla.Stat. ch. 828 (1987). Among other things, the
incorporated state law subjected to criminal punish-
ment “[w]hoever ... unnecessarily or cruelly ... kills
any animal.” § 828.12.
The city council desired to undertake further legis-
lative action, but Florida law prohibited a municip-
ality from enacting legislation relating to animal
cruelty that conflicted with *527 state law. §
828.27(4). To obtain clarification, Hialeah's city at-
torney requested an opinion from the attorney gen-
eral of Florida as to whether § 828.12 prohibited “a
religious group from sacrificing an animal in a reli-
gious ritual or practice” and whether the city could
enact ordinances “making religious animal sacrifice
unlawful.” The attorney general responded in mid-
July. He concluded that the “ritual sacrifice of an-
imals for purposes other than food consumption”
was not a “necessary” killing and so was prohibited
by § 828.12. Fla.Op.Atty.Gen. 87-56, Annual Re-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 8
port of the Atty.Gen. 146, 147, 149 (1988). The at-
torney general appeared to define “unnecessary” as
“done without any useful motive, in a spirit of wan-
ton cruelty or for the mere pleasure of destruction
without being in any sense beneficial or useful to
the person killing the animal.” Id., at 149, n. 11. He
advised that religious animal sacrifice was against
state law, so that a city ordinance prohibiting it
would not be in conflict. Id., at 151.
The city council responded at first with a hortatory
enactment, Resolution 87-90, that noted its resid-
ents' “great concern regarding the possibility of
public ritualistic animal sacrifices” **2224 and the
state-law prohibition. The resolution declared the
city policy “to oppose the ritual sacrifices of anim-
als” within Hialeah and announced that any person
or organization practicing animal sacrifice “will be
prosecuted.”
In September 1987, the city council adopted three
substantive ordinances addressing the issue of reli-
gious animal sacrifice. Ordinance 87-52 defined
“sacrifice” as “to unnecessarily kill, torment, tor-
ture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private
ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of
food consumption,” and prohibited owning or pos-
sessing an animal “intending to use such animal for
food purposes.” It restricted application of this pro-
hibition, however, to any individual or group that
“kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type
of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or
blood of the animal is to be consumed.” The ordin-
ance *528 contained an exemption for slaughtering
by “licensed establishment[s]” of animals
“specifically raised for food purposes.” Declaring,
moreover, that the city council “has determined that
the sacrificing of animals within the city limits is
contrary to the public health, safety, welfare and
morals of the community,” the city council adopted
Ordinance 87-71. That ordinance defined sacrifice
as had Ordinance 87-52, and then provided that
“[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, persons, cor-
porations or associations to sacrifice any animal
within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah,
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Florida.” The final Ordinance, 87-72, defined
“slaughter” as “the killing of animals for food” and
prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for
slaughterhouse use. The ordinance provided an ex-
emption, however, for the slaughter or processing
for sale of “small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per
week in accordance with an exemption provided by
state law.” All ordinances and resolutions passed
the city council by unanimous vote. Violations of
each of the four ordinances were punishable by
fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not ex-
ceeding 60 days, or both.
Following enactment of these ordinances, the
Church and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. Named as de-
fendants were the city of Hialeah and its mayor and
members of its city council in their individual capa-
cities. Alleging violations of petitioners' rights un-
der, inter alia, the Free Exercise Clause, the com-
plaint sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive
and monetary relief. The District Court granted
summary judgment to the individual defendants,
finding that they had absolute immunity for their le-
gislative acts and that the ordinances and resolu-
tions adopted by the council did not constitute an
official policy of harassment, as alleged by petition-
ers. 688 F.Supp. 1522 (SD Fla.1988).
After a 9-day bench trial on the remaining claims,
the District Court ruled for the city, finding no viol-
ation of petitioners'*529 rights under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 723 F.Supp. 1467 (SD Fla.1989). (The
court rejected as well petitioners' other claims,
which are not at issue here.) Although acknow-
ledging that “the ordinances are not religiously
neutral,” id., at 1476, and that the city's concern
about animal sacrifice was “prompted” by the es-
tablishment of the Church in the city, id., at 1479,
the District Court concluded that the purpose of the
ordinances was not to exclude the Church from the
city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for
whatever reason practiced, id., at 1479, 1483. The
court also found that the ordinances did not target
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 9
religious conduct “on their face,” though it noted
that in any event “specifically regulating [religious]
conduct” does not violate the First Amendment
“when [the conduct] is deemed inconsistent with
public health and welfare.” Id., at 1483-1484. Thus,
the court concluded that, at most, the ordinances'
effect on petitioners' religious conduct was
“incidental to [their] secular purpose and effect.”
Id., at 1484.
The District Court proceeded to determine whether
the governmental interests underlying the ordin-
ances were compelling and, if **2225 so, to bal-
ance the “governmental and religious interests.”
The court noted that “[t]his ‘balance depends upon
the cost to the government of altering its activity to
allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded
versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by
the government activity.’ ” Ibid., quoting Grosz v.
City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 734 (CA 11
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83
L.Ed.2d 52 (1984). The court found four compel-
ling interests. First, the court found that animal sac-
rifices present a substantial health risk, both to par-
ticipants and the general public. According to the
court, animals that are to be sacrificed are often
kept in unsanitary conditions and are uninspected,
and animal remains are found in public places. 723
F.Supp., at 1474-1475, 1485. Second, the court
found emotional injury to children who witness the
sacrifice of animals. Id., at 1475-1476, 1485-1486.
Third, the court found compelling the city's interest
*530 in protecting animals from cruel and unneces-
sary killing. The court determined that the method
of killing used in Santeria sacrifice was “unreliable
and not humane, and that the animals, before being
sacrificed, are often kept in conditions that produce
a great deal of fear and stress in the animal.” Id., at
1472-1473, 1486. Fourth, the District Court found
compelling the city's interest in restricting the
slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for
slaughterhouse use. Id., at 1486. This legal determ-
ination was not accompanied by factual findings.
Balancing the competing governmental and reli-
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
gious interests, the District Court concluded the
compelling governmental interests “fully justify the
absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice” accom-
plished by the ordinances. Id., at 1487. The court
also concluded that an exception to the sacrifice
prohibition for religious conduct would “ ‘unduly
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental in-
terest’ ” because any more narrow restrictions-e.g.,
regulation of disposal of animal carcasses-would be
unenforceable as a result of the secret nature of the
Santeria religion. Id., at 1486-1487, and nn. 57-59.
A religious exemption from the city's ordinances,
concluded the court, would defeat the city's com-
pelling interests in enforcing the prohibition. Id., at
1487.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion.
Judgt. order reported at 936 F.2d 586 (1991).
Choosing not to rely on the District Court's recita-
tion of a compelling interest in promoting the wel-
fare of children, the Court of Appeals stated simply
that it concluded the ordinances were consistent
with the Constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2. It
declined to address the effect of Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990),
decided after the District Court's opinion, because
the District Court “employed an arguably stricter
standard” than that applied in Smith. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A2, n. 1.
*531 II
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
which has been applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connectic-
ut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed.
1213 (1940), provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof....” (Emphasis ad-
ded). The city does not argue that Santeria is not a
“religion” within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment. Nor could it. Although the practice of animal
sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, “religious
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 10
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707,
714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1430, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981).
Given the historical association between animal
sacrifice and religious worship, see supra, at 2, pe-
titioners' assertion that animal sacrifice is an integ-
ral part of their religion “cannot be **2226 deemed
bizarre or incredible.” Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of
Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834, n. 2, 109
S.Ct. 1514, 1518, n. 2, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989).
Neither the city nor the courts below, moreover,
have questioned the sincerity of petitioners' pro-
fessed desire to conduct animal sacrifices for reli-
gious reasons. We must consider petitioners' First
Amendment claim.
[1][2] In addressing the constitutional protection for
free exercise of religion, our cases establish the
general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest even if the law has
the incidental effect of burdening a particular reli-
gious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra. Neutrality and
general applicability are interrelated, and, as be-
comes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has
not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these re-
quirements must be justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance*532 that interest. These ordinances fail to
satisfy the Smith requirements. We begin by dis-
cussing neutrality.
A
In our Establishment Clause cases we have often
stated the principle that the First Amendment for-
bids an official purpose to disapprove of a particu-
lar religion or of religion in general. See, e.g.,
Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist.
66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248, 110 S.Ct. 2356,
2370-71, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (plurality opin-
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
ion); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 389, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3225-26, 87 L.Ed.2d 267
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105
S.Ct. 2479, 2489-90, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-107, 89 S.Ct.
266, 271-72, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); School Dist.
of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83
S.Ct. 1560, 1573, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); Everson
v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 67
S.Ct. 504, 511-12, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). These
cases, however, for the most part have addressed
governmental efforts to benefit religion or particu-
lar religions, and so have dealt with a question dif-
ferent, at least in its formulation and emphasis,
from the issue here. Petitioners allege an attempt to
disfavor their religion because of the religious cere-
monies it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause
is dispositive in our analysis.
[3] At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exer-
cise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for reli-
gious reasons. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1148, 6 L.Ed.2d 563
(1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 69-70, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828
(1953). Indeed, it was “historical instances of reli-
gious persecution and intolerance that gave concern
to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.”
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703, 106 S.Ct. 2147,
2154, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (opinion of Burger,
C.J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States §§ 991-992 (abridged ed.
1833) (reprint 1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464, and n. 2, 81 S.Ct.
1153, 1156, and n. 2, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157, 179, 63 S.Ct. 882, 888, 87 L.Ed.
1324 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result);*533
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299,
300, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890). These principles, though
not often at issue in our Free Exercise Clause cases,
have played a role in some. In McDaniel v. Paty,
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 11
435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593
(1978), for example, we invalidated a State law that
disqualified members of the clergy from holding
certain public offices, because it “impose[d] special
disabilities on the basis of ... religious status,” Em-
ployment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct., at 1599. On
the **2227 same principle, in Fowler v. Rhode Is-
land, supra, we found that a municipal ordinance
was applied in an unconstitutional manner when in-
terpreted to prohibit preaching in a public park by a
Jehovah's Witness but to permit preaching during
the course of a Catholic mass or Protestant church
service. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 272-273, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327-28, 95 L.Ed. 267
(1951). Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 102
S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (state statute that
treated some religious denominations more favor-
ably than others violated the Establishment Clause).
1
[4][5] Although a law targeting religious beliefs as
such is never permissible, McDaniel v. Paty, supra,
435 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct., at 1327-28 (plurality
opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S.,
at 303-304, 60 S.Ct., at 903 if the object of a law is
to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral,
see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at 878-879, 110
S.Ct., at 1599-1600; and it is invalid unless it is jus-
tified by a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to advance that interest. There are, of
course, many ways of demonstrating that the object
or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or
religious conduct. To determine the object of a law,
we must begin with its text, for the minimum re-
quirement of neutrality is that a law not discrimin-
ate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it
refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernable from the language or context.
Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail
this test of facial neutrality because they use the
words*534 “sacrifice” and “ritual,” words with
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
strong religious connotations. Brief for Petitioners
16-17. We agree that these words are consistent
with the claim of facial discrimination, but the ar-
gument is not conclusive. The words “sacrifice”
and “ritual” have a religious origin, but current use
admits also of secular meanings. See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1961, 1996
(1971). See also 12 Encyclopedia of Religion, at
556 (“[T]he word sacrifice ultimately became very
much a secular term in common usage”). The or-
dinances, furthermore, define “sacrifice” in secular
terms, without referring to religious practices.
[6][7] We reject the contention advanced by the
city, see Brief for Respondent 15, that our inquiry
must end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial
neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise
Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends bey-
ond facial discrimination. The Clause “forbids
subtle departures from neutrality,” Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452, 91 S.Ct. 828,
837, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), and “covert suppres-
sion of particular religious beliefs,” Bowen v. Roy,
supra, 476 U.S., at 703, 106 S.Ct., at 2154 (opinion
of Burger, C.J.). Official action that targets reli-
gious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement
of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects against governmental hostility which is
masked, as well as overt. “The Court must survey
meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerry-
manders.” Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City,
397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1425, 25 L.Ed.2d
697 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
[8] The record in this case compels the conclusion
that suppression of the central element of the San-
teria worship service was the object of the ordin-
ances. First, though use of the words “sacrifice”
and “ritual” does not compel a finding of improper
targeting of the Santeria religion, the choice of
these words is support for our conclusion. There are
further respects in which the text of the city coun-
cil's enactments discloses the improper attempt to
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 12
target Santeria. *535 Resolution 87-66, adopted
June 9, 1987, recited that “residents and citizens of
the City of Hialeah have expressed their concern
**2228 that certain religions may propose to en-
gage in practices which are inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety,” and “reiterate[d]” the
city's commitment to prohibit “any and all [such]
acts of any and all religious groups.” No one sug-
gests, and on this record it cannot be maintained,
that city officials had in mind a religion other than
Santeria.
[9] It becomes evident that these ordinances target
Santeria sacrifice when the ordinances' operation is
considered. Apart from the text, the effect of a law
in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.
To be sure, adverse impact will not always lead to a
finding of impermissible targeting. For example, a
social harm may have been a legitimate concern of
government for reasons quite apart from discrimin-
ation. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 442, 81
S.Ct., at 1113-14. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637
(1890). See also Ely, Legislative and Administrat-
ive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J.
1205, 1319 (1970). The subject at hand does im-
plicate, of course, multiple concerns unrelated to
religious animosity, for example, the suffering or
mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed animals
and health hazards from improper disposal. But the
ordinances when considered together disclose an
object remote from these legitimate concerns. The
design of these laws accomplishes instead a
“religious gerrymander,” Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York City, supra, 397 U.S., at 696, 90 S.Ct., at
1425 (Harlan, J., concurring), an impermissible at-
tempt to target petitioners and their religious prac-
tices.
It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only
conduct subject to Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and
87-71 is the religious exercise of Santeria church
members. The texts show that they were drafted in
tandem to achieve this result. We begin with Ordin-
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
ance 87-71. It prohibits the sacrifice of animals, but
defines sacrifice as “to unnecessarily kill ... an an-
imal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not
for the *536 primary purpose of food consump-
tion.” The definition excludes almost all killings of
animals except for religious sacrifice, and the
primary purpose requirement narrows the pro-
scribed category even further, in particular by ex-
empting kosher slaughter, see 723 F.Supp., at 1480.
We need not discuss whether this differential treat-
ment of two religions is itself an independent con-
stitutional violation. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S., at 244-246, 102 S.Ct., at 1683-84. It suffices
to recite this feature of the law as support for our
conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive le-
gislative concern. The net result of the gerrymander
is that few if any killings of animals are prohibited
other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed
because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and
its primary purpose is to make an offering to the
orishas, not food consumption. Indeed, careful
drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is
prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or
humane in almost all other circumstances are un-
punished.
Operating in similar fashion is Ordinance 87-52,
which prohibits the “possess [ion], sacrifice, or
slaughter” of an animal with the “inten[t] to use
such animal for food purposes.” This prohibition,
extending to the keeping of an animal as well as the
killing itself, applies if the animal is killed in “any
type of ritual” and there is an intent to use the an-
imal for food, whether or not it is in fact consumed
for food. The ordinance exempts, however, “any li-
censed [food] establishment” with regard to “any
animals which are specifically raised for food pur-
poses,” if the activity is permitted by zoning and
other laws. This exception, too, seems intended to
cover kosher slaughter. Again, the burden of the or-
dinance, in practical terms, falls on Santeria adher-
ents but almost no others: If the killing is-unlike
most Santeria sacrifices-unaccompanied by the in-
tent to use the animal for food, then it is not prohib-
ited by Ordinance 87-52; if the killing is specific-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 13
ally for food but does not occur during the **2229
course of “any type of ritual,” it again falls outside
the prohibition; and if*537 the killing is for food
and occurs during the course of a ritual, it is still
exempted if it occurs in a properly zoned and li-
censed establishment and involves animals
“specifically raised for food purposes.” A pattern of
exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibi-
tions. Each contributes to the gerrymander.
Ordinance 87-40 incorporates the Florida animal
cruelty statute, Fla.Stat. § 828.12 (1987). Its pro-
hibition is broad on its face, punishing “[w]hoever
... unnecessarily ... kills any animal.” The city
claims that this ordinance is the epitome of a neut-
ral prohibition. Brief for Respondent 13-14. The
problem, however, is the interpretation given to the
ordinance by respondent and the Florida attorney
general. Killings for religious reasons are deemed
unnecessary, whereas most other killings fall out-
side the prohibition. The city, on what seems to be
a per se basis, deems hunting, slaughter of animals
for food, eradication of insects and pests, and eu-
thanasia as necessary. See id., at 22. There is no in-
dication in the record that respondent has concluded
that hunting or fishing for sport is unnecessary. In-
deed, one of the few reported Florida cases decided
under § 828.12 concludes that the use of live rab-
bits to train greyhounds is not unnecessary. See
Kiper v. State, 310 So.2d 42 (Fla.App.), cert.
denied, 328 So.2d 845 (Fla.1975). Further, because
it requires an evaluation of the particular justifica-
tion for the killing, this ordinance represents a sys-
tem of “individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct,” Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U.S., at 884, 110 S.Ct., at 1603. As we noted in
Smith, in circumstances in which individualized ex-
emptions from a general requirement are available,
the government “may not refuse to extend that sys-
tem to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without com-
pelling reason.” Ibid., quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156 (opinion of Burger,
C.J.). Respondent's application of the ordinance's
test of necessity devalues religious reasons for
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
killing by judging them to be of lesser import than
nonreligiousreasons.*538 Thus, religious practice is
being singled out for discriminatory treatment.
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S., at 722, and n. 17, 106
S.Ct., at 2164, and n. 17 (STEVENS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in result); id., at 708, 106
S.Ct. 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051,
1059, n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring in judgment).
We also find significant evidence of the ordinances'
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact
that they proscribe more religious conduct than is
necessary to achieve their stated ends. It is not un-
reasonable to infer, at least when there are no per-
suasive indications to the contrary, that a law which
visits “gratuitous restrictions” on religious conduct,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 520, 81 S.Ct.,
at 1186 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), seeks not to ef-
fectuate the stated governmental interests, but to
suppress the conduct because of its religious motiv-
ation.
[10] The legitimate governmental interests in pro-
tecting the public health and preventing cruelty to
animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping
far short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrifi-
FN*
cial practice. If improper disposal, not the sac-
rifice itself, is the harm to be prevented, the city
could have imposed a general regulation **2230 on
the disposal of organic garbage. It did not do so. In-
deed, counsel for the city conceded at oral argu-
ment that, under the ordinances, Santeria sacrifices
would be illegal even if they occurred in licensed,
inspected, and zoned slaughterhouses. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 45. See also id., at 42, 48. Thus, these broad
ordinances prohibit Santeria sacrifice even when it
does not threaten the city'sinterest*539 in the public
health. The District Court accepted the argument
that narrower regulation would be unenforceable
because of the secrecy in the Santeria rituals and
the lack of any central religious authority to require
compliance with secular disposal regulations. See
723 F.Supp., at 1486-1487, and nn. 58-59. It is dif-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 14
ficult to understand, however, how a prohibition of
the sacrifices themselves, which occur in private, is
enforceable if a ban on improper disposal, which
occurs in public, is not. The neutrality of a law is
suspect if First Amendment freedoms are curtailed
to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves
prohibited by direct regulation. See, e.g., Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151-52,
84 L.Ed. 155 (1939).
FN* Respondent advances the additional
governmental interest in prohibiting the
slaughter or sacrifice of animals in areas of
the city not zoned for slaughterhouses, see
Brief for Respondent 28-31, and the Dis-
trict Court found this interest to be compel-
ling, see 723 F.Supp. 1467, 1486 (SD
Fla.1989). This interest cannot justify Or-
dinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71, for they
apply to conduct without regard to where it
occurs. Ordinance 87-72 does impose a
locational restriction, but this asserted gov-
ernmental interest is a mere restatement of
the prohibition itself, not a justification for
it. In our discussion, therefore, we put
aside this asserted interest.
Under similar analysis, narrower regulation would
achieve the city's interest in preventing cruelty to
animals. With regard to the city's interest in ensur-
ing the adequate care of animals, regulation of con-
ditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal
is kept, is the logical response to the city's concern,
not a prohibition on possession for the purpose of
sacrifice. The same is true for the city's interest in
prohibiting cruel methods of killing. Under federal
and Florida law and Ordinance 87-40, which incor-
porates Florida law in this regard, killing an animal
by the “simultaneous and instantaneous severance
of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument”-the
method used in kosher slaughter-is approved as hu-
mane. See 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b); Fla.Stat. § 828.23
(7)(b) (1991); Ordinance 87-40, § 1. The District
Court found that, though Santeria sacrifice also res-
ults in severance of the carotid arteries, the method
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
used during sacrifice is less reliable and therefore
not humane. See 723 F.Supp., at 1472-1473. If the
city has a real concern that other methods are less
humane, however, the subject of the regulation
should be the method of slaughter itself, not a reli-
gious classification that is said to bear some general
relation to it.
[11] Ordinance 87-72-unlike the three other ordin-
ances-does appear to apply to substantial nonreli-
gious conduct and*540 not to be overbroad. For our
purposes here, however, the four substantive ordin-
ances may be treated as a group for neutrality pur-
poses. Ordinance 87-72 was passed the same day as
Ordinance 87-71 and was enacted, as were the three
others, in direct response to the opening of the
Church. It would be implausible to suggest that the
three other ordinances, but not Ordinance 87-72,
had as their object the suppression of religion. We
need not decide whether the Ordinance 87-72 could
survive constitutional scrutiny if it existed separ-
ately; it must be invalidated because it functions,
with the rest of the enactments in question, to sup-
press Santeria religious worship.
2
In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find
guidance in our equal protection cases. As Justice
Harlan noted in the related context of the Establish-
ment Clause, “[n]eutrality in its application requires
an equal protection mode of analysis.” Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S., at 696, 90
S.Ct., at 1425 (concurring opinion). Here, as in
equal protection cases, we may determine the city
council's object from both direct and circumstantial
evidence. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct.
555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Relevant evid-
ence includes, among other things, the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the
specific series of events leading to the enactment or
official policy in question, and the legislative or ad-
ministrative history, including contemporaneous
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 15
**2231 statements made by members of the de-
cisionmaking body. Id., at 267-268, 97 S.Ct., at
564-65. These objective factors bear on the ques-
tion of discriminatory object. Personnel Adminis-
trator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, n. 24,
99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, n. 24, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979).
That the ordinances were enacted “ ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ ” their suppression of San-
teria religious practice, id., at 279, 99 S.Ct., at 2296
is revealed by the events preceding their enactment.
Although respondent claimed at oral argument*541
that it had experienced significant problems result-
ing from the sacrifice of animals within the city be-
fore the announced opening of the Church, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 27, 46, the city council made no attempt
to address the supposed problem before its meeting
in June 1987, just weeks after the Church an-
nounced plans to open. The minutes and taped ex-
cerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in
the record, evidence significant hostility exhibited
by residents, members of the city council, and other
city officials toward the Santeria religion and its
practice of animal sacrifice. The public crowd that
attended the June 9 meetings interrupted statements
by council members critical of Santeria with cheers
and the brief comments of Pichardo with taunts.
When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the or-
dinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba “people
were put in jail for practicing this religion,” the
audience applauded. Taped excerpts of Hialeah
City Council Meeting, June 9, 1987.
Other statements by members of the city council
were in a similar vein. For example, Councilman
Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was
outlawed in Cuba, questioned: “[I]f we could not
practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba],
why bring it to this country?” Councilman Cardoso
said that Santeria devotees at the Church “are in vi-
olation of everything this country stands for.”
Councilman Mejides indicated that he was “totally
against the sacrificing of animals” and distin-
guished kosher slaughter because it had a “real pur-
pose.” The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
an animal for consumption,” he continued, “but for
any other purposes, I don't believe that the Bible al-
lows that.” The president of the city council, Coun-
cilman Echevarria, asked: “What can we do to pre-
vent the Church from opening?”
Various Hialeah city officials made comparable
comments. The chaplain of the Hialeah Police De-
partment told the city council that Santeria was a
sin, “foolishness,” “an abomination to the Lord,”
and the worship of “demons.” He advised*542 the
city council: “We need to be helping people and
sharing with them the truth that is found in Jesus
Christ.” He concluded: “I would exhort you ... not
to permit this Church to exist.” The city attorney
commented that Resolution 87-66 indicated: “This
community will not tolerate religious practices
which are abhorrent to its citizens....” Ibid. Similar
comments were made by the deputy city attorney.
This history discloses the object of the ordinances
to target animal sacrifice by Santeria worshippers
because of its religious motivation.
3
In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclu-
sion: The ordinances had as their object the sup-
pression of religion. The pattern we have recited
discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their
religious practices; the ordinances by their own
terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to pro-
scribe religious killings of animals but to exclude
almost all secular killings; and the ordinances sup-
press much more religious conduct than is neces-
sary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted
in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral,
and the court below committed clear error in failing
to reach this conclusion.
B [14] Respondent claims that Ordinances 87-40,
[12] We turn next to a second requirement of the
Free Exercise Clause, the rule **2232 that laws
burdening religious practice must be of general ap-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 16
plicability. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Re-
sources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 879-881, 110
S.Ct., at 1600-1601. All laws are selective to some
extent, but categories of selection are of paramount
concern when a law has the incidental effect of bur-
dening religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause
“protect[s] religious observers against unequal
treatment,” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148, 107 S.Ct. 1046,
1053, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (STEVENS, J., con-
curring in judgment), and inequality results when a
legislature decides that*543 the governmental in-
terests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pur-
sued only against conduct with a religious motiva-
tion.
[13] The principle that government, in pursuit of le-
gitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner im-
pose burdens only on conduct motivated by reli-
gious belief is essential to the protection of the
rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The
principle underlying the general applicability re-
quirement has parallels in our First Amendment jur-
isprudence. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 669-670, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518-2519,
115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991); University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201, 110
S.Ct. 577, 588-89, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990); Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365,
1371-72, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S., at 245-246, 102 S.Ct., at 1683-84; Pres-
byterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). In
this case we need not define with precision the
standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is
of general application, for these ordinances fall well
below the minimum standard necessary to protect
First Amendment rights.
87-52, and 87-71 advance two interests: protecting
the public health and preventing cruelty to animals.
The ordinances are underinclusive for those ends.
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that en-
dangers these interests in a similar or greater degree
than Santeria sacrifice does. The underinclusion is
substantial, not inconsequential. Despite the city's
proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals,
the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few
killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.
Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreli-
gious reasons are either not prohibited or approved
by express provision. For example, fishing-which
occurs in Hialeah, see A. Khedouri & F. Khedouri,
South Florida Inside Out 57 (1991)-is legal. Ex-
termination of mice and rats within a home is also
permitted. Florida law incorporated by Ordinance
87-40 sanctions*544 euthanasia of “stray, neg-
lected, abandoned, or unwanted animals,” Fla.Stat.
§ 828.058 (1987); destruction of animals judicially
removed from their owners “for humanitarian reas-
ons” or when the animal “is of no commercial
value,” § 828.073(4)(c)(2); the infliction of pain or
suffering “in the interest of medical science,” §
828.02; the placing of poison in one's yard or en-
closure, § 828.08; and the use of a live animal “to
pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunt-
ing,” § 828.122(6)(b), and “to hunt wild hogs,” §
828.122(6)(e).
The city concedes that “neither the State of Florida
nor the City has enacted a generally applicable ban
on the killing of animals.” Brief for Respondent 21.
It asserts, however, that animal sacrifice is
“different” from the animal killings that are permit-
ted by law. Ibid. According to the city, it is
“self-evident” that killing animals for food is
“important”; the eradication of insects and pests is
“obviously justified”; and the euthanasia of excess
animals “makes sense.” Id., at 22. These ipse dixits
do not explain why religion alone must bear the
burden of the ordinances, when many of these secu-
lar killings fall within the city's interest in prevent-
ing the cruel treatment of animals.
**2233 [15] The ordinances are also underinclusive
with regard to the city's interest in public health,
which is threatened by the disposal of animal car-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 17
casses in open public places and the consumption
of uninspected meat, see Brief for Respondent 32,
citing 723 F.Supp., at 1474-1475, 1485. Neither in-
terest is pursued by respondent with regard to con-
duct that is not motivated by religious conviction.
The health risks posed by the improper disposal of
animal carcasses are the same whether Santeria sac-
rifice or some nonreligious killing preceded it. The
city does not, however, prohibit hunters from bring-
ing their kill to their houses, nor does it regulate
disposal after their activity. Despite substantial
testimony at trial that the same public health haz-
ards result from improper disposal of garbage by
restaurants, see 11 Record 566,*545 590-591, res-
taurants are outside the scope of the ordinances.
Improper disposal is a general problem that causes
substantial health risks, 723 F.Supp., at 1485, but
which respondent addresses only when it results
from religious exercise.
The ordinances are underinclusive as well with re-
gard to the health risk posed by consumption of un-
inspected meat. Under the city's ordinances, hunters
may eat their kill and fishermen may eat their catch
without undergoing governmental inspection. Like-
wise, state law requires inspection of meat that is
sold but exempts meat from animals raised for the
use of the owner and “members of his household
and nonpaying guests and employees.” Fla.Stat. §
585.88(1)(a) (1991). The asserted interest in inspec-
ted meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that of
religious animal sacrifice.
Ordinance 87-72, which prohibits the slaughter of
animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses,
is underinclusive on its face. The ordinance in-
cludes an exemption for “any person, group, or or-
ganization” that “slaughters or processes for sale,
small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in ac-
cordance with an exemption provided by state law.”
See Fla.Stat. § 828.24(3) (1991). Respondent has
not explained why commercial operations that
slaughter “small numbers” of hogs and cattle do not
implicate its professed desire to prevent cruelty to
animals and preserve the public health. Although
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
the city has classified Santeria sacrifice as
slaughter, subjecting it to this ordinance, it does not
regulate other killings for food in like manner.
We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah's ordin-
ances pursues the city's governmental interests only
against conduct motivated by religious belief. The
ordinances “ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibi-
tion that society is prepared to impose upon
[Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself.” Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542, 109 S.Ct. 2603,
2614, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (SCALIA, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). This
*546 precise evil is what the requirement of general
applicability is designed to prevent.
III
[16][17][18] A law burdening religious practice
that is not neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy
the commands of the First Amendment, a law re-
strictive of religious practice must advance “
‘interests of the highest order’ ” and must be nar-
rowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S., at 628, 98 S.Ct., at
1328, quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
The compelling interest standard that we apply
once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is
not “water[ed] ... down” but “really means what it
says.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources
of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 888, 110 S.Ct., at
1605. A law that targets religious conduct for dis-
tinctive treatment or advances legitimate govern-
mental interests only against conduct with a reli-
gious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in
rare cases. It follows from what we have already
said that these ordinances cannot withstand this
scrutiny.
**2234 First, even were the governmental interests
compelling, the ordinances are not drawn in narrow
terms to accomplish those interests. As we have
discussed, see supra, at 16-18, 21-24, all four or-
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Page 18
dinances are overbroad or underinclusive in sub-
stantial respects. The proffered objectives are not
pursued with respect to analogous non-religious
conduct, and those interests could be achieved by
narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far
lesser degree. The absence of narrow tailoring suf-
fices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances.
See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 232, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1729, 95 L.Ed.2d
209 (1987).
Respondent has not demonstrated, moreover, that,
in the context of these ordinances, its governmental
interests are compelling. Where government re-
stricts only conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment and fails to enact feasible*547 measures to re-
strict other conduct producing substantial harm or
alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in
justification of the restriction is not compelling. It
is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence
that “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an in-
terest ‘of the highest order’ ... when it leaves appre-
ciable damage to that supposedly vital interest un-
prohibited.” Florida Star v. B.J.F., supra, 491 U.S.,
at 541-542, 109 S.Ct., at 2613-14 (SCALIA, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(citation omitted). See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 119-120, 112 S.Ct. 501, 510-11, 116 L.Ed.2d
476 (1991). Cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., supra, at
540-541, 109 S.Ct., at 2612-13; Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-105, 99 S.Ct.
2667, 2671-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979); id., at 110,
99 S.Ct., at 2674-75 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring
in judgment). As we show above, see supra, at
21-24, the ordinances are underinclusive to a sub-
stantial extent with respect to each of the interests
that respondent has asserted, and it is only conduct
motivated by religious conviction that bears the
weight of the governmental restrictions. There can
be no serious claim that those interests justify the
ordinances.
IV
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
The Free Exercise Clause commits government it-
self to religious tolerance, and upon even slight sus-
picion that proposals for state intervention stem
from animosity to religion or distrust of its prac-
tices, all officials must pause to remember their
own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights
it secures. Those in office must be resolute in res-
isting importunate demands and must ensure that
the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law
and regulation are secular. Legislators may not de-
vise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to
persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The
laws here in question were enacted contrary to
these constitutional principles, and they are void.
Reversed.
*548 APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
City of Hialeah, Florida, Resolution No. 87-66, ad-
opted June 9, 1987, provides:
“WHEREAS, residents and citizens of the City
of Hialeah have expressed their concern that cer-
tain religions may propose to engage in practices
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace
or safety, and
“WHEREAS, the Florida Constitution, Article
I, Declaration of Rights, Section 3, Religious
Freedom, specifically states that religious free-
dom shall not justify practices inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
“1. The City reiterates its commitment to a pro-
hibition against any and all acts of any and all re-
ligious groups which are **2235 inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety.”
City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-40, ad-
opted June 9, 1987, provides:
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 19
“WHEREAS, the citizens of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern
over the potential for animal sacrifices being con-
ducted in the City of Hialeah; and
“WHEREAS, Section 828.27, Florida Statutes,
provides that ‘nothing contained in this section
shall prevent any county or municipality from en-
acting any ordinance relating to animal control or
cruelty to animals which is identical to the provi-
sions of this Chapter ... except as to penalty.’
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
*549 “ Section 1. The Mayor and City Council
of the City of Hialeah, Florida, hereby adopt
Florida Statute, Chapter 828-‘Cruelty to Animals'
(copy attached hereto and made a part hereof), in
its entirety (relating to animal control or cruelty
to animals), except as to penalty.
“Section 2. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in con-
flict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of
such conflict.
“Section 3. Penalties.
“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of
violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be
punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by
a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or
both, in the discretion of the Court.
“Section 4. Inclusion in Code.
“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in-
cluded and incorporated in the Code of the City
of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto,
and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-
numbered to conform to the uniform numbering
system of the Code.
“Section 5. Severability Clause.
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared inval-
id or unconstitutional by the judge or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or
unconstitutionality shall not effect any of the re-
maining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs
or sections of this ordinance.
“Section 6. Effective Date.
“This Ordinance shall become effective when
passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah
and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”
City of Hialeah Resolution No. 87-90, adopted Au-
gust 11, 1987, provides:
“WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the
City of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great
concern regarding*550 the possibility of public
ritualistic animal sacrifices in the City of Hialeah,
Florida; and
“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
received an opinion from the Attorney General of
the State of Florida, concluding that public ritual-
istic animal sacrifices is [sic] a violation of the
Florida State Statute on Cruelty to Animals; and
“WHEREAS, the Attorney General further held
that the sacrificial killing of animals other than
for the primary purpose of food consumption is
prohibited under state law; and
“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
enacted an ordinance mirroring state law prohib-
iting cruelty to animals.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
“ Section 1. It is the policy of the Mayor and
City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, to
oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals within the
City of Hialeah, FLorida [sic]. Any individual or
organization **2236 that seeks to practice animal
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 20
sacrifice in violation of state and local law will
be prosecuted.”
City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-52, ad-
opted September 8, 1987, provides:
“WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the
City of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great
concern regarding the possibility of public ritual-
istic animal sacrifices within the City of Hialeah,
Florida; and
“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
received an opinion from the Attorney General of
the State of Florida, concluding that public ritual-
istic animal sacrifice, other than for the primary
purpose of food consumption, is a violation of
state law; and
*551 “WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Flor-
ida, has enacted an ordinance (Ordinance No.
87-40), mirroring the state law prohibiting cruelty
to animals.
“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, now
wishes to specifically prohibit the possession of
animals for slaughter or sacrifice within the City
of Hialeah, Florida.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
“ Section 1. Chapter 6 of the Code of Ordin-
ances of the City of Hialeah, Florida, is hereby
amended by adding thereto two (2) new Sections
6-8 ‘Definitions' and 6-9 ‘Prohibition Against
Possession Of Animals For Slaughter Or Sacri-
fice’, which is to read as follows:
“Section 6-8. Definitions
“1. Animal-any living dumb creature.
“2. Sacrifice-to unnecessarily kill, torment, tor-
ture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private
ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
food consumption.
“3. Slaughter-the killing of animals for food.
“Section 6-9. Prohibition Against Possession of
Animals for Slaughter Or Sacrifice.
“1. No person shall own, keep or otherwise
possess, sacrifice, or slaughter any sheep, goat,
pig, cow or the young of such species, poultry,
rabbit, dog, cat, or any other animal, intending to
use such animal for food purposes.
“2. This section is applicable to any group or
individual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices an-
imals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether
or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be
consumed.
“3. Nothing in this ordinance is to be inter-
preted as prohibiting any licensed establishment
from slaughtering for food purposes any animals
which are specifically*552 raised for food pur-
poses where such activity is properly zoned and/
or permitted under state and local law and under
rules promulgated by the Florida Department of
Agriculture.
“Section 2. Repeal of Ordinance in Conflict.
“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in con-
flict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of
such conflict.
“Section 3. Penalties.
“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of
violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be
punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by
a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or
both, in the discretion of the Court.
“Section 4. Inclusion in Code.
“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in-
cluded and incorporated in the Code of the City
of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto,
and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 21
numbered to conform to the uniform numbering
system of the Code.
“Section 5. Severability Clause.
“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared inval-
id or unconstitutional by the judgement or decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalid-
ity or unconstitutionality**2237 shall not effect
any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences,
paragraphs or sections of this ordinance.
“Section 6. Effective Date.
“This Ordinance shall become effective when
passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah
and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”
City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-71, ad-
opted September 22, 1987, provides:
“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, has determined that the sacrifi-
cing of animals*553 within the city limits is con-
trary to the public health, safety, welfare and
morals of the community; and
“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, desires to have qualified societ-
ies or corporations organized under the laws of
the State of Florida, to be authorized to investig-
ate and prosecute any violation(s) of the ordin-
ance herein after set forth, and for the registration
of the agents of said societies.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
“ Section 1. For the purpose of this ordinance,
the word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarily
kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a
public or private ritual or ceremony not for the
primary purpose of food consumption.
“ Section 2. For the purpose of this ordinance,
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
the word animal shall mean: any living dumb
creature.
“Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person,
persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice
any animal within the corporate limits of the City
of Hialeah, Florida.
“Section 4. All societies or associations for the
prevention of cruelty to animals organized under
the laws of the State of Florida, seeking to re-
gister with the City of Hialeah for purposes of in-
vestigating and assisting in the prosecution of vi-
olations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance,
shall apply to the City Council for authorization
to so register and shall be registered with the Of-
fice of the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida,
following approval by the City Council at a pub-
lic hearing in accordance with rules and regula-
tions (i.e., criteria) established by the City Coun-
cil by resolution, and shall thereafter, be em-
powered to assist in the prosection of any viola-
tion of this Ordinance.
*554 “Section 5. Any society or association for
the prevention of cruelty to animals registered
with the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 4 here-
inabove, may appoint agents for the purposes of
investigating and assisting in the prosecution of
violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance,
or any other laws of the City of Hialeah, Florida,
for the purpose of protecting animals and pre-
venting any act prohibited hereunder.
“Section 6. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in con-
flict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of
such conflict.
“Section 7. Penalties.
“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of
violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be
punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by
a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 22
both, in the discretion of the Court.
“Section 8. Inclusion in Code.
“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in-
cluded and incorporated in the Code of the City
of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto,
and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-
numbered to conform to the uniform numbering
system of the Code.
“Section 9. Severability Clause.
**2238 “If any phrase, clause, sentence, para-
graph or section of this Ordinance shall be de-
clared invalid or unconstitutional by the judg-
ment or decree of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall
not effect any of the remaining phrases, clauses,
sentences, paragraphs or sections of this Ordin-
ance.
“Section 10. Effective Date.
“This Ordinance shall become effective when
passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah
and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”
*555 City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No.
87-72, adopted September 22, 1987, provides:
“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, has determined that the
slaughtering of animals on the premises other
than those properly zoned as a slaughter house, is
contrary to the public health, safety and welfare
of the citizens of Hialeah, Florida.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
“ Section 1. For the purpose of this Ordinance,
the word slaughter shall mean: the killing of an-
imals for food.
“ Section 2. For the purpose of this Ordinance,
the word animal shall mean: any living dumb
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
creature.
“Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person,
persons, corporations or associations to slaughter
any animal on any premises in the City of
Hialeah, Florida, except those properly zoned as
a slaughter house, and meeting all the health,
safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City
for the operation of a slaughter house.
“Section 4. All societies or associations for the
prevention of cruelty to animals organized under
the laws of the State of Florida, seeking to re-
gister with the City of Hialeah for purposes of in-
vestigating and assisting in the prosecution of vi-
olations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance,
shall apply to the City Council for authorization
to so register and shall be registered with the Of-
fice of the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida,
following approval by the City Council at a pub-
lic hearing in accordance with rules and regula-
tions (i.e., criteria) established by the City Coun-
cil by resolution, and shall thereafter, be em-
powered to assist in the prosection of any viola-
tions of this Ordinance.
*556 “Section 5. Any society or association for
the prevention of cruelty to animals registered
with the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 4 here-
inabove, may appoint agents for the purposes of
investigating and assisting in the prosecution of
violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance,
or any other laws of the City of Hialeah, Florida,
for the purpose of protecting animals and pre-
venting any act prohibited hereunder.
“ Section 6. This Ordinance shall not apply to
any person, group or organization that slaughters,
or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/
or cattle per week in accordance with an exemp-
tion provided by state law.
“Section 7. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in con-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 23
flict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of
such conflict.
“Section 8. Penalties.
“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of
violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be
punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by
a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or
both, in the discretion of the Court.
“Section 9. Inclusion in Code.
“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in-
cluded and incorporated in the Code of the City
of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto,
and the sections of **2239 this Ordinance shall
be re-numbered to conform to the uniform num-
bering system of the Code.
“Section 10. Severability Clause.
“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared inval-
id or unconstitutional by the judgment or decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalid-
ity or unconstitutionality shall not effect any of
the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, para-
graphs or sections of this ordinance.
*557 “Section 11. Effective Date.
“This Ordinance shall become effective when
passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah
and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”
Justice SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF
JUSTICE joins, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.
The Court analyzes the “neutrality” and the
“general applicability” of the Hialeah ordinances in
separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively),
and allocates various invalidating factors to one or
the other of those sections. If it were necessary to
make a clear distinction between the two terms, I
would draw a line somewhat different from the
Court's. But I think it is not necessary, and would
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
frankly acknowledge that the terms are not only
“interrelated,” ante, 2226, but substantially overlap.
The terms “neutrality” and “general applicability”
are not to be found within the First Amendment it-
self, of course, but are used in Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990),
and earlier cases to describe those characteristics
which cause a law that prohibits an activity a par-
ticular individual wishes to engage in for religious
reasons nonetheless not to constitute a “law ... pro-
hibiting the free exercise” of religion within the
meaning of the First Amendment. In my view, the
defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to
those laws that by their terms impose disabilities on
the basis of religion (e.g., a law excluding members
of a certain sect from public benefits, cf. McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d
593 (1978)), see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
703-704, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2153-54, 90 L.Ed.2d 735
(1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); whereas the defect
of lack of general applicability applies primarily to
those laws which, though neutral in their terms,
through their design, construction, or enforcement
target the practices of a particular religion for dis-
criminatory treatment, see Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953). But
certainly a law that is not of general applicability
(in the sense I*558 have described) can be con-
sidered “nonneutral”; and certainly no law that is
nonneutral (in the relevant sense) can be thought to
be of general applicability. Because I agree with
most of the invalidating factors set forth in Part II
of the Court's opinion, and because it seems to me a
matter of no consequence under which rubric
(“neutrality,” Part II-A, or “general applicability,”
Part II-B) each invalidating factor is discussed, I
join the judgment of the Court and all of its opinion
except section 2 of Part II-A.
I do not join that section because it departs from the
opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at
issue to consider the subjective motivation of the
lawmakers, i.e., whether the Hialeah City Council
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 24
actually intended to disfavor the religion of Santer-
ia. As I have noted elsewhere, it is virtually im-
possible to determine the singular “motive” of a
collective legislative body, see, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-639, 107 S.Ct. 2573,
2605-07, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (dissenting opin-
ion), and this Court has a long tradition of refrain-
ing from such inquiries, see, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck,
6 Cranch 87, 130-131, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810)
(Marshall, C.J.); **2240United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-384, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682-83, 20
L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).
Perhaps there are contexts in which determination
of legislative motive must be undertaken. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct.
1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946). But I do not think that
is true of analysis under the First Amendment (or
the Fourteenth, to the extent it incorporates the
First). See Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, 482 U.S.,
at 639, 107 S.Ct., at 2607 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes
for which legislators enact laws, but to the effects
of the laws enacted: “Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]....”
This does not put us in the business of invalidating
laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors.
Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to
suppress the practices of Santeria, but ineptly adop-
ted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how
those laws could be said to “prohibi[t] the free ex-
ercise” of *559 religion. Nor, in my view, does it
matter that a legislature consists entirely of the
pure-hearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out
a religious practice for special burdens. Had the or-
dinances here been passed with no motive on the
part of any councilman except the ardent desire to
prevent cruelty to animals (as might in fact have
been the case), they would nonetheless be invalid.
Justice SOUTER, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.
This case turns on a principle about which there is
no disagreement, that the Free Exercise Clause bars
government action aimed at suppressing religious
belief or practice. The Court holds that Hialeah's
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
animal-sacrifice laws violate that principle, and I
concur in that holding without reservation.
Because prohibiting religious exercise is the object
of the laws at hand, this case does not present the
more difficult issue addressed in our last free-
exercise case, Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct.
1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which announced
the rule that a “neutral, generally applicable” law
does not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause even
when it prohibits religious exercise in effect. The
Court today refers to that rule in dicta, and despite
my general agreement with the Court's opinion I do
not join Part II, where the dicta appear, for I have
doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adher-
ence. I write separately to explain why the Smith
rule is not germane to this case and to express my
view that, in a case presenting the issue, the Court
should re-examine the rule Smith declared.
I thing unusual about the notion that the Free Exer-
According to Smith, if prohibiting the exercise of
religion results from enforcing a “neutral, generally
applicable” law, the Free Exercise Clause has not
been offended. Id., at 878-880, 110 S.Ct., at
1599-1601. I call this the Smith rule to distinguish
it from the noncontroversial principle, also ex-
pressed in Smith though *560 established long be-
fore, that the Free Exercise Clause is offended
when prohibiting religious exercise results from a
law that is not neutral or generally applicable. It is
this noncontroversial principle, that the Free Exer-
cise Clause requires neutrality and general applic-
ability, that is at issue here. But before turning to
the relationship of Smith to this case, it will help to
get the terms in order, for the significance of the
Smith rule is not only in its statement that the Free
Exercise Clause requires no more than “neutrality”
and “general applicability,” but also in its adoption
of a particular, narrow conception of free-exercise
neutrality.
That the Free Exercise Clause contains a *561 While general applicability is, for the most
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 25
“requirement for governmental neutrality,” Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526,
1535-36, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), is hardly a novel
proposition; though the term does not appear in the
First Amendment, our cases have used it as short-
hand to describe, at least in part, what the Clause
commands. **2241 See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Min-
istries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S.
378, 384, 110 S.Ct. 688, 693, 107 L.Ed.2d 796
(1990); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employ-
ment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717, 101 S.Ct.
1425, 1431, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Yoder, supra,
406 U.S., at 220, 92 S.Ct., at 1535; Committee for
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 792-793, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2975, 37 L.Ed.2d 948
(1973); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1571, 10 L.Ed.2d 844
(1963); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
627-629, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-1329, 55 L.Ed.2d 593
(1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a nonneut-
ral law without using the term). Nor is there any-
cise Clause requires general applicability, though
the Court, until today, has not used exactly that
term in stating a reason for invalidation. See Fowl-
er v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97
L.Ed. 828 (1953); cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1372, 75 L.Ed.2d 295
(1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245-246,
102 S.Ct. 1673, 1683-1684, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982).
FN1
FN1. A law that is not generally applicable
according to the Court's definition (one
that “selective[ly] impose[s] burdens only
on conduct motivated by religious belief,”
ante, at 2232) would, it seems to me, fail
almost any test for neutrality. Accordingly,
the cases stating that the Free Exercise
Clause requires neutrality are also fairly
read for the proposition that the Clause re-
quires general applicability.
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
part, self-explanatory, free-exercise neutrality is not
self-revealing. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
627, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2676, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992)
(SOUTER, J., concurring) (considering Establish-
ment Clause neutrality). A law that is religion neut-
ral on its face or in its purpose may lack neutrality
in its effect by forbidding something that religion
requires or requiring something that religion for-
bids. Cf. McConnell & Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56
U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 35 (1989) (“[A] regulation is not
neutral in an economic sense if, whatever its normal
scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater
costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious
activities”). A secular law, applicable to all, that
prohibits consumption of alcohol, for example, will
affect members of religions that require the use of
wine differently from members of other religions
and nonbelievers, disproportionately burdening the
practice of, say, Catholicism or Judaism. Without
an exemption for sacramental wine, Prohibition
FN2
may fail the test of religion neutrality.
FN2. Our cases make clear, to look at this
from a different perspective, that an ex-
emption for sacramental wine use would
not deprive Prohibition of neutrality.
Rather, “[s]uch an accommodation [would]
‘reflec[t] nothing more than the govern-
mental obligation of neutrality in the face
of religious differences.’ ” Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235, n. 22, 92 S.Ct.
1526, 1543, n. 22, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)
(quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
409, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1796, 10 L.Ed.2d 965
(1963)); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 627, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2677, 120
L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (SOUTER, J., concur-
ring). The prohibition law in place earlier
this century did in fact exempt “wine for
sacramental purposes.” National Prohibi-
tion Act, Title II, § 3, 41 Stat. 308.
It does not necessarily follow from that observa-
tion, of course, that the First Amendment requires
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 26
an exemption from Prohibition; that depends on the
meaning of neutrality as the Free Exercise Clause
embraces it. The point here is the unremarkable one
that our common notion of neutrality is broad
enough to cover not merely what might be called
formal neutrality, which as a free-exercise require-
ment*562 would only bar laws with an object to
discriminate against religion, but also what might
be called substantive neutrality, which, in addition
to demanding a secular object, would generally re-
quire government to accommodate religious differ-
ences by exempting religious practices from form-
ally neutral laws. See generally Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated**2242 Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L.Rev. 993 (1990). If
the Free Exercise Clause secures only protection
against deliberate discrimination, a formal require-
ment will exhaust the Clause's neutrality command;
if the Free Exercise Clause, rather, safeguards a
right to engage in religious activity free from unne-
cessary governmental interference, the Clause re-
quires substantive, as well as formal, neutrality.
FN3
FN3. One might further distinguish
between formal neutrality and facial neut-
rality. While facial neutrality would permit
discovery of a law's object or purpose only
by analysis of the law's words, structure,
and operation, formal neutrality would per-
mit enquiry also into the intentions of
those who enacted the law. Compare ante,
at 2230-31 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.,
joined by STEVENS, J.) with ante, at
2239-40 (opinion of SCALIA, J., joined by
REHNQUIST, C.J.). For present purposes,
the distinction between formal and facial
neutrality is less important than the distinc-
tion between those conceptions of neutral-
ity and substantive neutrality.
Though Smith used the term “neutrality” without a
modifier, the rule it announced plainly assumes that
free-exercise neutrality is of the formal sort. Distin-
guishing between laws whose “object” is to prohibit
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
religious exercise and those that prohibit religious
exercise as an “incidental effect,” Smith placed only
the former within the reaches of the Free Exercise
Clause; the latter, laws that satisfy formal neutral-
ity, Smith would subject to no free-exercise scrutiny
at all, even when they prohibit religious exercise in
application. 494 U.S., at 878, 110 S.Ct., at 1599.
The four Justices who rejected the Smith rule, by
contrast, read the Free Exercise Clause as embra-
cing what I have termed substantive neutrality. The
enforcement of a law “neutral on its face,” they
said, may “nonetheless offend [the Free Exercise
Clause's] requirement*563 for government neutral-
ity if it unduly burdens the free exercise of reli-
gion.” Id., at 896, 110 S.Ct., at 1609 (opinion of
O'CONNOR, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and
BLACKMUN, JJ.) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The rule these Justices saw as
flowing from free-exercise neutrality, in contrast to
the Smith rule, “requir[es] the government to justify
any substantial burden on religiously motivated
conduct by a compelling state interest and by
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”
Id., at 894, 110 S.Ct., at 1608 (emphasis added).
The proposition for which the Smith rule stands,
then, is that formal neutrality, along with general
applicability, are sufficient conditions for constitu-
tionality under the Free Exercise Clause. That pro-
position is not at issue in this case, however, for
Hialeah's animal-sacrifice ordinances are not neut-
ral under any definition, any more than they are
generally applicable. This case, rather, involves the
noncontroversial principle repeated in Smith, that
formal neutrality and general applicability are ne-
cessary conditions for free-exercise constitutional-
ity. It is only “this fundamental nonpersecution
principle of the First Amendment [that is] implic-
ated here,” ante, at 2222, and it is to that principle
that the Court adverts when it holds that Hialeah's
ordinances “fail to satisfy the Smith requirements,”
ante, at 2226. In applying that principle the Court
does not tread on troublesome ground.
In considering, for example, whether Hialeah's an-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 27
imal-sacrifice laws violate free-exercise neutrality,
the Court rightly observes that “[a]t a minimum, the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if
the law at issue discriminates against some or all
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons,”
ibid., and correctly finds Hialeah's laws to fail those
standards. The question whether the protections of
the Free Exercise Clause also pertain if the law at
issue, though nondiscriminatory in its object, has
the effect nonetheless of placing a burden on reli-
gious exercise is not before the Court*564 today,
and the Court's intimations on the matter are there-
fore dicta.
The Court also rightly finds Hialeah's laws to fail
the test of general applicability, and as **2243 the
Court “need not define with precision the standard
used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general
application, for these ordinances fall well below the
minimum standard necessary to protect First
Amendment rights,” ante, at 2232, it need not dis-
cuss the rules that apply to prohibitions found to be
generally applicable. The question whether “there
are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the
power of the State to control, even under regula-
tions of general applicability,” Yoder, 406 U.S., at
220, 92 S.Ct., at 1535, is not before the Court in
this case, and, again, suggestions on that score are
dicta.
II
In being so readily susceptible to resolution by ap-
plying the Free Exercise Clause's “fundamental
nonpersecution principle,” ante, at 2222, this is far
from a representative free-exercise case. While, as
the Court observes, the Hialeah City Council has
provided a rare example of a law actually aimed at
suppressing religious exercise, ibid., Smith was typ-
ical of our free-exercise cases, involving as it did a
formally neutral, generally applicable law. The rule
Smith announced, however, was decidedly untypic-
al of the cases involving the same type of law. Be-
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
cause Smith left those prior cases standing, we are
left with a free-exercise jurisprudence in tension
with itself, a tension that should be addressed, and
that may legitimately be addressed, by reexamining
the Smith rule in the next case that would turn upon
its application.
A
In developing standards to judge the enforceability
of formally neutral, generally applicable laws
against the mandates of the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court has addressed*565 the concepts of neut-
rality and general applicability by indicating, in
language hard to read as not foreclosing the Smith
rule, that the Free Exercise Clause embraces more
than mere formal neutrality, and that formal neut-
rality and general applicability are not sufficient
conditions for free-exercise constitutionality:
“In a variety of ways we have said that ‘[a] regu-
lation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.’ ” Thomas, 450 U.S.,
at 717 [101 S.Ct., at 1431] (quoting Yoder, 406
U.S., at 220 [92 S.Ct., at 1535] ).
“[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct
must often be subject to the broad police power
of the State is not to deny that there are areas of
conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and thus beyond the power
of the State to control, even under regulations of
general applicability.” Ibid.
Not long before the Smith decision, indeed, the
Court specifically rejected the argument that
“neutral and uniform” requirements for govern-
mental benefits need satisfy only a reasonableness
standard, in part because “[s]uch a test has no basis
in precedent.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1046,
1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, we have said, “[o]ur cases
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 28
have established that ‘[t]he free exercise inquiry
asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious be-
lief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden.’ ” Swag-
gart Ministries, 493 U.S., at 384-385, 110 S.Ct., at
692-693 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148, 104 L.Ed.2d
766 (1989)).
Thus we have applied the same rigorous scrutiny to
burdens on religious exercise resulting from the en-
forcement of formally neutral, generally applicable
laws as we have applied to burdens caused by laws
that single out religious exercise:*566 “ ‘only those
interests**2244 of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion.’ ” McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S., at 628, 98 S.Ct., at 1328 (plurality opin-
ion) (quoting Yoder, supra, 406 U.S., at 215, 92
S.Ct., at 1533). Compare McDaniel, supra, 435
U.S., at 628-629, 98 S.Ct., at 1328-1329 (plurality
opinion) (applying that test to a law aimed at reli-
gious conduct) with Yoder, supra, 406 U.S., at
215-229, 92 S.Ct., at 1533-1540 (applying that test
to a formally neutral, general law). Other cases in
which the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to
the enforcement of formally neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws that burden religious exercise include
Hernandez v. Commissioner, supra, 490 U.S., at
699, 109 S.Ct., at 2149; Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of
Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 835, 109 S.Ct.
1514, 1518, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989); Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm'n, supra, 480 U.S., at
141, 107 S.Ct., at 1049; Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76
L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257-258, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d
127 (1982); Thomas, supra, 450 U.S., at 718, 101
S.Ct., at 1432; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963);
and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
304-307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903-904, 84 L.Ed. 1213
(1940).
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Though Smith sought to distinguish the free-ex-
ercise cases in which the Court mandated exemp-
tions from secular laws of general application, see
494 U.S., at 881-885, 110 S.Ct., at 1601-1603, I am
not persuaded. Wisconsin v. Yoder, and Cantwell v.
Connecticut, according to Smith, were not true free-
exercise cases but “hybrid[s]” involving “the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of
the press, or the right of parents ... to direct the edu-
cation of their children.” Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at
881, 882, 110 S.Ct., at 1601, 1602. Neither opinion,
however, leaves any doubt that “fundamental
claims of religious freedom [were] at stake.” Yoder,
supra, 406 U.S., at 221, 92 S.Ct., at 1536. See also
Cantwell, supra, 310 U.S., at 303-307, 60 S.Ct., at
FN4
903-905. *567 And the distinction Smith draws
strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim
is simply one in which another constitutional right
is implicated, then the hybrid **2245 exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover
the situation exemplified by Smith, since free
speech and associational rights are certainly implic-
ated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is
one in which a litigant would actually obtain an ex-
emption from a formally neutral, generally applic-
able law under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court
in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have men-
tioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
FN4. Yoder, which involved a challenge by
Amish parents to the enforcement against
them of a compulsory school attendance
law, mentioned the parental rights recog-
nized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070
(1925), as Smith pointed out. See Employ-
ment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, n. 1, 110
S.Ct. 1595, 1601, n. 1, 108 L.Ed.2d 876
(1990) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S., at 233, 92
S.Ct., at 1542). But Yoder did so only to
distinguish Pierce, which involved a sub-
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stantive due process challenge to a com-
pulsory school attendance law and which
required merely a showing of “
‘reasonable[ness].’ ” Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32
L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (quoting Pierce, supra,
268 U.S., at 535, 45 S.Ct., at 573). Where
parents make a “free exercise claim,” the
Yoder Court said, the Pierce reasonable-
ness test is inapplicable and the State's ac-
tion must be measured by a stricter test, the
test developed under the Free Exercise
Clause and discussed at length earlier in
the opinion. See 406 U.S., at 233, 92 S.Ct.,
at 1542; id., at 213-229, 92 S.Ct., at
1532-1540. Quickly after the reference to
parental rights, the Yoder opinion makes
clear that the case involves “the central
values underlying the Religion Clauses.”
Id., at 234, 92 S.Ct., at 1542. The Yoders
raised only a free-exercise defense to their
prosecution under the school-attendance
law, id., at 209, and n. 4, 92 S.Ct., at 1530,
and n. 4; certiorari was granted only on the
free-exercise issue, id., at 207, 92 S.Ct., at
1529; and the Court plainly understood the
case to involve “conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause” even against en-
forcement of a “regulatio[n] of general ap-
plicability,” id., at 220, 92 S.Ct., at 1535.
As for Cantwell, Smith pointed out that
the case explicitly mentions freedom of
speech. See 494 U.S., at 881, n. 1, 110
S.Ct., at 1601, n. 1 (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct.
900, 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). But the
quote to which Smith refers occurs in a
portion of the Cantwell opinion (titled: “
[s]econd, ” and dealing with a breach-
of-peace conviction for playing phono-
graph records, see 310 U.S., at 307, 60
S.Ct., at 905) that discusses an entirely
different issue from the section of Cant-
well that Smith cites as involving a
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
“neutral, generally applicable law”
(titled: “ [f]irst, ” and dealing with a li-
censing system for solicitations, see
Cantwell, supra, 310 U.S., at 303-307,
60 S.Ct., at 903-905). See Smith, supra,
494 U.S., at 881, 110 S.Ct., at 1601.
Smith sought to confine the remaining free-exercise
exemption victories, which involved unemployment
compensation*568 systems, see Frazee, supra;
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employ-
ment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1125,
67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); and Sherbert, supra,
“stand[ing] for the proposition that where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it
may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”
494 U.S., at 884, 110 S.Ct., at 1603. But prior to
Smith the Court had already refused to accept that
explanation of the unemployment compensation
cases. See Hobbie, supra, 480 U.S., at 142, n. 7,
107 S.Ct., at 1049, n. 7; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 715-716, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2160-2161, 90
L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.);
id., at 727-732, 106 S.Ct., at 2166-2169 (opinion of
O'CONNOR, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,
JJ.); id., at 733, 106 S.Ct., at 2169 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). And, again, the distinction fails to exclude
Smith: “If Smith is viewed as a hypothetical crimin-
al prosecution for peyote use, there would be an in-
dividual governmental assessment of the defend-
ants' motives and actions in the form of a criminal
trial.” McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1109, 1124
(1990). Smith also distinguished the unemployment
compensation cases on the ground that they did not
involve “an across-the-board criminal prohibition
on a particular form of conduct.” 494 U.S., at 884,
110 S.Ct., at 1603. But even Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy, on which Smith
drew for its analysis of the unemployment com-
pensation cases, would have applied its reasonable-
ness test only to “denial of government benefits”
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and not to “governmental action or legislation that
criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescap-
ably compels conduct that some find objectionable
for religious reasons,” Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476
U.S., at 706, 106 S.Ct., at 2155 (opinion of Burger,
C.J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ.); to
the latter category of governmental action, it would
have applied the test employed in Yoder, which in-
volved an across-the-board criminal prohibition and
which Chief Justice Burger's opinion treated as an
ordinary free-exercise*569 case. See Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S., at 706-707, 106 S.Ct., at 2155-2156; id.,
at 705, n. 15, 106 S.Ct., at 2155, n. 15; Yoder, 406
U.S., at 218, 92 S.Ct., at 1534; see also McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S., at 628, n. 8, 98 S.Ct., at 1328, n. 8
(noting cases in which courts considered claims for
exemptions from general criminal prohibitions,
cases the Court thought were “illustrative of the
general nature of free-exercise protections and the
delicate balancing required by our decisions in [
Sherbert and Yoder,] when an important state in-
terest is shown”).
As for the cases on which Smith primarily relied as
establishing the rule it embraced, Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879),
and Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940), see
Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at 879, 110 S.Ct., at 1600,
their subsequent treatment by the Court would seem
to require rejection of the Smith rule. Reynolds,
which in upholding the polygamy conviction of a
Mormon stressed the evils it saw as associated with
polygamy, see 98 U.S., at 166 (“polygamy leads to
the patriarchal principle, and ... fetters the people in
stationary despotism”); id., at 165, 168, has been
read as consistent with the principle that religious
conduct may be regulated by general or targeting
law only if the conduct “pose[s] some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order.” **2246
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S., at 403, 83 S.Ct., at
1793; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at
257-258, 102 S.Ct., at 1055-1056; Bob Jones Uni-
versity, 461 U.S., at 603, 103 S.Ct., at 2034; Yoder,
supra, 406 U.S., at 230, 92 S.Ct., at 1540. And
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Gobitis, after three Justices who originally joined
the opinion renounced it for disregarding the gov-
ernment's constitutional obligation “to accommod-
ate itself to the religious views of minorities,”
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 624, 62 S.Ct. 1231,
1251, 86 L.Ed. 1691 (1942) (opinion of Black,
Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.), was explicitly overruled
in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L.Ed. 1628
(1943); see also id., at 643-644, 63 S.Ct., at
1187-1188 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
Since holding in 1940 that the Free Exercise Clause
applies to the States, see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, the
Court repeatedly has stated that the Clause sets
strict limits on the government's power to burden
religious exercise, whether it is a law's object to do
so or its unanticipated*570 effect. Smith responded
to these statements by suggesting that the Court did
not really mean what it said, detecting in at least the
most recent opinions a lack of commitment to the
compelling-interest test in the context of formally
neutral laws. Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at 884-885,
110 S.Ct., at 1603. But even if the Court's commit-
ment were that palid, it would argue only for mod-
erating the language of the test, not for eliminating
constitutional scrutiny altogether. In any event, I
would have trouble concluding that the Court has
not meant what it has said in more than a dozen
cases over several decades, particularly when in the
same period it repeatedly applied the compelling-in-
terest test to require exemptions, even in a case de-
cided the year before Smith. See Frazee v. Illinois
Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 109
FN5
S.Ct. 1514, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989). In sum, it
seems to me difficult to escape the conclusion*571
that, whatever Smith's virtues, **2247 they do not
include a comfortable fit with settled law.
FN5. Though Smith implied that the Court,
in considering claims for exemptions from
formally neutral, generally applicable
laws, has applied a “water[ed] down” ver-
sion of strict scrutiny, 494 U.S., at 888,
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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110 S.Ct., at 1605, that appraisal confuses
the cases in which we purported to apply
strict scrutiny with the cases in which we
did not. We did not purport to apply strict
scrutiny in several cases involving discrete
categories of governmental action in which
there are special reasons to defer to the
judgment of the political branches, and the
opinions in those cases said in no uncertain
terms that traditional heightened scrutiny
applies outside those categories. See
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282
(1987) (“[P]rison regulations ... are judged
under a ‘reasonableness' test less restrict-
ive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitution-
al rights”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 1313, 89
L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (“Our review of milit-
ary regulations challenged on First
Amendment grounds is far more deferen-
tial than constitutional review of similar
laws or regulations designed for civilian
society”); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 385-386, 94 S.Ct. 1160,
1174-1175, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462,
91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971).
We also did not purport to apply strict
scrutiny in several cases in which the
claimants failed to establish a constitution-
ally cognizable burden on religious exer-
cise, and again the opinions in those cases
left no doubt that heightened scrutiny ap-
plies to the enforcement of formally neut-
ral, general laws that do burden free exer-
cise. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S.
378, 384-385, 110 S.Ct. 688, 692-693, 107
L.Ed.2d 796 (1990) (“Our cases have es-
tablished that [t]he free exercise inquiry
asks whether government has placed a sub-
stantial burden on the observation of a
central religious belief or practice and, if
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
so, whether a compelling governmental in-
terest justifies the burden”) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 450, 108 S.Ct. 1319,
1326, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“[T]his
Court has repeatedly held that indirect co-
ercion or penalties on the free exercise of
religion, not just outright prohibitions, are
subject to [the] scrutiny” employed in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct.
1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)); see also
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
606-607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1147-1148, 6
L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion).
Among the cases in which we have purpor-
ted to apply strict scrutiny, we have re-
quired free-exercise exemptions more of-
ten than we have denied them. Compare
Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Se-
curity, 489 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 103
L.Ed.2d 914 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707,
101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct.
1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900,
84 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1940), with Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct.
2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102
S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). And of
the three cases in which we found that
denial of an exemption survived strict
scrutiny (all tax cases), one involved the
government's “fundamental, overriding in-
terest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education,” Bob Jones Univ., supra, 461
U.S., at 604, 103 S.Ct., at 2035; in a
second the Court “doubt[ed] whether the
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alleged burden ... [was] a substantial one,”
Hernandez, supra, 490 U.S., at 699, 109
S.Ct., at 2149; and the Court seemed to be
of the same view in the third, see Lee,
supra, 455 U.S., at 261, n. 12, 102 S.Ct., at
1057, n. 12. These cases, I think, provide
slim grounds for concluding that the Court
has not been true to its word.
B
The Smith rule, in my view, may be reexamined
consistently with principles of stare decisis. To be-
gin with, the Smith rule was not subject to
“full-dress argument” prior to its announcement.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676-677, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 1703, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). The State of Oregon in Smith contended
that its refusal to exempt religious peyote use sur-
vived the strict scrutiny required by “settled free
exercise principles,” inasmuch as the State had “a
compelling interest in regulating” the practice of
peyote use and could not “accommodate the reli-
gious practice without compromising*572 its in-
terest.” Brief for Petitioners in Smith, O.T. 1989,
No. 88-1213, p. 5; see also id., at 5-36; Reply Brief
for Petitioners in Smith, pp. 6-20. Respondents
joined issue on the outcome of strict scrutiny on the
facts before the Court, see Brief for Respondents in
Smith, pp. 14-41, and neither party squarely ad-
dressed the proposition the Court was to embrace,
that the Free Exercise Clause was irrelevant to the
dispute. Sound judicial decisionmaking requires
“both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous de-
fense” of the issues in dispute, Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 98 S.Ct.
694, 699, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), and a constitu-
tional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less
deference than one addressed on full briefing and
argument. Cf. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S.
169, 173, 79 S.Ct. 209, 211, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)
(declining to address “an important and complex”
issue concerning the scope of collateral attack upon
criminal sentences because it had received “only
meagre argument” from the parties, and the Court
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
thought it “should have the benefit of a full argu-
ment before dealing with the question”).
The Smith rule's vitality as precedent is limited fur-
ther by the seeming want of any need of it in
resolving the question presented in that case.
Justice O'CONNOR reached the same result as the
majority by applying, as the parties had requested,
“our established free exercise jurisprudence,” 494
U.S., at 903, 110 S.Ct., at 1613, and the majority
never determined that the case could not be re-
solved on the narrower ground, going instead
straight to the broader constitutional rule. But the
Court's better practice, one supported by the same
principles of restraint that underlie the rule of stare
decisis, is not to “ ‘formulate a rule of constitution-
al law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied.’ ” Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liver-
pool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commis-
sioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352,
355, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885)). While I am not suggest-
ing that the Smith Court lacked the power to an-
nounce its rule, I think a rule of law unnecessary to
the outcome of a case, especially one not put*573
into play by the parties, approaches without more
the sort of “dicta ... which may be followed if suffi-
ciently persuasive but which are not controlling.”
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 627, 55 S.Ct. 869, 873, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935);
see also **2248Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 454-455, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661-1662, 32
L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
I do not, of course, mean to imply that a broad con-
stitutional rule announced without full briefing and
argument necessarily lacks precedential weight.
Over time, such a decision may become “part of the
tissue of the law,” Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 455, 77 S.Ct. 390, 395, 1
L.Ed.2d 456 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
and may be subject to reliance in a way that new
and unexpected decisions are not. Cf. Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 33
505 U.S. 833, 854-855, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120
L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Smith, however, is not such a
case. By the same token, by pointing out Smith's re-
cent vintage I do not mean to suggest that novelty
alone is enough to justify reconsideration. “[S]tare
decisis, ” as Justice Frankfurter wrote, “is a prin-
ciple of policy and not a mechanical formula,”
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct.
444, 451, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940), and the decision
whether to adhere to a prior decision, particularly a
constitutional decision, is a complex and difficult
one that does not lend itself to resolution by applic-
ation of simple, categorical rules, but that must ac-
count for a variety of often competing considera-
tions.
The considerations of full briefing, necessity, and
novelty thus do not exhaust the legitimate reasons
for reexamining prior decisions, or even for reex-
amining the Smith rule. One important further con-
sideration warrants mention here, however, because
it demands the reexamination I have in mind. Smith
presents not the usual question of whether to follow
a constitutional rule, but the question of which con-
stitutional rule to follow, for Smith refrained from
overruling prior free-exercise cases that contain a
free-exercise rule fundamentally at odds with the
rule Smith declared. Smith, indeed, announced its
rule by relying squarely upon*574 the precedent of
prior cases. See 494 U.S., at 878, 110 S.Ct., at 1600
(“Our decisions reveal that the ... reading” of the
Free Exercise Clause contained in the Smith rule “is
the correct one”). Since that precedent is nonethe-
less at odds with the Smith rule, as I have discussed
above, the result is an intolerable tension in free-
exercise law which may be resolved, consistently
with principles of stare decisis, in a case in which
the tension is presented and its resolution pivotal.
While the tension on which I rely exists within the
body of our extant case law, a rereading of that case
law will not, of course, mark the limits of any en-
quiry directed to reexamining the Smith rule, which
should be reviewed in light not only of the preced-
ent on which it was rested but also of the text of the
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
Free Exercise Clause and its origins. As for text,
Smith did not assert that the plain language of the
Free Exercise Clause compelled its rule, but only
that the rule was “a permissible reading” of the
Clause. Ibid. Suffice it to say that a respectable ar-
gument may be made that the pre- Smith law comes
closer to fulfilling the language of the Free Exercise
Clause than the rule Smith announced. “[T]he Free
Exercise Clause ..., by its terms, gives special pro-
tection to the exercise of religion,” Thomas, 450
U.S., at 713, 101 S.Ct., at 1429, specifying an
activity and then flatly protecting it against govern-
ment prohibition. The Clause draws no distinction
between laws whose object is to prohibit religious
exercise and laws with that effect, on its face seem-
ingly applying to both.
Nor did Smith consider the original meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause, though overlooking the op-
portunity was no unique transgression. Save in a
handful of passing remarks, the Court has not ex-
plored the history of the Clause since its early at-
tempts in 1879 and 1890, see Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S., at 162-166, and Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 300, 33 L.Ed. 637
(1890), attempts that recent scholarship makes clear
were incomplete. See generally McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of **2249 Religion,*575 103 Harv.L.Rev.
FN6
1409 (1990). The curious absence of history
from our free-exercise decisions creates a stark
contrast with our cases under the Establishment
Clause, where historical analysis has been so prom-
FN7
inent.
FN6. Reynolds denied the free-exercise
claim of a Mormon convicted of poly-
gamy, and Davis v. Beason upheld against
a free-exercise challenge a law denying the
right to vote or hold public office to mem-
bers of organizations that practice or en-
courage polygamy. Exactly what the two
cases took from the Free Exercise Clause's
origins is unclear. The cases are open to
the reading that the Clause sometimes pro-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 34
tects religious conduct from enforcement
of generally applicable laws, see supra, at
2245-46 (citing cases); that the Clause
never protects religious conduct from the
enforcement of generally applicable laws,
see Smith, 494 U.S., at 879, 110 S.Ct., at
1600; or that the Clause does not protect
religious conduct at all, see Yoder, 406
U.S., at 247, 92 S.Ct., at 1549 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part); McConnell, The Ori-
gins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv.L.Rev.
1409, 1488, and n. 404 (1990).
FN7. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
425-436, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 1264-1270, 8
L.Ed.2d 601 (1962); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 431-443, 81 S.Ct.
1101, 1108-1114, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961);
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330
U.S. 1, 8-16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 508-511, 91
L.Ed. 711 (1947); see also Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 612-616, 622-626, 112 S.Ct.
2649, 2667, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992)
(SOUTER, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107, 105 S.Ct. 2479,
2507-2516, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 232-239, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1576-1581,
10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); McGowan v. Maryland, supra,
366 U.S., at 459-495, 81 S.Ct., at
1153-1172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Everson, supra, 330 U.S., at 31-43, 67
S.Ct., at 519-525 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
This is not the place to explore the history that a
century of free-exercise opinions have overlooked,
and it is enough to note that, when the opportunity
to reexamine Smith presents itself, we may consider
recent scholarship raising serious questions about
the Smith rule's consonance with the original under-
standing and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
See McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, supra;
Durham, Religious Liberty and the Call of Con-
science, 42 DePaul L.Rev. 71, 79-85 (1992); see
also Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Report to the Attorney General, Religious Liberty
under the Free Exercise Clause 38-42 (1986)
(predating Smith ). There appears to be a strong ar-
gument from the*576 Clause's development in the
First Congress, from its origins in the post-
Revolution state constitutions and pre-Revolution
colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights
to which the Framers adhered, that the Clause was
originally understood to preserve a right to engage
in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's
God, unless those activities threatened the rights of
others or the serious needs of the State. If, as this
scholarship suggests, the Free Exercise Clause's
original “purpose [was] to secure religious liberty
in the individual by prohibiting any invasions there-
of by civil authority,” School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S., at 223, 83 S.Ct., at 1572, then
there would be powerful reason to interpret the
Clause to accord with its natural reading, as apply-
ing to all laws prohibiting religious exercise in fact,
not just those aimed at its prohibition, and to hold
the neutrality needed to implement such a purpose
to be the substantive neutrality of our pre- Smith
cases, not the formal neutrality sufficient for consti-
FN8
tutionality under Smith.
FN8. The Court today observes that
“historical instances of religious persecu-
tion and intolerance ... gave concern to
those who drafted the Free Exercise
Clause.” Ante, at 2226 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). That is no
doubt true, and of course it supports the
proposition for which it was summoned,
that the Free Exercise Clause forbids reli-
gious persecution. But the Court's remark
merits this observation: the fact that the
Framers were concerned about victims of
religious persecution by no means demon-
strates that the Framers intended the Free
Exercise Clause to forbid only persecution,
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 35
the inference the Smith rule requires. On
the contrary, the eradication of persecution
would mean precious little to a member of
a formerly persecuted sect who was never-
theless prevented from practicing his reli-
gion by the enforcement of “neutral, gener-
ally applicable” laws. If what drove the
Framers was a desire to protect an activity
they deemed special, and if “the [Framers]
were well aware of potential conflicts
between religious conviction and social
duties,” A. Adams & C. Emmerich, A Na-
tion Dedicated to Religious Liberty 61
(1990), they may well have hoped to bar
not only prohibitions of religious exercise
fueled by the hostility of the majority, but
prohibitions flowing from the indifference
or ignorance of the majority as well.
**2250 *577 The scholarship on the original under-
standing of the Free Exercise Clause is, to be sure,
not uniform. See, e.g., Hamburger, A Constitutional
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Per-
spective, 60 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 915 (1992); Bradley,
Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L.Rev. 245 (1991).
And there are differences of opinion as to the
weight appropriately accorded original meaning.
But whether or not one considers the original
designs of the Clause binding, the interpretive sig-
nificance of those designs surely ranks in the hier-
archy of issues to be explored in resolving the ten-
sion inherent in free-exercise law as it stands today.
III
The extent to which the Free Exercise Clause re-
quires government to refrain from impeding reli-
gious exercise defines nothing less than the respect-
ive relationships in our constitutional democracy of
the individual to government and to God. “Neutral,
generally applicable” laws, drafted as they are from
the perspective of the non-adherent, have the un-
avoidable potential of putting the believer to a
choice between God and government. Our cases
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
now present competing answers to the question
when government, while pursuing secular ends,
may compel disobedience to what one believes reli-
gion commands. The case before us is rightly de-
cided without resolving the existing tension, which
remains for another day when it may be squarely
faced.
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice
O'CONNOR joins, concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds today that the city of Hialeah viol-
ated the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it
passed a set of restrictive ordinances explicitly dir-
ected at petitioners' religious practice. With this
holding I agree. I write separately to emphasize that
the First Amendment's protection of religion ex-
tends beyond those rare occasions on which the
government explicitly targets religion (or a particu-
lar religion)*578 for disfavored treatment, as is
done in this case. In my view, a statute that burdens
the free exercise of religion “may stand only if the
law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a re-
ligious exemption in particular, are justified by a
compelling interest that cannot be served by less re-
strictive means.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907, 110
S.Ct. 1595, 1615, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990)
(dissenting opinion). The Court, however, applies a
different test. It applies the test announced in Smith,
under which “a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incid-
ental effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice.” Ante, at 2226. I continue to believe that Smith
was wrongly decided, because it ignored the value
of religious freedom as an affirmative individual
liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no
more than an antidiscrimination principle. See 494
U.S., at 908-909, 110 S.Ct., at 1616. Thus, while I
agree with the result the Court reaches in this case,
I arrive at that result by a different route.
When the State enacts legislation that intentionally
or unintentionally places a burden upon religiously
motivated practice, it must justify that burden by
“showing that it is the least restrictive means of
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 36
achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67
L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d
15 (1972). A State may no more create an underin-
clusive statute, one **2251 that fails truly to pro-
mote its purported compelling interest, than it may
create an overinclusive statute, one that encom-
passes more protected conduct than necessary to
achieve its goal. In the latter circumstance, the
broad scope of the statute is unnecessary to serve
the interest, and the statute fails for that reason. In
the former situation, the fact that allegedly harmful
conduct falls outside the statute's scope belies a
governmental assertion that it has genuinely pur-
sued an interest “of the highest order.” Ibid. If the
State's goal is important enough to prohibit reli-
giously motivated activity, it*579 will not and must
not stop at religiously motivated activity. Cf. Zab-
locki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390, 98 S.Ct. 673,
683, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (invalidating certain re-
strictions on marriage as “grossly underinclusive
with respect to [their] purpose”); Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285, n. 19, 105 S.Ct.
1272, 1279, n. 19, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (a rule
excluding nonresidents from the bar of New Hamp-
shire “is underinclusive ... because it permits law-
yers who move away from the State to retain their
membership in the bar”).
In this case, the ordinances at issue are both overin-
clusive and underinclusive in relation to the state
interests they purportedly serve. They are overin-
clusive, as the majority correctly explains, because
the “legitimate govern mental interests in protecting
the public health and preventing cruelty to animals
could be addressed by restrictions stopping far
short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial
practice.” Ante, at 2229. They are underinclusive as
well, because “[d]espite the city's proffered interest
in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are
drafted with care to forbid few killings but those
occasioned by religious sacrifice.” Ante, at 2232.
Moreover, the “ordinances are also underinclusive
113 S.Ct. 2217
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61 USLW 4587
(Cite as: 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217)
with regard to the city's interest in public health....”
Ante, at 2233.
When a law discriminates against religion as such,
as do the ordinances in this case, it automatically
will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 407, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793,
1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (holding that govern-
mental regulation that imposes a burden upon reli-
gious practice must be narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling state interest). This is true because a
law that targets religious practice for disfavored
treatment both burdens the free exercise of religion
and, by definition, is not precisely tailored to a
compelling governmental interest.
Thus, unlike the majority, I do not believe that “[a]
law burdening religious practice that is not neutral
or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny.” Ante, at 2233. In my view,
regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso
facto, fails strict scrutiny. It is for this reason*580
that a statute that explicitly restricts religious prac-
tices violates the First Amendment. Otherwise,
however, “[t]he First Amendment ... does not dis-
tinguish between laws that are generally applicable
and laws that target particular religious practices.”
Smith, 494 U.S., at 894, 110 S.Ct., at 1608 (opinion
concurring in judgment).
It is only in the rare case that a state or local legis-
lature will enact a law directly burdening religious
practice as such. See ibid. Because respondent here
does single out religion in this way, the present case
is an easy one to decide.
A harder case would be presented if petitioners
were requesting an exemption from a generally ap-
plicable anticruelty law. The result in the case be-
fore the Court today, and the fact that every Mem-
ber of the Court concurs in that result, does not ne-
cessarily reflect this Court's views of the strength of
a State's interest in prohibiting cruelty to animals.
This case does not present, and I therefore decline
to reach, the question whether the Free Exercise
Clause would require a religious exemption from a
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 37
law that sincerely pursued the goal of protecting an-
imals from cruel treatment. The number of organiz-
ations that have filed amicus briefs **2252 on be-
FN*
half of this interest, however, demonstrates that
it is not a concern to be treated lightly.
FN* See Brief for Washington Humane
Society in support of Respondent; Brief for
People for the Ethical Treatment of Anim-
als, New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance,
and Foundation for Animal Rights Ad-
vocacy in support of Respondent; Brief for
Humane Society of the United States,
American Humane Association, American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, Animal Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., and Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in sup-
port of Respondent; Brief for the Interna-
tional Society for Animal Rights, Citizens
for Animals, Farm Animal Reform Move-
ment, In Defense of Animals, Performing
Animal Welfare Society, and Student Ac-
tion Corps for Animals in support of Re-
spondent; and Brief for the Institute for
Animal Rights Law, American Fund for
Alternatives to Animal Research, Farm
Sanctuary, Jews for Animal Rights, United
Animal Nations, and United Poultry Con-
cerns in support of Respondent.
U.S.Fla.,1993.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah
508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 61
USLW 4587
END OF DOCUMENT